Performance Objectives for Low Damage Seismic

Design of Buildings

John Hare, Stuart Oliver, Bruce Galloway

Holmes Consulting Group.

2012 NZSEE
Conference

ABSTRACT: Low damage design is emerging as a way forward for building designers
to implement damage reduction measures into seismic design. Although some low
damage measures can be incorporated into conventional structural systems, most research
is concentrated on developing new structural systems or devices which can deliver
improved building performance. However, not all of the proposed systems will provide
low damage outcomes, in the broadest sense.

The performance of buildings in the Canterbury earthquakes is discussed in relation to

desired future outcomes, with an outline of the required limit states to be considered. A
set of general performance objectives is proposed that such systems can be measured
against. Design methodologies are discussed, noting that current Building Code
approaches will generally not provide adequate verification methods. In addition, some
consideration of future development criteria is offered, with the aim of ensuring that the
credibility of the industry is maintained.

1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 General

Since the mid-70s, seismic resisting design has commonly followed a capacity approach, using
ultimate limit state (or predecessor) design principles. The majority of designers have used a force-
based approach, and the increasing accessibility and capacity of desktop computing has evolved to the
point where many practices have the capacity to perform linear dynamic analysis of complex
structures.
Early computer analysis typically was limited to the primary lateral load resisting structure, due to the
limited capacity and accessibility of computers. This usually required designers to consider gravity
loading and secondary (non-lateral load resisting) structure independently of the lateral structure.
This has had several implications for the resulting building designs, both positive and negative. Some
include:
Designers were therefore more directly and closely involved in the structural design and
hence may have been more attuned to the building behaviour, although not necessarily in
respect of the secondary gravity-only structure.
Where there was significant secondary structure, it may have provided additional lateral load
resistance for free.
Conversely, although the secondary structure would be required to undergo the same
displacement as the primary lateral load resisting structure, it was often not detailed for the
same level of deformation capacity. This may therefore have resulted in an effective
reduction in the overall performance.
Significant design effort was required for the design, compared to what can now be achieved
in a relatively short time with modern computers and software (noting that the actual analysis

Paper Number 035

 engines driving the software have changed little over the last 30 years)
The subsequent improvements in desktop computing capability have moved conventional computer
analysis from a niche skill to the structural engineering mainstream. Whole structures are usually
modelled, including gravity loads. Many designers have access to automated design processes that
allow variations of structural forms and ductility to be investigated and designs to be refined
considerably beyond what was previously possible.
Capacity design has proven generally reliable in providing designs that meet the life safety
performance objectives of the loading standard, but the often neglected truth is that these buildings are
designed to fail. Our engineering training had led us to believe that such buildings would be
generally repairable following a minor earthquake but may require demolition after a major event.
Communication of this to building owners and the general public was never fully achieved. Owners in
particular either could not or would not understand the implications of this.
Recent experience in Christchurch has shown that following a major earthquake it is seldom economic
to repair a ductile building that was designed following the principles of capacity design. This is an
emerging picture, with considerable research required, but issues such as dynamic loading effects,
low-cycle fatigue and the impact of concrete aging are a few of the possible contributing factors.
However, even the repairs after the more moderate event of September 4 were not as simple as might
have been expected.
More recently, alternative design methods have been proposed that may produce different outcomes.
Whether it is termed Damage Avoidance Design (DAD) or Low Damage Design (LDD), the
objectives are generally the same to design new forms of lateral load resisting structure where
damage is either suppressed or limited to readily replaceable elements, removing or reducing the
expensive downtime and even the need to replace buildings that have been severely damaged in an
earthquake.
The concept has in fact been in use for a long time. Base isolation has been used for buildings and
bridges since 1978, and is arguably the original form of LDD in modern design.
A common factor in the past for predecessor forms of LDD has been the need to complete
significantly more sophisticated forms of analysis and design, often incorporating non-linear time
history analysis. Such complex analysis is not merited for conventional design, where the building
behaviour can be controlled by the designer. However, the need for more sophisticated analysis has in
part lead to methods such as base isolation becoming a niche activity.
LDD is now being proposed by some as a widespread substitute for conventional systems. However
for this to happen, designers need to be given the means to readily complete such designs, and need to
understand what it is that they are trying to achieve. A clear set of performance objectives needs to be
agreed, and importantly, developers and builders of such structures need to have a clear and
reasonable expectation of the buildings likely behaviour. Arguably, the profession cannot allow a
failure of communication of design outcomes to be repeated.
1.2 Canterbury Earthquakes

The Canterbury Earthquakes have prompted a need for significant reconsideration of the design
process and performance objectives.

1.2.1 SLS behaviour

The Darfield (September 4th, 2010) earthquake is the most relevant of the Canterbury events for
consideration here, noting that although it exceeded SLS1 limits for the pre-earthquake loading
standard (R = 0.25, Z = 0.22), it is a reasonable approximation of the new standard (R = 0.33, Z =
0.3). One of the more concerning outcomes was the considerable amount of damage done in modern
structures, generally to non-structural elements. Although estimates were never completed, many
buildings suffered damage requiring weeks or even months of repair, some of which caused significant
disruption to users through having to vacate space while work was completed. In the worst cases, this
may have involved closure of buildings. Examples of the damage include:

2
 Significant cracking of precast floor systems (in the worst case leading to fracture of cold-
drawn wire mesh reinforcement).
Damage to partitions. The most critical damage was to firewalls, especially around fire escape
stairs, requiring repair in order to restore fire cell integrity
Failure of ceiling systems. In the extreme, entire ceilings systems fell, representing a
significant hazard to occupants
The question this prompts is whether LDD design should be able to avoid or minimise this level of
damage in what could have been considered an SLS event for much of the CBD.

1.2.2 ULS behaviour

The February 22nd, 2011 event was clearly a ULS level event (or larger) for the CBD, at least in terms
of the ground accelerations, if not duration. As such, it was to be expected that there would be
significant damage to modern buildings, even to the point that many would require demolition.
However, it is important to note that with one exception, buildings designed since the introduction of
capacity design did not fail to meet the basic life safety objective. The question could be asked though,
whether more buildings may have failed in a significantly longer duration event.
As might have been expected, this provides little comfort to owners, tenants or insurers. Although it
could be argued that this had been communicated and was a societal choice, the message had never
been fully understood. Interestingly, owners on the whole are relatively content with replacing their
aging buildings through insurance. However, the inconvenience to tenants and the overall impact on
the countrys economy of this is a more concerning issue. Although the economy will survive it, it
cannot afford to have another similar event in the near future.
The question this prompts is whether there needs to be more focus on reduction of damage in such an
event, particularly in the larger centres, where the overall impact of losing this concentration of
buildings with subsequent disruption to the economy may not be an acceptable outcome. Specifically,
can LDD design sufficiently reduce the impact of this level of damage to the point where the CBD
could have returned to near full business activity in a relatively short period of time?

1.3 MCE behaviour

The Maximum Considered Earthquake (MCE) is not currently a definition that appears in the New
Zealand Building Code (NZBC), apart from the commentary to AS/NZS1170.5. However it is used
here for convenience, in reference to the code requirement of collapse avoidance in larger earthquakes.
Many have stated that the February 22nd event approximated the MCE for much of Christchurch, from
the CBD to the east, including Lyttelton. If this is accepted, then the overall building performance
(arguably) easily met the Building Code requirement, of low probability of collapse in such an event.
Consideration may however be given as to whether the earthquakes have really been at this level
although the ground accelerations may have been, the duration was considerably shorter than would
normally be expected for a MCE event. There is plenty of evidence that more buildings may have
collapsed, had the duration been significantly longer.
The question this prompts is whether LDD systems can be demonstrated to meet this level of
performance demand, ie acceptably low probability of collapse in a significantly longer duration
shaking.

1.4 Special characteristics of Christchurch and the earthquakes

In considering these questions, it is worth noting that there are several aspects to the Canterbury
earthquakes that may be unusual or unique.
Firstly is the nature of the earthquakes, with unusually high ground accelerations from relatively low
magnitude events. This is of note as the impact of such events is relatively concentrated, but the CBD
just happened to fall within the area of greatest impact. Should this be considered something that

3
could happen anywhere, or is it an aberration? Observations are that most damage occurred within
about a 15 km radius of the epicentre. This is coincidentally within the radius noted as the basis for
the minimum seismic actions of AS/NZS1170.5 (noting that the minimum seismic loading is derived
from the 84th percentile actions of a M6.5 earthquake at 20km radius). Accepting that, if a circle of
15km radius is drawn around the centre of Auckland, it could include the CBD, Waitakere City,
Manukau City and the North Shore city centre. Given that Aucklands seismic hazard is
approximately 40% of that in Christchurch, the result would clearly be more catastrophic, as all
buildings would have significantly less strength. Added to that, the EPB threshold load is such a small
proportion of this as to be hardly significant.
Secondly is the deep soil profile and possible basin effects in Christchurch, that have resulted in high
period amplifications, liquefaction and high settlements. On one hand, this may have reduced lateral
loads (by providing a form of base isolation), but on the other, it has resulted in many buildings having
unacceptable differential settlements or lateral displacement, that otherwise performed well
structurally. Clearly any LDD systems must take into account the ground performance.
Thirdly, is the probability that longer durations of earthquake in Christchurch will most likely come
from more distant fault sources. Hence it is likely that the ground accelerations will be lower.
Conversely, the possible basin effect may be more pronounced, possibly leading to higher
amplification of the long period response. This was noted in Christchurch, in that for some sites, the
long period response from the Darfield earthquake was proportionally higher measured against the pga
than for February 22nd.
Finally, is the level of insurance carried, across all building types. It has been noted that in excess of
80% of properties carried earthquake cover, as opposed to international trends of more like 20%. This
has likely led to demolition of buildings that would have been repaired in other countries. Changes in
the New Zealand insurance market may see levels of insurance cover reduce as insurance premiums
and excesses increase.
These factors could be taken into account when considering the possible benefits of LDD, particularly
in the case of soil-structure interaction. There is little point in putting forward LDD systems that are
not matched by an equivalent level of performance in the foundations, and arguably, in the
surrounding infrastructure.

2 BUILDING PERFORMANCE LIMIT STATES

When assessing the seismic performance of low-damage design (LDD) systems the following building
performance limit states should be considered:
Serviceability Limit State (SLS)
Damage Control Limit State (DCLS)
Ultimate Limit State (ULS)
Collapse Limit State (CLS)
These building performance limit states are described in more detail below.

2.1 Serviceability Limit State

Two serviceability limit states are defined in NZS 1170.5 (SNZ, 2004), these are:
(i) SLS1. Damage shall be avoided to the structural and non-structural components that would
prevent the structure from being used as originally intended without repair. and
(ii) SLS2. Applies to critical post disaster designation buildings only (i.e. Importance Level (IL) 4
buildings). All elements required to maintain those operations for which the structure is designed as
critical, are to be maintained in an operations state or are to be returned to a fully operational state
within an acceptable short timeframe (usually minutes to hours rather than days).

4
The SLS loads are defined in clause 2.4, and for IL2 (regular buildings), SLS1 equates to the 1 in 25
annual probability of exceedance. For IL4 buildings, SLS2 equates to the 1 in 500 annual probability
of exceedance. This is generally the governing design criterion for an IL4 building.

2.2 Damage Control Limit State

Consideration of the damage control limit state (DCLS) is not required by NZS 1170.5 (SNZ, 2004).
The damage control limit state has been defined by Priestley et. al., (2007) as the limit state whereby a
certain amount of repairable damage is acceptable, but the cost of repair should be significantly less
than the cost of replacement.
Damage to reinforced concrete buildings may include minor spalling of cover concrete requiring cover
replacement, and the formation of residual flexural cracks requiring injection grouting. Inelastic strain
in reinforcing steel is limited, to ensure adequate performance in future earthquakes. For structural
steel buildings, flange or shear panel buckling shall be avoided.
Building drifts should be limited such that damage to non-structural components is limited to
acceptable levels at the specified earthquake hazard level.
As this is not a limit state defined by AS/NZS1170.5, there is no pre-determined load level. Therefore
this limit state becomes a matter for discussion with the building developer. It is expected that the
damage control limit state would be set somewhere between SLS1 and ULS requirements. A
reasonable correlation could be made between SLS2 and DCLS for many buildings.

2.3 Ultimate Limit State

Functional requirements for the ULS are defined in NZS 1170.5 (SNZ, 2004). These are:
(i) Avoidance of collapse of the structural system; and
(ii) Avoidance of collapse of loss of support to parts of categories P.1, P.2, P.3 and P.4; and
(iii) Avoidance of damage to non-structural systems necessary for emergency building
evacuation, that renders them inoperative

2.4 Collapse Limit State

Consideration of the collapse limit state is not required by NZS 1170.5 (SNZ, 2004), nor is any
specific guidance provided in the standard in terms of what defines the CLS. However for new
buildings, designed to modern design standards with ductile materials and configurations, NZS 1170.5
assumes that a margin of at least between 1.5 and 1.8 exists between ULS and CLS.
For building systems that are not covered by existing material standards, care needs to be taken to
ensure that similar margins of safety exist beyond the ULS.
Additional consideration should also be given to how the building might behave for those LDD
systems which have a hard limit (i.e. isolators where the rattle space is exceeded or dampers when the
maximum stroke is exceeded) if the CLS displacements are exceeded.

3 OBJECTIVES OF LDD

The basic objective of LDD must be a form of structure that will survive a DCLS (which may be ULS)
design level event with minimal damage and which may be reasonably easily and economically
repaired, with minimal disruption to the building users. However, this needs some expansion, noting
the recent experiences in the Canterbury earthquakes.
The effectiveness of low damage design systems may be characterised by the following properties:
Damage mitigation effectiveness

5
 Reparability
Self-centring ability
Non-structural Damage
Durability
Affordability
These objectives are considered in more detail below.

3.1 Damage Mitigation Effectiveness

Essentially, how effective is the LDD system at preventing damage to structural and non-structural
components? Some such as base isolation are proven systems which effectively mitigate building
damage. Other LDD systems may be less effective and may not prevent damage from occurring to
secondary elements.
If LDD is to become established as a preferred alternative to conventional design methods, it is critical
that it does not lose credibility in its infancy. This will happen if it fails to live up to its principle
promise, of minimising damage.
Articulating frame systems such as PRESSS or PRESLAM are examples of systems that provide some
of the benefits of LDD without mitigating one of the most significant short-comings of conventional
design. Both forms of construction rely on gapping of the beams at both top and bottom. This must
result in tearing of the floor diaphragms, which therefore lose the ability to distribute seismic actions
effectively. The observation that this is no worse than is expected in conventional RC moment frames
is not an adequate explanation or counter to this criticism, if they are to qualify as LDD systems.

3.2 System Reparability

Can the structural system be economically repaired following a major event i.e. does it have plug and
play capability? Some systems have energy dissipaters which can be unbolted and replaced following
a large event, for example Buckling Restrained Braced Frames (BRBFs) and U-shaped Flexural Plate
(UFP) systems Other systems that rely on mild steel reinforcing encapsulated inside reinforced
concrete elements, to act as energy dissipaters, are more difficult to repair.
As a general rule we should be aiming to use systems that can be easily repaired i.e. avoid
encapsulated systems; or replaced i.e. can have external dissipaters easily retrofitted if the original
dissipation system is damaged beyond use or repair.

3.3 Self-centring Ability

This section deals with those systems that can provide some self-centring capacity to a building such
that the building returns close to its original vertical alignment with minimal residual deformations
following the DCLS earthquake. It is unclear at time of writing how much of a premium should be
placed on this capability.
Some low damage design systems, such as PRESSS type hybrid walls and frames, have active self-
centring by means of unbonded post-tensioned tendons (notwithstanding the issues with gapping of
the frames). Base isolation systems are typically fully or nearly self-centring.
Residual building deformations can also be minimised by ensuring that the post-yield stiffness of the
whole building (i.e. including both primary and secondary elements) is at least 5% 10% of the initial
elastic stiffness (Pettinga et. al., 2007). As suggested by Pettinga et. al. (2007) in some cases the
required post yield stiffness could be provided by introducing a secondary, more flexible, seismic
resisting system which is designed to remain elastic for the DCLS earthquake. An example of this
would be a BRBF building with some of the secondary gravity frames detailed to provide the
necessary BRBF post yield stiffness.

6
Experience from earthquakes has typically shown that conventional buildings that have not
experienced foundation failures have generally sustained residual building drifts that are close to the
tolerances permitted in material standards for new construction i.e.:
Concrete buildings: h/400 (0.25%) or 25 mm (NZS 3109, SNZ, 1997)
Structural steel buildings up to 60 m: h/500 (0.2%) or 25 mm (NZS 3404.1, SNZ, 2009)
However it has also been noted that the Christchurch earthquakes have been relatively short duration
events and more significant residual building drifts might be expected for longer earthquakes.
McCormick et. al. (2008) have suggested an allowable residual drift of 0.5%. This limit has been
derived with consideration given to both human comfort, building functionality and building safety.
Buildings with residual drifts exceeding this limit may not be acceptable to occupy following an
earthquake. In many cases it may not be practicable to straighten a building following a major
earthquake. Because of this when designing new buildings we should have a target residual drift of no
more than 0.5% at the DCLS.

3.4 Non-structural Damage

Large inter-story drifts associated with flexible systems can result in significant damage to non-
structural components such as partitions and cladding elements. Conversely, stiff buildings typically
have higher floor accelerations which can lead to higher levels of contents damage.
Both inter-story drifts and floor accelerations can be reduced by adding damping to a structural
system, in excess of that traditionally assumed for conventional seismic design, i.e. 5%. The form of
the damping is also relevant, with viscous damping offering the benefit of peak energy dissipation at
peak velocity, out of phase with the maximum displacement. This may result in a more efficient
structure and foundation system.

3.5 Durability

The economic life of a building is generally assessed at 50 years under the Building Code, although
there is no consequent driver to require removal of the building. However it should be assumed that
any LDD system must achieve this life, either through durability or an effective maintenance regime.
A difficulty with this can be anticipation of the possible exposure of elements over time.
For example, in the case of friction damping elements, such as steel plate systems, what allowance
should be made for possible leaks in elements at building faade lines? As an alternative, should the
system have a fail-safe mechanism such that if the plates were to lock, an acceptable capacity designed
failure mechanism (strong column/weak beam) would ensue?
Other systems such as external dampers or base isolation require durability testing or protection. In
the case of systems such as PRESSS frames or walls, access for re-stressing should be allowed, but an
effective maintenance and monitoring process should be followed.

3.6 Affordability

All projects have budgets and some LDD systems are more expensive than others. It is important that
both the costs and benefits are fully considered when LDD systems are selected. This should include
consideration of ongoing life-cycle costs such as monitoring and maintenance if the systems require it,
and any increased design and compliance costs.
Ultimately, affordability must be determined by the developers and users, to the extent that they are
involved in the decision. However, the costs must be declared at the outset if they are to make
informed decisions. This may require development of alternative conventional systems at least to
concept phase, for comparative costing.

7
4 SEISMIC DESIGN METHODOLOGIES

Traditionally seismic design has been undertaken following a force based approach. More recently
this has changed to a deformation focused, force based design whereby a greater emphasis is placed on
checking expected plastic deformations of critical structural elements. This is the methodology
currently encapsulated within the NZBC and supporting documents.
Displacement based seismic design is also becoming more widely accepted in the design community
as the importance of deformation, rather than strength, in assessing the seismic performance of
buildings has become recognised (Priestley et. al., 2007). However the application of displacement
based design to real buildings is not always straightforward.
For irregular buildings, designed using displacement based design, a non-linear time history analysis is
recommended as part of the design validation. Furthermore displacement based design is not covered
by NZS 1170.5 (SNZ, 2004) and as such is treated as an alternative solution under the NZ Building
Code.
In practice, to simplify regulatory requirements, an interim pragmatic approach might be to undertake
a simplified displacement based design to determine basic detailing requirements and establish
adequate performance at the DCLS, while a conventional force based design is carried out to
demonstrate compliance with Building Code requirements. However, this depends on the nature of
the system being used, some of which may have unique design aspects requiring a specific
methodology to be followed. It is likely in either case that Building Consent Authorities will (or
should) require independent peer review, requiring agreement amongst designers on the verification
methods to be followed.
Eventually, some form of design appropriate to such systems may be standardised, allowing them to
be consented through a conventional processes. But it is worth noting that since the development of
base isolation in the 70s, there is still no codified design process in New Zealand, probably mainly
because of lack of demand. Such systems may be designed using international standards and
guidelines, but the adoption of such guidelines for use in New Zealand must be carefully considered to
ensure it is appropriately calibrated against the NZBC.
Future design methodologies are likely to follow performance based design principles. This is likely
to include greater flexibility for designers to select differing levels of performance in conjunction with
their clients. Although this is still in the early development stages, it is understood at the time of
writing, that ATC-58 has just been published in 100% draft form. Adaptation of this document may
be a way forward for the profession in New Zealand.

5 DEVELOPMENT AND TESTING

In recent years there has been a significant research effort put into the development of LDD systems.
Some of this has already translated to industry, with several friction-damped, PRESSS and PRESLAM
systems built or nearing completion. It is the authors contention though, that there is still further
development necessary to demonstrate that these systems are capable of delivering the levels of
performance that are ascribed to them (but not that they should be considered not to meet Building
Code life safety standards). An example of this is the consideration of diaphragm damage to multi-
bay PRESSS systems.
The verification of some of the performance objectives noted above is not a trivial task. For example,
it requires real-time testing in order to verify the performance of damping devices. Three dimensional
specimens may need to be tested in order to investigate concurrency and the performance of
diaphragms in gapping systems, pushing the limits of current testing facilities in New Zealand.
However, there is a need to ensure that these questions can be answered.
Design methodologies must be developed which offer at least the same margins of safety as are
inherently included in the current Building Code. This requires that sufficient test data is assembled as
to provide statistically meaningful results, as well as the underlying theory.

8
6 SUMMARY

Low Damage Design offers significant promise for the future as a means of reducing the impact of
future earthquakes. As has been demonstrated in the recent Canterbury earthquakes, even insured
losses can have tremendous consequential collateral damage to society and the economy.
It is likely that New Zealand will reconsider its approach to seismic design, with the possibility that
our current life safety design objectives will be expanded to consider more damage reduction
measures. But even if that is not the case and our life safety approach is reaffirmed, increased
awareness among building users, owners and developers is likely to result in increased interest in
damage reduction measures. It is vital for the ongoing credibility of the industry that LDD systems
that are implemented will actually deliver low damage.
The authors have proposed a set of objectives that should be considered in the development of LDD
systems, noting that although there are systems being developed that claim to deliver low damage
performance, they may not satisfy all of these objectives.
Looking forward there is a clear need for the development of a consistent set of standards which can
be used by Structural Engineers and Territorial Authorities to design and review LDD buildings. This
is important, both to reduce compliance costs, and to ensure that consistent and adequate levels of
structural performance are provided across the various LDD systems available. Ideally the standards
would be performance based rather than prescriptive.

REFERENCES:

AS/NZS1170.0 Structural Design Actions Part 0 General Principles, Standards New Zealand, Wellington, New
Zealand, 2002.
ATC-58-1 Seismic Performance Assessment of Buildings Volume 1 Methodology, Applied Tehnology
Council, Redwood City, California.
NZS1170.5 Structural Design Actions Part 5 Earthquake Actions, Standards New Zealand, Wellington, New
Zealand, 2005.
NZS3109:1997 Concrete Construction, Standards New Zealand, Wellington, New Zealand, 1997.
NZS3404.1:2009 Steel Structures Standard Part 1: Materials, Fabrication and Construction, Standards New
Zealand, Wellington, New Zealand, 2007.
Jason McCormick, J., Aburano, H., Ikenaga, M. & Nakashima, M, Permissible Residual Deformation Levels For
Building Structures Considering Both Safety And Human Elements, 14 WCEE, 2008.
Pettinga, D., Christopolous, C, Pampanin, S & Priestley, N, Effectiveness of Simple Approaches in Mitigating
Residual Deformations in Buildings, Earthquake Engineering and Structural Dynamics, Vol 36, 2007.
Priestley, M.J.N., Calvi, G.M. & Kowalsky, M.J., Displacement Based Seismic Design of Structures, IUSS
Press, Italy, 2007