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ow residing at No. 665 Rodger possessed at my death and which may have
SUPREME COURT Young Village, Los Angeles, California, come to me from any source whatsoever,
Manila U.S.A. during her lifetime: ....
EN BANC 4. I further declare that I now have no living It is in accordance with the above-quoted provisions
ascendants, and no descendants except my that the executor in his final account and project of
G.R. No. L-16749 January 31, 1963 above named daughter, MARIA LUCY partition ratified the payment of only P3,600 to Helen
CHRISTENSEN DANEY. Christensen Garcia and proposed that the residue of
IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF the estate be transferred to his daughter, Maria Lucy
EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN, DECEASED. xxx xxx xxx Christensen.
ADOLFO C. AZNAR, Executor and LUCY
CHRISTENSEN, Heir of the deceased, Executor and 7. I give, devise and bequeath unto MARIA Opposition to the approval of the project of partition
Heir-appellees, HELEN CHRISTENSEN, now married to was filed by Helen Christensen Garcia, insofar as it
vs. Eduardo Garcia, about eighteen years of age deprives her (Helen) of her legitime as an
HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA, oppositor- and who, notwithstanding the fact that she acknowledged natural child, she having been
appellant. was baptized Christensen, is not in any way declared by Us in G.R. Nos. L-11483-84 an
related to me, nor has she been at any time acknowledged natural child of the deceased Edward
M. R. Sotelo for executor and heir-appellees. adopted by me, and who, from all E. Christensen. The legal grounds of opposition are
Leopoldo M. Abellera and Jovito Salonga for information I have now resides in Egpit, (a) that the distribution should be governed by the
oppositor-appellant. Digos, Davao, Philippines, the sum of laws of the Philippines, and (b) that said order of
THREE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED distribution is contrary thereto insofar as it denies to
PESOS (P3,600.00), Philippine Currency the Helen Christensen, one of two acknowledged natural
LABRADOR, J.:
same to be deposited in trust for the said children, one-half of the estate in full ownership. In
Maria Helen Christensen with the Davao amplification of the above grounds it was alleged that
This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First the law that should govern the estate of the deceased
Branch of the Philippine National Bank, and
Instance of Davao, Hon. Vicente N. Cusi, Jr., Christensen should not be the internal law of
paid to her at the rate of One Hundred Pesos
presiding, in Special Proceeding No. 622 of said California alone, but the entire law thereof because
(P100.00), Philippine Currency per month
court, dated September 14, 1949, approving among several foreign elements are involved, that the forum
until the principal thereof as well as any
things the final accounts of the executor, directing the is the Philippines and even if the case were decided
interest which may have accrued thereon, is
executor to reimburse Maria Lucy Christensen the in California, Section 946 of the California Civil Code,
exhausted..
amount of P3,600 paid by her to Helen Christensen which requires that the domicile of the decedent
Garcia as her legacy, and declaring Maria Lucy should apply, should be applicable. It was also
Christensen entitled to the residue of the property to xxx xxx xxx
alleged that Maria Helen Christensen having been
be enjoyed during her lifetime, and in case of death declared an acknowledged natural child of the
without issue, one-half of said residue to be payable 12. I hereby give, devise and bequeath, unto
decedent, she is deemed for all purposes legitimate
to Mrs. Carrie Louise C. Borton, etc., in accordance my well-beloved daughter, the said MARIA
from the time of her birth.
with the provisions of the will of the testator Edward E. LUCY CHRISTENSEN DANEY (Mrs.
Christensen. The will was executed in Manila on Bernard Daney), now residing as aforesaid
at No. 665 Rodger Young Village, Los The court below ruled that as Edward E. Christensen
March 5, 1951 and contains the following provisions:
Angeles, California, U.S.A., all the income was a citizen of the United States and of the State of
from the rest, remainder, and residue of my California at the time of his death, the successional
3. I declare ... that I have but ONE (1) child, rights and intrinsic validity of the provisions in his will
named MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN (now property and estate, real, personal and/or
mixed, of whatsoever kind or character, and are to be governed by the law of California, in
Mrs. Bernard Daney), who was born in the accordance with which a testator has the right to
Philippines about twenty-eight years ago, wheresoever situated, of which I may be
dispose of his property in the way he desires, THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING to his own country, and came back to the
because the right of absolute dominion over his THAT THE SCHEDULE OF DISTRIBUTION Philippines the following year, 1939.
property is sacred and inviolable (In re McDaniel's SUBMITTED BY THE EXECUTOR IS CONTRARY
Estate, 77 Cal. Appl. 2d 877, 176 P. 2d 952, and In re TO THE PHILIPPINE LAWS. Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that
Kaufman, 117 Cal. 286, 49 Pac. 192, cited in page the foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted
179, Record on Appeal). Oppositor Maria Helen V and approved by this Honorable Court,
Christensen, through counsel, filed various motions without prejudice to the parties adducing
for reconsideration, but these were denied. Hence, THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING other evidence to prove their case not
this appeal. THAT UNDER THE PHILIPPINE LAWS HELEN covered by this stipulation of
CHRISTENSEN GARCIA IS ENTITLED TO ONE- facts. 1wph1.t
The most important assignments of error are as HALF (1/2) OF THE ESTATE IN FULL OWNERSHIP.
follows: Being an American citizen, Mr. Christensen
There is no question that Edward E. Christensen was was interned by the Japanese Military
I a citizen of the United States and of the State of Forces in the Philippines during World War
California at the time of his death. But there is also no II. Upon liberation, in April 1945, he left for
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN IGNORING THE question that at the time of his death he was the United States but returned to the
DECISION OF THE HONORABLE SUPREME domiciled in the Philippines, as witness the following Philippines in December, 1945. Appellees
COURT THAT HELEN IS THE ACKNOWLEDGED facts admitted by the executor himself in appellee's Collective Exhibits "6", CFI Davao, Sp. Proc.
NATURAL CHILD OF EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN brief: 622, as Exhibits "AA", "BB" and "CC-Daney";
AND, CONSEQUENTLY, IN DEPRIVING HER OF Exhs. "MM", "MM-l", "MM-2-Daney" and p.
HER JUST SHARE IN THE INHERITANCE. In the proceedings for admission of the will 473, t.s.n., July 21, 1953.)
to probate, the facts of record show that the
II deceased Edward E. Christensen was born In April, 1951, Edward E. Christensen
on November 29, 1875 in New York City, returned once more to California shortly after
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ENTIRELY N.Y., U.S.A.; his first arrival in the the making of his last will and testament
IGNORING AND/OR FAILING TO RECOGNIZE THE Philippines, as an appointed school teacher, (now in question herein) which he executed
EXISTENCE OF SEVERAL FACTORS, ELEMENTS was on July 1, 1901, on board the U.S. Army at his lawyers' offices in Manila on March 5,
AND CIRCUMSTANCES CALLING FOR THE Transport "Sheridan" with Port of 1951. He died at the St. Luke's Hospital in
APPLICATION OF INTERNAL LAW. Embarkation as the City of San Francisco, in the City of Manila on April 30, 1953. (pp. 2-3)
the State of California, U.S.A. He stayed in
III the Philippines until 1904. In arriving at the conclusion that the domicile of the
deceased is the Philippines, we are persuaded by the
In December, 1904, Mr. Christensen fact that he was born in New York, migrated to
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO
returned to the United States and stayed California and resided there for nine years, and since
RECOGNIZE THAT UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW,
there for the following nine years until 1913, he came to the Philippines in 1913 he returned to
PARTICULARLY UNDER THE RENVOI DOCTRINE,
during which time he resided in, and was California very rarely and only for short visits (perhaps
THE INTRINSIC VALIDITY OF THE
teaching school in Sacramento, California. to relatives), and considering that he appears never to
TESTAMENTARY DISPOSITION OF THE
have owned or acquired a home or properties in that
DISTRIBUTION OF THE ESTATE OF THE
Mr. Christensen's next arrival in the state, which would indicate that he would ultimately
DECEASED EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN SHOULD
Philippines was in July of the year 1913. abandon the Philippines and make home in the State
BE GOVERNED BY THE LAWS OF THE
However, in 1928, he again departed the of California.
PHILIPPINES.
Philippines for the United States and came
back here the following year, 1929. Some Sec. 16. Residence is a term used with
IV
nine years later, in 1938, he again returned many shades of meaning from mere
temporary presence to the most permanent place and also an intention to make it one's the executor-appellee that under the California
abode. Generally, however, it is used to domicile." Residence, however, is a term Probate Code, a testator may dispose of his property
denote something more than mere physical used with many shades of meaning, from the by will in the form and manner he desires, citing the
presence. (Goodrich on Conflict of Laws, p. merest temporary presence to the most case of Estate of McDaniel, 77 Cal. Appl. 2d 877, 176
29) permanent abode, and it is not safe to insist P. 2d 952. But appellant invokes the provisions of
that any one use et the only proper one. Article 946 of the Civil Code of California, which is as
As to his citizenship, however, We find that the (Goodrich, p. 29) follows:
citizenship that he acquired in California when he
resided in Sacramento, California from 1904 to 1913, The law that governs the validity of his testamentary If there is no law to the contrary, in the place
was never lost by his stay in the Philippines, for the dispositions is defined in Article 16 of the Civil Code of where personal property is situated, it is
latter was a territory of the United States (not a state) the Philippines, which is as follows: deemed to follow the person of its owner,
until 1946 and the deceased appears to have and is governed by the law of his domicile.
considered himself as a citizen of California by the ART. 16. Real property as well as personal
fact that when he executed his will in 1951 he property is subject to the law of the country The existence of this provision is alleged in
declared that he was a citizen of that State; so that he where it is situated. appellant's opposition and is not denied. We have
appears never to have intended to abandon his checked it in the California Civil Code and it is there.
California citizenship by acquiring another. This However, intestate and testamentary Appellee, on the other hand, relies on the case cited
conclusion is in accordance with the following successions, both with respect to the order in the decision and testified to by a witness. (Only the
principle expounded by Goodrich in his Conflict of of succession and to the amount of case of Kaufman is correctly cited.) It is argued on
Laws. successional rights and to the intrinsic executor's behalf that as the deceased Christensen
validity of testamentary provisions, shall be was a citizen of the State of California, the internal
The terms "'residence" and "domicile" might regulated by the national law of the person law thereof, which is that given in the abovecited
well be taken to mean the same thing, a whose succession is under consideration, case, should govern the determination of the validity
place of permanent abode. But domicile, as whatever may be the nature of the property of the testamentary provisions of Christensen's will,
has been shown, has acquired a technical and regardless of the country where said such law being in force in the State of California of
meaning. Thus one may be domiciled in a property may be found. which Christensen was a citizen. Appellant, on the
place where he has never been. And he may other hand, insists that Article 946 should be
reside in a place where he has no domicile. The application of this article in the case at bar applicable, and in accordance therewith and following
The man with two homes, between which he requires the determination of the meaning of the the doctrine of the renvoi, the question of the validity
divides his time, certainly resides in each term "national law" is used therein. of the testamentary provision in question should be
one, while living in it. But if he went on referred back to the law of the decedent's domicile,
business which would require his presence which is the Philippines.
There is no single American law governing the validity
for several weeks or months, he might
of testamentary provisions in the United States, each
properly be said to have sufficient The theory of doctrine of renvoi has been defined by
state of the Union having its own private law
connection with the place to be called a various authors, thus:
applicable to its citizens only and in force only within
resident. It is clear, however, that, if he
the state. The "national law" indicated in Article 16 of
treated his settlement as continuing only for The problem has been stated in this way:
the Civil Code above quoted can not, therefore,
the particular business in hand, not giving up "When the Conflict of Laws rule of the forum
possibly mean or apply to any general American law.
his former "home," he could not be a refers a jural matter to a foreign law for
So it can refer to no other than the private law of the
domiciled New Yorker. Acquisition of a decision, is the reference to the purely
State of California.
domicile of choice requires the exercise of internal rules of law of the foreign system;
intention as well as physical presence. i.e., to the totality of the foreign law minus its
"Residence simply requires bodily presence The next question is: What is the law in California
governing the disposition of personal property? The Conflict of Laws rules?"
of an inhabitant in a given place, while
domicile requires bodily presence in that decision of the court below, sustains the contention of
On logic, the solution is not an easy one. The though the courts would switch with respect action: (a) either to apply the French law is to
Michigan court chose to accept the renvoi, to which would hold liability, if both courts intestate succession, or (b) to resolve itself
that is, applied the Conflict of Laws rule of accepted the renvoi. into a French court and apply the
Illinois which referred the matter back to Massachusetts statute of distributions, on
Michigan law. But once having determined The Restatement accepts the renvoi theory the assumption that this is what a French
the the Conflict of Laws principle is the rule in two instances: where the title to land is in court would do. If it accepts the so-
looked to, it is difficult to see why the question, and where the validity of a decree called renvoi doctrine, it will follow the latter
reference back should not have been to of divorce is challenged. In these cases the course, thus applying its own law.
Michigan Conflict of Laws. This would have Conflict of Laws rule of the situs of the land,
resulted in the "endless chain of references" or the domicile of the parties in the divorce This is one type of renvoi. A jural matter is
which has so often been criticized be legal case, is applied by the forum, but any further presented which the conflict-of-laws rule of
writers. The opponents of the renvoi would reference goes only to the internal law. Thus, the forum refers to a foreign law, the conflict-
have looked merely to the internal law of a person's title to land, recognized by the of-laws rule of which, in turn, refers the
Illinois, thus rejecting the renvoi or the situs, will be recognized by every court; and matter back again to the law of the forum.
reference back. Yet there seems no every divorce, valid by the domicile of the This is renvoi in the narrower sense. The
compelling logical reason why the original parties, will be valid everywhere. (Goodrich, German term for this judicial process is
reference should be the internal law rather Conflict of Laws, Sec. 7, pp. 13-14.) 'Ruckverweisung.'" (Harvard Law Review,
than to the Conflict of Laws rule. It is true Vol. 31, pp. 523-571.)
that such a solution avoids going on a merry- X, a citizen of Massachusetts, dies intestate,
go-round, but those who have accepted domiciled in France, leaving movable After a decision has been arrived at that a
the renvoi theory avoid this inextricabilis property in Massachusetts, England, and foreign law is to be resorted to as governing
circulas by getting off at the second France. The question arises as to how this a particular case, the further question may
reference and at that point applying internal property is to be distributed among X's next arise: Are the rules as to the conflict of laws
law. Perhaps the opponents of the renvoi are of kin. contained in such foreign law also to be
a bit more consistent for they look always to resorted to? This is a question which, while it
internal law as the rule of reference. has been considered by the courts in but a
Assume (1) that this question arises in a
Massachusetts court. There the rule of the few instances, has been the subject of
Strangely enough, both the advocates for conflict of laws as to intestate succession to frequent discussion by textwriters and
and the objectors to the renvoi plead that movables calls for an application of the law essayists; and the doctrine involved has
greater uniformity will result from adoption of of the deceased's last domicile. Since by been descriptively designated by them as
their respective views. And still more strange hypothesis X's last domicile was France, the the "Renvoyer" to send back, or the
is the fact that the only way to achieve natural thing for the Massachusetts court to "Ruchversweisung", or the
uniformity in this choice-of-law problem is if do would be to turn to French statute of "Weiterverweisung", since an affirmative
in the dispute the two states whose laws distributions, or whatever corresponds answer to the question postulated and the
form the legal basis of the litigation disagree thereto in French law, and decree a operation of the adoption of the foreign law
as to whether the renvoi should be accepted. distribution accordingly. An examination of in toto would in many cases result in
If both reject, or both accept the doctrine, the French law, however, would show that if a returning the main controversy to be decided
result of the litigation will vary with the choice French court were called upon to determine according to the law of the forum. ... (16
of the forum. In the case stated above, had how this property should be distributed, it C.J.S. 872.)
the Michigan court rejected the renvoi, would refer the distribution to the national
judgment would have been against the law of the deceased, thus applying the Another theory, known as the "doctrine
woman; if the suit had been brought in the Massachusetts statute of distributions. So on of renvoi", has been advanced. The theory of
Illinois courts, and they too rejected the surface of things the Massachusetts the doctrine of renvoi is that the court of the
the renvoi, judgment would be for the court has open to it alternative course of forum, in determining the question before it,
woman. The same result would happen,
must take into account the whole law of the place where the act in question property, the law of the state where he was
other jurisdiction, but also its rules as to occurred. domiciled at the time of his death will be
conflict of laws, and then apply the law to the looked to in deciding legal questions about
actual question which the rules of the other (b) The decision of two or more the will, almost as completely as the law of
jurisdiction prescribe. This may be the law of foreign systems of law, provided it situs is consulted in questions about the
the forum. The doctrine of the renvoi has be certain that one of them is devise of land. It is logical that, since the
generally been repudiated by the American necessarily competent, which agree domiciliary rules control devolution of the
authorities. (2 Am. Jur. 296) in attributing the determination of a personal estate in case of intestate
question to the same system of law. succession, the same rules should
The scope of the theory of renvoi has also been determine the validity of an attempted
defined and the reasons for its application in a country xxx xxx xxx testamentary dispostion of the property.
explained by Prof. Lorenzen in an article in the Yale Here, also, it is not that the domiciliary has
Law Journal, Vol. 27, 1917-1918, pp. 529-531. The effect beyond the borders of the domiciliary
If, for example, the English law directs its
pertinent parts of the article are quoted herein below: state. The rules of the domicile are
judge to distribute the personal estate of an
recognized as controlling by the Conflict of
Englishman who has died domiciled in
The recognition of the renvoi theory implies Laws rules at the situs property, and the
Belgium in accordance with the law of his
that the rules of the conflict of laws are to be reason for the recognition as in the case of
domicile, he must first inquire whether the
understood as incorporating not only the intestate succession, is the general
law of Belgium would distribute personal
ordinary or internal law of the foreign state or convenience of the doctrine. The New York
property upon death in accordance with the
country, but its rules of the conflict of laws as court has said on the point: 'The general
law of domicile, and if he finds that the
well. According to this theory 'the law of a principle that a dispostiton of a personal
Belgian law would make the distribution in
country' means the whole of its law. property, valid at the domicile of the owner, is
accordance with the law of nationality that
valid anywhere, is one of the universal
is the English law he must accept this
application. It had its origin in that
xxx xxx xxx reference back to his own law.
international comity which was one of the
first fruits of civilization, and it this age, when
Von Bar presented his views at the meeting We note that Article 946 of the California Civil Code is business intercourse and the process of
of the Institute of International Law, at its conflict of laws rule, while the rule applied in In re accumulating property take but little notice of
Neuchatel, in 1900, in the form of the Kaufman, Supra, its internal law. If the law on boundary lines, the practical wisdom and
following theses: succession and the conflict of laws rules of California justice of the rule is more apparent than
are to be enforced jointly, each in its own intended ever. (Goodrich, Conflict of Laws, Sec. 164,
(1) Every court shall observe the law of its and appropriate sphere, the principle cited In re pp. 442-443.)
country as regards the application of foreign Kaufman should apply to citizens living in the State,
laws. but Article 946 should apply to such of its citizens as
Appellees argue that what Article 16 of the Civil Code
are not domiciled in California but in other
of the Philippines pointed out as the national law is
(2) Provided that no express provision to the jurisdictions. The rule laid down of resorting to the law
the internal law of California. But as above explained
contrary exists, the court shall respect: of the domicile in the determination of matters with
the laws of California have prescribed two sets of
foreign element involved is in accord with the general
laws for its citizens, one for residents therein and
principle of American law that the domiciliary law
(a) The provisions of a foreign law another for those domiciled in other jurisdictions.
should govern in most matters or rights which follow
which disclaims the right to bind its Reason demands that We should enforce the
the person of the owner.
nationals abroad as regards their California internal law prescribed for its citizens
personal statute, and desires that residing therein, and enforce the conflict of laws rules
said personal statute shall be When a man dies leaving personal property for the citizens domiciled abroad. If we must enforce
determined by the law of the in one or more states, and leaves a will the law of California as in comity we are bound to go,
domicile, or even by the law of the directing the manner of distribution of the as so declared in Article 16 of our Civil Code, then we
must enforce the law of California in accordance with not appear to be a citizen of a state in the United
the express mandate thereof and as above explained, States but with domicile in the Philippines, and it does
i.e., apply the internal law for residents therein, and its not appear in each case that there exists in the state
conflict-of-laws rule for those domiciled abroad. of which the subject is a citizen, a law similar to or
identical with Art. 946 of the California Civil Code.
It is argued on appellees' behalf that the clause "if
there is no law to the contrary in the place where the We therefore find that as the domicile of the deceased
property is situated" in Sec. 946 of the California Civil Christensen, a citizen of California, is the Philippines,
Code refers to Article 16 of the Civil Code of the the validity of the provisions of his will depriving his
Philippines and that the law to the contrary in the acknowledged natural child, the appellant, should be
Philippines is the provision in said Article 16 that governed by the Philippine Law, the domicile,
the national law of the deceased should govern. This pursuant to Art. 946 of the Civil Code of California, not
contention can not be sustained. As explained in the by the internal law of California..
various authorities cited above the national law
mentioned in Article 16 of our Civil Code is the law on WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby
conflict of laws in the California Civil Code, i.e., Article reversed and the case returned to the lower court with
946, which authorizes the reference or return of the instructions that the partition be made as the
question to the law of the testator's domicile. The Philippine law on succession provides. Judgment
conflict of laws rule in California, Article 946, Civil reversed, with costs against appellees.
Code, precisely refers back the case, when a
decedent is not domiciled in California, to the law of
his domicile, the Philippines in the case at bar. The
court of the domicile can not and should not refer the
case back to California; such action would leave the
issue incapable of determination because the case
will then be like a football, tossed back and forth
between the two states, between the country of which
the decedent was a citizen and the country of his
domicile. The Philippine court must apply its own law
as directed in the conflict of laws rule of the state of
the decedent, if the question has to be decided,
especially as the application of the internal law of
California provides no legitime for children while the
Philippine law, Arts. 887(4) and 894, Civil Code of the
Philippines, makes natural children legally
acknowledged forced heirs of the parent recognizing
them.
The naturalization laws of the United States require, The due execution of a will involves conditions As was said by this court in the case of Banco
as a condition precedent to the granting of the relating to a number of matters, such as the age and Espaol-Filipino vs. Palanca (37 Phil. Rep., 921),
certificate of naturalization, that the applicant should mental capacity of the testator, the signing of the "There is no principle of law better settled than that
have resided at least five years in the United States document by the testator, or by someone in his after jurisdiction has once been acquired, every act of
and for one year within the State or territory where the behalf, and the acknowledgment of the instrument by a court of general jurisdiction shall be presumed to
court granting the naturalization papers is held; and in him in the presence of the required number of have been rightly done. This rule is applied to every
the absence of clear proof to the contrary it should be witnesses who affix their signatures to the will to attest judgment or decree rendered in the various stages of
presumed that a person naturalized in a court of a the act. The proof of all these requisites is involved in the proceedings from their initiation to their
certain State thereby becomes a citizen of that State the probate; and as to each and all of them the completion (Voorhees vs. United States Bank, 10
as well as of the United States. probate is conclusive. (Castaeda vs. Alemany, 3 Pet., 314; 35 U. S., 449); and if the record is silent
Phil. Rep., 426; Pimentel vs. Palanca, 5 Phil. Rep., with respect to any fact which must have established
436; Chiong Joc-Soy vs. Vao, 8 Phil. Rep., 119; before the court could have rightly acted, it will be
In this connection it should be remembered that the
Sanchez vs. Pascual, 11 Phil. Rep., 395; presumed that such fact was properly brought to its
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the
Montaano vs. Suesa, 14 Phil. Rep., 676.) knowledge."
United States declares, in its opening words, that all
persons naturalized in the United States, and subject
to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United Our reported cases do not contain the slightest The Court of First Instance is a court of original and
States and of the State wherein they reside. intimation that a will which has been probated general jurisdiction; and there is no difference in its
according to law, and without fraud, can be annulled, faculties in this respect whether exercised in matters
in any other proceeding whatever, on account of any of probate or exerted in ordinary contentious litigation.
The trial court therefore necessarily had the power to The principal controversy is over the citizenship of the This is in accordance with that provision of the
determine the facts upon which the propriety of testator. The evidence adduced upon this point in the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the
admitting the will to probate depended; and the recital trial court consists of the certificate of naturalization United States which says that every citizen of the
of those facts in the judgment was probably not granted upon January 10, 1903, in the Circuit Court of United States is a citizen of the State where in he
essential to its validity. No express ruling is, however, Cook County, Illinois, in connection with certain resides. The effect of this provision necessarily is that
necessary on this point. biographical facts contained in the oral evidence. The a person transferring his domicile from one State to
certificate of naturalization supplies incontrovertible another loses his citizenship in the State of his
What has been said effectually disposes of the proof that upon the date stated the testator became a original above upon acquiring citizenship in the State
petition considered in its aspect as an attack upon the citizen of the United States, and inferentially also a of his new abode. The acquisition of the new State
order of probate for error apparent on the face of the citizen of said State. In the testimony submitted to the citizenship extinguishes the old. That situation, in our
record. But the petitioner seeks to have the judgment trial court it appears that, when Johnson first came to opinion, has no analogy to that which arises when a
reviewed, it being asserted that the findings of the trial the United States as a boy, he took up his abode in citizen of an American State comes to reside in the
court especially on the question of the citizenship the State of Illinois and there remained until he came Philippine Islands. Here he cannot acquire a new
of the testator are not supported by the evidence. It as a soldier in the United States Army to the citizenship; nor by the mere change of domicile does
needs but a moment's reflection, however, to show Philippine Islands. Although he remained in these he lose that which he brought with him.
that in such a proceeding as this it is not possible to Islands for sometime after receiving his discharge, no
reverse the original order on the ground that the evidence was adduced showing that at the time he The proof adduced before the trial court must
findings of the trial court are unsupported by the proof returned to the United States, in the autumn of 1902, therefore be taken as showing that, at the time the will
adduced before that court. The only proceeding in he had then abandoned Illinois as the State of his was executed, the testator was, as stated in the order
which a review of the evidence can be secured is by permanent domicile, and on the contrary the of probate, a citizen of the State of Illinois. This, in
appeal, and the case is not before us upon appeal certificate of naturalization itself recites that at that connection with the circumstance that the petition
from the original order admitting the will to probate. time he claimed to be a resident of Illinois. does not even so much as deny such citizenship but
The present proceedings by petition to set aside the only asserts that the testator was a resident of the
order of probate, and the appeal herein is from the Now, if upon January 10, 1903, the testator became a Philippine Islands, demonstrates the impossibility of
order denying this relief. It is obvious that on appeal citizen of the United States and of the State of Illinois, setting the probate aside for lack of the necessary
from an order refusing to vacate a judgment it is not how has he lost the character of citizen with respect citizenship on the part of the testator. As already
possible to review the evidence upon which the to either of these jurisdictions? There is no law in observed, the allegation of the petition on this point is
original judgment was based. To permit this would force by virtue of which any person of foreign nativity wholly insufficient to justify any relief whatever.
operate unduly to protract the right of appeal. can become a naturalized citizen of the Philippine
Islands; and it was, therefore, impossible for the Upon the other point as to whether the will was
However, for the purpose of arriving at a just testator, even if he had so desired, to expatriate executed in conformity with the statutes of the State
conception of the case from the point of view of the himself from the United States and change his of Illinois we note that it does not affirmatively
petitioner, we propose to examine the evidence political status from a citizen of the United States to a appear from the transaction of the testimony adduced
submitted upon the original hearing, in connection citizen of these Islands. This being true, it is to be in the trial court that any witness was examined with
with the allegations of the petition, in order to see, presumed that he retained his citizenship in the State reference to the law of Illinois on the subject of the
first, whether the evidence submitted to the trial court of Illinois along with his status as a citizen of the execution of will. The trial judge no doubt was
was sufficient to justify its findings, and, secondly, United States. It would be novel doctrine to Americans satisfied that the will was properly executed by
whether the petition contains any matter which would living in the Philippine Islands to be told that by living examining section 1874 of the Revised Statutes of
justify the court in setting the judgment, aside. In this here they lose their citizenship in the State of their Illinois, as exhibited in volume 3 of Starr & Curtis's
connection we shall for a moment ignore the naturalization or nativity. Annotated Illinois Statutes, 2nd ed., p. 426; and he
circumstance that the petition was filed after the may have assumed that he could take judicial notice
expiration of the six months allowed by section 113 of We are not unmindful of the fact that when a citizen of of the laws of Illinois under section 275 of the Code of
the Code of Civil Procedure. one State leaves it and takes up his abode in another Civil Procedure. If so, he was in our opinion mistaken.
State with no intention of returning, he immediately that section authorizes the courts here to take judicial
acquires citizenship in the State of his new domicile. notice, among other things, of the acts of the
legislative department of the United States. These Islands; and it is suggested that as the petitioner is a It follows that the trial court committed no error in
words clearly have reference to Acts of the Congress legitimate heir of the testator she cannot be deprived denying the relief sought. The order appealed from is
of the United States; and we would hesitate to hold of the legitime to which she is entitled under the law accordingly affirmed with costs. So ordered.
that our courts can, under this provision, take judicial governing testamentary successions in these Islands.
notice of the multifarious laws of the various American Upon this point it is sufficient to say that the probate
States. Nor do we think that any such authority can be of the will does not affect the intrinsic validity of its
derived from the broader language, used in the same provisions, the decree of probate being conclusive
action, where it is said that our courts may take only as regards the due execution of the will. (Code of
judicial notice of matters of public knowledge "similar" Civil Procedure, secs. 625, 614; Sahagun vs. De
to those therein enumerated. The proper rule we think Gorostiza, 7 Phil. Rep., 347, 349; Chiong Joc-
is to require proof of the statutes of the States of the Soy vs. Vao, 8 Phil. Rep., 119, 121;
American Union whenever their provisions are Limjuco vs. Ganara, 11 Phil. Rep., 393, 395.)
determinative of the issues in any action litigated in
the Philippine courts. If, therefore, upon the distribution of this estate, it
should appear that any legacy given by the will or
Nevertheless, even supposing that the trial court may other disposition made therein is contrary to the law
have erred in taking judicial notice of the law of Illinois applicable in such case, the will must necessarily
on the point in question, such error is not now yield upon that point and the law must prevail.
available to the petitioner, first, because the petition Nevertheless, it should not be forgotten that the
does not state any fact from which it would appear intrinsic validity of the provisions of this will must be
that the law of Illinois is different from what the court determined by the law of Illinois and not, as the
found, and, secondly, because the assignment of appellant apparently assumes, by the general
error and argument for the appellant in this court provisions here applicable in such matters; for in the
raises no question based on such supposed error. second paragraph of article 10 of the Civil Code it is
Though the trial court may have acted upon pure declared that "legal and testamentary successions,
conjecture as to the law prevailing in the State of with regard to the order of succession, as well as to
Illinois, its judgment could not be set aside, even upon the amount of the successional rights and to the
application made within six months under section 113 intrinsic validity of their provisions, shall be regulated
of the Code of Civil procedure, unless it should be by the laws of the nation of the person whose
made to appear affirmatively that the conjecture was succession is in question, whatever may be the
wrong. The petitioner, it is true, states in general nature of the property and the country where it may
terms that the will in question is invalid and be situate."
inadequate to pass real and personal property in the
State of Illinois, but this is merely a conclusion of law. From what has been said, it is, we think, manifest that
The affidavits by which the petition is accompanied the petition submitted to the court below on October
contain no reference to the subject, and we are cited 31, 1916, was entirely insufficient to warrant the
to no authority in the appellant's brief which might tent setting aside of the other probating the will in
to raise a doubt as to the correctness of the question, whether said petition be considered as an
conclusion of the trial court. It is very clear, therefore, attack on the validity of the decree for error apparent,
that this point cannot be urged as of serious moment. or whether it be considered as an application for a
rehearing based upon the new evidence submitted in
But it is insisted in the brief for the appellant that the the affidavits which accompany the petition. And in
will in question was not properly admissible to probate this latter aspect the petition is subject to the further
because it contains provisions which cannot be given fatal defect that it was not presented within the time
effect consistently with the laws of the Philippine allowed by law.
Republic of the Philippines the properties declared therein finally appraised at Claims against the estate:
SUPREME COURT their values six months after the death of Stevenson. ($5,000.00) P10,000.00
Manila Preliminary return was made by the ancillary
EN BANC administrator in order to secure the waiver of the Plus: 4% int. p.a. from Feb. 2 to 22, 1951
G.R. No. L-11622 January 28, 1961 Collector of Internal Revenue on the inheritance tax Sub-Total
THE COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL due on the 210,000 shares of stock in the Mindanao In the meantime, on December 1, 1952, Beatrice
REVENUE, petitioner, Mother Lode Mines Inc. which the estate then desired Mauricia Stevenson assigned all her rights and
vs. to dispose in the United States. Acting upon said interests in the estate to the spouses, Douglas and
DOUGLAS FISHER AND BETTINA FISHER, and the return, the Collector of Internal Revenue accepted the Bettina Fisher, respondents herein.
COURT OF TAX APPEALS, respondents. valuation of the personal properties declared therein, On September 7, 1953, the ancillary administrator
BARRERA, J.: but increased the appraisal of the two parcels of land filed a second amended estate and inheritance tax
This case relates to the determination and settlement located in Baguio City by fixing their fair market value return (Exh. "M-N"). This return declared the same
of the hereditary estate left by the deceased Walter G. in the amount of P52.200.00, instead of P43,500.00. assets of the estate stated in the amended return of
Stevenson, and the laws applicable thereto. Walter G. After allowing the deductions claimed by the ancillary September 22, 1952, except that it contained new
Stevenson (born in the Philippines on August 9, 1874 administrator for funeral expenses in the amount of claims for additional exemption and deduction to wit:
of British parents and married in the City of Manila on P2,000.00 and for judicial and administration (1) deduction in the amount of P4,000.00 from the
January 23, 1909 to Beatrice Mauricia Stevenson expenses in the sum of P5,500.00, the Collector gross estate of the decedent as provided for in
another British subject) died on February 22, 1951 in assessed the state the amount of P5,147.98 for Section 861 (4) of the U.S. Federal Internal Revenue
San Francisco, California, U.S.A. whereto he and his estate tax and P10,875,26 or inheritance tax, or a Code which the ancillary administrator averred was
wife moved and established their permanent total of P16,023.23. Both of these assessments were allowable by way of the reciprocity granted by Section
residence since May 10, 1945. In his will executed in paid by the estate on June 6, 1952. 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code, as then
San Francisco on May 22, 1947, and which was duly On September 27, 1952, the ancillary administrator held by the Board of Tax Appeals in case No. 71
probated in the Superior Court of California on April filed in amended estate and inheritance tax return in entitled "Housman vs. Collector," August 14, 1952;
11, 1951, Stevenson instituted his wife Beatrice as his pursuance f his reservation made at the time of filing and (2) exemption from the imposition of estate and
sole heiress to the following real and personal of the preliminary return and for the purpose of inheritance taxes on the 210,000 shares of stock in
properties acquired by the spouses while residing in availing of the right granted by section 91 of the the Mindanao Mother Lode Mines, Inc. also pursuant
the Philippines, described and preliminary assessed National Internal Revenue Code. to the reciprocity proviso of Section 122 of the
as follows: In this amended return the valuation of the 210,000 National Internal Revenue Code. In this last return,
Gross Estate shares of stock in the Mindanao Mother Lode Mines, the estate claimed that it was liable only for the
Inc. was reduced from 0.38 per share, as originally amount of P525.34 for estate tax and P238.06 for
Real Property 2 parcels of land in Baguio, declared, to P0.20 per share, or from a total valuation
covered by T.C.T. Nos. 378 and 379 inheritance tax and that, as a consequence, it had
of P79,800.00 to P42,000.00. This change in price per overpaid the government. The refund of the amount of
Personal Property share of stock was based by the ancillary P15,259.83, allegedly overpaid, was accordingly
administrator on the market notation of the stock requested by the estate. The Collector denied the
(1) 177 shares of stock of Canacao Estate at
obtaining at the San Francisco California) Stock claim. For this reason, action was commenced in the
P10.00 each
Exchange six months from the death of Stevenson, Court of First Instance of Manila by respondents, as
(2) 210,000 shares of stock of Mindanao Mother that is, As of August 22, 1931. In addition, the assignees of Beatrice Mauricia Stevenson, for the
Lode Mines, Inc. at P0.38 per share ancillary administrator made claim for the following recovery of said amount. Pursuant to Republic Act
(3) Cash credit with Canacao Estate Inc. deductions: No. 1125, the case was forwarded to the Court of Tax
Funeral expenses ($1,04326) Appeals which court, after hearing, rendered decision
(4) Cash, with the Chartered Bank of India,
Judicial Expenses: the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
Australia & China
In fine, we are of the opinion and so hold that: (a)
Total Gross Assets (a) Administrator's Fee the one-half () share of the surviving spouse in
On May 22, 1951, ancillary administration (b) Attorney's Fee the conjugal partnership property as diminished by
proceedings were instituted in the Court of First the obligations properly chargeable to such
(c) Judicial and Administration expenses property should be deducted from the net estate
Instance of Manila for the settlement of the estate in
as of August 9, 1952 of the deceased Walter G. Stevenson, pursuant to
the Philippines. In due time Stevenson's will was duly
admitted to probate by our court and Ian Murray Statt Section 89-C of the National Internal Revenue
was appointed ancillary administrator of the estate, Code; (b) the intangible personal property
Real Estate Tax for 1951 on Baguio real
who on July 11, 1951, filed a preliminary estate and belonging to the estate of said Stevenson is
properties (O.R. No. B-1 686836)
inheritance tax return with the reservation of having exempt from inheritance tax, pursuant to the
provision of section 122 of the National Internal In deciding the first issue, the lower court applied a celebradas en el extranjero cuando alguno
Revenue Code in relation to the California well-known doctrine in our civil law that in the de los conyuges es espanol. En cuanto a la
Inheritance Tax Law but decedent's estate is not absence of any ante-nuptial agreement, the regla procedente cuando dos extranjeros se
entitled to an exemption of P4,000.00 in the contracting parties are presumed to have adopted the casan en Espana, o dos espanoles en el
computation of the estate tax; (c) for purposes of system of conjugal partnership as to the properties extranjero hay que atender en el primer caso
estate and inheritance taxation the Baguio real acquired during their marriage. The application of this a la legislacion de pais a que aquellos
estate of the spouses should be valued at doctrine to the instant case is being disputed, pertenezean, y en el segundo, a las reglas
P52,200.00, and 210,000 shares of stock in the however, by petitioner Collector of Internal Revenue, generales consignadas en los articulos 9 y
Mindanao Mother Lode Mines, Inc. should be who contends that pursuant to Article 124 of the New 10 de nuestro Codigo. (Emphasis supplied.)
appraised at P0.38 per share; and (d) the estate Civil Code, the property relation of the spouses If we adopt the view of Manresa, the law
shall be entitled to a deduction of P2,000.00 for Stevensons ought not to be determined by the determinative of the property relation of the
funeral expenses and judicial expenses of Philippine law, but by the national law of the decedent Stevensons, married in 1909, would be the English
P8,604.39. husband, in this case, the law of England. It is alleged law even if the marriage was celebrated in the
From this decision, both parties appealed. by petitioner that English laws do not recognize legal Philippines, both of them being foreigners. But, as
The Collector of Internal Revenue, hereinafter called partnership between spouses, and that what obtains correctly observed by the Tax Court, the pertinent
petitioner assigned four errors allegedly committed by in that jurisdiction is another regime of property English law that allegedly vests in the decedent
the trial court, while the assignees, Douglas and relation, wherein all properties acquired during the husband full ownership of the properties acquired
Bettina Fisher hereinafter called respondents, made marriage pertain and belong Exclusively to the during the marriage has not been proven by
six assignments of error. Together, the assigned husband. In further support of his stand, petitioner petitioner. Except for a mere allegation in his answer,
errors raise the following main issues for resolution by cites Article 16 of the New Civil Code (Art. 10 of the which is not sufficient, the record is bereft of any
this Court: old) to the effect that in testate and intestate evidence as to what English law says on the matter.
(1) Whether or not, in determining the taxable net proceedings, the amount of successional rights, In the absence of proof, the Court is justified,
estate of the decedent, one-half () of the net estate among others, is to be determined by the national law therefore, in indulging in what Wharton calls
should be deducted therefrom as the share of tile of the decedent. "processual presumption," in presuming that the law
surviving spouse in accordance with our law on In this connection, let it be noted that since the of England on this matter is the same as our law.4
conjugal partnership and in relation to section 89 (c) mariage of the Stevensons in the Philippines took Nor do we believe petitioner can make use of Article
of the National Internal revenue Code; place in 1909, the applicable law is Article 1325 of the 16 of the New Civil Code (art. 10, old Civil Code) to
(2) Whether or not the estate can avail itself of the old Civil Code and not Article 124 of the New Civil bolster his stand. A reading of Article 10 of the old
reciprocity proviso embodied in Section 122 of the Code which became effective only in 1950. It is true Civil Code, which incidentally is the one applicable,
National Internal Revenue Code granting exemption that both articles adhere to the so-called nationality shows that it does not encompass or contemplate to
from the payment of estate and inheritance taxes on theory of determining the property relation of spouses govern the question of property relation between
the 210,000 shares of stock in the Mindanao Mother where one of them is a foreigner and they have made spouses. Said article distinctly speaks of amount of
Lode Mines Inc.; no prior agreement as to the administration successional rights and this term, in speaks in our
(3) Whether or not the estate is entitled to the disposition, and ownership of their conjugal opinion, properly refers to the extent or amount of
deduction of P4,000.00 allowed by Section 861, U.S. properties. In such a case, the national law of the property that each heir is legally entitled to inherit
Internal Revenue Code in relation to section 122 of husband becomes the dominant law in determining from the estate available for distribution. It needs to
the National Internal Revenue Code; the property relation of the spouses. There is, be pointed out that the property relation of spouses,
(4) Whether or not the real estate properties of the however, a difference between the two articles in that as distinguished from their successional rights, is
decedent located in Baguio City and the 210,000 Article 1241 of the new Civil Code expressly provides governed differently by the specific and express
shares of stock in the Mindanao Mother Lode Mines, that it shall be applicable regardless of whether the provisions of Title VI, Chapter I of our new Civil Code
Inc., were correctly appraised by the lower court; marriage was celebrated in the Philippines or abroad (Title III, Chapter I of the old Civil Code.) We,
(5) Whether or not the estate is entitled to the while Article 13252 of the old Civil Code is limited to therefore, find that the lower court correctly deducted
following deductions: P8,604.39 for judicial and marriages contracted in a foreign land. the half of the conjugal property in determining the
administration expenses; P2,086.52 for funeral It must be noted, however, that what has just been hereditary estate left by the deceased Stevenson.
expenses; P652.50 for real estate taxes; and said refers to mixed marriages between a Filipino On the second issue, petitioner disputes the action of
P10,0,22.47 representing the amount of indebtedness citizen and a foreigner. In the instant case, both the Tax Court in the exempting the respondents from
allegedly incurred by the decedent during his lifetime; spouses are foreigners who married in the paying inheritance tax on the 210,000 shares of stock
and Philippines. Manresa,3 in his Commentaries, has this in the Mindanao Mother Lode Mines, Inc. in virtue of
(6) Whether or not the estate is entitled to the to say on this point: the reciprocity proviso of Section 122 of the National
payment of interest on the amount it claims to have La regla establecida en el art. 1.315, se Internal Revenue Code, in relation to Section 13851
overpaid the government and to be refundable to it. refiere a las capitulaciones otorgadas en of the California Revenue and Taxation Code, on the
Espana y entre espanoles. El 1.325, a las ground that: (1) the said proviso of the California
Revenue and Taxation Code has not been duly Section 122 of our National Internal Revenue Code, in if any of the two states collects or imposes and does
proven by the respondents; (2) the reciprocity pertinent part, provides: not exempt any transfer, death, legacy, or succession
exemptions granted by section 122 of the National ... And, provided, further, That no tax shall be tax of any character, the reciprocity does not work.
Internal Revenue Code can only be availed of by collected under this Title in respect of This is the underlying principle of the reciprocity
residents of foreign countries and not of residents of a intangible personal property (a) if the clauses in both laws.
state in the United States; and (3) there is no "total" decedent at the time of his death was a In the Philippines, upon the death of any citizen or
reciprocity between the Philippines and the state of resident of a foreign country which at the resident, or non-resident with properties therein, there
California in that while the former exempts payment of time of his death did not impose a transfer of are imposed upon his estate and its settlement, both
both estate and inheritance taxes on intangible tax or death tax of any character in respect an estate and an inheritance tax. Under the laws of
personal properties, the latter only exempts the of intangible personal property of citizens of California, only inheritance tax is imposed. On the
payment of inheritance tax.. the Philippines not residing in that foreign other hand, the Federal Internal Revenue Code
To prove the pertinent California law, Attorney Allison country, or (b) if the laws of the foreign imposes an estate tax on non-residents not citizens of
Gibbs, counsel for herein respondents, testified that country of which the decedent was a the United States,7 but does not provide for any
as an active member of the California Bar since 1931, resident at the time of his death allow a exemption on the basis of reciprocity. Applying these
he is familiar with the revenue and taxation laws of similar exemption from transfer taxes or laws in the manner the Court of Tax Appeals did in the
the State of California. When asked by the lower court death taxes of every character in respect of instant case, we will have a situation where a
to state the pertinent California law as regards intangible personal property owned by Californian, who is non-resident in the Philippines but
exemption of intangible personal properties, the citizens of the Philippines not residing in that has intangible personal properties here, will the
witness cited article 4, section 13851 (a) and (b) of foreign country." (Emphasis supplied). subject to the payment of an estate tax, although
the California Internal and Revenue Code as On the other hand, Section 13851 of the California exempt from the payment of the inheritance tax. This
published in Derring's California Code, a publication Inheritance Tax Law, insofar as pertinent, reads:. being the case, will a Filipino, non-resident of
of the Bancroft-Whitney Company inc. And as part of "SEC. 13851, Intangibles of nonresident: California, but with intangible personal properties
his testimony, a full quotation of the cited section was Conditions. Intangible personal property is there, be entitled to the exemption clause of the
offered in evidence as Exhibits "V-2" by the exempt from the tax imposed by this part if California law, since the Californian has not been
respondents. the decedent at the time of his death was a exempted from every character of legacy, succession,
It is well-settled that foreign laws do not prove resident of a territory or another State of the or death tax because he is, under our law, under
themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not United States or of a foreign state or country obligation to pay an estate tax? Upon the other hand,
authorized to take judicial notice of them.5 Like any which then imposed a legacy, succession, or if we exempt the Californian from paying the estate
other fact, they must be alleged and proved.6 death tax in respect to intangible personal tax, we do not thereby entitle a Filipino to be exempt
Section 41, Rule 123 of our Rules of Court prescribes property of its own residents, but either:. from a similar estate tax in California because under
the manner of proving foreign laws before our (a) Did not impose a legacy, succession, or the Federal Law, which is equally enforceable in
tribunals. However, although we believe it desirable death tax of any character in respect to California he is bound to pay the same, there being
that these laws be proved in accordance with said intangible personal property of residents of no reciprocity recognized in respect thereto. In both
rule, we held in the case of Willamette Iron and Steel this State, or instances, the Filipino citizen is always at a
Works v. Muzzal, 61 Phil. 471, that "a reading of (b) Had in its laws a reciprocal provision disadvantage. We do not believe that our legislature
sections 300 and 301 of our Code of Civil Procedure under which intangible personal property of a has intended such an unfair situation to the detriment
(now section 41, Rule 123) will convince one that non-resident was exempt from legacy, of our own government and people. We, therefore,
these sections do not exclude the presentation of succession, or death taxes of every find and declare that the lower court erred in
other competent evidence to prove the existence of a character if the Territory or other State of the exempting the estate in question from payment of the
foreign law." In that case, we considered the United States or foreign state or country in inheritance tax.
testimony of an attorney-at-law of San Francisco, which the nonresident resided allowed a We are not unaware of our ruling in the case
California who quoted verbatim a section of California similar exemption in respect to intangible of Collector of Internal Revenue vs. Lara (G.R. Nos.
Civil Code and who stated that the same was in force personal property of residents of the Territory L-9456 & L-9481, prom. January 6, 1958, 54 O.G.
at the time the obligations were contracted, as or State of the United States or foreign state 2881) exempting the estate of the deceased Hugo H.
sufficient evidence to establish the existence of said or country of residence of the decedent." Miller from payment of the inheritance tax imposed by
law. In line with this view, we find no error, therefore, (Id.) the Collector of Internal Revenue. It will be noted,
on the part of the Tax Court in considering the It is clear from both these quoted provisions that the however, that the issue of reciprocity between the
pertinent California law as proved by respondents' reciprocity must be total, that is, with respect to pertinent provisions of our tax law and that of the
witness. transfer or death taxes of any and every character, in State of California was not there squarely raised, and
We now take up the question of reciprocity in the case of the Philippine law, and to legacy, the ruling therein cannot control the determination of
exemption from transfer or death taxes, between the succession, or death taxes of any and every the case at bar. Be that as it may, we now declare that
State of California and the Philippines.F character, in the case of the California law. Therefore, in view of the express provisions of both the
Philippine and California laws that the exemption 1951. Even more, the counsel for plaintiffs which by the Tax Court, both petitioner and
would apply only if the law of the other grants an himself admitted in open court that he was respondents have appealed..
exemption from legacy, succession, or death taxes of willing to purchase the said properties at Petitioner, in this regard, contends that no evidence of
every character, there could not be partial reciprocity. P2.00 per square meter. In the light of these record exists to support the allowance of the sum of
It would have to be total or none at all. facts we believe and therefore hold that the P8,604.39 for the following expenses:.
With respect to the question of deduction or reduction valuation of P52,200.00 of the real estate in 1) Administrator's fee
in the amount of P4,000.00 based on the U.S. Federal Baguio made by defendant is fair,
Estate Tax Law which is also being claimed by reasonable and justified in the premises." 2) Attorney's fee
respondents, we uphold and adhere to our ruling in (Decision, p. 19). 3) Judicial and Administrative expenses
the Lara case (supra) that the amount of $2,000.00 In respect to the valuation of the 210,000 shares of
Total Deductions
allowed under the Federal Estate Tax Law is in the stock in the Mindanao Mother Lode Mines, Inc., (a
nature of a deduction and not of an exemption domestic corporation), respondents contend that their An examination of the record discloses, however, that
regarding which reciprocity cannot be claimed under value should be fixed on the basis of the market the foregoing items were considered deductible by the
the provision of Section 122 of our National Internal quotation obtaining at the San Francisco (California) Tax Court on the basis of their approval by the
Revenue Code. Nor is reciprocity authorized under Stock Exchange, on the theory that the certificates of probate court to which said expenses, we may
the Federal Law. . stocks were then held in that place and registered presume, had also been presented for consideration.
On the issue of the correctness of the appraisal of the with the said stock exchange. We cannot agree with It is to be supposed that the probate court would not
two parcels of land situated in Baguio City, it is respondents' argument. The situs of the shares of have approved said items were they not supported by
contended that their assessed values, as appearing in stock, for purposes of taxation, being located here in evidence presented by the estate. In allowing the
the tax rolls 6 months after the death of Stevenson, the Philippines, as respondents themselves concede items in question, the Tax Court had before it the
ought to have been considered by petitioner as their and considering that they are sought to be taxed in pertinent order of the probate court which was
fair market value, pursuant to section 91 of the this jurisdiction, consistent with the exercise of our submitted in evidence by respondents. (Exh. "AA-2",
National Internal Revenue Code. It should be pointed government's taxing authority, their fair market value p. 100, record). As the Tax Court said, it found no
out, however, that in accordance with said proviso the should be taxed on the basis of the price prevailing in basis for departing from the findings of the probate
properties are required to be appraised at their fair our country. court, as it must have been satisfied that those
market value and the assessed value thereof shall be Upon the other hand, we find merit in respondents' expenses were actually incurred. Under the
considered as the fair market value only when other contention that the said shares of stock circumstances, we see no ground to reverse this
evidence to the contrary has not been shown. After all commanded a lesser value at the Manila Stock finding of fact which, under Republic Act of California
review of the record, we are satisfied that such Exchange six months after the death of Stevenson. National Association, which it would appear, that while
evidence exists to justify the valuation made by Through Atty. Allison Gibbs, respondents have shown still living, Walter G. Stevenson obtained we are not
petitioner which was sustained by the tax court, for as that at that time a share of said stock was bid for at inclined to pass upon the claim of respondents in
the tax court aptly observed: only P.325 (p. 103, t.s.n.). Significantly, the testimony respect to the additional amount of P86.52 for funeral
"The two parcels of land containing 36,264 of Atty. Gibbs in this respect has never been expenses which was disapproved by the court a quo
square meters were valued by the questioned nor refuted by petitioner either before this for lack of evidence.
administrator of the estate in the Estate and court or in the court below. In the absence of evidence In connection with the deduction of P652.50
Inheritance tax returns filed by him at to the contrary, we are, therefore, constrained to representing the amount of realty taxes paid in 1951
P43,500.00 which is the assessed value of reverse the Tax Court on this point and to hold that on the decedent's two parcels of land in Baguio City,
said properties. On the other hand, the value of a share in the said mining company on which respondents claim was disallowed by the Tax
defendant appraised the same at August 22, 1951 in the Philippine market was P.325 Court, we find that this claim has in fact been allowed.
P52,200.00. It is of common knowledge, and as claimed by respondents.. What happened here, which a careful review of the
this Court can take judicial notice of it, that It should be noted that the petitioner and the Tax record will reveal, was that the Tax Court, in itemizing
assessments for real estate taxation Court valued each share of stock of P.38 on the basis the liabilities of the estate, viz:
purposes are very much lower than the true of the declaration made by the estate in its preliminary 1) Administrator's fee
and fair market value of the properties at a return. Patently, this should not have been the case, 2) Attorney's fee
given time and place. In fact one year after in view of the fact that the ancillary administrator had
decedent's death or in 1952 the said reserved and availed of his legal right to have the 3) Judicial and Administration expenses as of August 9
properties were sold for a price of properties of the estate declared at their fair market Total
P72,000.00 and there is no showing that value as of six months from the time the decedent
added the P652.50 for realty taxes as a liability of the
special or extraordinary circumstances died..
estate, to the P1,400.05 for judicial and administration
caused the sudden increase from the price On the fifth issue, we shall consider the various
expenses approved by the court, making a total of
of P43,500.00, if we were to accept this deductions, from the allowance or disallowance of
P2,052.55, exactly the same figure which was arrived
value as a fair and reasonable one as of
at by the Tax Court for judicial and administration presented for allowance therein.9 And the estate shall In other words, the allowable deduction is only to the
expenses. Hence, the difference between the total of be administered under letters testamentary, or letters extent of the portion of the indebtedness which is
P9,256.98 allowed by the Tax Court as deductions, of administration granted by the court, and disposed equivalent to the proportion that the estate in the
and the P8,604.39 as found by the probate court, of according to the will as probated, after payment of Philippines bears to the total estate wherever
which is P652.50, the same amount allowed for realty just debts and expenses of administration.10 In other situated. Stated differently, if the properties in the
taxes. An evident oversight has involuntarily been words, there is a regular administration under the Philippines constitute but 1/5 of the entire assets
made in omitting the P2,000.00 for funeral expenses control of the court, where claims must be presented wherever situated, then only 1/5 of the indebtedness
in the final computation. This amount has been and approved, and expenses of administration may be deducted. But since, as heretofore adverted
expressly allowed by the lower court and there is no allowed before deductions from the estate can be to, there is no statement of the value of the estate
reason why it should not be. . authorized. Otherwise, we would have the actuations situated outside the Philippines, no part of the
We come now to the other claim of respondents that of our own probate court, in the settlement and indebtedness can be allowed to be deducted,
pursuant to section 89(b) (1) in relation to section distribution of the estate situated here, subject to the pursuant to Section 89, letter (d), number (1) of the
89(a) (1) (E) and section 89(d), National Internal proceedings before the foreign court over which our Internal Revenue Code.
Revenue Code, the amount of P10,022.47 should courts have no control. We do not believe such a For the reasons thus stated, we affirm the ruling of the
have been allowed the estate as a deduction, procedure is countenanced or contemplated in the lower court disallowing the deduction of the alleged
because it represented an indebtedness of the Rules of Court. indebtedness in the sum of P10,022.47.
decedent incurred during his lifetime. In support Another reason for the disallowance of this In recapitulation, we hold and declare that:
thereof, they offered in evidence a duly certified claim, indebtedness as a deduction, springs from the (a) only the one-half (1/2) share of the
presented to the probate court in California by the provisions of Section 89, letter (d), number (1), of the decedent Stevenson in the conjugal
Bank of California National Association, which it would National Internal Revenue Code which reads: partnership property constitutes his hereditary
appear, that while still living, Walter G. Stevenson (d) Miscellaneous provisions (1) No estate subject to the estate and inheritance
obtained a loan of $5,000.00 secured by pledge on deductions shall be allowed in the case of a taxes;
140,000 of his shares of stock in the Mindanao non-resident not a citizen of the Philippines (b) the intangible personal property is not
Mother Lode Mines, Inc. (Exhs. "Q-Q4", pp. 53-59, unless the executor, administrator or anyone exempt from inheritance tax, there existing no
record). The Tax Court disallowed this item on the of the heirs, as the case may be, includes in complete total reciprocity as required in
ground that the local probate court had not approved the return required to be filed under section section 122 of the National Internal Revenue
the same as a valid claim against the estate and ninety-three the value at the time of his Code, nor is the decedent's estate entitled to
because it constituted an indebtedness in respect to death of that part of the gross estate of the an exemption of P4,000.00 in the computation
intangible personal property which the Tax Court held non-resident not situated in the Philippines." of the estate tax;
to be exempt from inheritance tax. In the case at bar, no such statement of the gross (c) for the purpose of the estate and
For two reasons, we uphold the action of the lower estate of the non-resident Stevenson not situated in inheritance taxes, the 210,000 shares of stock
court in disallowing the deduction. the Philippines appears in the three returns submitted in the Mindanao Mother Lode Mines, Inc. are
Firstly, we believe that the approval of the Philippine to the court or to the office of the petitioner Collector to be appraised at P0.325 per share; and
probate court of this particular indebtedness of the of Internal Revenue. The purpose of this requirement (d) the P2,000.00 for funeral expenses should
decedent is necessary. This is so although the same, is to enable the revenue officer to determine how be deducted in the determination of the net
it is averred has been already admitted and approved much of the indebtedness may be allowed to be asset of the deceased Stevenson.
by the corresponding probate court in California, situs deducted, pursuant to (b), number (1) of the same In all other respects, the decision of the Court of Tax
of the principal or domiciliary administration. It is true section 89 of the Internal Revenue Code which Appeals is affirmed.
that we have here in the Philippines only an ancillary provides: Respondent's claim for interest on the amount
administration in this case, but, it has been held, the (b) Deductions allowed to non-resident allegedly overpaid, if any actually results after a
distinction between domiciliary or principal estates. In the case of a non-resident not recomputation on the basis of this decision is hereby
administration and ancillary administration serves only a citizen of the Philippines, by deducting denied in line with our recent decision in Collector of
to distinguish one administration from the other, for from the value of that part of his gross estate Internal Revenue v. St. Paul's Hospital (G.R. No. L-
the two proceedings are separate and which at the time of his death is situated in 12127, May 29, 1959) wherein we held that, "in the
independent.8 The reason for the ancillary the Philippines absence of a statutory provision clearly or expressly
administration is that, a grant of administration does (1) Expenses, losses, indebtedness, and directing or authorizing such payment, and none has
not ex proprio vigore, have any effect beyond the taxes. That proportion of the deductions been cited by respondents, the National Government
limits of the country in which it was granted. Hence, specified in paragraph (1) of subjection (a) of cannot be required to pay interest."
we have the requirement that before a will duly this section11 which the value of such part WHEREFORE, as modified in the manner heretofore
probated outside of the Philippines can have effect bears the value of his entire gross estate indicated, the judgment of the lower court is hereby
here, it must first be proved and allowed before our wherever situated;" affirmed in all other respects not inconsistent
courts, in much the same manner as wills originally herewith. No costs. So ordered.
Resolution/Temporary Restraining Order dated citizens (Annex "C", petition). As a consequence
Republic of the Philippines September 7, 1990, issued by respondent Judge de thereof, William Gatchalian was issued Identification
SUPREME COURT la Rosa in Civil Case No. 90-54214 which denied Certificate No. 16135 by the immigration authorities
Manila petitioners' motion to dismiss and restrained on August 16, 1961 (Annex "D", petition).
EN BANC petitioners from commencing or continuing with any of On January 24, 1962, the then Secretary of Justice
G.R. Nos. 95122-23 May 31, 1991 the proceedings which would lead to the deportation issued Memorandum No. 9 setting aside all decisions
BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS (COMMISSION ON of respondent William Gatchalian, docketed as D.C. purporting to have been rendered by the Board of
IMMIGRATION AND DEPORTATION), BOARD OF No. 90-523, as well as the Order of respondent Judge Commissioners on appeal or on review motu
SPECIAL INQUIRY, COMMISSIONER ANDREA D. Capulong dated September 6, 1990 in Civil Case No. proprio of decisions of the Board of Special Inquiry.
DOMINGO, ASSOCIATE COMMISSIONER JORGE 3431-V-90 which likewise enjoined petitioners from The same memorandum directed the Board of
V. SARMIENTO, ACTING ASSOCIATE proceeding with the deportation charges against Commissioners to review all cases where entry was
COMMISSIONER REGINO R. SANTIAGO, respondent Gatchalian, and 2) to prohibit respondent allowed on the ground that the entrant was a
MEMBERS OF THE BOARD OF SPECIAL INQUIRY, judges from further acting in the aforesaid civil cases. Philippine citizen. Among those cases was that of
ESTANISLAO CANTA, LEO MAGAHOM and On October 23, 1990, respondent Gatchalian filed his William and others.
BENJAMIN KALAW, petitioners, Comment with Counter-Petition, docketed as G.R. On July 6, 1962, the new Board of Commissioners,
vs. Nos. 96512-13, alleging lack of jurisdiction on the part after a review motu proprio of the proceedings had in
HON. JOSELITO DELA ROSA, Presiding Judge, of respondent Board of Commissioners, et al., over the Board of Special Inquiry, reversed the decision of
RTC Manila, Branch 29, WILLIAM T. his person with prayer that he be declared a Filipino the latter and ordered the exclusion of, among others,
GATCHALIAN, respondents. citizen, or in the alternative, to remand the case to the respondent Gatchalian (Annex "E", petition). A
BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS (COMMISSION ON trial court for further proceedings. warrant of exclusion also dated July 6, 1962 was
IMMIGRATION AND DEPORTATION), BOARD OF On December 13, 1990, petitioners filed their issued alleging that "the decision of the Board of
SPECIAL INQUIRY, COMMISSIONER ANDREA D. comment to respondent Gatchalian's counter-petition. Commissioners dated July 6, 1962 . . . has now
DOMINGO, ASSOCIATE COMMISSIONER JORGE The Court considers the comment filed by respondent become final and executory (Annex "F", petition).
V. SARMIENTO, ACTING ASSOCIATE Gatchalian as answer to the petition and petitioners' The actual date of rendition of said decision by the
COMMISSIONER REGINO R. SANTIAGO, comment as answer to the counter-petition and gives Board of Commissioners (whether on July 6, 1962 or
MEMBERS OF THE BOARD OF SPECIAL INQUIRY, due course to the petitions. July 20, 1962) became the subject of controversy in
ESTANISLAO CANTA, LEO MAGAHOM and There is no dispute as to the following facts: the 1967 case of Arocha vs. Vivo (21 SCRA 532)
BENJAMIN KALAW, petitioners, On July 12, 1960, Santiago Gatchalian, grandfather of wherein this Court sustained the validity of the
vs. William Gatchalian, was recognized by the Bureau of decision of the new Board of Commissioners having
HON. TERESITA DIZON CAPULONG, Presiding Immigration as a native born Filipino citizen following been promulgated on July 6, 1962, or within the
Judge, RTC Branch 172, Valenzuela, Metro Manila, the citizenship of his natural mother, Marciana reglementary period for review.
DEE HUA T. GATCHALIAN, SHERWING T. Gatchalian (Annex "1", counter-petition). Before the Sometime in 1973, respondent Gatchalian, as well as
GATCHALIAN, KENNETH T. GATCHALIAN, Citizenship Evaluation Board, Santiago Gatchalian the others covered by the July 6, 1962 warrant of
REXLON T. GATCHALIAN, and WESLIE T. testified that he has five (5) children with his wife Chu exclusion, filed a motion for re-hearing with the Board
GATCHALIAN, respondents. Gim Tee, namely: Jose Gatchalian, Gloria Gatchalian, of Special Inquiry where the deportion case against
G.R. Nos. 95612-13 May 31, 1991 Francisco Gatchalian, Elena Gatchalian and Benjamin them was assigned.
WILLIAM T. GATCHALIAN, petitioner, Gatchalian (Annex "2", counter-petition). On March 14, 1973, the Board of Special Inquiry
vs. On June 27, 1961, William Gatchalian, then a twelve- recommended to the then Acting Commissioner Victor
BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS (COMMISSION ON year old minor, arrived in Manila from Hongkong Nituda the reversal of the July 6, 1962 decision of the
IMMIGRATION AND DEPORTATION), et together with Gloria, Francisco, and Johnson, all then Board of Commissioners and the recall of the
al., respondents. surnamed Gatchalian. They had with them warrants of arrest issued therein (Annex "5", counter-
The Solicitor General for petitioners. Certificates of Registration and Identity issued by the petition).
edesma, Saludo & Associates for respondent William Philippine Consulate in Hongkong based on a On March 15, 1973, Acting Commissioner Nituda
Gatchalian. cablegram bearing the signature of the then Secretary issued an order reaffirming the July 6, 1961 decision
Cervo and Tanay Law Office for respondent T.D. of Foreign Affairs, Felixberto Serrano, and sought of the Board of Special Inquiry thereby admitting
Capulong, D.H.T. Gatchalian, et al. admission as Filipino citizens. Gloria and Francisco respondent Gatchalian as a Filipino citizen and
are the daughter and son, respectively, of Santiago recalled the warrant of arrest issued against him
Gatchalian; while William and Johnson are the sons (Annex "6", counter-petition).
BIDIN, J.: of Francisco. On June 7, 1990, the acting director of the National
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by After investigation, the Board of Special Inquiry No. 1 Bureau of Investigation wrote the Secretary of Justice
the Solicitor General seeking 1) to set aside the rendered a decision dated July 6, 1961, admitting recommending that respondent Gatchalian along with
William Gatchalian and his companions as Filipino the other applicants covered by the warrant of
exclusion dated July 6, 1962 be charged with violation process determine also his citizenship; 3) respondent Constitution, the provisions of this Act, and of
of Sec. 37 (a), pars. 1 and 2, in relation to Secs. 45 judge dela Rosa gravely abused his discretion in sub-paragraph (1) of the third paragraph of
(c), and (d) and (e) of Commonwealth Act No. 613, as ruling that the issues raised in the deportation and sub-paragraph (4) of the fourth
amended, also known as the Immigration Act of 1940 proceedings are beyond the competence and paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act
(Annex "G", petition). jurisdiction of petitioners, thereby disregarding the of 1948.
On August 1, 1990, the Secretary of Justice indorsed cases of Arocha vs. Vivo and Vivo vs. Arca (supra), It does not provide, however, that said exclusive
the recommendation of the NBI to the Commissioner which put finality to the July 6, 1962 decision of the appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals extends
of Immigration for investigation and immediate action Board of Commissioners that respondent Gatchalian to all quasi-judicial agencies. The quasi-judicial
(Annex "20", counter-petition). is a Chinese citizen; and 4) respondent judge bodies whose decisions are exclusively appealable to
On August 15, 1990, petitioner Commissioner Capulong should have dismissed Civil Case No. the Court of Appeals are those which under the law,
Domingo of the Commission of Immigration and 3431-V-90 for forum-shopping. Republic Act No. 5434, or their enabling acts, are
Deportation * issued a mission order commanding the In his counter-petition, William Gatchalian alleges specifically appealable to the Court of Appeals
arrest of respondent William Gatchalian (Annex "18", among others that: 1) assuming that the evidence on (Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force vs. Court
counter-petition). The latter appeared before record is not sufficient to declare him a Filipino citizen, of Appeals, 171 SCRA 348 [1989]; Lupangco vs.
Commissioner Domingo on August 20, 1990 and was petitioners have no jurisdiction to proceed with the Court of Appeals, 160 SCRA 848 [1988]). Thus, under
released on the same day upon posting P200,000.00 deportation case until the courts shall have finally Republic Act No. 5434, it is specifically provided that
cash bond. resolved the question of his citizenship; 2) petitioners the decisions of the Land Registration Commission
On August 29, 1990, William Gatchalian filed a can no longer judiciously and fairly resolve the (LRC), the Social Security Commission (SSC), Civil
petition for certiorari and prohibition with injunction question of respondent's citizenship in the deportation Aeronautics Board (CAB), the Patent Office and the
before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Br. 29, case because of their bias, pre-judgment and Agricultural Invention Board are appealable to the
presided by respondent Judge dela Rosa, docketed prejudice against him; and 3) the ground for which he Court of Appeals.
as Civil Case No. 90-54214. is sought to be deported has already prescribed. In the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force
On September 4, 1990, petitioners filed a motion to For purposes of uniformity, the parties herein will be (supra), this Court clarified the matter when We ruled:
dismiss Civil Case No. 90-54214 alleging that referred to in the order the petitions were filed. Under our Resolution dated January 11,
respondent judge has no jurisdiction over the Board of Petitioners argue that under Sec. 9 (3) of BP 129, it is 1983:
Commissioners and/or the Board of Special Inquiry. the Court of Appeals which has exclusive appellate . . . The appeals to the Intermediate
Nonetheless, respondent judge dela Rosa issued the jurisdiction over all final judgments or orders of quasi- Appellate Court (now Court of
assailed order dated September 7, 1990, denying the judicial agencies, boards or commissions, such as the Appeals) from quasi-judicial bodies
motion to dismiss. Board of Commissioners and the Board of Special shall continue to be governed by
Meanwhile, on September 6, 1990, respondent Inquiry. the provisions of Republic Act No.
Gatchalian's wife and minor children filed before the Respondent, on the other hand, contends that 5434 insofar as the same is not
Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Br. petitioners are not quasi-judicial agencies and are not inconsistent with the provisions of
172, presided by respondent judge Capulong Civil in equal rank with Regional Trial Courts. B.P. Blg. 129.
Case No. 3431-V-90 for injunction with writ of Under Sec. 21 (1) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, the The pertinent provisions of Republic Act No.
preliminary injunction. The complaint alleged, among Regional Trial Courts have concurrent jurisdiction with 5434 are as follows:
others, that petitioners acted without or in excess of this Court and the Court of Appeals to issue "writs Sec. 1. Appeals from specified
jurisdiction in the institution of deportation of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, agencies. Any provision of
proceedings against William. On the same day, habeas corpus and injunction which may be enforced existing law or Rules of Court to the
respondent Capulong issued the questioned in any part of their respective regions, . . ." Thus, the contrary notwithstanding, parties
temporary restraining order restraining petitioners RTCs are vested with the power to determine whether aggrieved by a final ruling, award,
from continuing with the deportation proceedings or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion on order, or decision, or judgment of
against William Gatchalian. the part of any branch or instrumentality of the the Court of Agrarian Relations; the
The petition is anchored on the following propositions: government. Secretary of Labor under Section 7
1) respondent judges have no jurisdiction over It is true that under Sec. 9 (3) of Batas Pambansa Blg. of Republic Act Numbered Six
petitioners (Board of Commissioners, et al.,) and the 129, the Court of Appeals is vested with hundred and two, also known as
subject matter of the case, appellate jurisdiction being (3) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all the "Minimum Wage Law"; the
vested by BP 129 with the Court of Appeals; 2) final judgments, decisions, resolutions, order, Department of Labor under Section
assuming respondent judges have jurisdiction, they or awards of Regional Trial Courts and 23 of Republic Act Numbered Eight
acted with grave abuse of discretion in preempting quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, hundred seventy-five, also known
petitioners in the exercise of the authority and board or commission, except those falling as the "Industrial Peace Act"; the
jurisdiction to hear and determine the deportation within the appellate jurisdiction of the Land Registration Commission; the
case against respondent Gatchalian, and in the Supreme Court in accordance with the Social Security Commission; the
Civil Aeronautics Board; the Patent However, the Bureau of Immigration (or CID) is not When the evidence submitted by a
Office and the Agricultural among those quasi-judicial agencies specified by law respondent is conclusive of his citizenship,
Inventions Board, may appeal whose decisions, orders, and resolutions are directly the right to immediate review should also be
therefrom to the Court of Appeals, appealable to the Court of Appeals. In fact, its recognized and the courts should promptly
within the period and in the manner decisions are subject to judicial review in accordance enjoin the deportation proceedings. A citizen
herein provided, whether the appeal with Sec. 25, Chapter 4, Book VII of the 1987 is entitled to live in peace, without
involves questions of fact, mixed Administrative Code, which provides as follows: molestation from any official or authority, and
questions of fact and law, or Sec. 25. Judicial Review.(1) Agency if he is disturbed by a deportation
questions of law, or all three kinds decisions shall be subject to judicial review proceeding, he has the unquestionable right
of questions. From final judgments in accordance with this chapter and to resort to the courts for his protection,
or decisions of the Court of applicable laws. either by a writ of habeas corpus or of
Appeals, the aggrieved party may xxx xxx xxx prohibition, on the legal ground that the
appeal by certiorari to the Supreme (6) The review proceeding shall be filed in Board lacks jurisdiction. If he is a citizen and
Court as provided under Rule 45 of the court specified in the statute or, in the evidence thereof is satisfactory, there is no
the Rules of Court. absence thereof, in any court of competent sense nor justice in allowing the deportation
Because of subsequent amendments, jurisdiction in accordance with the provisions proceedings to continue, granting him the
including the abolition of various special on venue of the Rules of Court. remedy only after the Board has finished its
courts, jurisdiction over quasi-judicial bodies Said provision of the Administrative Code, which is investigation of his undesirability.
has to be, consequently, determined by the subsequent to B.P. Blg. 129 and which thus modifies . . . And if the right (to peace) is precious and
corresponding amendatory statutes. Under the latter, provides that the decision of an agency like valuable at all, it must also be protected on
the Labor Code, decisions and awards of the the Bureau of Immigration should be subject to review time, to prevent undue harassment at the
National Labor Relations Commission are by the court specified by the statute or in the absence hands of ill-meaning or misinformed
final and executory, but, nevertheless, thereof, it is subject to review by any court of administrative officials. Of what use is this
reviewable by this Court through a petition competent jurisdiction in accordance with the much boasted right to peace and liberty if it
for certiorari and not by way of appeal. provisions on venue of the Rules of Court. can be availed of only after the Deportation
Under the Property Registration Decree, B.P. Blg. 129 did not intend to raise all quasi-judicial Board has unjustly trampled upon it,
decision of the Commission of Land bodies to the same level or rank of the RTC except besmirching the citizen's name before the
Registration, en consulta, are appealable to those specifically provided for under the law as bar of public opinion? (Emphasis supplied)
the Court of Appeals. aforestated. As the Bureau of Immigration is not of The doctrine of primary jurisdiction of petitioners
The decisions of the Securities and equal rank as the RTC, its decisions may be Board of Commissioners over deportation
Exchange Commission are likewise appealable to, and may be reviewed through a special proceedings is, therefore, not without exception
appealable to the Appellate Court, and so civil action for certiorari by, the RTC (Sec. 21, (1) BP (Calacday vs. Vivo, 33 SCRA 413 [1970]; Vivo vs.
are decisions of the Social Security 129). Montesa, 24 SCRA 155 [1967]). Judicial intervention,
Commission. True, it is beyond cavil that the Bureau of Immigration however, should be granted only in cases where the
As a rule, where legislation provides for an has the exclusive authority and jurisdiction to try and "claim of citizenship is so substantial that there are
appeal from decisions of certain hear cases against an alleged alien, and in the reasonable grounds to believe that the claim is
administrative bodies to the Court of process, determine also their citizenship (Lao Gi vs. correct. In other words, the remedy should be allowed
Appeals, it means that such bodies are co- Court of Appeals, 180 SCRA 756 [1989]). And a mere only on sound discretion of a competent court in a
equal with the Regional Trial Courts, in terms claim of citizenship cannot operate to divest the Board proper proceeding (Chua Hiong vs. Deportation
of rank and stature, and logically, beyond the of Commissioners of its jurisdiction in deportation Board, supra; Co. vs. Deportation Board, 78 SCRA
control of the latter. (Emphasis supplied) proceedings (Miranda vs. Deportation Board, 94 Phil. 107 [1977]). It appearing from the records that
There are quasi-judicial agencies, as the National 531 [1954]). respondent's claim of citizenship is substantial, as We
Labor Relations Commissions, whose decisions are However, the rule enunciated in the above-cases shall show later, judicial intervention should be
directly appealable to this Court. It is only when a admits of an exception, at least insofar as deportation allowed.
specific law, as Republic Act No. 5434, provides proceedings are concerned. Thus, what if the claim to In the case at bar, the competent court which could
appeal from certain bodies or commissions to the citizenship of the alleged deportee is satisfactory? properly take cognizance of the proceedings instituted
Court of Appeals as the Land Registration Should the deportation proceedings be allowed to by respondent Gatchalian would nonetheless be the
Commission (LRC), Securities and Exchange continue or should the question of citizenship be Regional Trial Court and not the Court of Appeals in
Commission (SEC) and others, that the said ventilated in a judicial proceeding? In Chua Hiong vs. view of Sec. 21 (1), BP 129, which confers upon the
commissions or boards may be considered co-equal Deportation Board (96 Phil. 665 [1955]), this Court former jurisdiction over actions for prohibition
with the RTCs in terms of rank, stature and are answered the question in the affirmative, and We concurrently with the Court of Appeals and the
logically beyond the control of the latter. quote:
Supreme Court and in line with the pronouncements where the dictates of justice so demand . . . statement that respondent Gatchalian is a Chinese.
of this Court in Chua Hiong and Co cases. the Supreme Court should act, and act with Secondly, the doctrine of res judicata does not apply
Ordinarily, the case would then be remanded to the finality (Li Siu Liat vs. Republic, 21 SCRA to questions of citizenship (Labo vs. Commission on
Regional Trial Court. But not in the case at 1039, 1046, citing Samal vs. CA, 99 Phil. Elections (supra); citing Soria vs. Commissioner of
bar.1wphi1 Considering the voluminous pleadings 230 and US vs. Gimenez, 34 Phil. 74.) Immigration, 37 SCRA 213; Lee vs. Commissioner of
submitted by the parties and the evidence presented, (Beautifont, Inc. vs. Court of appeals, et al., Immigration, 42 SCRA 561 [1971]; Sia Reyes vs.
We deem it proper to decide the controversy right at Jan. 29, 1988; See also Labo vs. Deportation Board, 122 SCRA 478 [1983]).
this instance. And this course of action is not without Commission on Elections, 176 SCRA 1 In Moy Ya Lim vs. Commissioner of Immigration (41
precedent for "it is a cherished rule of procedure for [1989]). SCRA 292 [1971]) and in Lee vs. Commissioner of
this Court to always strive to settle the entire Respondent Gatchalian has adduced evidence not Immigration (supra), this Court declared that:
controversy in a single proceeding leaving no root or only before the Regional Trial Court but also before (e)verytime the citizenship of a person is
branch to bear the seeds of future litigation. No useful Us in the form of public documents attached to his material or indispensable in a judicial or
purpose will be served if this case is remanded to the pleadings. On the other hand, Special Prosecutor administrative case, whatever the
trial court only to have its decision raised again to the Renato Mabolo in his Manifestation (dated September corresponding court or administrative
Court of Appeals and from there to this Court" 6, 1990; Rollo, p. 298, counter-petition) before the authority decides therein as to such
(Marquez vs. Marquez, 73 Phil. 74; Keramic Bureau of Immigration already stated that there is no citizenship is generally not considered as res
Industries, Inc. vs. Guerrero, 61 SCRA 265 [1974]) longer a need to adduce evidence in support of the adjudicata, hence it has to be threshed out
Alger Electric, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals (135 SCRA 37 deportation charges against respondent. In addition, again and again as the occasion may
[1985]), citing Gayos vs. Gayos (67 SCRA 146 petitioners invoke that this Court's decision in Arocha demand.
[1975]). vs. Vivo and Vivo vs. Arca (supra), has already settled An exception to the above rule was laid by this Court
In Lianga Bay Logging Co., Inc. vs. Court of respondent's alienage. Hence, the need for a judicial in Burca vs. Republic (51 SCRA 248 [1973]), viz:
Appeals (157 SCRA 357 [1988]), We also stated: determination of respondent's citizenship specially so We declare it to be a sound rule that where
Remand of the case to the lower court for where the latter is not seeking admission, but is the citizenship of a party in a case is
further reception of evidence is not already in the Philippines (for the past thirty [30] definitely resolved by a court or by an
necessary where the court is in a position to years) and is being expelled (Chua Hiong vs. administrative agency, as a material issue in
resolve the dispute based on the records Deportation Board, supra). the controversy, after a full-blown hearing
before it. On many occasions, the Court, in According to petitioners, respondent's alienage has with the active participation of the Solicitor
the public interest and the expeditious been conclusively settled by this Court in General or his authorized representative,
administration of justice, has resolved the Arocha and Vivo cases, We disagree. It must be and this finding or the citizenship of the party
actions on the merits instead of remanding noted that in said cases, the sole issue resolved is affirmed by this Court, the decision on the
them to the trial court for further therein was the actual date of rendition of the July 6, matter shall constitute conclusive proof of
proceedings, such as where the ends of 1962 decision of the then board of such party's citizenship in any other case or
justice would not be subserved by the Commissioners, i.e., whether the decision was proceeding. But it is made clear that in no
remand of the case or when public interest rendered on July 6, 1962 or on July 20, 1962 it instance will a decision on the question of
demands an early disposition of the case or appearing that the figure (date) "20" was erased and citizenship in such cases be considered
where the trial court had already received all over it was superimposed the figure "6" thereby conclusive or binding in any other case or
the evidence of the parties (Quisumbing vs. making the decision fall within the one-year proceeding, unless obtained in accordance
CA, 112 SCRA 703; Francisco, et al., vs. The reglementary period from July 6, 1961 within which with the procedure herein stated.
City of Davao, et al., supra; Republic vs. the decision may be reviewed. This Court did not Thus, in order that the doctrine of res judicata may be
Security Credit & Acceptance Corp., et al., squarely pass upon any question of citizenship, much applied in cases of citizenship, the following must be
19 SCRA 58; Samal vs. CA, supra; Republic less that of respondent's who was not a party in the present: 1) a person's citizenship must be raised as a
vs. Central Surety & Insurance Co., 25 aforesaid cases. The said cases originated from a material issue in a controversy where said person is a
SCRA 641). petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed on July 21, party; 2) the Solicitor General or his authorized
Likewise in Tejones vs. Gironella (159 SCRA 100 1965 by Macario Arocha in behalf of Pedro representative took active part in the resolution
[1988]), We said: Gatchalian. Well settled is the rule that a person not thereof, and 3) the finding or citizenship is affirmed by
Sound practice seeks to accommodate the party to a case cannot be bound by a decision this Court.
theory which avoids waste of time, effort and rendered therein. Gauged by the foregoing, We find the pre-conditions
expense, both to the parties and the Neither can it be argued that the Board of set forth in Burca inexistent in
government, not to speak of delay in the Commissioners' decision (dated July 6, 1962) finding the Arocha and Vivo cases relied upon by petitioners.
disposal of the case (cf. Fernandez vs. respondent's claim to Philippine citizenship not Indeed, respondent William Gatchalian was not even
Garcia, 92 Phil. 592, 297). A marked satisfactorily proved, constitute res judicata. For one a party in said cases.
characterstic of our judicial set-up is that thing, said decision did not make any categorical
Coming now to the contention of petitioners that the the test of constitutionality for only judges can issue cablegram only led to the issuance of their
arrest of respondent follows as a matter of the same (Sec. 2, Art. III, Constitution). Certificate(s) of Identity which took the place of a
consequence based on the warrant of exclusion A reading of the mission order/warrant of arrest (dated passport for their authorized travel to the Philippines.
issued on July 6, 1962, coupled with August 15, 1990; Rollo, p. 183, counter-petition) It being so, even if the applicants could have entered
the Arocha and Vivo cases (Rollo, pp. 33), the Court issued by the Commissioner of Immigration, clearly illegally, the mere fact that they are citizens of the
finds the same devoid of merit. indicates that the same was issued only for purposes Philippines entitles them to remain in the country."
Sec. 37 (a) of Commonwealth Act No. 613, as of investigation of the suspects, William Gatchalian On March 15, 1973, then Acting Commissioner Nituda
amended, otherwise known as the Immigration Act of included. Paragraphs 1 and 3 of the mission order issued an Order (Annex "6", counter-petition) which
1940, reads: directs the Intelligence Agents/Officers to: affirmed the Board of Special Inquiry No. 1 decision
Sec. 37. (a) The following aliens shall be xxx xxx xxx dated July 6, 1961 admitting respondent Gatchalian
arrested upon the warrant of the 1. Make a warrantless arrest under the Rules and others as Filipino citizens; recalled the July 6,
Commissioner of Immigration or of any other of Criminal Procedure, Rule 113, Sec. 5, for 1962 warrant of arrest and revalidated their
officer designated by him for the purpose violation of the Immigration Act, Sec. 37, Identification Certificates.
and deported upon the warrant of the para. a; Secs. 45 and 46 Administrative The above order admitting respondent as a Filipino
Commissioner of Immigration after a Code; citizen is the last official act of the government on the
determination by the Board of Commissioner xxx xxx xxx basis of which respondent William Gatchalian
of the existence of the ground for 3. Deliver the suspect to the Intelligence continually exercised the rights of a Filipino citizen to
deportation as charged against the alien. Division and immediately conduct custodial the present. Consequently, the presumption of
(Emphasis supplied) interrogation, after warning the suspect that citizenship lies in favor of respondent William
From a perusal of the above provision, it is clear that he has a right to remain silent and a right to Gatchalian.
in matters of implementing the Immigration Act insofar counsel; . . . There should be no question that Santiago
as deportation of aliens are concerned, the Hence, petitioners' argument that the arrest of Gatchalian, grandfather of William Gatchalian, is a
Commissioner of Immigration may issue warrants of respondent was based, ostensibly, on the July 6, Filipino citizen. As a matter of fact, in the very order of
arrest only after a determination by the Board of 1962 warrant of exclusion has obviously no leg to the BOC of July 6, 1962, which reversed the July 6,
Commissioners of the existence of the ground for stand on. The mission order/warrant of arrest made 1961 BSI order, it is an accepted fact that Santiago
deportation as charged against the alien. In other no mention that the same was issued pursuant to a Gatchalian is a Filipino. The opening paragraph of
words, a warrant of arrest issued by the final order of deportation or warrant of exclusion. said order states:
Commissioner of Immigration, to be valid, must be for But there is one more thing that militates against The claim to Filipino citizenship of
the sole purpose of executing a final order of petitioners' cause. As records indicate, which abovenamed applicants is based on the
deportation. A warrant of arrest issued by the petitioners conveniently omitted to state either in their citizenship of one Santiago Gatchalian
Commissioner of Immigration for purposes of petition or comment to the counter-petition of whose Philippine citizenship was recognized
investigation only, as in the case at bar, is null and respondent, respondent Gatchalian, along with others by the Bureau of Immigration in an Order
void for being unconstitutional (Ang Ngo Chiong vs. previously covered by the 1962 warrant of exclusion, dated July 12, 1960. (Annex "37", Comment
Galang, 67 SCRA 338 [1975] citing Po Siok Pin vs. filed a motion for re-hearing before the Board of with Counter-Petition).
Vivo, 62 SCRA 363 [1975]; Vivo vs. Montesa, 24 Special Inquiry (BSI) sometime in 1973. Nonetheless, in said order it was found that the
SCRA 155; Morano vs. Vivo, 20 SCRA 562; Qua On March 14, 1973, the Board of Special Inquiry, after applicants therein have not satisfactorily proven that
Chee Gan vs. Deportation Board, 9 SCRA 27 [1963]; giving due course to the motion for re-hearing, they are the children and/or grandchildren of Santiago
Ng Hua To vs. Galang, 10 SCRA 411; see also Santos submitted a memorandum to the then Acting Gatchalian. The status of Santiago Gatchalian as a
vs. Commissioner of Immigration, 74 SCRA 96 Commissioner Victor Nituda (Annex "5", counter- Filipino was reiterated in Arocha and Arca (supra)
[1976]). petition) recommending 1 the reconsideration of the where advertence is made to the "applicants being
As We held in Qua Chee Gan vs. Deportation July 6, 1962 decision of the then Board of the descendants of one Santiago Gatchalian, a
Board (supra), "(t)he constitution does not distinguish Commissioners which reversed the July 6, 1961 Filipino." (at p. 539).
warrants between a criminal case and administrative decision of the then Board of Special Inquiry No. 1 In the sworn statement of Santiago Gatchalian before
proceedings. And if one suspected of having and 2 the lifting of the warrants of arrest issued the Philippine Consul in Hongkong in 1961 (Annex "1"
committed a crime is entitled to a determination of the against applicants. The memorandum inferred that to the Comment of petitioners to Counter-Petition), he
probable cause against him, by a judge, why should the "very basis of the Board of Commissioners in reiterated his status as a Philippine citizen being the
one suspected of a violation of an administrative reversing the decision of the Board of Special Inquiry illegitimate child of Pablo Pacheco and Marciana
nature deserve less guarantee?" It is not was due to a forged cablegram by the then Secretary Gatchalian, the latter being a Filipino; that he was
indispensable that the alleged alien be arrested for of Foreign Affairs, . . ., which was dispatched to the born in Manila on July 25, 1905; and that he was
purposes of investigation. If the purpose of the Philippine Consulate in Hong Kong authorizing the issued Philippine Passport No. 28160 (PA-No.
issuance of the warrant of arrest is to determine the registration of applicants as P.I. citizens." The Board A91196) on November 18, 1960 by the Department of
existence of probable cause, surely, it cannot pass of Special Inquiry concluded that "(i)f at all, the Foreign Affairs in Manila. In his affidavit of January 23,
1961 (Annex "5", counter-petition), Santiago resident merchant, now deceased, who in Arocha should be applicable to respondent William
reiterated his claim of Philippine citizenship as a owned a restaurant in the Philippines valued Gatchalian even if the latter was not a party to said
consequence of his petition for cancellation of his at P15,000 and which gives a net profit of case. They also opined that under Sec. 37 (b) of the
alien registry which was granted on February 18, P500 a month, the immigration officials then Immigration Act, the five (5) years limitation is
1960 in C.E.B. No. 3660-L; and that on July 20, 1960, must have considered the irregularity not applicable only where the deportation is sought to be
he was recognized by the Bureau of Immigration as a serious enough when, inspire of that finding, effected under clauses of Sec. 37 (b) other than
Filipino and was issued Certificate No. 1-2123. they decided to land said minor "as a clauses 2, 7, 8, 11 and 12 and that no period of
The dissenting opinions of my esteemed brethrens, properly documented preference quota limitation is applicable in deportations under clauses
Messrs. Justices F.P. Feliciano and H.G. Davide, Jr., immigrant" (Exhibit D). We cannot therefore 2, 7, 8, 11 and 12.
proposing to re-open the question of citizenship of but wonder why two years later the The Court disagrees. Under Sec. 39 of the
Santiago Gatchalian at this stage of the case, where it immigration officials would reverse their Immigration Act, it is reiterated that such deportation
is not even put in issue, is quite much to late. As attitude and would take steps to institute proceedings should be instituted within five (5) years.
stated above, the records of the Bureau of deportation proceedings against the minor. Section 45 of the same Act provides penal sanctions
Immigration show that as of July 20, 1960, Santiago Under the circumstances obtaining in this for violations of the offenses therein enumerated with
Gatchalian had been declared to be a Filipino citizen. case, we believe that much as the attitude of a fine of "not more than P1,000.00 and imprisonment
It is a final decision that forecloses a re-opening of the the mother would be condemned for having for not more than two (2) years and deportation if he
same 30 years later. Petitioners do not even question made use of an improper means to gain is an alien." Thus:
Santiago Gatchalian's Philippine citizenship. It is the entrance into the Philippines and acquire Penal Provisions
citizenship of respondent William Gatchalian that is in permanent residence there, it is now too Sec. 45. Any individual who
issue and addressed for determination of the Court in late, not to say unchristian, to deport the (a) When applying for an immigration
this case. minor after having allowed the mother to document personates another individual, or
Furthermore, petitioners' position is not enhanced by remain even illegally to the extent of falsely appears in the name of deceased
the fact that respondent's arrest came twenty-eight validating her residence by inaction, thus individual, or evades the immigration laws by
(28) years after the alleged cause of deportation allowing the period of prescription to set in appearing under an assumed name; fictitious
arose. Section 37 (b) of the Immigration Act states and to elapse in her favor. To permit his name; or
that deportation "shall not be effected . . . unless the deportation at this late hour would be to (b) Issues or otherwise disposes of an
arrest in the deportation proceedings is made within condemn him to live separately from his immigration document, to any person not
five (5) years after the cause of deportation arises." mother through no fault of his thereby authorized by law to receive such document;
In Lam Shee vs. Bengzon (93 Phil. 1065 [1953]), We leaving him to a life of insecurity resulting or
laid down the consequences of such inaction, thus: from lack of support and protection of his (c) Obtains, accepts or uses any immigration
There is however an important circumstance family. This inaction or oversight on the part document, knowing it to be false; or
which places this case beyond the reach of of immigration officials has created an (d) Being an alien, enters the Philippines
the resultant consequence of the fraudulent anomalous situation which, for reasons of without inspection and admission by the
act committed by the mother of the minor equity, should be resolved in favor of the immigration officials, or obtains entry into the
when she admitted that she gained entrance minor herein involved. (Emphasis supplied) Philippines by wilful, false, or misleading
into the Philippines by making use of the In the case at bar, petitioners' alleged cause of action representation or wilful concealment of a
name of a Chinese resident merchant other and deportation against herein respondent arose in material fact; or
than that of her lawful husband, and that is, 1962. However, the warrant of arrest of respondent (e) Being an alien shall for any fraudulent
that the mother can no longer be the subject was issued by Commissioner Domingo only on purpose represent himself to be a Philippine
of deportation proceedings for the simple August 15, 1990 28 long years after. It is clear that citizen in order to evade any requirement of
reason that more than 5 years had elapsed petitioners' cause of action has already prescribed the immigration laws; or
from the date of her admission. Note that the and by their inaction could not now be validly (f) In any immigration matter shall knowingly
above irregularity was divulged by the enforced by petitioners against respondent William make under oath any false statement or
mother herself, who in a gesture of sincerity, Gatchalian. Furthermore, the warrant of exclusion representations; or
made an spontaneous admission before the dated July 6, 1962 was already recalled and the (g) Being an alien, shall depart from the
immigration officials in the investigation Identification certificate of respondent, among others, Philippines without first securing an
conducted in connection with the landing of was revalidated on March 15, 1973 by the then Acting immigration clearance certificates required
the minor on September 24, 1947, and not Commissioner Nituda. by section twenty-two of this Act; or
through any effort on the part of the It is also proposed in the dissenting opinions of (h) Attempts or conspires with another to
immigration authorities. And considering this Messrs. Justices Feliciano and Davide, Jr., that the commit any of the foregoing acts, shall be
frank admission, plus the fact that the mother BOC decision dated July 6, 1962 and the warrant of guilty of an offense, and upon conviction
was found to be married to another Chinese exclusion which was found to be valid thereof, shall be fined not more than one
thousand pesos, and imprisoned for not 1. Deportation or exclusion proceedings should be alien who invest at least US$50,000.00 in the
more than two years, and deported if he is initiated within five (5) years after the cause of country? Even assuming arguendo that respondent is
an alien. (Emphasis supplied) deportation or exclusion arises when effected under an alien, his deportation under the circumstances is
Such offenses punishable by correctional penalty any other clauses other than clauses 2, 7, 8, 11 and unjust and unfair, if not downright illegal. The action
prescribe in 10 years (Art. 90, Revised Penal Code); 12 and of paragraph (a) of Sec. 37 of the Immigration taken by petitioners in the case at bar is diametrically
correctional penalties also prescribe in 10 years (Art. Act; and opposed to settled government policy.
92, Revised Penal Code). 2. When deportation or exclusion is effected under Petitioners, on the other hand, claim that respondent
It must be noted, however, that under Sec. 1, Act No. clauses 2, 7, 8, 11 and 12 of paragraph (a) of Sec. 37, is an alien. In support of their position, petitioners
3326 [1926], as amended, (Prescription for Violations the prescriptive period of the deportation or exclusion point out that Santiago Gatchalian's marriage with
Penalized by Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances) proceedings is eight (8) years. Chu Gim Tee in China as well as the marriage of
"violations penalized by special acts shall, unless In the case at bar, it took petitioners 28 years since Francisco (father of William) Gatchalian to Ong Chiu
otherwise provided in such acts, prescribe in the BOC decision was rendered on July 6, 1962 Kiok, likewise in China, were not supported by any
accordance with the following rules: . . .c) after eight before they commenced deportation or exclusion evidence other than their own self-serving testimony
years for those punished by imprisonment for two proceedings against respondent William Gatchalian in nor was there any showing what the laws of China
years or more, but less than six years; . . ." 1990. Undoubtedly, petitioners' cause of action has were. It is the postulate advanced by petitioners that
Consequently, no prosecution and consequent already prescribed. Neither may an action to revive for the said marriages to be valid in this country, it
deportation for violation of the offenses enumerated in and/or enforce the decision dated July 6, 1962 be should have been shown that they were valid by the
the Immigration Act can be initiated beyond the eight- instituted after ten (10) years (Art. 1144 [3], Civil laws of China wherein the same were contracted.
year prescriptive period, the Immigration Act being a Code). There being none, petitioners conclude that the
special legislation. Since his admission as a Filipino citizen in 1961, aforesaid marriages cannot be considered valid.
The Court, therefore, holds that the period of effecting respondent William Gatchalian has continuously Hence, Santiago's children, including Francisco,
deportation of an alien after entry or a warrant of resided in the Philippines. He married Ting Dee Hua followed the citizenship of their mother, having been
exclusion based on a final order of the BSI or BOC on July 1, 1973 (Annex "8", counter-petition) with born outside of a valid marriage. Similarly, the validity
are not imprescriptible. The law itself provides for a whom he has four (4) minor children. The marriage of the Francisco's marriage not having been
period of prescription. Prescription of the crime is contract shows that said respondent is a Filipino demonstrated, William and Johnson followed the
forfeiture or loss of the rights of the State to prosecute (Annex "8"). He holds passports and earlier passports citizenship of their mother, a Chinese national.
the offender after the lapse of a certain time, while as a Filipino (Annexes "9", "10" & "11", counter- After a careful consideration of petitioner's argument,
prescription of the penalty is the loss or forfeiture by petition). He is a registered voter of Valenzuela, Metro We find that it cannot be sustained.
the government of the right to execute the final Manila where he has long resided and exercised his In Miciano vs. Brimo (50 Phil. 867 [1924]; Lim and Lim
sentence after the lapse of a certain time (Padilla, right of suffrage (Annex 12, counter-petition). He vs. Collector of Customs, 36 Phil. 472; Yam Ka Lim
Criminal Law, Vol. 1, 1974, at p. 855). engaged in business in the Philippines since 1973 vs. Collector of Customs, 30 Phil. 46 [1915]), this
"Although a deportation proceeding does not partake and is the director/officer of the International Polymer Court held that in the absence of evidence to the
of the nature of a criminal action, however, Corp. and Ropeman International Corp. as a Filipino contrary, foreign laws on a particular subject are
considering that it is a harsh and extraordinary (Annexes, "13" & "14", counter-petition). He is a presumed to be the same as those of the Philippines.
administrative proceeding affecting the freedom and taxpayer. Respondent claims that the companies he In the case at bar, there being no proof of Chinese
liberty of a person, the constitutional right of such runs and in which he has a controlling investment law relating to marriage, there arises the presumption
person to due process should not be denied. Thus, provides livelihood to 4,000 employees and that it is the same as that of Philippine law.
the provisions of the Rules of Court of the Philippines approximately 25,000 dependents. He continuously The lack of proof of Chinese law on the matter cannot
particularly on criminal procedure are applicable to enjoyed the status of Filipino citizenship and be blamed on Santiago Gatchalian much more on
deportation proceedings." (Lao Gi vs. Court of discharged his responsibility as such until petitioners respondent William Gatchalian who was then a
Appeals, supra). Under Sec. 6, Rule 39 of the Rules initiated the deportation proceedings against him. twelve-year old minor. The fact is, as records indicate,
of Court, a final judgment may not be executed after "The power to deport an alien is an act of the State. It Santiago was not pressed by the Citizenship
the lapse of five (5) years from the date of its entry or is an act by or under the authority of the sovereign Investigation Board to prove the laws of China relating
from the date it becomes final and executory. power. It is a police measure against undesirable to marriage, having been content with the testimony
Thereafter, it may be enforced only by a separate aliens whose presence in the country is found to be of Santiago that the Marriage Certificate was lost or
action subject to the statute of limitations. Under Art. injurious to the public good and domestic tranquility of destroyed during the Japanese occupation of China.
1144 (3) of the Civil Code, an action based on the people" (Lao Gi vs. Court of Appeals, supra). How Neither was Francisco Gatchalian's testimony
judgment must be brought within 10 years from the could one who has helped the economy of the country subjected to the same scrutiny by the Board of
time the right of action accrues. by providing employment to some 4,000 people be Special Inquiry. Nevertheless, the testimonies of
In relation to Sec. 37 (b) of the Immigration Act, the considered undesirable and be summarily deported Santiago Gatchalian and Francisco Gatchalian before
rule, therefore, is: when the government, in its concerted drive to attract the Philippine consular and immigration authorities
foreign investors, grants Special Resident Visa to any regarding their marriages, birth and relationship to
each other are not self-serving but are admissible in Sec. 1. The following are citizens of the However, I cannot go along with the view that the
evidence as statements or declarations regarding Philippines: case of William Gatchalian should be treated as an
family reputation or tradition in matters of pedigree (1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines exception to that doctrine and, above all, to the law
(Sec. 34, Rule 130). Furtheremore, this salutary rule at the time of the adoption of this which vests upon the Court of Appeals exclusive
of evidence finds support in substantive law. Thus, Constitution. . . . appellate jurisdiction over the Boards. Neither can I
Art. 267 of the Civil Code provides: This forecloses any further question about the have solidarity with his opinion that this Court should,
Art. 267. In the absence of a record of birth, Philippine citizenship of respondent William in this instance, rule on the citizenship of Mr.
authentic document, final judgment or Gatchalian. Gatchalian instead of remanding the case to the
possession of status, legitimate filiation may The Court is not unaware of Woong Woo Yiu vs. Regional Trial Court. To grant him these benefits
be proved by any other means allowed by Vivo (13 SCRA 552 [1965]) relied upon by petitioners. would do violence to the law, liberally stretch the limits
the Rules of Court and special laws. (See The ruling arrived thereat, however, cannot apply in of the exceptions or misapply the exceptionary rule,
also Art. 172 of the Family Code) the case at bar for the simple reason that the parties and to unduly pollute the settled doctrine. No fact or
Consequently, the testimonies/affidavits of Santiago therein testified to have been married in China by a circumstance exists to justify the application of the
Gatchalian and Francisco Gatchalian aforementioned village leader, which undoubtedly is not among those exceptions for the benefit of Mr. Gatchalian. On the
are not self-serving but are competent proof of filiation authorized to solemnize marriage as provided in Art. contrary, substantial facts exist to render immutable
(Art. 172 [2], Family Code). 56 of the Civil Code (now Art. 7, Family Code). the unqualified application of the law and the doctrine.
Philippine law, following the lex loci celebrationis, Premises considered, the Court deems it To my mind, the questioned acts of the Boards were
adheres to the rule that a marriage formally valid unnecessary to resolve the other issues raised by the done absolutely within their quasi-judicial functions.
where celebrated is valid everywhere. Referring to parties. Therefore, the rule laid down in Filipinas Engineering
marriages contracted abroad, Art. 71 of the Civil Code WHEREFORE, G.R. Nos. 95122-23 is DISMISSED and Machine Shop vs. Ferrer (135 SCRA 25)
(now Art. 26 of the Family Code) provides that "(a)ll for lack of merit; G.R. Nos. 95612-13 is hereby and Lupangco vs. Court of Appeals (160 SCRA 848)
marriages performed outside of the Philippines in GRANTED and respondent William Gatchalian is does not apply.
accordance with the laws in force in the country declared a Filipino citizen. Petitioners are hereby Consequently, pursuant to paragraph 3 of Section 9 of
where they were performed, and valid there as such, permanently enjoined from continuing with the Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, and Our resolutions of 15
shall also be valid in this country . . ." And any doubt deportation proceedings docketed as DC No. 90-523 September 1987 and 2 April 1990 in G.R. No. 79635
as to the validity of the matrimonial unity and the for lack of jurisdiction over respondent Gatchalian, he (Commissioner of Customs vs. Court of Tax Appeals,
extent as to how far the validity of such marriage may being a Filipino citizen; Civil Cases No. 90-54214 and et al.) and G.R. No. 80320 (Commissioner of Internal
be extended to the consequences of the coverture is 3431-V-90 pending before respondent judges are Revenue vs. Court of Tax Appeals, et al.),
answered by Art. 220 of the Civil Code in this manner: likewise DISMISSED. Without pronouncement as to respectively, and Our decisions of 16 March 1989, 22
"In case of doubt, all presumptions favor the solidarity costs. December 1989, and 6 June 1990 in G.R. No. 83578
of the family. Thus, every intendment of law or facts SO ORDERED. (Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force vs. Court
leans toward the validity of marriage, the Gutierrez, Jr., Gancayco, Sarmiento, Grio-Aquino of Appeals, et al.), 171 SCRA 348, G.R. No. 86625
indissolubility of the marriage bonds, the legitimacy of and Medialdea, JJ., concur. (Development Bank of the Philippines vs. Court of Tax
children, the community of property during marriage, Fernan, C.J., and Narvasa, J., concur in the result. Appeals, et al.), 180 SCRA 609, 617, and in G.R. No.
the authority of parents over their children, and the L-48113 (Yang vs. Court of Appeals, et al.),
validity of defense for any member of the family in respectively, the Gatchalians should have invoked the
case of unlawful aggression." (Emphasis supplied). Separate Opinions exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals
Bearing in mind the "processual presumption" DAVIDE, JR., J., concurring-dissenting: for appropriate redress instead of filing petitions
enunciated in Miciano and other cases, he who I can easily agree with the summary of antecedent for certiorari and prohibition with injunction before the
asserts that the marriage is not valid under our law facts in the ponencia of Mr. Justice Bidin and the Regional Trial Court of Manila (Civil Case No. 90-
bears the burden of proof to present the foreign law. reiteration therein of the established doctrine that the 54214) and before the Regional Trial Court of
Having declared the assailed marriages as valid, Bureau of Immigration has the exclusive authority and Valenzuela, Metro Manila (Civil Case No. 3431-V-90).
respondent William Gatchalian follows the citizenship jurisdiction to try and hear cases against alleged The trial courts should have dismissed the cases. In
of his father Francisco, a Filipino, as a legitimate child aliens, and in the process, determine also their issuing the questioned orders, respondents Judge
of the latter. Francisco, in turn is likewise a Filipino citizenship, and that "a mere claim of citizenship Dela Rosa and Judge Capulong clearly acted without
being the legitimate child of Santiago Gatchalian who cannot operate to divest the Board of Commissioners jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.
(the latter) is admittedly a Filipino citizen whose of its jurisdiction in deportation proceedings." I also As to why William Gatchalian filed his petition before
Philippine citizenship was recognized by the Bureau agree with the conclusion that the petitioners in G.R. the former court and his wife and minor children filed
of Immigration in an order dated July 12, 1960. No. 95122-23, the Board of Commissioners and a separate complaint before the latter has not been
Finally, respondent William Gatchalian belongs to the Board of Special Inquiry, hereinafter referred to as the explained. It is to be noted that he is a registered
class of Filipino citizens contemplated under Sec. 1, Boards, are quasi-judicial bodies. voter of Valenzuela, Metro Manila where he has long
Article IV of the Constitution, which provides: resided and exercised his right of suffrage (Annex 12,
Counter-Petition). Therefore, he should have filed his his deportation and to divest the Boards of their of Identity (as Filipino) which was issued on the basis
petition with the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela. original jurisdiction thereon. He could have done this of a forged cablegram by the then Secretary of
His wife and minor children are not parties to the case at the first instance; he did not. He and his wife and Foreign Affairs. Then on 6 July 1962 the then new
before the Commission on Immigration and minor children deliberately chose, instead, to Board of Commissioners promulgated a written
Deportation. Their causes of action are based mainly separately go to the wrong court, evidently to delay decision in I.C. Cases Nos. 61-2108-C to 61-2116-C
on their claim that the acts of the Boards against the proceedings before the Boards, which they inclusive (Application for admission as Philippine
William tend to deprive plaintiff mother consortium accomplished when the two judges separately issued citizens of Jose, Elena, Benjamin, Juan, Pedro,
and connubium and the plaintiffs minors protection orders restraining said Boards from commencing or Gloria, Francisco, William and Johnson, all surnamed
and support. At once, the viability of their causes of continuing with any of the proceedings which would Gatchalian) reversing the decision of the Board of
action is doubtful; however, if indeed they have valid lead to the deportation of William Gatchalian (Civil Special Inquiry No. 1 of 6 July 1961 and ordering the
causes of action, they could have been joined as co- Case No. 90-54214) and from proceeding with the exclusion of William Gatchalian and the others as
plaintiffs in the case filed by William. It appears then deportation charges against William Gatchalian (Civil aliens not properly documented. Accordingly, a
that their filing of a separate complaint before another Case No. 3431-V-90). warrant of exclusion, also dated 6 July 1962, was
court was part of a strategy to frustrate the Chua Hiong vs. Deportation Board (96 Phil. 665) cited issued by the Commissioners commanding the
proceedings before the Boards. As correctly in the ponencia as another authority which allows deportation officer to exclude William Gatchalian, and
maintained by the petitioning Boards, we have here a William Gatchalian to enjoy the protective mantle of others, and to cause their removal from the country
clear case of forum-shopping, especially considering the exceptionary rule affecting the exclusive power of on the first available transportation in accordance with
the fact that on September 4, 1990, or two days the Commission on Immigration and Deportation to try law to the port of the country of which they were
before the filing of the case before the Valenzuela and hear cases against aliens and in the process also nationals. The pertinent portion of the Decision reads
court the government filed a motion to dismiss the determine their citizenship is either not applicable or as follows:
case before the Manila court. Forum-shopping has is mis-applied. This case laid down the principle that The claim to Philippine citizenship of above-
long been condemned and proscribed. In People vs. "when the evidence submitted by a respondent is named applicants is based on the citizenship
Court of Appeals, et al. (101 SCRA 450, 463), conclusive of his citizenship, the right to immediate of one Santiago Gatchalian whose Philippine
promulgated on 28 November 1980, this Court held review should also be recognized and the courts citizenship was recognized by the Bureau of
that a party "should not be allowed to pursue should promptly enjoin the deportation Immigration in an Order, dated July 12,
simultaneous remedies in two different forums." In the proceedings. . . . If he is a citizen and evidence 1960. It is alleged that applicants JOSE
Resolution of 31 July 1986 in E. Razon Inc., et al. vs. thereof is satisfactory, there is no sense nor justice in GATCHALIAN, FRANCISCO GATCHALIAN,
Philippine Port Authority, et al., G.R. No. 75197, this allowing the deportation proceedings to continue, ELENA GATCHALIAN and BENJAMIN
Court held: granting him the remedy only after the Board has GATCHALIAN are the legitimate children of
The acts of petitioners constitute a clear finished its investigation of his undesirability. . . ." Santiago Gatchalian with one Chiu Gim Tee.
case of forum-shopping, an act of (emphasis supplied). The word courts should Except for the self-serving testimonies of
malpractice that is proscribed and not now be interpreted to mean or to include the Santiago Gatchalian and his alleged
condemned as trifling with the courts and regional trial courts because, as stated above, said children, there has not been submitted any
abusing their processes. It is improper courts do not have any appellate jurisdiction over the evidence of Santiago Gatchalian's marriage
conduct that tends to degrade the Commission on Immigration and Deportation, the to Chiu Gim Tee and the birth of the alleged
administration of justice. (See also Buan vs. Board of Commissioners and the Board of Special children of the couple. The personal records
Lopez, Jr., 145 SCRA 34; Palm Avenue Inquiry. This case was decided in 1955 yet, or twenty- of Santiago Gatchalian on file with this office
Realty Development Corp. vs. PCGG, 153 six years before the effectivity of Batas Pambansa do not reflect the names of applicants as his
SCRA 591; Minister of Natural Resources, et Blg. 129. children, and while two names listed in his
al. vs. Heirs of Orval Hughes, et al., 155 The condition sine qua non then to an authorized Form 1 (ACR application), Jose and Elena,
SCRA 566; Limpin vs. IAC, 161 SCRA 98; judicial intervention is that the evidence submitted by bear the same name as two of herein
Collado vs. Hernando, 161 SCRA 639; a respondent is conclusive of his citizenship, or as applicants, the difference in the ages of said
Villanueva, et al. vs. Adre, et al., 172 SCRA stated in Co vs. Deportation Board, (78 SCRA 104, applicants, casts serious doubt on their
877; Danville Maritime, Inc. vs. COA, 175 107), the claim of citizenship is so substantial that identity. Apropos, the applicants JOSE
SCRA 717; Crisostomo vs. SEC, 179 SCRA there are no reasonable grounds for the belief that the GATCHALIAN, GLORIA GATCHALIAN,
154; Adlawan vs. Tomol, 179 SCRA 42; and claim is correct. FRANCISCO GATCHALIAN, ELENA
Alonto vs. Memoracion, 185 SCRA 73). The facts before this Court do not constitute, or even GATCHALIAN and BENJAMIN
William Gatchalian did not stop in his forum-shopping show, a conclusive or substantial evidence that GATCHALIAN, not having satisfactorily
in the regional trial courts. Under the guise of a William Gatchalian is a Filipino citizen. On the proved as the children of Santiago
counter-petition, he is now before this Court in an contrary, very serious doubts surround such a claim Gatchalian, determination of the citizenship
active offensive role. This is a very clever, albeit from the beginning. His initial entry into the of the other applicants, JUAN GATCHALIAN,
subtle, ploy to bang directly to this Court the issue of Philippines was made possible through a Certificate PEDRO GATCHALIAN and JOHNSON
GATCHALIAN, whose right to Filipino as Santiago Pacheco (Class card for 1920- Tee. (p. 4, Transcript of the proceedings
citizenship are merely drawn from their 21, Meisic, Manila; Certificates of completion before the Citizen Evaluation Board on 12
fathers, Jose Gatchalian and Francisco of third and fourth grades, Meisic Primary February 1960, Annex "2" of Comment with
Gatchalian, is unnecessary. (Decision, Annex School); but in his residence certificate dated Counter-Petition).
"E" of Petition). 17 September 1937, and in Tax Clearance If indeed Santiago's parents, Pablo Pacheco and
Looking back to the case of Santiago, William's Certificate issued on 2 October 1937, he is Marciana Gatchalian, were married, what was his
alleged grandfather, I cannot find sufficient credible referred to as Santiago Gatchalian; and in a reason for insisting, through his brother Joaquin, that
evidence to support his claim of Filipino citizenship. communication dated 6 June 1941, he was he, is an illegitimate son? The only possible reason is
For a long time before 20 July 1960 he considered addressed to as Santiago Pacheco by the that Pablo Pacheco is a Chinese citizen, in which
himself a Chinese citizen. The "conclusion" of the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes office. case Santiago would follow the citizenship of
Bureau of Immigration that Santiago is a Filipino Considering, however, the positive assertion Marciana, a "filipina." But to give full faith and credit to
citizen is based on totally questionable and by his elder brother who is better informed the oral insistence of illegitimacy is to do violence to
insufficient evidence which cannot inspire belief. The about their origin, the incontestable entry in the presumptions of validity of marriage, the
Order itself, signed by Associate Commissioner Felix his baptismal record that he is illegitimate indissolubility of the marriage bonds and the
Talabis, supports this conclusion. It reads in full as and the entry in the marriage contract of his legitimacy of children. (Art. 220, Civil Code). These
follows: elder brother wherein the father's name is are among the presumptions which
This is a petition for the cancellation of an omitted and the mother, Marciana the ponencia precisely applied when it rejected the
alien registry of SANTIAGO GATCHALIAN, Gatchalian, is described as Filipina petitioners' claim that Santiago failed to establish his
registered as Chinese and holder of ACR (marriage contract dated 29 November claimed marriage to Chu Gim Tee and Francisco's
No. A-219003 issued at Manila on 13 1936) there is sufficient evidence to establish (father of William) claimed marriage to Ong Chiu Kiok,
February 1951 and ICR No. 7501 dated 3 that Santiago Gatchalian is really Filipino at both of which were allegedly celebrated abroad. I
May 1946. He is alleged to be the son of birth, being the legitimate child of a Filipino cannot find any valid justification why these
Filipino parents who were not lawfully woman. presumptions should be liberally applied in favor of
married. WHEREFORE, the herein petition to cancel claimed marriages allegedly celebrated abroad but
It is alleged that the petitioner was born in his alien registration is granted, petitioner denied to purported marriages celebrated in the
Binondo, Manila, on 25 July 1905, to Pablo shall henceforth be shown in the records of Philippines.
Pacheco and Marciana Gatchalian. It is this office as a citizen of the Philippines and Interestingly, Santiago used the surname Pacheco
noted that in his application for alien the issuance to him of the appropriate during such proceedings and when he testified, he
registration filed with this Office on 13 Identification certificate showing his correct gave his name as Santiago Gatchalian Pacheco. This
January 1951, Santiago Gatchalian stated status is hereby authorized. (Order of 12 July is an incontrovertible proof that he recognized the
that his deceased parents were Pablo 1960, Annex "1" of Comment with Counter- legitimate union of his father and mother.
Pacheco and Marciana. He was identified by Petition). On 18 February 1960, Santiago was recalled to be
his only brother, Joaquin Pacheco, who As to his alleged marriage to Chu Gim Tee, and their confronted re his claim as to the number of his
insisted that he and petitioner are five children, we only have his self-selling oral children; he testified thus:
illegitimate. It is true that, on record, there is testimony, thus: Q In your testimony on February 12, this
a certificate signed on 26 October 1902 by Q What is the name of your wife? year, you named as your children the
Maxima Gatchalian, their maternal A Her name is Chu Gim Tee. following: Jose, Gloria, Francisco, Elena and
grandmother, giving consent to the marriage Q Is she still alive? Benjamin, all born in Amoy, arranged
of Marciana Gatchalian to Pablo Pacheco A No, she died in 1951, in Amoy. according to the order of their ages.
(Exh. B), but Joaquin said that his parents Q Do you have children with her, if so, However, in your Form 1 when you secured
did not actually get married. In proof of this, mention their names, ages and sexes? your ACR in 1951, you mentioned only Jose
the baptismal record of the petitioner A Yes. I have five children, all of them alive Gatchalian and Elena Gatchalian. Why, what
expressly states that Santiago Gatchalian and they are as follows: is the reason why in this form that you filled
was born on 25 July 1905 and baptized on 6 Jose Gatchalian, born on Jan. 2, 1927 in up in 1951, you mentioned only Jose and
October 1905, being the son of Marciana Amoy; Gloria Gatchalian, born February 20, Elena?
Gatchalian, "filipina", and an unknown father 1929 in Amoy; Francisco Gatchalian, born on A That form I am not the one who filled it
(verbatim copy dated 22 June 1907, Parish March 3, 1931 in Amoy; Elena Gatchalian, because that is not my handwriting. It is the
Priest of Binondo, Manila). born on April 4, 1933 in Amoy; Benjamin handwriting of my broker or the clerk of my
The petitioner, apparently not completely Gatchalian, born on 31 March 1942 in Amoy. broker. However, when they prepared that I
certain about his civil status, has been Q Where are they living now? mentioned my children named Jose, Gloria,
interchangeably using his paternal and A All of them are now living in Macao, with Francisco, Elena in a piece of paper which I
maternal surnames. In school he was known my sister-in-law by the name of Chu Lam gave to him, except Benjamin.
Q Why did you not mention Benjamin in the The decision then of Acting Commissioner Nituda was invalid ab initio cannot be a source of valid acts.
list? void and invalid ab initio. In view thereof, the Neither can such substantive infirmity be cured by
A Because he was not yet baptized then. rationalization in the ponencia that the issue could be salutary acts that tend to confirm the status conferred
(Transcript, p. 7, Annex "2" of Comment with re-opened since the decision of the Board of by the void decision.
Counter-Petition). Commissioners of 6 July 1962 did not constitute res In the light of the foregoing, it follows that the warrant
The explanation is very flimsy and does not deserve judicata is irrelevant. But even if it is to be conceded of exclusion issued against William Gatchalian
the respect of a passing glance. that the 6 July 1962 decision did not constitute res pursuant to and by virtue of the 6 July 1962 Decision
There is no showing that Gatchalian took any judicata, I find it both strange and illogical to give full of the Board of Commissioners subsists and remains
immediate definite positive step against the 6 July faith and credit to the unilateral action of Mr. Nituda valid and enforceable.
1962 decision and the warrant of exclusion. and to use it to bar the Boards from exercising its I disagree with the view advanced in
It was only sometime in 1973, or eleven years after, power and jurisdiction over William Gatchalian. the ponencia that the State can no longer enforce the
that he and others covered by the warrant of Assuming that indeed William is the grandson of warrant of exclusion because it is already barred by
expulsion filed a motion for re-hearing with the Board Santiago, I find it rather strange why Santiago did not prescription considering that Section 37 (b) of the
of Special Inquiry. There has been no explanation for mention him in his testimony before the Citizenship Immigration Act states that deportation "shall not be
the unreasonable delay in the filing of the motion. It Evaluation Board. At that time William was already effected . . . unless the arrest in the deportation
may be surmised that it was due to his minority, eleven years old. It is logical to presume that the proceedings is made within five (5) years after the
considering that he was allegedly only twelve years proceeding initiated by Santiago was principally for cause of deportation arises."
old when he arrived in Manila from Hongkong on 27 the benefit of his alleged children and grandchildren. Said paragraph (b) of Section 37 reads in full as
June 1961. But, such minority was no obstacle to the It was, as subsequent events proved, intended to follows:
filing of any remedial action for and in his behalf. prepare the legal basis for their entry into the country (b) Deportation may be effected under
The action taken by and the recommendation of the as Filipino citizens. Thus, eleven months after he clauses 2, 7, 8, 11 and 12 paragraph (a) of
Board of Special Inquiry of 14 March 1973 to the then obtained a favorable decision from the Board, and on this section at any time after entry, but shall
Acting Commissioner Victor Nituda for the reversal of two successive dates, his alleged children and not be effected under any other
the July 6, 1962 decision of the Board of grandchildren entered the country. On 25 June 1961 clause unless the arrest in the deportation
Commissioners were not only highly anomalous, his alleged children Jose, Elena, Benjamin, and his proceedings is made within five years after
irregular and improper, it was done without any alleged grandchildren Pedro and Juan arrived from the cause of deportation arises. Deportation
semblance of authority. The Board of Special Inquiry Hongkong. On 27 June 1961, his alleged daughter under clauses 3 and 4 shall not be effected if
did not have the power to review, modify or reverse a Gloria and son Francisco with his alleged children the court or judge thereof, when sentencing
Decision of the Board of Commissioners rendered William and Johnson also arrived from Hongkong. the alien, shall recommend to the
about eleven years earlier. Then Acting Commissioner (pp. 4-5, Petition). Commissioner of Immigration that the alien
Victor Nituda, acting alone, did not likewise have the That he has continuously resided in the Philippines be not deported. (As amended by Sec. 13,
power or authority to approve the recommendation of since 1961; he is married to Ting Dee Hua on July 1, R.A. No. 503). (Emphasis supplied).
said Board, to revive and/or reaffirm the July 6, 1961 1973, and his marriage contract shows that he is a Note that the five-year period applies only to clauses
decision of the Board of Special Inquiry, to reverse, Filipino citizen; he holds passports and earlier other than 2, 7, 8, 11 and 12 of paragraph (a) of the
and nullify, the Decision of 6 July 1962 of the Board of passports as a Filipino; he is a registered voter of Section. In respect to clauses 2, 7, 8, 11 and 12, the
Commissioners, and to order the admission of William Valenzuela, Metro Manila where he has long resided limitation does not apply. These clauses read as
Gatchalian as a Filipino citizen. Pursuant to Sec. 26 and exercised his right of suffrage; he is engaged in follows:
(b) of C.A. No. 613, as amended (The Philippine business in the Philippines since 1973, and is a (2) Any alien who enters the Philippines after
Immigration Act of 1940), only the Board of director/officer of the International Polymer Corp. and the effective date of this Act, who was not
Commissioners can act on the recommendation, if at Ropeman International Corp. as a Filipino, and that lawfully admissible at the time of entry;
all it was legally and validly done. The Board of the companies he runs and in which he has a xxx xxx xxx
Commissioners is composed of the Commissioner of controlling investment provided a livelihood to 4,000 (7) Any alien who remains in the Philippines
Immigration and the two Deputy Commissioners. In employees and approximately 25,000 dependents; he in violation of any limitation or condition
the absence of any member of the Board, the is a taxpayer; and he has continuously enjoyed the under which he was admitted as a non-
Department Head shall designate an officer or status of Filipino citizenship, discharged his immigrant;
employee in the Bureau of Immigration to serve as responsibility as such until petitioning Boards initiated (8) Any alien who believes in, advises,
member thereof. In any case coming before it, the the deportation proceedings against him, are not of advocates or teaches the overthrow by force
decision of any two members shall prevail. (Sec. 8, any help to William Gatchalian. For, they neither and violence of the Government of the
C.A. No. 613 as amended). The Department Head confer nor strengthen his claim of Filipino citizenship Philippines, or of constituted law and
referred to is the Secretary of Justice since the since they are all rooted on the illegal and void authority, or who disbelieves in or is opposed
Commission is, for administrative purposes, under the decision of then Acting Commissioner Victor Nituda of to organized government, or who advises,
supervision and control of the Department of Justice. 15 March 1973. A decision which is void and advocates, or teaches the assault or
assassination of public officials because of Bidin, and I, therefore, undertake to submit this Gatchalian as a natural born Philippine citizenship,
their office, or who advises, advocates, or separate opinion. shows that those claims to Philippine citizenship were
teaches the unlawful destruction of property, For convenience, the following is a precis of the indeed not proven by respondent William Gatchalian
or who is a member of or affiliated with any matters discussed in detail below. and his co-applicants. Since respondent William
organization entertaining, advocating or 1. I agree that the Warrant of Arrest dated 14 August Gatchalian does not claim to have been naturalized
teaching such doctrines, or who in any 1990 is defective in its language. The surrounding as a Philippine citizen after rendition of the 6 July
manner whatsoever lends assistance, facts, however, make quite clear that an amended 1962 BOC Decision, he must accordingly be held to
financial or otherwise, to the dissemination of warrant of arrest or mission order, or a new one be not a Philippine citizen.
such doctrines; correctly worded, may be issued by Immigration 5. Should the legal results thus reached seem harsh
xxx xxx xxx Commissioner Domingo for the purpose of carrying to some, I respectfully submit that the remedy lies not
(11) Any alien who engages in profiteering, out an existing and valid Warrant of Exclusion with this Court which is charged with the application of
hoarding, or black-marketing, independent of covering respondent William Gatchalian and his co- the law as it is in fact written, but with the political
any criminal action which may be brought applicants for admission. branches of the Government. It is those departments
against him; 2. The 6 July 1962 Decision of the Board of of Government which must consider the desirability
(12) Any alien who is convicted of any Commissioners ("BOC") and Warrant of Exclusion and wisdom of enacting legislation providing for the
offense penalized under Commonwealth Act remain valid and effective and enforceable against legalization of the entry and stay of aliens who may
Numbered Four Hundred and Seventy- respondent William Gatchalian, and his co-applicants be in the same situation as respondent William
Three, otherwise known as the Revised for that matter. That Decision reversed a 6 July 1961 Gatchalian and his co-applicants.
Naturalization Laws of the Philippines, or any decision of the Board of Special Inquiry ("BSI") and I
law relating to acquisition of Philippine held that respondent William Gatchalian and his co- 1. Petitioner argues that respondent William
citizenship; applicants failed to subtantiate and prove their claim Gatchalian's arrest follows as a matter of
xxx xxx xxx to Philippine citizenship in 1961. Respondent William "consequence" of the Warrant of Exclusion issued by
Mr. Gatchalian is covered by clause (2); besides, the Gatchalian does not claim Philippine citizenship by the BOC on 6 July 1962. This is opposed by
warrant for his exclusion was issued within a period of any mode of entitlement subsequent to his application respondent Gatchalian upon the ground that the
five years following his entry. for entry as a citizen of the Philippines in 1961, i.e., by Mission Order or Warrant of Arrest does not mention
Lam Shee vs. Bengzon (93 Phil. 1065) is not any act or circumstance subsequent to his birth and that it is issued pursuant to a final order of deportation
applicable to Mr. Gatchalian. In issue in that case was supposed filiation as a legitimate son of Francisco or Warrant of Exclusion.
the deportation of a minor whose mother fraudulently Gatchalian, also a supposed citizen of the Philippines. The Mission Order or Warrant of Arrest dated 14
entered the Philippines by using the name of a 3. In its Decision in Arocha vs. Vivo,1 the Supreme August 1990 issued by petitioner Commissioner
resident Chinese merchant who is not her lawful Court upheld the validity and legal effect of the 6 July Domingo, CID, reads in part as follows:
husband but against whom no deportation 1962 Decision of the BOC and the Warrant of Intelligence Officers/Agents: All Teams
proceedings was initiated within five years following Exclusion not only against Pedro Gatchalian, the Team No.
her entry. Said mother did in fact acquire permanent particular Gatchalian who was taken into custody by Subject: William, Juan, Francisco, Jose,
residence status. Furthermore, the minor's mother immigration authorities in 1965, but also against Benjamin, Jonathan, Pedro, Gloria, Elena, all
never claimed to be a Filipino citizen. Pedro's co-applicants, which include respondent surnamed Gatchalian
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, I vote to GRANT William Gatchalian. The validity of the claim to Address: Bgy. Canumay, Valenzuela, M.M.
the petition in G.R. Nos. 95122-23, SET ASIDE the Philippine citizenship by Pedro Gatchalian, as a xxx xxx xxx
questioned orders of respondents Judge Joselito Dela supposed descendant of Santiago Gatchalian, 1. Make a warrantless arrest under the Rules
Rosa and Judge Teresita Dizon Capulong as having allegedly a natural born citizen of the Philippines, of Criminal Procedure, Rule 113, Section 5,
been issued beyond their jurisdiction, ORDER the was directly placed in issue in the 1961-1962 for violation of the Immigration Act, Section
DISMISSAL of Civil Case Nos. 90-54214 of the proceedings before the BSI and the BOC, and by the 37, para. a; Secs. 45 and 46 Administrative
Regional Trial Court of Manila and 3431-V-90 of the Solicitor General and Pedro Gatchalian in Arocha vs. Code;
Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila and Vivo (supra). In upholding the validity and legal effect 2. Make a warrantless search as an incident
to DISMISS for lack of merit the COUNTER- of the 6 July 1962 BOC Decision that the Gatchalian to a lawful arrest under Rule 125, Section
PETITION. applicants had not substantiated their claim to 12.
Philippine citizenship, this Court in effect ruled that 3. Deliver the suspect to the Intelligence
the Gatchalian applicants were not Philippine citizens, Division and immediately conduct custodial
FELICIANO, J., dissenting: whatever their true nationality might be. interrogation, after warning the suspect that
I regret I am unable to join the opinion written by my 4. Should this Court now determine to examine once he has a right to remain silent and a right to
distinguished brother in the Court, Mr. Justice A.A. more the claim to Philippine citizenship of respondent counsel;
William Gatchalian, a detailed examination of the 4. Prepare and file an affidavit of arrest with
facts, including the supposed status of Santiago the Special Prosecutor's Office and, in case
of a search, prepare and file an inventory of ordering the exclusion of above-named 1990, the Acting Director of the National Bureau of
the properties seized, verified under oath applicants, has now become final and Investigation ("NBI") initiated the proceedings
following Office Memorandum Order No. 45 executory. immediately before us by writing to the Secretary of
xxx xxx xxx NOW THEREFORE, by virtue of the Justice recommending that respondent William
The above Mission Order merely referred to Section authority vested in the undersigned by law, Gatchalian, and his co-applicants covered by the
37 (a) of the Immigration Act, as amended, and to you are hereby ordered to exclude the Warrant of Exclusion dated 6 July 1962, be charged
Sections 45 and 46 of the Administrative Code aforenamed individuals and cause their with: "Violation of Section 37 (a), paragraphs 1 and 2,
(should be Immigration Law), and that its wording removal from this country to the port where in relation to Section 45 (c), (d) and (e) of
suggests that the arrest is sought to be carried out for they came or to the port of the country of Commonwealth Act 613 as amended, also known as
the purpose of carrying out a preliminary investigation which they are nationals, on the first the Immigration Act of 1940." The Secretary of Justice
or custodial interrogation rather than for the purpose available transportation, in accordance with endorsed this recommendation to Immigration
of enforcing a final order of deportation or warrant of law. (Emphasis supplied) Commissioner Domingo for investigation and
exclusion. More specifically, the Mission Order failed It should be noted that respondent William Gatchalian immediate action. On 20 August 1990, Special
to mention the 6 July 1962 BOC Decision and was a party to the 1961-1962 proceedings before the Prosecutor Mabolo filed a charge sheet against
Warrant of Exclusion. At the same time, there is no Bureau of Immigration which proceedings culminated respondent William Gatchalian which specified the
gainsaying the fact that the 6 July 1962 BOC Decision in the 6 July 1962 Decision of the BOC and the following charges:
and Warrant of Exclusion do exist and became final aforequoted Warrant of Exclusion. The respondent is an alien national who
and, as discussed in detail below, remain valid and It is, however, insisted by respondent William unlawfully gained entry into the Philippines
effective. Gatchalian that the Warrant of Exclusion may no without valid travel document in violation of
It should be noted also that by 6 September 1990, longer be executed or implemented as against him in the Immigration Act; Sec. 37 par. a, sub
Special Prosecutor Mabolo had filed a Manifestation view of the passage of approximately twenty-eight pars. (1) and (2);
or Motion before the Bureau of Immigration explicitly (28) years since the issuance of such Warrant. That respondent being an alien
referring to the Warrant of Exclusion issued against Respondent Gatchalian here relies upon Section 37 misrepresented himself as Philippine Citizen
respondent William Gatchalian and his original co- (b) of the Immigration Act which states that: by false statements and fraudulent
applicants for admission in 1961, which had been Sec. 37 (b). Deportation may be effected documents in violation of the Immigration
passed upon in Arocha vs. Vivo (supra), and argued under clauses 2, 3, 7, 8, 11 and 12 of the Act, Sec. 45, par. (c), (d) and (e).
that there was, therefore, no longer any need to Par. (a) of this Section at any time after That respondent being an alien national is an
adduce evidence in support of the charges against entry, but shall not be effected under any undocumented person classified as
respondent William Gatchalian. other clauses unless the arrest in the excludable under the Immigration Act, Sec.
Thus it appears to me that the Warrant of Arrest or deportation proceedings is made within 29 (a) sub par. (17).
Mission Order dated 15 August 1990, ineptly worded five (5) years after the cause for deportation xxx xxx xxx
as it is, may be amended so as to refer explicitly to arises . . . (Emphasis supplied) (Emphasis supplied)
the mentioned Warrant of Exclusion, or a new warrant Examination of the above quoted Section 37 (b) Section 37 (a) (1) and (2), of Commonwealth Act No.
of arrest or mission order issued similarly explicitly shows that the five (5) year-limitation is 613, as amended, provides as follows:
referring to the Warrant of Exclusion. applicable only where deportation is sought to be Sec. 37 (a). The following aliens shall be
2. It is indispensably necessary to refer to the Warrant effected under clauses of Section 37 (a) other arrested upon the warrant of the
of Exclusion of 6 July 1962 which read as follows: than clauses 2, 7, 8, 11 and 12; that where Commissioner of Immigration or of any other
WHEREAS, upon review, motu proprio of the deportation or exclusion is sought to be effected officer designated by him for the purpose
proceedings had on the application for under clauses 2, 7, 8 11 and 12 of Section 37 and deported upon the warrant of the
admission as Philippine citizens of JOSE (a), no period of limitation is applicable; and that, to Commissioner of Immigration after a
GATCHALIAN, ELENA GATCHALIAN, the contrary, deportation or exclusion may be effected determination by the Board of
BENJAMIN GATCHALIAN, JUAN "at any time after entry." Commissioners of the existence of the
GATCHALIAN, PEDRO GATCHALIAN, Examination of contemporaneous facts shows that ground for deportation as charged against
GLORIA GATCHALIAN, FRANCISCO the Government has sought to effect the exclusion the alien.
GATCHALIAN, WILLIAM GATCHALIAN, and and deportation of respondent William Gatchalian (1) Any alien who enters the Philippines after
JOHNSON GATCHALIAN, the Board of upon the ground that he had entered the country as a the effective date of this act by means of
Commissioners found them not entitled to citizen of the Philippines when he was not lawfully false and misleading statements or without
admission as Filipinos in a Decision, dated admissible as such at the time of entry under Section inspection and admission by the Immigration
July 6, 1962, and ordered their exclusion 37 (a) (2), since the BOC had held him and the other authorities at a designated port of entry or at
as persons not properly documented; Gatchalians there involved as not properly any place other than at a designated port of
AND WHEREAS, the Decision of the Board documented for admission, under Section 29 (a) entry; (As amended by Republic Act No.
of Commissioners, dated 6 July 1962, (17) of the Immigration Act, as amended. On 7 July 503).
(2) An alien who enters the Philippines after It is worth noting at this point that in Arocha vs. under such ground "at any time after entry." It is, thus,
the effective date of this act, who was not Vivo (supra), this Court upheld the 6 July 1962 Order very difficult to see how Act No. 3326 could apply at
lawfully admissible at the time of entry. of the BOC and the application of the Warrant of all to the instant case.
xxx xxx xxx Exclusion, in respect of Pedro Gatchalian, even Finally, we must recall once more that what is actually
(Emphasis supplied) though more than five (5) years had elapsed by the involved in the case at bar is exclusion,
Section 37 (a) (2), quoted above, relates back to time the Court's Decision was promulgated on 26 not deportation.
Section 29 (a) of the Immigration Act, as amended, October 1967. 3. It is urged by the government that Arocha vs.
which lists the classes of alien excluded from entry in Though respondent William Gatchalian is physically Vivo (supra) has already resolved the claim to
the Philippines, as follows: inside the country, it is the government's basic Philippine citizenship of respondent William
Sec. 29. (a). The following classes of aliens position that he was never lawfully admitted into the Gatchalian adversely to him and that such ruling
shall be excluded from entry into the country, having failed to prove his claim of Philippine constitutes res judicata. Upon the other hand,
Philippines; citizenship, and hence the Warrant of Exclusion of 6 respondent William Gatchalian vehemently argues
xxx xxx xxx July 1962, or a new Warrant of Exclusion for that that neither the 6 July 1962 BOC's Decision
(17) Persons not properly documented for matter, may be executed "at any time" under Section nor Arocha definitely settled the question of his
admission as may be required under the 37 (b). It is the correctness of that basic position citizenship.
provisions of this act. (Emphasis supplied) which must be ascertained and in that ascertainment, My respectful submission is that respondent William
Thus, in the instant case, the net result is that no time the mere passage of time is quite peripheral in Gatchalian's argument constitutes a highly selective
limitation is applicable in respect of the carrying out of relevance considering the express language of reading of both the BOC Decision and the Decision
the Warrant of Exclusion issued in 1962. Section 37 (b). in Arocha Written by J.B.L. Reyes, J. for a unanimous
A little reflection suffices to show why this must be so. My distinguished brother, Bidin, J., finally invokes Act court. The 6 July 1962 Decision of the BOC, in its
What was involved in 1961 when the supposed No. 3326, and on the basis of Section 1 thereof, dispositive portion, reads as follows:
children and grandchildren of Santiago Gatchalian would hold that where the arrest for purpose of IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING
first descended upon the Philippines, was the right of deportation is made more than five (5) years after the CONSIDERATIONS, this Board finds and
a person claiming to be a Philippine citizen to enter cause for deportation arose, the prescriptive period of hereby holds that the applicants [Jose
for the first time and reside in the Philippines. On the eight (8) years should be applied. Act No. 3326 which Gatchalian, Elena Gatchalian, Benjamin
part of the Government, what was at stake was the took effect on 4 December 1926, establishes Gatchalian, Juan Gatchalian, Pedro
right to exclude from the country persons who had prescriptive periods in respect of criminal Gatchalian, Gloria Gatchalian, Francisco
claimed the right to enter the country as Philippine prosecutions for violations penalized not by the Gatchalian, William Gatchalian and Johnson
citizens but who had failed to substantiate such Revised Penal Code but rather by special acts which Gatchalian] herein have not satisfactorily
claimed status. Aliens seeking entry into the do not otherwise establish a period of prescription. In proved their claim to Philippine
Philippines do not acquire the right to be admitted into other words, Act No. 3326 establishes a statute of citizenship and therefore the Decision of the
the country by the simple passage of limitations for the institution of criminal proceedings. It Board of Special Inquiry, dated July 6, 1961
time. Exclusion of persons found not to be entitled to is, however, quite settled that deportation proceedings admitting them as Filipinos is hereby
admission as Philippine citizens, must be cannot be assimilated to criminal prosecutions for reversed, and said applicants should be, as
distinguished from the deportation of aliens, who, violation either of the Revised Penal Code or of they are hereby ordered excluded as
after having been initially lawfully admitted into the special statutes. 3 Moreover, Act No. 3326 purports to persons not properly documented.
Philippines, committed acts which rendered them be applicable only where the special act itself has not SO ORDERED. (Emphasis supplied)
liable to deportation. established an applicable statute of limitations for Since respondent William Gatchalian and his co-
Normally, aliens excluded are immediately sent back criminal proceedings. It cannot, however, be said that applicants in 1961 claimed the right to enter the
to their country of origin. 2 This is so in cases where Article 37 (b) of the Immigration Act (quoted earlier) country as Philippine citizens, determination of their
the alien has not yet gained a foothold into the has not established an applicable statute of right to enter the Philippines thus indispensably
country and is still seeking physical admittance. limitations. For, precisely, Section 37 (b) of the involved the resolution of their claim to Philippine
However, when the alien had already physically Immigration Act states that deportation may be citizenship. In other words, the determination of that
gained entry but such entry is later found unlawful or effected under certain clauses of Section 37 (a) "at citizenship in the instant case was not a mere incident
devoid of legal basis, the alien can be excluded any any time after entry." One of those instances is, of the case; it was rather the central and indeed the
time after it is found that he was not lawfully precisely, deportation upon the ground specified in only issue that had to be resolved by the BOC.
admissible at the time of his entry. Technically, the Clause (2) of 37 (a) which relates to "any alien who Review of the 1961 proceedings before the BSI
alien in this case is being excluded; however, the enters the Philippines after the effective date of this shows that the sole issue before it was the supposed
rules on deportation can be made to apply to him in act, who was not lawfully admissible at the time of Philippine citizenship of the applicants. Thus, the very
view of the fact that the cause for his exclusion is entry." Thus, the Immigration Act, far from failing to same issue of claimed Philippine citizenship was
discovered only after he had gained physical entry. specify a prescriptive period for deportation under resolved by the BOC when it reversed the 6 July 1961
Section 37 (a) (2), expressly authorizes deportation decision of the BSI. This case may be distinguished
from other types of cases, e.g., applications for public officials pursuant to the 6 July 1962 Warrant admission had not proved their claim to Philippine
utility franchises, petitions for change of name, of Exclusion. citizenship; not being Filipinos, they must have been
applications for registration as voter, filing of The Court of First Instance ("CFI") decision ordered aliens, to be excluded as persons not properly
certificates of candidacy for an elective position, etc., Pedro Gatchalian's release upon the ground that the 6 documented. Moreover, a review of
where the central issue is not citizenship although July 1962 BOC Decision had been issued beyond the the Rollo in Arocha vs. Vivo shows that the parties
resolution of that issue requires a determination of the one (1) year period for review of the BSI decision of 6 there had expressly raised the issue of the citizenship
citizenship of the applicant, candidate or petitioner. July 1961. The CFI decision was reversed and of Pedro Gatchalian in their pleadings. The Solicitor
The ruling of the BOC that respondent William nullified by the Supreme Court. General, in his fifth assignment of error, argued that
Gatchalian and his co-applicants for admission as The Supreme Court held that the BOC Decision of 6 the Court of First Instance had erred in declaring
Philippine citizens had not satisfactorily proved their July 1962 had not been antedated and that it was Pedro Gatchalian a Filipino, and simultaneously urged
claim to Philippine citizenship, can only be reasonably valid and effective to reverse and nullify the BSI order that the 6 July 1962 decision of the Board of
read as a holding that respondent William Gatchalian granting admission to the Gatchalians as citizens of Commissioners was quite correct. Pedro Gatchalian,
and his co-applicants were not Philippine citizens, the Philippines. upon the other hand, contended that precisely
whatever their true nationality or nationalities might The Court also held that the split BOC decision of because he was a Filipino, the Bureau of Immigration
be. Thus, it appears to be merely semantic play to July-August 1961 did not operate to confirm and had no jurisdiction to exclude him. 5
argue, as respondent William Gatchalian argues, that render final the BSI decision of 6 July 1961, the split The Court also said in Arocha:
the 1962 BOC Decision did not categorically hold him decision being null and void because it had not been Finally, it is well to note that appellee did not
to be an "alien" and that the BOC had merely held rendered by the BOC as a body. traverse the allegation of appellant
him and his co-applicants as "not properly The Court further rejected Pedro Gatchalian's Commissioners in their return to the writ
documented." The phrase "not properly documented" argument that he was not bound by the 6 July 1962 of Habeas Corpus that appellee Pedro
was strictly and technically correct. For William BOC Decision: Gatchalian gained entry on the strength of a
Gatchalian and his co-applicants had presented It is argued for the appellee that the minutes forged cablegram, purportedly signed by the
themselves as Philippine citizens and as such entitled in Exh. 5-A refer only to the cases of Gloria, former Secretary of Foreign Affairs Felixberto
to admission into the country. Since the BOC rejected Francisco and Benjamin Gatchalian. But the Serrano, and apparently authorizing
their claims to Philippine citizenship, William designation of the case is "Gloria Gatchalian, appellee's documentation as a Filipino (par.
Gatchalian and his co-applicants were non-Filipinos et al." No reason is shown why the case of 3[a] of Return, C.F.I. Rec., pp. 15-16). Such
"not properly documented for admission" under these three should be considered and voted failure to deny imports admission of its truth
Section 29 (a) (17), Immigration Act as amended. upon separately, considering that the claims by the appellee, establishes that his entry
4. In Arocha vs. Vivo (supra), the Supreme Court had to citizenship and entry of all were based on was irregular. Neither has he appealed the
before it the following items: the same circumstances, applicants being decision of the Commissioners of
1. The 6 July 1961 Decision of the BSI which the descendants of one Santiago Gatchalian, Immigration to the Department Head.6
allowed the entry of respondent Gatchalian a Filipino and that all their applications for Since the physical entry of Pedro Gatchalian was
and his co-applicants as citizens of the entry were in fact jointly resolved by the effected simultaneously with that of Francisco and
Philippines; Board of Inquiry in one single decision William Gatchalian, on exactly the same basis and on
2. A split BOC Decision approving the 6 July (Annex 1, petition, G.R. No. L-24844). 4 the strength of the same forged cablegram allegedly
1961 BSI decision, which had been "noted" I respectfully submit that the above-quoted ruling from then Secretary of Foreign Affairs Felixberto
by two (2) Commissioners but rejected by in Arocha disposes of the contention here being made Serrano, it must follow that the entry of Francisco and
Commissioner Galang on 14 and 26 July by respondent William Gatchalian that he is not bound William Gatchalian was similarly irregular. The
1961 and 21 August 1961, respectively; by the Decision in Arocha vs. Vivo, Arocha held that applications for admission of the nine (9) Gatchalians
3. The 6 July 1962 Decision of the BOC in the 1962 BOC Decision was valid and effective and were all jointly resolved by the BSI on 6 July 1961 on
which the BOC had reviewed motu William was certainly one of the applicants for the identical basis that they were all descendants of
proprio the Gatchalian proceedings before admission in the proceedings which began in 1961 Santiago Gatchalian, a supposed natural born
the BSI and reversed the BSI decision of 6 before the BSI. Philippine citizen.
July 1961; Respondent William Gatchalian contends that the 5. The purported reversal of the 1962 BOC Decision
4. The Warrant of Exclusion dated 6 July Court in Arocha did not find him nor any of his co- by Commissioner Nituda in 1973, cannot be given any
1962 issued pursuant to the 6 July 1962 applicants to be aliens and that all the Court did was effect. A close examination of the same reveals that
Decision of the BOC; and to hold that the 6 July 1962 Board of Commissioners such purported reversal was highly irregular.
5. A decision of the Manila Court of First decision had not been antedated. This contention Respondent William Gatchalian alleges that Mr.
Instance dated 31 July 1965, rendered in cannot be taken seriously. As has already been Nituda, being in 1973 Acting Commissioner of
a habeas corpus proceeding brought to pointed out several times, the 1962 Board of Immigration, had the authority to reverse the BOC
effect the release of Pedro Gatchalian who Commissioners decision held that William Gatchalian Decision of 6 July 1962, since he (Nituda) had
had been taken into custody by immigration and his eight (8) other co-applicants for immediate control, direction and supervision of all
officers, clerks and employees of the Bureau of respondent Gatchalian was properly We must, finally, not lose sight of the ruling in Arocha
Immigration. Control means, respondent Gatchalian documented, a ruling which was precipitated vs. Vivo (supra) where the Supreme Court expressly
continues, the power to alter or modify or nullify or set by a "Petition for Rehearing" filed by outlined the procedure to be followed by the BOC in
aside what a subordinate officer had done in the respondent Gatchalian and his co-applicants resolving cases before them. This court was very
performance of his duties and to substitute the in 8 March 1972 before the BSI. There are a explicit in holding that individual actions of members
judgment of the former for that of the latter. 7 number of obvious defects in the action of of the BOC are legally ineffective:
Respondent Gatchalian's view is obviously flawed. the BSI. Firstly, the motion for rehearing was . . . [T]he former Immigration Commissioners
The Commissioner's power of control over the officers filed way out of time. Rule 3, B 22 of the appeared to have acted individually in this
and employees of the Bureau of Immigration cannot Immigration Rules and Regulations of 1 particular instance and not as a Board. It is
be compared to the power of control and supervision January 1941 provides as follows: shown by the different dates affixed to their
vested by the Constitution in the President of the At any time before the alien is signatures that they did not actually meet to
Philippines (which was what Ham was all about), for deported, but not later than seven discuss and vote on the case. This was
the Commissioner's general power of control cannot days from the date he receives officially made to record by the Secretary of
be said to include the power to review and set aside notice of the decision on appeal of Justice in his Memorandum Order No. 9, on
the prior final decision reached by the BOC. The the Board of Commissioners, the January 24, 1962, wherein he stated.
Commissioner of Immigration, acting alone, cannot be applicant or his attorney or counsel that for the past several years, the
regarded as an authority higher than the BOC itself may file a petition for rehearing only Board of Commissioners of
(constituted by the Commissioner and the two [2] on the ground of newly discovered Immigration has not met collectively
Associate Commissioners), in respect of matters evidence. Such petition shall be in to discuss and deliberate in the
vested by the governing statute in such Board itself. writing and shall set forth the nature cases coming before it. [Citation
One of these matters is precisely the hearing and of the evidence discovered and the omitted]
deciding of appeals from decisions of the BSI, and reason or reasons why it was not Individual action by members of a board
the motu proprio review of the entire proceedings of a produced before. . . . (Emphasis plainly renders nugatory the purpose of its
case within one (1) year from the promulgation of a supplied) constitution as a Board. The Legislature
decision by the BSI. 8 Respondent Gatchalian's and his co- organized the Board of Commissioners
Respondent Gatchalian points to Section 29 (b) of the applicants' motion for rehearing was filed, precisely in order that they should deliberate
Immigration Act as amended, as empowering Nituda not seven (7) days but rather ten (10) years collectively and in order that their views and
to reverse the 1962 BOC Decision. Section 29 (b) after notice of the 1962 BOC Decision had Ideas should be exchanged and examined
reads as follows: been received by them. Secondly, Rule 3, B before reaching a conclusion (See Ryan vs.
Section 29. . . . 25 of the Immigration Rules and Regulations Humphrise, LRA 1915F 1047). This process
xxx xxx xxx prescribed that any motion for rehearing is of the essence of a board's action, save
(b) Notwithstanding the provisions of this shall be filed only with the Board of where otherwise provided by law, and the
section, the Commissioner of Immigration, in Commissioners; the Gatchalians' motion for salutary effects of the rule would be lost were
his discretion, may permit to enter (sic) any rehearing was filed with the BSI which then the members to act individually, without
alien properly documented, who is subject to purported to reopen the case "without first benefit of discussion.
exclusion under this section, but who is securing the consent in writing of the The powers and duties of boards
(1) an alien lawfully resident in the Commissioner of Immigration" as required by and commissions may not be
Philippines who is returning from a Rule 2, D 20. exercised by the individual
temporary visit abroad; Furthermore, the purported reversal of the members separately. Their acts are
(2) an alien applying for temporary 1962 BOC Decision was made not by the official only when done by the
admission. duly constituted BOC in 1973, but only by its members convened in sessions,
It is difficult to understand respondent's Chairman, then Acting Commissioner Nituda. upon a concurrence of at least a
argument. For one thing, Section 29 (b) Mr. Nituda's action flew in the face of Rule 3, majority and with at least
relates to an "alien properly documented" B 22 of the Immigration Rules and a quorum present. [Citation omitted]
while respondent Gatchalian precisely claims Regulation, which mandates that the Where the action needed is not of
to be a citizen of the Philippines rather than decision of any two (2) members of the BOC the individuals composing a board
a resident alien returning from a temporary shall prevail. It thus appears that Mr. Nituda but of the official body, the
visit abroad or an alien applying for purported to act as if he were the entire members must be together and act
temporary admission. BOC. Indeed, even the BOC itself in 1973 in their official capacity, and the
It should be recalled that Nituda's 1973 could not have lawfully reversed a final action should appear on the records
Decision approved a ruling rendered by a decision rendered by the BOC ten (10) years of the board. [Citation omitted]
Board of Special Inquiry in 1973 that ago. 9
Where a duty is entrusted to a I respectfully submit that a careful Santiago never brought or attempted to bring
board, composed of different examination of the facts made of record will to the Philippines and she allegedly died in
individuals, that board can act show that the correctness and factual nature China in 1951, or four (4)
officially only as such, in convened of each of these layered premises are open years after Santiago had permanently
sessions, with the members, or to very serious doubt, doubts which can only returned to the Philippines.
a quorum thereof, present. [Citation lead to the same conclusion which the BOC In 1958, when he was 53 years of age,
omitted] 10 (Emphasis supplied) reached on 6 July 1962 when it reversed the Santiago obtained a residence certificate
The act of Mr. Nituda of reversing the 1962 BSI, that is, that there was failure to prove where for the first time he described himself
Decision of the BOC could not hence be the Philippine citizenship of William as a Filipino. It was also only in 1960, that is,
considered as the act of the BOC itself. Gatchalian and of his eight (8) alleged when Santiago was 55 years of age, that he
The pretended act of reversal 0of Mr. Nituda uncles, aunts and brother in 1961 when they filed a petition for cancellation of his ACR
must, therefore, be stricken down and first arrived in the Philippines. obviously upon the theory that he had
disregarded for having been made in excess 1. The supposed Philippine citizenship of always been a Philippine citizen. It was at
of his lawful authority. The 1973 order of Santiago Gatchalian must be considered the hearing of his petition for cancellation of
Nituda was ineffective to vest any right upon first. Santiago was allegedly born in Binondo, his ACR that Santiago made his oral
respondent Gatchalian who, it is worth Manila, on 25 July 1905 to Pablo Pacheco statements concerning the supposed
nothing, did not pretend to submit any newly and Marciana Gatchalian. The records do circumstances of his birth, parentage and
discovered evidence to support their claim to not disclose anything about Pablo Pacheco marriage. Santiago's petition to cancel his
Philippine citizenship already rejected by the but everyone, including William Gatchalian, ACR was apparently made in preparation for
1962 BOC. In essence, Mr. Nituda purported assumes that Pablo Pacheco was a Chinese efforts to bring in, the succeeding year, a
not merely to set aside the 1962 BOC subject and never became a citizen of the whole group of persons as his supposed
Decision but also the 1967 Decision of this Philippine Islands. The basic claim of descendants.
Court in Arocha vs. Vivo. Santiago was that his mother Marciana The second point that needs to be made in
II Gatchalian was a Philippine citizen and that respect of Santiago's claim of citizenship
I turn to an examination of the underlying Marciana was not lawfully married to Pablo resting on his supposed status as an
facts which make up the basis of the claim of Pacheco and that consequently, he illegitimate son of a Filipina woman, is that
William Gatchalian to Philippine citizenship. (Santiago) was an illegitimate son of no birth certificate bearing the name of
The most striking feature of this claim to Marciana Gatchalian. Santiago Gatchalian was ever presented.
Philippine citizenship is that it rests upon a The first point that should be made in Instead, a baptismal certificate bearing the
fragile web constructed out of self-serving respect of Santiago's claim was that he had name Santiago Gatchalian was presented
oral testimony, a total lack of official always regarded himself as a Chinese showing the name of Marciana Gatchalian,
documentation whether Philippine or foreign, citizen until around 1958 or 1960, that is, Filipina, as mother, with the name of the
of negative facts and of invocation of when he reached the age of 53 or 55 years. father unknown. There was also presented a
presumptions without proof of essential Santiago, by his own testimony, lived the marriage certificate dated 1936 of Joaquin
factual premises. Put in summary terms, the bulk of his adult life in China where he went Pacheco, alleged brother of Santiago
claim of William Gatchalian to Philippine in 1924 at age 19 and where he stayed for Gatchalian, also showing Marciana
citizenship rests upon three (3) premises, to about 13 years returning to the Philippines Gatchalian as mother with the name of the
wit: for the first time in 1937. He returned in the father similarly left blank. These two (2)
a. that Santiago Gatchalian was a same year to China, stayed there for another pieces of paper, together with Santiago's
Philippine citizen; nine (9) years, and then came back to the own statements to the Citizenship Evaluation
b. the supposed filiation of Philippines again in 1946. He once more left Board as well as the statements of Joaquin
Francisco Gatchalian as a the Philippines for China on 14 April 1947 Pacheco to the same Board, constituted the
legitimate son of Santiago and returned on 14 June 1947. Upon his sum total of the evidence supporting
Gatchalian, which leads to the second return to the Philippines in 1946, he Santiago's claim to Philippine citizenship and
intermediate conclusion that documented himself as a Chinese national: on the basis of which an Order dated 12 July
Francisco was a Philippine citizen; he was holder of ICR No. 7501 dated 3 May 1960, signed by Felix S. Talabis, Associate
and 1946. He continued to be documented as Commissioner, granted the petition to cancel
c. the supposed filiation of William such, the record showing that he was also Santiago's alien registry.
Gatchalian as a legitimate son of holder of an ACR No. A-219003 dated 13 In so issuing his Order granting cancellation
Francisco Gatchalian leading to the January 1951. Santiago, again by his own of Santiago's ACR, Commissioner Talabis
final conclusion that William statement, married in China a Chinese disregarded Santiago's failure to present a
Gatchalian is a Philippine citizen. woman. This Chinese wife, however, birth certificate, in obvious violation of rules
of the Bureau of Immigration which expressly least, such use of both paternal and when Santiago returned permanently to the
require the submission of a birth certificate, maternal surnames indicated that Santiago Philippines in 1947. In other words, Santiago
or a certified true copy thereof, in was uncertain as to his supposed Gatchalian behaved as if the nine (9)
proceedings brought for cancellation of an illegitimacy. In our case law, moreover, the supposed descendants did not exist until
ACR upon the ground that the petitioner is use of a paternal surname may be regarded 1960 when Commissioner Talabis' Order
an illegitimate son of a Filipina mother. 11 It is as an indication of possession of the status cancelling Santiago's ACR was issued.
well-settled that a baptismal certificate is of a legitimate or acknowledged natural It may also be noted that Santiago's 1951
proof only of the administration of baptism to child. 14 ACR application mentioned only two (2)
the person named therein, and that such Perhaps the most important aspect of children of Santiago: Jose and Elena. In
certificate is not proof of anything else and Commissioner Talabis Order granting 1961, however, Santiago stated before the
certainly not proof of parentage nor of cancellation of Santiago's ACR, is that such immigration investigator that he had a total of
the status of legitimacy or illegitimacy.12 Order failed to give any weight to the five (5) children: Jose, Elena, Francisco,
That Order also casually disregarded a presumption in law in favor of marriage, a Gloria and Benjamin. Santiago's explanation
number of other things, one of which was a presumption significantly reinforced by the strongly echoes a common lawyer's excuse
document dated 1902 signed by Maxima parental consent given by Maxima for failure to seasonably file some pleading,
Gatchalian, the mother of Marciana Gatchalian to the marriage of her daughter and, it is respectfully submitted, is equally
Gatchalian, stating that Maxima Marciana Gatchalian to one Pablo C. contrived and unpersuasive; that he had his
. . . residing in the City of Manila, Pacheco. A related presumption is that in clerk fill up the ACR; that he gave his clerk
mother of Marciana Gatchalian, favor of the legitimacy of offspring born of a four (4) names (not five [5]); that the clerk
unmarried, of 18 years of age, her man and woman comporting themselves as had simply failed to fill up the ACR correctly.
father being dead, do hereby husband and wife. 15 I respectfully submit In its 6 July 1962 Decision, the BOC noted
freely consent to her marriage with that these presumptions cannot be that "while the two (2) names listed in
Pablo C. Pacheco, of Manila, and successfully overthrown by the simple self- [Santiago's] [ACR application] Jose and
that I know of no legal impediment serving testimony of Santiago and of his Elena, bear the same names as two of the
to such marriage. (Emphasis alleged brother Joaquin Pacheco and by the [9] applicants, the difference in the ages of
supplied) two (2) pieces of paper (the baptismal said persons compared to the said
Such parental consent indicated that a certificate of Santiago and the marriage applicants, casts serious doubts on their
marriage ceremony would have taken place certificate of Joaquin Pacheco). It seems Identity." 16
shortly thereafter as a matter of course; relevant to point out that Joaquin Pacheco, It is suggested in the majority opinion that
otherwise, the consent would have been too, was unable to present any birth the question of citizenship of Santiago
totally pointless. Even more importantly, certificate to prove his supposed common Gatchalian is a closed matter which cannot
Commissioner Talabis' Order disregarded parentage with Santiago Gatchalian; Joaquin be reviewed by this Court; that per the
the testimony of Santiago Gatchalian himself was allegedly born in 1902, the same records of the Bureau of Immigration, as of
in the same cancellation proceedings that he year that Maxima Gatchalian gave her 20 July 1960, Santiago Gatchalian had been
(Santiago) believed that his parents had consent to the marriage of Marciana declared to be a Filipino citizen and that this
been married by the Justice of the Peace of Gatchalian and Pablo C. Pacheco. forecloses re-opening of that question thirty
Pasig, Rizal. 13 In his Order, Commissioner The third point that needs to be underscored (30) years later. I must, with respect,
Talabis referred to the fact that Santiago is that Santiago Gatchalian did nothing to try disagree with this suggestion. The
Gatchalian had been "interchangeably using to bring into the Philippines his supposed administrative determination by the Bureau
his parental and maternal surnames. In sons and daughters and grandchildren since of Immigration as of 20 July 1960 certainly
school, he was known as Santiago 1947, when he returned permanently to the does not constitute res adjudicata that
Pacheco (Class Card for 1920-1921, Meisic Philippines, and until 1960. The story given forecloses this Court from examining the
Manila; Certificates of Completion of Third by the nine (9) supposed descendants of supposed Philippine citizenship of Santiago
and Fourth Grades, Meisic Primary School). Santiago when they first arrived in the Gatchalian upon which private respondent
But in his Special Cedula Certificate No. Philippines was that they had left the William Gatchalian seeks to rely. The Court
676812 dated 17 September 1937, and in People's Republic of China and had gone to cannot avoid examining the Philippine
tax clearance certificate issued on 2 October Macao in 1952 and there they stayed until nationality claimed by Santiago Gatchalian
1937, he is referred to as Santiago they moved to Hongkong in 1958. It should or, more accurately, claimed on his behalf by
Gatchalian; and in a Communication dated 6 also be noted that the youngest supposed William Gatchalian, considering that one of
June 1941, he was addressed to child of Santiago, Benjamin Gatchalian, was the central issues here is the tanability or
as Santiago Pacheco by the Philippine said to have been born in China in 1942 and untenability of the claim of William
Charity Sweepstakes Office." At the very was consequently only five (5) years old Gatchalian to Philippine citizenship and
hence to entry or admission to the same do not suffice to establish the The contents of the relevant Chinese law on marriage
Philippines as such citizen. validity of said marriage in at the time of the supposed marriage, was similarly
2. The second of the three (3) premises accordance with Chinese law and not shown. Should it be assumed simply that the
noted in the beginning of this section is: that custom. requirements of the 1926 Chinese law on marriage
Francisco Gatchalian was the legitimate son Custom is defined as "a rule of are identical with the requirements of the Philippine
of Santiago Gatchalian and therefore conduct formed by repetition of law on marriage, it must be pointed out that neither
followed the supposed Philippine citizenship acts, uniformly observed (practiced) Santiago nor Francisco Gatchalian submitted proof
of Santiago. This premise has in fact two (2) as a social rule, legally binding and that any of the requirements of a valid marriage under
parts: (a) the physical filiation of Francisco obligatory." The law requires that "a Philippine law had been complied with.
Gatchalian as the son of Santiago custom must be proved as a fact, I respectfully urge, therefore, that the reliance in the
Gatchalian; and (b) that Santiago Gatchalian according to the rules of evidence" majority opinion upon our conflicts rule on marriage
was lawfully married to the Chinese mother [Article 12, Civil Code]. On this embodied in Article 71 of the Civil Code (now Article
of Francisco Gatchalian. This premise is score the Court had occasion to 26 of the Family Code; then Section 19 of Act No.
remarkable for the total absence of state that "a local custom as a 3630) is unwarranted. The rule that a foreign marriage
documentary support for either of its two (2) source of right can not be valid in accordance with the law of the place where it
parts. Francisco was born in Amoy, China in considered by a court of justice was performed shall be valid also in the Philippines,
1931, according to Santiago. The sum total unless such custom is properly cannot begin to operate until after the marriage
of the evidence on this premise consists of established by competent evidence performed abroad and its compliane with the
Francisco Gatchalian's own statement and like any other fact" [Patriarca vs. requirements for validity under the marriage law of
that of Santiago. No birth certificate or Orato, 7 Phil. 390, 395 (1907)]. The the place where performed, are first shown as factual
certified true copy thereof, or comparable same evidence, if not one of a matters. There is, in other words, no factual basis for
documentation under Chinese law, was higher degree, should be required a presumption that a lawful marriage under Chinese
submitted by either Santiago or by of a foreign custom. law had taken place in 1926 in China between
Francisco. No secondary evidence of any The law on foreign marriages is Santiago Gatchalian and Chua Gim Tee.
kind was submitted. No testimony of a provided by Article 71 of the Civil It must follow also that Francisco Gatchalian cannot
disinterested person was offered. Code which states that: simply rely upon a presumption of legitimacy of
Santiago Gatchalian claimed to have been Art. 71. All marriages offspring of a valid marriage.1wphi1 As far as the
married in China in 1926 to a Chinese performed outside the record here is concerned, there could well have been
woman, Chua Gim Tee, out of which Philippines in accordance no marriage at all in China between Santiago
marriage Francisco was allegedly born. No with the laws in force in Gatchalian and Chua Gim Tee (just as Santiago had
documentary proof of such marriage in the country where they insisted that his father and mother had never married
China, whether primary or secondary, was were performed, and valid each other) and that consequently Francisco
ever submitted. Neither was there ever there as such, shall also Gatchalian could just as well have followed the
presented any proof of the contents of the be valid in this country, nationality of his admittedly Chinese mother.
Chinese law on marriage in 1926 and of except bigamous, 3. The last premise noted earlier is the supposed
compliance with its requirements. polygamous, or incestuous filiation of William Gatchalian as a legitimate son of
It is firmly settled in our jurisdiction that he marriages, as determined Francisco which resulted in William's following the
who asserts and relies upon the existence of by Philippine law. supposed Philippine citizenship of Francisco
a valid foreign marriage must prove not only Construing this provision of law the Gatchalian. William was, according to Santiago
the foreign law on marriage and the fact of Court has held that to establish a Gatchalian, born in Amoy, China in 1949. Here again,
compliance with the requisites of such law, valid foreign marriage two things just in the case of Francisco Gatchalian, there is a
but also the fact of the marriage itself. In Yao must be proven, namely: (1) the complete absence of contemporaneous documentary
Kee vs. Sy-Gonzales, 17 the issue before the existence of the foreign law as a evidence of the supposed filiation of William
Court was whether the marriage of petitioner question of fact; and (2) the alleged Gatchalian as a legitimate son of Francisco
Yao Kee to the deceased Sy Kiat in foreign marriage by convincing Gatchalian. 19 The only support ever presented for
accordance with Chinese law and custom evidence [Adong vs. Cheong Seng such alleged filiation consisted of the oral statements
had been adequately proven. In rendering a Gee, 43 Phil. 43, 49 of Santiago Gatchalian, Francisco Gatchalian and
negative answer, this Court, speaking (1922). 18 (Emphasis supplied) William Gatchalian. It is difficult to resist the
through Cortes, J., said: In the instant case, there was absolutely no proof impression that there took place here a pyramiding of
These evidence may very well other than Santiago's bare assertion that a marriage oral statements, each resting upon another oral
prove the fact of marriage between ceremony between Santiago and Chua Gim Tee had statement and all going back to the supposed
Yao Kee and Sy Kiat. However, the taken place in China in accordance with Chinese law. bastardy of Santiago, a status suddenly discovered or
asserted by Santiago in his 55th year in life. No birth
certificate, or comparable documentation under
Chinese law, exhibiting the name of William
Gatchalian was submitted.
Francisco Gatchalian stated that he had married a
Chinese woman, Ong Siu Kiok, in Amoy in 1947
according to Chinese custom. Once again, we must
note that there was no proof submitted that a
marriage ceremony satisfying the requirements of
"Chinese custom" had ever taken place in China
between Francisco and Ong Siu Kiok; neither was
there any proof that a marriage "according to Chinese
custom" was valid and lawful under Chinese law in
1947 and of factual compliance with the requirements
of the law and custom in China concerning
marriage. 20 Ong Siu Kiok was alleged to have died in
Macau and never came to the Philippines. It must
then follow, once again, that no presumption of a
lawful marriage between Francisco Gatchalian and
his alleged Chinese wife can be invoked by William
Gatchalian. It follows still further that William
Gatchalian cannot invoke any presumption of
legitimacy in his own favor. As in the case of his
putative father Francisco, William could as well have
followed the nationality of his concededly Chinese
mother.
One final note: it might be thought that the result I
have reached is unduly harsh considering the
prolonged physical stay of William Gatchalian in the
country. But this Court must apply the law as it is in
fact written. I respectfully submit that the appropriate
recourse of respondent William Gatchalian, should he
feel that he has some humanitarian claim to a right to
stay in the Philippines, is to the political departments
of Government. Those departments of Government
may then consider the wisdom and desirability, in the
light of the interests of the country, of legislation
permitting the legalization of the entry and stay in the
Philippines of respondent William Gatchalian and
those similarly situated. Unless and until such
legislation is enacted, this Court really has no choice
save to apply and enforce our immigration law and
regulations and our law on citizenship.
Accordingly, I vote to GRANT the Petition
for Certiorari and Prohibition in G.R. Nos. 95122-23,
and to SET ASIDE the Resolution/Temporary
Restraining Order dated 7 September 1990 issued by
respondent Judge Dela Rosa in Civil Case No. 90-
5214, as well as the Order of respondent Judge
Capulong dated 6 September 1990 in Civil Case No.
3431-V-90; and to RE-AFFIRM that respondent
William Gatchalian is not a Philippine citizen.
Republic of the Philippines The factual backdrop of the case is as follows: Upon their arrival in the Philippines, petitioners filed
SUPREME COURT an action for damages based on breach of contract of
Manila Petitioners-spouses Cesar C. Zalamea and Suthira air carriage before the Regional Trial Court of Makati,
Zalamea, and their daughter, Liana Zalamea, Metro Manila, Branch 145. As aforesaid, the lower
SECOND DIVISION purchased three (3) airline tickets from the Manila court ruled in favor of petitioners in its decision 1 dated
agent of respondent TransWorld Airlines, Inc. for a January 9, 1989 the dispositive portion of which
flight to New York to Los Angeles on June 6, 1984. states as follows:
The tickets of petitioners-spouses were purchased at
G.R. No. 104235 November 18, 1993 a discount of 75% while that of their daughter was a WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby
full fare ticket. All three tickets represented confirmed rendered ordering the defendant to
reservations. pay plaintiffs the following amounts:
SPOUSES CESAR & SUTHIRA ZALAMEA and
LIANA ZALAMEA, petitioners,
vs. While in New York, on June 4, 1984, petitioners (1) US $918.00, or its peso
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and received notice of the reconfirmation of their equivalent at the time of payment
TRANSWORLD AIRLINES, INC., respondents. reservations for said flight. On the appointed date, representing the price of the tickets
however, petitioners checked in at 10:00 a.m., an bought by Suthira and Liana
hour earlier than the scheduled flight at 11:00 a.m. but Zalamea from American Airlines, to
Sycip, Salazar, Hernandez, Gatmaitan for petitioners.
were placed on the wait-list because the number of enable them to fly to Los Angeles
passengers who had checked in before them had from New York City;
Quisumbing, Torres & Evangelista for private- already taken all the seats available on the flight.
respondent. Liana Zalamea appeared as the No. 13 on the wait- (2) US $159.49, or its peso
list while the two other Zalameas were listed as "No. equivalent at the time of payment,
34, showing a party of two." Out of the 42 names on representing the price of Suthira
the wait list, the first 22 names were eventually Zalamea's ticket for TWA Flight 007;
NOCON, J.: allowed to board the flight to Los Angeles, including
petitioner Cesar Zalamea. The two others, on the (3) Eight Thousand Nine Hundred
Disgruntled over TransWorld Airlines, Inc.'s refusal to other hand, at No. 34, being ranked lower than 22, Thirty-Four Pesos and Fifty
accommodate them in TWA Flight 007 departing from were not able to fly. As it were, those holding full-fare Centavos (P8,934.50, Philippine
New York to Los Angeles on June 6, 1984 despite tickets were given first priority among the wait-listed Currency, representing the price of
possession of confirmed tickets, petitioners filed an passengers. Mr. Zalamea, who was holding the full- Liana Zalamea's ticket for TWA
action for damages before the Regional Trial Court of fare ticket of his daughter, was allowed to board the Flight 007,
Makati, Metro Manila, Branch 145. Advocating plane; while his wife and daughter, who presented the
petitioner's position, the trial court categorically ruled discounted tickets were denied boarding. According to
(4) Two Hundred Fifty Thousand
that respondent TransWorld Airlines (TWA) breached Mr. Zalamea, it was only later when he discovered the
Pesos (P250,000.00), Philippine
its contract of carriage with petitioners and that said he was holding his daughter's full-fare ticket.
Currency, as moral damages for all
breach was "characterized by bad faith." On appeal, the plaintiffs'
however, the appellate court found that while there Even in the next TWA flight to Los Angeles Mrs.
was a breach of contract on respondent TWA's part, Zalamea and her daughter, could not be
(5) One Hundred Thousand Pesos
there was neither fraud nor bad faith because under accommodated because it was also fully booked.
(P100,000.00), Philippine Currency,
the Code of Federal Regulations by the Civil Thus, they were constrained to book in another flight
as and for attorney's fees; and
Aeronautics Board of the United States of America it and purchased two tickets from American Airlines at a
is allowed to overbook flights. cost of Nine Hundred Eighteen ($918.00) Dollars.
(6) The costs of suit.
SO ORDERED. 2 (2) US$159.49, or its peso allegedly authorizing overbooking has never been
equivalent at the time of the proved. Foreign laws do not prove themselves nor
On appeal, the respondent Court of Appeals held that payment, representing the price of can the courts take judicial notice of them. Like any
moral damages are recoverable in a damage suit Cesar Zalamea's ticket for TWA other fact, they must be alleged and proved. 6 Written
predicated upon a breach of contract of Flight 007; law may be evidenced by an official publication
carriage only where there is fraud or bad faith. Since it thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the
is a matter of record that overbooking of flights is a (3) P50,000.00 as and for attorney's legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and
common and accepted practice of airlines in the fees. accompanied with a certificate that such officer has
United States and is specifically allowed under the custody. The certificate may be made by a secretary
Code of Federal Regulations by the Civil Aeronautics (4) The costs of suit. of an embassy or legation, consul general, consul,
Board, no fraud nor bad faith could be imputed on vice-consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the
respondent TransWorld Airlines. foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the
SO ORDERED. 4
foreign country in which the record is kept, and
Moreover, while respondent TWA was remiss in not authenticated by the seal of his office. 7
Not satisfied with the decision, petitioners raised the
informing petitioners that the flight was overbooked case on petition for review on certiorari and alleged
and that even a person with a confirmed reservation Respondent TWA relied solely on the statement of
the following errors committed by the respondent
may be denied accommodation on an overbooked Ms. Gwendolyn Lather, its customer service agent, in
Court of Appeals, to wit:
flight, nevertheless it ruled that such omission or her deposition dated January 27, 1986 that the Code
negligence cannot under the circumstances be of Federal Regulations of the Civil Aeronautics Board
I. allows overbooking. Aside from said statement, no
considered to be so gross as to amount to bad faith.
official publication of said code was presented as
. . . IN HOLDING THAT THERE evidence. Thus, respondent court's finding that
Finally, it also held that there was no bad faith in
WAS NO FRAUD OR BAD FAITH overbooking is specifically allowed by the US Code of
placing petitioners in the wait-list along with forty-eight
ON THE PART OF RESPONDENT Federal Regulations has no basis in fact.
(48) other passengers where full-fare first class tickets
TWA BECAUSE IT HAS A RIGHT
were given priority over discounted tickets.
TO OVERBOOK FLIGHTS. Even if the claimed U.S. Code of Federal Regulations
The dispositive portion of the decision of respondent does exist, the same is not applicable to the case at
II. bar in accordance with the principle of lex loci
Court of Appeals 3 dated October 25, 1991 states as
follows: contractus which require that the law of the place
. . . IN ELIMINATING THE AWARD where the airline ticket was issued should be applied
OF EXEMPLARY DAMAGES. by the court where the passengers are residents and
WHEREFORE, in view of all the
nationals of the forum and the ticket is issued in such
foregoing, the decision under
III. State by the defendant airline. 8 Since the tickets were
review is hereby MODIFIED in that
sold and issued in the Philippines, the applicable law
the award of moral and exemplary
in this case would be Philippine law.
damages to the plaintiffs is . . . IN NOT ORDERING THE
eliminated, and the defendant- REFUND OF LIANA ZALAMEA'S
appellant is hereby ordered to pay TWA TICKET AND PAYMENT FOR Existing jurisprudence explicitly states that
the plaintiff the following amounts: THE AMERICAN AIRLINES overbooking amounts to bad faith, entitling the
TICKETS. 5 passengers concerned to an award of moral
damages. In Alitalia Airways v. Court of
(1) US$159.49, or its peso
Appeals, 9 where passengers with confirmed bookings
equivalent at the time of the That there was fraud or bad faith on the part of
were refused carriage on the last minute, this Court
payment, representing the price of respondent airline when it did not allow petitioners to
held that when an airline issues a ticket to a
Suthira Zalamea's ticket for TWA board their flight for Los Angeles in spite of confirmed
passenger confirmed on a particular flight, on a
Flight 007; tickets cannot be disputed. The U.S. law or regulation
certain date, a contract of carriage arises, and the of planes from Lockheed 1011 to a smaller Boeing priorities are reasonable policies, which when
passenger has every right to expect that he would fly 707 because there were only 138 confirmed economy implemented do not amount to bad faith. But the issue
on that flight and on that date. If he does not, then the class passengers who could very well be raised in this case is not the reasonableness of said
carrier opens itself to a suit for breach of contract of accommodated in the smaller planes, thereby policies but whether or not said policies were
carriage. Where an airline had deliberately sacrificing the comfort of its first class passengers for incorporated or deemed written on petitioners'
overbooked, it took the risk of having to deprive some the sake of economy, amounts to bad faith. Such contracts of carriage. Respondent TWA failed to show
passengers of their seats in case all of them would inattention and lack of care for the interest of its that there are provisions to that effect. Neither did it
show up for the check in. For the indignity and passengers who are entitled to its utmost present any argument of substance to show that
inconvenience of being refused a confirmed seat on consideration entitles the passenger to an award of petitioners were duly apprised of the overbooked
the last minute, said passenger is entitled to an award moral damages. 13 condition of the flight or that there is a hierarchy of
of moral damages. boarding priorities in booking passengers. It is evident
Even on the assumption that overbooking is allowed, that petitioners had the right to rely upon the
Similarly, in Korean Airlines Co., Ltd. v. Court of respondent TWA is still guilty of bad faith in not assurance of respondent TWA, thru its agent in
Appeals, 10 where private respondent was not allowed informing its passengers beforehand that it could Manila, then in New York, that their tickets
to board the plane because her seat had already breach the contract of carriage even if they have represented confirmed seats without any qualification.
been given to another passenger even before the confirmed tickets if there was overbooking. The failure of respondent TWA to so inform them
allowable period for passengers to check in had Respondent TWA should have incorporated when it could easily have done so thereby enabling
lapsed despite the fact that she had a confirmed ticket stipulations on overbooking on the tickets issued or to respondent to hold on to them as passengers up to
and she had arrived on time, this Court held that properly inform its passengers about these policies so the last minute amounts to bad faith. Evidently,
petitioner airline acted in bad faith in violating private that the latter would be prepared for such eventuality respondent TWA placed its self-interest over the rights
respondent's rights under their contract of carriage or would have the choice to ride with another airline. of petitioners under their contracts of carriage. Such
and is therefore liable for the injuries she has conscious disregard of petitioners' rights makes
sustained as a result. Respondent TWA contends that Exhibit I, the respondent TWA liable for moral damages. To deter
detached flight coupon upon which were written the breach of contracts by respondent TWA in similar
In fact, existing jurisprudence abounds with rulings name of the passenger and the points of origin and fashion in the future, we adjudge respondent TWA
where the breach of contract of carriage amounts to destination, contained such a notice. An examination liable for exemplary damages, as well.
bad faith. In Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. of Exhibit I does not bear this out. At any rate, said
Intermediate Appellate Court, 11 where a would-be exhibit was not offered for the purpose of showing the Petitioners also assail the respondent court's decision
passenger had the necessary ticket, baggage claim existence of a notice of overbooking but to show that not to require the refund of Liana Zalamea's ticket
and clearance from immigration all clearly and Exhibit I was used for flight 007 in first class of June because the ticket was used by her father. On this
unmistakably showing that she was, in fact, included 11, 1984 from New York to Los Angeles. score, we uphold the respondent court. Petitioners
in the passenger manifest of said flight, and yet was had not shown with certainty that the act of
denied accommodation in said flight, this Court did Moreover, respondent TWA was also guilty of not respondent TWA in allowing Mr. Zalamea to use the
not hesitate to affirm the lower court's finding informing its passengers of its alleged policy of giving ticket of her daughter was due to inadvertence or
awarding her damages. less priority to discounted tickets. While the deliberate act. Petitioners had also failed to establish
petitioners had checked in at the same time, and held that they did not accede to said agreement. The
A contract to transport passengers is quite different in confirmed tickets, yet, only one of them was allowed logical conclusion, therefore, is that both petitioners
kind and degree from any other contractual relation. to board the plane ten minutes before departure time and respondent TWA agreed, albeit impliedly, to the
So ruled this Court in Zulueta v. Pan American World because the full-fare ticket he was holding was given course of action taken.
Airways, Inc. 12 This is so, for a contract of carriage priority over discounted tickets. The other two
generates a relation attended with public duty a petitioners were left behind. The respondent court erred, however, in not ordering
duty to provide public service and convenience to its the refund of the American Airlines tickets purchased
passengers which must be paramount to self-interest It is respondent TWA's position that the practice of and used by petitioners Suthira and Liana. The
or enrichment. Thus, it was also held that the switch overbooking and the airline system of boarding evidence shows that petitioners Suthira and Liana
were constrained to take the American Airlines flight
to Los Angeles not because they "opted not to use (1) US$918.00 or its peso equivalent at the time of
their TWA tickets on another TWA flight" but because payment representing the price of the tickets bought
respondent TWA could not accommodate them either by Suthira and Liana Zalamea from American Airlines,
on the next TWA flight which was also fully to enable them to fly to Los Angeles from New York
booked. 14 The purchase of the American Airlines City;
tickets by petitioners Suthira and Liana was the
consequence of respondent TWA's unjustifiable (2) P50,000.00 as moral damages;
breach of its contracts of carriage with petitioners. In
accordance with Article 2201, New Civil Code, (3) P50,000.00 as exemplary damages;
respondent TWA should, therefore, be responsible for
all damages which may be reasonably attributed to
(4) P50,000.00 as attorney's fees; and
the non-performance of its obligation. In the
previously cited case of Alitalia Airways v. Court of
Appeals, 15 this Court explicitly held that a passenger (5) Costs of suit.
is entitled to be reimbursed for the cost of the tickets
he had to buy for a flight to another airline. Thus, SO ORDERED.
instead of simply being refunded for the cost of the
unused TWA tickets, petitioners should be awarded
the actual cost of their flight from New York to Los
Angeles. On this score, we differ from the trial court's
ruling which ordered not only the reimbursement of
the American Airlines tickets but also the refund of the
unused TWA tickets. To require both prestations
would have enabled petitioners to fly from New York
to Los Angeles without any fare being paid.
" Mr. Arthur W. Bolton, an attorney-at-law of San Pilotaje was published in the Gaceta Oficial[32]of the
Francisco, California, since the year 1918 under oath, Republic of Venezuela. A photocopy of the Gaceta With respect to proof of written laws, parol proof
quoted verbatim section 322 of the California Civil Oficial was presented in evidence as an official is objectionable, for the written law itself is the best
Code and stated that said section was in force at the publication of the Republic of Venezuela. evidence. According to the weight of authority, when a
time the obligations of defendant to the plaintiff were foreign statute is involved, the best evidence rule
incurred, i.e. on November 5, 1928 and December 22, The Reglamento Para la Zona de Pilotaje No 1 requires that it be proved by a duly authenticated
1928. This evidence sufficiently established the fact del Orinoco is published in a book issued by copy of the statute.[37]
that the section in question was the law of the State of the Ministerio de Comunicaciones of Venezuela.
California on the above dates. A reading of sections [33]
Only a photocopy of the said rules was likewise At this juncture, we have to point out that the
300 and 301 of our Code of Civil Procedure will presented as evidence. Venezuelan law was not pleaded before the lower
convince one that these sections do not exclude the court.
presentation of other competent evidence to prove the Both of these documents are considered in
existence of a foreign law. Philippine jurisprudence to be public documents for A foreign law is considered to be pleaded if there
they are the written official acts, or records of the is an allegation in the pleading about the existence of
"`The foreign law is a matter of fact You ask the official acts of the sovereign authority, official bodies the foreign law, its import and legal consequence on
witness what the law is; he may, from his recollection, and tribunals, and public officers of Venezuela.[34] the event or transaction in issue.[38]
or on producing and referring to books, say what it is.'
(Lord Campbell concurring in an opinion of Lord Chief For a copy of a foreign public document to be A review of the Complaint[39] revealed that it was
Justice Denman in a well-known English case where admissible, the following requisites are mandatory: (1) never alleged or invoked despite the fact that the
a witness was called upon to prove the Roman laws It must be attested by the officer having legal custody grounding of the M/V Philippine Roxas occurred
of marriage and was permitted to testify, though he of the records or by his deputy; and (2) It must be within the territorial jurisdiction of Venezuela.
referred to a book containing the decrees of the accompanied by a certificate by a secretary of the
Council of Trent as controlling, Jones on Evidence, embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice We reiterate that under the rules of private
Second Edition, Volume 4, pages 3148-3152.) x x x. consular or consular agent or foreign service officer, international law, a foreign law must be properly
and with the seal of his office. [35] The latter pleaded and proved as a fact. In the absence of
We do not dispute the competency of Capt. requirement is not a mere technicality but is intended pleading and proof, the laws of a foreign country, or
Oscar Leon Monzon, the Assistant Harbor Master and to justify the giving of full faith and credit to the state, will be presumed to be the same as our own
Chief of Pilots at Puerto Ordaz, Venezuela, [28] to testify genuineness of a document in a foreign country.[36] local or domestic law and this is known as processual
on the existence of the Reglamento General de la presumption.[40]
Ley de Pilotaje (pilotage law of Venezuela)[29] and It is not enough that the Gaceta Oficial, or a
the Reglamento Para la Zona de Pilotaje No 1 del book published by the Ministerio de
Having cleared this point, we now proceed to a Governing Pilotage Services, the Conduct of Pilots thereof until he leaves it anchored or berthed safely;
thorough study of the errors assigned by the and Pilotage Fees in Philippine Ports enunciate the Provided, however, that his responsibility shall cease
petitioner. duties and responsibilities of a master of a vessel and at the moment the Master neglects or refuses to carry
its pilot, among other things. out his order."
Petitioner alleges that there was negligence on
the part of the private respondent that would warrant The pertinent provisions of the said The Code of Commerce likewise provides for
the award of damages. administrative order governing these persons are the obligations expected of a captain of a vessel, to
quoted hereunder: wit:
There being no contractual obligation, the
private respondent is obliged to give only the Sec. 11. Control of Vessels and Liability for Art. 612. The following obligations shall be inherent in
diligence required of a good father of a family in Damage. -- On compulsory pilotage grounds, the the office of captain:
accordance with the provisions of Article 1173 of the Harbor Pilot providing the service to a vessel shall be
New Civil Code, thus: responsible for the damage caused to a vessel or to xxx
life and property at ports due to his negligence or
Art. 1173. The fault or negligence of the obligor fault. He can be absolved from liability if the accident "7. To be on deck on reaching land and to take
consists in the omission of that diligence which is is caused by force majeure or natural calamities command on entering and leaving ports, canals,
required by the nature of the obligation and provided he has exercised prudence and extra roadsteads, and rivers, unless there is a pilot on
corresponds with the circumstances of the persons, of diligence to prevent or minimize the damage. board discharging his duties. x x x.
the time and of the place. When negligence shows
bad faith, the provisions of articles 1171 and 2201, The Master shall retain overall command of the vessel The law is very explicit. The master remains the
paragraph 2, shall apply. even on pilotage grounds whereby he can overall commander of the vessel even when there is a
countermand or overrule the order or command of the pilot on board. He remains in control of the ship as he
If the law or contract does not state the diligence Harbor Pilot on board. In such event, any damage can still perform the duties conferred upon him by
which is to be observed in the performance, that caused to a vessel or to life and property at ports by law[43] despite the presence of a pilot who is
which is expected of a good father of a family shall be reason of the fault or negligence of the Master shall temporarily in charge of the vessel. It is not required
required. be the responsibility and liability of the registered of him to be on the bridge while the vessel is being
owner of the vessel concerned without prejudice to navigated by a pilot.
The diligence of a good father of a family recourse against said Master.
requires only that diligence which an ordinary prudent However, Section 8 of PPA Administrative Order
man would exercise with regard to his own Such liability of the owner or Master of the vessel or No. 03-85, provides:
property. This we have found private respondent to its pilots shall be determined by competent authority
have exercised when the vessel sailed only after the in appropriate proceedings in the light of the facts and
Sec. 8. Compulsory Pilotage Service - For entering a
"main engine, machineries, and other auxiliaries" circumstances of each particular case.
harbor and anchoring thereat, or passing through
were checked and found to be in good running rivers or straits within a pilotage district, as well as
condition;[41] when the master left a competent officer, xxx docking and undocking at any pier/wharf, or shifting
the officer on watch on the bridge with a pilot who is from one berth or another, every vessel engaged in
experienced in navigating the Orinoco River; when Sec. 32. Duties and Responsibilities of the Pilots or coastwise and foreign trade shall be under
the master ordered the inspection of the vessel's Pilots Association. -- The duties and responsibilities of compulsory pilotage.
double bottom tanks when the vibrations occurred the Harbor Pilot shall be as follows:
anew.[42]
xxx.
xxx
The Philippine rules on pilotage, embodied in
The Orinoco River being a compulsory pilotage
Philippine Ports Authority Administrative Order No. f) A pilot shall be held responsible for the direction of a channel necessitated the engaging of a pilot who was
03-85, otherwise known as the Rules and Regulations vessel from the time he assumes his work as a pilot
presumed to be knowledgeable of every shoal, bank, navigation, with charts that disclose the places of pilot, and, a fortiori, if he is bound to do so under
deep and shallow ends of the river. In his deposition, hidden rocks, dangerous shores, or other dangers of penalty, then, and in such case, neither he nor the
pilot Ezzar Solarzano Vasquez testified that he is an the way, are the main elements of a pilot's knowledge owner will be liable for injuries occasioned by the
official pilot in the Harbour at Port Ordaz, Venezuela, and skill. But the pilot of a river vessel, like the harbor negligence of the pilot; for in such a case the pilot
[44]
and that he had been a pilot for twelve (12) years. pilot, is selected for the individual's personal cannot be deemed properly the servant of the master
[45]
He also had experience in navigating the waters of knowledge of the topography through which the or the owner, but is forced upon them, and the
the Orinoco River.[46] vessel is steered."[50] maxim Qui facit per alium facit per se does not apply."
(Underscoring supplied)
The law does provide that the master can We find that the grounding of the vessel is
countermand or overrule the order or command of the attributable to the pilot. When the vibrations were first Anent the river passage plan, we find that, while
harbor pilot on board. The master of the Philippine felt the watch officer asked him what was going on, there was none,[52] the voyage has been sufficiently
Roxas deemed it best not to order him (the pilot) to and pilot Vasquez replied that "(they) were in the planned and monitored as shown by the following
stop the vessel,[47] mayhap, because the latter had middle of the channel and that the vibration was as actions undertaken by the pilot, Ezzar Solarzano
assured him that they were navigating normally (sic) a result of the shallowness of the channel."[51] Vasquez, to wit: contacting the radio marina via VHF
before the grounding of the vessel.[48] Moreover, the for information regarding the channel, river traffic,
[53]
pilot had admitted that on account of his experience Pilot Ezzar Solarzano Vasquez was assigned to soundings of the river, depth of the river, bulletin on
he was very familiar with the configuration of the river pilot the vessel Philippine Roxas as well as other the buoys.[54] The officer on watch also monitored the
as well as the course headings, and that he does not vessels on the Orinoco River due to his knowledge of voyage.[55]
even refer to river charts when navigating the Orinoco the same. In his experience as a pilot, he should have
River.[49] been aware of the portions which are shallow and We, therefore, do not find the absence of a river
which are not. His failure to determine the depth of passage plan to be the cause for the grounding of the
Based on these declarations, it comes as no the said river and his decision to plod on his set vessel.
surprise to us that the master chose not to regain course, in all probability, caused damage to the
control of the ship. Admitting his limited knowledge of vessel. Thus, we hold him as negligent and liable for The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur does not apply
the Orinoco River, Captain Colon relied on the its grounding. to the case at bar because the circumstances
knowledge and experience of pilot Vasquez to guide surrounding the injury do not clearly indicate
the vessel safely. In the case of Homer Ramsdell Transportation negligence on the part of the private respondent. For
Company vs. La Compagnie Generale the said doctrine to apply, the following conditions
Licensed pilots, enjoying the emoluments of Transatlantique, 182 U.S. 406, it was held that: must be met: (1) the accident was of such character
compulsory pilotage, are in a different class from as to warrant an inference that it would not have
ordinary employees, for they assume to have a skill x x x The master of a ship, and the owner also, is happened except for defendant's negligence; (2) the
and a knowledge of navigation in the particular waters liable for any injury done by the negligence of the accident must have been caused by an agency or
over which their licenses extend superior to that of the crew employed in the ship. The same doctrine will instrumentality within the exclusive management or
master; pilots are bound to use due diligence and apply to the case of a pilot employed by the master or control of the person charged with the negligence
reasonable care and skill. A pilot's ordinary skill is in owner, by whose negligence any injury happens to a complained of; and (3) the accident must not have
proportion to the pilot's responsibilities, and implies a third person or his property: as, for example, by a been due to any voluntary action or contribution on
knowledge and observance of the usual rules of collision with another ship, occasioned by his the part of the person injured.[56]
navigation, acquaintance with the waters piloted in negligence. And it will make no difference in the case
their ordinary condition, and nautical skill in avoiding that the pilot, if any is employed, is required to be a As has already been held above, there was a
all known obstructions. The character of the skill and licensed pilot; provided the master is at liberty to take temporary shift of control over the ship from the
knowledge required of a pilot in charge of a vessel on a pilot, or not, at his pleasure, for in such a case the master of the vessel to the pilot on a compulsory
the rivers of a country is very different from that which master acts voluntarily, although he is necessarily pilotage channel. Thus, two of the requisites
enables a navigator to carry a vessel safely in the required to select from a particular class. On the other necessary for the doctrine to apply, i.e., negligence
ocean. On the ocean, a knowledge of the rules of hand, if it is compulsive upon the master to take a
and control, to render the respondent liable, are their record states, the vessel was class or "Q. Was the vessel able to respond to all your
absent. maintained, and she is fit to travel during that commands and orders?
voyage."
As to the claim that the ship was unseaworthy, "A. The vessel was navigating normally.[60]
we hold that it is not. xxx
Eduardo P. Mata, Second Engineer of the
The Lloyds Register of Shipping confirmed the "ATTY. MISA Philippine Roxas submitted an accident report
vessels seaworthiness in a Confirmation of Class wherein he stated that on February 11, 1988, he
issued on February 16, 1988 by finding that "the Before we proceed to other matter, will you kindly checked and prepared the main engine, machineries
above named ship (Philippine Roxas) maintained the tell us what is (sic) the 'class +100A1 and all other auxiliaries and found them all to be in
class "+100A1 Strengthened for Ore Cargoes, Nos. 2 Strengthened for Ore Cargoes', mean? good running condition and ready for
and 8 Holds may be empty (CC) and +LMC" from maneuvering. That same day the main engine, bridge
31/12/87 up until the time of casualty on or about "WITNESS and engine telegraph and steering gear motor were
12/2/88."[57] The same would not have been issued also tested.[61] Engineer Mata also prepared the fuel
had not the vessel been built according to the for consumption for maneuvering and checked the
"A Plus 100A1 means that the vessel was built
standards set by Lloyd's. engine generators.[62]
according to Lloyd's rules and she is capable
of carrying ore bulk cargoes, but she is
Samuel Lim, a marine surveyor, at Lloyd's particularly capable of carrying Ore Cargoes Finally, we find the award of attorneys fee
Register of Shipping testified thus: with No. 2 and No. 8 holds empty. justified.
"Q Now, in your opinion, as a surveyor, did top xxx Article 2208 of the New Civil Code provides that:
side tank have any bearing at all to the
seaworthiness of the vessel? "Art. 2208. In the absence of stipulation, attorney's
"COURT
fees and expenses of litigation, other than judicial
"A Well, judging on this particular vessel, and also costs, cannot be recovered, except:
The vessel is classed, meaning?
basing on the class record of the vessel,
wherein recommendations were made on xxx
the top side tank, and it was given sufficient "A Meaning she is fit to travel, your Honor, or
time to be repaired, it means that the vessel seaworthy."[58]
"(11) In any other case where the court deems it just
is fit to travel even with those defects on the and equitable that attorney's fees and expenses of
ship. It is not required that the vessel must be
litigation should be recovered.
perfect. To be seaworthy, a ship must be reasonably
"COURT fit to perform the services, and to encounter the
ordinary perils of the voyage, contemplated by the xxx
parties to the policy.[59]
What do you mean by that? You explain. The Due to the unfounded filing of this case, the
vessel is fit to travel even with defects? Is private respondent was unjustifiably forced to litigate,
that what you mean? Explain. As further evidence that the vessel was
seaworthy, we quote the deposition of pilot Vasquez: thus the award of attorneys fees was proper.