Encore 401

再来一次

Jacques Lacan
雅克 拉岡

On the Baroque 01
论巴洛克风格

I think of you (je pense a vous). That does not mean that I conceptualize you ( ye vous
pense).

我想到你。这並不意味着，我将你概念化。

Perhaps someone here remembers that I once spoke of a language in which one would
say, “ I love to you” ( j’amie a vous), that language modeling itself better than others
on the indirect character of that attack called love.

或许，这里的每个人都还记得，我有一次提到有一种语言，在那种语言里，我
们将会说，「我爱、对於你而言」。那种语言比起其它语言，更能够模拟自己，因
为它谈到爱的来临，是以间接提到的特性。

‘ I think of you” (Je pense a vous) already constitutes a clear objection to everything
that could be called ‘ human sciences’ in a certain conception of science—not the
kind that was defined in a certain way with Aristotle. The consequence is that one
must wonder, regarding the crux ( principe) of what analytic discourse has
contributed, by what pathways the new science that is ours can proceed.

「我想到你」这一句话已经形成显而易见的反对，对於科学的某种概念，在我们
所谓的「人类的科学」里，但不是亚里斯多德以某种方式所定义的那种。结果是
我们好奇地想要知道，既然精神分析学已经贡献转变的关键，属於我们的新科
学，要朝怎样的途径前进？

That implies that I first formulate where we are starting from. We are starting from
what analytic discourse provides us, namely, the unconscious. That is why I will first
refine for you a few formulations that are a bit tough going concerning where the
unconscious stands with respect to traditional science. That will lead me to raise the
following question: how is a science still possible after what can be said about the
unconscious?

那暗示着，我将首先构想我们现在要从那里讲起。我们将从精神分析学所提供给
我们的内容讲起，换句话说，从无意识讲起。那就是为什麽，我将替你们澄清几
个难於理解的构想，关於就传统的科学而言，无意识的立场在哪里。那将会引导
我提出以下的问题：对於无意识的存在，我们既然已经确定，那科学怎麽还可
能成立？

I will announce to you already that, as surprising as it may seem, that will lead me to
talk to you today about Christianity.

我已经跟你们宣佈过了，虽然听起来有一点奇怪，它引导我今天要谈论的问题
是关於基督教。

I will begin with my difficult formulations, or at least I assume they must be difficult:
“ The unconscious is not the fact that being thinks”—though that is implied by what is
said thereof in traditional science—“ the unconscious is the fact that being, by
speaking, enjoys, and,” I will add, “ wants to know nothing more about it.” I will add
that means “ know nothing about it at all.”

我将从我最困难的构想开始，或至少我以为这是最困难的构想：「无意识並不是
人类会思想的事实。」虽然那句话的前提暗含着传统的科学的内涵：「无意识是
人类在言谈中自得其乐的事实，」我再加上：「可是，人类对於这个事实，却不
想弄得更清楚。」我再加上解释：「人类对於这个事实，完全一无所知。」

To immediately show you a card I could have made you wait a little while for—“
there’s no such thing as a desire to know,” that famous Wissentrieb Freud points to
somewhere.

我本来想要让你们先等待一段时间，再给你们观看这一张纸牌的内容：「渴望要
知道这一回事，根本不存在。」佛洛伊德所指的「追求真理的欲望」是运用在别的
地方。

Freud contradicts himself there. Everything indicates—that is the meaning of the

unconscious—not only that man already knows all he needs to know, but that this
knowledge is utterly and completely limited to that insufficient joussance constituted
by the fact that he speaks.

佛洛伊德在这里自相矛盾。每一样东西都指示（那就是无意识的意义），不但人
类已经知道了他所需要知道的东西，而且他还要洋洋自得地言谈出来，而不在
乎自己的这种知道是井底之蛙的局限。

You see that that implies a question regarding the status of the actual science we
clearly possess that goes by the name of a physics. In what sense does this new
science concern the real? The problem with the kind of science I qualify as traditional,
because it comes to us from Aristotle’s thought, is that it implies that what is thought
of ( le pense) is in the image of thought, in other words, that being thinks.

你们明白，那意味着一个问题，关於我们显而易见已经拥有的实际科学，例如
物理学，它的地位在哪里？这门新的科学，相对於精神分析学的真实界，它有
何意义？我将这种科学的问题，定位为传统的科学，因为它从亚里斯多德的思
想一脉相传。它暗示着，一切被思想到的东西，都是以思想的意象，换句话说，
是人类在思想。

To take an example that is close to home for you, I will state that what makes what we
call “ human relations” bearable is not thinking about them.

举一个你们耳熟能详的例子。容我这样说，我们能够容忍所谓的「人际关系」，
是因为我们没有去思考到它们。

It is on that point that what is comically called “ behaviorism” is ultimately based—

behavior, according to behaviorism can be observed in such a way that it is clarified
by its end. People hoped to found human sciences thereupon, encompassing all
behavior, there being no intention of any subject presupposed therein. On the basis of
a finality posited as the object of that behavior, nothing is easier—that object having
its own regulation—than to imagine it in the nervous system.

这就是荒谬绝伦的所谓「行为主义」最终的理论依据。依据行为主义的说法，人
类的行为能够被观察，最后能够被弄得一目了然。人们因此想創建各种人文科学
涵盖一切人类的行为，在那里，被预先假设的人作为生命的主体，不再有任何
意图不被观察到。最后，人类一但被提出的假设，是作为那个行为的客体，那个
客体有它自己的规则，那麽最容易做的事，就是从人类的神经系统去想像它。

The hitch is that behaviorism does nothing more than inject therein everything that
has been elaborated philosophically, ‘ Aristotlely,” concerning the soul. And thus
nothing changes. That is borne out by the fact that behaviorism has not, to the best of
knowledge, distinguished itself by any radical change in ethics, in other words, in
mental habits, in the fundamental habit. Man, being but an object, serves an end. He is
founded on the basis of his final cause—regardless of what we may think, it’s still
there—which, in this case, is to live or, more precisely, to survive, in other words, to
postpone death and dominate his rival.

问题是，对於人的灵魂，行为主义仅仅投射自己在哲学上，「亚里斯多德思想」
所精心构想的一切。然后，一切都不会再改变。这种事实彰彰明甚，据我们所知
行为主义对於人的伦理道德，始终没有提出任何創新的改变，换句话说，对於
人的思维习惯，对於人的「最基本的习惯」。人作为生命的主体，却被行为主义
视为一个客体，充当被利用的工具。人的价值因此被建立在他最后的目标，不管
我们内心怎麽想，那个目标就是在那里：在这种情形下，人就是要活下去，更
準确地说，就是要生存下去，换句话说，就是好死不如歹活，而且还要处处利
用别人。

It is clear that the number of thoughts implicit in such a world view, such a “
Weltanschauung” as they say, is utterly incalculable. What is at stake is the constant
equation of thought and that which is thought of.

显而易见的，这样一种世界观，或如他们所说的，这样一种人生观，暗含着各
种奇形怪状的思想，是完全罄笔难书。最岌岌可危的地方是，主观性的思想不断
地被充当着被动性的思想看待。

What is clearest about traditional science’s way of thinking is what is called its “
classicism”—namely, the Aristotelian reign of the class, that is, of the genus and the
species, in other words, of the individual considered as specified. It is also the
aesthetic that results there from, and the ethics that is ordained thereby. I qill qualify
that ethics in a simple way, an overly simple way that risks making you see red, that’s
the word for it, but you would be wrong to see too quickly—“ thought is on the
winning side ( du cote du manche), and that which is thought of is on the other side,”
which can be read in the fact that the winner is speech—only speech explains and
justifies ( rend raison).

关於传统的科学的思想方式，最显而易见的，是我们所谓的「古典主义」。换句
话说，亚里斯多德对於分类的支配，也就是，对於物种及品种的支配，换言之，
个体被当着具有明确特癥来看待。从这里，产生了人的美学观念，以及从这里制
定了人的伦理学。我用一个简单的方式，来说明那个伦理学，但是过分简化，又
担心引起你们的拂然不悦，问题就在这里，但是你们若是太匆促下定论，也会
犯下错误：「思想是在胜利者的这一边，而被人言说认为则是在输者的那一
边。」我们也可以读成以下的事实：胜利者的这一边拥有言谈的权力，只有言谈
才能解释，才能证明自己是有道理。

In that sense, behaviorism does not leave behind the classical. It is the said winner (
dit-manche)—the Sunday ( dimanche) of life, as Queneau says, not without at the
same time revealing therein being as abased.

以那种意义来说，行为主义並没有脱离古典主义。如哲学家奎那所说，被言说的
胜利者的那一边，享有生活中星期日休息的权利。言下之意，显示出被言说的胜
利者，本身不无谦卑之意。

It’s not obvious at first. But what I will point out is that Sunday was read and
approved of by someone who, in the history of thought, knew quite a bit, namely,
kojeve, and who recognized in it nothing less than absolute knowledge such as it is
promised to us by Hegel.

这个现象起初没有很明显。但是，我要指出来的是，在思想史上，有一位学识渊
博的学者，也就是柯爵比，看出星期日作为安息日的奥秘，並且坦然接受。他认
出，那道道地地就是黑格尔所许诺给我们的主人真理的绝对知识：未来的理想
世界。

雄伯译
springherohsiung@gmail.com