ABOITIZ SHIPPING V. CA (G.R. NO.

84458) time after leaving the conveyance are to be deemed passengers,

Facts:
Anacleto Viana boarded the vessel M/V Antonia owned by petitioner
Aboitiz Shipping Corp at the port at San Jose, Occidental Mindoro,
bound for Manila. The vessel arrived at Pier 4, North Harbor, Manila
and was taken over by Pioneer Stevedoring for the latter to unload
the cargoes from the said vessel pursuant to their Memorandum of
Agreement. An hour after the passengers and Viana had
disembarked the vessel the crane operator began its unloading
operation. While the crane was being operated, Viana who had
already disembarked the vessel remembered that some of his
cargoes were still loaded there. He went back and while he was
pointing to the crew where his cargoes were, the crane hit him
pinning him between the side of the vessel and the crane resulting
to his death. A complaint for damages was filed against petitioner
for breach of contract of carriage. Petitioner contends that Viana
ceased to be a passenger when he disembarked the vessel and
that consequently his presence there was no longer reasonable. CA
affirmed the trial courts order holding Aboitiz liable. Hence the
petition.
and what is a reasonable time or a reasonable delay within this rule
is to be determined from all the circumstances, and includes a
reasonable time to see after his baggage and prepare for his
departure. The carrier-passenger relationship is not terminated
merely by the fact that the person transported has been carried to
his destination if, for example, such person remains in the carriers
premises to claim his baggage.
The primary factor to be considered is the existence of a
reasonable cause as will justify the presence of the victim on or
near the petitioners vessel. We believe there exists such a
justifiable cause. When the accident occurred, the victim was in the
act of unloading his cargoes, which he had every right to do, from
petitioners vessel. As earlier stated, a carrier is duty bound not only
to bring its passengers safely to their destination but also to afford
them a reasonable time to claim their baggage.
Consequently, under the foregoing circumstances, the victim
Anacleto Viana is still deemed a passenger of said carrier at the
time of his tragic death.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioner is still responsible as a carrier to Viana
after the latter had already disembarked the vessel.

Ruling: YES.
The rule is that the relation of carrier and passenger continues until
the passenger has been landed at the port of destination and has
left the vessel owners dock or premises. Once created, the
relationship will not ordinarily terminate until the passenger has,
after reaching his destination, safely alighted from the carriers
conveyance or had a reasonable opportunity to leave the carriers
premises. All persons who remain on the premises a reasonable

G.R. No. 95582 October 7, 1991
Lessons Applicable: Actionable Document (Transportation)
Laws Applicable: Art. 1733, Art. 1755
FACTS:
May 13, 1985: Theodore M. Lardizabal was driving a
passenger bus belonging to Dangwa Transportation Co. Inc.
(Dangwa)
The bus was at full stop bet. Bunkhouses 53 and 54
when Pedro alighted
Pedro Cudiamat fell from the platform of the
bus when it suddenly accelerated forward
Pedro was ran over by the rear right
tires of the vehicle
Theodore first brought his other passengers and
cargo to their respective destinations before bringing Pedro to
Lepanto Hospital where he expired
Private respondents filed a complaint for damages against
Dangwa for the death of Pedro Cudiamat
Dangwa: observed and continued to observe the
extraordinary diligence required in the operation of the co. and
the supervision of the employees even as they are not absolute
insurers of the public at large
RTC: in favour of Dangwa holding Pedrito as negligent and
his negligence was the cause of his death but still ordered to
pay in equity P 10,000 to the heirs of Pedrito
CA: reversed and ordered to pay Pedrito indemnity, moral
damages, actual and compensatory damages and cost of the
suit
ISSUE: W/N Dangwa should be held liable for the negligence of its
driver Theodore
HELD: YES. CA affirmed.
A public utility once it stops, is in effect making a continuous
offer to bus riders (EVEN when moving as long as it is still slow
in motion)
Duty of the driver: do NOT make acts that would
have the effect of increasing peril to a passenger while he is
attempting to board the same
Premature acceleration of the bus in this
case = breach of duty
Stepping and standing on the platform of the bus is already
considered a passenger and is entitled all the rights and
protection pertaining to such a contractual relation
Duty extends to boarding and alighting
GR: By contract of carriage, the carrier assumes the
express obligation to transport the passenger to his destination
safely and observe extraordinary diligence with a due regard for
all the circumstances, and any injury that might be suffered by
the passenger is right away attributable to the fault or
negligence of the carrier
EX: carrier to prove that it has exercised extraordinary
diligence as prescribed in Art. 1733 and 1755 of the Civil Code
Failure to immediately bring Pedrito to the hospital despite
his serious condition = patent and incontrovertible proof of their
negligence
Hospital was in Bunk 56
1st proceeded to Bunk 70 to allow a passenger (who
later called the family of Pedrito on his own will) to alight and
deliver a refrigerator
In tort, actual damages is based on net earnings

LIGHT RAIL TRANSIT AUTHORITY & RODOLFO ROMAN, versus
MARJORIE NAVIDAD, Heirs of the Late NICANOR NAVIDAD &
PRUDENT SECURITY AGENCY
FACTS:
Nicanor Navidad, then drunk, entered the EDSA LRT station after
purchasing a token (representing payment of the fare). While
Navidad was standing on the platform near the LRT tracks, Junelito
Escartin, the security guard assigned to the area approached him. A
misunderstanding or an altercation between the two apparently
ensued that led to a fist fight. No evidence, however, was adduced
to indicate how the fight started or who, between the two, delivered
the first blow or how Navidad later fell on the LRT tracks. At the
exact moment that Navidad fell, an LRT train, operated by petitioner
Rodolfo Roman, was coming in. Navidad was struck by the moving
train, and he was killed instantaneously. The widow of Nicanor,
Marjorie Navidad, along with her children, filed a complaint for
damages against Junelito Escartin, Rodolfo Roman, the LRTA, the
Metro Transit Organization, Inc. (Metro Transit), and Prudent for the
death of her husband. Trial court ruled in favor Navidads wife and
against the defendants Prudent Security and Junelito Escartin .
LRTA and Rodolfo Roman were dismissed for lack of merit. CA held
LRTA and Roman liable, hence the petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was a perfected contract of carriage between
Navidad and LRTA
RATIO:
Liability of LRTA Read Arts. 1755,1756, 1759 and 1763 of the
New Civil Code
A common carrier is required by these above statutory provisions to
use utmost diligence in carrying passengers with due regard for all
circumstances. This obligation exists not only during the course of
the trip but for so long as the passengers are within its premises
where they ought to be in pursuance to then contract of carriage.
Art. 1763 renders a common carrier liable for death of or injury to
passengers (a) through the negligence or wilful acts of its
employees or (b) on account of willful acts or negligence of other
passengers or of strangers if the common carriers employees
through theexercise of due diligence could have prevented or
stopped the act or omission. In case of such death or injury, a
carrier is presumed to have been at fault or been negligent, and by
simple proof of injury, the passenger is relieved of the duty to still
establish the fault or negligence of the carrier or of its employees
and the burden shifts upon the carrier to prove that the injury is due
to an unforeseen event or to force majeure.
Liability of Security Agency If Prudent is to be held liable, it
would be for a tort under Art. 2176 in conjunction with Art. 2180.
Once the fault of the employee Escartin is established, the
employer, Prudent, would be held liable on the presumption that it
did not exercise the diligence of a good father of the family in the
selection and supervision of its employees.
Relationship between contractual and non-contractual
breach How then must the liability of the common carrier, on the
one hand, and an independent contractor, on the other hand, be
described? It would be solidary. A contractual obligation can be
breached by tort and when the same act or omission causes the
injury, one resulting in culpa contractual and the other in culpa
aquiliana, Article 2194 of the Civil Code can well apply. In fine, a
liability for tort may arise even under a contract, where tort is that
which breaches the contract. Stated differently, when an act which
constitutes a breach of ontract would have itself constituted the
source of a quasi-delictual liability had no contract existed between
the parties, the contract can be said to have been breached by tort,
thereby allowing the rules on tort to apply.

Nominal Damages - The award of nominal damages in addition to

actual damages is untenable. Nominal damages are adjudicated in
order that a right of the plaintiff, which has been violated or invaded
by the defendant, may be vindicated or recognized, and not for the
purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by him. It
is an established rule that nominal damages cannot co-exist with
compensatory damages. The award was deleted.

La Mallorca v. Court of Appeals (17 SCRA 739)
Post under case digests, Civil Law at Thursday, February 23,
2012 Posted by Schizophrenic Mind
Facts: Plaintiffs husband and wife, together with their minor
children, boarded a La Mallorca bus. Upon arrival at their
destination, plaintiffs and their children alighted from the bus and
the father led them to a shaded spot about 5 meters from the
vehicle. The father returned to the bus to get a piece of baggage
which was not unloaded. He was followed by her daughter Raquel.
While the father was still on the running board awaiting for the
conductor to give his baggage, the bus started to run so that the
father had to jump. Raquel, who was near the bus, was run over
and killed.
Lower court rendered judgment for the plaintiff which was affirmed
by CA, holding La Mallorca liable for quasi-delict and ordering it to
pay P6,000 plus P400. La Mallorco contended that when the child
was killed, she was no longer a passenger and therefore the
contract of carriage terminated.
Issue: Whether or not the contractual obligation between the
parties ceases the moment the passenger alighted form the
vehicle.
Held: On the question whether the liability of the carrier, as to the
child who was already led a place 5 meters from the bus under the
contract of carrier, still persists, we rule in the affirmative. It is
arecognized rules that the relation between carrier and passengers
does not cease at the moment the passenger alights from the
carriers premises, to be determined from the circumstances. In this
case, there was no utmost diligence. Firstly, the driver, although
stopping the bus, did not put off the engine. Secondly, he started to
run the bus even before the bus conductor gave him the signal and
while the latter was unloading cargo. Here, the presence of said
passenger near the bus was not unreasonable and the duration of
responsibility still exists. Averment of quasi-delict
is permissibleunder the Rules of Court, although incompatible
with the contract of carriage. The Rules of Court allows the plaintiffs
to allege causes of action in the alternative, be they compatible with
each other or not (Sec. 2, Rule 1). Even assuming arguendo
that the contract of carriage has already terminated, herein
petitioner can be held liable for the negligence of its driver pursuant
to Art. 2180 of NCC. Decision MODIFIED. Only question raised in
the briefs can be passed upon, and as plaintiffs did not appeals the
award of P3,000.00 the increase by the CA of the award to
P6,000.00 cannot be sustained.
 Issue: Whether JAL is guilty of breach of contract.

JAPAN AIRLINES VS. ASUNCION
G.R. No. 161730. January 28, 2005
Facts: On March 27, 1992, respondents Michael and Jeanette
Asuncion left Manila on board Japan Airlines (JAL) bound for Los
Angeles. Their itinerary included a stop-over in Narita and an
overnight stay at Hotel Nikko Narita. Upon arrival at Narita, en
employee of JAL endorsed their applications for shore pass and
directed them to the Japanese immigration official. A shore pass is
required of a foreigner aboard a vessel or aircraft who desires to
stay in the neighborhood of the port of call for not more than 72
hours.
Held: The SC found that JAL did not breach its contract of carriage
with respondents. It may be true that JAL has the duty to inspect
whether its passengers have the necessary travel documents,
however, such duty does not extend to checking the veracity of
every entry in these documents. JAL could not vouch for the
authenticity of a passport and the correctness of the entries therein.
The power to admit or not an alien into the country is a sovereign
act which cannot be interfered with even by JAL. This is not within
the ambit of the contract of carriage entered into by JAL and herein
respondents. As such, JAL should not be faulted for the denial of
respondents shore pass applications.

During their interview, the Japanese immigration official noted that

Michael appeared shorter than his height as indicated in his
passport. Because of this inconsistency, respondents were denied
shore pass entries and were detained at the Narita Airport Rest
House where they were billeted overnight. A JAL employee was
instructed that the respondents were to be watched so as not to
escape. Respondents were charged US $400.00 each for their
accommodation, security, service and meals.

Subsequently, respondents filed a complaint for damages claiming

that JAL did not fully apprise them of their travel requirements and
that they were rudely and forcibly detained at the Narita Airport. The
trial court rendered a decision favor of the respondents. On appeal,
the CA affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court.

GACAL v. PAL
G.R. No. 55300
NATURE
Petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of First
Instance
FACTS
Franklin G. Gacal and his wife, Corazon, Bonifacio S. Anislag
and his wife, Mansueta, and the late Elma de Guzman, boarded a
PAL flight to Manila from the Davao Airport. Commander Zapata,
and five other armed members of the Moro National Liberation
Front (MNLF), all passengers of the same flight, hijacked the
aircraft ten minutes after take off. The hijackers directed the pilot to
fly to Libya but upon the pilots explanation of the fuel
limitations, they relented and directed the aircraft to land at
Zamboanga Airport.
At the runway of the Zamboanga Airport, the aircraft was met
by two armored cars of the military with machine guns pointed at
the plane. The rebels demanded that a DC-aircraft take them to
Libya with the President of PAL as hostage and that they be given
$375,000 and 6 armalites, otherwise they will blow up the plane.
The negotiations lasted for three days and it was only on the third
day that the passengers were served 1/4 slice of a sandwich and
1/10 cup of PAL water. On the same day, relatives of the hijackers
were allowed to board the plane but immediately after they alighted
therefrom, a battle between the military and the hijackers ensued,
culminating in the liberation of the surviving crew and passengers,
the death of 10 passengers and 3 hijackers, and the capture of the
3 others.
Franklin G. Gacal was unhurt but his wife suffered injuries and
was hospitalized for 2 days. Bonifacio S. Anislag also escaped
unhurt but Mrs. Anislag suffered a fracture at the radial bone of her
left elbow for which she was hospitalized and operated on. Elma de
Guzman died because of that battle.
The plaintiffs filed an action for damages demanding from PAL
actual damages for hospital and medical expenses and the value of
lost personal belongings, moral damages, attorneys fees and
exemplary damages. The trial court dismissed the complaints
finding that all the damages sustained in the premises were
attributed to force majeure. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE
Whether or not PAL is liable for damages
HELD
NO. Under Art 1733 of the Civil Code, common carriers are
required to exercise extraordinary diligence in their vigilance over
the goods and for the safety of passengers transported by them,
according so all the circumstances of each case. They are
presumed at fault or to have acted negligently whenever a
passenger dies or is injured or for the loss, destruction or
deterioration of goods in cases other than those enumerated in which, though foreseen, are inevitable. It is, therefore, not enough
Article 1734 of the Civil Code. that the event should not have been foreseen or anticipated, as is

The source of a common carrier's legal liability is the contract

of carriage, and by entering into said contract, it binds itself to carry
the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can
provide. There is breach of this obligation if it fails to exert
extraordinary diligence according to all the circumstances of the
case in exercise of the utmost diligence of a very cautious person.

It is the duty of a common carrier to overcome the

presumption of negligence and it must be shown that the carrier
had observed the required extraordinary diligence of a very
cautious person as far as human care and foresight can provide or
that the accident was caused by a fortuitous event. Thus, as ruled
by this Court, no person shall be responsible for those "events
which could not be foreseen or which though foreseen were
inevitable." (Article 1174, Civil Code). The term is synonymous with
caso fortuito which is of the same sense as "force majeure".

In order to constitute a caso fortuito or force majeure that

would exempt a person from liability under Article 1174 of the Civil
Code, it is necessary that the following elements must concur: (a)
the cause of the breach of the obligation must be independent of
the human will (the will of the debtor or the obligor); (b) the event
must be either unforeseeable or unavoidable; (c) the event must be
such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation
in a normal manner; and (d) the debtor must be free from any
participation in, or aggravation of the injury to the creditor. Caso
fortuito or force majeure, by definition, are extraordinary events not
foreseeable or avoidable, events that could not be foreseen, or
FORTUNE EXPRESS, INC. VS. COURT OF APPEALS
305 SCRA 14

Facts: A bus of Fortune Express, Inc. (FEI) figured in an accident

with a jeepney which resulted in the death of several passengers
including two Maranaos. It was found out that a Maranao owns said
jeepney and certain Maranaos were planning to take revenge by
burning some of FEIs buses. The operations manager of FEI was
advised to take precautionary measures but just the same, three
armed Maranaos were able to seize a bus of FEI and set it on fire.

Issue: Whether the seizure of the bus was a fortuitous event which
Fortune Express, Inc could not be held liable.

Held: A fortuitous event is an occurrence which could not be

foreseen or which though foreseen, is inevitable. This factor of
unforeseen-ability is lacking in this case for despite the report that
the Maranaos were planning to burn FEIs buses, nothing was really
done by FEI to protect the safety of the passengers.
Singapore Airlines Ltd. vs. Fernandez, GR 142305, Dec. 10, 2003 The respondent never made it to Manila and was forced to take a
direct flight to Malaysia on Jan. 29, 1991 through the efforts of her
mother and a travel agency in Manila. Her mother had to travel to
Malaysia with the wardrobe which caused them to incur expenses
FACTS: of 50,000.

Respondent Andion Fernandez is an acclaimed soprano in the RTC Manila ordered SAL to pay respondent 50k as actual
Philippines and abroad. At the time of the incident she was availing damages, 250k as moral damages, 100k as exemplary
of an educational grant from the Federal Republic of Germany damages, 75k as attorneys fees and costs of suit.
pursuing a Masters Degree in Music major in Voice. She was
invited to sing before the King and Queen of Malaysia on Feb. 3-4,
1991. For this purpose, she took an airline ticket from Singapore
Airlines (SAL) FOR THE Frankfurt-Manila-Malaysia route. CA affirmed RTC decision.
Respondent had to pass by Manila in order to gather her wardrobe
and rehearse with the pianist. SAL issued ticket for Flight SQ 27
leaving Frankfurt on Jan. 27, 1991 for Singapore with connections
to Manila in the morning of Jan. 28, 1991. On Jan. 27, 1991 SQ 27 ISSUE:
LEFT Frankfurt but arrived two hours late in Singapore on Jan. 28,
1991. By then, the aircraft bound for Manila had already left. Upon Did SAL break the contract of carriage?
deplaning in Singapore, Fernandez approached the transit counter
at Changi Airport and was told by a lady employee that there were
no more flights to Manila on that day and that she had to stay in
Singapore, if she wanted, she could fly to HK but at her own RULING:
expense. Respondent stayed with a relative in Singapore for the
night. The next day, she was brought back to the airport and
approached a counter for immediate booking but was told by a male
employee: Cant you see I am doing something. She explained Yes, when an airline issues a ticket to a passenger, confirmed for a
her predicament but was told: Its your problem, not ours. particular flight on a certain date, a contract of carriage arises. The
passenger has every right to expect that he be transported on that
flight and on that date. If he does not, then the carrier opens itself to
a suit for a breach of contract of carriage. A contract of carriage
requires common carriers to transport passengers safely as human
care and foresight can provide (Art. 1755, NCC). In an action for
brech of a contract of carriage, the aggrieved party does not have to
prove that the common carrier was at fault or was negligent. All that
is necessary is to prove the existence of the contract and the fact of
its non-performance by the carrier.

SAL failed to inform of the delay in the turnaround aircraft in

Frankfurt, neither did it ask if the respondent and 25 other delayed
passengers are amenable to a stay in Singapore. Even SALs
manual mandates that in cases of urgent connections the head
office of defendant in Singapore has to be informed of delays so as
to make needed arrangements for connecting passengers.

When respondent conveyed her apprehension in Frankfurt of the

impending delay, she was assured by petitioners personnel in
Frankfurt that she will be transported to Manila on the same date.
The lady employee at the counter in Singapore only allowed
respondent to use the phone upon threat of suit, the male employee
at the counter marked Immediate Attention to Passengers with
Immediate Booking was rude to her.

Petition is denied. CA decision affirmed.


JOSE PILAPIL vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ALATCO
TRANSPORTATION COMPANY, INC.
(G.R. No. 52159, December 22, 1989)
FACTS:
Petitioner Pilapil, on board respondents bus was hit above his eye
by a stone hurled by an unidentified bystander. Respondents
personnel lost no time in bringing him to a hospital, but eventually
petitioner partially lost his left eyes vision and sustained a
permanent scar.
Thus, Petitioner lodged an action for recovery of damages before
the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur which the latter
granted. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed said decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not common carriers assume risks to passengers such
as the stoning in this case?
HELD:
In consideration of the right granted to it by the public to engage in
the business of transporting passengers and goods, a common
carrier does not give its consent to become an insurer of any and all
risks to passengers and goods. It merely undertakes to perform
certain duties to the public as the law imposes, and holds itself
liable for any breach thereof.
xxx
While the law requires the highest degree of diligence from
common carriers in the safe transport of their passengers and
creates a presumption of negligence against them, it does not,
however, make the carrier an insurer of the absolute safety of its
passengers.
xxx
Article 1763. A common carrier is responsible for injuries suffered
by a passenger on account of the wilful acts or negligence of other
passengers or of strangers, if the common carrier's employees
through the exercise of the diligence of a good father of a family
could have prevented or stopped the act or omission.
Clearly under the above provision, a tort committed by a stranger
which causes injury to a passenger does not accord the latter a
cause of action against the carrier. The negligence for which a
common carrier is held responsible is the negligent omission by the
carrier's employees to prevent the tort from being committed when
the same could have been foreseen and prevented by them.
Further, under the same provision, it is to be noted that when the
violation of the contract is due to the willful acts of strangers, as in
the instant case, the degree of care essential to be exercised by the
common carrier for the protection of its passenger is only that of a
good father of a family.
MARANAN VS PEREZ
20 SCRA 412
FACTS:
Rogelio Corachea, a passenger in a taxicab owned and operated
by Pascual Perez, was stabbed and killed by the driver, Simeon
Valenzuela. Valenzuela was found guilty for homicide by the Court
of First Instance and was sentenced to suffer Imprisonment and to
indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P6000. While
pending appeal, mother of deceased filed an action in the Court of
First Instance of Batangas to recover damages from Perez and
Valenzuela. Defendant Perez claimed that the death was a caso
fortuito for which the carrier was not liable. The court a quo, after
trial, found for the plaintiff and awarded her P3,000 as damages
against defendant Perez. The claim against defendant Valenzuela
was dismissed. From this
ruling, both plaintiff and defendant Perez appealed to this Court, the
former asking for more damages and the latter insisting on non-
liability.
Defendant-appellant relied solely on the ruling enunciated in Gillaco
vs. Manila Railroad Co. that the carrier is under no absolute liability
for assaults of its employees upon the passengers.
ISSUE:
Was the contention of the defendant valid?
RULING:
No. The attendant facts and controlling law of that case and the one
at bar were very different. In the Gillaco case, the passenger was
killed outside the scope and the course of duty of the guilty
employee. The Gillaco case was
decided under the provisions of the Civil Code of 1889 which, unlike
the present Civil Code, did not impose upon common carriers
absolute liability for the safety of passengers against willful assaults
or negligent acts committed by their employees. The death of the
passenger in the Gillaco case was truly a fortuitous event which
exempted the carrier from liability. It is true that Art. 1105 of the old
Civil Code on fortuitous events has been substantially reproduced
in Art. 1174 of the Civil Code of the Philippines but both articles passengers, but above all, from the acts of the carrier's own
clearly remove from their exempting effect the case where the law
servants charged with the passenger's safety; (2) said liability of the
expressly provides for liability in spite of the occurrence of force
majeure. The Civil Code provisions on the subject of Common carrier for the servant's violation of duty to passengers, is the result
Carriers are new and were taken from Anglo-American Law. The of the formers confiding in the servant's hands the performance of
basis of the carrier's liability for assaults on passengers committed his contract to safely transport the passenger, delegating therewith
by its drivers rested either on the doctrine of respondent superior or
the duty of protecting the passenger with the utmost care
the principle that it was the carrier's implied duty to transport the
passenger safely. prescribed by law; and (3) as between the carrier and the
Under the second view, upheld by the majority and also by the later passenger, the former must bear the risk of wrongful acts or
cases, it was enough that the assault happens within the course of negligence of the carrier's employees against passengers, since it,
the employee's duty. It was no defense for the carrier that the act
and not the passengers, has power to select and remove them.
was done in excess of authority or in disobedience of the carrier's
orders. The carrier's liability here was absolute in the sense that it
practically secured the passengers from assaults committed by its
own employees.

The court's decision is yes, the carrier is liable for the damages
due to Art. 1759 of the Civil Code proves his guilt.

The three very least reasons to which the remaining issues are
also 'yesy', explained in Texas Midland R.R. v. Monroe, 110 Tex. 97,
216 S.W. 388, 389-390, and Haver v. Central Railroad Co., 43 LRA
84, 85: (1) the special undertaking of the carrier requires that it
furnish its passenger that full measure of protection afforded by the
exercise of the high degree of care prescribed by the law, inter
alia from violence and insults at the hands of strangers and other
 A bus owned by Bachelor express and driven by Cresencio Rivera
was the situs of a stampeded which resulted in the death of
passengers Ornominio Beter and Narcisa Rautraut.
A passenger at the rear portion suddenly stabbed a PC soldier
which caused commotion and panic among the passengers. When
the bus stopped, the two said passengers were found lying on the
road and dead because of head injuries. The passenger-assailant
ran alighted the bus and ran towards the bushes but was killed by
the police. The heirs of the deceased filed a complaint for a sum of
money against Bachelor Express, the owner, and the driver Rivera.
RTC dismissed complaint and later on reversed and found Bachelor
Express, its owner and the driver solidarily liable.
Bachelor Express, Inc. denies liability for the death of Beter and
Rautraut on its posture that the death of the said passengers was
caused by a third person who was beyond its control and
supervision; that the accident resulting in the death of the two
passengers was caused by force majeure over which the
CC did not have any control. (1174)

ISSUE:
Whether or not Bachelor Express is liable.

RULING:
The liability is anchored on culpa contractual.
Bachelor express v CA Bachelor Express, being a CC, is presumed to have acted
negligently unless it can prove that it had observed extraordinary
FACTS: diligence in accordance with Art. 1733 and 1755.
A caso fortuito presents the following essential characteristics: (1)
The cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence, or of the
failure of the debtor to comply with his obligation, must be clear that the ; petitioners have failed to overcome the presumption
independent of the human will. (2) It must be impossible to foresee of fault and negligence found in the law governing common
the event which constitutes the caso fortuito, or if it can be carriers.
foreseen, it must be impossible to avoid. (3) The occurrence must
be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his
obligation in a normal manner. And (4) the obligor (debtor) must be
free from any participation in the aggravation of the injury resulting
to the creditor.
The running amuck of the passenger was the proximate cause of
the incident as it triggered off a commotion an panic among the
passengers such that the passengers started running to the sole
exit shoving each other resulting in the falling off the bus by
passengers Beter and Rautraut causing them fatal injuries. The
sudden act o the passenger who stabbed another passenger in the
bus is within the context of force majeure.
However, in order that a common carrier may be absolved from
liability in case of force majeure, it is not enough that the accident
was caused by force majeure. The common carrier must still prove
that it was not negligent I causing the injuries resulting from such
accident
The CC was negligent in the provision of safety precautions so that
its passengers may be transported safely to their destinations. The
door was not locked as to prevent the passengers from alighting.
The conductor opened the door when the passengers started
shouting. The door was forced open by the onrushing passengers.
The speed of the bus was not slow, 30/40.
Appeals the bus driver did not immediately stop the bus at the
height of the commotion the bus; was speeding from a full stop the
victims fell from the bus door when it was opened or gave way while
; the bus was still running the conductor panicked and blew his
whistle after people had already fallen off ; the bus and the bus
was not properly equipped with doors in accordance with lawit is

De Gillaco v. MRR
Liability for acts of others
Facts: Lieut. Tomas Gillaco, husband of the plaintiff, was a
passenger in the early morning train of the Manila Railroad
Company from Calamba, Laguna to Manila. When the train reached
the Paco Rail road station, Emilio Devesa, a train guard of the MRR
happened to be in said station waiting for the same train which
would take him to Tutuban Station, where he was going to report for
duty. Emilio had along standing personal grudge against Tomas.
Because of this, Emilio shot Tomas with the carbine furnished to
him by the MRR for his use as such train guard upon seeing him
inside the train coach. Tomas died. Emilio was convicted of
homicide. A complaint for damages was filed by the victims widow.
Damages were awarded to the plaintiff, hence the instant petition.
Appellant's contention I sthat, no liability attaches to it as employer
of Emilio because the crime was not committed while the slayer
was in the actual performance of his ordinary duties and service
and that no negligence on appellant's part was shown.
Issue:Whether or not MRR could be held liable for the acts of its
employee?
Held: No. While a passenger is entitled to protection from personal
violence by the carrier or its agents or employees, since the
contract of transportation obligates the carrier to transport a
passenger safely to his destination, the responsibility of the carrier
extends only to those acts that the carrier could foresee or avoid
through the exercise of the degree of care and diligence required of
it. In the present case, the act of the train guard of the Manila
Railroad Company in shooting the passenger (because of a
personal grudge nurtured against the latter since the Japanese
occupation) was entirely unforseeable by the Manila Railroad Co.
The latter had no means to ascertain or anticipate that the two
would meet, nor could it reasonably for see every personal rancor
that might exist between each one of its many employees and any
one of the thousands of eventual passengers riding in its trains. The
shooting in question was therefore "caso fortuito" within the
definition of Art. 1105 of the old CivilCode (which is the law
applicable), being both unforeseeable and inevitable under the
given circumstances; and pursuant to established doctrine, the
resulting breach of the company's contract of safe carriage with the
deceased was excused thereby
Cathay Pacific Airways, Ltd. V. CA
DOCTRINE:
Although the Warsaw Convention has the force and effect of law in
this country, being a treaty commitment assumed by the Philippine
government, said convention does not operate as an exclusive
enumeration of the instances for declaring a carrier liable for breach
of contract of carriage or as an absolute limit of the extent of that
liability. The Warsaw Convention declares the carrier liable for
damages in the enumerated cases and under certain limitations.
However, it must not be construed to preclude the operation of the
Civil Code and other pertinent laws. It does not regulate, much less
exempt, the carrier from liability for damages for violating the rights
of its passengers under the contract of carriage, especially if willful
misconduct on the part of the carrier's employees is found or
established.
FACTS:
- On 19 October 1975, respondent Tomas L. Alcantara was a
first class passenger of petitioner Cathay Pacific
Airways, Ltd. (CATHAY) on its flight from Manila to
Hongkong and onward from Hongkong to Jakarta on
another flight. The purpose of his trip was to attend the
following day, a conference with the Director General of
Trade of Indonesia, Alcantara being the Executive Vice-
President and General Manager of Iligan Cement
Corporation, Chairman of the Export Committee of the
Philippine Cement Corporation, and representative of
the Cement Industry Authority and the Philippine
Cement Corporation.
- Alcantara checked in his luggage which contained not only
his clothing and articles for personal use but also papers
and documents he needed for the conference.
- Upon his arrival in Jakarta, respondent discovered that
his luggage was missing. When he inquired about his
luggage from CATHAY's representative in Jakarta,
Alcantara was told that his luggage was left behind in
Hongkong. For this, respondent Alcantara was offered
 $20.00 as "inconvenience money" to buy his immediate
personal needs until the luggage could be delivered to him.
- His luggage finally reached Jakarta more than twenty four
(24) hours after his arrival. However, it was not delivered
to him at his hotel but was required by petitioner to be
picked up by an official of the Philippine Embassy.
- Alcantara filed a complaint against CATHAY with the CFI
praying for damages.
- CFI ordered CATHAY to pay Alcantara moral, temperate,
exemplary and attorneys fees. Both parties appealed to the
CA. CATHAY assailed the conclusion of the trial court that it
was accountable for breach of contract and questioned the
non-application by the court of the Warsaw Convention
as well as the excessive damages awarded on the basis of
its finding that respondent Alcantara was rudely treated by
petitioner's employees during the time that his luggage
could not be found. For his part, respondent Alcantara
assigned as error the failure of the trial court to grant the full
amount of damages sought in his complaint. CA rendered its
decision affirming the findings of fact of the trial court but
modifying its award by increasing the moral damages to
P80K exemplary damages to P20K and temperate or
moderate damages to P10K.
ISSUE/S:
1. W/N the award of damages was proper? YES save for the award
of temperate damages.
2. W/N the Warsaw Convention is applicable to the present case?
NO
RULING:
1. Both the trial court and the appellate court found that CATHAY
was grossly negligent and reckless when it failed to deliver the
luggage of petitioner at the appointed place and time. CATHAY
alleges that as a result of mechanical trouble, all pieces of luggage
on board the first aircraft bound for Jakarta were unloaded and
transferred to the second aircraft which departed an hour and a half
later. Yet, as the CA noted, petitioner was not even aware that it
left behind private respondent's luggage until its attention was
called by the Hongkong Customs authorities. More, bad faith
or otherwise improper conduct may be attributed to the
employees of petitioner. While the mere failure of CATHAY to
deliver respondent's luggage at the agreed place and time did
not ipso facto amount to willful misconduct since the luggage
was eventually delivered to private respondent, albeit
belatedly, the Court is persuaded that the employees of
CATHAY acted in bad faith.
Where in breaching the contract of carriage the defendant
airline is not shown to have acted fraudulently or in bad faith,
liability for damages is limited to the natural and probable
consequences of the breach of obligation which the parties
had foreseen or could have reasonably foreseen. In that case,
such liability does not include moral and exemplary damages.
Conversely, if the defendant airline is shown to have acted
fraudulently or in bad faith, the award of moral and exemplary
damages is proper.
However, respondent Alcantara is not entitled to temperate
damages, contrary to the ruling of the court a quo, in the absence of
any showing that he sustained some pecuniary loss. t cannot be
gainsaid that respondent's luggage was ultimately delivered to him
without serious or appreciable damage.
2. Although the Warsaw Convention has the force and effect of
law in this country, being a treaty commitment assumed by the
Philippine government, said convention does not operate as
an exclusive enumeration of the instances for declaring a
carrier liable for breach of contract of carriage or as an
absolute limit of the extent of that liability. The Warsaw
Convention declares the carrier liable for damages in the without any article of clothing other than what he has on. Thus,
enumerated cases and under certain limitations. However, it respondent is entitled to moral and exemplary damages
must not be construed to preclude the operation of the Civil
Code and other pertinent laws. It does not regulate, much less
exempt, the carrier from liability for damages for violating the
rights of its passengers under the contract of carriage,
especially if willful misconduct on the part of the carrier's
employees is found or established, which is what was
manifested in the instant case.

For, the Warsaw Convention itself provides in Art. 25 that (1)

The carrier shall not be entitled to avail himself of the
provisions of this convention which exclude or limit his
liability, if the damage is caused by his willful misconduct or
by such default on his part as, in accordance with the law of
the court to which the case is submitted, is considered to be
equivalent to willful misconduct; (2) Similarly the carrier shall
not be entitled to avail himself of the said provisions, if the
damage is caused under the same circumstances by any agent
of the carrier acting within the scope of his employment;

When petitioner airline misplaced respondent's luggage and failed

to deliver it to its passenger at the appointed place and time, some
special species of injury must have been caused to him. For sure,
the latter underwent profound distress and anxiety, and the fear of
losing the opportunity to fulfill the purpose of his trip. In fact, for
want of appropriate clothings for the occasion brought about by the
delay of the arrival of his luggage, to his embarrassment and
consternation respondent Alcantara had to seek postponement of
his pre-arranged conference with the Director General of Trade of
the host country.

In one case, this Court observed that a traveller would naturally

suffer mental anguish, anxiety and shock when he finds that his
luggage did not travel with him and he finds himself in a foreign land
 Facts: Plaintiffs Cornelio Mapa and Purita Mapa entered into
contract of air transportation with defendant TWA as evidenced by
TWA tickets. Said TWA tickets are for Los Angeles-New York-
Boston-St. Louis-Chicago.

The domicile of carrier TWA is Kansas City, Missouri, USA. Its

principal place of business is Kansas City, Missouri, USA. TWA's
place of business through which the contracts were made is
Bangkok, Thailand. The place of destination is Chicago, USA.

On August 10, 1990, plaintiffs Carmina (daughter of Cornelio and

Purita) and Purita left Manila on board a PAL flight for Los Angeles.
Carmina was to commence schooling and thus was accompanied
by Purita to assist her in settling down at the University.

They arrived Los Angeles on the same date and stayed there until
August 14, 1990 when they left for New York City on a TWA flight.
On August 27, 1990, plaintiffs Purita and Carmina S. Mapa
departed for Boston, checking in seven (7) pieces of luggage at the
TWA counter in the JFK Airport. They were issued receipts for the
said baggage.

Upon arriving in Boston, plaintiffs Purita and Carmina proceeded to

the carousel to claim their baggages and found only three out of the
seven they checked in. Plaintiffs immediately reported the loss of
their four baggages to the TWA Baggage Office at Logan Airport.
TWA's representative confidently assured them that
their baggageswould be located within 24 hours and not more than
48 hours.

They were requested to accomplish a passenger property

Mapa vs. CA
questionnaire to facilitate a further intensive and computerized
search for the lost luggage, which they duly accomplished. The total
value of the lost items amounted to $11,283.79.
The respondent court further held that the cause of action of the
Two months later, TWA offered to amicably settle the case by giving petitioners arose from the loss of the four checked pieces of
plaintiffs-appellants two options: (a) transportation credit for future baggage, which then falls under Article 18(1), Chapter III (Liability of
TWA travel or (b) cash settlement. Five months lapsed without any the Carrier) of the Warsaw Conventions. Pursuant to Article 24(1) of
result on TWA's intensive search. the Convention, all actions for damages, whether based on tort,
code law or common law, arising from loss of baggage under Article
Plaintiffs-appellant opted for transportation credit for future TWA
18 of the Warsaw Convention, can only be brought subject to the
travel. TWA disregarded plaintiffs' option and unilaterally declared
conditions and limits set forth in the Warsaw Convention. Article
the payment of $2,560.00 as constituting full satisfaction of the
28(1) thereof sets forth conditions and limits in that the action for
plaintiffs' claim. Plaintiffs accepted the check for $2,560.00, as
damages may be instituted only in the territory of one of the High
partial payment for the actual cost of their lost baggages and their
Contracting Parties, before the court of (1) the domicile of the
contents.
carrier, (2) the carrier's principal place of business, (3) the place of
Despite demands by plaintiffs, TWA failed and refused without just business through which the contract has been made, or (4) the
cause to indemnify and redress plaintiffs for the grave injury and place of destination. Since the Philippines is not one of these
damages they have suffered. places, a Philippine Court, like the RTC, has no jurisdiction over the
complaint for damages.
Petitioners then filed a complaint for damages and complaint
forbreach of contract of carriage against TWA in the RTC. The trial
court dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction in light of Article
Issue: Whether the Warsaw Convention is applicable to this case
28(1) of the Warsaw Convention.

The CA affirmed the order of the trial court. It held that the Warsaw
Convention is the law which governs the dispute between the Held: No, the Warsaw Convention is not applicable because the
petitioners and TWA because what is involved is international carriage or transportation was not international in character. The
transportation defined by said Convention in Article I(2). This RTC is directed to proceed with pre-trial.
holding is founded on its determination that the two TWA tickets for
It appears clear to us that TWA itself, the trial court, and the Court of
Los Angeles-New York-Boston-St. Louis-Chicago purchased in
Appeals impliedly admit that if the sole basis were the two TWA
Bangkok, Thailand, were issued in conjunction with, and therefore
tickets for Los Angeles-New York-Boston-St. Louis-Chicago, the
formed part of, the contract of transportation performed from
contracts cannot be brought within the term "international
Manila, Philippines, to the United States.
transportation," as defined in Article I(2) of the Warsaw Convention.
As provided therein, a contract is one of international transportation
only if according to the contract made by the parties, the place of
departure and the place of destination, whether or not there be a
break in the transportation or a transshipment, are situated either
within the territories of two High Contracting Parties, or within the
territory of a single High Contracting Party, if there is an agreed
stopping place within a territory subject to the sovereignty, mandate
or authority of another power, even though that power is not a party
to this convention.
There are then two categories of international transportation, (1)
that where the place of departure and the place of destination are
situated within the territories of two High Contracting Parties
regardless of whether or not there be a break in the transportation
or a transshipment; and (2) that where the place of departure and
the place of destination are within the territory of a single High
Contracting Party if there is an agreed stopping place within a
territory subject to the sovereignty, mandate, or authority of another
power, even though the power is not a party of the Convention.
The contracts of transportation in this case are evidenced by the
two TWA tickets, both purchased and issued in Bangkok, Thailand.
On the basis alone of the provisions therein, it is obvious that the
place of departure and the place of destination are all in the territory
of the United States, or of a single High Contracting Party. The
contracts, therefore, cannot come within the purview of the first
category of international transportation. Neither can it be under the
second category since there was NO agreed stopping place within
a territory subject to the sovereignty, mandate, or authority of
another power.
The only way to bring the contracts between Purita and Carmina
Mapa, on the one hand, and TWA, on the other, within the first
category of "international transportation" is to link them with, or to
make them an integral part of, the Manila-Los Angeles travel of
Purita and Carmina through PAL aircraft. The "linkages" which have
been pointed out by the TWA, the trial court, and the Court of
Appeals are (1) the handwritten notations, on the two TWA tickets;
and (2) the entries made by petitioners Purita and Carmina Mapa in
column YOUR COMPLETE ITINERARY in TWA's Passenger
Property Questionnaire, wherein they mentioned their travel from
Manila to Los Angeles in flight PR 102.
The alleged "international tickets" mentioned in the notations in
conjunction with which the two TWA tickets were issued were not
presented. Clearly then, there is at all no factual basis of the finding
that the TWA tickets were issued in conjunction with the
international tickets, which are even, at least as of now, non-
existent.
As regards the petitioner's entry in Your Complete Itenerary
column of the Passenger Property Questionnaire wherein they
included the Manila-Los Angeles travel, it must be pointed out that
this was made by petitioners Purita and Carmina Mapa, and only in
connection with their claim for their lost pieces of baggage. The
entry can by no means be considered as a part of, or supplement
to, their contracts of transportation evidenced by the TWA tickets
which covered transportation within the United States only.
It must be underscored that the first category of international
transportation under the Warsaw Convention is based on "the
contract made by the parties." TWA does not claim that the Manila-
Los Angeles contracts of transportation which brought Purita and
Carmina to Los Angeles were also its contracts. It does not deny
the assertion of the petitioners that those contracts were
independent of the TWA tickets issued in Bangkok, Thailand. No
evidence was offered that TWA and PAL had an agreement
concerning transportation of passengers from points of departures
not served with aircrafts of one or the other.
TWA relies on Article I(3) of the Convention, which provides as
follows:
3. A carriage to be performed by several successive air carriers is
deemed, for the purposes of this Convention, to be one undivided
carriage, if it has been regarded by the parties as a single
operation, whether it had been agreed upon under the form of a
single contract or of a series of contracts, and it shall not lose its
international character merely because one contract or a series of
contracts is to be performed entirely within a territory subject to the
sovereignty, suzerainty, mandate, or authority of the same High
Contracting Party.
The flaw of respondent's position is the presumption that the parties
have "regarded" as an "undivided carriage" or as a "single
operation" the carriage from Manila to Los Angeles through PAL
then to New York-Boston-St. Louis-Chicago through TWA.