3.
HOME GUARANTY CORPORATION
Vs.
R-II BUILDERS INC., and NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY
G.R. No. 192649 March 9, 2011
Amendment is not allowed where the court has no jurisdiction over the original complaint and the
purpose of the amendment is to confer jurisdiction upon the court. Hence, with jurisdiction over the
case yet to properly attach, CA erred in upholding respondent RTCs admission of respondents R-II
Builders Second Amended Complaint despite non-payment of the docket fees for its original
complaint and Amended and Supplemental Complaint as well as the clear intent to evade payment
thereof
Facts:
March 19, 1993, a Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) was entered into between respondents NHA
and R-II Builders for the implementation of the Smokey Mountain Development and Reclamation
Project (SMDRP) which was amended and restated after 11 months. 11 August 1994, JVA was aimed
at implementing a 2-phase conversion of the Smokey Mountain Dumpsite into a habitable housing
project inclusive of the reclamation of the area across Radial Road 10 (R-10) R-II Builders, as
developer, was entitled to own 79 hectares of reclaimed land and the 2.3 hectare commercial area at
the Smokey Mountain. NHA, as landowner/implementing agency, was entitled to own the 2,992
temporary housing units agreed to be built in the premises, the cleared and fenced incinerator site
consisting of 5 hectares, 3,520 units of permanent housing to be awarded to qualified on site
residents, the industrial area consisting of 3.2 hectares and the open spaces, roads and facilities
within the Smokey Mountain Area.
September 26, 1994, NHA and R-II Builders, alongside petitioner Housing Guaranty
Corporation (HGC) as guarantor and the PNB as trustee, entered into an Asset Pool Formation Trust
Agreement which provided the mechanics for the implementation of the project. January 29, 2001,
subsequent to R-II Builders' infusion of P300M into the project, the issuance of the SMPPCs and the
termination of PNBs services, NHA, R-II Builders and HGC agreed on the institution of Planters
Development Bank (PDB) as trustee. October 24, 2002, all the Regular SMPPCs issued had reached
maturity and, unredeemed, already amounted to an aggregate face value of P2.513 Billion. The lack
of liquid assets with which to effect redemption of the regular SMPPCs prompted PDB to make a call
on HGCs guaranty and to execute in the latters favor a Deed of Assignment and Conveyance (DAC) of
the entire Asset Pool.
RTC issued the writ of preliminary injunction sought by R-II Builders. In the meantime, HGC,
having filed its answer to the complaint, went on before the SC to move for the conduct of a
preliminary hearing on its affirmative defenses which included such grounds as lack of jurisdiction,
improper venue and the then pendency entitled Francisco Chavez vs. National Housing Authority, et
al., a case which challenged, among other matters, the validity of the JVA and its subsequent
amendments. R-II Builders filed a motion to admit its Amended and Supplemental Complaint which
deleted the prayer for resolution of the DAC initially prayed for in its original complaint. Manila RTC
Branch 24 issued a clarificatory order holding that R-II Builders complaint was an ordinary civil action
and not an intra-corporate controversy and that it did not have the authority to hear the case.
Undaunted, HGC filed its MFR of the foregoing order, arguing that: (a) the case is real action
and the docket fees paid by R-II Builders were grossly insufficient because the estimated value of
properties in the Asset Pool exceeds P5B; (b) a complaint cannot be amended to confer jurisdiction
when the court had none; (c) the RTC should have simply denied the Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for
Annotation of Lis Pendens instead of rendering an advisory opinion thereon. R-II Builders opposed the
foregoing motion and on the theory that the Asset Pool was still in danger of dissipation, filed an
urgent motion to resolve its application for the appointment of a receiver and submitted its nominees
for said position. Respondent RTC issued its second assailed order which (a) denied HGCs motion for
reconsideration; (b) granted R-II Builders application for appointment of receiver and, for said
purpose: appointed Atty. Danilo Concepcion as Receiver and, directed R-II Builders to post a bond in
the sum of P10M.
HGC filed Rule 65 petition for certiorari and prohibition imputing grave abuse of discretion
against the RTC for not dismissing the case and for granting R-II Builders application for receivership.
Petition denied and HGCs MFR was denied for lack of merit. Hence, this petition.
Issues
1 WON RTC a quo had jurisdiction to proceed with the case. (NO jurisdiction)
2 (TOPICAL) WON the admitting of R-II Builders Second Amended Complaint is
proper. (NO)
Ruling : 1. A court acquires jurisdiction over a case only upon the payment of the prescribed filing
and docket fees. R-II Builders original complaint was initially docketed before RTC Manila Br. 24, a
designated Special Commercial Court. With HGCs filing of a motion for a preliminary hearing on the
affirmative defenses asserted in its answer and R-II Builders filing of its Amended and Supplemental
Complaint, said court issued an order ordering the re-raffle of the case upon the finding that the same
is not an intra-corporate dispute. With its acknowledged lack of jurisdiction over the case, RTC Manila
Br. 24 should have ordered the dismissal of the complaint, since a court without subject matter
jurisdiction cannot transfer the case to another court.
At the time of its surrender of jurisdiction, Br. 24 had already acted on the case and had in
fact issued the writ of preliminary injunction sought by herein respondent R-II Builders. At that point,
there was absolutely no reason which could justify a re-raffle of the case considering that the order
that was supposed to have caused the re-raffle was not an inhibition of the judge but a declaration of
absence of jurisdiction. A re-raffle which causes a transfer of the case involves courts with the same
subject matter jurisdiction; it cannot involve courts which have different jurisdictions exclusive of the
other. More apt in this case, a re-raffle of a case cannot cure a jurisdictional defect.
The jurisdictionally flawed transfer of the case from Branch 24, the SCC to Branch 22, the
regular court, is topped by another jurisdictional defect which is the non-payment of the correct
docket fees. Granted that R-II Builders is not claiming ownership of the Asset Pool because its
continuing stake is, in the first place, limited only to the residual value thereof, the conveyance and/or
transfer of possession of the same properties sought in the original complaint and Amended and
Supplemental Complaint both presuppose a real action for which appropriate docket fees computed on
the basis of the assessed or estimated value of said properties should have been assessed and paid.
For failure of R-II Builders to pay the correct docket fees for its original complaint or, for that
matter, its Amended and Supplemental Complaint as directed in respondent RTC's 19 May 2008 order,
it stands to reason that jurisdiction over the case had yet to properly attach.
2. Although the policy in this jurisdiction is to the effect that amendments to pleadings are favored
and liberally allowed in the interest of justice, amendment is not allowed where the court has no
jurisdiction over the original complaint and the purpose of the amendment is to confer jurisdiction
upon the court. Hence, with jurisdiction over the case yet to properly attach, CA erred in upholding
respondent RTCs admission of R-II Builders Second Amended Complaint despite non-payment of the
docket fees for its original complaint and Amended and Supplemental Complaint as well as the clear
intent to evade payment thereof.
In view of respondent RTCs non-acquisition of jurisdiction over the case, it clearly had no
authority to grant the receivership sought by R-II Builders. It needs pointing out though that the
prayer for receivership clearly indicates that the R-II Builders sought the transfer of possession of
property consisting of the assets of the JVA from HGC to the formers named Receiver. As already
noted, said transfer of possession was sought by respondent R-II Builders since the very start, overtly
at the first two attempts, covertly in the last, the successive amendments betraying the deft
maneuverings to evade payment of the correct docket fees.
CA decision REVERSED and SET ASIDE. RTC Branch 22s & 24s Orders are NULLIFIED.
The complaint of R-II Builders first before Br. 24 and thereafter before Br. 22 both of the RTC Manila is
DISMISSED.
4. INRE: PETITION FOR RECOGNITION OF THE EXEMPTION OF THE GSIS FROM PAYMENT OF
LEGAL FEES
A.M. No. 08-2-01-0
February 11, 2010
FACTS:
The GSIS seeks exemption from the payment of legal fees imposed on government-owned or
controlled corporations under Section 22, Rule 141 (Legal Fees) of the Rules of Court, which provides
that the Republic of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities are exempt from paying the
legal fees provided in this Rule. Local government corporations and government-owned or controlled
corporations with or without independent charter are not exempt from paying such fees.
The GSIS anchors its petition on Section 39 of its charter, RA 8291 (The GSIS Act of 1997), providing
for the exemption of GSIS from all taxes, assessments, fees, charges or duties of all kinds.
The GSIS urges this Court to recognize its exemption from payment of legal fees to preserve and
maintain the actuarial solvency of its funds for the benefit of its members.
Required to comment on the GSIS petition, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) maintains that the
petition should be denied.
The Office of the Chief Attorney (OCAT) submitted a report and recommendation on the petition of the
GSIS and the comment of the OSG thereon. According to the OCAT, the claim of the GSIS for
exemption from the payment of legal fees has no legal basis. Read in its proper and full context,
Section 39 intends to preserve the actuarial solvency of GSIS funds by exempting the GSIS from
government impositions through taxes. Legal fees imposed under Rule 141 are not taxes. The OCAT
further posits that the GSIS could not have been exempted by Congress from the payment of legal
fees. Otherwise, Congress would have encroached on the rule-making power of this Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the congress may exempt the GSIS from the payment of legal fees.
HELD:
NO. The payment of legal fees under Rule 141 of the Rules of Court is an integral part of the rules
promulgated by this Court pursuant to its rule-making power under Section 5(5), Article VIII of the
Constitution. In particular, it is part of the rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in courts.
Indeed, payment of legal (or docket) fees is a jurisdictional requirement. Without such payment, the
appellate court does not acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action and the decision
sought to be appealed from becomes final and executory.
Since the payment of legal fees is a vital component of the rules promulgated by this Court concerning
pleading, practice and procedure, it cannot be validly annulled, changed or modified by Congress. As
one of the safeguards of this Courts institutional independence, the power to promulgate rules of
pleading, practice and procedure is now the Courts exclusive domain. That power is no longer shared
by this Court with Congress, much less with the Executive.
The separation of powers among the three co-equal branches of our government has erected an
impregnable wall that keeps the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure within
the sole province of this Court. The other branches trespass upon this prerogative if they enact laws or
issue orders that effectively repeal, alter or modify any of the procedural rules promulgated by this
Court. Viewed from this perspective, the claim of a legislative grant of exemption from the payment of
legal fees under Section 39 of RA 8291 necessarily fails.
5. MARIETTA B. ANCHETA vs. RODOLFO S. ANCHETA
G.R. No. 145370, March 4, 2004
Facts:
This case stemmed from the filing of a petition for nullity of marriage by the Respondent
against the Petitioner on the ground of psychological incapacity. The former upon knowing that the
latter was already a resident of Munting Paraiso in Bancal, Carmona, Cavite, he nevertheless alleged in
his petition that the petitioner was residing at No. 72 CRM Avenue corner CRM Corazon, BF Homes,
Almanza, Las Pias, Metro Manila, where she may be served with summons. Comes now the
issuance of summons by the clerk of court at the address stated in the petition which was served by
the sheriff together with the said petition by substituted service on June 6, 1995. The said summons
as well as the petition was received by the petitioner through her son, Venancio Mariano B. Ancheta III
at his residence in Bancal, Carmona, Cavite. However, the petitioner failed to file and answer to the
said petition, thus, the respondent filed an Ex-Parte Motion to Declare Defendant as in Default which
was granted by the court upon failure of the Petitioner to appear during the hearing of the said
motion. Because of that, the respondent was allowed to testify and adduced evidence in his behalf.
Thereafter, the said petition was granted by the court and issued an Order declaring the marriage of
the herein parties void ab initio. The petitioner filed a verified petition against the respondent with the
Court of Appeals for the annulment of the Order of the RTC of Cavite in Special Proceedings. The
petitioner contends that the respondent committed gross misrepresentations by making it appear in
his petition that she was a resident of No. 72 CRM Avenue cor. CRM Corazon, BF Homes, Almanza, Las
Pias, Metro Manila, when in truth and in fact, the latter knew very well that the former was residing at
Munting Paraiso, Bancal, Carmona, Cavite. Also, it was claimed by the petitioner that such act
deprives her of her right to be heard. Furthermore, the petitioner contends that the order of the trial
court was null and void for lack of jurisdiction over her person and it was due to extrinsic fraud made
by the respondent.
Issues:
1 WON the condition precedent required under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court was complied
with, in order to annul a judgment or final order of the court, in the instant case based on extrinsic
fraud.
2. WON the Court of Appeals acted arbitrarily in dismissing the Original Petition and amended petition
of the Petitioner for annulment of the assailed order of the RTC grounded on lack of jurisdiction over
the person of the latter
Held:
1 No, in this case, the condition precedent required under Rule 47 of the Rules of
Court was not complied with. If the annulment of judgment or final orders or resolutions in civil
actions of the RTC is based on extrinsic fraud, the remedy is subject to a condition precedent, namely,
the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no
longer available through no fault of hers; otherwise, the petition will be dismissed. If the petitioner
fails to avail of the remedies of new trial, appeal or relief from judgment through her own fault or
negligence before filing her petition with the Court of Appeals, she cannot resort to the remedy under
Rule 47 of the Rules of Court; otherwise, she would benefit from her inaction or negligence. It is not
enough to allege in the petition that the said remedies were no longer available through no fault of her
own. The petitioner must also explain and justify her failure to avail of such remedies. In this case,
the petitioner failed to allege in her petition in the CA the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal and
petition for relief, were no longer available through no fault of her own. She merely alleged therein
that she received the assailed order of the trial court on January 11, 2000. The petitioners amended
petition did not cure the fatal defect in her original petition, because although she admitted therein
that she did not avail of the remedies of new trial, appeal or petition for relief from judgment, she did
not explain why she failed to do so.
2 Yes, the Court of Appeals acted arbitrarily in dismissing the original petition of the
petitioner and the amended petition for annulment of the assailed order grounded on lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner. It must be noted that in a case where a petition for
annulment of a judgment of a final order of the RTC filed under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court is
grounded on lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant/respondent or over the nature or
subject of the action, the petitioner need not allege in the petition that the ordinary remedy of a new
trial or reconsideration of the final order or judgment or appeal therefrom are no longer available
through no fault of her own. This is so because a judgment rendered or final order issued by the RTC
without jurisdiction is null and void and may be assailed any time either collaterally or in a direct
action or by resisting such judgment or final order in any action or proceeding whenever it is invoked,
unless by laches. In this case, the original petition and the amended in the Court of Appeals, in light
of the material averments therein, were based not only on extrinsic fraud, but also on lack of
jurisdiction of the trial court over the person of the petitioner because of the failure of the sheriff to
serve on her the summons and a copy of the complaint. She claimed that the summons and
complaint were served on her son, Venancio Mariano B. Ancheta III, who, however, failed to give her
the said summons and complaint. Besides, it is a well-settled rule that jurisdiction is acquired by a
trial court over the person of the defendant either by his voluntary appearance in court and his
submission to its authority or by service of summons. The service of summons and the complaint on
the defendant is to inform him that a case has been filed against him and, thus, enable him to defend
himself. He is, thus, put on guard as to the demands of the plaintiff or the petitioner. Without such
service in the absence of a valid waiver renders the judgment of the court null and void. Furthermore,
jurisdiction cannot be acquired by the court on the person of the defendant even if he knows of the
case against him unless he is validly served with summons.
6. Chester De Joya vs. Sandoval Gutierrez, Corona, Azcuna, Garcia, and Judge Placido
Marquez in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 40 Manila RTC
G.R. No. 162416 January 31, 2006
Facts:
This case involves a petition for certiorari and prohibition that seeks the Court to nullify and
set aside the warrant of arrest issued by respondent judge against petitioner in Criminal Case No. 03-
219952 for violation of Article 315, par. 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Presidential
Decree (P.D.) No. 1689. Petitioner asserts that respondent judge erred in finding the existence of
probable cause that justifies the issuance of a warrant of arrest against him and his co-accused.
The documents found in the records and examined by respondent judge tend to show that
therein private complainant was enticed to invest a large sum of money in State Resources
Development Management Corporation; that he issued several checks amounting to P114,286,086.14
in favor of the corporation; that the corporation, in turn, issued several checks to private complainant,
purportedly representing the return of his investments; that said checks were later dishonored for
insufficient funds and closed account; that petitioner and his co-accused, being incorporators and
directors of the corporation, had knowledge of its activities and transactions.
Despite seeking relief through a petition, the defendant refuses to surrender and submit to
the lower courts jurisdiction in the belief of lack of probable and improper issuance of a warrant.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the respondent judge is correct in issuing a warrant of arrest
2. Whether or not the lower court acquires jurisdiction over the case
3. Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to relief from Courts even if he continuously refuse to
surrender and submit to the courts jurisdiction
Held:
1. Yes. The Supreme Court finds from the records of Criminal Case No. 03-219952 documents to
support the motion of the prosecution for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. It finds that the
documents sufficiently establish the existence of probable cause as required under Section 6, Rule 112
of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. It need not be shown that the accused are indeed guilty of
the crime charged. That matter should be left to the trial. It should be emphasized that before issuing
warrants of arrest, judges merely determine personally the probability, not the certainty, of guilt of an
accused. Hence, judges do not conduct a de novo hearing to determine the existence of probable
cause. They just personally review the initial determination of the prosecutor finding a probable cause
to see if it is supported by substantial evidence. In case of doubt on the existence of probable cause,
the Rules allow the judge to order the prosecutor to present additional evidence. In the present case, it
is notable that the resolution issued by State Prosecutor Benny Nicdao thoroughly explains the bases
for his findings that there is probable cause to charge all the accused with violation of Article 315, par.
2(a) of the Revised Penal Code in relation to P.D. No. 1689.
The general rule is that this Court does not review the factual findings of the trial court, which
include the determination of probable cause for the issuance of warrant of arrest. It is only in
exceptional cases where this Court sets aside the conclusions of the prosecutor and the trial judge on
the existence of probable cause, that is, when it is necessary to prevent the misuse of the strong arm
of the law or to protect the orderly administration of justice. The facts obtaining in this case do not
warrant the application of the exception.
2. Yes. The lower court acquires jurisdiction over the case. Justice Florenz D. Regalado explains
the requisites for the exercise of jurisdiction and how the court acquires such jurisdiction, thus:
Requisites for the exercise of jurisdiction and how the court acquires such jurisdiction:
a. Jurisdiction over the plaintiff or petitioner: This is acquired by the filing of the complaint,
petition or initiatory pleading before the court by the plaintiff or petitioner.
b. Jurisdiction over the defendant or respondent: This is acquired by the voluntary
appearance or submission by the defendant or respondent to the court or by coercive process issued
by the court to him, generally by the service of summons.
c. Jurisdiction over the subject matter: This is conferred by law and, unlike jurisdiction over
the parties, cannot be conferred on the court by the voluntary act or agreement of the parties.
d. Jurisdiction over the issues of the case: This is determined and conferred by the pleadings
filed in the case by the parties, or by their agreement in a pre-trial order or stipulation, or, at times by
their implied consent as by the failure of a party to object to evidence on an issue not covered by the
pleadings, as provided in Sec. 5, Rule 10.
e. Jurisdiction over the res (or the property or thing which is the subject of the
litigation). This is acquired by the actual or constructive seizure by the court of the thing in question,
thus placing it in custodia legis, as in attachment or garnishment; or by provision of law which
recognizes in the court the power to deal with the property or subject matter within its territorial
jurisdiction, as in land registration proceedings or suits involving civil status or real property in the
Philippines of a non-resident defendant.
Justice Regalado continues to explain: In two cases, the court acquires jurisdiction to try the
case, even if it has not acquired jurisdiction over the person of a nonresident defendant, as long as it
has jurisdiction over the res, as when the action involves the personal status of the plaintiff or
property in the Philippines in which the defendant claims an interest. In such cases, the service of
summons by publication and notice to the defendant is merely to comply with due process
requirements. Under Sec. 133 of the Corporation Code, while a foreign corporation doing business in
the Philippines without a license cannot sue or intervene in any action here, it may be sued or
proceeded against before our courts or administrative tribunals.
2. No. Petition is dismissed. The petitioner is not entitled to seek relief from the Court nor from
the trial court as he continuously refuses to surrender and submit to the courts jurisdiction.
There is no exceptional reason in this case to allow petitioner to obtain relief from the courts
without submitting to its jurisdiction. On the contrary, his continued refusal to submit to the lower
courts jurisdiction should give this Court more reason to uphold the action of the respondent
judge. The purpose of a warrant of arrest is to place the accused under the custody of the law to hold
him for trial of the charges against him. His evasive stance shows intent to circumvent and frustrate
the object of this legal process. It should be remembered that he who invokes the courts jurisdiction
must first submit to its jurisdiction.
7. MELINA P. MACAHILIG, petitioner, vs.
The Heirs of GRACE M. MAGALIT, respondents.
G.R. No. 141423. November 15, 2000
Facts:
On February 5, 1965, Pepito Magalit, deceased husband of Dr. Grace M. Magalit (now substituted by
her heirs as respondents in view of her recent demise), filed with the then Philippine Fisheries
Commission now Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR) Fishpond Application No.
24400. The application was for eleven 11 hectares of land situated in the Municipality of Batan,
Province of Aklan. On April 13, 1972, Bernardo Macahilig, deceased husband of petitioner, filed with
the BFAR Fishpond Application No. 29972 for five of the eleven hectares which Magalit had previously
applied for. On February 28, 1972, BFAR rejected Macahiligs application for his failure to submit all the
requirements. Undaunted, Macahilig protested Magalits application (in what will be referred to as the
Fishpond Case) on November 8, 1976, contending that for a period of 20 years, he had been in actual
possession of the five-hectare area included in Magalits application. On August 22, 1979, the director
of BFAR ordered the Committee on Fishpond Claims and Conflict to hear and determine the rights of
Macahilig and Magalit over the disputed area. The Committee concluded that the former was merely
the latters laborer and caretaker. On October 9, 1992, Dr. Magalit filed a Petition for Contempt Against
Melina Macahilig, alleging that on November 29, 1985, Bernardo Macahilig had refused to turn over
Lot 4417 to her.
Petitioner Dr. Grace M. Magalit is in the actual possession of Lot-A with an area of 99,114
square meters or 9.9 hcts. which is a fully developed fishpond, and without any question from the
respondent. However, as per Order of the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources dated June 6,
1980, that portion labeled Parcel-A in the sketch with an area of 2.3 hcts. has to be excluded because
it is needed for forest purposes. So if we deduct 2.3 hcts. from the 9.9 hcts. the remaining area for the
petitioner will only be 7.6 hcts., that is why the Bureau of Fisheries has to include Lot 4417 and Lot
5216, in order that the area of 10.0 hectares in said order will be satisfied.
In the Order of June 18, 1993, the trial court adopted the Commissioners Report and ruled in
favor of Dr. Magalit in finding from the Commissioners Report and the sketch submitted that the
questioned Lot 4417 with an area of 20,805 square meters is actually in the possession of Petitioner
Melina Macahilig but which was given to the respondents husband and let a writ of execution be
issued in favor of the respondent and against petitioner Melina Macahilig for the delivery of Lot 4417.
As regards Lot 5216, the report of the commissioner states that the same is covered by an
Original Certificate of Title No. P-19359 in the name of Julie Cawaling. The petitioner is hereby directed
to desist from occupying this lot until the original certificate of title in the name of Julie Cawaling shall
have been passed upon by a competent court.
Failure on the part of the petitioner to deliver the said area covered by Lot 4417 to the respondent, the
court declared her in contempt.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but her motion was denied in the Order of July 14, 1993, which
held that she had no valid reason to possess the disputed lot, considering that her husbands
application therefor had been rejected.
Unfazed by the unfavorable turn of events, petitioner filed with the CA, on August 12, 1993, a Petition
for Certiorari alleging that the trial court had acted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the Orders
dated June 18 and July 14, 1993.
Issues:
1 Whether or not said orders are void for lack of jurisdiction.
2 Whether or not the court commit grave abuse of discretion
Held:
1 The trial court acquired jurisdiction over the disputed lot by virtue of the institution of the
Petition for a Writ of Execution filed by the respondents predecessors in interest. Without
taking actual physical control of the property, it had an impliedly recognized potential
jurisdiction or potential custody over the res. This was the jurisdiction which it exercised when
it issued the Writ of Execution directing the surrender of Lot 4417 to Dr. Magalit.
2 The CA ruled that the trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it issued a
Writ of Execution ordering the delivery of Lot 4417 to Dr. Magalit. The records show that the
fishpond application of petitioners husband was rejected by the BFAR, and that petitioner did
not present any other evidence to prove her right of possession over the disputed
property.On the other hand, Dr. Magalit claim was based on the Decision in the Fishpond
Case, which upheld her right as the surviving spouse of the applicant to possess the ten
hectares of land awarded to him, including Lot 4417 which covered an area of more or less
2.0805 hectares. The disputed lot was included in the area awarded to Dr. Magalit because of
the report of the commissioner appointed by the trial court to settle the issue. Petitioner had
not objected either to the said appointment or to the Report.
8. G.R. No. 144934 January 15, 2004
ADELFA S. RIVERA, CYNTHIA S. RIVERA, and JOSE S. RIVERA, petitioners,
vs. FIDELA DEL ROSARIO (deceased and substituted by her co-respondents), and her
children, OSCAR, ROSITA, VIOLETA, ENRIQUE JR., CARLOS, JUANITO and ELOISA, all
surnamed DEL ROSARIO, respondents.
FACTS:
On May 16, 1983, Oscar, Rosita, Violeta, Enrique Jr., Juanito, and Eloisa, executed a Special Power
of Attorney[3] in favor of their mother and co-respondent, Fidela, authorizing her to sell, lease,
mortgage, transfer and convey their rights over Lot No. 1083-C. [4] Subsequently, Fidela
borrowed P250,000 from Mariano Rivera in the early part of 1987. To secure the loan, she and Mariano
Rivera agreed to execute a deed of real estate mortgage and an agreement to sell the
land. Consequently, on March 9, 1987, Mariano went to his lawyer, Atty. Efren Barangan, to have three
documents drafted: the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage [5], a Kasunduan (Agreement to Sell)[6], and a
Deed of Absolute Sale.[7]
The Kasunduan provided that the children of Mariano Rivera, herein petitioners Adelfa, Cynthia
and Jose, would purchase Lot No. 1083-C for a consideration of P2,141,622.50. This purchase price
was to be paid in three installments: P250,000 upon the signing of the Kasunduan, P750,000 on
August 31, 1987, and P1,141,622.50 on December 31, 1987.[8] It also provided that the Deed of
Absolute Sale would be executed only after the second installment is paid and a postdated check for
the last installment is deposited with Fidela. [9] As previously stated, however, Mariano had already
caused the drafting of the Deed of Absolute Sale. But unlike the Kasunduan, the said deed stipulated a
purchase price of only P601,160, and covered a certain Lot No. 1083-A in addition to Lot No. 1083-C.
[10]
This deed, as well as the Kasunduan and the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage [11], was signed by
Marianos children, petitioners Adelfa, Cynthia and Jose, as buyers and mortgagees, on March 9, 1987.
[12]
Although Fidela intended to sign only the Kasunduan and the Real Estate Mortgage, she
inadvertently affixed her signature on all the three documents in the office of Atty. Barangan and
Mariano then gave Fidela the amount of P250,000. While Mariano was making payments to Oscar,
Fidela entrusted the owners copy of TCT No. T-50.668 (M) to Mariano to guarantee compliance with
the Kasunduan.
Meanwhile, the Riveras, representing themselves to be the new owners of Lot No. 1083-C, were
also negotiating with the tenant, Feliciano Nieto, to rid the land of the latters tenurial right. When
Nieto refused to relinquish his tenurial right over 9,000 sq. m. of the land, the Riveras offered to give
4,500 sq. m. in exchange for the surrender. Nieto could not resist and he accepted. Subdivision Plan
No. Psd-031404-052505 was then made on August 12, 1992. Later, it was inscribed on TCT No.
158443 (M), and Lot No. 1083-C was divided into Lots 1083 C-1 and 1083 C-2.
On February 18, 1993, respondents filed a complaint [19] in the Regional Trial Court of Malolos,
asking that the Kasunduan be rescinded for failure of the Riveras to comply with its conditions, with
damages. They also sought the annulment of the Deed of Absolute Sale on the ground of fraud, the
cancellation of TCT No. T-161784 (M) and TCT No. T-161785 (M), and the reconveyance to them of the
entire property with TCT No. T-50.668 (M) restored.[20]
 Respondents claimed that Fidela never intended to enter into a deed of sale at the time of its
execution and that she signed the said deed on the mistaken belief that she was merely signing copies
of the Kasunduan. They argued that given Fidelas advanced age (she was then around 72 at the time)
[21]
and the fact that the documents were stacked one on top of the other at the time of signing, Fidela
could have easily and mistakenly presumed that she was merely signing additional copies of
the Kasunduan.
Petitioners likewise argued that respondents cause of action had been barred by laches or
estoppel since more than four years has lapsed from the time the parties executed the Deed of
Absolute Sale on March 10, 1987, to the time respondents instituted their complaint on February 18,
1993.
After trial, the RTC ruled in favor of respondents.
The trial court ruled that Fidelas signature in the Deed of Absolute Sale was genuine, but found that
Fidela never intended to sign the said deed. Noting the peculiar differences between
the Kasunduan and the Deed of Absolute Sale, the trial court concluded that the Riveras were guilty of
fraud in securing the execution of the deed and its registration in the Registry of Deeds. [24] This
notwithstanding, the trial court sustained the validity of TCT No. T-161784 (M) in the name of Feliciano
Nieto since there was no fraud proven on Nietos part. The trial court found him to have relied in good
faith and that his rights, according to the trial court, were akin to those of an innocent purchaser for
value.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the trial courts judgment was AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION
that the Deed of Absolute Sale dated March 10, 1987 is declared null and void only insofar as Lot No.
1083-C is concerned, but valid insofar as it conveyed Lot No. 1083-A, that TCT No. 158443 (M) is valid
insofar as Lot No. 1083-A is concerned and should not be annulled, and increasing the amount to be
paid by the defendants-appellants to the plaintiffs-appellees for the 4,500 square meters of land given
to Feliciano Nieto to P323,617.50.
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, this petition.
ISSUES:
1 Whether or not the trial court acquire jurisdiction over the case, despite an alleged deficiency
in the amount of filing fees paid by respondents and despite the fact that an agricultural
tenant is involved in the case
2 Whether or not the respondents cause of action barred by prescription
HELD:
On the first issue, petitioners contend that jurisdiction was not validly acquired because the filing
fees respondents paid was only P1,554.45 when the relief sought was reconveyance of land that was
worth P2,141,622.50 under the Kasunduan. They contend that respondents should have paid filing
fees amounting to P12,183.70. In support of their argument, petitioners invoke the doctrine in Sun
Insurance Office, Ltd., (SIOL) v. Asuncion[31] and attach a certification[32] from the Clerk of Court of the
RTC of Quezon City.
Respondents counter that it is beyond dispute that they paid the correct amount of docket fees when
they filed the complaint. If the assessment was inadequate, they could not be faulted because the
clerk of court made no notice of demand or reassessment, respondents argue. Respondents also add
that since petitioners failed to contest the alleged underpayment of docket fees in the lower court,
they cannot raise the same on appeal.
We rule in favor of respondents. Jurisdiction was validly acquired over the complaint. In Sun
Insurance Office, Ltd., (SIOL) v. Asuncion,[34] this Court ruled that the filing of the complaint or
appropriate initiatory pleading and the payment of the prescribed docket fee vest a trial court with
jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action. If the amount of docket fees paid is
insufficient considering the amount of the claim, the clerk of court of the lower court involved or his
duly authorized deputy has the responsibility of making a deficiency assessment.The party filing the
case will be required to pay the deficiency, but jurisdiction is not automatically lost.
Petitioners also contend that the trial court does not have jurisdiction over the case because it
involves an agricultural tenant. They insist that by virtue of Presidential Decree Nos. 316 and 1038,
[35]
it is the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) that has jurisdiction. [36]
Petitioners contention lacks merit. The DARAB has exclusive original jurisdiction over cases
involving the rights and obligations of persons engaged in the management, cultivation and use of all
agricultural lands covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. [37] However, the cause of
action in this case is primarily against the petitioners, as indispensable parties, for rescission of
the Kasunduan and nullification of the Deed of Sale and the TCTs issued because of them. Feliciano
Nieto was impleaded merely as a necessary party, stemming from whatever rights he may have
acquired by virtue of the agreement between him and the Riveras and the corresponding TCT
issued. Hence, it is the regular judicial courts that have jurisdiction over the case.
As to the second issue, petitioners cite Articles 1383, [40] 1389[41] and 1391[42] of the New Civil
Code. They submit that the complaint for rescission of the Kasunduan should have been dismissed, for
respondents failure to prove that there was no other legal means available to obtain reparation other
than to file a case for rescission, as required by Article 1383. Moreover, petitioners contend that even
assuming respondents had satisfied this requirement, prescription had already set in, the complaint
having been filed in 1992 or five years after the execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale in March 10,
1987.
Obviously, the Kasunduan does not fall under any of those situations mentioned in Article
1381. Consequently, Article 1383 is inapplicable. Hence, the court ruled in favor of the respondents.
Coming now to the matter of prescription. Contrary to petitioners assertion, we find that
prescription has not yet set in. Article 1391 states that the action for annulment of void contracts shall
be brought within four years. This period shall begin from the time the fraud or mistake is
discovered. Here, the fraud was discovered in 1992 and the complaint filed in 1993. Thus, the case is
well within the prescriptive period.
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is MODIFIED. The Deed of Absolute
Sale in question is declared NULL and VOID in its entirety. Petitioners are ORDERED to pay
respondents P323,617.50 as actual damages, P30,000.00 as moral damages, P20,000.00 as
exemplary damages and P20,000.00 as attorneys fees. No pronouncement as to costs.
9. SPOUSES JORGE J. HUGUETE and YOLANDA B. HUGUETE, petitioners, vs. SPOUSES
TEOFEDO AMARILLO EMBUDO and MARITES HUGUETE-EMBUDO, respondents. D E C I S I O
N YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This is a petition for review assailing the Orders dated June 27, 2001and July 26, 2001[2] of the
Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 7, in Civil Case No. CEB-24925.
On March 2, 2000, petitioner spouses Jorge and Yolanda Huguete instituted against respondent
spouses Teofredo Amarillo Embudo and Marites Huguete-Embudo a complaint for Annulment of TCT
No. 99694, Tax Declaration No. 46493, and Deed of Sale, Partition, Damages and Attorneys Fees,
docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-24925 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 7. Petitioners
alleged that their son-in-law, respondent Teofredo, sold to them a 50-square meter portion of his 150-
square meter parcel of land, known as Lot No. 1920-F-2, situated in San Isidro, Talisay, Cebu, for a
consideration of P15,000.00; that Teofredo acquired the lot from Ma. Lourdes Villaber-Padillo by virtue
of a deed of sale, after which Transfer Certificate of Title No. 99694 was issued solely in his name; that
despite demands, Teofredo refused to partition the lot between them.
On March 15, 2001, respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case, arguing that the total assessed value of the subject
land was only P15,000.00 which falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court,
pursuant to Section 33(3) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act No. 7691.
Petitioners filed an Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss alleging that the subject matter of the action
is incapable of pecuniary estimation and, therefore, is cognizable by the Regional Trial Court, as
provided by Section 19(1) of B.P. 129, as amended.
The trial court dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. Petitioners filed a Motion for
Reconsideration, which was denied on July 26, 2001.
ISSUE: WON the civil action is one in which the subject matter is incapable of pecuniary estimation.
Held: No. The argument that the present action is one incapable of pecuniary estimation considering
that it is for annulment of deed of sale and partition is not well-taken.
What determines the nature of an action as well as which court has jurisdiction over it are the
allegations of the complaint and the character of the relief sought.
(Caiza vs CA). And in Singsong vs Isabela Sawmill, the Supreme Court ruled that:
In determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary
estimation this Court has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the principal action or
remedy sought. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of
pecuniary estimation, and whether the jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the courts of first
instance would depend on the amount of the claim. However, where the basic issue is something
other than the right to recover a sum of money, where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a
consequence of, the principal relief sought, this Court has considered such actions as cases where the
subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, and are cognizable exclusively by
courts of first instance (now Regional Trial Courts).
The principal purpose of the petitioners in filing the complaint was to secure title to the 50-square
meter portion of the property which they purchased from the respondents. Their cause of action is
based on their right as purchaser of the subject land from respondents. They pray that they be
declared owners of the property sold. Thus, their complaint involved title to real property or any
interest therein. The alleged value of the land which they purchased was P15,000.00, which was within
the jurisdiction of MTC.
The annulment of the deed of sale, were prayed for in the complaint because they were necessary
before the lot may be partitioned and the 50-square meter portion subject thereof may be conveyed
to petitioners.
10. Capacete vs Baroro
G.R. No. 154184
July 8, 2003
Facts:
Respondents application for a free patent over a parcel of land, opposed by petitioners who
were then the possessor of the same, was subsequently denied by the Bureau of Lands. Respondent
commenced an action in MTC for unlawful detainer against the petitioners contending that the latter
took possession of the disputed property in 1957 by mere tolerance from them. Petitioners justified
their occupancy of the land claiming that they bought it from respondent in 1956. The MTC decided in
favor of respondent.
Upon failure to appeal within the allotted time, petitioners filed a complaint against
respondent with the RTC for accion reinvindicatoria, claiming that they bought the land from
respondent. The latter alleged that she owns the land by virtue of her possession of it and that the
same had been declared for taxation purposes by her father and declared it in her own name. The RTC
decided in favor of respondent.
Upon failure to appeal with the CA, petitioners filed a complaint with the RTC for a writ of
injunction to restrain the respondents from dispossessing them of the land but the same was
dismissed ruling that it cannot interfere with the judgment of another branch. Petitioners then repaired
to Supreme Court via a petition for certiorari, which was also dismissed for their failure to submit the
certified true copies of the assailed orders and decision of the lower court.
Petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals a petition to annul the judgment in the RTC on the
ground that it was rendered with extrinsic or collateral fraud or lack of jurisdiction but the same was
dismissed.
Issue:
Whether or not the not the RTC decision and the writ of demolition must be annulled due to
the court's lack of jurisdiction to issue the writ of execution.
Held:
No. The Supreme Court held that it cannot be considered a lack of jurisdiction over their
person or over the subject matter of their claim where in fact, the lower court duly acquired
jurisdiction over them upon their filing of the complaint claiming for the annulment of the decision of
the MTC, accion reinvindicatoria, and quieting of title. The RTC has the power to direct the ejectment
of the petitioners and order them to vacate the disputed land and it can also adjudicate its possession
in respondents favor. The writ was issued well within its authority.
11. PNB vs. Rittrato Group, Inc., et.al.
GR No. 142616 July 31, 20001
Facts:
Petitioner Philippine National Bank is a domestic corporation organized and existing under
Philippine law. Meanwhile, respondents Ritratto Group, Inc., Riatto International, Inc. and Dadasan
General Merchandise are domestic corporations, likewise, organized and existing under Philippine law.
On May 29, 1996, PNB International Finance Ltd. (PNB-IFL) a subsidiary company of PNB
organized and doing business in Hong Kong, extended a letter of credit in favor of the respondents in
the amount of US$300,000.00 secured by real estate mortgages constituted over four (4) parcels of
land in Makati City. This credit facility was later increased successively in September 1996 to February
1997; and decreased in 1998. Respondents made repayments of the loan incurred by remitting those
amounts to their loan account with PNB-IFL in Hong Kong.
However, as of April 30, 1998, their outstanding obligations stood at US$1,497,274.70.
Pursuant to the terms of the real estate mortgages, PNB-IFL, through its attorney-in-fact PNB, notified
the respondents of the foreclosure of all the real estate mortgages and that the properties subject
thereof were to be sold at a public auction on May 27, 1999 at the Makati City Hall.
On May 25, 1999, respondents filed a complaint for injunction with prayer for the issuance of
a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order before the Regional Trial Court of
Makati. The Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Makati issued a 72-hour temporary
restraining order. On May 28, 1999, the case was raffled to the Regional Trial Court of Makati. The trial
judge then set a hearing on June 8, 1999. At the hearing of the application for preliminary injunction,
petitioner was given a period of seven days to file its written opposition to the application. On June 15,
1999, petitioner filed an opposition to the application for a writ of preliminary injunction to which the
respondents filed a reply. On June 25, 1999, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of
failure to state a cause of action and the absence of any privity between the petitioner and
respondents. On June 30, 1999, the trial court judge issued an Order for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction, which writ was correspondingly issued on July 14, 1999. On October 4, 1999,
the motion to dismiss was denied by the trial court judge for lack of merit.
Issues:
1 WON there was a cause of action that exists against petitioner which is not a real party in
interest being a mere attorney-in-fact authorized to enforce an ancillary contract.
2 WON the Court of Appeals erred in allowing the trial to issue in excess or lack of jurisdiction a
writ of preliminary injunction.
Ruling:
1 No. There was no cause of action that exists against petitioner which is not a real party in
interest in the case. The parent-subsidiary relationship between PNB and PNB-IFL is not the
significant legal relationship involved in this case since the petitioner was not sued because it
is the parent company of PNB-IFL. Rather, the petitioner was sued because it acted as an
attorney-in-fact of PNB-IFL in initiating the foreclosure proceedings. A suit against an agent
cannot without compelling reasons be considered a suit against the principal. Under the Rules
of Court, every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party-in-
interest, unless otherwise authorized by law or these Rules. In mandatory terms, the Rules
require that "parties-in-interest without whom no final determination can be had, an action
shall be joined either as plaintiffs or defendants." In the case at bar, the injunction suit is
 directed only against the agent, not the principal. Respondents do not have a cause of action
against the petitioner as the latter is not privy to the contract the provisions of which
respondents seek to declare void.
2 The issuance of the preliminary injunction must be lifted as it is a mere provisional remedy
but adjunct to the main suit. A writ of preliminary injunction is an ancillary or preventive
remedy that may only be resorted to by a litigant to protect or preserve his rights or interests
and for no other purpose during the pendency of the principal action. The dismissal of the
principal action thus results in the denial of the prayer for the issuance of the writ. Further,
there is no showing that respondents are entitled to the issuance of the writ under Section 3,
Rule 58, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Thus, an injunctive remedy may only be
resorted to when there is a pressing necessity to avoid injurious consequences which cannot
be remedied under any standard compensation. Respondents do not deny their
indebtedness. Their properties are by their own choice encumbered by real estate
mortgages. Upon the non-payment of the loans, which were secured by the mortgages
sought to be foreclosed, the mortgaged properties are properly subject to a foreclosure sale.
Moreover, respondents questioned the alleged void stipulations in the contract only when
petitioner initiated the foreclosure proceedings. Clearly, respondents have failed to prove that
they have a right protected and that the acts against which the writ is to be directed are
violative of said right. The Court is not unmindful of the findings of both the trial court and
the appellate court that there may be serious grounds to nullify the provisions of the loan
agreement. However, as earlier discussed, respondents committed the mistake of filing the
case against the wrong party, thus, they must suffer the consequences of their error
12. Ban Hua U. Flores v Office of the OMBUDSMAN and Atty. Enrique L. Flores, Jr.
GR No. 136769 Sept. 17, 2002
Facts:
A complaint against the Ban Hua Flores for accounting and turnover of corporate funds of UBS
Marketing was instituted by Johnny K. H. Uy with the Securities and Exchange Commission. Petitioner
moved for the dismissal of the case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction which was denied. Likewise
denied was the appeal filed with the SEC en banc. A judgment was rendered in favor of the
complainant. Petitioner Flores and company then appealed to the SEC en banc which reversed the
decision except the order of accounting. A criminal complaint was then filed by the petitioner alleging
that Hearing Officer Enrique Flores rendered an unjust judgment under Art. 204 of the RPC and
violating Sec. 3 of RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) which was dismissed by the Office of
Ombudsman for insufficiency of evidence ratiocinating that there was no showing that the decision
was rendered maliciously and deliberately to do an injustice to the complainant and that the error was
committed in good faith pursuant to the principle of regularity in the performance of official functions.
It was well settled that a judicial officer, when required to exercise his judgment or discretion is not
criminally liable for any error which he commits provided he acts in good faith. Even though the
complainant had been inconvenienced because of the decision of the respondent, such inconvenience
did not amount to causing undue injury under Sec. 3 of RA 3019, not only because there is no showing
of evident bad faith or inexcusable negligence but because the decision appealed to the SEC en banc
was immediately corrected, hence said decision did not become final and executory. Petitioner moved
for the reconsideration which was likewise denied. Hence this petition where petitioner contends that
public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the complaint, alleging that the
decision was not made in good faith since the case did not involve a complex question of law but was
a plain violation of simple rules of procedure and that petitioner and her family suffered undue injury
as result of the decision, making respondent liable under Sec. 3 of RA 3019.
Issue: whether the Office of the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the
complaint against private respondent for violation of Article 204 of the Revised Penal Code and Section
3 (e) of RA 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
Ruling:
The instant petition emerged as a procedural concern captioned as a petition for review by certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. However, the arguments raised refer to alleged grave abuse of
discretion committed by the Office of the Ombudsman. Accordingly, the instant petition is considered
as one under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. In this case, the assailed resolution of the Office of the
Ombudsman dismissing the complaint against private respondent was legally justified because before
one can be held liable under Article 204 of the Revised Penal Code and Section 3 (e) of RA 3019, the
person subject of the complaint must be shown to have committed the act in bad faith. The Office of
the Ombudsman did not find private respondent in bad faith, hence, the important element for the
above offenses is wanting. Under Article 204 of the Revised Penal Code, the offender must be a judge,
however in this case the alleged offender is a hearing officer of the SEC.
The Office of the Solicitor General observed that aside from the allegation that private respondents
decision cannot be possibly made in good faith for the case did not involve complex questions of law,
petitioner did not show other facts which warrant a conclusion of malice and bad faith. Further, due to
the policy of non-interference with the Office of the Ombudsmans exercise of its investigatory and
prosecutory powers, the Ombudsmans finding of absence of bad faith cannot be disturbed. This is not
only in recognition of the authority of the Ombudsman mandated by the Constitution, but for
practicality as well, for otherwise the courts will be grievously hampered by innumerable petitions
assailing the dismissal of investigatory proceedings by the Office of the Ombudsman with regard to
complaints filed before it, in much the same way that courts would be swamped if they could be
compelled to review the exercise of discretion by the fiscals or prosecuting attorneys on whether to
file an information in court or dismiss the complaint by a private complainant. Hence the petition is
dismissed for lack of merit.
13. SUI MAN HUI CHAN AND GONZALO CO vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND OSCAR MEDALLA
GR NO. 147999, FEBRUARY 27, 2004
FACTS:
Private respondent OSCAR MEDALLA filed a complaint on March 30, 1999 for collection of a
sum of money arising from breach of a contract of lease and damages, against petitioners Sui Man Hui
Chan and Gonzalo Co.
The complaint alleged Napoleon C. Medalla as lessor and Ramon Chan as lessee entered into a Lease
Contract over a hotel building located at No. 29 Abanao Street, Baguio City. Chan would use the leased
premises as a restaurant named Cypress Inn. Pertinently, the parties agreed on the following:
1. The period of lease shall be for ten (10) years or from 15 July 1988 to 15 July 1998.
2. The payment of the realty taxes due to the government on the leased premises shall be for the
account of the Lessee.
3. The agreement is binding upon the heirs and/or successors-in-interest of the Lessor and the Lessee.
Petitioner Gonzalo Co was employed by Ramon Chan as the general manager of Cypress Inn and acted
as his agent in all his dealings with Napoleon Medalla.
On August 5, 1989, Ramon Chan died and was survived by his wife, petitioner Sui Man Hui Chan and
on July 17, 1996, Napoleon Medalla died and among his heirs is private respondent Oscar Medalla,
who succeeded him as owner and lessor of the leased premises.
Petitioners failed to pay the monthly rentals due on the leased premises. Despite several Statements
of Accounts sent by Medalla, petitioners failed to pay the rentals due but, nonetheless, continued to
use and occupy the leased premises.
On February 26, 1997, Medalla sent a letter addressed to Ramon Chan, indicating that (1) the contract
of lease would expire on July 15, 1998, and (2) he was not amenable to a renewal of said contract
after its expiration.
Medalla then sent demand letters to petitioners and to settle the unpaid rentals, pay the unpaid real
estate taxes, and vacate the leased premises.
On January 1999, petitioners vacated the premises but without paying their unpaid rentals and realty
taxes. Aggrieved by petitioners refusal to pay the amounts owing, which had reached P4,147,901.80
by March 1999, private respondent Medalla instituted Civil Case No. MC99-666.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not petitioner is a real party in interest.
2. Whether or Not the claim of the private respondent should have been filed against the estate of
Ramon Chan.
HELD:
1. YES, It is undeniable that petitioner Chan is an heir of Ramon Chan and, together with petitioner
Co, was a successor-in-interest to the restaurant business of the late Ramon Chan. Both continued to
operate the business after the death of Ramon. Thus, they are real parties-in-interest in the case filed
by private respondent, notwithstanding that they are not signatories to the Contract of Lease.
A lease contract is not essentially personal in character. Thus, the rights and obligations therein are
transmissible to the heirs. The general rule, therefore, is that heirs are bound by contracts entered
into by their predecessors-in-interest except when the rights and obligations arising therefrom are not
transmissible by (1) their nature, (2) stipulation or (3) provision of law. In the subject Contract of
Lease, not only were there no stipulations prohibiting any transmission of rights, but its very terms
and conditions explicitly provided for the transmission of the rights of the lessor and of the lessee to
their respective heirs and successors. The contract is the law between the parties. The death of a
party does not excuse non-performance of a contract, which involves a property right, and the rights
and obligations thereunder pass to the successors or representatives of the deceased. Similarly, non-
performance is not excused by the death of the party when the other party has a property interest in
the subject matter of the contract.
2. NO, Petitioners contention that any claim should have been filed before the estate proceeding of
Ramon Chan pursuant to Section 5 of Rule 86, the trial court found that the unpaid rentals sought to
be claimed were for the period April 1993 to December 1998. Note that Ramon Chan, the original
lessee, died on August 5, 1989. In other words, as the unpaid rentals did not accrue during the lifetime
of Ramon Chan, but well after his death, his estate might not be held liable for them. Hence, there is
no indubitable basis to apply Section 5, Rule 86, of the Revised Rules of Court as petitioners urge
respondents to do.
14.
15. G.R. No. 160261 November 10, 2003
ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR., petitioner,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES et. al., respondents.
FACTS:
On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, sponsored by
Representative Felix William D. Fuentebella, which directed the Committee on Justice "to conduct an
investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF)." On June 2, 2003, former
President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr.
and seven Associate Justices of this Court for "culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the
public trust and other high crimes." The complaint was endorsed by Representatives Rolex T. Suplico,
Ronaldo B. Zamora and Didagen Piang Dilangalen, and was referred to the House Committee. The
House Committee on Justice ruled on October 13, 2003 that the first impeachment complaint was
"sufficient in form," but voted to dismiss the same on October 22, 2003 for being insufficient in
substance. To date, the Committee Report to this effect has not yet been sent to the House in plenary
in accordance with the said Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution. Four months and three weeks
since the filing on June 2, 2003 of the first complaint or on October 23, 2003, a day after the House
Committee on Justice voted to dismiss it, the second impeachment complaint was filed with the
Secretary General of the House by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B.
Fuentebella against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of the legislative
inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution. This second impeachment complaint was
accompanied by a "Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least one-third (1/3) of all
the Members of the House of Representatives.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the filing of the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G.
Davide, Jr. with the House of Representatives falls within the one year bar provided in the Constitution.
HELD:
Yes, the filing of the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide,
Jr. with the House of Representatives falls within the one year bar provided in the Constitution. Having
concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment complaint and referral
to the House Committee on Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of
Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated in the foregoing manner,
another may not be filed against the same official within a one year period following Article XI, Section
3(5) of the Constitution. In fine, considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed by former
President Estrada against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along with seven associate justices of this
Court, on June 2, 2003 and referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003, the second
impeachment complaint filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella
against the Chief Justice on October 23, 2003 violates the constitutional prohibition against the
initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same impeachable officer within a one-year period.
16. MICHELLE I. PINEDA vs. COURT OF APPEALS (Former Ninth Division) and the
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, represented by Assistant Secretary CAMILO MIGUEL M.
MONTESA
G.R. No. 181643, November 17, 2010
Facts:
On May 14, 2004, Pineda entered into a Memorandum of Agreement with Lakandula High
School represented by its principal, Dr. Alice B. Blas , for a five-year lease of the school canteen with a
monthly rental of P20,000.00 and an additional P4,000.00 monthly for the schools feeding program as
well as medicines for the school clinic.
On August 5, 2004, the faculty and personnel of LHS sent a letter to the Division School
Superintendent, Dr. Ma. Luisa Quiones , questioning the validity of the May-MOA. Dr. Blas sent a letter-
reply on September 17, 2004 and an exchange of correspondence followed. Meanwhile, on August 14,
2004, Pineda and Dr. Blas executed another MOA (August-MOA) superseding the May-MOA. This time,
the August-MOA followed the standard form under Department Order No. 95, Series of 1998 or the
Revised Implementing Guidelines for the Turnover of School Canteens to Teachers Cooperatives.
On February 11, 2005, respondent DepEd, through Undersecretary Jose Luis Martin C.
Gascon, declared the August-MOA null and void ab initio and ordered it cancelled. Pineda was also
ordered to cease and desist from further managing and operating the canteen. DepEd made clear that
the management and operation of the canteen should revert to the Home Economics Department of
the School. This prompted Pineda to file a petition for certiorari with prayer for temporary restraining
order and/or writ of preliminary injunction before the RTC.
On March 14, 2005, the RTC ordered the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory
Injunction enjoining the enforcement of Usec. Gascons decision. DepEd, represented by Usec. Gascon,
Dr. Quiones and Ms. Olympiada Camilo, who succeeded Dr. Blas as School Principal, sought the
dismissal of Pinedas petition before the RTC on the ground that the latter failed to state a cause of
action. On June 7, 2005, the trial court denied its motion. For said reason, DepEd, this time
represented by Assistant Secretary Camilo Miguel M. Montesa, filed a petition for certiorari before the
CA seeking to set aside the March 14, 2005 and June 7, 2005 orders of the RTC.
The CA affirmed the June 7, 2005 order of the RTC denying DepEds motion to dismiss but
reversed its March 14, 2005 order granting the issuance of the Writ of Preliminary Mandatory
Injunction.
Issue:
Whether or not the preliminary mandatory injunction was valid.

Held:
No. The very writ of preliminary injunction set aside by the CA could no longer lie for the acts
sought to be enjoined had already been accomplished or consummated. The DepEd already prohibited
Pineda from operating the school canteen. As correctly ruled by the CA in its questioned decision,
since Pineda had ceased the operation of the school canteen since 2005, the RTCs preliminary writ
should be set aside as there was nothing more to enjoin. The Court agrees with the CA when it
explained: A preliminary injunction is a provisional remedy that a party may resort to in order to
preserve and protect certain rights and interests during the pendency of an action. Its sole objective is
to preserve the status quo until the merits of the case can be heard fully. Status quo is defined as the
last actual, peaceful, and uncontested status that precedes the actual controversy, that which is
existing at the time of the filing of the case. Indubitably, the trial court must not make use of its
injunctive relief to alter such status.
In this case, the status quo ante litem or the state of affairs existing at the time of the filing of
the case was that Pineda was already prohibited from operating the school canteen. For said reason,
the trial court cannot make use of its injunctive power to change said status.
17. G.R. No. 150159 July 25, 2003
TERESITA VILLAREAL MANIPOR, LAILANIE VILLAREAL MACANDOG, RODELO VILLAREAL, ELY
VILLAREAL, NOELITO VILLAREAL and LUISITO VILLAREAL, as represented by his attorney-
in-fact, TERESITA VILLAREAL MANIPOR, petitioners,
vs.
SPOUSES PABLO & ANTONIA RICAFORT, respondents.
FACTS:
The herein respondents are co-owners of Abelardo Villareal, the predecessor in interest of
Renato and Teresita Villareal. However, Abelardo, during his lifetime acquired an OCT in violation of
his agreement with respondents. When Abelardo died, Renato and Teresita Villareal as heirs acquired a
TCT.
Respondents filed an action for annulment of the said TCT. During the course of the
proceedings, the parties entered into an agreement whereby Renato and Teresita shall grant one-half
of the land and the cost of the suit to respondents after the formers admission of the agreement made
by their predecessor.
Not long after the approval of the compromise agreement, the respondent filed for contempt
against the two due to failure to comply with the agreement. Before the proceedings upon the
motion, herein petitioners filed for intervention and substitution of the defendant as the latter waived
their interest on the land. Upon realizing that the compromise was really final, petitioners sought for
relief of judgment by their co-heir Luisito, who according to them learned of the judgment much later
that them and is yet time barred.
The motion for intervention and substitution was denied and no M.R. was filed. The said
petition for relief was then filed by Luisito but was denied for lack of affidavit of merit and filing
beyond 6 mos. after judgment.
Petitioners filed a petition for annulment before the C.A but was denied for not stating the
reason for mailing and so is their M.R. for not stating the material dates. No appeal was filed.
Another petition for annulment was filed before the CA but was denied against because they
were unable to move for a new trial or a petition for relief from judgment through no fault attributable
to them. Hence this petition.
ISSUE/S:
WON the CA erred in attributing fault to petitioners simply because of the RTCs denial of the latters
petition for relief.
WON the CA erred in considering their original petition as not having been filed under Rule 13 Section
11.
WON the CA erred in denying their M.R. for failure to state the material dates.
HELD:
1 NO. Petitioners herein do not have legal interest over the said land as they have donated it
already to Renato and his wife at the death of their father. Petitioners are deemed estopped
for claiming interest therein and as not being indispensable parties cannot file for relief of
judgment.
2 NO. Rule 13 Section 11. States,
Priorities in modes of service and filing. Whenever practicable, the service and filing of
pleadings and other papers shall be done personally. Except with respect to papers
emanating from the court, a resort to other modes must be accompanied by a written
explanation why the service or filing was not done personally. A violation of this Rule may be
cause to consider the paper as not filed. (n)
Petitioners failed to state their reason for usage of the said service of filing thus making it
void.
3 NO. It appears that petitioners did not appeal from the Court of Appeals resolutions denying
the first petition for annulment of compromise judgment and the subsequent motion for
reconsideration brought by petitioners in CA-G.R. SP No. 64952, as a result of which the same
became final. Basic is the rule that perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the
period prescribed by law is not only mandatory but jurisdictional and failure to perfect an
appeal has the effect of rendering the judgment or resolution final and executory. 16 Hence,
petitioners are precluded from resurrecting any issue relative to these resolutions after they
have lapsed into finality by operation of law.
18.
19. GR NO. 160053
August 28,2006
Spouses Renato and Angelina Lantin, Petitioners
Vs.
Hon. Jane Aurora Lantion, et.al., Respondents
FACTS:
Spouses Lantin took several dollar and peso loans from Planters Development Bank (PDB) and
executed mortgages and promissory notes to cover the loans. The Lantins defaulted on their loans so
PDB foreclosed on the properties to partially satisfy the Lantins debt. Subsequently, the Lantins filed a
Complaint for Declaration of Nullity and/or Annulment of Sale and/or Mortgage, Reconveyance,
Discharge of Mortgage, Accounting, Permanent Injunction, and Damages with the RTC of Lipa City,
Batangas against PDB. According to the Lantins, the REM only covered the peso loans which they have
already paid off, and not the dollar loans. PDB filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of improper
venue since according to their agreement, the venue of any suit should be Metro Manila. Judge (Jane
Aurora) Lantion dismissed the complaint because of improper venue. Lantins asked for a
reconsideration which was denied. Lantins claim that since they are assailing the validity of the loan
documents, then the stipulation stating that Metro Manila should be the venue of any suit is also in
question. They also argue that the venue stipulated in the agreement is not the exclusive venue
stipulation covered by Section 4(b) of the Rules on Civil Procedure.
ISSUE: Whether the stipulation on the loan agreement is an exclusive venue stipulation under Sec.
4(b) of the Rules
HELD:
Yes. WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The assailed orders dated May 15, 2003 and September
15, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court of Lipa City, Batangas, in Civil Case No. 2002-0555 are AFFIRMED.
RATIONALE: Under Section 4 (b) of Rule 4 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the general rules on
venue of actions shall not apply where the parties, before the filing of the action, have validly agreed
in writing on an exclusive venue. The mere stipulation on the venue of an action, however, is not
enough to preclude parties from bringing a case in other venues. The parties must be able to show
that such stipulation is exclusive. In the absence of qualifying or restrictive words, the stipulation
should be deemed as merely an agreement on an additional forum, not as limiting venue to the
specified place.
Under the agreement, it is clear that the Lantins and PDB agreed that any suit arising from the
contract should be brought exclusively in the proper Makati court (or to any court that PDB wants to),
as the Lantins had waived the right to choose the venue of the action. The Lantins only assailed of the
coverage of the loan agreement and the validity of the loan agreement itself. Since the issues of
whether the mortgages should be properly discharged and whether these also cover the dollar loans,
arose out of the said loan documents, the stipulation on venue is also applicable thereto.
20. PILIPINO TELEPHONE CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. DELFINO TECSON, respondent.
[G.R. No. 156966. May 7, 2004]
Facts: Delfin Tecson applied for 6 cellular phone subscriptions with PILTEL on various dates in 1996,
which were all approved and later on covered by 6 mobiline service agreements. However, in 2001,
Tecson filed with the RTC of Iligan City a complaint against PILTEL for Sum of Money and Damages.
PILTEL, Moved to dismiss the case on the ground of improper venue, citing a common
provision in the mobiline service agreements to the effect that -
"Venue of all suits arising from this Agreement or any other suit directly or indirectly arising from the
relationship between PILTEL and subscriber shall be in the proper courts of Makati, Metro Manila.
Subscriber hereby expressly waives any other venues.
RTC of Iligan denied the motion to dismiss and required PILTEL to file an answer on the
complaint within 15 days from receipt thereof. It also denied PILTELs subsequent Motion For
Reconsideration.
PILTEL appealed to the CA, which affirmed the Decision of the RTC and denied the subsequent MFR
filed by PILTEL.
ISSUE: WON the provision in the mobiline service agreements fixing the venue of all suits arising from
the contract is clear and binding and that the venue of the complaint was improperly laid.
Held:
Yes, the provision is clear and binding, and the venue was improperly laid. Section 4, Rule 4,
of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure allows the parties to agree and stipulate in writing, before the
filing of an action, on the exclusive venue of any litigation between them. Such an agreement would
be valid and binding provided that the stipulation on the chosen venue is exclusive in nature or in
intent, that it is expressed in writing by the parties thereto, and that it is entered into before the filing
of the suit.
In the case at bar, respondent secured six (6) subscription contracts for cellular phones on
various dates. It would be difficult to assume that, during each of those times, respondent had no
sufficient opportunity to read and go over the terms and conditions embodied in the agreements.
Respondent continued, in fact, to acquire in the pursuit of his business subsequent subscriptions and
remained a subscriber of petitioner for quite sometime.
A contract duly executed is the law between the parties, and they are obliged to comply fully and not
selectively with its terms. A contract of adhesion is no exception.
21.
22.
23. ESTRELLITA J. TAMANO vs. HON. RODOLFO A. ORTIZ, Presiding Judge, RTC-Br. 89,
Quezon City, HAJA PUTRI ZORAYDA A. TAMANO, ADIB A. TAMANO and the HON. COURT OF
APPEALS,
G.R. No. 126603 June 29, 1998
The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, Regional Trial Courts have jurisdiction over all actions
involving the contract of marriage and marital relations. Personal actions, such as the instant
complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage, may be commenced and tried where the plaintiff or
any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants
resides, at the election of the plaintiff. There should be no question by now that what determines the
nature of an action and correspondingly the court which has jurisdiction over it are the allegations
made by the plaintiff in this case.
Facts:
On 31 May 1958 Senator Mamintal Abdul Jabar Tamano (Tamano) married private respondent
Haja Putri Zorayda A. Tamano (Zorayda) in civil rites. Their marriage supposedly remained valid and
subsisting until his death on 18 May 1994. Prior to his death, particularly on 2 June 1993, Tamano also
married petitioner Estrellita J. Tamano (Estrellita) in civil rites in Malabang, Lanao del Sur.
Private respondent Zorayda joined by her son Adib A. Tamano (Adib) filed a Complaint for
Declaration of Nullify of Marriage of Tamano and Estrellita on the ground that it was bigamous.
Estrellita filed a motion to dismiss alleging that the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City was without
jurisdiction over the subject and nature of the action. The court ruled in favor of Private respondent
Zorayda. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration contending that since Tamano and Zorayda were
both Muslims and married in Muslim rites the jurisdiction to hear and try the instant case was vested
in the shari'a courts pursuant to Art. 155 of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws.
The lower court denied the motion to dismiss and ruled that the instant case was properly
cognizable by the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City since Estrellita and Tamano were married in
accordance with the Civil Code and not exclusively in accordance with PD No. 1083 2 or the Code of
Muslim Personal laws. The motion for reconsideration was likewise denied.
Issue:
Whether or not shari'a court and not the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the subject
and nature of the action.
Held:
We affirm the decision of the RTC. The Regional Trial Court was not divested of jurisdiction to
hear and try the instant case despite the allegation in the Motion for Reconsideration that Estrellita
and Tamano were likewise married in Muslim rites. This is because a court's jurisdiction cannot be
made to depend upon defenses set up in the answer, in a motion to dismiss, or in a motion for
reconsideration, but only upon the allegations of the complaint. Jurisdiction over the subject matter of
a case is determined from the allegations of the complaint as the latter comprises a concise statement
of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff's causes of action.
Also, in the complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage filed by private respondents
herein, it was alleged that Estrellita and Tamano were married in accordance with the provisions of the
Civil Code. Never was it mentioned that Estrellita and Tamano were married under Muslim laws or PD
No. 1083. Interestingly, Estrellita never stated in her Motion to Dismiss that she and Tamano were
married under Muslim laws. That she was in fact married to Tamano under Muslim laws was first
mentioned only in her Motion for Reconsideration.
Article 13 of PD No. 1083 does not provide for a situation where the parties were married
both in civil and Muslim rites. Consequently, the shari'a courts are not vested with original and
exclusive jurisdiction when it comes to marriages celebrated under both civil and Muslim laws.
24. THOMAS M. GONZALEZ, plaintiff and appellant, WON the case against CRS be filed in Manila where they hold their principal office.
vs. Held:
DEMETRIO B. ENCARNACION and VENANCIO H. AQUINO, defendants and appellees. Yes. It is clear that the damage is based upon tort and not upon a written contract. Under par. (b)(3)
G.R. No. L-18726 August 31, 1966 Sec. 1 Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, "the action is not upon a written contract, then in the municipality
where the defendant or any of the defendants resides or may be served with summons." In
Corporation law, it is settled that the residence of the corporation is the place where the principal
office is established. Since CRS' principal office is in Manila, then the suit against it shall be filed in
Facts:
Manila. Furthermore, the Court held in Evangelista vs. Santos, et al., that the laying of the venue of an
On September 6, 1960 Gonzalez filed with the aforesaid court a complaint to recover from
action is not left to plaintiff's caprice because the matter is regulated by the Rules of Court. Applying
Encarnacion, moral damages in the amount of P25,000 and exemplary or corrective damages as the
the provision of the Rules of Court, the venue in this case was improperly laid.
court may deem just and proper, allegedly sustained by the former as a result of the filing by the
latter in civil case N-151, a pleading captioned "Reply and Answer to Counterclaim," containing words
and expressions which are allegedly highly libelous, derogatory and scurrilous to "the personal worth,
26. Rebecca T. Cabutihan vs Lancenter Construction & Development Corporation
integrity, honor and reputation" of Gonzalez, as well as "impertinent, immaterial and irrelevant to the
G.R No. 146594, June 10, 2002
issues". On September 28, 1960 Encarnacion filed a motion to dismiss the complaint upon the grounds
that (1) it states no cause of action, and (2) venue is improperly laid and/or the trial court has no
Facts:
jurisdiction. The motion was denied by the Court in its order of November 10, 1960. On November 21,
On December 3, 1996 Land center Construction & Development Corporation and petitioner
1960 Encarnacion moved to reconsider the order denying his motion to dismiss, insisting on his
Rebecca Cabutihan entered into an Agreement. The agreement states that Respondent Corporation is
previous grounds. Meanwhile, Aquino also asked for the dismissal of the complaint on the very same
the absolute owner of a parcel of land situated at Kay-biga, Paranaque, Metro Manila.
grounds relied upon by Encarnacion. Gonzalez takes the position that the venue of his complaint is not
The petitioner facilitates and undertakes for the recovery of the property and the compensation for the
improperly laid because under Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act
undertaking of the facilitatorand that petitioner is entitled of 20% of the total area of the property thus
1289, effective June 15, 1955, a civil action for damages in cases of written defamation may be filed in
recovered for and in behalf of respondent corporation, Forro 10%, Radan 4% and Anave 2.5% and a
the court of first instance of the province where the offended party resides. On the other hand, the
total of 36.5%.
defendants contend that the complaint should have been filed in civil case N-151 of the Court of First
Instance of Cavite because under the aforesaid provision of law the court where the criminal or civil
On February 11, 1997 upon accomplishment of the Agreement and Undertakings, petitioner
action for damages is first filed acquires jurisdiction to the exclusion of other courts.
demanded to execute the corresponding Deed of Assignment of the lots in the subject property, as
Issue:
compensation for the services rendered however the respondent corporation refused to act on the
Whether or not the venue is improperly laid and/or the trial court has no jurisdiction.
said demand.
Held:
No, the venue is not improperly laid. The language of the above quoted provision is, to our
On October 14, 1999, petitioner filed specific performance with damages against respondents.
mind, plain and clear. It establishes a general rule and an exception thereto. Civil actions for damages
Petitioner prayed, inter alia, that respondent corporation be ordered to execute the appropriate
in cases of written defamation "shall" be filed with the court of first Instance of the province or city in
document assigning, conveying, transferring and delivering the particular lots in her favor.
which "any of the accused or any of the offended parties resides." In other words, the plaintiff is
limited in his choice of venue to the court of first instance of his residence or to that of any of the
Respondent filed dismissal of the complaint on the grounds of (1) the venue is improperly laid because
accused." Plaintiff may not file the action elsewhere, unless the libel is published, circulated,
since petitioner seeks to recover property, then the case is an action in rem which should be (2)the
displayed, or exhibited in a province or city wherein, neither the offender nor the offended party
court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter because Forro, Radan, and Anave are not named as
resides in which case the civil and criminal actions may be brought in the court of first instance
plaintiffs, and petitioner is not named/does not included in the cause of action(3) it was imperative for
thereof." The verb "may" is permissive. Hence it does not necessarily imply a complete abrogation of
petitioner to pay the appropriate docket or filing fees equivalent to the pecuniary value of her claim
the general rule laid down in the preceding sentence except in so far as it broadens the two (2)
and the trial court never acquired jurisdiction over the case.
alternatives therein set forth, by giving the plaintiff a third choice of venue.

25. G.R. No. L-22238 February 18, 1967 ISSUES:

CLAVECILLIA RADIO SYSTEM, petitioner-appellant, vs. HON. AGUSTIN ANTILLON, as City
Judge of the Municipal Court of Cagayan de Oro City and NEW CAGAYAN
GROCERY, respondents-appellees.
Facts:
New Cagayan Grocery filed a complaint for damages against CRS. They alleged that CRS omitted the
word NOT in the letter addressed to New Cagayan Grocery for transmittal at Clavecilla, Cagayan de
Oro branch. Such omission changed entirely the content of the letter causing the addressee to suffer
damages. CRS filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of action and
improper venue. City Judge Antillon denied the motion to dismiss for lack of merit. Hence, CRS filed a
petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction praying that City Judge Antillon be enjoined from
proceeding with the case because of improper venue. The lower court dismissed the case and held
that CRS may be sued either in Manila, where they hold their principal office, or in Cagayan de Oro
City, where the summons is served in their branch office. Upon appeal to the Supreme Court, CRS
contended that the suit should be filed in Manila where they hold their principal office.
Issue:
Whether or not the dismissal of the complaint was in accordance with the pertinent law and
jurisprudence on the matter
RULING:
YES
Proper venue -the RTC ruled that since the primary objective of petitioner was to recover real
property -- even though her Complaint was for specific performance and damages -- her action should
have been instituted in the trial court where the property was situated, in accordance with
Commodities Storage & Ice Plant Corp. v. Court of Appeals
In Commodities Storage, petitioner spouses obtained a loan secured by a mortgage over their land
and ice plant in Sta. Maria, Bulacan. Because they had failed to pay the loan, the mortgage was
foreclosed and the ice plant auctioned. Before the RTC of Manila, they sued the bank for damages and
for the fixing of the redemption period. Since the spouses ultimately sought redemption of the
mortgaged property, the action affected the mortgage debtors title to the foreclosed property; hence,
it was a real action. Where the action affects title to the property, it should be instituted in the trial
court where the property is situated.
Non-joinder of the parties
The RTC ruled that there was no allegation anywhere in the records that petitioner had been
authorized to represent Forro, Radan and Anave, who were real parties-in-interest with respect to their
respective shares of the 36.5 percent claim. The trial court never acquired jurisdiction over the
subject matter of their claims. Neither a misjoinder nor a non-joinder of parties is a ground for the
dismissal of an action. Parties may be dropped or added by order of the court, on motion of any party
or on the courts own initiative at any stage of the action. RTC ordered the joinder of such party, and
noncompliance with the said order would be ground for dismissal of the action.
Correct Docket Fees
The decision of the court in raising the issue on correct docket fees by respondent is based on the
landmark case of Sunlife Insurance Office, Ltd. v. Asuncion holds as follows: Where the filing of the
initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the court may allow payment of
the fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary
period..
Hence, the trial court and respondent used technicalities to avoid the resolution of the case and to
trifle with the law. True, Section 5, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court requires that the assessed value of
the real estate, subject of an action, should be considered in computing the filing fees. The Court has
already clarified that the Rule does not apply to an action for specific performance, which is classified
as an action not capable of pecuniary estimation.
27.
1. FELIPE G. UY, petitioner,
vs.
THE LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
G.R. No. 136100
July 24, 2000
FACTS:
Land Bank of the Philippines filed before the MTCC a complaint for unlawful detainer against
Felipe Uy. MTCC rendered a decision in favor of Uy. RTC affirmed the decision of the MTCC in toto. Land
Bank filed in the CA a motion for a 30-day extension to file a petition for review but CA granted 15
days only. Land Bank did not file its petition within the extension granted but filed the petition 15 days
beyond the extension. However, CA issued a resolution granting the manifestation and motion, and
admitting the petition and rendered a decision reversing the decision of the RTC. It held that Land
Bank had a superior right over the property since it was already issued a TCT in its name. The CA also
ruled that the RTC erred in declaring the mortgage void since the validity of the mortgage was not in
issue in the proceedings before the MTCC.
Land Bank filed a motion for partial reconsideration, asking that the CA award reasonable
rent in its favor. Uy likewise filed a motion for reconsideration. The CA denied both motions hence; Uy
filed in this Court a petition to review the decision of the CA. The Court denied the petition for (a) lack
of certification against forum shopping, and (b) lack of verification.
Petitioner filed a "Motion for Admission of Verification and Certification against Forum-
Shopping but the Court denied for lack of merit. Petitioner filed a "Motion for Leave to File and for
Admission of Second Motion for Reconsideration," reiterating its allegations in its motion for admission
of verification and certification against forum shopping. The Court granted the second motion for
reconsideration, reinstated the petition.
ISSUE: Whether the reinstatement of the petition is correct.
HELD:
YES, the reinstatement of the petition is correct.
The requirement regarding verification of a pleading is formal, not jurisdictional. Such
requirement is simply a condition affecting the form of pleading, the non-compliance of which does not
necessarily render the pleading fatally defective. Verification is simply intended to secure an
assurance that the allegations in the pleading are true and correct and not the product of the
imagination or a matter of speculation, and that the pleading is filed in good faith. The court may
order the correction of the pleading if verification is lacking or act on the pleading although it is not
verified, if the attending circumstances are such that strict compliance with the rules may be
dispensed with in order that the ends of justice may thereby be served.
The lack of certification against forum shopping, on the other hand, is generally not curable
by the submission thereof after the filing of the petition. Section 5, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
provides that the failure of petitioner to submit the required documents that should accompany the
petition, including the certification against forum shopping, shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal
thereof. The admission of the petition after the belated filing of the certification is not unprecedented.
There were cases where the Court excused non-compliance with the requirements since there were
special circumstances or compelling reasons making the strict application of the rule clearly
unjustified. In the case at bar, the apparent merits of the substantive aspects of the case should be
deemed as a "special circumstance" or "compelling reason" for the reinstatement of the petition.
In any event, this Court has the power to suspend its own rules when, as in this case, the
ends of justice would be served thereby.
2. DIGITAL MICROWAVE CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ASIAN HIGH TECHNOLOGY CORPORATION, respondents.
G.R. No. 128550
March 16, 2000
FACTS:
Private respondent Asian High Technology Corp. filed a complaint against petitioner Digital
Microwave Corp. for a sum of money and damages before the RTC. Petitioner moved for the dismissal
of the complaint. The trial court denied the motion and subsequent motion for reconsideration.
Petitioner then initiated a special civil action for certiorari before the CA, alleging grave abuse
of discretion on the part of the trial court. However, the CA dismissed the petition for failure to comply
with Revised Circular No. 28-91, as amended by Administrative Circular No. 04-94 requiring the
petition be accompanied by a sworn certification against forum shopping, signed by petitioner himself
but the Petitioner's certification was signed by counsel.
Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of the dismissal and submitted a sworn certification
against forum shopping duly signed by one of its senior officers. The CA denied the motion since
absent any compelling reason for petitioner's failure to comply, at first instance, with the rules, the
Court cannot therefore, accept its subsequent compliance.
Hence, this petition before the Court seeking reversal of the ruling of CA.
ISSUE: Whether or not a corporation must comply with the requirement under Revised Circular No.
28-91 that the certification against forum shopping be accomplished by petitioner himself.
HELD:
YES, a corporation must comply with the Revised Circular. The reason the certification against
forum shopping is required to be accomplished by petitioner himself is because only the petitioner
himself has actual knowledge of whether or not he has initiated similar actions or proceedings in
different courts or agencies. His counsel may be unaware of such fact.
The petitioners contention that a corporation cannot possibly hope to comply with the
requirement laid down by Revised Circular No. 28-91 because it is a juridical entity and not a natural
person is not tenable. Corporations have directors and officers to represent it in its transactions with
others as in this case for the certification against forum shopping. It could easily have been made by a
duly authorized director or officer of the corporation.
The petitioner only complied by having the certification signed by one of its officers after its
petition before the Court of Appeals had been dismissed. The petitioner has not adequately explained
its initial failure to have the certification signed by one of its officers. Neither has it shown any I have read the allegations contained therein and that the same are true and correct to the best of my
compelling reason for us to disregard strict compliance with the rules. As stated in Spouses Ortiz, own personal knowledge.
"Utter disregard of the rules cannot justly be rationalized by harking on the policy of liberal A reading of the above verification reveals nothing objectionable about it. The affiant confirmed that
construction." he had read the allegations in the petition which were true and correct based on his personal
knowledge. The addition of the words "to the best" before the phrase "of my personal knowledge" did
not violate the requirement under Section 4 of Rule 7, it being sufficient that the affiant declared that
the allegations in the petition are true and correct based on his personal knowledge.
3. G.R. No. 149121 April 20, 2010
4. G.R. No. 119879 March 11, 2004
National Housing Authority vs. Basa
Heirs of Juana Gaudiane vs. CA,et.al.
FACTS:
FACTS:
On April 19, 1983, spouses Augusto and Luz Basa loaned from NHA the amount
Felix and Juana Gaudiane are co-owners of a parcel of land. On November 4, 1927, Felix
of P556,827.10 secured by a real estate mortgage over their properties. For failure to pay despite
executed a document entitled Escritura de Compra-Venta (Escritura, for brevity) whereby he sold to
repeated demands, the NHA, filed for an extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage. After notice and
his sister Juana his one-half share in Lot No. 4156. The herein petitioners believe that the sale included
publication, the properties were sold at public auction where NHA emerged as the highest bidder.
not only Lot 4156 but also Lot 4389. In 1974, they filed a petition to cancel the OCT covering Lot 4389
Upon expiration of the redemption period, NHA executed an Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership
and issue a new title in their name. This was later withdrawn when the respondents opposed it on the
and filed for petition for the issuance of a Writ of Possession. The said petition was granted by the
ground that the Escritura is falsified. Thereafter, the petitioners filed an action for quieting of title but
Regional Trial Court, however, it remained unserved. This compelled NHA to move for the issuance of
the same was dismissed without prejudice. For the second time, the petitioners filed for an action for
an alias writ of possession. The respondents opposed this by filing a petition for intervention alleging
quieting of title but it was again dismissed. The respondents filed a case for partition of Lot 4389,
that the redemption period has not even began to run since there was no actual inscription on the
accounting of proceeds and damages against herein petitioners. The trial court rendered a decision in
certificate of title in the custody of the civil registrar as it was burned. The RTC granted the alias writ of
favor of the respondents for the reason that there was no actual sale and that the dismissal of
possession as well as the petition for intervention and also issued a writ of preliminary injunction. The
petitioners second case for quieting of title was due to failure to prosecute and for failure to comply
Court of Appeals rendered null and void the RTCs decision, but overturned such decision upon motion
with court orders, it had the effect of adjudication on the merits, pursuant to the Rules of Court.
for reconsideration. Undaunted, the herein petitioners filed for a petition for Certiorari under Rule 45 of
Consequently, petitioners claim of exclusive ownership over Lot 4389 was without merit because it
the Rules of Court. The respondents question NHAs alleged failure to include in its petition copies of
was barred by the order of dismissal. The CA affirmed the decision of the trial court. The petitioners
material portions of the record such as pleadings filed in the RTC and the Court of Appeals as required
raised as an error that the dismissal of the second case for quieting of title did not bar them from
under Section 4, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Respondents also pointed out the purported defective
interposing it as a defense in the present case. They argue that res judicata does not apply in the case
verification of NHA in view of the fact that it merely stated that the one verifying had read the
at bar for the reason that a petition to quiet title has a cause of action different from a petition for
allegations of the petition and that the same were true and correct to the best of his knowledge.
partition.
According to respondents, such declarations were not in accordance with the rules which require that
ISSUE: WON res judicata will apply in the instant case.
a verified pleading must state that the affiant had read the pleading and that the allegations therein
HELD:
were true and correct based on his personal knowledge and not only to the "best" of his knowledge.
Yes. The Court ruled in Medija vs. Patcho, et al. that a case for partition and an action for
ISSUES:
quieting of title have identical causes of action and can therefore be the subject of res j udicata. The
1. WON the instant petition is dismissible on the ground that the NHA failed to attach the
action for quieting of title filed by the petitioners is for the purpose of claiming sole ownership over the
pleadings filed in the RTC and the Court of Appeals as required under Section 4, Rule 45 of the Rules of
land. On the other hand, in the case for partition filed the respondents, the petitioners also set up as a
Court is fatal in the instant petition.
defense of exclusive ownership in order to curtail the equal division of the property. . Considering the
2. WON the verification made by NHA is in accordance with the rules.
similarity of petitioners defense in this case with their main averment in the case for quieting of title,
HELD:
petitioners are barred by res judicata from claiming sole ownership of Lot 4389.
1. No. As held by this Court in Air Philippines Corporation v. Zamora:
Even if a document is relevant and pertinent to the petition, it need not be appended if it is
5. Phil. Pharmawealth, Inc. v. Pfizer, Inc. & Pfizer (Phil.), Inc.
shown that the contents thereof can also [be] found in another document already attached to the
G.R. No. 167715, 17
petition. Thus, if the material allegations in a position paper are summarized in a questioned
November 2010
judgment, it will suffice that only a certified true copy of the judgment is attached. Third, a petition
lacking an essential pleading or part of the case record may still be given due course or reinstated (if
Facts:
earlier dismissed) upon showing that petitioner later submitted the documents required, or that it will
serve the higher interest of justice that the case be decided on the merits. Nevertheless, even if the
Pfizer is the registered owner of a patent, Sulbactam Ampicillin, marketed under the brand name
pleadings and other supporting documents were not attached to the petition, the dismissal is
Unasyn. Sometime in January and February 2003, Pfizer discovered that Pharmawealth submitted
unwarranted because the CA records containing the promissory notes and the real estate and chattel
bids for the supply of Sulbactam Ampicillin to several hospitals without the Pfizers consent. Pfizer
mortgages were elevated to this Court. Without a doubt, we have sufficient basis to actually and
then demanded that the hospitals cease and desist from accepting such bids. Pfizer also demanded
completely dispose of the case.
that Pharmawealth immediately withdraw its bids to supply Sulbactam Ampicillin. Pharmawealth and
Cases should be determined based on the merits rather than on the procedural flaws. Rules
the hospitals ignored the demands.
of procedure are mere tools designed to expedite the decision or resolution of cases and other matters
pending in court. A strict and rigid application of rules, resulting in technicalities that tend to frustrate
Pfizer then filed a complaint for patent infringement with a prayer for permanent injunction and
rather than promote substantial justice, must be avoided. In fact, Section 6 of Rule 1 states that the
forfeiture of the infringing products. A preliminary injunction effective for 90 days was granted by the
Rules shall be liberally construed in order to promote their objective of ensuring the just, speedy and
IPOs Bureau of Legal Affairs (IPO-BLA). Upon expiration, a motion for extension filed by Pfizer was
inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding.
denied. Pfizer filed a Special Civil Action for Certiorari in the Court of Appeals (CA) assailing the denial.
2. Yes. The verification of the General Manager of the NHA states:
While the case was pending in the CA, Pfizer filed with the Regional Trial Court of Makati (RTC) a
complaint for infringement and unfair competition, with a prayer for injunction. The RTC issued a
temporary restraining order, and then a preliminary injunction.
Pharmawealth filed a motion to dismiss the case in the CA, on the ground of forum shopping.
Nevertheless, the CA issued a temporary restraining order. Pharmawealth again filed a motion to
dismiss, alleging that the patent, the main basis of the case, had already lapsed, thus making the case
moot, and that the CA had no jurisdiction to review the order of the IPO-BLA because this was granted
to the Director General. The CA denied all the motions hence this petition for review on Certiorari.
Issues: Whether or not there forum shopping when a party files two actions with two seemingly
different causes of action and yet pray for the same relief?
Held:
Yes. Forum shopping is defined as the act of a party against whom an adverse judgment has been
rendered in one forum, of seeking another (and possibly favorable) opinion in another forum (other
than by appeal or the special civil action of certiorari), or the institution of two (2) or more actions or
proceedings grounded on the same cause on the supposition that one or the other court would make a
favorable disposition.
The elements of forum shopping are: (a) identity of parties, or at least such parties that represent the
same interests in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the reliefs being
founded on the same facts; (c) identity of the two preceding particulars, such that any judgment
rendered in the other action will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the
action under consideration. This instance meets these elements.
The parties are clearly identical. In both the complaints in the BLA-IPO and RTC, the rights allegedly
violated and the acts allegedly violative of such rights are identical, regardless of whether the patents
on which the complaints were based are different. In both cases, the ultimate objective of Pfizer was to
ask for damages and to permanently prevent Pharmawealth from selling the contested products.
Relevantly, the Supreme Court has decided that the filing of two actions with the same objective, as in
this instance, constitutes forum shopping.
Owing to the substantial identity of parties, reliefs and issues in the IPO and RTC cases, a decision in
one case will necessarily amount to res judicata in the other action.
6. Attys. VILMA HILDA D. VILLANUEVA-FABELLA and WILMAR T. ARUGAY vs.
Judge RALPH S. LEE and Sheriff JUSTINIANO C. DE LA CRUZ JR
A.M. No. MTJ-04-1518
January 15, 2004
FACTS
In an administrative Complaint, Attys. Vilma Hilda D. Villanueva-Fabella and Wilmar T. Arugay
charged Judge Ralph S. Lee of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Quezon City (Branch 38) with
manifest partiality, incompetence and gross ignorance of the law; and Sheriff Justiniano C. de la Cruz
Jr. of the same MeTC, with unjust, oppressive, irregular and excessive enforcement of a writ of
attachment.
The complainants are counsels for the defendants in a case for Sum of Money with Prayer for
Preliminary Attachment. A printing machine was levied and delivered to the plaintiffs warehouse,
although there was an offer to pay the amount fixed in the order of attachment. The complainants
claimed that Sheriff dela Cruz violated Rule 57, Section 7, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which
provided that in the attachment of personal property capable of manual delivery, the property should
be taken and safely kept in the sheriffs custody. The machinery, according to complainants, was
brought to the plaintiffs warehouse in San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City. The foregoing showed
that the implementation of the writ of attachment was marred by excessiveness, irregularity and
oppressiveness.
An Urgent Motion to discharge Attachment was granted by Judge Lee. An Urgent Ex-Parte
Motion to Withdraw Cash Deposit was filed and granted by the same Judge. A Motion for
reconsideration was filed. Defendants stressed that the Motion to Withdraw Cash Deposit has no basis,
shows no urgency, lacks notice and hearing, and is already a prejudgment of the case even before the
pre-trial stage which is tantamount to the taking of property without due process of law.
For failure of the plaintiff to appear at the pre-trial conference, the court granted the motion
to declare the plaintiff as non-suited and to allow ex-parte presentation of the defenses evidence on
its counterclaim. The plaintiff then filed a Verified Motion for Reconsideration of the Order declaring it
as non-suited. The hearing on the motion did not materialize because the Clerk of Court refused to
proceed for the reason that a motion for reconsideration had been filed the day before and she did not
notice that Judge Lee had already issued the order granting such motion.
According to complainants, the Clerk of Court could not explain the irregularity in the
granting of the plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration and the fact that the same was swiftly resolved,
while the defendants similar motion had not been resolved for more than two (2) months already.
According to the OCA, it is not required that the adverse party be first notified and heard
bfore an attachment bond may be released. The better practice was for the latter to be notified and
heard before the motion to discharge attachment could be resolved. And this error was corrected
when the Judge reversed himself before the adverse party incurred any damage and that it had not
been clearly and convincingly shown that the erroneous act as committed with fraud, dishonesty,
corruption, malice or bad faith.
The OCA found that respondent sheriff had erred when he deposited the plaintiffs levied
property in the warehouse and thereby lost actual or constructive possession thereof. The OCA said
that this legal violation could not be justified by the weight and the condition of the machine, which
could have been deposited in a rented private warehouse where it could have been guarded under his
strict supervision.
The OCA recommended that respondent judge be REMINDED to be more circumspect in the
performance of his duties and to keep abreast with the law and jurisprudence; and that respondent
sheriff be SUSPENDED for one (1) month without pay.
ISSUE
1. Whether or not Judge Lee committed manifest impartiality, incompetence and gross
ignorance of the law.
2. Whether or not Sheriff dela Cruz should be held administratively liable for unjust, oppressive,
irregular and excessive enforcement of a writ of attachment.
HELD
1. No.
With respect to the charges against respondent judge, we find that his grant of the
withdrawal of the cash deposit -- an Order he later reversed by ruling that the deposit be
returned to the clerk of court -- was a mere error of judgment, not an act revealing
gross ignorance of the law or procedure.
Respondent judge had ordered the withdrawal of the cash deposit of the defendant and
released it in favor of the plaintiff, even before judgment was rendered. This action was
clearly in violation of the Rules mandating that after the discharge of an attachment, the
money deposited shall stand in place of the property released. However, the inadvertence of
respondent judge was not gross enough to merit sanction.
The Rules mandate that, except for motions that the court may act upon without prejudicing
the rights of the adverse party, every written motion shall be set for hearing by the applicant.
The notice of hearing shall be addressed to the defendants therein and shall specify the time
and date of the hearing, which must not be later than ten (10) days after the filing of the
motion. The motion and notice shall be served at least three days before the date of hearing.
Without proof of its service, the court cannot act upon it.
The plaintiffs Motion to withdraw the cash deposit lacked notice of hearing and proof of
service. Respondent judge should not have acted upon it. However, because he had
erroneously thought that the rights of the defendants would not be prejudiced thereby, he
 took action. His poor judgment obviously resulted in his issuance of the erroneous Order that
granted the release of the deposit.
The verified Motion for Reconsideration of the Order declaring plaintiff as non-suited and
allowing the ex-parte presentation of evidence by the defense should have been heard in
open court, not granted in chamber.
The verification in their Complaint, albeit handwritten after the jurat, is sufficient in form and
substance. Such verification is a clear affirmation that they are prepared to establish the
truth of the facts pleaded. In fact, the lack of it is merely a formal defect that is neither
jurisdictional nor fatal. This Court may order the correction of a pleading, if the attending
circumstances are such that strict compliance with the rule may be dispensed with in order
to serve the ends of justice.
2. Yes. Sheriff de la Cruz blatantly violated Section 7(b) of Rule 57 of the Rules of Court when he
deposited the machine in the warehouse of the plaintiff. In enforcing a writ of attachment, a
sheriff who takes personal property capable of manual delivery shall safely keep it in custody
after issuing the corresponding receipt therefor. Respondent sheriff failed to do so.
Applying the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, we find respondent
sheriff guilty of simple neglect of duty for violating Section 7(b) of Rule 57 of the Rules of
Court.
The Court reiterates its REMINDER to Judge Ralph S. Lee of the Metropolitan Trial
Court of Quezon City (Branch 38) to evince due care in the exercise of his
adjudicative functions, and Sheriff de la Cruz GUILTY of simple neglect of duty and
is hereby suspended for one month and one day without pay, with a warning that a
repetition of the same or of a similar act in the future shall be dealt with more
severely.
7. SHIPSIDE INCORPORATED vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.,
G. R. No. 143377 dated February 20, 2001
Facts:
This is a Petition for Certiorari filed by Shipside Incorporated under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules on
Civil Procedure against the resolutions of the Court of Appeals which respectively, dismissed a petition
for certiorari and prohibition and thereafter, denied a motion for reconsideration.
Rafael Gualvez is an owner of four (4) parcels of land situated in Barrio Poro, Municipality of San
Fernando, Province of La Union, evidenced by an Original Certificate of Title No. 0-381. The said
parcels of land are Lot 1 with an area of 6,571 square meters, Lot 2, with an area of 16,777 square
meters, Lot 3, with an area of 1,583 square meters and Lot 4, with an area of 508 square meters. Lot
Nos. 1 and 4 were conveyed by Rafael Galvez in favor of Filipina Mamaril, Cleopatra Llana, Regina
Bustos and Erlinda Balatbat in a Deed of Sale and thereafter, a Transfer Certificate No. T-4304 was
issued in favor of the buyers covering the said lots.
Sometime in August 16, 1960, Mamaril, et al., sold the said lots (Lots 1 and 4) to Lepanto
Consolidated Mining Company. Also, a Transfer Certificate No. T-4314 was issued in the name of the
said company as owner thereof. Again, on October 28, 1963, the said Lots were sold to the herein
Petitioner by Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company. Thereafter, a Transfer of Certificate of Title No. T-
5710 was issued in favor of the herein Petitioner which starting then exercised proprietary rights over
the said lands.
However, unknown to the said company, the Court of First Instance of La Union issued an Order
in Land Registration Case involving Rafael Galvez as applicant therein, declaring OCT No. 0-381 as null
and void, and ordered the cancellation thereof. Rafael Galvez filed its motion for reconsideration,
however, said motion was denied. Also, the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the Republic of the
Philippines. Thereafter, the CA issued an Entry of Judgment certifying that the said Decision became
final and executory on October 23, 1973. Thus, the trial court issued a writ of execution of the
judgment which was served on the Register of Deeds, San Fernando, La Union on April 29, 1974.
After the lapse of 24 years, the Office of the Solicitor General received a letter from Mr. Victor G.
Floresca, Vice-President, John Hay Poro Point Development Corporation informing the former that the
said orders and decision of the trial court have not been executed by the said Register of Deeds
despite receipt of the writ of execution. Hence, the filing of a Complaint for revival of judgment and
cancellation of titles before the Regional Trial Court, Br. 26, San Fernando, La Union against the heirs of
Rafael Galvez as well as the Petitioner and the Register of Deeds of La Union.
The Solicitor General contends that successors-in-interest of Rafael Galvez have no valid title
over the property since the Court of Appeals had ruled and declared said title as null and void, thus,
subsequent Torrens title in their names should be cancelled. However, Petitioner filed its Motion to
Dismiss on the ground that the complaint stated no cause of action because only final and executory
judgments may be the subject of an action for revival of judgment. Moreover, the Plaintiff therein is
not the real party-in-interest because the real property was allegedly part of Camp Wallace. It was
under the ownership and administration of the Bases Conversion Development Authority (BCDA)
pursuant to R.A. No. 7227. In addition, Petitioner claims that Plaintiffs cause of action is barred by
prescription. Lastly, Petitioner further contends that it was already 25 years have lapsed since the
issuance of the writ of execution and no action for revival of judgment may be instituted because
under Paragraph 3 of Article 1144 of the Civil Code, such action may be brought only within ten (10)
years from the time the judgment had been rendered. An opposition to these contentions was filed by
the Solicitor General on the ground that the real party-in-interest is the Republic and prescription does
not run against the State. The trial court denied Petitioners motion to dismiss as well as its motion for
reconsideration. Hence, Petitioner instituted a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals on the
ground that the trial court acted in excess of jurisdiction in denying the said motion to dismiss and
subsequent motion for reconsideration. The CA dismissed the petition on the ground that the
verification and certification in the petition was made without authority, there being no proof that
Balbin was authorized to institute the petition for and in behalf of petitioner. Also, Petitioners motion
for reconsideration was denied by the CA. Hence, the filing of this instant petition before the Supreme
Court.
ISSUES:
1) WON an authorization from petitioners Board of Directors is still required in order for its
resident manager to institute or commence a legal action for and in behalf of the corporation
2) WON the Republic of the Philippines can maintain an action for the revival of judgment herein
3) WON the Republic of the Philippines is the real party-in-interest
HELD:
1. No. The Supreme Court has consistently held that the requirement regarding verification of a
pleading is formal, not jurisdictional (Uy vs. LandBank, G.R. No. 136100, July 24, 2000). Such
requirement is simply a condition affecting the form of the pleading, non-compliance with which does
not necessarily render the pleading fatally defective. Verification is simply intended to secure an
assurance that the allegations in the pleading are true and correct and not the product of the
imagination or a matter of speculation, and that the pleading is filed in good faith. The court may
order the correction of the pleading if verification is lacking or act on the pleading although it is not
verified, if the attending circumstances are such that strict compliance with the rules may be
dispensed with in order that the ends of justice may thereby be served. It is a well-settled rule that in
certain exceptional circumstances, however, the Supreme Court has allowed the belated filing of the
certification. There were special circumstances or compelling reasons that justified the relaxation of
the rule requiring verification and certification on non-forum shopping. In the instant case, the merits
of petitioners case should be considered special circumstances or compelling reasons that justify
tempering the requirement in regard to the certificate of non-forum shopping. Moreover, in certain
cases decided by the Supreme Court such as Loyola v. CA, et al., Roadway Express Inc., vs. CA, et al.,
and Uy v. LandBank, the Court excused non-compliance with the requirement as to the certificate of
non-forum shopping. With more reason should we allow the instant petition since petitioner herein did
submit a certification on non-forum shopping, failing only to show proof that the signatory was
authorized to do so. That petitioner subsequently submitted a secretarys certificate attesting that
Balbin was authorized to file an action on behalf of petitioner likewise mitigates this oversight.
Furthermore, It must also be kept in mind that while the requirement of the certificate of non-forum
shopping is mandatory, nonetheless the requirements must not be interpreted too literally and thus
 defeat the objective of preventing the undesirable practice of forum-shopping (Bernardo v. NLRC, 255
SCRA 108 [1996]). Lastly, technical rules of procedure should be used to promote, not frustrate
justice. While the swift unclogging of court dockets is a laudable objective, the granting of substantial
justice is an even more urgent ideal.
2. No. The action instituted by the Solicitor General in the trial court is one for revival of judgment which
is governed by Article 1144(3) of the Civil Code and Section 6, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules on Civil
Procedure. Article 1144(3) provides that an action upon a judgment must be brought within 10 years
from the time the right of action accrues." On the other hand, Section 6, Rule 39 provides that a final
and executory judgment or order may be executed on motion within five (5) years from the date of its
entry, but that after the lapse of such time, and before it is barred by the statute of limitations, a
judgment may be enforced by action. Taking these two provisions into consideration, it is plain that an
action for revival of judgment must be brought within ten years from the time said judgment becomes
final. From the records of this case, it is clear that the judgment sought to be revived became final on
October 23, 1973. On the other hand, the action for revival of judgment was instituted only in 1999, or
more than twenty-five (25) years after the judgment had become final. Hence, the action is barred by
extinctive prescription considering that such an action can be instituted only within ten (10) years
from the time the cause of action accrues. However, the Solicitor General, nonetheless, argues that
the States cause of action in the cancellation of the land title issued to petitioner s predecessor-in-
interest is imprescriptible because it is included in Camp Wallace, which belongs to the government.
The Supreme Court ruled that this kind of argument is misleading. While it is true that prescription
does not run against the State, the same may not be invoked by the government in this case since it
is no longer interested in the subject matter.
3. No. While Camp Wallace may have belonged to the government at the time Rafael Galvezs title was
ordered cancelled in Land Registration Case No. N-361, the same no longer holds true today.
Moreover, with the transfer of Camp Wallace to the BCDA, the government no longer has a right or
interest to protect. Consequently, Republic is not a real party-in-interest and it may not institute the
instant action. Nor may it raise the defense of imprescriptibility, the same being applicable only in
cases where the government is a party in interest. Under Section 2 of Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest. To
qualify a person to be a real party in interest in whose name an action must be prosecuted, he must
appear to be the present real owner of the right sought to enforced (Pioneer Insurance v. CA, 175
SCRA 668 [1989]). A real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the
judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. And by real interest is meant a
present substantial interest, as distinguished from a mere expectancy, or a future, contingent,
subordinate or consequential interest (Ibonilla v. Province of Cebu, 210 SCRA 526 [1992]). Being the
owner of the areas covered by Camp Wallace, it is the Bases Conversion and Development Authority,
not the Government, which stands to be benefited if the land covered by TCT No. T-5710 issued in the
name of petitioner is cancelled. Furthermore, to recognize the Government as a proper party to sue in
this case would set a bad precedent as it would allow the Republic to prosecute, on behalf of
government-owned or controlled corporations, causes of action which have already prescribed, on the
pretext that the Government is the real party-in-interest against whom prescription does not run, said
corporations having been created merely as agents for the realization of government programs. In
addition, the Petitioner is unquestionably a buyer in good faith and for value, having acquired the
property in 1963, or 5years after the issuance of the original certificate of title, as a third transferee.
Lastly, since the portion in dispute now forms part of the property owned and administered by the
Bases Conversion and Development Authority, it is alienable and registerable real property.
8. TERESITA C. GERALES, CESAR DELA FUENTE, MARCELA GOLDING, MARIA VERGARA and
PERLITO TRIGERO
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ENRIQUE E. PIMENTEL and LETICIA FIDELDIA
G.R. No. 85909 February 9, 1993
Facts: A car owned by Fideldia, then driven by Pimentel, hit another car, owned by Teresita Gerales.
The crime of Damage to Property with Multiple Physical Injuries thru Reckless Imprudence was filed
against Pimentel. During the pendency of the criminal case, a civil case for Damages was filed by
petitioners. However, before the service of summons on Fideldia and Pimentel, the claims of
petitioners were amicably settled and they executed and signed Releases of Claim.
After the dismissal of the criminal charge, Pimentel and Fideldia were served with summons
and a copy of the complaint of the civil case. Pimentel wrote a letter addressed to the Clerk of Court of
RTC requesting that the settlement of criminal case based on the Releases of Clams be considered.
On motion of petitioners, the RTC issued an order declaring Pimentel and Fideldia in default.
Consequently, judgment was rendered in favor of petitioners.
Respondents filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals contending that the
Trial Court committed grave abuse of discretion in not considering their letter as their responsive
pleading and in consequently declaring them in default. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of
the RTC and ruled that the letter, which Pimentel sent to the Trial Court, can be considered as their
answer. Thus, they should not be held in default. Petitioners argue that in dismissing the civil case on
the sole basis of the "releases of claims," the CA had denied them procedural due process as they
were not afforded the opportunity to refute, assail, and overcome their probative value.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondent Court of Appeals committed reversible error in deciding
private respondents' petition on the merits, thereby reversing the decision of the trial
court and disregarding petitioners' evidence
Held: No. The rule is that pleadings should be liberally construed in order that the litigant may have
ample opportunity to prove their respective claims, and possible denial of substantial justice, due to
technicalities, may be avoided. Under the factual setting of the case, the Trial Court ought to have
considered the letter as a responsive pleading even if it lacks the formalities required by law. It should
have granted the petition for relief from judgment as it would ultimately afford both parties the
opportunity to prove their respective claims by fully and fairly laying before the Court, the facts in
issue and seek justice upon the merits thereof and that possible denial of justice due to legal
technicalities may be avoided.
With regard to the petitioners claim of denial of due process, the rule is that a notarized
instrument is admissible in evidence without further proof of its due execution and is conclusive as to
the truthfulness of its contents, although not absolute but rebuttable by clear and convincing evidence
to the contrary. In the case at bar, the Releases of Claims were duly notarized. Thus, petitioners
cannot now question the validity of the releases of claims considering that they caused the criminal
charge against Pimentel to be dismissed.
Thus, the petition is dismissed by the Supreme Court and the decision of the Court of Appeals
dismissing the complaint for damages against private respondents is affirmed.
9. FRANCISCO S. TANTUICO, JR vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 89114 December 2, 1991
Facts:
Petitioner Francisco S. Tantuico, Jr. was included as defendant in Civil Case No. 0035 in the
Sandiganbayan entitled "Republic of the Philippines vs. Benjamin Romualdez, et al." for reconveyance,
reversion, accounting, restitution and damages on the theory that: (1) he acted in unlawful concert
with the principal defendants, Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos, Benjamin Romualdez and
Juliette Gomez Romualdez, in the misappropriation and theft of public funds, plunder of the nation's
wealth, extortion, blackmail, bribery, embezzlement and other acts of corruption, betrayal of public
trust and brazen abuse of power; (2) he acted as dummy, nominee or agent, by allowing himself to be
incorporator, director, board member and/or stockholder of corporations beneficially held and/or
controlled by the principal defendants; (3) he acted singly or collectively, and/or in unlawful concert
with one another, in flagrant breach of public trust and of their fiduciary obligations as public
officers; (4) he taking undue advantage of his position as Chairman of the COA and with grave failure
to perform his constitutional duties as such Chairman, acting in concert with defendants facilitated
and made possible the withdrawals, disbursements and questionable use of government funds; and
(5) he acted as dummy, nominee and/or agent by allowing himself to be used as instrument in
accumulating ill-gotten wealth in order to conceal and prevent recovery of assets illegally obtained.
On April 11, 1988, after his motion for production and inspection of documents was denied
by respondent court in its resolution dated March 8, 1988, petitioner filed a Motion for a Bill of
Particulars, alleging inter alia that he is sued for acts allegedly committed by him as (a) a public
officer-Chairman of the Commission on Audit, (b) as a private individual, and (c) in both capacities, in a
complaint couched in too general terms and shorn of particulars that would inform him of the factual
and legal basis thereof, and that to enable him to understand and know with certainty the particular
acts allegedly committed by him and which he is now charged with culpability, it is necessary that
plaintiff furnish him the particulars sought therein.
In his petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction and/or restraining order, the petitioner seeks to annul and set aside the
resolution of the Sandiganbayan, dated April 21, 1989, denying his motion for a bill of particulars as
well as its resolution, dated May 29, 1989, which denied his motion for reconsideration; to compel the
respondent PCGG to prepare and file a bill of particulars, or that said respondent be ordered to exclude
petitioner as defendant in Civil Case No. 0035 should they fail to submit the said bill of particulars; and
to enjoin the respondent Sandiganbayan from further proceeding against petitioner until the bill of
particulars is submitted, claiming that the respondent Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in promulgating the aforesaid resolutions and that there is
no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy for him in the ordinary course of law other
than the present petition. As prayed for, this Court issued on August 1, 1989 a temporary restraining
order "effective immediately and continuing until further orders from this Court, ordering the
respondent Sandiganbayan to cease and desist from further proceeding in Civil Case No. 0035
pending before it.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the
disputed resolutions, denying the petitioner for his motion for a bill of particulars
HELD:
Yes. The complaint does not contain any allegation as to how petitioner became, or why he is
perceived to be, a dummy, nominee or agent. There is no averment in the complaint how petitioner
allowed himself to be used as instrument in the accumulation of ill-gotten wealth, what the
concessions, orders and/or policies prejudicial to plaintiff are, why they are prejudicial, and what
petitioner had to do with the granting, issuance, and or formulation of such concessions, orders,
and/or policies. Moreover, the complaint does not state which corporations petitioner is supposed to
be a stockholder, director, member, dummy, nominee and/or agent. More significantly, the petitioner's
name does not even appear in annex of the complaint, which is a listing of the alleged "Positions and
Participations of Some Defendants". The allegations in the complaint, above-referred to, pertaining to
petitioner are, therefore, deficient in that they merely articulate conclusions of law and presumptions
unsupported by factual premises. Hence, without the particulars prayed for in petitioner's motion for a
bill of particulars, it can be said the petitioner can not intelligently prepare his responsive pleading and
for trial.
Furthermore, the particulars prayed for such as names of persons, names of corporations,
dates, amounts involved, a specification of property for identification purposes, the particular
transactions involving withdrawals and disbursements, and a statement of other material facts as
would support the conclusions and inferences in the complaint, are not evidentiary in nature. On the
contrary, those particulars are material facts that should be clearly and definitely averred in the
complaint in order that the defendant may, in fairness, be informed of the claims made against him to
the end that he may be prepared to meet the issues at the trial.
The Supreme Court ruled that respondent Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in promulgating the questioned resolutions. The
petition is granted and the resolutions in question are annulled and set aside. The respondents are
ordered to prepare and file a Bill of Particulars containing the facts prayed for by petitioner, or
otherwise, respondent Sandiganbayan is ordered to exclude the herein petitioner as defendant in the
above-mentioned civil case.
10. METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST COMPANY vs. QUILTS & ALL, INC.
G.R. No. 91436 May 24, 1993
Facts:
On April 7, 1987, Relita P. de los Santos then Corporate Secretary issued a Secretary's
Certificate which certified that in a special meeting of the Board of Directors of Quilts and All, Inc. its
President, Mr. Senen B. Dizon was authorized and empowered to mortgage in favor of Metrobank, a
property belonging to Quilts.
More than a year later, Metrobank received a letter from Quilt's counsel offering for the
cancellation of the mortgage on the property owned by Quilts, allegedly, that Mr. & Mrs. Senen Dizon
had left the Philippines, leaving several creditors. Metrobank refused the offer since the amount
offered did not approximate the appraised value of the mortgaged property. Quilt's new counsel wrote
Metrobank reiterating the mortgage cancellation. In addition, counsel claimed that the alleged special
meeting could not have taken place for lack of the requisite number of directors present to constitute
a quorum since the Chairman and 2 other members of the Board of Directors were aboard on that
date. Quilts filed a complaint against Metrobank, Dizon and de los Santos for annulment and
cancellation of mortgage. Metrobank moved to dismiss the complaint based on 1) lack of jurisdiction
and 2) failure to state a cause of action.
Issue: Whether or not the respondent court has jurisdiction over the case
Held:
The Court of Appeals held that judgment is hereby rendered giving due course to the petition
and declaring that the honorable respondent court is without jurisdiction to pass upon the issue
against defendants Senen B. Dizon and Relita P. de los Santos and the authority of Senen B. Dizon to
enter into a mortgage contract as this falls within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the
Securities and Exchange Commission, and ordering the suspension of further proceedings until said
issue shall have been resolved by the Securities and Exchange Commission. On the other hand,
Metrobank cannot be faulted for relying on the Secretary's Certificate. It is in good faith and unaware
of any flaw and on the presumption that the ordinary course of business had been followed and that
the Corporate Secretary had regularly performed her duties.
The Court of Appeals upheld the jurisdiction of the lower Court only with respect to
Metrobank. It dismissed the case against Dizon and de los Santos, since either this two persons had
committed ultra vires acts or the acts fall outside the powers that are specifically listed in a corporate
charter or state law is an intra-corporate matter which falls within the original and exclusive
jurisdiction of the Securities and Exchange Commission pursuant to section 5 of Presidential Decree
902-A, as amended. Pending the outcome of the case that would be filed in the Securities and
Exchange Commission, however, the Court of Appeals directed the suspension of the proceedings
against Metrobank.
11. GR 102603 SPS DONATO vs. CA AND HEIRS OF ROSARIO FONTANILLA
FACTS:
The land in dispute is Lot 5145, CAD, 325-D of the Alaminos Cadastre, located at Brgy. Inerangan,
Alaminos, Pangasinan. The said land is an unregistered riceland with an area of 4,280 square meters
and used to be owned by Rosario Fontanilla, deceased mother of the plaintiffs, as her paraphernal
property. Said Rosario Fontanilla died in 1971 in Davao City and is survived by her five (5) children to
wit: Rodolfo, Plotarco, Ernesto, Edgardo, and Lolita, all surnamed Rarang as her heirs. All of the said
children were born in Inerangan, Alaminos, Pangasinan. However, between 1957 and 1967, Rosario
Fontanilla and her children migrated separately to Davao City.
Sometime in 1982, Sps. Villamor and Luzonia Donato (defendants) purchased the land, denominated
as Lot No. 5303, CAD, 325-D of Alaminos Cadastre, from the Rural Bank of Urbiztondo, Inc. after the
said bank foreclosed the mortgage constituted thereon by one Carolina Abrigo. Believing that the land
which they purchased from the Rural Bank of Urbiztondo is Lot 5145, CAD, 325-D of Alaminos
Cadastre, defendants occupied the said land in 1982 and are still in possession of the same up to this
date.
In the complaint, private respondents (Fontanillas) claim ownership over the parcel of land in dispute
allegedly inherited by them from their late mother, Rosario. They contend that petitioners herein own
a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 5535 and denominated as Lot No. 5303,
CAD, 325-D, as appearing in the Registry of Deeds of Pangasinan, which is not the same nor is it
identical with the land in dispute.
In their answer, however, petitioners maintain that Lot No. 5303 was originally applied for titling by
one Carolina Abrigo on the strength of a Deed of Sale executed by Jose Ochave as her vendor.
According to the petitioners, Jose Ochave's ownership over the same parcel finds support in the Deed
of Sale executed by Basilio Rarang, who allegedly derives his authority as Rosario's agent from a
Special Power of Attorney duly executed in his favor.
During the trial on the merits, private respondents, through Rodolfo Rarang who is the lone witness,
disputed the validity of the Special Power of Attorney. The rest of their evidence consisted of
documents.
Petitioners countered and presented the Notary Public who notarized the Deed of Sale between Basilio
Rarang and Jose Ochave. Among the documents presented by the petitioners were the controverted
Deed of Sale and the Special Power of Attorney said to have been executed by Rosario Fontanilla-
Rarang in favor of Basilio Rarang.
The trial court ruled in favor of the private respondents (Heirs of Rosario) for finding the petitioners
(Donatos) claim of ownership, devoid of merit and that the Court is not convinced as to the validity of
the sale of the land in question in 1967 by Basilio Rarang in favor of Jose Ochave. Article 1874 of the
Civil Code provides that:
When a sale of a piece of land or any interest therein is through an agent,
the authority of the latter shall be in writing; otherwise, the sale shall be
void.
The trial court held that the Power of Attorney is not a sufficient authority. The person who appeared,
signed, and acknowledged the said Power of Attorney before the notary public was Basilio Rarang (the
agent) and not Rosario Rarang (the principal) and was not also signed by the supposed notary public
Anastacio D. Deluao of Davao City.
This decision was affirmed by the Respondent Court of Appeals.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Special Power of Attorney is null and void
HELD:
Yes. The court finds no cogent reason to fault the findings of the trial court that the Special Power of
Attorney is null and void. This being the case, all subsequent transactions involving Lot 5145 and
springing from the Special Power of Attorney are also null and void. Consequently, on this alone,
petitioner's claim of ownership should be rejected outright.
The Supreme Court hold that the appellate court did not commit a mistake.
While it is true that Section 8, Rule 8 of the Revised Rules of Court provides for the rule on implied
admission of the genuineness and due execution of a document subject of an action or defense, the
same is not without exception. One such exception is when the adverse party does not appear to be a
party to the instrument. 5 Private respondents Lolita and Ernesto were mere witnesses to the Special
Power of Attorney in question and as such, they cannot be considered as parties to the instrument.
Moreover, the same document should not be afforded a presumption of genuineness and due
execution. In view of the various discrepancies found by the trial court, 6 it lacks the veracity to entitle
it to any degree of credibility.
Finding no truth to the petitioners' claim of validity of the instrument from which their title emanates
and their argument of title by prescription, the court considers it unnecessary to discuss at length or
to determine the other issues presented, they being immaterial to the resolution of this appeal.
For reasons indicated, the petition for review is hereby DISMISSED. The decision of the respondent
Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. With costs.
12. G.R. No. 87434 August 5, 1992
PHILIPPINE AMERICAN GENERAL INSURANCE CO., INC. and TAGUM PLASTICS, INC., vs.
SWEET LINES, INC., DAVAO VETERANS ARRASTRE AND PORT SERVICES, INC. and HON.
COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS:
A maritime suit 1 was commenced on May 12, 1978 by herein Petitioner Philippine American General
Insurance Co., Inc. (Philamgen) and Tagum Plastics, Inc. (TPI) against private respondents Sweet Lines,
Inc. (SLI) and Davao Veterans Arrastre and Port Services, Inc. (DVAPSI), along with S.C.I. Line (The
Shipping Corporation of India Limited) and F.E. Zuellig, Inc., as co-defendants in the court a quo,
seeking recovery of the cost of lost or damaged shipment plus exemplary damages, attorney's fees
and costs allegedly due to defendants' negligence.
In or about March 1977, a vessel belonging to or operated by the foreign common carrier, took on
board at Baton Rouge, LA, two (2) consignments of cargoes for shipment to Manila and later for
transhipment to Davao City, consisting of 600 bags Low Density Polyethylene 631 and another 6,400
bags Low Density Polyethylene 647, both consigned to the order of Far East Bank and Trust Company
of Manila, with arrival notice to Tagum Plastics, Inc., Madaum, Tagum, Davao City. Said cargoes were
covered, respectively, by Bills of Lading Nos. 6 and 7 issued by the foreign common carrier (Exhs. E
and F). The necessary packing or Weight List (Exhs. A and B), as well as the Commercial Invoices
(Exhs. C and D) accompanied the shipment. The cargoes were likewise insured by the Tagum Plastics
Inc. with plaintiff Philippine American General Insurance Co., Inc., (Exh. G).
In the course of time, the said vessel arrived at Manila and discharged its cargoes in the Port of Manila
for transhipment to Davao City. For this purpose, the foreign carrier awaited and made use of the
services of the vessel called M/V "Sweet Love" owned and operated by defendant interisland carrier.
On May 15, 1977, the shipment(s) were discharged from the interisland carrier into the custody of the
consignee. A later survey conducted on July 8, 1977 upon the instance of the plaintiff. The survey
shows unreasonable shortages, damages and losses during the discharge from the vessel.
Of said shipment totalling 7,000 bags, originally contained in 175 pallets, only a total of 5,820 bags
were delivered to the consignee in good order condition, leaving a balance of 1,080 bags. Such loss
from this particular shipment is what any or all defendants may be answerable to.
Before trial, a compromise agreement was entered into between petitioners, as plaintiffs, and
defendants S.C.I. Line and F.E. Zuellig, upon the latter's payment of P532.65 in settlement of the claim
against them. Whereupon, the trial court in its order of August 12, 1981 3 granted plaintiffs' motion to
dismiss grounded on said amicable settlement and the case as to S.C.I. Line and F.E. Zuellig was
consequently "dismissed with prejudice and without pronouncement as to costs."
The trial court thereafter rendered judgment in favor of herein petitioners. Defendant Sweet Lines Inc.
and Davao Veterans Arrastre and (Port) Services Inc. are directed to pay jointly and severally, the
plaintiff the sum of P49,747.55, with legal interest thereon from April 28, 1978 until fully paid.
Respondents then appealed the trial courts decision with the Court of Appeals. The respondent court
has reversed the trial courts decision on the ground of prescription, in effect dismissing the complaint
of herein petitioners, and the denial of their motion for reconsideration.
Hence this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in reversing the trial courts decision
HELD:
On the said issue, petitioners contend that it was error for the Court of Appeals to reverse the
appealed decision on the supposed ground of prescription when SLI failed to adduce any evidence in
support thereof and that the bills of lading said to contain the shortened periods for filing a claim and
for instituting a court action against the carrier were never offered in evidence. Considering that the
existence and tenor of this stipulation on the aforesaid periods have allegedly not been established,
petitioners maintain that it is inconceivable how they can possibly comply therewith. 12 In refutation,
SLI avers that it is standard practice in its operations to issue bills of lading for shipments entrusted to
it for carriage and that it in fact issued bills of lading numbered MD-25 and MD-26 therefor with proof
of their existence manifest in the records of the case. 13 For its part, DVAPSI insists on the propriety of
the dismissal of the complaint as to it due to petitioners' failure to prove its direct responsibility for the
loss of and/or damage to the cargo.
Respondent court correctly passed upon the matter of prescription, since that defense was so
considered and controverted by the parties. This issue may accordingly be taken cognizance of by the
court even if not inceptively raised as a defense so long as its existence is plainly apparent on the face
of relevant pleadings. 16 In the case at bar, prescription as an affirmative defense was seasonably
raised by SLI in its answer, 17 except that the bills of lading embodying the same were not formally
offered in evidence, thus reducing the bone of contention to whether or not prescription can be
maintained as such defense and, as in this case, consequently upheld on the strength of mere
references thereto.
As petitioners are suing upon SLI's contractual obligation under the contract of carriage as contained
in the bills of lading, such bills of lading can be categorized as actionable documents which under the
Rules must be properly pleaded either as causes of action or defenses, 18 and the genuineness and
due execution of which are deemed admitted unless specifically denied under oath by the adverse
party. 19 The rules on actionable documents cover and apply to both a cause of action or defense
based on said documents.
Petitioners' failure to specifically deny the existence, much less the genuineness and due execution, of
the instruments in question amounts to an admission. Judicial admissions, verbal or written, made by
the parties in the pleadings or in the course of the trial or other proceedings in the same case are
conclusive, no evidence being required to prove the same, and cannot be contradicted unless shown
to have been made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made. 23 Moreover, when
the due execution and genuineness of an instrument are deemed admitted because of the adverse
party's failure to make a specific verified denial thereof, the instrument need not be presented
formally in evidence for it may be considered an admitted fact.
Neither did nor could the trial court, much less the Court of Appeals, precisely establish the stage in
the course of the shipment when the goods were lost, destroyed or damaged. What can only be
inferred from the factual findings of the trial court is that by the time the cargo was discharged to
DVAPSI, loss or damage had already occurred and that the same could not have possibly occurred
while the same was in the custody of DVAPSI, as demonstrated by the observations of the trial court
quoted at the start of this opinion.
ACCORDINGLY, on the foregoing premises, the instant petition is DENIED and the dismissal of the
complaint in the court a quo as decreed by respondent Court of Appeals in its challenged judgment is
hereby AFFIRMED.
13. A.M. No. 1288 July 29, 1974
FLORAIDA BANARES, complainant, vs.ATTY. ROSALINO C. BARICAN, respondent.
The verified complaint riled by Floraida Lopez de Banares who accuses Atty. Rosalino C. Barican of
"abandoning" her case (referring to Special Proceeding 7500 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
Branch II), alleges specifically that she engaged the services of the respondent lawyer for the purpose
of acquiring the custody of her minor children from the spouses Francisco Banares and Ester Macam;
that the respondent did file the appropriate petition for habeas corpus, but that except for the initial
hearing the respondent failed to appear in court at the succeeding scheduled hearings resulting in the
dismissal of the petition on November 7, 1973.
Required to comment, the respondent explained, under oath, that it was not the complainant, but her
mother, Percida Vasquez, who did engage but later terminated his legal services. His version of the
material events is as follows: he was the lawyer of the Baron Express, a transportation firm whose bus
figured in an accident which cause the death of Rolando Banares, alleged husband of the complainant;
in August 1973 the complainant's mother, Percida Vasquez, who wanted compensation for the death
of her son-in-law, was referred to him; he advised her that no settlement could at the time be
discussed because Francisco Banares, the father of the deceased, had filed a similar claim with the
Office of Civil Relations at Camp Aguinaldo, whereupon, she assured the respondent that she would
cause her daughter (the complainant) to thresh out the matter with her in laws; a week later the
complainant and her mother informed the respondent that the Banares family, who had the custody of
the complainant's daughter, would not forego their claim as they refused to recognize the complainant
as the lawful wife of the deceased on September 5, 1973 Percida Vasquez informed the respondent
that they could not avail of the services of their lawyer, one Atty. Oligarion, in the matter of their claim
for compensation from the Baron Express and for recovery of the custody of the complainant's
daughter, for lack of expense money; she pleaded with the respondent who, moved by her insistence
and also by his (respondent) wife's intercession, agreed, to help in the recovery of the child's custody;
on another visit, the complainant and her mother proposed to the respondent that, because they did
not have money to pay for litigation expenses, the Baron Express assist them financially, and any
financial assistance it would extend was to be deducted from whatever compensation was due them
for Rolando's death; the respondent referred the proposal to the management of the Baron Express,
which accepted the proposal and consequently advanced a sum of money to the complainant;
thereafter, the respondent prepared the petition for habeas corpus; on September 16, 1973, the
complainant and her mother were given the petition but they did not file it for lack of funds; the
respondent again interceded with the Baron Express, which again extended monetary assistance, and
the petition was thereafter filed with the Court of First Instance of Rizal; the case was set for initial
hearing but was re-set to October 24, 1973 because Francisco Banares manifested in court that the
complainant was not the lawful wife of his deceased son; on the day of the initial hearing, the
complainant's mother intimated to the respondent that her daughter's common-law husband, one Mr.
Hilado, was furious with her and her daughter for soliciting the services of the respondent, whereupon
the latter, on confirmation by the complainant and her step-father of the information given to him,
advised the complainant that it was best that they retain the services of another lawyer; it was then
agreed that the complainant would confer with her common law husband, after which if she believed
that the respondent's appearance would still be necessary, she would accordingly notify the
respondent before October 24, 1973, submit to the respondent pertinent documents from the hospital
where she allegedly gave birth, and arrange a conference between the attending physician and the
respondent, but the complainant did none of these; on October 18, 1973 Percida Vasquez tearfully
informed the respondent that she was terminating his services as counsel, as her daughter and her
common-law husband had forbidden her from interfering with the case because they had replaced the
respondent with another lawyer, one Atty. Fortaleza; in the respondent's presence Percida Vasquez
instructed her other daughter (who came with her) to fetch the complainant in order to clarify matters
with the respondent; on October 22, 1973 Percida Vasquez informed the respondent that her daughter
would no longer avail of his services as she had decided to retain the services of another lawyer
chosen by her common-law husband; and for all his bother the respondent was not compensated a
single centavo.
In reply to the foregoing comment, the complainant denied that she had solicited the respondent's
services and alleged that on the contrary the respondent had volunteered his services; denied that the
professional services of the respondent were contracted gratis et a more and averred that he had
agreed to a contingent-fee arrangement; denied that she failed to contact the respondent because in
fact she did call him by phone and advised him of the next hearing; averred that the respondent had
promised to appear but did not; admitted that she was able to secure "vales"" or cash advances from
the Baron Express on three occasions thru the help of the respondent; alleged that during the initial
hearing the respondent talked to her and suggested that they live together as husband and wife, and
promised to provide her with life's comforts, and later reminded her of their "date" the following
Saturday at "Jack's Place" in Caloocan City; asserted that she did not appear at the designated place,
and that thereafter the respondent turned indifferent to her case and consequently failed to appear at
the later court hearings.
The respondent filed a rejoinder wherein he stressed that it was not the complainant but her mother,
Percida Vasquez, who engaged his services; denied the allegation that he had suggested that he and
the complainant live together and he would provide her with luxuries; and further denied the
allegation that he had reminded the complainant of a supposed "data."
Upon the allegations of the parties, the charge that the respondent abandoned the habeas corpus
case of the complainant Floraida Banares would appear to merit investigation, but the apparent
joinder of issues is unreal, for rather than frontally meeting or directly traversing the allegations of the
respondent that are material to the existence of a cause of action for abandonment of a client's case,
the complainant evades or does not categorically or completely deny said allegations.
If an allegation is not specifically denied or the denial is a negative pregnant, the allegation is deemed
admitted. (1 Moran 332-334).
The material determinative allegations of the respondent and the statements of the complainant
thereon are as follows:
1. The complainant neither admits nor denies the respondent's allegation that it was the
complainant's mother, and not she, who engaged his professional services, but simply states that he
volunteered his services.
2. To the allegation that the complainant agreed (but failed) to notify the respondent before
October 24, 1973 if, after conferring with her common-law husband, the respondent's appearance in
court would still be necessary, the complainant states that she did call the respondent by phone about
the necessity of his appearance and the respondent allegedly promised to appear, but the
complainant fails to state whether or not she had conferred with her common-law husband on the
matter of the dismissal or the further retention of the respondent as her counsel. It is to be noted that
the agreement that the complainant would inform the respondent before the October 24, 1973
hearing as to the necessity of his appearance was predicated on the facts (a) that the complainant's
common law husband have objected to the respondent's being retained as counsel, and (b) that the
respondent had, in deference thereto, advised the complainant to secure the services of another
lawyer.
3. The complainant does not deny the respondent's allegation that although she had agreed to
present pertinent hospital records to the respondent and to arrange a conference between the doctor
and the respondent, she failed to do so.
4. The allegation that the complainant's mother went twice to see the respondent to inform him
that his services would no longer be availed of by her daughter as she and her common-law husband
had already replaced the respondent as counsel, is not at all denied by the complainant.
In sum and substance, the complainant's non-categorical statements on the material issues amount to
an admission (requiring no proof) that the respondent did not "abandon" her case, and, instead, that
she, by herself and thru her mother, dismissed the respondent as her lawyer.
ACCORDINGLY, the administrative complaint against the respondent is hereby dismissed. No costs.
14. Director of Lands vs CA
G.R. No. L-47847
July 31, 1981
Facts:
Respondent Pastor filed with the Court of First Instance an application for confirmation of
imperfect title over thirteen (13) lots which were allegedly inherited from her parents and from her
aunt, without any surviving heir except herself. The Director of Lands filed an opposition to the
application on the ground that applicant respondent and her predecessors-in-interest neither had title
in fee simple nor imperfect title under the Public Land Law over the lots in question. No other persons
filed opposition to the application.
Respondent presented a certification from the Land Registration Commission stating that one
of the lots was declared public land in a Cadastral Case and further submitted another certification
from the same Commission that five lots were the subject of a decision in a Cadastral Case, although
no decree of registration has as yet been issued. The CFI granted her application for registration. The
Director of Lands appealed to the Court of Appeals but the court affirmed the decision of the trial
court.
On appeal to the Supreme Court, petitioner asserts that the decision rendered in Cadastral
Case constitutes res judicata as to the nature of the lots in question and therefore, a bar to
respondents application.
Issue:
Whether or not the decision rendered in Cadastral Case constitutes res judicata and a bar to
respondents application.
Held:
No. The Supreme Court held that the decision in Cadastral Case does not constitute a bar to
the application of respondent Manuela Pastor. A decision in a cadastral proceeding declaring a lot
public land is not the final decree contemplated in the Land Registration Act. A judicial declaration that
a parcel of land is public, does not preclude even the same applicant from subsequently seeking a
judicial confirmation of his title to the same land, provided he thereafter complies with the provisions
of Commonwealth Act No. 141 and as long as said public land remains alienable and disposable.
However, the Director of Lands did not interpose any objection nor set up the defense of res judicata
with respect to the lots in question. Such failure on the part of oppositor is a procedural infirmity which
cannot be cured on appeal. All defenses therefore not interposed in a motion to dismiss or in an
answer are deemed waived and cannot be pleaded for the first time at the trial or on appeal.
15. G.R. No. 139588 March 4, 2004 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by
the DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner, vs. JOSEFINA B. VDA. DE NERI, et.al., respondents.
FACTS:
The heirs of Graciano Neri, Sr. filed an application with the CFI of MIsamis Oriental for judicial
confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title. They prayed that, after due process, judgment be
rendered in their favor. Thereafter, they filed an amended application in the same case on December
17, 1974. On January 27, 1975, the Court, through the Land Registration Commission, issued a notice
of initial hearing addressed to the Director of the Bureau of Lands, the Solicitor General and the
Bureau of Forest Development. The notice was published in the Official Gazette. Copies thereof were
sent by ordinary mail to the persons named therein; the copies intended for the Director of the Bureau
of Lands and the Office of the Solicitor General were sent by special messenger. The Solicitor General
and the Director of the Bureau of Lands failed to file any opposition thereto.
The court rendered judgment granting the application. The Office of the Solicitor General, as well as
the Director of the Bureau of Lands, failed to appeal the same. Thus, the court issued Decree No. N-
361749, on the basis of which OCT No. 0662 was issued by the Register of Deeds of Cagayan de Oro
City.
On January 5, 1981, the Office of the Solicitor General, for and in behalf of the petitioner Republic of
the Philippines, through the Director of the Bureau of Lands, filed with the court a quo a complaint for
annulment of OCT No. 0662 and the reversion of the property covered by the said title against herein
respondents. In its complaint, the petitioner alleged inter alia that it is the true owner of a parcel of
land of the public domain surveyed as Lot No. 2821 (subject lot) situated in Cagayan de Oro City.
Despite the fact that the Solicitor General and the Director of the Bureau of Lands were not served
copies of the respondents application for judicial confirmation of imperfect title in LRC Case No. N-
531, in violation of Section 51 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, the said case was set for initial hearing
on June 18, 1975. Petitioners also averred that although the survey plan of the subject lot, was
processed and approved by the Land Registration Commission, it was not submitted to the Director of
the Bureau of Lands for re-verification and approval as required by Sections 2 and 3 of Presidential
Decree No. 239. As such, according to the petitioner, the court failed to acquire jurisdiction over the
property.
The petitioner prayed that judgment be rendered nullifying the proceedings in LRC No. N-531, as well
as the courts decision therein, for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner as well as the
property subject matter of the case. This is in view of the courts failure to comply with Section 51 of
Commonwealth Act No. 141. Petitioner also prayed OCT No. 0662 issued in favour of the private
respondents be declared null and void.
In the private respondents answer, they averred that the subject lot had been theirs and their
predecessors private and exclusive property for more than fifty years. According them, even if there
were deficiencies on the part of the administrative officials in complying with the procedures relative
to land registration, the same was not jurisdictional, but merely a procedural flaw. As such, the failure
of the Bureau of Lands and the Land Registration Commission to comply with the law did not result in
nullifying the proceedings in LRC Case No. N-531. The respondents countered, the action of the
petitioner had long since prescribed.
The private respondents filed a motion in LRC Case No. N-531 for the issuance of a writ of possession
and the demolition of the houses of the occupants. The court granted the motion. The Director of the
Bureau of Lands, likewise, prayed for the suspension of the enforcement of the writ pending final
resolution of Civil Case No. 7514. The court refused to suspend the enforcement of its decision.
On November 19, 1981, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Director of the Bureau of Lands,
filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with this Court. On March 18, 1985, this Court rendered a
decision dismissing the petition without prejudice to the outcome of the petitioners action against the
private respondents in Civil Case No. 7514. The decision of the Court became final and executory.
During the hearing of March 27, 1989, the parties agreed to forego a full-blown trial and to instead file
their respective "Memorandum of Authority" and to submit evidence in support of their respective
contentions. The court issued an order on the said date, giving the parties thirty days to submit their
respective memoranda and evidence.
The trial court declared that the requisite copies of the notice of initial hearing had been transmitted
to the Office of the Solicitor General and the Bureau of Lands as confirmed by Josefina Bacarusso, the
incumbent Branch Clerk of Court when LRC Case No. N-531 was being heard. The court further stated
that the petitioner failed to adduce at least prima facie evidence to prove the material allegations of
the complaint. The presumption then is that the personnel of CFI and the officers of the Bureau of
Lands performed their duties in accordance with law, there being no evidence to the contrary. The
court even noted the fact that the petitioner, through counsel, agreed to dispense with the trial and to
submit the case for decision after the submission of the parties respective memoranda and
documentary evidence.
The Office of the Solicitor General alleged that the trial court acted arbitrarily when it rendered
judgment based on the pleadings. They contend that the trial court should have conducted a full-
blown trial instead of allowing the parties to forego with the same. The private respondents, for their
part, admitted that the Land Registration Commissions survey plan had not been re-evaluated much
less approved, by the Director of the Bureau of Lands. They averred, however, that the same was
merely a procedural defect.
The CA rendered a decision affirming the ruling of the CFI holding that: (a) the petitioner failed to
prove the material allegations of its complaint; and, (b) the personnel of the CFI and the Land
Registration Commission are presumed to have performed their duties as the law mandated. The CA
denied the petitioners motion for reconsideration of the said decision.
ISSUES:
1. WON the Court may review the decision of the appellate court on the issues raised herein.
2. WON the RTC erred in rendering the decision without a full-blown trial, based solely on the
pleadings of the documents appended to their memorandum.
3. WON the decision of the trial court was made in accordance with law.
RULINGS:
1. The rule is that only questions of law may be reviewed in this Court on a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. However, it has also been held that the finding of
facts of the appellate court may be questioned in this Court, where as in this case, the latters
judgment is based on a misapprehension of the facts, or such findings are contrary to the admissions
of the parties, or when certain relevant facts are overlooked, which, if property considered, would
justify a different conclusion.
2. NO. The trial court dispensed with a full-blown trial because, precisely, the parties themselves
agreed thereto, on the claim that the issues raised may be resolved on the basis of the pleadings, the
memoranda and the appended documents, without need of presenting witnesses thereon. A party
may waive its right to present testimonial evidence and opt to adduce documentary evidence and
thereafter, submit the case for resolution based solely on their pleadings and documentary evidence.
In this case, no less than the petitioner, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General through
Special Attorney Vicente Seria, agreed to dispense with a full-blown trial.
3. NO. The trial court erred in rendering judgment in favor of the private respondents and that
the CA committed a reversible error in affirming the same. As applicants in LRC Case No. N-531, the
private respondents had the burden of complying with the statutory requirement of serving the
Director of the Bureau of Lands with a copy of their application and amended application, and to show
proof of their compliance thereon. However, we also agree with the CA that it was the burden of the
petitioner in the trial court to prove the material allegations of its complaint.
In ordinary civil cases, the plaintiff has the burden of proving the material allegations of the complaint
which are denied by the defendant, and the defendant has the burden of proving the material
allegations in his case where he sets up a new matter.
The effect of a presumption upon the burden of proof is to create the need of presenting evidence to
overcome the prima facie case created thereby which if no proof to the contrary is offered will prevail;
it does not shift the burden of proof. In this case, the personnel of the Land Registration Commission
and the CFI in LRC Case No. N-531 are presumed to have performed their duty of serving a copy of the
application and its appendages to the petitioner. It was thus the burden of the petitioner to prove that:
(a) it was not served with a copy of the application of the private respondents and its annexes; (b) the
private respondents failed to append to their application the survey plan of Lot No. 2821, duly
approved by the Director of the Bureau of Lands as required by P.D. Nos. 1529 and 239. Unless the
same were admitted by the respondents, the petitioner should have adduced in evidence the relevant
portions of the records of LRC Case No. N-531, including the decision of the trial court, to prove that
the Director of the Bureau of Lands was not served with a copy of the application and the amended
application
The CFI committed a reversible error in dismissing the petitioners complaint and in not rendering
judgment in favor of the petitioner. In turn, the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the decision of the
CFI.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the Decision of the
Court of First Instance in Civil Case No. 7514 is SET ASIDE AND REVERSED. The Decision of the Court
of First Instance appealed from is also SET ASIDE AND REVERSED. The Court hereby nullifies Original
Certificate of Title No. 6662 under the names of the private respondents and orders the reversion of
the property covered by the said title to the petitioner.
16. G.R. No. 75379 March 31, 1989
Spouses REYNALDO and ESTELITA JAVIER, petitioners,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and LEON S. GUTIERREZ, JR.
Facts:
Private respondent was charged with estafa under BP Blg 22 in the RTC of Makati for issuing to the
petitioners a check that was subsequently dishonored and not made good despite the required notice
of dishonor. In private respondents complaint filed in RTC of Catarman, Northern Samar, he alleged
that the petitioners have inveigled him into signing the very check subject of the criminal case for
which he is now facing prosecution. Petitioners motion to dismiss the civil case filed by the
respondent on the grounds of lack of cause of action and litis pendentia was denied. The civil case was
set for trial despite the petitioners second motion for reconsideration based on the original two
grounds and alleging the additional ground of improper venue. The petitioners questioned the trial
courts decision in denying their motion to dismiss and motion for reconsideration in the Intermediate
Appellate Court which affirmed the trial courts decision. Hence this petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45.
Issue:
Whether or not the private respondent can raise his reason for issuing the very check subject of the
criminal case against him in a separate civil action for damages and against the petitioners in another
court.
Ruling:
As the civil action was not reserved by the petitioners, it was deemed impliedly instituted with the
criminal case in the Regional Trial Court of Makati. The applicable provision is Rule 111, Section 1, of
the Rules of Court.
When the offended party seeks to enforce civil liability against the accused by way of actual, moral,
nominal, temperate or exemplary damages, the filing fees for such civil action as provided in these
Rules shall first be paid to the Clerk of Court of the court where the criminal case is filed. In all other
cases, the filing fees corresponding to the civil liability awarded by the court shall constitute a first lien
on the judgment award and no payment by execution or otherwise may be made to the offended party
without his first paying the amount of such filing fees to the Clerk of Court.
As the civil action based on the same act was also deemed filed in the RTC of Makati, it was also
before that same court that he could offer evidence to refute the claim for damages made by the
petitioners. The counterclaim was compulsory and should have been filed by the private respondent
upon the implied institution of the civil action for damages in the criminal action.
A counterclaim is compulsory and is considered barred if not set up where the following circumstances
are present: (1) that it arises out of, or is necessarily connected with the transaction or occurrence
that is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim; (2) that it does not require for its adjudication
the presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction, and (3) that the court has
jurisdiction to entertain the claim. All these circumstances are present in the case before the Regional
Trial Court of Makati.
This being so, it was improper for the private respondent to file his civil complaint in the Regional Trial
Court of Northern Samar alleging the very defense he should be making in the Regional Trial Court of
Makati. It is, of course, not possible for him now to invoke a different defense there because he would
be contradicting his own verified complaint in the Regional Trial Court in Northern Samar. In effect,
therefore, he is arguing that both courts have jurisdiction to consider the same claim of deception he
is making in connection with the same transaction and involving the same parties.
private respondent is now seeking to make amends by filing a separate civil action based on the same
matter in the Regional Trial Court of Northern Samar.
The principal reason of the respondent court in sustaining the trial judge is that Civil Case filed by the
private respondent is not barred because it was filed not by the petitioners but by the private
respondent. If such logic were accepted, every accused could file his own civil complaint against the
offended party based on the same transaction involved in the prosecution, but in another court. The
effect would not only be multiplicity of suits but delay and frustration of the criminal case.
What the Court finds especially questionable here is the choice of the venue for the civil action.
Although both parties appear to be residents and running their affairs in Metro Manila, the private
respondent filed his complaint in Catarman, Northern Samar in an obvious attempt to inconvenience
the petitioners. The lower courts should have taken this matter into consideration if only for reasons of
equity. Legally, of course, the lack of proper venue was deemed waived by the petitioners when they
failed to invoke it in their original motion to dismiss. Even so, the motivation of the private respondent
should have been taken into account by both the trial judge and the respondent court in arriving at
their decisions.
Courts should not allow themselves to be used as instruments for harassment and the circumvention
of the law through cunning manipulations of the procedural rules by counsel who may be too clever
for their own good. Rules of procedure are intended to expedite rather than complicate, and much less
to obstruct, the administration of justice. There is no excuse why the bench and the bar should not
know this principle by now.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent court and its resolution are SET ASIDE and Civil Case filed
by the private respondent in the Regional Trial Court of Catarman, Northern Samar is DISMISSED, with
costs against the private respondent. It is so ordered.
17. Evangeline Alday, petitioner vs. FGU Insurance Corporation, respondent.
GR No. 138822, January 23, 2001
Facts:
On 5 May 1989, respondent FGU Insurance Corporation filed a complaint with the Regional
Trial Court of Makati alleging that petitioner Alday owed it P114,650.76, representing unliquidated
cash advances, unremitted costs of premiums and other charges incurred by petitioner in the course
of her work as an insurance agent for respondent. Respondent also prayed for exemplary damages,
attorney's fees, and costs of suit. Petitioner filed her answer and by way of counterclaim, asserted her
right for the payment of P104,893.45, representing direct commissions, profit commissions and
contingent bonuses earned from 1 July 1986 to 7 December 1986, and for accumulated premium
reserves amounting to P500,000.00. In addition, petitioner prayed for attorney's fees, litigation
expenses, moral damages and exemplary damages for the allegedly unfounded action filed by
respondent.
Respondent filed a "Motion to Strike Out Answer With Compulsory Counterclaim And To
Declare Defendant In Default" because petitioner's answer was allegedly filed out of time. However,
the trial court denied the motion and similarly rejected respondent's motion for reconsideration. A few
weeks later, respondent filed a motion to dismiss petitioner's counterclaim, contending that the trial
court never acquired jurisdiction over the same because of the non-payment of docket fees by
petitioner. In response, petitioner asked the trial court to declare her counterclaim as exempt from
payment of docket fees since it is compulsory and that respondent be declared in default for having
failed to answer such counterclaim.
The trial court granted respondent's motion to dismiss petitioner's counterclaim and
consequently, denied petitioner's motion. The court found petitioner's counterclaim to be merely
permissive in nature and held that petitioner's failure to pay docket fees prevented the court from
acquiring jurisdiction over the same. The trial court similar denied petitioner's motion for
reconsideration. The Court of Appeals sustained the trial court.
Issues:
1. WON the respondent is estopped from questioning the petitioners non-payment of docket
fees.
2. WON the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over the appeal filed by petitioner.
3. WON the counterclaim of the petitioner is compulsory or permissive in nature.
Ruling:
1. No. Petitioners claim that respondent is estopped from questioning her(petitioner) non-
payment of docket fees because it did not raise this particular issue when it filed the motion
to strike out answer with compulsory counterclaim and to declare defendant in default is
unmeritorious. Estoppel by laches arises from the negligence or omission to assert a right
within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either
has abandoned or declined to assert it.15 In the case at bar, respondent cannot be
 considered as estopped from assailing the trial court's jurisdiction over petitioner's
counterclaim since this issue was raised by respondent with the trial court itself - the body
where the action is pending - even before the presentation of any evidence by the parties
and definitely, way before any judgment could be rendered by the trial court.
2. It is significant to note that this objection to the appellate court's jurisdiction is raised for the
first time before this Court; respondent never having raised this issue before the appellate
court. Although the lack of jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any stage of the action, a
party may be estopped from raising such questions if he has actively taken part in the very
proceedings which he questions, belatedly objecting to the court's jurisdiction in the event
that the judgment or order subsequently rendered is adverse to him. In this case, respondent
actively took part in the proceedings before the Court of Appeals by filing its appellee's brief
with the same. Its participation, when taken together with its failure to object to the appellate
court's jurisdiction during the entire duration of the proceedings before such court,
demonstrates a willingness to abide by the resolution of the case by such tribunal and
accordingly, respondent is now most decidedly estopped from objecting to the Court of
Appeals' assumption of jurisdiction over petitioner's appeal.
3. A compulsory counterclaim is one which, being cognizable by the regular courts of justice,
arises out of or is connected with the transaction or occurrence constituting the subject
matter of the opposing party's claim and does not require for its adjudication the presence of
third parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction.
Petitioner's counterclaim for commissions, bonuses, and accumulated premium reserves is
merely permissive. The evidence required to prove petitioner's claims differs from that
needed to establish respondent's demands for the recovery of cash accountabilities from
petitioner, such as cash advances and costs of premiums. The recovery of respondent's
claims is not contingent or dependent upon establishing petitioner's counterclaim, such that
conducting separate trials will not result in the substantial duplication of the time and effort
of the court and the parties. One would search the records in vain for a logical connection
between the parties' claims. This conclusion is further reinforced by petitioner's own
admissions since she declared in her answer that respondent's cause of action, unlike her
own, was not based upon the Special Agent's Contract. However, petitioner's claims for
damages, allegedly suffered as a result of the filing by respondent of its complaint, are
compulsory.
There is no need for petitioner to pay docket fees for her compulsory counterclaim. On the
other hand, in order for the trial court to acquire jurisdiction over her permissive
counterclaim, petitioner is bound to pay the prescribed docket fees.
Insofar as the permissive counterclaim of petitioner is concerned, there is obviously no need
to file an answer until petitioner has paid the prescribed docket fees for only then shall the
court acquire jurisdiction over such claim. Meanwhile, the compulsory counterclaim of
petitioner for damages based on the filing by respondent of an allegedly unfounded and
malicious suit need not be answered since it is inseparable from the claims of respondent. If
respondent were to answer the compulsory counterclaim of petitioner, it would merely result
in the former pleading the same facts raised in its complaint.
18. G.R. No. 161431 October 13, 2010
CALIBRE TRADERS, INC., et. al., petitioners,
vs.
BAYER PHILIPPINES, INC., respondent.
Facts:
Petitioner Calibre was one of respondents distributors/dealers of its agricultural chemicals within the
Pangasinan and Tarlac provinces effective from 1989-1991. However, petitioner Calibre failed to settle its
obligation making respondent to stop from delivering stocks to it. Several letters were communicated by the
parties to reach a settlement which eventually failed due to petitioner Mario Sebastians expressed
discontent in respondents refusal to credit his claims in full and underscored the alleged inaction of
respondent in reconciling petitioner's accounts. Petitioner Calibre, accusing respondent of maliciously
breaching the distributorship agreement by manipulating its accounts, withholding discounts and rebates due it,
charging unwarranted penalties, refusing to supply goods, and favoring the new distributors/dealers to drive it out
of business, filed a suit for damages before the RTC. Respondent filed an answer with Counterclaim,
denying its alleged wanton appointment of other distributors and that petitioner Calibre filed the
damage suit to avoid paying its overdue accounts. It also moved that petitioner Sebastians be
impleaded as co-defendants, considering that they bound themselves as solidary debtors under the
distributorship/dealership agreement.
Issue:
WON petitioner Calibre is entitled to an award of damages.
Held:
No, petitioner Calibre is not entitled to an award of damages. No form of damages can be awarded to
Calibre for it miserably failed to prove its right to the reliefs it sought. The Court agrees with the CAs conclusion
that there is no adequate proof that Bayerphil was guilty of abusing its rights. Good faith is presumed and that
the burden of proving bad faith rests upon a party alleging the same. In civil cases, the law requires that the party
who alleges a fact and substantially asserts the affirmative of the issue has the burden of proving it, which Calibre
failed to establish.
19. G.R. No. L-29673 November 12, 1987
THE VISAYAN PACKING CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
THE REPARATIONS COMMISSION and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
Facts:
Herein petitioner and respondent RepaCom entered into an agreement denominated "Contract of
Constitutional Purchase and Sale of nterparation Goods" wherein the former bound itself to pay the
purchase price in ten equal yearly installments with interest of the cannery plant, a tin manufacturing plant,
and three (3) filing boats sold to it by the latter. Prior to the due of the first installment, respondent
RepaCom sent to the petitioner a written remainder thereof which was responded by it with two
special civil actions for declaratory relief, alleging ambiguity in the contract between the parties
consisting in the agreements failure to clearly state the precise time when the obligation to pay the
first installment would arise. Respondent RepaCom subsequently filed a civil action for collection
based on what it deemed to be the due date. In turn, petitioner move for said actions dismissal where
it alleged that the pendency of the actions for declaratory relief yields no cause of action could be
deemed to exist in favor of respondent RepaCom for collection. The trial court denied the motion and
ordered the petitioner to pay the respondent the sum claimed by it. Aggrieved, the decision was
appealed to the CA, which later on affirmed the collection suit. Thus, this action. The petitioner now
asserts that the collection of the money claims is barred because it should have been set up as a
compulsory counterclaim in the declaratory relief action, which the respondent failed to do so and
instead, filed it in a separate suit.
Issue:
WON the failure to set up the money claim in the declaratory relief actions barred its
collection in a separate civil case?
Held:
No. Now, there is nothing in the nature of a special civil action for declaratory relief that
proscribes the filing of a counterclaim based on the same transaction, deed or contract subject of the
complaint. Ideally, in the case at bar, the separate action for collection should have been dismissed
and set up as a compulsory counterclaim in the declaratory relief suits, by way of an amended answer.
This was not done. The actions proceeded separately and were decided on the merits. The final verdict
was that the declaratory relief suits instituted by VISPAC were unmeritorious, quite without foundation
and, in the light of all the relevant facts, appear to have been initiated by VISPAC merely to obstruct
and delay the payment of the installments clearly due from it, payment of which was decreed in
the collection suit. Under the circumstances, and taking account of the not inconsiderable length of
time that the case at bar has been pending, it would be to do violence to substantial justice to
pronounce the proceedings fatally defective for breach of the rule on compulsory counterclaims. Rules
of procedure are after all laid down in order to attain justice. They cannot be applied to prevent the
achievement of that goal. Form cannot prevail over substance.
20. G.R. No. 105751 June 30, 1993
BA FINANCE CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs. RUFINO CO, HIGHLINE MERCANTILE, INC., LUCITA VELOSO YAP, CLOVERLEAF
SUPERMARKET, INC., SAN ANDRES COMMERCIAL and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
FACTS:
Petitioner BA Finance Corporation brought this action as plaintiff in the court below to recover
a sum of money arising from a credit accommodation in the form of a discounting line which it granted
to defendant Rufino Co, and from certain suretyship agreements executed in its favor by his co-
defendants Highline Mercantile, Inc., Lucita Veloso Yap, Cloverleaf Supermarket, Inc., and San Andres
Commercial. After defendants' Amended Answer to Complaint with Compulsory Counterclaim was
admitted, the case was set for Pre-Trial Conference. For various reasons, however, the conference was
repeatedly reset. On 19 December 1989, counsel for plaintiff, petitioner herein, failed to attend the
Pre-Trial Conference. Consequently, defendants moved for dismissal of the case without prejudice. The
motion was granted thus the plaintiff's representative and counsel having failed to appear for
today's setting, Atty. Luis Vera Cruz, Jr., for the defendants moved that the above-entitled case be
dismissed, without prejudice. Finding merit in said motion, the same is hereby granted.On 22 January
1990, private respondents moved to set the reception of their evidence in support of their
counterclaim. Petitioner opposed the motion.
On 2 April 1990, the trial court denied the motion of private respondents, prompting them to
elevate the order of denial to the Court of Appeals which, on 18 December 1991, reversed the
questioned order and directed the trial court to set the reception of their evidence on their
counterclaim. Its motion for reconsideration having on 2 June 1992 been denied, petitioner instituted
the instant petition.Petitioner contends that the dismissal of the complaint carries with it the dismissal
of the counterclaim. Private respondents, on the other hand, claim that their compulsory counterclaim
should not have been included in the dismissal.
Issue: Whether the dismissal of the complaint carries with it the dismissal of the counterclaim.
Ruling:
YES. The rule is that a compulsory counterclaim cannot "remain pending for independent adjudication
by the court." This is because a compulsory counterclaim is auxiliary to the proceeding in the original
suit and merely derives its jurisdictional support therefrom. Thus, it necessarily follows that if the trial
court no longer possesses jurisdiction to entertain the main action of the case, as when it dismisses
the same, then the compulsory counterclaim being ancillary to the principal controversy, must
likewise be similarly dismissed since no jurisdiction remains for the grant of any relief under the
counterclaim.
For the guidance of Bench and Bar, if any of the grounds to dismiss under Sec. 3, Rule 17, of the Rules
of Court arises, the proper recourse for a defendant who desires to pursue his compulsory
counterclaim in the same proceeding is not to move for the dismissal of the complaint; instead, he
should only move to have plaintiff declared non-suited on the complaint so that the latter can no
longer present his evidence thereon, and simultaneously move that he be declared as in default on
the compulsory counterclaim, and reserve the right to present evidence ex parte on his counterclaim.
This will enable defendant who was unjustly haled to court to prove his compulsory counterclaim,
which is intertwined with the complaint, because the trial court retains jurisdiction over the complaint
and of the whole case. The non-dismissal of the complaint, the nonsuit notwithstanding, provides the
basis for the compulsory counterclaim to remain active and subsisting.
21
22. G.R. No. L-24103, August 10, 1967
BEATRIZ G. VDA. DE DIOS, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. LEANDRO BALAGOT, PETITIONER-
APPELLANT, VS. J.M. TUASON & CO., INC., AND PEDRO DEUDOR, OPPOSITORS-APPELLEES.
FACTS:
Beatriz g. Vda De dios, Plaintiff-Appellee filed an action for recovery of possession of land was filed on
January 24, 1963 against Leandro Balagot, in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City branch.
She alleged in her complaint that she is the registered owner of parcel of land that she had purchased
from J.M. Tuason& Co., that defendant has been in possession of a portion of said parcel of land,
without the knowledge and tolerance of J.M. Tuason & Co., and that in spite of demands on him by
plaintiff and her predecessor-in-interest, defendant has failed and refused to vacate the land and re-
move his house and other construction thereon.
The defendant filed an answer with a counterclaim. Alleged therein were that the portion of land
occupied by defendant, an area of 700 square meters owned by Telesforo Deudor in 1873; that from
Pedro Deudor, successor-in-interest of Telesforo, he bought the portion of land, that right after the
sale, he took possession of the land, subsequently constructing thereon a house; that pursuant to an
agreement between J.M. Tuason & Co., and the Deudor heirs dated March 16, 1953, defendant's right
to the land has preference over the sale in favor of plaintiff; that, therefore, plaintiff should reconvey
the portion of the land involved herein to defendant or pay him P4,900.00 for the land, P40,000.00 for
his house, and P5,000.00 for attorneys fees and damages.
Plaintiff answered defendant's counterclaim. Prior to this scheduled hearing date, defendant filed a
motion for leave to file a third-party complaint, attaching the same to the motion, against J.M. Tuason
& Co. and Pedro Deudor, for payment of the value of the house and lot in case of eviction and the said
motion was denied by the court for lack of merit.
Hence this petition.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether Or Not the third-party complaint admissible.
(2) whether or not order denying the admission of the third-party complaint be appealed from at this
stage of the proceedings..
HELD:
1. As a rule the admission of a third-party complaint is left to the discretion of the trial court.
In the first case, the vendor is summoned by being made a co-defendant; in the second, by being
made a third-party defendant. From this it can be seen that a third-party complaint filed after the
answer but before trial is not late; Article 1559's time-limit does not apply thereto. And Sec. 2 of Rule
12 of the old Rules of Court, then applicable, provided that after service of his ans wer, defendant may,
with notice to plaintiff, move for leave as third-party plaintiff to file a complaint against a third-party
defendant.
As adverted to above, in this case, the third-party complaint, as against Pedro Deudor, seeks
enforcement of the warranty against eviction. The same is thus required by law to be resorted to
instead of being left to be filed as a separate action. If not raised in the action for eviction, the same
will not prosper and the vendor will be released from his warranty. Not only does the admission of the
third-party complaint against Pedro Deudor, avoid multiplicity of suits; it is necessary for defendant to
enforce said warranty against his vendor.
As regards J.M. Tuason & Co., and defendant, however, no relationship of vendor and vendee obtains
and the third-party complaint does not partake of the nature of an enforcement of a warranty against
eviction; rather, it seeks to enforce the Tuason-Deudor agreement. As such, the trial court properly
disallowed the same. Article 1558 of the Civil Code requires defendant in eviction to summon to the
suit his vendor, in this case Pedro Deudor; non-parties to the sale, such as J.M. Tuason & Co., do not
have to be summoned therein; hence, there being no necessity for inclusion of J.M. Tuason & Co., the
disallowance of the third-party complaint against it was not erroneous.
2. As to the appealability of the order disallowing the third-party complaint against Pedro Deudor,
suffice it to reiterate that the same would finally dispose of defendant's right to enforce his warranty
against eviction, since a separate action for the same, without having thus summoned to the suit the
vendor, would not prosper . After said disallowance, nothing further was left to be done in the court a
quo, as regards defendant's right to enforce against Deudor the warranty of eviction. Said denial was
therefore appealable.
23. GR No. 137359 September 13, 2004
Edwin N. Tribiana vs Lourdes Tribiana
FACTS: Herein respondent filed a petition for habeas corpus before the RTC of
Bacoor, Cavite against her husband who left their conjugal home with their child and
since then deprived the former of lawful custody of the child. It was found out that
the child was being withheld by respondents mother-in-law. Petitioner moved to
dismiss the petition on the ground that respondent failed to allege that a
compromise was made before the filing in court as requires under Art. 151 of the
Family Code. Lourdes however showed proofs of prior efforts at a compromise which
failed together with the Certificcate to file action from their barangay. Edwins
motion to dismiss and a motion for reconsideration thereafter was denied. The court
ordered that the child be surrendered to Lourdes, the child being below 7 years old
and as according to law must not be separated from the mother. Petitioner filed a
petition for prohibition and certiorari under Rule 65 before the CA but was denied
also even after a motion for reconsideration. Hence the petition.
ISSUE: WON the RTC and appellate court should have dismissed the
petition for habeas corpus on the ground of failure to comply with the
condition precedent under Art. 151 of the Family Code.
HELD: The petition lacks merit. Although it is true that Art. 151 of the Family
Code provides that an earnest effort to reach a compromise is an indispensable
condition precedent and a ground for dismissal, such rule does not apply to cases
which may not be the subject of a compromise. In fact, even if such rule be followed,
respondent herein has presented evidence through a Certificate to file Action, that a
compromise proceeding was availed to which petitioner failed to oppose. In
addition, the failure of a party to comply with a condition precedent is not a
jurisdictional defect and can only be subjected to an amendment. Noreover, in a
habeas corpus proceeding involving the welfare and custody of a child, it is
paramaount to immediately resolve the issue. The court also cited Section 412 of
the Local Government Code providing that where a person has been deprived of
personal liberty calling for habeas corpus, the parties may go directly to the court.
24. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company. Vs RTC Manila, Raycor Aircontrol System Inc
and CA
GR No. 89909 September 21, 1990
FACTS: Good Earth Emporium executed formerly a deed of chattel mortgage over certain air
conditioning units installed in its GEE building. Such building was later on subjected to a foreclosure
wherein Uniwide Sales and BPI and other banks ,collectively called as BPI Consortium, acquired.
Herein petitioner filed a replevin case to recover the mortgage airconditioners or if not to be paid by
Uniwide,BPI and others the unpaid obligations on the units.
On July 17 1986 private respondent herein. Raycor, filed a motion for leave to intervene alleging it has
direct and immediate interest on the subject matter of the litigation such that it will either gain or lose
by the direct legal operation and effect of judgment. The motion and intervention complaint was
admitted.
On March 15, 1988, Metrobank and BPI Consortium filed a joint motion to dismiss. The court dismissed
the complaint with prejudice.
Private respondent, Raycor, filed a motion for reconsideration of the order dismissing the complaint
with prejudice claiming that it was not notified of the dismissal in due time. On June 2, 1988, the
respondent court granted the motion filed by the intervenor RAycor. Private respondent filed a motion
to admit amended complaint to which Metrobank filed an opposition. The respondent court admitted
the said amended complaint in intervention. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus
with respondent CA contending that the lower court committed a grave abuse of discretion by letting
the intervention suit survive and admitting the amended intervention complaint. The CA dismissed
the petition. Hence petition to the highest court.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent courts erred in letting the intervention suit to survive despite the
dismissal of the main action.
Whether or not the respondent courts erred in admitting the amended complaint in
intervention.
HELD: No. There is no final dismissal of the main case. The aforementioned order of the lower court
has the effect not only of allowing the intervention suit to proceed but also of vacating its previous
order of dismissal. The reinstatement of the case in order to try and determine the claims and rights of
the intervenor is proper. The joint motion of therein plaintiff and the original defendants to dismiss the
case without notice to and consent of the intervenor has the effect of putting to rest only the
respective claims of the said original parties inter se but the same cannot in any way affect the claim
of private respondent which was allowed by the court to intervene without opposition from the original
parties. When an intervenor has become a party to a case, it is error for the court to dismiss the action
to the latters prejudice.
No. The granting of leave to file an amended pleading, in this case an intervention complaint, is a
matter particularly addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court subject only to limitations that
the amendments should not substantially change the cause of action or alter the theory of the case or
that it was made to delay action. In the case at bar, the amended complaint shows only that it merely
supplements an incomplete allegation of the cause of action.
Philippine Export and Foreign Loan Guarantee Corporation vs. Philippine Infrastructures, Inc.,
Philippine British Assurance Co., Inc., The Solid Guaranty, Inc., B.F. Homes, Inc., Pilar Development
Corporation and Tomas F. Aguirre
25. G.R. No. 120384. January 13, 2004
Facts:
The case involves a collection of sum of money by the petitioner from the respondent by virtue of
their Deed of Undertaking where petitioner stands as a guarantor to the credit accommodation
provided by PNB to respondent which upon failure of the respondent to pay the PNB, the petitioner
was made to pay by the bank on behalf of the respondent. Upon filing of the complaint to collect the
said money, respondent files a motion to dismiss due to lack of cause of action on the part of the
petitioner since it does not allege that petitioner has suffered any damage, loss or penalty because of
the guarantees petitioner had extended for and on behalf of respondent. Subsequently petitioner filed
a Motion to Amend Complaint to Conform to Evidence and the motion to amend resulted to the
dismissal of the case on the on the ground of failure to state a cause of action by RTC decision. The CA
denied the motion to set aside the decision of RTC and its motion for reconsideration.
Issue :
Whether or not the complaint be dismissed due to lack of cause of action.
Held:
Although the complaint did not allege that the petitioner sustained some actual loss, the
complaint of the petitioner emanates from the obligation of the respondent to indemnify the petitioner
once it fails to comply with paying its creditors by virtue of their Deed of Undertaking. Respondents
obligation under the Deed of Undertaking to keep petitioner free and harmless from any damage or
liability then became operative as soon as the liability of petitioner arose and there was no need for
petitioner to first sustain actual loss before it could have a cause of action against respondents
26. [G.R. No. 153777. April 15, 2005]
PLANTERS DEVELOPMENT BANK, petitioner, vs. LZK HOLDINGS and DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, respondent
FACTS:
On December 16, 1996, The LHDC, and PDB entered into a Loan Agreement in the amount
of P40,000,000.00, to finance the ongoing construction of the seven-storey AGZ Building at San
Fernando City, La Union. To secure the loan, the LHDC executed a real estate mortgage over the 589-
sq m. lot where the AGZ Building was then being constructed. Subsequently, the latter executed two
(2) promissory notes payable on or before February 24, 2012 in favor of the PDB .Thereafter, the LHDC
executed a Deed of Assignment in favor of the PDB, wherein it assigned to the latter all its rental
incomes from its AGZ Building, as payment of its obligations.
For non-payment of loan, non-compliance with the terms and conditions of the Deed of
Assignment, and failure to comply with the conditions of the promissory notes, the PDB caused the
extra-judicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage. It was sold to the PDB as the highest bidder.
On April 5, 1999, the PDB filed with the (RTC) of Makati City, a complaint against the LHDC for
Annulment of Extrajudicial Foreclosure, Mortgage Contract, Promissory Notes and for Damages. It was
alleged, that the real estate mortgage was Void because it was executed on December 16, 1996, a
day after TCT No. T-45337 was issued by the Register of Deeds, and two months before the execution
of the promissory notes; the first page was unsigned by the parties; and it never received the
proceeds of the loan in the amount of P40,000,000.00.
The LHDC alleged that the extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage was void
because the LHDC did not, in any way, violate the said deed, and the PDB even failed to take into
account the remittances made under the promissory note. Before the pre-trial, the LHDC filed a Motion
for Leave to file a Supplemental Complaint. It alleged that after the filing of the original complaint, it
agreed to enter into a contract of lease with AMA Computer College, but the latter required it to first
secure the petitioners consent. The LHDC wrote to PDB, requesting its consent to the said lease.
However, the latter gave unreasonable conditions in its reply. This prompted the AMA Computer
College to back-out from the contract. Furthermore, the PDB wrote every tenant of the LHDC,
demanding that they directly remit their respective rentals to it. Worse still, the PDB, which was
leasing a space in the same building, had ceased paying its monthly rentals since November 1999, on
the pretext that it was setting-off the same against the loan deficiency of the LHDC.
The PDB opposed the supplemental complaint; it argued that the supplemental matters involved
therein would bring into the case new causes of action, distinct from those mentioned in the original
complaint. On July 27, 2000, over the opposition of the PDB, the trial court issued an Order, admitting
the supplemental complaint. The PDB moved for reconsideration, but the trial court denied the
motion. Dissatisfied, the PDB sought redress in the CA via a petition for certiorari.
ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not the trial court committed a grave abuse of discretion; and (2) Whether or not
LHDCs supplemental complaint bring into the case new causes of action, distinct from those
mentioned in the original complaint.
RULING:
(1) No; the CA rendered a Decision, finding that no grave abuse of discretion was committed by the
trial court in admitting the supplemental complaint of the LHDC. The CA ratiocinated:
The original complaint for annulment of extrajudicial foreclosure, mortgage contract, promissory notes
and for damages was founded on the same transaction the loan and contract of mortgage as security
for such loan as that of the supplemental complaint. The original complaint sought the annulment of
the promissory note and the contract of mortgage. Thus, the acts complained of under the
supplemental complaint, namely: that petitioner imposed unreasonable conditions in giving its
consent to a pending lease agreement between respondent and a third party and that petitioner
demanded that rentals on the property be made directly to it are acts calculated to exercise
petitioners rights, validly or invalidly, as the obligee and mortgagor in the transaction sought to be
annulled in the original complaint.
(2) No; The supplemental complaint is based on matters arising subsequent to the original complaint
related to the claim or defense presented therein, and founded on the same cause of action.
Section 6, Rule 10 of the Revised Rules of Court prescribes the manner and substance of filing
supplemental pleadings: SECTION 6. Supplemental Pleadings. Upon motion of a party the court may,
upon reasonable notice and upon such terms as are just, permit him to serve a supplemental pleading
setting forth transactions, occurrences or events which have happened since the date of the pleading
sought to be supplemented. The adverse party may plead thereto within ten (10) days from notice of
the order admitting the supplemental pleading.
The issue as to whether the petitioner stopped the payment of rentals and the application
thereof on the perceived loan deficiency of the respondent, is a new matter that occurred after the
filing of the original complaint. However, the relief for damages, the collection of the rentals and the
application thereof by the petitioner to the perceived loan deficiency of the respondent are germane
to, and are in fact, intertwined with the cause of action of nullification of the real estate mortgage and
the extrajudicial foreclosure thereof, as well as the sale at public auction. They are, likewise, germane
and related to the respondents claim in its original complaint that it remained the owner of the
property despite the sale at public auction; hence, it is entitled to lease the property and collect the
rentals therefrom. By its supplemental complaint, the respondent merely enlarged its original causes
of action on account of events that transpired after the filing of the original complaint and prayed for
additional reliefs. The principal and core issues raised by the parties in their original pleadings remain
the same.
27. G. R. No. 156747 February 23, 2005
ALLEN A. MACASAET, NICOLAS V. QUIJANO, JR., and ALFIE LORENZO, petitioners,
vs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and JOSELITO TRINIDAD, respondents.
Facts:
Petitioners were charged with the crime of libel before the RTC of Quezon City. Petitioners filed a
Motion to Dismiss the libel case on the ground that the trial court did not have jurisdiction over the
offense charged. According to petitioners, as the information discloses that the residence of private
respondent was in Marikina, the RTC of Quezon City did not have jurisdiction over the case pursuant to
Article 360 of the RPC. The public prosecutor argued that the RTC of QC had jurisdiction over the case.
He maintained that during the time material to this case, the complainant was a resident of both QC
and Marikina as shown in his Reply-Affidavit filed during his preliminary investigation of the case. The
petitioners contended that the complaint-affidavit executed by complainant and
th e i n f o r m a t i o n fi l e d b e f o r e t h e c o u r t s t a t e t h a t c o m p l a i n a n t s r e s i d e n c e i s
i n Marikina, thus the dismissal of the case is warranted for the rule is that jurisdiction is determined
solely by the allegations contained in the complaint or information. The trial court rendered an Order
dismissing the case due to lack of jurisdiction and it held that the editorial box of Abante is in Manila
and that the address of complainant is in Marikina as provided in the information. The complainant
then filed a motion for reconsideration insisting that at the time the alleged libelous article was
published, he was actually residing in QC. According to him, he mistakenly stated that he was a
resident of Marikina at the time of
publication but he rectified the error by his supplemental affidavit which indicated QC as his actu al
res id en ce at the time o f pu blication of th e d efamator y ar ticle. However , th e motion for
reconsideration was denied. Respondents file a notice of appeal to the Court of appeals. The CA
reversed and set aside the ruling of the RTC. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration which was
denied by the CA, hence this petition before the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether the RTC of QC had jurisdiction.
Ruling:
The RTC o f Q C h a d no jurisdiction. The
S u p r e m e C o u r t h e l d t h a t f o r jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in criminal cases
the offense should have been committed o r an y one of its ess ential ingred ients to ok place
with in the territor ial jurisdiction of the court. In libel cases, the criminal action and civil action for
damages in cases of written defamations as provided for in this chapter, shall be filed simultaneously
or separately with the Court of First Instance of the province or city where the libelous ar ticle is
pr in ted and fi r st pub lish ed or where any of th e off ended parties actu ally resides at the
time of the commission of the offense. In the case at bar, private respondent was a private citizen at
the time of the publication of the alleged libelous article, hence, he could only file his libel suit in the
City of Manila where Abante was first published or in the province or city where he actually resided at
the time the purported libelous article was printed. A perusal, however, of the information involved in
this case easily reveals that the alleg ations con tain ed th erein are utterly insuffi cient to
ves t ju risdiction on the RTC o f Q u e z o n
C i t y. O t h e r t h a n p e r f u n c t o r i l y s t a t i n g Q u e z o n C i t y a t t h e beginning of the infor
mation, the assistant city prosecutor who prepared theinformation did not bother to indicate whether
the jurisdiction of RTC Quezon City was invoked either becau se Ab ante was p rinted in th at
p lace o r pr ivate respo ndent was a resident of said city at the time the claimed libelous article
came out. As these matters deal with the fundamental issue of the courts jurisdiction, Article 360 of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended, mandates that either one of these statements must be alleged
in the information itself and the absence of both from the very face of the informa tio n rend ers the
latter fatally d efective. Sad ly fo r priva te res pon den t, the informa tio n fi led b efore the
trial co urt fa lls wa y shor t o f th is
req uirement. Th ea s s i s t a n t c i t y p r o s e c u t o r s f a i l u r e t o p r o p e r l y l a y t h e b a s i s f
o r i n v o k i n g t h e jurisdiction of the RTC, Quezon City, effectively denied said court of the power to
take cognizance of this case.
28. [G.R. No. 144533. September 23, 2003]
JIMMY L. BARNES a.k.a. JAMES L. BARNES, petitioner, vs. TERESITA C. REYES, ELIZABETH C.
PASION, MA. ELSA C. GARCIA, IMELDA C. TRILLO, MA. ELENA C. DINGLASAN and RICARDO P.
CRISOSTOMO, respondents.
Facts:
This case emanated from a complaint for ejectment filed by siblings Teresita C. Reyes, Elizabeth C.
Pasion, Imelda C. Trillo. Ma. Elena C. Dinglasan and Ricardo P. Crisostomo against petitioner Jimmy
Barnes.
Metropolitan Trial Court ruled in favor of Teresita and her co-parties. On appeal to the Regional Trial
Court, the said decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court was reversed. Respondents Teresita C. Reyes
and her siblings filed a petition for review in the Court of Appeals. CA dismissed the petition. The
verification and certification on non-forum shopping was signed only by one of the six petitioners
without any showing that the signatory (Teresita C. Reyes) was duly authorized to bind her fellow
petitioners.
Teresita filed a motion for reconsideration attaching therewith the Special Power of Attorney executed
by the other five petitioners specifically authorizing her to sign the verification and certification page
of their petition and file it on their behalf, which petitioner opposed. The Court of Appeals found
respondents motion for reconsideration meritorious and reinstated their petition for review. petitioner
moved for the reconsideration of the aforesaid resolution of the Court of Appeals.CA denied petitioners
motion for reconsideration for lack of merit. Hence, the instant petition.
Issue:
WON the subsequent filing of the Special Power of Attorney by respondents showing the authority of
Teresita to file the petition in their behalf did not cure the fatal defect.
WON respondents failed to comply with Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure requiring that pleadings and other papers must be personally served on the other party.
Held:
1.
Section 5, Rule 7 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
x x x The plaintiff or principal party shall certify under oath in the complaint or other initiatory
pleading asserting a claim for relief, or in a sworn certification annexed thereto and simultaneously
filed therewith: (a) that he has not theretofore commenced any action or filed any claim involving the
same issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his knowledge, no such
other action or claim is pending therein; (b) if there is such other pending action or claim, a complete
statement of the present status thereof; and (c) if he should thereafter learn that the same or similar
action or claim has been filed or is pending, he shall report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to
the court wherein his aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed.
With respect to the contents of the certification which the pleader may prepare, the rule of substantial
compliance applies. While this section requires that it be strictly complied with, in essence, what it
means is that it cannot be altogether dispensed with or its requirements completely disregarded. But
it does not thereby rule out substantial compliance under justifiable circumstances. The rule against
forum-shopping was designed to serve as an instrument to promote and facilitate the orderly
administration of justice and should not be interpreted with such absolute literalness as to subvert its
ultimate objective the goal of all rules of procedure of achieving substantial justice as expeditiously as
possible.
2.
Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure states:
Whenever practicable, the service and filing of pleadings and other papers shall be done personally.
Except with respect to papers emanating from the court, a resort to other modes must be
accompanied by a written explanation why the service or filing was not done personally. A violation of
this Rule may be cause to consider the paper as not filed.
The rule suggests the preferential mode of serving pleadings and other papers personally on the other
party to ensure (and prove) the latters receipt thereof. The preference is apparent from the phrase
whenever practicable. It is then incumbent upon the court to use its discretion in determining whether
substantial justice will be served (or rights unjustifiably prejudiced) if it resolves to dismiss a petition
because of non-compliance with a mere directory rule. We say directory because of the use of the
word may.
29. G.R. No. 140158
FERNANDO T. BALTAZAR, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, HON. ISAGANI PALAD,
Presiding Judge, Branch 53, RTC, Guagua, Pampanga, and CATALINA BAGASINA,
respondents.
Facts:
Petitioner Fernando Baltazar and private respondent Catalina Bagasina were both candidates for the
position of municipal mayor of Sasmuan, Pampanga during the May 11, 1998 local elections. The
Municipal Board of Canvassers declared petitioner as the duly elected mayor of the municipality. On
June 29, 1998, Private respondent filed with the RTC of Guagua, Pampanga, an election protest.
Summons was served on petitioner on July 7, 1998. Thereafter, Petitioner filed with the trial court his
Answer with Counter-Protest. Private respondent filed a Motion to Expunge from the Records Of this
Case Protestee's Answer And Counter-Protest on the ground that the same was filed out of time or
three (3) days beyond the five-day reglementary period.
The trial court granted private respondents motion and declared that it has no jurisdiction to entertain
the belatedly filed Answer with Counter-Protest. Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied by
the trial court. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the COMELEC. He alleged that his Answer
with Counter-Protest was actually filed on July 13, 1998 as evidenced by a certification; and that the
registry receipt was stamped the date July 14, 1998 because it was posted past two oclock in the
afternoon of July 13, 1998. The envelope, however, which contained the answer was postmarked July
15, 1998.
Public respondent COMELEC issued the challenged Resolution dismissing the petition reasoning, that
the date postmarked on the envelope is conclusively presumed to be the date of mailing, and the
same cannot be overcome by a mere certification by the Operations Manager that the same was
actually received on July 13, 1998, sent on July 14, 1998 but postmarked July 15, 1998.
Issue:
WON THE PETITIONER WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS OF LAW
WON THE ANSWER WITH COUNTER PROTEST WAS FILED WITHIN THE REGLEMENTARY PERIOD OF FIVE
(5) DAYS.
WON THE COMELEC AND THE RESPONDENT REGIONAL TRIAL COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT RULED THAT THE ANSWER WITH
COUNTER PROTEST WAS MAILED ON JULY 14, 1998
Held:
1. Petitioner cannot insist that he was denied due process because he sought a reconsideration of
the trial courts assailed order.
It is settled that due process is satisfied when the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity
to explain their side of the controversy or an opportunity to move for a reconsideration of the action or
ruling complained of.
2. A close scrutiny of the record shows that the envelope which contained petitioners Answer
with Counter-Protest was filed postmarked July 15, 1998. It is, therefore, clear that the pleading was
filed three (3) days beyond the five-day reglementary period within which to file the same, considering
that summons was served on him on July 7, 1998.
It would be a legal absurdity for the Court to allow a mere certification, whose author has not been
presented to testify on its veracity, to overthrow the evidentiary value of an uncontroverted
documentary exhibit such as the Registry Receipt and the postmark actually stamped on the envelope
itself to prove the actual date of mailing of the pleading.
3. A long line of cases establish the basic rule that the courts will not interfere in matters which
are addressed to the sound discretion of government agencies entrusted with the regulation of
activities coming under their special technical knowledge and training. i[7] However, when an
administrative agency renders an opinion or issues a statement of policy, it merely interprets a pre-
existing law and the administrative interpretation is at best advisory for it is the courts that finally
determine what the law means.ii[8] Thus an action by an administrative agency may be set aside by
the judicial department if there is an error of law, abuse of power, lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of
discretion clearly conflicting with the letter and spirit of the law. iii[9]
In the case at bar, there is no cogent reason to depart from the general rule because the findings of
the COMELEC conforms rather than conflicts with the governing statute, implementing rules and
controlling case law on the matter.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. SO ORDERED.
30. Boiser v Judge Aguirre, Jr
A.M. No. RTJ-04-1886
May 16, 2005
FACTS:
The case stems from an ejectment case filed by Petitioner Boiser against one Julleza, which was
decided in favor of Boiser by the MTC. When the case reached the RTC on appeal by Julleza, Julleza
filed a motion to release bond which was granted by Respondent Judge. Boiser then filed the instant
administrative case against Respondent Judge for ignorance of the law, alleging that the motion did
not state that he was furnished a copy of the motion thereby depriving him of his right to due process.
After it was found out by Boiser that Respondent Judge held in his favor in the decision of his
ejectment case, Boiser withdrew his administrative complaint. The administrative complaint was still
placed under investigation with the CA which held to dismiss the case; the case was raised to the
Supreme Court for instant review.
ISSUE: Whether or not the administrative case is moot, the petitioner having withdrawn the case
RULING: No, mere desistance on the part of the complainant does not warrant the dismissal of an
administrative complaint against any member of the bench
The withdrawal of complaints cannot divest the Court of its jurisdiction nor strip it of its power to
determine the veracity of the charges made and to discipline, such as the results of its investigation
may warrant, an erring respondent. Even the retirement of respondent does not oust the Court of its
jurisdiction over an administrative case by the mere fact that the respondent public official ceases to
hold office during the pendency of respondents case.
On deciding the main issue, the Court held that the Motion to Release Bond was defective, not having
a proper notice of hearing. Not to mention the fact that the date and time of the hearing were not
specified, and that neither complainant nor his counsel was furnished a copy thereof. These were
never controverted by respondent judge. A motion without notice of hearing is pro forma, a mere
scrap of paper. It presents no question which the court could decide. The court has no reason to
consider it and the clerk has no right to receive it.
31. ERTRUDES THE vs. THE PEOPLE of the PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 141180
January 11, 2005
FACTS
Petitioner Gertrudes Teh and Josalie Baguio were charged with estafa before the Municipal Trial Courts
in Cities (MTCC), Branch 2, Davao City. Upon arraignment, petitioner, assisted by counsel, pleaded not
guilty to the charge. Josalie Baguio has remained at large.The evidence for the prosecution show that
petitioner was formerly an area manager of Rodsons Collection Center which sells various personal
products, such as ladies T-shirts and perfumes, mens cologne, care soap and shading strip. On
December 18, 1995, petitioner and Josalie Baguio withdrew from the Rodsons Collection Center
several items consisting of mens cologne, soap, and other sundries worth P1,583.00. Both signed the
required trust receipt agreement.However, petitioner and Josalie failed to remit the proceeds of the
sale despite Rodsons Collection Centers several demands, hence, they were charged with
estafa.Petitioner contends that while she signed the trust receipt agreement, however, she did so only
for the purpose of identifying her as the area manager of Josalie Baguio. She denied receiving any
item. The stocks withdrawn were for the account of Josalie. in finding petitioner guilty as charged, the
MTCC ruled that inasmuch as she signed the trust receipt agreement, she is bound by the terms
stipulated therein. Her failure to remit the proceeds or to return the goods to Rodsons Collection
Center constitutes estafa under Article 315(1) of the Revised Penal Code. On appeal, the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 10, Davao City, affirmed the MTCC Decision. Petitioner then elevated the matter
to the Court of Appeals by way of a petition for review. However, the Court of Appeals dismissed the
petition for being insufficient in form, not being accompanied by duplicate original or certified true
copies of the documents and material parts of the record that would support the allegations.
Moreover, there was no written explanation why service of the petition was not done personally.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied by the Appellate Court.
Hence, the instant petition.
ISSUE
WON the Court of Appeals erred in holding that petitioner failed to comply with Section 2, Rule 42 and
Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
HELD
No, the Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing the petition.
Section 2, Rule 42 of the same Rules provides:
"SEC. 2. Form and contents. The petition shall be filed in seven (7) legible copies, with the original
copy intended for the court being indicated as such by the petitioner, and shall (a) state the full
names of the parties to the case, without impleading the lower courts or judges thereof either as
petitioners or respondents; (b) indicate the specific material dates showing that it was filed on time;
(c) set forth concisely a statement of the matters involved, the issues raised, the specification of
errors of fact or law, or both, allegedly committed by the Regional Trial Court, and the reasons or
arguments relied upon for the allowance of the appeal; (d) be accompanied by clearly legible duplicate
originals or true copies of the judgments or final orders of both lower courts, certified correct by the
clerk of court of the Regional Trial Court, the requisite number of plain copies thereof and of the
pleadings and other material portions of the record as would support the allegations of the petition.
petitioner herself admits that the only documents attached to the petition in CA-G.R. CR No. 23482
were certified true copies of the Decisions of the RTC and the MTCC. There were no copies of the
pleadings filed below or other material portions of the record which would support the allegations in
the petition. Indeed, this is contrary to Section 2, Rule 42 quoted above.
Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure reads:
"SEC. 11. Priorities in modes of service and filing. Whenever practicable, the service and filing of
pleadings and other papers shall be done personally. Except with respect to papers emanating from
the court, a resort to other modes must be accompanied by a written explanation why the service or
filing was not done personally. A violation of this Rule may be cause to consider the paper as not filed."
Again, petitioner admits that she failed to comply with the above provision. She contends, however,
that no prejudice was caused to the parties by her non-compliance.
Clearly, petitioner violated both provisions quoted above which warrants the dismissal of her petition
by the Court of Appeals.
32. SPOUSES HENRY G. LIM and ROSARIO T. LIM vs. PEPITO M. VERA CRUZ
G.R. No. 143646
April 4, 2001

FACTS
The antecedent facts of this case as found by the Court of Appeals are:
A complaint for quieting of title, annulment and damages was filed by petitioner[4] against private
respondents[5] before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 84, Malolos, Bulacan, docketed as Civil Case
No. 195-M-94, alleging that he has been in possession since 1960 of a 200 square meter portion of Lot
4204 situated in Barrio Tikay, Malolos, Bulacan covered by TCT No. 191498 of the Registry of Deeds of
Bulacan in the names of Turandut, Traviata, Marcelita, Pacita, Marlene, Mathews, Victoria and Rosary,
all surnamed Aldaba; that on January 11, 1983, Rosary Aldaba sold to him said 200 square meter
portion, which is included in the formers one-eight share in Lot 4204, consisting of 1,732 square
meters; that a complaint for ejectment was filed against him in 1993 by private respondent Henry Lim,
who claims to be the owner of the property occupied by him, being a portion of the parcel of land
covered by TCT No. T-16375 registered in his name; that judgment was rendered against him in the
ejectment case, which he elevated to the appellate court, and that upon investigation, he discovered
that TCT No. T-16375 in the name of private respondents was obtained in bad faith, by fraud and/or
clever machination. On the other hand, private respondents maintained that their title is valid and
legal.
Petitioner caused the annotation of a notice of lis pendens at the back of TCT T-16375.
A motion to cancel notice of lis pendens was filed by private respondents on the grounds that said
notice was designed solely to molest them/or it is not necessary to protect petitioners rights. The
same was opposed by petitioner insisting that the notice of lis pendens was recorded in order to
protect his right over the property covered by TCT No. T-16375 and to avoid sale of property pending
the execution of the judgment in the case.
On July 22, 1998, respondent judge issued an order cancelling the notice of lis pendens annotated at
the back of TCT No. T-16375 upon the posting by private respondents of an indemnity bond in the
amount of P2,000,000.00. Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied in an order dated October
7, 1998.
Petitioners filed the instant petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, assailing the Decision dated January 25, 2000 and Resolution dated June 9, 2000 of the
Court of Appeals which set aside the order of the trial court cancelling the notice of lis pendens.
ISSUE
WON Court of Appeals erred in holding that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in
cancelling the notice of lis pendens
HELD
No. The CA did not erred in holding that trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in cancelling
the notice of lis pendens.
Lis pendens has been conceived to protect the real rights of the party causing the registration thereof.
With the lis pendens duly recorded, he could rest secure that he would not lose the property or any
part of it. For such notice serves as a warning to a prospective purchaser or incumbrancer that the
particular property is in litigation; and that he should keep his hands off the same unless of course, he
intends to gamble on the results of the litigation.Based on this principle as well as the express
provisions of Sec. 14, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, only the particular
property subject of litigation is covered by the notice of lis pendens. In this case, only the 200 square
meter portion of the entire area is embraced by the notice of lis pendens. In causing the annotation of
such notice, respondents aim is to protect his right as an owner of this specific area. Thus, the ruling
of the trial court that the notice of lis pendens is tantamount to an unlawful dispossession and
restriction of petitioners right of dominion over the entire 5,432 square meter lot covered by TCT
16375 in their names is, therefore, an erroneous conclusion. It was also observed that the trial judge
was convinced that the cancellation of the lis pendens is not in order. Otherwise, he should not have
required petitioners to post a bond of P2,000,000.00.Pursuant to Section 14, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure, as amended, earlier quoted, courts can cancel a notice of lis pendens only on two
grounds: a) after a proper showing that the notice is for the purpose of molesting the adverse party; or
b) it is not necessary to protect the interest of the party who caused it to be recorded. It bears
emphasis that respondent caused the registration of the notice of lis pendens in Civil Case No. 195-M-
94 for quieting of title to his, 200 square meter lot, not in the ejectment case. Consequently, the
notice of lis pendens annotated on TCT No. T-16375 must stay.
33. GOMEZ v. COURT OF APPEALS, ADOLFO TROCINO AND MARIANO TROCINO
GR NO. 127692
18 March 2004
FACTS:
Sometime in 1975, spouses Jesus and Caridad Trocino mortgaged 2 parcels of land to Dr. Yujuico in
Cebu City. The mortgage was subsequently foreclosed. Respondent-spouses Trocino sold the lands to
petitioner-spouses, who in turn redeemed the lands from the mortgagee. However, the spouses
Trocino refused to deliver the titles to petitioner-spouses. Thus, spouses Gomez sued spouses Trocino
for delivery of the titles. The husband Trocino died before the suit was filed, thus his children, including
Adolfo Trocino and Mariano Trocino, were impleaded in the suit. Summons was served, and it was only
received by Caridad Trocino in behalf of the children. The trial court rendered judgment against the
spouses Trocino and their heirs. Adolfo and Mariano Trocino petitioned for the annulment of the
judgment of the RTC with the CA, alleging that no jurisdiction was acquired over them. At that time,
Adolfo Trocino was a resident of Ohio, USA while Mariano Trocino was a resident of Talibon, Bohol, and
both were not found in Cebu City at the time summons was served.
ISSUES:
1. What was the nature of the complaint, upon which the manner of the service of summons should be
based?
2. WON there was a valid service of summons?
HELD:
1. The action was an action in personam. While it is a real action because it affects title to or
possession of land, it does not automatically follow that the action is one in rem. In a personal action,
the plaintiff seeks the recovery of personal property, the enforcement of a contract or the recovery of
damages. A real action is one affecting title to real property or for the recovery of possession, or for
partition or condemnation of, or foreclosure of a mortgage on real property. An action in personam is
an action against a person on the basis of his personal liability, while an action in rem is an action
against the thing itself, instead of against the person. The present case is an action in personam,
because it is an action against persons, on the basis of their personal liability of non-delivery of titles.
Thus, personal service of summons upon the private respondents is essential in order for the court to
acquire jurisdiction over their persons.
2. No. There was none. In actions in personam, summons on the defendant must be served by handing
a copy thereof to the defendant in person, or, if he refuses to receive it, by tendering it to him. In
substituted service, it is mandated that the fact of impossibility of personal service should be
explained in the proof of service. Where the defendant in an action in personam is a non-resident who
does not voluntarily submit himself to the authority of the court, personal service of summons within
the State is essential to acquire jurisdiction over his person. An exception was accorded in Gemperle
v. Schenker wherein service of summons through the non-residents wife, who was a resident of the
Philippines, was held valid, as the latter was his representative and attorney-in-fact in a prior civil case
filed by the non-resident, and the second case was merely an offshoot of the first case. In an action in
rem or quasi in rem, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is not a prerequisite to confer
jurisdiction on the court provided the court acquires jurisdiction over the res, although summons must
be served upon the defendant for purposes of due process.
Thus, where the defendant is a non-resident and not found in the Philippines, and:
1. the action affects the personal status of the plaintiff;
2. the action relates to, or the subject matter of which is property in the Philippines in which the
defendant has or claims a lien or interest;
3. the action seeks the exclusion of the defendant from any interest in the property located in the
Philippines; or
4. the property of the defendant has been attached in the Philippines, summons may be served
extrajudicially by:
a. personal service out of the country, with leave of court;
b. publication, also with leave of court; or
c. any other manner the court may deem sufficient.
The manner of service of summons must be distinguished between Adolfo Trocino and Mariano
Trocino. Since Adolfo Trocino is a resident of a foreign country, the court cannot acquire jurisdiction
over his person and validly try and decide the case against him; the action being in personam.
Mariano Trocino is a resident of Bohol and not of Cebu City. Thus, summons must be served on him
personally, or through substituted service, upon showing of impossibility of personal service. Such
impossibility, and why efforts exerted towards personal service failed, should be explained in the proof
of service. The pertinent facts and circumstances attendant to the service of summons must be
stated in the proof of service or Officers Return. Failure to do so would invalidate all subsequent
proceedings on jurisdictional grounds.
34. G.R. No. 81123February 28, 1989
CRISOSTOMO REBOLLIDO, FERNANDO VALENCIA and EDWIN REBOLLIDO,
vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and PEPSICO, INC., respondents.
Facts:
The case arose out of a vehicular accident on March 1, 1984, involving a a schoolbus driven
by petitioners Crisostomo Rebollido and Fernando Valencia, respectively and a truck trailer owned at
that time by Pepsi Cola and driven by Alberto Alva. On August 7, 1984, the petitioners filed Civil Case
damages against Pepsi Cola Bottling Company of the Philippines, Inc. and Alberto Alva before the
Regional Trial Court of Makati.
On September 21, 1984, the sheriff of the lower court served the summons addressed to the
defendants. It was received by one Nanette Sison who represented herself to be the authorized person
receiving court processes as she was the secretary of the legal department of Pepsi Cola. Pepsi Cola
failed to file an answer and was later declared in default. The lower court heard the case ex-parte and
adjudged the defendants jointly and severally liable for damages in a decision.
On August 5, 1985, when the default judgment became final and executory, the petitioners
filed a motion for execution, a copy of which was received no longer by the defendant Pepsi Cola but
by private respondent PEPSICO, Inc., which held offices here for the purpose, among others, of settling
Pepsi Cola's debts, liabilities and obligations to the expected dissolution of Pepsi Cola.
Realizing that the judgment of the lower court would eventually be executed against it,
respondent PEPSICO, Inc., opposed the motion for execution and moved to vacate the judgment on
the ground of lack of jurisdiction. The private respondent questioned the validity of the service of
summons to a mere clerk. It invoked Section 13, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court on the manner of
service upon a private domestic corporation and Section 14 of the same rule on service upon a private
foreign corporation.
On August 14, 1985, the lower court denied the motion of the private respondent holding that
under Section 122 of the Corporation Code, the defendant continued its corporate existence for three
(3) years from the date of dissolution. On December 29, 1986, the Court of Appeals granted the
petition on the ground of lack of jurisdiction ruling that there was no valid service of summons which
should be made upon the private respondent itself in accordance with Section 14, Rule 14 of the Rules
of Court. It remanded the case to the lower court and ordered that the private respondent be
summoned and be given its day in court.
On November 27, 1987, a motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence this petition.
Issues: (1) whether or not Pepsi Cola, the dissolved corporation, is the real party
in interest to whom summons should be served in the civil case for
damages; and
(2) whether or not there was valid service of summons through Nanette
Sison, allegedly the secretary of the legal department of Pepsi Cola. If
there was valid service of summons upon Pepsi Cola, the issue arises as to
whether or not such service validly vested jurisdiction on the lower court
over the person of the respondent corporation.
Held: 1. Yes. A real party in interest-plaintiff is one who has a legal right while a real party in
interest-defendant is one who has a correlative legal obligation whose act or omission violates the
legal rights of the former.
For purposes of valid summons, the dissolved Pepsi Cola was the real party in interest-
defendant in the civil case filed by the petitioners not only because it is the registered owner of the
truck involved but also because, when the cause of action accrued, Pepsi Cola still existed as a
corporation and was the party involved in the acts violative of the legal right of another.
Also, the law provides that a corporation whose corporate term has ceased can still be made
a party to a suit. Under paragraph 1, Section 122 of the Corporation Code, a dissolved corporation:
xxx shall nevertheless be continued as a body corporate for three (3) years after the time
when it would have been so dissolved, for the purpose of prosecuting and defending suits
by or against it and enabling it to settle and close its affairs, to dispose of and convey its
property and to distribute its assets, but not for the purpose of continuing the business
for which it was established.xxx
2. Yes. Section 13, Rule 14 mandates:
Service upon private domestic corporation or partnership. - If the defendant is a
corporation organized under the laws of the Philippines or a partnership duly registered,
service may be made on the president, manager, secretary , cashier, agent or any of its
directors.
Therefore, service upon a dissolved corporation may be made through any of the persons
enumerated in Section 13, Rule 14. Whomsoever Miss Sison was acting for in receiving the summons
there is no question that the notice of the action was promptly delivered either to Pepsi Cola or
PEPSICO with whom she is admittedly connected. We rule, as in G & G Trading Corporation v. Court of
Appeals (supra), that there was substantial compliance with Section 13, Rule 14 because the purpose
of notice was satisfied. Contrary to the decision of the Court of Appeals, we therefore, hold that there
was proper service of summons to bind Pepsi Cola and that the decision of the lower court against
Pepsi Cola rendered on June 24, 1985 is valid and enforceable against the private respondent.
Therefore, we rule that the private respondent is bound to satisfy the judgment by default
which has become final and executory. The lower court did not abuse its discretion in denying the
motion of the private respondent to vacate judgment.
Motion GRANTED and CA is REVERSE
35. SPOUSES VIOLETA S. VENTURANZA and ROMY VENTURANZA, petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. JUDGE BERNARDO P. PARDO, PRESIDING JUDGE OF
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA, BRANCH XLIII, HON. JUDGE ERNESTO MADAMBA,
PRESIDING JUDGE OF METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT OF MANILA, BRANCH XVII AND NIEVES
SENORAN, respondents.
G.R. No. 77760 December 11, 1987
Facts:
On 22 May 1985, plaintiff Nieves Y. Senoran (now private respondent) filed a complaint
against spouses Violeta S. Venturanza and Romy Venturanza (now petitioners) with the Metropolitan
Trial Court of Manila, Branch XVI 1 for collection of sums of money in the aggregate amount of
P9,711.50, representing several loans evidenced by promissory notes which had become due and
demandable but unpaid despite repeated demands. For failure of the petitioners to file their Answer, a
decision dated 12 August 1985 was rendered by the court a quo based on the allegations of fact in the
complaint, and ordering the petitioners to pay jointly and severally the private respondent the sum of
P9,711.50 with interest thereon at the rate of 12% per annum from due date per promissory notes
until fully paid, to pay P1,000.00 as attorney's fees and costs of suit. Considering that, as per sheriff's
Return, dated 17 August 1985, said decision could not be served upon the petitioners, on the ground
that they were no longer at said address, the same was served on 16 September 1985 upon Violeta S.
Venturanza in her office at Asian Development Bank. On 22 September 1985, petitioners filed a
"Motion to Set Aside Decision and to Declare Past Proceedings Null and Void for Lack of Jurisdiction,"
alleging that there had been no proper and valid service of summons upon them in accordance with
either Section 7 or Section 8 of Rule 14 of the Rules of Court and that the court a quo never acquired
jurisdiction over the person of the petitioners, considering that the address where the summons was
served is the residence of Violeta S. Venturanza's father, Augusto Soan, and not the residence or
dwelling house of the petitioners, and that since April 1985, petitioners had been already residing at
Aurora Street, Pasay City. In an order dated 20 October 1985, the court a quo denied the motion, for
lack of merit.
Issue:
Whether or not the Metropolitan Trial Court validly acquired jurisdiction over the persons of
the petitioners when the summons was served upon Augusto Soans address which is no longer the
residence nor the place of business of petitioners.
Held:
No. Under Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, there are three (3) methods of service of summons in
civil actions, namely: 1) personal service (See. 7); 2) substituted service (Sec. 8); and 3) service by
publication. Strict compliance with these modes of service is required in order that the court may
require jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. Service of summons upon the defendant is the
means by which the court acquires jurisdiction over his person. This process is for the benefit of the
defendant, and is intended to afford the latter an opportunity to be heard on the claim against him. In
the absence of valid waiver trial and judgment, without such service, are null and void. There is no
question that the case at bar which is an action for collection of sum of money is an action in
personam thereby requiring personal service of summons on the defendants. In an action strictly in
personam, personal sevice of summons within the forum is essential to the acquisition of jurisdiction
over the person of the defendant who does not voluntarily submit himself to the authority of the court.
It is only when a defendant cannot be personally served with summons within a reasonable
time that a substituted service may be availed of. For a substituted service to be valid, summons
served at the defendant's residence must be served at his residence at the time of such service and
not at his former place of residence.
Upon careful examination of the sheriff 's Return in this case, which purports to serve as proof
that summons had been served upon the defendants, no statement is made that an effort or attempt
was exerted to personally serve the summons on the defendants and that the same had failed. In fact,
said Return does not even indicate the address of the defendants to whom summons was supposed to
have been served. The presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions by the sheriff
is not applicable in this case where it is patent that the sheriff's return is defective.
36
37. G.R. No. 158407 January 17, 2005
FILOMENA DOMAGAS, petitioner, vs. VIVIAN LAYNO JENSEN, respondent.
Facts:
On February 19, 1999, petitioner Filomena Domagas filed a complaint for forcible entry
against respondent Vivian Jensen before the MTC of Calasiao, Pangasinan. The petitioner alleged in her
complaint that she was the registered owner of a parcel of land covered by Original Certificate of Title
(OCT) No. P-30980, situated in Barangay Buenlag, Calasiao, Pangasinan, and with an area of 827
square meters. On January 9, 1999 the respondent, by means of force, strategy and stealth, gained
entry into the petitioners property by excavating a portion thereof and thereafter constructing a fence
thereon. As such, the petitioner was deprived of a 68-square meter portion of her property along the
boundary line.
The summons and the complaint were not served on the respondent because the latter was
apparently out of the country. The Sheriff left the summons and complaint with Oscar Layno, the
brother of respondent, who received the same. The MTC rendered judgment ordering the respondent
and all persons occupying the property for and in the latters behalf to vacate the disputed area.
Respondent filed a complaint against the petitioner before the RTC of Dagupan City for the annulment
of the decision of the MTC in Civil Case No. 879, on the ground that due to the Sheriffs failure to serve
the complaint and summons on her because she was in Oslo, Norway, the MTC never acquired
jurisdiction over her person. After due proceedings, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of the
respondent.
The petitioner appealed the decision to the CA which rendered judgment affirming the
appealed decision with modifications. The CA ruled that the complaint was one for ejectment, which is
an action quasi in rem. The appellate court ruled that since the defendant therein was temporarily out
of the country, the summons and the complaint should have been served via extraterritorial service
under Section 15 in relation to Section 16, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, which likewise requires prior
leave of court. Considering that there was no prior leave of court and none of the modes of service
prescribed by the Rules of Court was followed by the petitioner, the CA concluded that there was really
no valid service of summons and complaint upon the respondent.
Hence, the present petition.
Issue: Whether or not there was a valid service of the summons and complaint.
Held:
The contention of the petitioner has no merit.
In an action in personam, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is necessary for the
court to validly try and decide the case. Jurisdiction over the person of a resident defendant who does
not voluntarily appear in court can be acquired by personal service of summons as provided under
Section 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. If he cannot be personally served with summons within a
reasonable time, substituted service may be made in accordance with Section 8 of said Rule. If he is
temporarily out of the country, any of the following modes of service may be resorted to:
(a) substituted service set forth in Section 8;
(2) personal service outside the country, with leave of court;
(3) service by publication, also with leave of court; or
(4) any other manner the court may deem sufficient.
Also, there is no showing that as of April 5, 1999, the house where the Sheriff found Oscar
Layno was the latters residence or that of the respondent herein. Neither is there any showing that
the Sheriff tried to ascertain where the residence of the respondent was on the said date. It turned out
that the occupant of the house was a lessor, Eduardo Gonzales, and that Oscar Layno was in the
premises only to collect the rentals from him. The service of the summons on a person at a place
where he was a visitor is not considered to have been left at the residence or place or abode, where
he has another place at which he ordinarily stays and to which he intends to return.
38. Erlinda Velayo-Fong vs Spouses Raymond and Maria Hedy Velayo
G.R. No. 155488 December 6, 2006
FACTS:
Spouses Raymond and Maria hedy Velayo filed a complaint for collection of sum of money against
Velayo-Fong. In the complaint, spouses Velayo alleged that Velayo-Fong was a resident of Hanolulu,
Hawaii,USA. Since Velayo-Fong was a non-resident and not found in the Philippines, Spouses Velayo
prayed for a writ to attach Velayo-Fongs properties found in the Philippines.
However, before the application for the writ can be acted upon by the RTC, spouses Velayo filed an
Urgent Motion praying that the summons be served to Velayo-Fong at her Two Condominium
Suites.One at Roxas Boulevard, Pasay City and another, at Burgos Street, Towers Condominium,
Makati. Subsequently, the RTC granted the said motion.
Then, the Process server indicated on his Officers Return that after several failed attempts to serve the
copy of summons and complaints issued at the given address of Velayo-Fong, Finally, the Process
server was able to serve personally the summons together with the copy of the complaint upon
Velayo-Fong, not at her two addresses but at the lobby of a hotel, right in the presence of a lobby
counter personnel but Velayo-Fong refused to sign in the receipt thereof.
Later, the RTC in its Order declared Velayo-Fong in default for failure to file an answer. Velayo-Fong
upon knowing the order of the RTC, filed a Motion to set Aside Order of Default claiming that she was
prevented from filing a responsive pleading and defending herself against respondents, complaint
because of fraud, accident or mistake; that contrary to the Officers; return, no summons was served
upon her; that she was has valid and meritorious defenses to refute respondents material allegation.
The RTC denied the Motion and CA affirmed RTCs order.
Now, Velayo-Fong questioned the propriety and validity of the service of summons made upon her as
she did not remember that a man hurled some papers at her while she was entering the elevator and
not knowing what the papers were all about, she threw back the papers to the man she has a valid
and meritorious defense to refute the material allegations of respondents; complain.
She also argued that the summons should have been served through extraterritorial service since she
is a non-resident.
ISSUES:
Whether or not service of summon may be effective on a non-resident.
RULING:
NO. Under Sec.17, Rule 14 when the defendant is a non-resident and he is not found in the country
summons may be served extraterritorially. This kind of service of summons applies only where the
actions is in rem because in in rem and quasi in rem actions, jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant is not a prerequisites to confer jurisdiction on the court provided that the court acquires
jurisdiction over the res.
Where the action is in personam and when the defendant is a non-resident, personal service of
summons within the states is essential to the acquisition of jurisdiction over the person. This cannot
be done, however, if the defendant is not physically presents in the country, and thus the court cannot
acquire jurisdiction over the person and therefore cannot validly try and decide the case against him.
In the present case, spouses Velayos cause of action and their prayer that actual and moral damages,
plus attorneys fees, be awarded in their favour affect the parties alone, not the whole world. Any
judgement therein is binding only upon the parties properly impleaded, thus, it is an action in
personam. As such personal service of summons upon the defendants is essential in order for the
court to acquire jurisdiction over their person.
39. G.R. No. 165273, March 10, 2010
LEAH PALMA, petitioner
vs
HON.DANILO P. GALVEZ, Presiding Judge,
RTC Br. 24, Iloilo City, and PSYCHE ELENA AGUDO, private respondent
Facts:
The herein petitioner filed with RTC an Action with Damages against the Phil. Heart Center
and its two doctors. Defendants subsequently filed their answers. Petitioner subsequently filed a
Motion for Leave to Admit Amended Complaint, praying for the inclusion of the herein private
respondent Agudo as additional defendant. As per process servers return, the summons was served
upon private respondent thru her husband MR. AGUDO who received and signed the same in behalf of
his wife who was out of the country.
On March 1, 2004, counsel of private respondent filed a Notice of Appearance and a Motion
for Extension of Time to File Answer. On March 15, 2004, another Motion for Extension of time to file
Answer was filed by the said counsel because the draft answer would be sent to private respondent for
her clarification/verification before the Philippine Consulate in Ireland.
On March 30, 2004, private respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss [6] on the ground that the RTC
had not acquired jurisdiction over her as she was not properly served with summons, since she was
temporarily out of the country; that service of summons on her should conform to Section 16, Rule 14
of the Rules of Court. The court granted the said motion based on the ground raised by the private
respondent. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which the RTC denied.
Issue:
1. Whether or not petitioner's certiorari under Rule 65 is the proper remedy and not a petition
for review under Rule 45.
2. Whether or not the petition was not properly verified because while the verification was
dated September 15, 2004, the petition was dated September 30, 2004.
3. Whether or not the service of summons on private respondent thru her husband was valid.
Held:
1. Yes. A petition for certiorari is proper when there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy at law.
Section 1, Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states that an appeal may be taken
only from a final order that completely disposes of the case; that no appeal may be taken
from (a),b),c),d),(e),(f),(g) a judgment or final order for or against one or more of several
parties or in separate claims, counterclaims, cross-claims and third-party complaints,
while the main case is pending, unless the court allows an appeal therefrom; or (h). In all
the above instances where the judgment or final order is not appealable, the aggrieved party may file
an appropriate special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65.
In this case, the RTC Order granting the motion to dismiss filed by private respondent is a
final order because it terminates the proceedings against her, but it falls within exception (g) of the
Rule since the case involves several defendants, and the complaint for damages against these
defendants is still pending. Since there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in
law, the remedy of a special civil action for certiorari is proper as there is a need to promptly relieve
the aggrieved party from the injurious effects of the acts of an inferior court or tribunal.
2. Yes. The purpose of requiring a verification is to secure an assurance that the allegations of
the petition have been made in good faith, or are true and correct, not merely speculative. In this
instance, petitioner attached a verification to her petition although dated earlier than the filing of her
petition. Petitioner explains that since a draft of the petition and the verification were earlier sent to
her in New York for her signature, the verification was earlier dated than the petition
for certiorari filed. While Section 1, Rule 65 requires that the petition for certiorari be verified, this is
not an absolute necessity where the material facts alleged are a matter of record and the questions
raised are mainly of law.[15] In this case, the issue raised is purely of law.
3. Yes. The service of summons under Sec. 16, Rule 14 in relation to Sec. 15 which provides for the
extraterritorial service of summons uses the word may and also, hence, it is not mandatory. In Montalban v.
Maximo the Supreme Court held that substituted service of summons under the present Section 7,
Rule 14 of the Rules of Court in a suit in personam against residents of the Philippines temporarily
absent therefrom is the normal method of service of summons that will confer jurisdiction on the court
over such defendant.
Considering that private respondent was temporarily out of the country and makes no issue
as to the fact that the place where the summons was served was her residence, the service of
summons thru her husband who is presumably a person of suitable age and discretion and therefore
competent to receive such court process on the formers behalf is valid under Section 7, Rule 14 of the
Rules of Court.
The Supreme Court granted the petition and ordered for the setting aside the Orders of the
RTC and directed the private respondent to file her answer within the reglementary period from receipt
of the SCs decision.
40. Florentino Gonzales, Edgardo Santos, LeopoldoRosete. Et.al
vsBalikbayanKilusang Bayan saPananalapi,Inc. To stave off the impending eviction of petitioners, this Court issued a restraining order on
G.R. NO. 150859, March 28, 2005 April 28, 1986 directed against the reviewing authority and private respondent until further orders.
Issue:
1. Whether or not the court of origin acquired jurisdiction over the person of the petitioners
FACTS even though the statutory norms of the service of summons has not been complied with by the person
Sometime in November 7, 1997, petitioner Florentino Gonzales together with other petitioners who effected the service.
Edgardo Santos, LeopoldoRosete, Felina Victoria and Cristetadela Cruz obtained a loan of P150, 000.
On a promissory note, they bind themselves jointly and severally to pay the loan in monthly 2. Whether or not the fact that the petitioners are supposedly occupying a parcel of land
amortizations of P6,250 for two years starting November 7, 1997 up to November 7, 1999. Petitioner other than the realty claimed by private respondent deserves consideration on appeal by certiorari.
Gonzales failed to pay despite repeated written demands, respondent filed then a case for sum of
money and damages in the Municipal Trial Court of Bocaue. Summons were thereafter served and the 3. Whether or not the execution pending appeal which was granted without any prior notice
case was set for hearing on September 29, 2000. On the scheduled hearing, defendants appeared but to them is valid.
because they failed to file their answer to the complaint, the court declared them in default and
thereafter allowed the presentation of respondents evidence ex-parte on October 6, 2000. Held:
On January 23, 2001, the court a quo rendered its decision finding for the respondent and against the 1. Yes. Even, and assuming in gratia argumenti that the statutory norms on service of
petitioners and ordering the latter to pay jointly and severally to the former the sum of P128,953.45 summons have not been strictly complied with in as much as the proof of service of the summons
with interest thereon at the rate of 11% per annum from the time demand was made until upon petitioners does not indicate impossibility of personal service, a condition precedent for resorting
fully paid. to substituted service, still, any defect in form and in the manner of effecting service thereof were
nonetheless erased when petitioners' counsel moved to re-examine the impugned decision and posed
a subsequent bid on appeal to impede immediate execution. Indeed, such demeanor is tantamount to
Petitioners appealed to Regional Trial Court of Bocaue contending that the court a quo erred when it
voluntary submission to the competencia of the court within the purview of Section 23, Rule 14 of the
declared them in default as they were not notified of the respondents motion to declare them in
Revised Rules of Court since any mode of appearance in court by a defendant or his lawyer is
default but the Regional Trial court affirmed the decision of MTC.
equivalent to service of summons, absent any indication that the appearance of counsel for petitioner
Petitioners elevated the case on Court of Appeals.
was precisely to protest the jurisdiction of the court over the person of defendant.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not petitioners substantially complied with the certification on non-forum
2. No. It deserves scant consideration since a clarification on a factual query of this nature is
shopping and on attachment of certain relevant documents
proscribed by the second paragraph, Section 2 of Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court. Furthermore,
2. Whether or not the judgement by default is void for lack of jurisdiction over the petitioners
counsel for petitioners' assertion in the notice of appeal filed with respondent judge that the grievance
who were not serve with summons properly.
to be elevated to the Supreme Court will focus "fully on a question of law" is a self-defeating posture
RULING:
and operates as a legal bar for the Supreme Court to dwell into the truth or falsehood of such factual
1. No. Court of Appeals ruled that petitioners did not satisfactory explain upon failure of the
premise
other petitioners to sign the certification of non-forum shopping nor did it cure the said
defect, hence the petition was appropriately and validly to dismiss.
3. Yes. Petitioners stance that the execution pending appeal which was granted without any
prior notice to them is invalid erroneously suggests that the court is duty-bound to notify petitioners of
2. No, the records showed that after the court a quo issued the default order, the petitioners did
the immediate enforcement of the appealed decision. A contrario, it is the prevailing party moving for
not file any pleading at all questioning its validity. They merely waited for the decision to be
execution pending appeal under Section 2, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court who is obliged to
rendered, and when it was adverse to their interest, they began questioning it. On the other
serve a copy of such motion on the adverse partys counsel, which, on the face of the subject motion,
hand, there was no showing at all that petitioners ever questioned the jurisdiction of the MTC
was effected by personal delivery.
over them, except when the judgment in default was already rendered. Court of Appeals
ruled that to properly avail of the defense of invalid service of summons, petitioners should
The SC ordered for the dismissal of the petition and the lifting of the Restraining Order.
have questioned it and the MTCs exercise of jurisdiction over them from the very start.
CASE NO. 1
41. G.R. No. 73531. April 6, 1993.
G.R. No. 127692 March 10, 2004
DOLORES DELOS SANTOS, et, al., petitioners,
FORTUNATO GOMEZ and AURORA GOMEZ, petitioners,
vs.
vs.
HON. JUDGE CAMILO MONTESA, JR. and JUANA DELOS SANTOS, respondents.
COURT OF APPEALS, ADOLFO TROCINO and MARIANO TROCINO, respondents.
Facts:
FACTS: Sometime in 1975, the spouses Jesus and Caridad Trocino mortgaged two parcels of land. The
The private respondent filed a suit for desahucio (unlawful detainer) against petitioners.
mortgage was subsequently foreclosed. The respondent spouses Trocino sold the property to
Summons was served through the mother of petitioners when the process server was unable to locate
petitioners spouses who in turn, redeemed the lands from mortgagee. The spouses Trocino, however,
them in Talampas, Bustos, Bulacan. For failure of petitioners to submit the corresponding answer,
refused to convey ownership of the properties to petitioners; hence, spouses Gomez sued spouses
judgment was rendered pursuant to the rules on summary procedure. Upon learning of said decision,
Trocino for delivery of titles. The husband Trocino died before the suit was filed, thus his children
petitioners sought to reconsider on the principal thesis that they were never served notice of the
Adolfo and Mariano impleaded in the suit. Summons was served and it was only received by Caridad
conciliation meeting at the barangay level, as well as the summons. They insist that private
Trocino in behalf of the children. The RTC rendered judgment against the spouses Trocino and the
respondent was referring to a different piece of realty and that Dolores' husband should have been
heirs.Adolfo and Mariano Trocino petitioned for the annulment of the judgment of the RTC with the CA
impleaded. Upon appeal, the RTC Br. 19 presided over by herein respondent judge, granted private
alleging that no jurisdiction was acquired over them. At that time Adolfo Trocino was already residing
respondents motion for execution pending appeal on account of petitioners' failure to post a
supersedeas bond.
in Ohio, U.S.A and Mariano Trocino was in Talibon, Bohol. And both were not found in Cebu City at the
time summons were served.
ISSUE:
1 What was the nature of the complaint, upon which the manner of the service of summons
should be based?
2 Was there a valid service of summons?
3 If personal service were impossible to comply what should have been done?
RULING:
1. The action was an action in personam, while it is a real action because it affects title or
possession of the land, it does not automatically follow that the action is one in rem. But it is an action
against a person on the basis of the personal liability of non delivery of the titles. Thus, personal
service of summons upon the private respondents is essential in order for the court to acquire
jurisdiction over the person.
2. There was no valid summons. In actions in personam, summons on the defendant must be
served by handing a copy thereof to the defendant in person, or, if he refuses to receive it, by
tendering it to him. This is specifically provided in Section 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. In
substituted service, it is mandated that the fact of impossibility of personal service should be
explained in the proof of service.
When the defendant in an action in personam is a non-resident who does not voluntarily
submit himself to the authority of the court, personal service of summons within the State is essential
to the acquisition of jurisdiction over his person. This cannot be done if the defendant is not physically
present in the country, and thus, the court cannot acquire jurisdiction over his person and therefore
cannot validly try and decide the case against him. An exception was accorded in Gemperle vs.
Schenker wherein service of summons through the non-residents wife, who was a resident of the
Philippines, was held valid, as the latter was his representative and attorney-in-fact in a prior civil case
filed by the non-resident, and the second case was merely an offshoot of the first case.
The manner of summons must be distinguished Adolfo Trocino being a non-resident, the court
cannot acquire jurisdiction over his person and validly try and decide the case against him. The action
being in personam. On the other hand, Mariano Trocino has been in Talibon, Bohol not in Cebu City to
validly acquire jurisdiction over his person, summons must be served on him personally, or through
substituted service, upon showing of impossibility of personal service. Such impossibility, and why
efforts exerted towards personal service failed, should be explained in the proof of service. The
pertinent facts and circumstances attendant to the service of summons must be stated in the proof of
service or Officers Return. Failure to do so would invalidate all subsequent proceedings on
jurisdictional grounds.
3. Moreover, inasmuch as the sheriffs return failed to state the facts and circumstances
showing the impossibility of personal service of summons upon respondents within a reasonable time,
petitioners should have sought the issuance of an alias summons. Under Section 5, Rule 14 of the
Rules of Court, alias summons may be issued when the original summons is returned without being
served on any or all of the defendants. Petitioners, however, did not do so, and they should now bear
the consequences of their lack of diligence.
CASE 2
REBOLLIDO, ET AL VS. HONORABLE CA AND PESICO INC.,
G.R. NO. 81123
FEBRUARY 28, 1989
FACTS: Petitioners filed a civil case for damages against Pepsi Cola Bottling Company of the
Philippines Inc. and Alberto Lava before the RTC, involving a vehicular accident. On September
21,1984, the sheriff of the lower court served the summons addressed to the defendants. It was
received by one Nanette Sison who represented herself to be the authorized person receiving court
processes as she was the secretary of the legal department of Pepsi Cola.
The RTC heard the case ex-parte and adjudged the defendants jointly and severally liable for
damages. PEPSICO Inc., a foreign corporation organized under the State of Delaware, USA, held offices
here for the purpose of settling Pepsi Colas debts, liabilities and obligations, opposed the motion for
execution filed by the petitioners, and moved to vacate the judgment on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction due to invalidity of the service of summons to a mere clerk.
The lower court denied the motion, holding that there was proper service of summons because the
defendant continued its existence for 3 years from the date of dissolution.
The CA ruled that there was no valid service of summons, and that the service of summons should be
made upon the private respondent itself in accordance with Section 14, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court.
It remanded the case to the lower court and ordered that the private respondent be summoned and be
given its day in court.
ISSUES:
1 Whether or not Pepsi Cola, the dissolved corporation, is the real party in interest to whom
summons should be served in the civil case for damages;
2 Whether or not there was valid service of summons through Nanette Sison, allegedly the
secretary of the legal department of Pepsi Cola.
HELD:
1 YES. For purposes of valid summons, the dissolved Pepsi Cola was the real party in interest-
defendant in the civil case filed by the petitioners not only because it is the registered owner
of the truck involved but also because, when the cause of action accrued, Pepsi Cola still
existed as a corporation and was the party involved in the acts violative of the legal right of
another. The law provides that a corporation whose corporate term has ceased can still be
made a party to a suit. It shall be continued as a body corporate for three (3) years after the
time when it would have been so dissolved, for the purpose of prosecuting and defending
suits by or against it and enabling it to settle and close its affairs, to dispose of and convey
its property and to distribute its assets, but not for the purpose of continuing the business for
which it was established. The right of action of the petitioners against Pepsi Cola and its
driver arose not at the time when the complaint was filed but when the acts or omission
constituting the cause of action accrued.
2 YES. There was a valid service of summons to bind Pepsi Cola. Whomsoever Miss Sison was
acting for in receiving the summons there is no question that the notice of the action was
promptly delivered either to Pepsi Cola or PEPSICO with whom she is admittedly connected.
We rule, as in G & G Trading Corporation v. Court of Appeals (supra), that there was
substantial compliance with Section 13, Rule 14 because the purpose of notice was satisfied.
At the time of the issuance and receipt of the summons, Pepsi Cola was already dissolved.
The Court is of the opinion that service is allowed in such a situation. Since our law
recognizes the liability of a dissolved corporation to an aggrieved creditor, it is but logical for
the law to allow service of process upon a dissolved corporation. Otherwise, substantive
rights would be lost by the mere lack of explicit technical rules. The Rules of Court on service
of summons upon a private domestic corporation is also applicable to a corporation which is
no longer a going concern. Service upon a dissolved corporation may be made through any of
the persons enumerated in Section 13, Rule 14.
The purpose is to render it reasonably certain that the corporation will receive prompt and
proper notice in an action against it or to insure that the summons be served on a
representative so integrated with the corporation that such person will know what to do with
the legal papers served on him. In other words, 'to bring home to the corporation notice of
the filing of the action.
CASE 3
SPS. VENTURANZA VS. HONORABLE CA, ET AL
G.R. NO. 77760 DECEMBER 11, 1987
FACTS: Plaintiff Nieves Y. Senoran (now private respondent) filed a complaint against spouses Violeta
S. Venturanza and Romy Venturanza (now petitioners) with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, for
collection of sums of money in the aggregate amount of P9,711.50, representing several loans
evidenced by promissory notes which had become due and demandable but unpaid despite repeated
demands. On June 10, 1985, summons was issued against the petitioners on Augusto Soan, father of
petitioner Violeta S. Venturanza, at 3412 B.A. Tan Street. Barrio Obrero Tondo, Manila, the address of
petitioners stated in the complaint. The court a quo rendered a decision ordering Venturanza to pay
jointly and severally the private respondent.
On September 22, 1985, petitioners filed a "Motion to Set Aside Decision and to Declare Past
Proceedings Null and Void for Lack of Jurisdiction," alleging that there had been no proper and valid
service of summons upon them and that the court a quo never acquired jurisdiction over the person of
the petitioners, considering that the address where the summons was served is the residence of
Violeta S. Venturanza's father, Augusto Soan, and not the residence or dwelling house of the
petitioners. The telephone directory of the Asian Development Bank where defendant is employed,
also indicates that the defendant is a resident of Tondo, Manila.
The court a quo denied the motion for lack of merit since the defendants motion that they have been
residing at Aurora St., Pasay City since April 1985, was not supported by any other competent
evidence.
On appeal to RTC, decision by the MeTC was affirmed with slight modification as to the amount of
damages. On a petition for review, the CA affirmed in toto the RTCs decision. Hence this petition for
certiorari.
ISSUES:
1 WON Metropolitan Trial Court acquired jurisdiction over the person of the petitioners when the
summons was served upon Augusto Soan, father of petitioner Violeta S. Venturanza at 3412
B.A. Tan St., Bo. Obrero Tondo, Manila, which address is no longer the residence nor the place
of business of petitioners.
2 Whether or not the provisions of Section 8, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court was legally complied
with by the Sheriff in serving the summons upon the father of one of the petitioners.
HELD:
1 No. The MeTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of the petitioners. The action for
collection of sum of money, being an action in personam, requires the personal service of
summons on the defendants to acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. It was
admitted by Venturanza that they were actual residents of Tondo, Manila in 1984 , but
transferred in April 1985 to Pasay City. There was also an affidavit of Augusto Soan
stating that he never told the sheriff that the defendants were residing in his house
at Tondo, Manila, sufficiently negating the conclusion of the court a quo.
2 No. It is only when a defendant cannot be personally served with summons within a
reasonable time that a substituted service may be availed of, the same to be effected in the
following manner: a) by leaving copies of the summons at the defendants' dwelling house or
residence, with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or b) by
leaving the copies at defendant's office or regular place of business, with some competent
person in charge thereof. For a substituted service to be valid, summons served at the
defendant's residence must be served at his residence at the time of such service and not at
his former place of residence.
It is required by law that an effort or attempt should first be made to personally serve the
summons and after this has failed, a substituted service may be caused upon the defendant,
and the same must be reflected in the proof of service. Upon careful examination of the
sheriff 's Return in this case, which purports to serve as proof that summons had been served
upon the defendants, together with a copy of the complaint, through Augusto Soan, no
statement is made that an effort or attempt was exerted to personally serve the summons on
the defendants and that the same had failed. In fact, said Return does not even indicate the
address of the defendants to whom summons was supposed to have been served. The
presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions by the sheriff is not
applicable in this case where it is patent that the sheriff's return is defective.
CASE NO.4
FILOMENA DOMAGAS vs. VIVIAN LAYNO JENSEN
G.R. No. 158407. January 17, 2005
FACTS:
On February 19, 1999, petitioner Filomena Domagas filed a complaint for forcible entry
against respondent Vivian Jensen before the MTC of Calasiao, Pangasinan. The petitioner alleged in her
complaint that she was the registered owner of a parcel of land covered by Original Certificate of Title
(OCT) No. P-30980, situated in Barangay Buenlag, Calasiao, Pangasinan, and with an area of 827
square meters of which petitioner was deprived of a 68-square meter portion of her property along the
boundary line. The MTC rendered the decision in favour of the petitioner.
The respondent failed to appeal the decision. Consequently, a writ of execution was issued.
Then, the respondent filed a complaint against the petitioner before the RTC of Dagupan City for the
annulment of the decision of the MTC in Civil Case No. 879, on the ground that due to the Sheriffs
failure to serve the complaint and summons on her because she was in Oslo, Norway, the MTC never
acquired jurisdiction over her person. The respondent alleged therein that the service of the complaint
and summons through substituted service on her brother, Oscar Layno, was improper because he was
merely visiting her house in Barangay Buenlag and was not a resident nor an occupant of the house
being leased to Eduardo Gonzales. Judgment is rendered in favor of plaintiff Jensen and against
defendant Domagas declaring the previous decision of the MTC of Calasiao, as null and void, for lack
of jurisdiction over the person of the plaintiff and the subject matter. The trial court declared that
there was no valid service of the complaint and summons on the respondent Jensen the defendant in
Civil Case No. 879, considering that she left the Philippines on February 17, 1999 for Oslo, Norway,
and her brother Oscar Layno was never authorized to receive the said complaint and summons for and
in her behalf.
The petitioner appealed the decision to the CA which rendered judgment affirming the appealed
decision of the RTC with modifications. The CA ruled that the complaint in Civil Case No. 879 was one
for ejectment, which is an action quasi in rem. The appellate court ruled that since the defendant
therein was temporarily out of the country, the summons and the complaint should have been
served via extraterritorial service under Section 15 in relation to Section 16, Rule 14 of the Rules of
Court, which likewise requires prior leave of court. Considering that there was no prior leave of court
and none of the modes of service prescribed by the Rules of Court was followed by the petitioner, the
CA concluded that there was really no valid service of summons and complaint upon the respondent,
the defendant in Civil Case No. 879. Hence, the petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent was validly served with summons and the complaint by
substituted sevice.
HELD: No. There is no showing that as of April 5, 1999, the house where the Sheriff found Oscar Layno
was the latters residence or that of the respondent herein. Neither is there any showing that the
Sheriff tried to ascertain where the residence of the respondent was on the said date. It turned out
that the occupant of the house was a lessor, Eduardo Gonzales, and that Oscar Layno was in the
premises only to collect the rentals from him. The service of the summons on a person at a place
where he was a visitor is not considered to have been left at the residence or place or abode, where
he has another place at which he ordinarily stays and to which he intends to return.
The Voters Registration Record of Oscar Layno wherein he declared that he was a resident of the same
barangay cannot prevail over the Contract of Lease the respondent had executed in favor of Eduardo
Gonzales showing that the latter had resided and occupied the house of the respondent as lessee and
the affidavit of Eduardo Gonzales that Oscar Layno was not residing in the said house on during the
said service of complaint and summons. In sum, then, the respondent was not validly served with
summons and the complaint in Civil Case No. 879 on April 5, 1999, by substituted service. Hence, the
MTC failed to acquire jurisdiction over the person of the respondent; as such, the decision of the MTC
in Civil Case No. 879 is null and void.
CASE NO. 5
ERLINDA R. VELAYO-FONG vs. SPOUSES RAYMOND and MARIA HEDY VELAYO
G.R. NO. 155488 December 6, 2006
FACTS: On August 9, 1993, Raymond Velayo (Raymond) and his wife, Maria
Hedy Velayo (respondents) filed a complaint for sum of money and damages with prayer for
preliminary attachment against Erlinda R. Velayo-Fong (petitioner), Rodolfo R. Velayo, Jr. (Rodolfo Jr.)
and Roberto R. Velayo (Roberto). Raymond is the half-brother of petitioner and her co-
defendants. Respondents cause of action in Civil Case No. Q-93-17133 is anchored on the claim that
petitioner, a resident of 1860 Alamoana Boulevard, Honolulu, Hawaii, USA, and her co-defendants
maliciously instituted a criminal complaint before the NBI and a petition before the SEC which
prevented the respondents from leaving the country and paralyzed the latters business transactions.
Respondents pray that actual and moral damages, plus attorneys fees, be awarded in their favor.
Before respondents application for a writ of preliminary attachment can be acted upon by
the RTC, respondents filed an Urgent Motion praying that the summons addressed to petitioner be
served to her at two condominiums in Pasay City and in Makati. In its Order dated September 13,
1993, the RTC granted the said motion. The Process Server submitted the Officers Return stating that
he was able to personally serve upon defendant Erlinda Velayo the copy of summons together with the
thereto attached copy of the complaint, not at her two (2) given addresses, but at the lobby of
Intercontinental Hotel, Makati, Metro Manila, right in the presence of lobby counter personnel by the
name of Ms. A. Zulueta, but said defendant refused to sign in receipt thereof. Upon ex-parte motions
of respondents, the RTC in its Order, declared petitioner and her co-defendant in default for failure to
file an answer and ordered the ex-parte presentation of respondents evidence. The RTC rendered its
Decision in respondents favour. Thereafter, petitioner filed a Motion to Set Aside Order of Default
claiming that she was prevented from filing a responsive pleading and defending herself against
respondents complaint because of fraud, accident or mistake; that contrary to the Officers Return, no
summons was served upon her; that she has valid and meritorious defenses to refute respondents
material allegations. Respondents opposed said Motion.
In its Order dated May 29, 1995, the RTC denied petitioners Motion ruling that the
presumption of regularity in the discharge of the function of the Process Server was not sufficiently
overcome by petitioners allegation to the contrary; that there was no evident reason for the Process
Server to make a false narration regarding the service of summons to defaulting defendant in the
Officers Return. Then, respondents filed a Motion for Execution but the petitioner filed an Opposition to
Motion for Execution contending that she has not yet received the Decision and it is not yet final and
executory as against her.In its Order, the RTC, finding that the Decision and the Order were indeed
not furnished or served upon petitioner, denied respondents motion for execution against petitioner
and ordered that petitioner be furnished the said Decision and Order. The RTC issued an Order
directing the issuance of the writ of execution against petitioners co-defendant.
On May 23, 1996, petitioner, through her counsel, finally received the Decision and the Order.
Petitioner filed an appeal with the CA questioning the propriety and validity of the service of summons
made upon her. The CA rendered its Decision affirming the Decision and Order of the RTC. Petitioner
filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the CA denied it. Hence, the petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45.
ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the petitioner was not validly served with summons.
2. Whether or not RTC should have set aside the order of default.
HELD: 1. Yes. In the present case, The action instituted by respondents affect the parties alone, not
the whole world. Any judgment therein is binding only upon the parties properly impleaded. Thus, it is
an action in personam. As such, personal service of summons upon the defendants is essential in
order for the court to acquire jurisdiction over their persons. Petitioners bare allegation that the
statement in the Officers Return that she was personally served summons is inaccurate is not
sufficient. A process servers certificate of service is prima facie evidence of the facts as set out in the
certificate. Between the claim of non-receipt of summons by a party against the assertion of an official
whose duty is to send notices, the latter assertion is fortified by the presumption that official duty has
been regularly performed. To overcome the presumption of regularity of performance of official
functions in favor of such Officers Return, the evidence against it must be clear and
convincing. Petitioner having been unable to come forward with the requisite quantum of proof to the
contrary, the presumption of regularity of performance on the part of the process server stands.
2. No. Petitioners argument that the RTC should have set aside the order of default and applied the
liberal interpretation of rules with a view of affording parties their day in court is not tenable. While
indeed default orders are not viewed with favor, the party seeking to have the order of default lifted
must first show that her failure to file an answer or any other responsive pleading was due to fraud,
accident, mistake, or excusable neglect and then she must show that she has a valid and meritorious
defense.
In this case, petitioner failed to show that her failure to file an answer was due to fraud, accident,
mistake or excusable neglect. Except for her bare unsupported allegation that the summons were only
thrown to her at the elevator, petitioner did not present any competent evidence to justify the setting
aside of the order of default. Petitioner contented herself with stating in her affidavit of merit that the
cases against respondent Raymond were filed at the instance of her father. Such allegation is a
conclusion rather than a statement of facts showing a meritorious defense. The affidavit failed to
controvert the facts allegedby the respondents. Petitioner has not shown that she has a meritorious
defense.
CASE NO. 6
Palma vs. Galvez
G.R. No. 165273 March 10, 2010
Facts:
On July 28, 2003, Palma filed with the RTC an action for damages against the Philippine
Heart Center, Dr. Giron, Dr. Cruz, alleging that the defendants committed professional fault,
negligence and omission for having removed her right ovary against her will, and losing the
same and the tissues extracted from her during her surgery; and that although the specimens
were subsequently found, Palma was doubtful and uncertain that the same was hers as the
label therein pertained that of somebody else. Later, Palma filed a Motion for Leave to Admit
Amended Complaint, praying for inclusion of some nurses, one of which is respondent Agudo.
The RTCs process server submitted his return of summons stating that the alias summons,
together with a copy of the amended complaint and its annexes, were served upon Agudo thru
her husband Alfredo, who received and signed the same since Agudo was out of the country.
Agudos counsel filed a Notice of Appearance and Motion for Extension of Time to File Answer
stating that he was just engaged by Alfredo Agudo, as respondent Agudo was out of the country
and the Answer was already due.
Two weeks later, counsel again filed a Motion for Another
Extension of Time to File Answer, stating that the draft answer was finished but would be sent to
Agudo for clarification/verification before the Phil. Consulate in Ireland. Two weeks later, Agudo
filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the RTC had not acquired jurisdiction over her as
she was not property served with summons since she was temporarily out of the country. Palma
filed her Opposition to the MTD, arguing that a substituted service of summons on Agudos
husband was valid and binding on her, that the service of summons under Sec. 16, Rule 14 was
not exclusive and maybe effected by other modes of service.
RTC granted Agudos MTD. RTC found that while summons was served at Agudos house and
received by her husband, such service did not qualify as a valid service of summons on her as
she was out of the country at the time it was served. Palma thus filed this petition for certiorari
under Rule 65.
Issues:
1. Whether or not a petition for certiorari under 65 is proper
2. Whether or not there was a valid service of summons on Agudo
Held:
1. A petition for certiorari is proper when any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and there is no appeal, or plain,
speedy and adequate remedy. Sec. 1, Rule 41 of the Rules of CivPro states that
where a judgment or final order is not appealable, the aggrieved party may file an
appropriate special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65.
2. In civil cases, the trial court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the defendant either
by the service of summons or by the latters voluntary appearance and submission to the
authority of the former. Agudo was a Filipino resident temporarily out of the country at
the time of the service of summons, thus service of summons on her is governed by
Sec. 16, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court
CASE NO. 7
G.R. No. 150859 March 28, 2005
FLORENTINO GONZALES, EDGARDO SANTOS, LEOPOLDO ROSETE, FELINA VICTORIA and
CRISTETA DELA CRUZ, Petitioner,
vs.
BALIKATAN KILUSANG BAYAN SA PANANALAPI, INCORPORATED, respondent.
FACTS. Sometime in November 7, 1997, petitioner Florentino Gonzales obtained a loan of P150,000
with the other petitioners Edgardo Santos, Leopoldo Rosete, Felina Victoria and Cristeta dela Cruz as
co-makers. Petitioners signed a promissory note binding themselves jointly and severally to pay the
loan in monthly amortizations of P6,250 for two years starting November 7, 1997 up to November 7,
1999. When petitioner Gonzales failed to pay despite repeated written demands, respondent filed a
case for sum of money and damages in the Municipal Trial Court of Bocaue. Summons were thereafter
served and the case was set for hearing on September 29, 2000. On the scheduled hearing,
defendants appeared but because they failed to file their answer to the complaint, the court declared
them in default and thereafter allowed the presentation of respondents evidence ex-parte on October
6, 2000. MTC ruled in favor of the respondent thereby ordering the petitioners to pay jointly and
severally the amount owed plus corresponding interests. Unhappy of the decision, petitioners
appealed MTCs decision to the RTC but the latter court AFFIRMED the decision of the court a quo.
Petitioners thereafter elevated the case to the Court of Appeals on a petition for review. The
CA dismissed the petition.
ISSUE. WHETHER OR NOT THE JUDGMENT BY DEFAULT IS VOID FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION OVER THE
PETITIONERS WHO WERE NOT SERVED WITH SUMMONS PROPERLY and should thereby be dismissed
HELD. In this regard, petitioners should be reminded of the provision in the Rules of Court that a
defendants voluntary appearance in an action shall be equivalent to service of summons. Further, the
lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant may be waived either expressly or impliedly.
When a defendant voluntarily appears, he is deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of
the court. If he does not wish to waive this defense, he must do so seasonably by motion, and object
thereto.
As the records would show, summons and copies of the complaint were served on the
petitioners and the case was set for hearing by the MTC on September 29, 2000, upon the motion of
the respondent. The petitioners appeared before the court on the scheduled hearing, as evidenced by
their signatures in the minutes. Their voluntary appearance cured the defect, if any, in the service of
summons.
Petitioners ought to be guided by Rule 15, Section 2, which provides that "[a]ll motions shall be in
writing exceptthose made in open court or in the course of a hearing or trial." Moreover, every written
motion shall be set for hearing by the applicant, with the exception of motions which the court might
act upon without prejudicing the rights of the adverse party. As a general rule, a notice is required
where a party has a right to resist the relief sought by the motion. Principles of natural justice demand
that his right should not be affected without an opportunity to be heard. Such, however, does not
appear to be the situation here.
In this case, the motion to declare petitioners in default was, to reiterate, made in open court and in
their presence. By their presence, notice to them is fairly constituted. What the law really eschews is
not the lack of previous notice of hearing but the lack of opportunity to be heard. Petitioners were not
without such opportunity to contest the motion for and the order of default then and there at the trial
court.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The assailed decisions of the Regional Trial Court and
the Municipal Trial Court of Bocaue, Bulacan are hereby AFFIRMED.
CASE NO. 8
G.R. No. 73531. April 6, 1993.
DOLORES DELOS SANTOS, NICOLAS DELOS SANTOS and RICARDO DELOS SANTOS,
petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUDGE CAMILO MONTESA, JR. and JUANA DELOS SANTOS, respondents.
FACTS: This is a suit for desahucio (an action for eviction/ejectment) initiated by herein private
respondent against petitioners to which the court of origin ordered petitioners to vacate the lot in
question. Upon appeal, the Regional Trial Court presided over by herein respondent judge, granted
private respondents motion for execution pending appeal on account of petitioners' failure to post a
supersedeas bond.
Petitioners' mental distress started when private respondent, who supposedly owns a lot a portion of
which petitioners entered and occupied, lodged the complaint geared towards petitioners' eviction.
Summons was served through the mother of petitioners when the process server was unable to locate
Dolores, Nicolas, and Ricardo delos Santos in Talampas, Bustos, Bulacan. For failure of petitioners to
submit the corresponding answer, judgment was rendered pursuant to the rules on summary
procedure.
Upon learning of said decision, petitioners sought to reconsider on the principal thesis that they were
never served notice of the conciliation meeting at the barangay level, as well as the summons. They
insist that private respondent was referring to a different piece of realty because petitioners actually
occupied a different lot owned by Nicolas delos Santos. Moreover, petitioners' counsel moved to re-
examine the impugned decision and posed a subsequent bid on appeal to impede immediate
execution.
ISSUE: WON the service of summons was strictly complied with
HELD: At first blush, it would appear that the recourse pursued by petitioners could elicit a favorable
response from the court in as much as the proof of service of the summons upon petitioners does not
indicate impossibility of personal service, a condition precedent for resorting to substituted service.
Even then, and assuming in gratia argumenti that the statutory norms on service of summons have
not been strictly complied with, still, any defect in form and in the manner of effecting service thereof
were nonetheless erased when petitioners' counsel moved to re-examine the impugned decision and
posed a subsequent bid on appeal to impede immediate execution. Indeed, such demeanor is
tantamount to voluntary submission to the competencia of the court within the purview of Section
23, Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Court since any mode of appearance in court by a defendant
or his lawyer is equivalent to service of summons, absent any indication that the appearance of
counsel for petitioner was precisely to protest the jurisdiction of the court over the person of
defendant.
CASE NO. 9.
G.R. No. 159139 June 15, 2005
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY FOUNDATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, MEGA PACIFIC eSOLUTIONS, INC.; and MEGA PACIFIC
CONSORTIUM, Respondents.
FACTS: Before us is the Commission on Elections "Most Respectful Motion for Leave to Use the
Automated Counting Machines in the Custody of the Commission on Elections for use in the August 8,
2005 Elections in the Autonomous Region for Muslim Mindanao (ARMM)," dated December 9, 2004.
The Motion alleges that "information technology experts," who purportedly supervised all stages of the
software development for the creation of the final version to be used in the ACMs, have unanimously
confirmed that this undertaking is in line with the internationally accepted standards for software life
cycle processes, "with its quality assurance that it would be fit for use in the elections.
Recall that our previous Decision declared COMELEC to have acted with grave abuse of discretion
when, by way of its Resolution No. 6074, it awarded the Contract for the supply of automated counting
machines (ACMs) to private respondents. It did so, not only in clear violation of law and jurisprudence,
but also with inexplicable haste and reckless disregard of its own bidding rules and procedures;
particularly the mandatory financial, technical and legal requirements. The motion for reconsideration
was likewise denied.
Notwithstanding our Decision and Resolution, the present Motion claims, inter alia, that the ARMM
elections are slated to be held on August 8, 2005, and are mandated by RA 9333 to be automated;
that the government has no available funds to finance the automation of those elections; that
considering its present fiscal difficulties, obtaining a special appropriation for the purpose is unlikely;
that, on the other hand, there are in Comelecs custody at present 1,991 ACMs, which were previously
delivered by private respondents; that these machines would deteriorate and become obsolete if they
remain idle and unused; that they are now being stored in the Comelec Maxilite Warehouse along UN
Avenue, at "storage expenses of P329,355.26 a month, or P3,979,460.24 annually."
Private respondents contend that since the subject ACMs have already been delivered to, paid for and
used by Comelec, the Republic of the Philippines is now their owner, without prejudice to Mega Pacific
eSolutions, Inc.s claim for damages in the case pending before the RTC of Makati; and that,
consequently, as far as private respondents are concerned, the question of using the subject ACMs for
the ARMM elections is dependent solely on the discretion of the owner, the Republic of the Philippines.
Petitioners assert that there is no longer any live case or controversy to speak of an existing case or
controversy that is appropriate or ripe for determination, not merely conjectural or anticipatory; and
that Comelecs allegations in its Motion do not amount to an actual case or controversy that would
require this Court to render a decision or resolution in the legitimate exercise of its judicial power.
Assuming arguendo that the present Motion might somehow be justified by the governments fiscal
difficulties, petitioners further argue that permitting Comelec to use the ACMs would nevertheless
allow it to do indirectly what it was not permitted by this Court to do directly. They argue that the
instant Motion is merely a subterfuge on the poll bodys part to resurrect a lost case via a request for
an advisory opinion.
ISSUE: Whether or not the motion must be denied.
HELD: YES. although it professes utmost respect for the finality of our Decision of January 13, 2004 --
an inescapable and immutable fact from which spring equally ineludible consequences -- granting it
would have the effect of illegally reversing and subverting our final Decision. Plainly stated, our final
Decision bars the grant of the present Motion.
Apparently, COMELEC has simply filed the present Motion asking permission to do what it has
precisely been prohibited from doing under our final and executory Decision. If law and jurisprudence
bar it from using the subject ACMs during the last elections, why should it even propose to use these
machines in the forthcoming ARMM elections? True, these elections are important. But they cannot be
more important than the 2004 national elections. Note that the factual premises and the laws involved
in the procurement and use of the ACMs have not changed. Indeed, Comelec has not even alleged,
much less proven, any supervening factual or legal circumstances to justify its Motion.
The Motion has not at all demonstrated that technical requirements have been addressed from the
time our Decision was issued up to now. In fact, COMELEC is merely asking for leave to use the
machines, without mentioning any specific manner in which the foregoing requirements have been
satisfactorily met.
Assuming arguendo that the foregoing formidable legal, financial and technical obstacles could be
overcome or set aside, still, the Motion cannot be granted because it is vague; it does not contain
enough details to enable this Court to act appropriately.
CASE NO. 1O
PH Credit Corporation vs CA
G.R. No. 109648
November 22, 2001
FACTS: PH Credit Corp., filed a case against Pacific Lloyd Corp., Carlos Farrales, Thomas H. Van Sebille
and Federico C. Lim, for sum of money with the RTC. After service of summons upon the defendants,
they failed to file their answer within the reglementary period, hence were declared in default. The
court rendered decision ordering defendants being solidarily liable and to pay PH Credit Corp. After the
decision had become final and executory, properties of defendant Farrales were levied and sold at
public auction.
Petitioner filed for a motion for the issuance of a writ of possession and the same was
granted. However, the judge declared the previous decision being null and void. Petitioner now claims
that the judge acted with grave abuse of discretion. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial
courts decision declaring null and void the sale of Faralles properties and that their liability was
merely joint and not solidary.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent has been barred by the Omnibus Motion Rule in not questioning
the joint and solidary nature of his liability in his motions.
HELD: No. The Supreme Court held that petitioners erred in arguing that respondents motions did
not question respondents liability. The three motions filed by respondent were directed at the acts of
execution against his personal properties but respondent realized after that he was being made to
answer on the entire liability as a solidary debtor and filed his Omnibus Motion questioning the Writ of
Possession and all incident orders and proceedings relevant thereto. This realization dawned on him,
because his real property was levied and sold despite the previous sale of his personal property. Only
at this point was he in a position to assert his objections to the auction sale of his real property and to
put up the defense of joint liability among all the respondents.
Prior to his Omnibus Motion, respondent was not yet being made to pay for
the entire obligation. Thus, his objection to his being made solidarily liable with the other respondents
was not yet available to him at the time he filed the Motions referred to by petitioner. Not being
available, these objections could not have been deemed waived when he filed his three earlier
Motions, which pertained to matters different from those covered by his Omnibus Motion. The
Omnibus Motion Rule requires the movant to raise all available exceptions in a single opportunity to
avoid multiple piecemeal objections. But to apply that statutory norm, the objections must have been
available to the party at the time the Motion was filed.
CASE NO. 11
DELTA MOTORS VS CA AND STATE INVESTMENT HOUSE, INC.
G.R. NO. 121075
JULY 24, 1997
FACTS: State Investment House, Inc. brought an action for a sum of money against Delta in the RTC
where Delta was declared in default, and ordered to pay State Investment its total outstanding
obligation. The decision, however, could not be served on Delta, either personally or by registered
mail, due to its earlier dissolution. However, Delta had been taken over by the Philippine National
Bank (PNB) in the meantime. State Investment moved for service of the decision by way of publication
and execution of the judgment, which the trial court granted. The writ of execution was issued and
properties of Delta in Iloilo and Bacolod City were levied upon and sold.
Delta then commenced a special civil action for certiorari with the CA insisting that the trial court did
not acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant since there was no valid/proper service of
summons, thus rendering the decision null and void, hence never became final and executory. The CA
ruled against Delta. Both Delta and State Investment filed for a motion for reconsideration but the
same were denied.
State Investment appealed to the Supreme Court. During the pendency of the case, Delta
filed an Omnibus Motion with the CA but the same was denied. Delta raised the case to the Supreme
Court.
ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the summons was validly served to Delta.
2.Whether or not the Omnibus Motion was valid.
HELD: The Court of Appels held that no records shows that a copy of the assailed judgment had been
properly served on P.N.B., which assumed DELTA's operation upon the latter's dissolution. That the
service by publication did not cure the fatal defect Thus, the judgement of the trial court has did not were to be used as the site for a new municipal building. PARAAQUE claimed that it offered to buy
become executory and has not yet attained finality. the property for P54,520,800.00 based on the fair market value stated in the tax declarations, but
PIRC refused to sell. PARAAQUE deposited with the Philippine National Bank (PNB) the amount of P8.1
1 No. The Supreme Court held that if Delta intended such orders to be challenged in the CA million, or fifteen percent (15%) of P54,520,800.00, pursuant to Section 19 3 of the Local Government
case, it could have explicitly alleged them as sources of additional causes of action and Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160, hereinafter LGC). It then filed an ex-parte motion for the issuance of a
prayed for the corresponding affirmative relief therefrom, and if this course of action initially writ of possession which was granted by the RTC. PARANAQUE was placed in possession of the lots.
proved unavailing then Delta could and should have moved for reconsideration on that
aspect. After the finality of the decision in said case, any attempt to introduce or revive the
The civil case was then returned to Branch 61 of RTC Makati presided by Judge Gorospe, Jr.
issue had become procedurally impermissible.
PIRC moved for reconsideration of the order of the RTC of Paranaque that PARANAQUE be ordered to
2 The issues raised in the Omnibus Motion could have been allowed during the pendency of
vacate the lots on a number of grounds including lack of jurisdiction because the lots were also subject
said case by way of amendments to the petition. The Court of Appeals could only consider
of an action pending before the Sandiganbayan. The RTC of Makati also granted PIRCs motion for
errors raised by petitioner which were limited to the trial court's orders. These were the only
recognition and dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction as the lots to be expropriated were
errors Delta argued extensively in its brief. To allow Delta's Omnibus Motion which it filed
in custodia legis, being sequestered by the PCGG and involved in a case pending before the
more than eight months from promulgation of the decision or long after finality of said case,
Sandiganbayan. It also set aside the previous order granting the motion for the issuance of a writ of
would result in abandonment of sound judicial process.
possession. PARANAQUE filed a motion for reconsideration and on the other hand, PIRC filed an urgent
ex parte motion for an order directing PARANAQUE to vacate the lots and surrender them to PIRC.
CASE NO. 12
A.M. No. MTJ-04-1518
Judge Gorospe, upon PARAAQUE's motion, inhibited himself and ordered the case re-raffled.
January 15, 2004
The case was eventually assigned to Branch 133 of the RTC of Makati, presided by Judge Mendiola.
Attys. VILMA HILDA D. VILLANUEVA-FABELLA and WILMAR T. ARUGAY vs. Judge RALPH S.
Branch 133 of the RTC of Makati denied PARAAQUE's motion for reconsideration and directing
LEE and Sheriff JUSTINIANO C. DE LA CRUZ JR
PARAAQUE and its agents to vacate the lots and surrender possession to PIRC within five days from
FACTS: The complainants are counsels for the defendants in Civil Case No. [38]-28457 entitled Star
notice. PARAAQUE filed its Notice of Appeal from the order setting aside the grant of the writ of
Paper Corporation vs. Society of St. Paul and Fr. Leonardo Eleazar for Sum of Money with Prayer for
possession and the denial of the motion for reconsideration, Branch 133 gave due course to
Preliminary Attachment. Their clients were served a copy of the complaint and a Writ of Attachment by
PARANAQUEs appeal and ordered the transmittal of the entire records of the civil case to the CA for
Sheriff Dela Cruz based on the plaintiffs allegation that the defendants contracted a debt in bad faith
further proceedings.
with no intention of paying the same. A printing machine was levied and delivered to the plaintiffs
warehouse instead of keeping the same in the custody of the sheriff.
PIRC filed a motion for the issuance of a writ implementing the order to vacate and the
Judge Lee granted the defendants Urgent Motion to Discharge Attachment. Thereafter, an Urgent Ex-
appointment of a special sheriff. Forthwith, and on even date, the RTC of Makati (Branch 133) gave
Parte Motion to Withdraw Cash Deposit was filed, without notice to the defendants and despite failure
PARAAQUE a period of five days from receipt of the order within which to file its Comment/Opposition
of the plaintiff to set such litigious motion for hearing and contrary to existing laws and jurisprudence
to the motion. , PARAAQUE manifested 11 that the trial court had lost jurisdiction over the case "after
which was then granted by the respondent judge.
November 6, 1993 with the perfection of [PARAAQUE's] appeal by the filing of its notice of appeal on
An administrative complaint was charged against the latter for granting the withdrawal of cash
27 October 1993 before the 15-day period for appeal expired." Hence, no longer could the court act on
deposit in favour of the plaintiff even before judgement was rendered and for granting another Verified
PIRC's motion for an order to vacate, which PARAAQUE pointed out, was not a motion for execution
Motion for Reconsideration of the Order declaring plaintiff as non-suited.
pending appeal; and even assuming otherwise, no good reason was cited in the motion to justify its
ISSUE: WON the respondent judges granting of of the plaintiffs motion for the withdrawal of cash
grant. Nevertheless, PARAAQUE asked the trial court "should [it] be [so] minded, before transmittal of
deposit is a violation of the Rules of Court amounting to gross ignorance of the law/ procedure.
the entire records to the Court of Appeals, to reverse or reconsider its appealed order due to the
HELD: Yes the respondent judge made an erroneous order upon granting the motion for the
supervening event of a Sandiganbayan denial of the PCGG motion for reconsideration of its decision
withdrawal of cash deposit in favour of the plaintiff even before judgment is rendered. As long as the
lifting the sequestration.
judgment remains unsatisfied, it would be erroneous to order the cancellation of a bond filed for the
A day after, PARAAQUE filed a manifestation calling the trial court's attention to the fact that up to
discharge of a writ of attachment. Furthermore, the rules mandate that every written motion shall be
said date, the record of the case had not been transmitted to the CA. Branch 133 issued an
set for hearing by the applicant. The notice of hearing shall be addressed to the defendants and shall
order denying PARAAQUE's "prayer for reversal or second reconsideration contained in its
specify the time and date of the hearing. The motion and notice shall be served at least three days
Manifestation but granting PIRC's motion for the issuance of a writ implementing the order to vacate
before the date of hearing and without proof of its service the court cannot act upon it.
which the court deemed a motion for execution pending appeal. It then ordered the issuance of a writ
For failure of the plaintiff to address the notice of hearing and for the lack of proof of service,
of execution upon PIRC's filing of a bond of P1 million, and appointed a special sheriff to implement the
respondent should have not acted upon said motion. The rules on notice of hearing and proof of
writ by ejecting PARAAQUE from the subject property and placing PIRC in physical possession thereof.
service should have been observed by both the plaintiff and the respondent judge.
However the latters poor judgment fell short of gross ignorance of the law/ procedure since the
PARAAQUE then filed with this Court a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition to
erroneous act should have been committed with fraud, dishonesty, corruption, malice or bad faith
annul the orders of the trial court. The SC referred the case to the CA. It was about 2 months before
which have not been convincingly shown in the instant case for the respondent judge corrected said
the RTFC transmitted to the CA the records of the case. PARAAQUE claims in its Memorandum
error by reversing himself before the adverse party incurred any damage.
dated 8 December 1995 that the said appeal remained undocketed "pending elevation by the trial
CASE NO. 13
court of the complete records to the Court of Appeals notwithstanding efforts made by Paraaque to
PROVIDENT INTERNATIONAL RESOURCES INC. VS. CA AND MUNICIPALITY OF PARANAQUE
expedite the appeal.
GR NO. 119328, JULY 26, 1996
CA rendered its original decision, dismissing the petition on the ground of forum shopping.
PARANAQUE moved for reconsideration. CA rendered its amended decision granting the petition for
FACTS: PARAAQUE filed Civil Case with the RTC of Makati for the expropriation of certain parcels of
the certiorari and prohibition, hereby annulling the order of RTC and permanently enjoining the RTC
land located at Likod Ibayo, Barangay Sto. Nio, Ninoy Aquino Avenue, Paraaque. Likod Ibayo,
from further acting in said case, without prejudice to the final decision in the appeal.
Barangay Sto. Nio, Ninoy Aquino Avenue, Paraaque, Metro Manila. These lots belonged to PIRC and
ISSUES: 1. WON the trial court had authority to act upon PIRCs motion for the issuance of a writ prohibitory injunction and/or temporary restraining order. [1] A motion for reconsideration was filed but
implementing the order to vacate. the same was likewise denied. Hence this petition.
2. WON the trial court acted in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in
granting the motion for a writ to implement the order to vacate. ISSUE: whether or not there was a valid service of summons to acquire jurisdiction over the
petitioners
RULING: 1. Yes. There can be no question as to the trial court's authority to act upon PIRC's motion,
filed within the period to appeal, for the issuance of a writ implementing the order to vacate. Such a HELD: Jurisdiction was never acquired over them by the lower court. Secs. 7 and 8 provide -
motion cannot be characterized as anything but a motion for execution pending appeal, and pursuant
to Section 2, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, such may be filed before the expiration of the period to
Sec. 7. Personal service of summons. - The summons shall be served by handing a copy thereof to
appeal.
the defendant in person, or, if he refuses to receive it, by tendering it to him.
It is settled that a court may take cognizance of a motion for execution pending appeal filed
Sec. 8. Substituted service. - If the defendant cannot be served within a reasonable time as provided
by a party within its period to appeal, as the filing of an appeal by a losing party does not
in the preceding section, service may be effected (a) by leaving copies of the summons at the
automatically divest the adverse party of the right to ask for execution pending appeal. Thus,
defendant's dwelling house or residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing
the trial court's order giving due course to PARAAQUE's appeal and for the transmittal of the
therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at defendant's office or regular place of business with some
record of the case to the CA was inconsequential, for, despite that, PIRC had the right to file a
competent person in charge thereof.
motion for the execution of the order to vacate on or before 6 November 1993, and the trial
court could validly act thereon even after the expiration of the period to appeal or perfection
of the appeal, but before the transmittal of the record of the case to the CA. However, they are deemed to have waived any flaw in the court's jurisdiction arising from a defective
service of summons. For, instead of entering a special appearance questioning the propriety of the
2.Yes. SCs examination of PIRC's motion for the issuance of a writ implementing the order to service of summons, hence, the exercise of jurisdiction by the trial court over petitioners, they filed a
vacate and the appointment of the special sheriff shows that it contained no notice of hearing motion for additional time to file answer on 24 February 1993, which was beyond the reglementary
to PARAAQUE. The notice was a request directed to the Clerk of Court to submit the motion period. In effect, they voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the court. Consequently, whatever
to the court for its consideration and approval immediately upon receipt thereof. defect there was in the mode of service of summons was deemed waived and the court acquired
A notice of hearing addressed to the Clerk of Court, and not to the parties, is not notice at all. jurisdiction over the persons of petitioners by their voluntary submission thereto.
Accordingly, a motion that does not contain a notice of hearing to the adverse party is
nothing but a mere scrap of paper. 43 The Clerk of Court did not even have the duty to accept
it, much more to bring it to the attention of the Presiding Judge. Yet, the former did. Worse, DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
the latter not only gave it undue attention, forthwith on the date the motion was filed he
issued an order giving PARAAQUE five days from receipt of the order within which to file its Resultantly, the instant petition is DENIED. The decision of respondent Court of Appeals dated 18
comment/opposition to the motion, after which the motion would be deemed submitted for October 1994 as well as its resolution of 20 January 1995 is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
resolution, with or without such comment/opposition.
By overlooking the mandatory rule on notice to the adverse party in Section 2, Rule 39 of the
Rules of Court, a positive duty imposed upon the movant, and by according value to a mere
scrap of paper by "curing" its fatal defect by means of the order to serve as notice to
PARAAQUE, the trial court clearly acted with grave abuse of discretion.
To these must be added the palpable absence of any good reason to justify execution
pending appeal.
CASE NO. 15
CASE NO. 14
[G.R. No. 118696. September 3, 1996] RAMON S. OROSA, JOSE S. OROSA, LIZA O. PRIMETOWN PROPERTY G.R. No. 157801
TRINIDAD, MYRNA D. DESTURA and ALFREDO S. MENDOZA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF GROUP, INC.,
APPEALS, BERTAN PRESS and ANTONIO J. BERTOSO, respondent Petitioner, Present:
PUNO, J., Chairman,*
- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,**
CALLEJO, SR.,
FACTS: Private respondents Bertan Press and Antonio J. Bertoso filed a complaint for a sum of money
TINGA, and
against petitioners Ramon S. Orosa, Jose S. Orosa, Liza O. Trinidad, Myrna D. Destura and Alfredo S.
HON. LYNDON D. JUNTILLA, CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.
Mendoza before the Regional Trial Court of Manila. Accordingly, the trial court issued the
in his capacity as HOUSING AND
corresponding summons to be served upon petitioners through their secretary and to Mendoza
LAND USE ARBITER of HLURB,
through his employee.
Region VII, Cebu City, and Promulgated:
Petitioners filed a motion for additional time to file answer,however, upon urgent ex-
TERESA C. AGUILAR,
parte motion by private respondents the trial court declared petitioners in default for failure to answer
Respondents. June 8, 2005
within the reglementary period. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration and at the same time
filed their answer but the court denied the motion for reconsideration and expunged petitioners'
FACTS: In 1996, Teresa C. Aguilar entered into a contract to sell with Primetown Property Group, Inc.
answer from the records. RTC ruled in favour of private respondent. Petitioners filed petition for
(PPGI) covering a contract that PPGI should deliver a condominium unit on June 1998 to Aguilar.
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before respondent Court of Appeals which rendered the
Thereafter, Aguilar paid by installment the purchase price of the condominium unit in the total amount
assailed decision dismissing the petition and denying the motion for issuance of a writ of preliminary
of P727,921.82. Two years after the signing of the contract to sell, Aguilar saw that the construction of
the building, where her supposed condominium unit was to be located, had barely even started.
Believing that PPGI would not be able to deliver the unit to her by June 1998, she demanded in writing
the rescission of her contract to sell with PPGI and the refund of what she had paid. When PPGI
refused, she filed a complaint against PPGI for the rescission of the contract to sell and damages with
the HLURB.
HLURB then rendered its decision in favor or Aguilar. PPGI then appealed the decision to
HLURB Board of Commissioners, which the latter affirmed and declared final and executory. The
HLURB then issued a writ of execution ordering the ex-officio sheriff to execute its decision against
PPGI with address at the Penthouse, Century Citadel, No. 5007 P. Burgos Street, Bel-Air, Makati City.
The sheriff then levied on the several propertiesof PPGI, one of which is, Condominium Unit No. 3301
in Makati Prime Citadel at P. Burgos, Makati City. Before the scheduled auction of the said
condominium, Michael OPallick served a copy of his third- party claim to the sheriff, yet the latter
proceeded with the public auction where Aguilar was declared the highest bidder.
With the failure of PPGI to redeem the property, the sheriff executed a final deed of sale in
favor of Aguilar, which the latter declared for taxation purposes and has then filed a motion for a
motion for a writ of possession to the HLURB, whose copy was served to the PPGIs address. After the
granting of the writ of possession to Aguilar, and serving it to the companys address, PPGI filed a
motion for reconsideration with the contention that it was not served with a copy of the motion for the
issuance for the writ of possession of Aguilar as it was served in its old office address. PPGI further
averred that despite its earnest efforts to secure copies of the aforementioned motion of Aguilar, the
HLURB Arbiter refused to furnish it with such copies and thus prayed for the recall and setting aside of
the implementation of the order. HLURB then denied the said motion for reconsideration for lack of
merit as it was already enforced and thus rendering it moot and academic.
PPGI then filed its petition for certiorari with the CA seeking the reversal of the decision of the
HLURB in granting the writ of possession to Aguilar, CA then denied the PPGIs, now petitioner, motion
for reconsideration for lack of merit. Thus, this petition for review.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the HLURBs action in ordering the writ of possession
when PPGI was not informed nor duly notified of the hearing on the motion for the issuance of the said
writ thereby depriving PPGI with its constitutional right to due process
HELD: No, the CA did not err in affirming the HLURBs action. Based on the records of the HLURB and
those of the respondents, the principal office still remained at the old address provided by PPGI,
where the motions were served, and where in fact one of its employees has received it, in which the
petitioner failed to dispute the authority of the said employee.
Further, the motion for the issuance of the writ of possession is an ex parte motion and thus
does not need a notice of hearing nor a hearing per se, as it is not a litigated motion but only a mode
to inform the party that the writ of execution has not yet been implemented. As the court puts it,
there is no need for a hearing of such motion because it is not a litigated motion and that the court
may act thereon causing no prejudice to the rights of the adverse party. The writ of possession is but
an implementation of the writ of execution. Thus, it is well- settled that the procedure in a motion for
the issuance of a writ of possession being summary in nature provides a proceeding wherein relief is
granted without an opportunity for the person against whom the relief is sought to be heard. The
issuance of a writ of possession is not a judgment on the merits. Therefore, the HLURB may grant the
motion even in the absence of the judgment obligor, herein petitioner, PPGI.
CASE NO. 16
[G.R. No. 131889. March 12, 2001]
VIRGINIA O. GOCHAN, FELIX Y. GOCHAN III, MAE GOCHAN-EFANN, LOUISE Y. GOCHAN,
ESTEBAN Y. GOCHAN JR., DOMINIC Y. GOCHAN, FELIX O. GOCHAN III, MERCEDES R. GOCHAN,
ALFREDO R. GOCHAN, ANGELINA R. GOCHAN-HERNAEZ, MARIA MERCED R. GOCHAN,
CRISPO R. GOCHAN JR., MARION R. GOCHAN, MACTAN REALTY DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION and FELIX GOCHAN & SONS REALTY CORPORATION, petitioners,
vs. RICHARD G. YOUNG, DAVID G. YOUNG, JANE G. YOUNG-LLABAN, JOHN D. YOUNG JR.,
MARY G. YOUNG-HSU and ALEXANDER THOMAS G. YOUNG as heirs of Alice Gochan; the
INTESTATE ESTATE OF JOHN D. YOUNG SR.; and CECILIA GOCHAN-UY and MIGUEL C. UY, for
themselves and on behalf and for the benefit of FELIX GOCHAN & SONS REALTY
CORPORATION, respondents.
FACTS: Felix Gochan and Sons Realty Corporation (Gochan Realty, for brevity) was registered with the
SEC on June, 1951, with Felix Gochan, Sr., Maria Pan Nuy Go Tiong, Pedro Gochan, Tomasa Gochan,
Esteban Gochan and Crispo Gochan as its incorporators.
Felix Gochan Sr.s daughter, Alice, mother of [herein respondents], inherited 50 shares of stock in
Gochan Realty from the former.
Alice died in 1955, leaving the 50 shares to her husband, John Young, Sr.In 1962, the Regional Trial
Court of Cebu adjudicated 6/14 of these shares to her children, herein [respondents] Richard Young,
David Young, Jane Young Llaban, John Young Jr., Mary Young Hsu and Alexander Thomas Young.Having
earned dividends, these stocks numbered 179 by 20 September 1979.Five days later (25 September),
at which time all the children had reached the age of majority, their father John Sr., requested Gochan
Realty to partition the shares of his late wife by cancelling the stock certificates in his name and
issuing in lieu thereof, new stock certificates in the names of [herein respondents].
On 17 October 1979, respondent Gochan Realty refused, citing as reason, the right of first refusal
granted to the remaining stockholders by the Articles of Incorporation.On 21, 1990, [sic] John, Sr. died,
leaving the shares to the [respondents].On 8 February 1994, [respondents] Cecilia Gochan Uy and
Miguel Uy filed a complaint with the SEC for issuance of shares of stock to the rightful owners,
nullification of shares of stock, reconveyance of property impressed with trust, accounting, removal of
officers and directors and damages against respondents. A Notice of Lis Pendens was annotated as
[sic] real properties of the corporation.
On 16 March 1994, [herein petitioners] moved to dismiss the complaint alleging that: (1) the SEC
ha[d] no jurisdiction over the nature of the action; (2) the [respondents] [were] not the real parties-in-
interest and ha[d] no capacity to sue; and (3) [respondents] causes of action [were] barred by the
Statute of Limitations.The motion was opposed by herein [respondents].On 29 March 1994,
[petitioners] filed a Motion for cancellation of Notice of Lis Pendens. [Respondents] opposed the said
motion.
On 9 December 1994, the SEC, through its Hearing Officer, granted the motion to dismiss and ordered
the cancellation of the notice of lis pendens annotated upon the titles of the corporate lands. In its
order, the SEC opined:
In the instant case, the complaint admits that complainants Richard G. Young, David G. Young, Jane G.
Young Llaban, John D. Young, Jr., Mary G. Young Hsu and Alexander Thomas G. Young, who are the
children of the late Alice T. Gochan and the late John D. Young, Sr. are suing in their own right and as
heirs of and/or as the beneficial owners of the shares in the capital stock of FGSRC held in trust for
them during his lifetime by the late John D. Young. Moreover, it has been shown that said
complainants ha[d] never been x x x stockholder[s] of record of FGSRC to confer them with the legal
capacity to bring and maintain their action.Conformably, the case cannot be considered as an intra-
corporate controversy within the jurisdiction of this Commission.
The complainant heirs base what they perceived to be their stockholders rights upon the fact of their
succession to all the rights, property and interest of their father, John D. Young, Sr. While their heirship
is not disputed, their right to compel the corporation to register John D. Youngs Sr. shares of stock in
their names cannot go unchallenged because the devolution of property to the heirs by operation of
law in succession is subject to just obligations of the deceased before such property passes to the
heirs. Conformably, until therefore the estate is settled and the payment of the debts of the deceased
is accomplished, the heirs cannot as a matter of right compel the delivery of the shares of stock to
them and register such transfer in the books of the corporation to recognize them as stockholders. The
complainant heirs succeed to the estate of [the] deceased John D. Young, Sr. but they do not thereby
become stockholders of the corporation.
Moreover, John D. [Young Sr.s] shares of stocks form part of his estate which is the subject of Special
Proceedings No. 3694-CEB in the Regional Trial Court of Cebu, Branch VIII, [par. 4 of the complaint]. As
complainants clearly claim[,] the Intestate Estate of John D. Young, Sr. has an interest in the subject
matter of the instant case. However, actions for the recovery or protection of the property [such as the
shares of stock in question] may be brought or defended not by the heirs but by the executor or
administrator thereof.
Complainants further contend that the alleged wrongful acts of the corporation and its directors
constitute fraudulent devices or schemes which may be detrimental to the stockholders. Again, the
injury [is] perceived[,] as is alleged[,] to have been suffered by complainants as stockholders, which
they are not. Admittedly, the SEC has no jurisdiction over a controversy wherein one of the parties
involved is not or not yet a stockholder of the corporation. [SEC vs. CA, 201 SCRA 134].
Further, by the express allegation of the complaint, herein complainants bring this action as [a]
derivative suit on their own behalf and on behalf of respondent FGSRC.
Section 5, Rule III of the Revised Rules of Procedure in the Securities and Exchange Commission
provides:
Section 5. Derivative Suit. No action shall be brought by stockholder in the right of a corporation
unless the complainant was a stockholder at the time the questioned transaction occurred as well as
at the time the action was filed and remains a stockholder during the pendency of the action. x x x.
The rule is in accord with well settled jurisprudence holding that a stockholder bringing a derivative
action must have been [so] at the time the transaction or act complained of [took] place. (Pascual vs.
Orozco, 19 Phil. 82; Republic vs. Cuaderno, 19 SCRA 671; San Miguel Corporation vs. Khan, 176 SCRA
462-463) The language of the rule is mandatory, strict compliance with the terms thereof thus being a
condition precedent, a jurisdictional requirement to the filing of the instant action.
Otherwise stated, proof of compliance with the requirement must be sufficiently established for the
action to be given due course by this Commission. The failure to comply with this jurisdictional
requirement on derivative action must necessarily result in the dismissal of the instant complaint. (pp.
77-79, Rollo)
[Respondents] moved for a reconsideration but the same was denied for being pro-
forma.Respondents] appealed to the SEC en banc, contending, among others, that the SEC ha[d]
jurisdiction over the case.[Petitioners], on the other hand, contend that the appeal was 97 days late,
beyond the 30-day period for appeals.
On 3 March 1995, the SEC en banc ruled for the [petitioners,] holding that the [respondents] motion
for reconsideration did not interrupt the 30-day period for appeal because said motion was pro-forma.
[4]
Aggrieved, herein respondents then filed a Petition for Review with the Court of Appeals. The
Court of Appeals ruled that the SEC had no jurisdiction over the case as far as the heirs of Alice
Gochan were concerned, because they were not yet stockholders of the corporation. On the other
hand, it upheld the capacity of Respondents Cecilia Gochan Uy and her spouse Miguel Uy. It also held
that the intestate Estate of John Young Sr. was an indispensable party.
The appellate court further ruled that the cancellation of the notice of lis pendens on the titles of
the corporate real estate was not justified. Moreover, it declared that respondents Motion for
Reconsideration before the SEC was not pro forma; thus, its filing tolled the appeal period.
Hence, this Petition.[5]
ISSUES:
A Whether or not the Spouses Uy have the personality to file an action before the SEC against
Gochan Realty Corporation.
B Whether or not the intestate estate of John D. Young Sr. is an indispensable party in the SEC
case considering that the individual heirs shares are still in the decedent stockholders name.
RULING:
1.)Petitioners argue that Spouses Cecilia and Miguel Uy had no capacity or legal standing to bring the
suit before the SEC on February 8, 1994, because the latter were no longer stockholders at the
time. Allegedly, the stocks had already been purchased by the corporation. Petitioners further assert
that, being allegedly a simple contract of sale cognizable by the regular courts, the purchase by
Gochan Realty of Cecilia Gochan Uys 210 shares does not come within the purview of an intra-
corporate controversy.
As a general rule, the jurisdiction of a court or tribunal over the subject matter is determined by
the allegations in the complaint. [8] For purposes of resolving a motion to dismiss, Cecilia Uys averment
in the Complaint -- that the purchase of her stocks by the corporation was null and void ab initio is
deemed admitted. It is elementary that a void contract produces no effect either against or in favor of
anyone; it cannot create, modify or extinguish the juridical relation to which it refers. [9]Thus, Cecilia
remains a stockholder of the corporation in view of the nullity of the Contract of Sale. Although she
was no longer registered as a stockholder in the corporate records as of the filing of the case before
the SEC, the admitted allegations in the Complaint made her still a bona fide stockholder of Felix
Gochan & Sons Realty Corporation (FGSRC), as between said parties.
In any event, the present controversy, whether intra-corporate or not, is no longer cognizable by
the SEC, in view of RA 8799, which transferred to regional trial courts the formers jurisdiction over
cases involving intra-corporate disputes.
2.) Petitioners contend that the Intestate Estate of John D. Young Sr. is not an indispensable party, as
there is no showing that it stands to be benefited or injured by any court judgment.
It would be useful to point out at this juncture that one of the causes of action stated in the
Complaint filed with the SEC refers to the registration, in the name of the other heirs of Alice Gochan
Young, of 6/14th of the shares still registered under the name of John D. Young Sr. Since all the shares
that belonged to Alice are still in his name, no final determination can be had without his estate being
impleaded in the suit. His estate is thus an indispensable party with respect to the cause of action
dealing with the registration of the shares in the names of the heirs of Alice.
Petitioners further claim that the Estate of John Young Sr. was not properly represented. They
claim that when the estate is under administration, suits for the recovery or protection of the property
or rights of the deceased may be brought only by the administrator or executor as approved by the
court.[14] The rules relative to this matter do not, however, make any such categorical and confining
statement.
Section 3 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, which is cited by petitioner in support of their position,
reads:
Sec. 3. Representatives as parties. - Where the action is allowed to be prosecuted or defended by a
representative or someone acting in a fiduciary capacity, the beneficiary shall be included in the title
of the case and shall be deemed to be the real party in interest. A representative may be a trustee of
an express trust, a guardian, an executor or administrator, or a party authorized by law or these
Rules. An agent acting in his own name and for the benefit of an undisclosed principal may sue or be
sued without joining the principal except when the contract involves things belonging to the principal.
Section 2 of Rule 87 of the same Rules, which also deals with administrators, states:
Sec. 2. Executor or administrator may bring or defend actions which survive. - For the recovery or
protection of the property or rights of the deceased, an executor or administrator may bring or defend,
in the right of the deceased, actions for causes which survive.
The above-quoted rules, while permitting an executor or administrator to represent or to bring
suits on behalf of the deceased, do not prohibit the heirs from representing the deceased. These rules
are easily applicable to cases in which an administrator has already been appointed. But no rule
categorically addresses the situation in which special proceedings for the settlement of an estate have
already been instituted, yet no administrator has been appointed. In such instances, the heirs cannot
be expected to wait for the appointment of an administrator; then wait further to see if the
administrator appointed would care enough to file a suit to protect the rights and the interests of the
deceased; and in the meantime do nothing while the rights and the properties of the decedent are
violated or dissipated.
The Rules are to be interpreted liberally in order to promote their objective of securing a just,
speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding. [15] They cannot be interpreted in
such a way as to unnecessarily put undue hardships on litigants. For the protection of the interests of
the decedent, this Court has in previous instances [16] recognized the heirs as proper representatives of
the decedent, even when there is already an administrator appointed by the court. When no
administrator has been appointed, as in this case, there is all the more reason to recognize the heirs
as the proper representatives of the deceased.Since the Rules do not specifically prohibit them from
representing the deceased, and since no administrator had as yet been appointed at the time of the
institution of the Complaint with the SEC, we see nothing wrong with the fact that it was the heirs of
John D. Young Sr. who represented his estate in the case filed before the SEC.
CASE NO. 17
G.R. NO. 132174 AUGUST 20, 2001
GUALBERTO CASTRO, PETITIONER,
VS.
HONORABLE SECRETARY RICARDO GLORIA (DECS), RESPONDENT.
FACTS: One Porfirio Gutang Jr. Filed with the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) a
complaint for disgraceful and immoral conduct against petitioner, a teacher in Guibuangan Central
School, Barili, Cebu, for having an illicit affair with the formers wife. The DECS Regional Office VII
rendered a decision thru Asst. Supt. Concillo declaring petitioner guilty of the offense charged and
dismissed him from service. Said judgment was affirmed by the DECS Central Office. Petitioner later
on filed several Motion for Reconsiderations (MR) to incumbent DECS Secretary which were all
overlooked. Thus, petitioner filed a case with DCES Central Office a motion for review setting
aside/modifying the decision of the DECS Region VII Director. Herein respondent referred the motion
for comment to the DECS Region VII who sustained the decision of Asst. Supt. Concillo, so it denied the
motion. This prompted the petitioner to file a petition for mandamus with the RTC of Cebu. The trial
court however dismissed petition on the ground of non exhaustion of administrative remedies and
mandamus would be improper if appeal or some other equally adequate administrative remedy is
available in the ordinary courts of law. It is clear that the penalty of dismissal from service was
erroneously imposed upon the petitioner. However, certiorari is the remedy to correct the errors of
judgment which are grave and arbitrary and not mandamus. Hence, the instant petition for review on
certiorari.
ISSUE: WON the RTC erred in dismissing the petition for mandamus filed by the petitioner.
HELD: Yes. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies calls for resort first to the
appropriate administrative authorities in the resolution of a controversy falling under their
jurisdiction before the same may be elevated to the courts of justice for review. It is settled
that non-observance of the doctrine results in lack of a cause of action, which is one of the
grounds allowed by the Rules of Court for the dismissal of the complaint. The doctrine is not
absolute. There are instances when it may be dispensed with and judicial action may be
validly resorted to immediately. Among these exceptions are: 1) When the question raised is
purely legal; 2) when the administrative body is in estoppel; 3) when the act complained of is
patently illegal; 4) when there is urgent need for judicial intervention; 5) when the claim
involved is small; 6) when irreparable damage will be suffered; 7) when there is no other
plain, speedy and adequate remedy; 8) when strong public interest is involved; and 10) in quo
warranto proceedings. Truly, a petition for mandamus is premature if there are administrative
remedies available to petitioner. But where the case involves only legal questions, the litigant
need not exhaust all administrative remedies before such judicial relief can be sought. Thus, in
the ultimate, the resolution of this case hinges on whether or not the following is a question
of law or a question of fact Is dismissal from the service the proper penalty for the offense
of disgraceful and immoral conduct? It is settled that for a question to be one of law, the
same must not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by
the litigants or any of them. And the distinction is well known. There is a question of law when
the doubt or differences arise as to what the law is on a certain state of facts. There is a
question of fact when the doubt or differences arise as to the truth or the falsehood of alleged
facts.] In the case at bench, petitioner no longer disputes the administrative finding of his
guilt for the offense of disgraceful and immoral conduct. It is settled and final insofar as he is
concerned. What petitioner only impugns is the correctness of the penalty of dismissal from
the service. He is convinced that the proper penalty for the first offense of disgraceful and
immoral conduct is only suspension from the service. Undoubtedly, the issue here is a pure
question of law. We need only to look at the applicable law or rule and we will be able to
determine whether the penalty of dismissal is in order.
CASE NO. 18
GR No. 129313 October 10, 2001
SPOUSES MA. CRISTINA D. TIRONA and OSCAR TIRONA, SPOUSES MA. PAZ D. BAUTISTA and
CESAR BAUTISTA, SPOUSES MA. ARANZAZU D. ORETA and CANUTO ORETA, SPOUSES MA.
CORAZON D. BAUTISTA and PABLO S. BAUTISTA, JR., and DEO S. DIONISIO, petitioners, vs.
HON. FLORO P. ALEJO as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila,
Branch 172, JUANITO IGNACIO and LUIS NUEZ, respondents.
FACTS:On March 25, 1996, petitioners sued private respondents, Ignacio and Nuez for ejectment in
separate branches of MeTC of Valenzuela, namely Branch 81 and 82. Petitioners allege that
respondents unlawfully entered there fishpond lots and occupied the same by means of force,
stealth or strategy. Respondent Nuez was alleged to have occupied a house belonging to
Deo Dionisio and Ignacio on the house of Sps. Bautista. Prior to these suits, there is already a
pending case in the Department of Agrarian Reform filed by respondents seeking for tenancy
rights. MeTC Branch 81 ruled in favor of petitioner, thereby ordering respondent Nuez to
vacate the said properties with damages and other fees. However, Branch 82 dismissed the
ejectment case against Ignacio. On appeal to RTC, the appeal of respondents and petitioners
were properly consolidated. Respondents argued that the lower court had no jurisdiction over
the case as no evidence of prior possession was presented by petitioners and the latter filed
already the same case in the DARAB as it is an agrarian dispute. Petituioner on their appeal
regarding Ignacios case pointed out the errors of the lower court. The RTC affirmed the
dismissal of the case against Ignacio and reversed that of Nuez.
ISSUE: WON the pendency of the suit filed by private respondents in the DAR proscribes the
institution of the ejectment cases.
WON there had been an infraction on the affidavit of non-forum-shopping requirements.
HELD: YES. The pending suit under the DARAB bars the filing of the civil cases of the petitioners
against respondent due following the concept and principle of litis pendentia that no party is
allowed to vex another more than once regarding the same subject matter and cause of
action.
YES. Infraction on the affidavit of non-forum-shopping was present. Petitioner could not have
been unaware that the possession of subject fishponds was in issue under the DARAB as they
were parties therein.
Wherefore, the petition is denied.
CASE NO. 19
GR. No. 144189, October 5, 2001
R & M GENERAL MERCHANDISE, INC., petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and LA PERLA
INDUSTRIES, INC., respondents.
FACTS: Petitioner R&M entered into a contract of lease with Pioneer Realty, for the lease of a parcel of
land and building in Makati City. Later, Pioneer was merged with respondent LA Perla who
agreed to enter another lease contract with petitioner on the same property subject of the
first lease. The contract was for 3 years and renewed for another 3 years. Later after the
expiration of the renewed 3 years, respondent and petitioner entered into a lease contract
again, this time, for five years. The contract provides that in case a party do not wish to
renew the contracrt anymore, a 45-day written notice must be accomplished. Months before
the expiry of the five year contract, petitioner sent a notice of non-renewal to respondent
who claims to have an option to renew. Respondent sent several demand letters but
petitioner refused to vacate the premises. Petitioner even filed a complaint for specific
performance in Quezon City for respondent to let them renew as what they claim to have
 been agreed upon by both parties orally. Private respondent filed for unlawful detainer before
the MeTC of Makati City which favored respondent. On appeal to the RTC and CA, both courts
affirmed the decision. Hence, the petition.
ISSUE: WON the case must be dismissed on the ground of litis pendentia and forum-shopping..
HELD: NO. The requirements of litis pendentia do not exist between this case and the case filed by
petitioner for specific performance in Quezon. For litis pendentia to apply, there must be (a)
identity of the parties;(b) identity of the rights asserted and reliefs prayed for ;(c) that the
judgement which may be rendered in one would amount to res judicata in the other. The
complaint for specific performance in Quezon City prays for the renewal of the contract while
the ejectment case herein, is for recovery of possession. Thus litis pendentia nor forum
shopping does not apply.
finding that they have participated in an illegal strike or walkout may no longer be
relitigated.
In Stilianopulos vs. City of Legaspi The Court held that when a right or fact has been judicially
tried and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction or an opportunity for such trial has been
given, the judgment of the court, as long as it remains unreversed, should be conclusive upon the
parties and those in privity with them. Clearly, there should be an end to litigation by the same parties
and their privies over a subject, once it is fully and fairly adjudicated.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision and of the Court of Appeals are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Labor Arbiter is ordered to implement the alias writ of
execution with dispatch. SO ORDERED.

CASE NO. 21
CASE NO. 20
(G.R. No. 124204. April 20, 2001)
NORMA V. MANALO, ET. AL VS. COURT OF APPEALS, SEC. OF EDUCATION, CULTURE AND
(G.R. No. 139068, Jan 16, 2004)
SPORTS ET.AL
MALAYANG SAMAHAN NG MANGGAGAWA SA BALANCED FOOD, NILO LETADA, et.
al , petitioners, vs. PINAKAMASARAP CORPORATION, SY TIAN TIN, et. al, respondents.
FACTS: The Congress enacted Batas Pambansa Blg. 412, converting the Cebu School of Arts &Trade
into the Cebu State College of Science and Technology (CSCST) including Abellana National School and
all other Schools in Cebu City. On May 26, 1988, Congress enacted R.A. No. 6655, or the Free Public
FACTS: The controversy stemmed from the petition of the union members of the Malayang Samahan
Secondary Education Act of 1988. It vests in the Department of Education, Culture and Sports
ng Manggagawa sa Balanced Food (petitioner union), who filed with the management of
(DECS) the establishment, renaming, conversion, integration, separation, administration, supervision
Pinakamasarap Corporation (respondent company). They sought the ouster of Rolando Reyes,
and control of all public secondary schools and public secondary teachers and other school personnel,
companys Production and Assistant Manager. Respondent claimed that petitioner union members &
including the payment of their salaries, allowances and other fringe benefits as well as those provided
officers abandoned work and picketed. That, although, the employees resumed their work,
by local government.
nonetheless persisted with their illegal activities, causing the companys operations and production
Secretary Quisumbing issued DECS Order No. 5 setting forth the guidelines and procedures in the
severely paralyzed.
implementation of Section 7 of R.A. No. 6655.
Respondent filed with the Labor Arbiter a complaint for unfair labor practices (ULP) and damages
Plaintiff Romeo Reyes filed with the RTC Cebu a complaint for TRO enjoining defendants from
against petitioners, for violation of Art. 282 of the Labor Code and their (CBA). Petitioners answered
enforcing or implementing DECS Order No. 5 for being issued not in accordance with law. However, the
with motion to dismiss, claiming they left their workplace to testify at a barangay hearing with the
trial court dismissed the complaint.
permission of respondent companys Assistant Manager, respondent Tan.
DECS, entered into a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with the CSCST. The MOA provided for
The Labor Arbiter declared the forfeiture/ loss of employment status of the union officers.
the Transfer of the secondary education program of Abellana College of Arts and Trade (ACAT), its
Petitioners appeal to (NLRC), which uphold the illegality of the strike by petitioners, but ordered their
personnel, facilities, as well as the funding of its operation, and gradually phasing out its college
reinstatement. Both parties filed their motions for reconsideration but were denied by the NLRC. Both
offerings or integrating them into the main campus. The MOA is based on R.A. No. 6655 which
parties filed a petition for certiorari, but was similarly dismissed. The Resolution became final and
mandated the nationalization of public secondary schools and their transfer to the DECS.
executory.
On Oct. 1990, Bonilla and other superintendents of CSCST filed with the RTC, Cebu City, a
On petitioners motion, the Arbiter issued a writ of execution directing the sheriff to reinstate to
petition for the issuance of preliminary injunction restraining the DECS from continuing with the
their former positions. Thereupon, respondent filed an appeal to the NLRC praying that the writ of
implementation of the rules and regulations separating the high schools from CSCST. It also argued
execution be quashed. It alleged that there have been supervening events which rendered unjust the
that R.A. No. 6655 is a general law which cannot supersede B.P. Blg. 412, which is a special law.
reinstatement of petitioners to their former positions. Among the supervening events was the hiring
However, The trial court, likewise, dismissed the petition. It ruled that DECS orders implementing R.A.
by respondent company of new regular employees in place of petitioners. Thus, the Arbiter granted
6655, are valid and legitimate acts of the Secretary of Education. Corolarilly, prohibition and/or
the motion and quashed the alias writ of execution.
injunction will not lie against the herein respondents. The Court further states that R.A. 6655 modified/
The NLRC remanded the case to the Arbiter for immediate implementation of the alias writ of
repealed BP 412.
execution. Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. Respondent filed a petition
On May 1992, Abucay and other CSCST faculty members filed with the RTC Cebu another
for certiorari.The Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the final and executory Decision of the
petition for Declaration of Nullity of the MOA with preliminary injunction and restraining order. But
NLRC. The CA upheld the illegality of the strike by petitioners, however, it modified the NLRC Decision
again, the trial court dismissed the petition on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, failure to exhaust
reinstating them to the service by declaring that they have lost their employment status.
administrative remedies and failure to state a cause of action.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. Hence, this petition for review
On February 4, 1993, Petitioners Manalo, and other faculty members, registrar, librarian, janitor
on certiorari.
and other personnel of CSCST filed with the RTC Cebu a complaint for Declaration of Nullity of MOA
ISSUE: Whether or not the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion when it declared the strike
with Preliminary Injunction; questioning the validity of the MOA entered by DECS and CSCST.
illegal but ordered the reinstatement of petitioners.
Respondent Bacalso filed a motion to dismiss the case on the ground of res judicata. Respondent
insisted that the case repeated the very same issue already decided three times by the Regional Trial
HELD: The Court of Appeals declared that the NLRC did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it
Court of Cebu. The appeal to the Supreme Court from one of these decisions was dismissed, which
declared the strike illegal but ordered the reinstatement of petitioners. Truly, the Appellate Court
dismissal had become final and executory.
modified what should otherwise have been an irreversible Decision.
Indeed, the same court disregarded the doctrine of res judicata. Applying the said doctrine,
the issue of whether petitioners should be reinstated to their former positions despite the
 The trial court finds that respondents motion to be meritorious. Hence it dismissed the
petitioners complaint. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration which the trial court denied.
Petitioners filed a notice of appeal. The CA also dismissed petitioners complaint. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondents motion to dismiss the case on the ground of res judicata is
meritorious.
HELD: Yes. The Court finds respondents Motion to dismiss the case on the ground of res judicata
meritorious.
Res judicata means a matter adjudged, a thing judicially acted upon or decided; a thing or
matter settled by judgment. In res judicata, the judgment in the first action is considered conclusive as
to every matter offered and received therein, as to any other admissible matter which might have
been offered for that purpose, and all other matters that could have been adjudged therein. Res
judicata is an absolute bar to a subsequent action for the same cause; and its requisites are: (a) the
former judgment or order must be final; (b) the judgment or order must be one on the merits; (c) it
must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and parties; (d) there
must be between the first and second actions, identity of parties, of subject matter and of causes of
action.
All these requisites were present in this case. The parties in Civil Case No. CEB-11735 and in Civil
Case No. 13562 were faculty members and personnel of the CSCST. They represented the same
interest in both actions which referred to the nullity of the MOA. As observed by the appellate court,
there is substantial identity in the cause of action and relief sought.
The order is conclusive on the validity of the Memorandum of Agreement, which will bar a
subsequent action on the same subject matter. If allowed, it would result in the re-litigation of the
same cause involving the same issues, parties, and subject matter.
The judgment of either court will constitute a bar to the other. It has been held that where a
litigant sues the same party against whom the same action or actions, for the alleged violation of the
same right, and the enforcement of the same relief are still pending, the defense of litis pendentia in
one case is a bar to the other; and a final judgment in one would constitute res judicata and thus,
would cause the dismissal of the rest.
"Under the principle of res judicata, the Court and the parties are bound by such final decision,
otherwise, there will be no end to litigation. It is to the interest of the public that there should be an
end to litigation by the parties over a subject fully and fairly adjudicated, and an individual should not
be vexed twice for the same cause.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED and the appealed decision of the Court of Appeals
is AFFIRMED.
CASE NO. 22
G.R. No. 143556 March 16, 2004
EQUITABLE PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL INTERNATIONAL BANK and RAFAEL B.
BUENAVENTURA, petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and SANTA ROSA MINING CO., INC., respondents.
FACTS: Sta. Rosa Mining Co., Inc. filed before the RTC Quezon City a complaint for sum of money and
damages against petitioners Philippine Commercial International Bank alleging that it lost income
opportunity from its joint venture with Sa Amin sa San Jose Panganiban, Inc. Respondent alleged that it
opened a savings account with the said bank and informed the latter of its intention to convert its
account into a savings/current/time deposit account and sought to obtain checkbooks pursuant
thereto on October 26, 1993 which the bank refused due to a restraining order issued by the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Respondent alleged that in refusing to issue checkbooks,
Lota, the bank manager was guilty of misrepresentation as verification with SEC showed that the bank
received the SEC order on October 27, 1993. Respondent averred that such refusal resulted to its
prejudice and its joint venture partner, Sa Amin.
Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss CA-G.R. SP No. 33674 on the grounds that Sta. Rosa was guilty of
forum shopping because the amount involved in the case was also the issue filed in RTC Daet
Camarines Sur and that the complaint stated no cause of action because as judgment debtor in Civil
Case No. 6014, Sta. Rosa has lost all rights over the funds deposited under its Savings Account since
the same had already been garnished by RTC, Branch 39, in favor of the judgment creditor, Sa Amin.
RTC denied petitioners motion to dismiss. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration whereas Sta.
Rosa filed a motion to declare petitioners in default for failure to file their Answer. RTC likewise denied
the motion for reconsideration and granted petitioners motion to declare petitioners in default.
Later petitioners became involved in Civil Case No. 6014 as a forced intervenor when the Daet court
ordered the continuation of garnishment of the funds despite the TRO and preliminary injunction
issued earlier by the SEC. Due to conflicting claims, it elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals
which dismissed the petition and upheld the order of garnishment of the Daet court.
Petitioners then filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus before the Court of Appeals,
which seasonably set aside the order of default of the lower court and directed the latter to admit
petitioners Answer and proceed to hear the case on the merits.
Petitioners not satisfied with CAs decision elevated the matter to the Supreme Court.
Issues: 1. Whether or not Sta. Rosa is guilty of forum shopping;
2. Whether or not Civil Case No. Q-95-25073 should be dismissed for failure to state a cause
of action; and
3. Whether or not Civil Case No. Q-95-25073 should be dismissed on the ground of res
judicata.
RULING:
1 No. For a charge of forum shopping to prosper, there must exist between an action pending in
one court and another action before another court: (a) identity of parties, or at least such
parties as represent the same interests in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and
relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity of the two
preceding particulars is such that any judgment rendered in the other action will, regardless
of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the action under consideration. There
is no identity of parties since the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 6014, Sa Amin, is not a party in
Civil Case No. Q-95-25073. On the other hand, in Civil Case No. Q-95-25073, Sta. Rosa is the
plaintiff while petitioners are the defendants. Apparently, the parties represented different
interests in these cases. Neither is there identity of rights asserted or relief sought. In Civil
Case No. 6014, Sta. Rosa is defending its right as a debtor in a collection case where
petitioners are the intervenors, while in Civil Case No. Q-95-25073, Sta. Rosa is asserting its
right as a depositor to file a damage suit against the defendant, now petitioner bank. The two
proceedings are far from identical.
2 No. The respondents allegations would suffice to constitute a cause of action against
petitioners. That petitioners have a valid defense is another matter. At any rate, matters such
as the propriety of refusal to release the funds by petitioners and the actual date of receipt of
the restraining order, among others, are matters for trial. They require evidentiary proof and
support that can be better threshed out not upon a motion to dismiss but in a full blown trial
on the merits. These matters, indeed, would not yet go into the question of the absence of a
cause of action as a ground to dismiss.
3 No. Res judicata or bar by prior judgment is a doctrine which holds that a matter that has been
adjudicated by a court of competent jurisdiction must be deemed to have been finally and
conclusively settled if it arises in any subsequent litigation between the same parties and for
the same cause. For a claim of res judicata to prosper, the following requisites must concur:
(1) there must be a final judgment or order; (2) the court rendering it must have jurisdiction
over the subject matter and the parties; (3) it must be a judgment or order on the merits; and
(4) there must be, between the two cases, identity of parties, subject matter and causes of
action. In the present case, while the first three requisites may be present, the fourth requisite
 is absent. As stated earlier, there is no identity of parties, subject matter and causes of action filing or re-filing of an information lies within the discretion of the prosecutor who must
between Civil Case No. 6014 and Civil Case No. Q-95-25073. act independently of the affected parties.
The remedy of a party whenever the complaint does not allege a cause of action is to set up
this defense in a motion to dismiss or in the answer. A motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to
CASE NO. 23
state a cause of action in the complaint hypothetically admits the truth of the facts alleged therein.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ERIBERTO U. ROSARIO, JR., in his capacity as Presiding Judge of
However, the hypothetical admission is limited to the "relevant and material facts well pleaded in the
Branch 66, Regional Trial Court of Makati and JUAN PONCE ENRILE, respondents.
complaint and inferences fairly deductible therefrom. The admission does not extend to conclusion or
G.R. No. 106922 April 20, 2001
interpretations of law; nor does it cover allegations of fact the falsity of which is subject to judicial
notice."
FACTS: After the unsuccessful December 1989 coup d etat, the DOJ headed by Franklin Drilon,
Private respondent claims that an appeal or an original action for certiorari is not
requested for investigation of Juan Ponce Enrile for his alleged participation in the said coup. The
the proper remedy for a defendant whose motion to dismiss has been denied by the trial
Prosecutors issued a subpoena to Enrile with an order to submit his counter-affidavit to the letter-
court for the reason that the order does not terminate the proceedings, nor finally dispose
complaint. Instead of filing his counter-affidavit, Enrile filed a Petition for Summary Dismissal of the
of the contentions of the parties. In its decision affirming the trial court's denial of the
charge against him.
motion to dismiss, the appellate court sustained this contention. However, as correctly
On February 27, 1990, the Team of Prosecutors filed before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
pointed out by the petitioners, the rule admits of an exception. Thus, where the denial of
City on Information charging private respondent with the complex crime of rebellion with murder and
the motion to dismiss by the trial court was tainted with grave abuse of discretion
frustrated murder. Enrile then filed a complaint accusing the petitioners of bad faith in filing the
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, as in the case at bar, the aggrieved party may
information for rebellion complexed with murder and frustrated murder.
assail the order of denial on certiorari. A wide breadth of discretion is granted in certiorari
On October 9, 1990, Drilons group filed a Motion to Dismiss for failure of the Complaint to
proceedings in the interest of substantial justice and to prevent a substantial wrong. In the Drilon
state a cause of action. They claimed that there was no allegation of any actionable wrong
case, we also held that the denial by the trial court of the motion to dismiss of herein petitioners
constituting a violation of any of the legal rights of private respondent.
based on the same grounds as in the instant petition constituted grave abuse of discretion for the
On October 8, 1991, respondent trial court issued an Order denying the Motion to Dismiss
reason that "this (private respondent's baseless action) would unjustly compel the petitioners to
and requiring petitioners to file their answer and to present evidence in support of their defenses in a
needlessly go through a protracted trial and thereby unduly burden the court with one more futile and
full-blown trial inasmuch as the defense of good faith and immunity from suit does not appear to be
inconsequential case." 32 The appellate court therefore erred in not ruling that the trial court
indubitable. Drilons motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. Hence this petition.
committed a grave abuse of discretion when the latter refused to dismiss the case as against herein
Going now to the crux of the petition, Drilons group contend that the complaint sets forth no
petitioners, notwithstanding the obvious insufficiency of the complaint against them.
cause of action against them. They allege good faith, regularity in the performance of official duties
and lack of ultimate facts constituting an actionable wrong. On the other hand, Enrile argues that a
CASE NO. 24
cause of action has been sufficiently pleaded and that the defenses of good faith and performance of
[G.R. No. 138945. August 19, 2003]
official duties are best disposed in a judicial hearing.
FELIX GOCHAN AND SONS REALTY CORPORATION and STA. LUCIA REALTY AND
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,petitioners,
ISSUE: The main question in the instant petition is whether the allegations in the complaint
vs.
sufficiently plead a cause of action to hold Drilons group liable for damages.
HEIRS OF RAYMUNDO BABA, namely, BESTRA BABA, MARICEL BABA, CRESENCIA BABA,
ANTONIO BABA, and PETRONILA BABA, represented by Attorney-in-fact VIRGINIA
HELD: The petition of Drilons group is granted.
SUMALINOG, respondents.
Lack of cause of action, as a ground for a motion to dismissmust appear on the face of the complaint
itself, meaning that it must be determined from the allegations of the complaint and from none other.
FACTS:
The infirmity of the complaint in this regard is only too obvious to have escaped respondent judge's
Lot No. 3537 is a conjugal property of spouses Raymundo Baba and Dorotea Inot. After Raymundo
attention. Paragraph 14 of the complaint which states:
died, an extrajudicial settlement of his estate was executed among the heirs of Raymundo, namely,
xxx xxx xxx 14. The malicious prosecution, nay persecution, of plaintiff for a non-existent crime
Dorotea Inot and his 2 children, Victoriano Baba and Gregorio Baba. On December 28, 1966, Dorotea,
had severely injured and besmirched plaintiff's name and reputation and forever stigmatized his
Victoriano and Gregorio sold said property to petitioner Felix Gochan and Sons Realty Corporation
stature as a public figure, thereby causing him extreme physical suffering, serious anxiety, mental
(Gochan Realty) which thereafter entered into a joint venture agreement with Sta. Lucia Realty and
anguish, moral shock and social humiliation."
Development Corporation Inc. for the development, of said lot into a subdivision.
is a mere conclusion of law and is not an averment or allegation of ultimate facts. It does not,
Respondents Bestra, Maricel, Crecencia, Antonio and Petronila, all surnamed Baba, filed a complaint
therefore, aid in any wise the complaint in setting forth a valid cause of action against the petitioners.
for quieting of title and reconveyance with damages against petitioners with the RTC of Lapu-Lapu City
alleging that said transaction was fraudulent and is void because they never consented to the said
However, we hold that the said allegations still fail to maintain a cause of action against
sale and extrajudicial settlement.
Drilons group. To reiterate, a cause of action exists if the following elements are present:
RTC dismissed respondents complaint on the ground of prescription and laches. CA reversed the
(1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or
decision. Hence the petition.
is created; (2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to
ISSUE:
violate such right; and (3) an act or omission on the part of such defendant violative of the
WON respondents complaint is dismissible on the ground of prescription and laches.
right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of defendant to the plaintiff
RULING:
for which the latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages. 29 In the case at bar,
1. A. Re prescription:
we fail to see any right of the Enrile supposedly violated by the petitioners. Nowhere in
No. Applying Article 1410, the court stated that a claim of prescription is unavailing where the assailed
the statute books is a prospective accused given the right to be notified beforehand of the
conveyance is void ab initio with respect to those who had no knowledge of the transaction. The case
filing of an information against him. Likewise, the withdrawal of the information and the
involved a fraudulent sale and extrajudicial settlement of a lot executed without the knowledge and
subsequent re-filing of the same do not constitute an actionable wrong inasmuch as the
consent of some of the co-owners. This is based on the principle Nemo dat quod non habet which
means No one can give more than what he has. Assuming that the allegations in respondents
complaint are true, their claim that the execution of the extrajudicial settlement and the deed of sale
involving Lot No. 3537, which led to the issuance of a certificate of title in the name of Gochan Realty,
was without their knowledge or consent, gives rise to an imprescriptible cause of action to declare
said transactions inexistent on the ground of absence of legal capacity and consent. Hence, the
dismissal of respondents complaint on the ground of prescription was erroneous.
B. Laches
No. Laches is defined as failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do
that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier. It is negligence or
omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting presumption that the party entitled to
assert it has abandoned it or has declined to assert it.
The dismissal of the complaint on the ground of laches is premature. Though laches applies even to
imprescriptible actions, its elements must be proved positively. Laches is evidentiary in nature which
could not be established by mere allegations in the pleadings and cannot be resolved in a motion to
dismiss.
-Case remanded to RTC for trial and judgement on the merits.
CASE NO. 25
G.R. No. 108991
March 20, 2001
WILLIAM ALAIN MIAILHE
vs. COURT OF APPEALS and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
FACTS: Petitioner filed a complaint for annulment of sale, reconveyance and damages against herein
respondent for the property in dispute, which is alleged by the petitioner that due to threat and
intimidation employed during the Marcos regime caused them to sell the property to the respondent.
The latter denied the allegation and filed its answer raising as Special and affirmative defense and
motion to dismiss on the ground that the action had prescribed. Trial court denied the petition. On
appeal, CA reversed the decision. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: WON the petitioners action had prescribed
HELD:
Yes. Trial courts have authority and discretion to dismiss an action on the ground of prescription when
the parties pleadings or other facts on record show it to be indeed time-barred; and it may do so on
the basis of a motion to dismiss, or an answer which sets up such ground as an affirmative defense; or
even if the ground is alleged after judgment on the merits, as in a motion for reconsideration; or even
if the defense has not been asserted at all, as where no statement thereof is found in the pleadings, or
where a defendant has been declared in default. What is essential only is that the facts demonstrating
the lapse of the prescriptive period, be otherwise sufficiently and satisfactorily apparent on the record;
either in averments of the plaintiffs complaint or otherwise established by the evidence.
CASE NO. 26
EQUITABLE PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL INTERNATIONAL BANK, and
RAFAEL B. BUENAVENTURA
VS.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, and
SANTA ROSA MINING CO., INC.
GR No. 143556
March 16, 2004
FACTS
On September 19, 1995. Sta. Rosa Mining Co., Inc., filed before the RTC of Quezon City
Branch 222, a complaint for sum of money and damages against petitioners Philippine Commercial
International Bank (now Equitable-PCIB), Rafael B. Buenaventura (PCIBs former President), and
Cynthia F. Lota (Cubao Branch manager).
On October 21, 1993, Sta. Rosa opened Savings Account No. 0453-52672-1 with PCIB Cubao
by depositing a check amounting to PHP6,389,071.35, plus PHP100.00 cash. The next day, October
22, it informed the bank of its intention to convert its newly opened account into a
savings/current/time deposit account, and on October 26, sought to obtain checkbooks. The bank
refused to issue the checkbooks due to an alleged restraining order issued by SEC, enjoining the
officers of Sta. Rosa from withdrawing the funds deposited under Savings Account No. 0453-52672-1.
Sta. Rosa accuses Lota guilty of misrepresentation, and their refusal to release funds caused undue
harm and prejudice to its stockholders, and social development projects of its joint venture partner, Sa
Amin. Sta. Rosa asks for PHP9,238,800.00 for total damages.
On October 6, 1995, petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that Sta. Rosa was
guilty of forum shopping, because the amount involved in this case is the same that was involved in
Civil Case No. 6014, filed before the RTC Branch 39. Also, that the complaint has no cause of action
because as judgment debtor in the aforesaid civil case, Sta. Rosa lost all rights over the funds
deposited under the Savings Account, since the same has been garnished by RTC Branch 39, in favor
of the judgment creditor, Sa Amin.
Petitioners elevated the matter to the CA through a Petition for Certiorari, seeking the
annulment of the garnishment order issued by the Daet Court. Petitioners refused to comply with
order due to an earlier TRO issued by SEC. The CA dismissed the petition and upheld the order of
garnishment of the Daet court.
On November 7, 1995, the RTC of Quezon City denied herein petitioners motion to dismiss. It
stated that defiance of the garnishment order caused inconveniences not only to Sa Amin, but also to
Sta. Rosa, since garnishment would indirectly benefit Sta. Rosa.
On November 28, 1995, petitioners filed for a Motion for Reconsideration of the dismissal
order, whereas Sta. Rosa filed a motion to declare petitioners in default for failure to file their Answer.
On March 5, 1996, petitioners filed a consolidated Motion to set aside the order of default and
for reconsideration, which was denied on June 26, 1996 for lack of merit.
On October 14, 1996, petitioners filed for Relief from the order of default, which was also
denied in an order dated March 4, 1998. Petitioners then filed for petition for Certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus before the CA, which set aside the order of default of the lower court, and directed the
latter to admit petitioners Answer, and proceed to hear the case on the merits thus, the order of the
public respondent dated March 4, 1998 is RESCINDED and AVOIDED.
ISSUES
1 Whether or not Sta. Rosa is guilty of forum shopping, in which case its claim for damages
would be deemed waived, since the funds in doubt of release were already a subject of
litigation in Civil Case No. 6014, and Sta. Rosa cannot file another case for claims of damages
involving the same parties, the same cause of action, and the same object, in a different
court.
2 Whether or not Sta. Rosa has no cause of action against petitioners, since the latter insisted
on acting in good faith, and releasing the funds after the denial of their petition for Certiorari,
were it not for the motion for reconsideration filed by SEC, among other accusations of the
respondent.
3 Whether or not res judicata is present, with respect to the issue regarding the entitlement
over the savings account.
HELD
1 NO. For a party to be guilty of forum shopping, he must have repetitively availed of the
several judicial remedies in different courts, simultaneously, or successively, all substantially
founded on the same transactions, and the same essential facts and circumstances, and all
raising substantially the same issues, either pending in, or already resolved adversely, by
some other court.
In the cited case, there is no identity of parties because the plaintiff in Civil Case NO. 6014,
Sa Amin, is not a party in case at bar. Also, the parties represented different interests in these
case.
 2 If, the following factual allegations in the Complaint be deemed admitted, Sta. Rosa has
established her cause of action, and may be entitled to relief, to wit:
(a). On October 21, 1993, Sta. Rosa opened a savings account with petitioner PCIB, Cubao
Branch;
(b). On October 22, 1993, respondent conveyed interest to convert said account into a
savings/current/time deposit accounts;
(c). Sta. Rosa sought to obtain checkbooks from petitioner bank, but was denied allegedly
due to a restraining order from SEC;
(d). Such restraining order was verified to have been received by PCIB only on October 27,
1993, at 1:45p.m.; and
(e). The refusal of the petitioners to issue checkbooks and to release funds to Sta. Rosa
prejudiced the latters livelihood.
Hence, the test of sufficiency of the facts to constitute a cause of action is, whether or not,
admitting the facts alleged, the court can render a valid judgment. These allegations
would suffice a to constitute a cause of action against petitioners, and that the
petitioners may have a valid defense is another matter.
3 NO. Res judicata or bar by prior judgment is a doctrine which holds that a matter that has
been adjudicated by a court of competent jurisdiction, must be deemed to have been finally
and conclusively settled, if it arises in any subsequent litigation between the same parties,
and for the same cause/s. as stated earlier, there is no identity of parties, subject matter and
causes of action between Civil Case No. 6014, and Civil Case No. Q-95-25073. While the
deposit in Savings Account No. 0453-52672-1 was involved in both cases, causes of actions
and reliefs prayed for are entirely different.
Wherefore, the petition is DENIED. The decisions of the Court of Appeals dated November 23, 1999,
are AFFIRMED.
CASE NO. 27
ASIA UNITED BANK Vs. GOODLAND COMPANY, INC.
G.R. No. 191388
March 9, 2011
FACTS: Respondent Goodland Company, Inc. (Goodland) executed a Third Party Real Estate Mortgage
(REM) over two parcels of land in favor of petitioner Asia United Bank (AUB). The mortgage secured
the obligation amounting to P250 million of Radiomarine Network, Inc. (RMNI), doing business as
Smartnet Philippines, to AUB. Goodland then filed a Complaint for the annulment of the REM on the
ground that the same was falsified and done in contravention of the parties verbal agreement
(Annulment Case).
While the Annulment Case was pending, RMNI defaulted in the payment of its obligation to AUB,
prompting the latter to extrajudicially foreclose the mortgage. The mortgaged properties were sold in
public auction to AUB as the highest bidder. It was issued a Certificate of Sale, which was registered
with the Registry of Deeds of Calamba on November 23, 2006. Before AUB could consolidate its title,
Goodland filed on November 28, 2006 another Complaint to annul the foreclosure sale and to enjoin
the consolidation of title in favor of AUB (Injunction Case). Goodland asserted the alleged falsified
nature of the REM as basis for its prayer for injunction.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court (Injunction Case)
On March 15, 2007, the trial court acted favorably on petitioners motion and dismissed the Injunction
Case with prejudice on the grounds of forum shopping and litis pendentia.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals1 (Injunction Case)
Goodland appealed the same to the CA.
On June 5, 2009, the CA promulgated its assailed Decision, which ruled in favor of Goodland and
ordered the reinstatement of the Injunction Case in the trial court. Hence, the instant petition.
ISSUE: WON the successive filing of the Annulment and Injunction Cases constitute forum shopping.
HELD: Yes. There is forum shopping "when a party repetitively avails of several judicial remedies in
different courts, simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on the same transactions
and the same essential facts and circumstances, and all raising substantially the same issues either
pending in or already resolved adversely by some other court." The different ways by which forum
shopping may be committed were explained in Chua v. Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company:
Forum shopping can be committed in three ways: (1) filing multiple cases based on the same cause of
action and with the same prayer, the previous case not having been resolved yet (where the ground
for dismissal is litis pendentia); (2) filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action and the
same prayer, the previous case having been finally resolved (where the ground for dismissal is res
judicata); and (3) filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action, but with different prayers
(splitting causes of action, where the ground for dismissal is also either litis pendentia or res judicata).
Common in these types of forum shopping is the identity of the cause of action in the different cases
filed. Cause of action is defined as "the act or omission by which a party violates the right of another."
The cause of action in the earlier Annulment Case is the alleged nullity of the REM (due to its allegedly
falsified or spurious nature) which is allegedly violative of Goodlands right to the mortgaged property.
It serves as the basis for the prayer for the nullification of the REM. The Injunction Case involves the
same cause of action, inasmuch as it also invokes the nullity of the REM as the basis for the prayer for
the nullification of the extrajudicial foreclosure and for injunction against consolidation of title. While
the main relief sought in the Annulment Case (nullification of the REM) is ostensibly different from the
main relief sought in the Injunction Case (nullification of the extrajudicial foreclosure and injunction
against consolidation of title), the cause of action which serves as the basis for the said reliefs remains
the same the alleged nullity of the REM. Thus, what is involved here is the third way of committing
forum shopping, i.e., filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action, but with different
prayers. As previously held by the Court, there is still forum shopping even if the reliefs prayed for in
the two cases are different, so long as both cases raise substantially the same issues.
CASE NO. 28
TEODORO B. VESAGAS, and WILFRED D. ASIS, vs. The Honorable COURT OF APPEALS and
DELFINO RANIEL and HELENDA RANIEL
G.R. No. 142924 December 5, 2001
FACTS: The respondent spouses Delfino and Helenda Raniel are members in good standing of the Luz
Villaga Tennis Clud, Inc. (club). They alleged that petitioner Teodoro B. Vesagas, who claims to be the
club's duly elected president, in conspiracy with petitioner Wilfred D. Asis, who, in turn, claims to be its
duly elected vice-president and legal counsel, summarily stripped them of their lawful membership,
without due process of law. Thereafter, respondent spouses filed a Complaint with the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC). Before the hearing, petitioners filed a motion to dismiss on the ground
that the SEC lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case. The motion was denied by SEC, as
well as, the CA.
Hence, the present course of action where petitioner alleged that since its (the Corporation)
inception in the 1970's, the club in practice has not been a corporation. They add that it was only the
respondent spouses, motivated by their own personal agenda to make money from the club, who
surreptitiously caused its registration with the SEC. They then assert that, at any rate, the club has
already ceased to be a corporate body. Therefore, no intra-corporate relations can arise as between
the respondent spouses and the club or any of its members. Stretching their argument further,
petitioners insist that since the club, by their reckoning is not a corporation, the SEC does not have the
power or authority to inquire into the validity of the expulsion of the respondent spouses.
Consequently, it is not the correct forum to review the challenged act. In conclusion, petitioners put
respondent spouses to task for their failure to implead the club as a necessary or indispensable party
to the case.
Issues:1. Whether or not the SEC has jurisdiction to try and hear the case
2. Whether or not the respondent Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when it
merely upheld the theoretical power of the SEC Hearing Officer to issue a subpoena and to cite a
person in contempt (actually a non-issue of the petition) while it shunted away the issue of whether
that hearing officer may hold a person in contempt for not obeying a subpoena where his residence is
beyond fifty kilometers from the place of hearing and no transportation expense was tendered to
him."
HELD:
1 YES. First we now resolve whether the dispute between the respondents and petitioners is a
corporate matter within the exclusive competence of the SEC to decide. In order that the
commission can take cognizance of a case, the controversy must pertain to any of the
following relationship:
 a) between the corporation, partnership or association and its of minority, insanity, incompetence, lack of juridical personality or any other general disqualifications
stockholders, partners, members, or officers; of a party, the latter refers to the fact that the plaintiff is not the real party- in-interest.
c) between the corporation, partnership, or association and the state as far Correspondingly, the first can be a ground for a motion to dismiss based on the ground of lack of legal
as its franchise, permit or license to operate is concerned; and capacity to sue; whereas the second can be used as a ground for a motion to dismiss based on the
d) among the stockholders, partners or associates themselves. fact that the complaint, on the face thereof, evidently states no cause of action.
Facts: This case is about the complaint for the declaration of nullity of Original Certificate of Title No.
The fact that the parties involved in the controversy are all stockholders or that the
670 and all other titles emanating therefrom. The subject property is a vast tract of lands where the
parties involved are the stockholders and the corporation, does not necessarily place the
petitioners alleged that they occupied and possessed such parcels. The whole property covered by
dispute within the loop of jurisdiction of the SEC. Jurisdiction should be determined by
OCT No. 670 was issued pursuant to Decree No. 1024 in favor of Isabel Manahan Santiago the mother
considering not only the status or relationship of the parties but also the nature of the
of herein respondent. Petitioners filed with the trial court, on 29 April 1996, an action for declaration of
question that is the subject of their controversy.
nullity of respondents certificates of title on the basis that OCT No. 670 was fake and spurious and
Also, the alleged failure of the respondents to implead the club as a necessary or
also Petitioners came by information that respondent was planning to evict them from the Subject
indispensable party where the Petitioners contend that the original complaint should be
Property. Two of the petitioners had actually received notices to vacate.
dismissed for not including the club as one of the respondents therein. Dismissal is not the
Respondent filed his Answer with Prayer for Preliminary Hearing on the Affirmative Defenses.
remedy for non-joinder of parties. Under the Rules, the remedy is to implead the
Respondent claimed that the petitioners had no legal capacity to file the Complaint, and thus, the
non-party, claimed to be necessary or indispensable, in the action, thus:
Complaint stated no cause of action. Since OCT No. 670 was genuine and authentic on its face, then
OCT No. 670 and all of respondents land titles derived therefrom, are incontrovertible, indefeasible
"SEC. 11. Misjoinder and non-joinder of parties. - Neither
and conclusive against the petitioners and the whole world. Furthermore, He pointed out that any
misjoinder nor non-joinder of parties is a ground for dismissal of an action.
action against his certificates of title already prescribed, especially with regard to OCT No. 670, which
Parties may be dropped or added by order of the court on motion of any
was issued in 1913 or more than 83 years prior to the filing of the Complaint by the petitioners.
party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action and on such terms
During said hearing, petitioners presented their lone witness, Engineer Placido Naval, a
as are just. Any claim against a misjoined party may be severed and
supposed expert on land registration laws. In response to questions from Honorable Judge Francisco C.
proceeded with separately."
Rodriguez of the trial court, Engineer Naval answered that a parcel of land titled illegally would revert
to the State if the Torrens title was cancelled, and that it was the State, through the Office of the
2 The other issue is with regard to the alleged oppressive subpoenas and orders issued by
Solicitor General, that should file for the annulment or cancellation of the title. Respondent, on the
Hearing Officer Soller, purportedly without or in excess of authority. In light of PD 902-A's
other hand, did not present any evidence but relied on all the pleadings and documents he had so far
repeal, the need to rule on the question of the extent of the contempt powers of an SEC
submitted to the trial court.
hearing officer relative to his authority to issue subpoenas and orders to parties involved in
RTC dismissed the case ruling that plaintiffs were not the lawful owners of the land subject of
intra-corporate cases, or potential witnesses therein has been rendered academic. The
this case, for they did not comply with PD 892, the said plaintiffs do not have the legal standing to
enactment of RA 8799 mooted this issue as SEC hearing officers, now bereft of any power to
bring before this Court the instant complaint. Defendants title especially so with the mother title OCT
resolve disputes, are likewise stripped of their power to issue subpoenas and contempt orders
670 was entered and issued in 1913 or more than Eighty Three (83) years ago, the same not having
incidental to the exercise of their quasi-judicial powers.
been questioned by any party. Only now that it is being questioned, but sad to say, plaintiffs who are
At any rate, it taxes our credulity why the petitioners insist in raising this issue in the
on the offensive and relying on their lone expert witness, instead of bolstering their case, unwittingly
case at bar. The so-called oppressive subpoenas and orders were not directed to them. They
sealed their fate.
were issued to the club's secretary, Purita Escobar, directing her to appear before the
The MR of the petitioner are likewise dismissed. The CA affirmed the decision of RTC. Hence
Commission and bring certain documents of the club,that were supposedly under her
the reason of this petition.
possession or control. It is obvious that the petitioners are not the proper parties to assail the
Issue: 1. Whether or not the Petitioner has the capacity to sue
oppressiveness of the subpoenas or the orders, and impugn their validity. Elementary is the
2. Whether an action for quieting of title, specifically where petitioners are
principle that only those who expect to be adversely affected by an order can complain
in possession of subject land, can be subject of prescription.
against it. It is their addressee, Purita Escobar, who can assail their alleged oppressiveness.
Held: No. According to Article 477 of the Civil Code, the plaintiff, in an action to
Petitioners' protestation has therefore no legal leg to stand on.
remove a cloud on or to quiet title, must have legal or equitable title to, or interest in, the real
property which is the subject matter of the action. Petitioners failed to establish in their Complaint that
CASE NO. 29
they had any legal or equitable title to, or legitimate interest in, the Subject Property so as to justify
NEMENCIO C. EVANGELISTA, PASCUAL G. QUINTO, LUIS B. BUENA, EUSEBIA V. TABLADA,
their right to file an action to remove a cloud on or to quiet title.
CANUTO G. TISBE, DAVID R. CARULLO, SOFONIAS E. COLEGADO, FELIX B. BUENA, TORIBIO
Even as this Court agrees with the petitioners that their action was one for removal
C. EVANGELISTA, LEBRADA A. NICOLAS, ALECIA J. RAMOS, MILA G. DE LOS REYES,
of a cloud on or quieting of title, it does arrive at the same conclusion as the trial court and the Court
SALVADOR I. DE LA TORRE, MOISES CRUZ, RUFINO INFANTE, ALICIA ASTROLOGO, TRINIDAD
of Appeals that petitioners had no personality to file the said action, not being the parties-in-interest,
LUMIQUED, LUZMINIDA QUINIQUINI, & TEODORA C. TEMERAS, Petitioners. vs. CARMELINO
and their Complaint should be dismissed for not stating a cause of action.
M. SANTIAGO
Therefore, without legal or equitable title to the Subject Property, the petitioners
G.R. No. 157447. April 29, 2005
lacked the personality to file an action for removal of a cloud on, or quieting of, title and their
Principle laid down by SC:
Complaint was properly dismissed for failing to state a cause of action. In view of the dismissal of the
Lack of legal capacity to sue means that the plaintiff is not in the exercise of his civil rights, or case on this ground, it is already unnecessary for this Court to address the issue of prescription of the
does not have the necessary qualification to appear in the case, or does not have the character or action.
representation he claims. On the other hand, a case is dismissible for lack of personality to sue
upon proof that the plaintiff is not the real party-in-interest, hence grounded on failure to state a CASE NO. 30
cause of action. The term "lack of capacity to sue" should not be confused with the term "lack of
personality to sue." While the former refers to a plaintiffs general disability to sue, such as on account
SUI MAN HUI CHAN and GONZALO CO, petitioners
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and OSCAR D. MEDALLA, respondents.
G.R. No. 147999 February 27, 2004
FACTS: On March 30, 1999, private respondent Oscar Medalla filed a complaint before the RTC of
Mandaluyong City for collection of a sum of money arising from breach of a contract of lease and
damages, against petitioners Sui Man Hui Chan and Gonzalo Co. The complaint alleged that on
November 14, 1988, Napoleon C. Medalla as lessor and Ramon Chan as lessee entered into a Lease
Contract3 over a hotel building located at No. 29 Abanao Street, Baguio City. Chan would use the
leased premises as a restaurant named "Cypress Inn". Petitioner Gonzalo Co was employed by Ramon
Chan as the general manager of "Cypress Inn" and acted as his agent in all his dealings with Napoleon
Medalla. When Ramon Chan died, he was survived by his wife, petitioner Sui Man Hui Chan, who
continued to operate the restaurant. On July 17, 1996, Napoleon Medalla died. Among his heirs is
private respondent Oscar Medalla, who succeeded him as owner and lessor of the leased premises.
The contract was neither amended nor terminated after the death of the original parties but was
continued by their respective successors-in-interest pursuant to the terms thereof. Petitioners Chan
and Co, the latter, in his capacity as agent and general manager, continued to deal with private
respondent Medalla in all transactions pertaining to the contract. On various occasions, petitioners
failed to pay the monthly rentals due on the leased premises. Despite several Statements of Accounts
sent by Medalla, petitioners failed to pay the rentals due but, nonetheless, continued to use and
occupy the leased premises. Medalla then sent demand letters to petitioners, but the latter still failed
to pay the unpaid rentals. He also found out that petitioners had not paid the realty taxes due on the
leased premises since 1991, amounting to P610,019.11. Medalla then asked petitioners to settle the
unpaid rentals, pay the unpaid real estate taxes, and vacate the leased premises. On January 1999,
petitioners vacated the premises but without paying their unpaid rentals and realty taxes. Aggrieved
by petitioners refusal to pay the amounts owing, which had reached P4,147,901.80 by March 1999,
private respondent Medalla instituted Civil Case No. MC99-666.
In their Answer to the Complaint, petitioners denied owing private respondent the amounts
claimed by the latter. They alleged that the late Ramon Chan had paid all the rentals due up to March
15, 1998. On July 19, 1999, petitioners filed a Supplemental Answer with Motion to Dismiss alleging
that they were neither parties nor privies to the Contract of Lease, hence they are not the real parties-
in-interest. Private respondent filed a Reply and Opposition to petitioners Supplemental Answer with
Motion to Dismiss dated August 2, 1999, praying for the denial of the Motion to Dismiss for having
been belatedly filed in direct contravention of Section 1, Rule 16, of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure.4 He further alleged that petitioner Chan, as the owner of the business and petitioner Co as
the agent of petitioner Chan, are clearly real parties-in-interest in the case. Private respondent pointed
to their continuous dealings with him in all transactions relating to the contract after the death of
Ramon Chan and even after the expiration of the Contract of Lease. The RTC denied petitioners
Motion to Dismiss. Dissatisfied, petitioners elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals through a
special civil action of certiorari. The Court of Appeals, however, affirmed the RTC Orders.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Court of Appeals committed serious error in law in affirming the
RTC Orders denying petitioners motion to dismiss and the subsequent motion for reconsideration.
HELD: No. Prefatorily, it bears stressing that petitioners Motion to Dismiss was filed after an Answer
had already been filed. This alone warranted an outright dismissal of the motion for having been filed
in contravention of the clear and explicit mandate of Section 1, Rule 16, of the Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure. Under this section, a motion to dismiss shall be filed within the time for but before filing the
answer to the complaint or pleading asserting a claim. 9 Here, petitioners filed their Supplemental
Answer with Motion to Dismiss almost two months after filing their Answer, in clear contravention of
the aforecited rule. The Court of Appeals stated that the grant or denial of a Motion to Dismiss is an
interlocutory order, and it cannot be the proper subject of a special civil action for certiorari. The
proper remedy in such a case is to appeal after a decision has been rendered, the CA said. A writ
of certiorari is not intended to correct every controversial interlocutory ruling; it is resorted to only to
correct a grave abuse of discretion or a whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. The function of a petition for certiorari is limited to keeping an inferior court within the
bounds of its jurisdiction and to relieve persons from arbitrary acts, acts which courts or judges have
no power or authority in law to perform. Certiorari is not designed to correct erroneous findings and
conclusions made by the court. At any rate, we find no merit to petitioners contention that they are
not real parties-in-interest since they are not parties nor signatories to the contract and hence should
not have been impleaded as defendants. It is undeniable that petitioner Chan is an heir of Ramon
Chan and, together with petitioner Co, was a successor-in-interest to the restaurant business of the
late Ramon Chan. Both continued to operate the business after the death of Ramon. Thus, they are
real parties-in-interest in the case filed by private respondent, notwithstanding that they are not
signatories to the Contract of Lease.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and the Decision of the Court of Appeals is
AFFIRMED.
CASE NO. 31
G.R. No. 129008 January 13, 2004
TEODORA A. RIOFERIO, VERONICA O. EVANGELISTA assisted by her husband ZALDY
EVANGELISTA, ALBERTO ORFINADA, and ROWENA O. UNGOS, assisted by her husband
BEDA UNGOS, petitioners
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, ESPERANZA P. ORFINADA, LOURDES P. ORFINADA, ALFONSO
ORFINADA, NANCY P. ORFINADA, ALFONSO JAMES P. ORFINADA, CHRISTOPHER P.
ORFINADA and ANGELO P. ORFINADA, respondents
FACTS: On May 13, 1995, Alfonso P. Orfinada, Jr. died without a will leaving several personal and real
properties. He also left a widow, respondent Esperanza, whom he married in 1960. They had seven
children. Apart from the respondents, the demise of the decedent left in mourning his paramour,
petitioner Teodora, and their children, co-petitioners in this case.
On November 14, 1995, respondents discovered that on June 29, 1995, petitioner Teodora
and her children executed an Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate of a Deceased Person with
Quitclaim involving the properties of the estate of the decedent. Corresponding certificate of titles
were issued to them. Respondents also found out that petitioners were able to obtain a loan
of P700,000.00 from the Rural Bank of Mangaldan Inc. by executing a Real Estate Mortgage over the
properties subject of the extra-judicial settlement.
On December 1, 1995, respondent Alfonso Clyde filed a Petition for Letters of Administration
praying that letters of administration encompassing the estate of the decedent be issued upon him.
Pending such proceeding, respondents also filed a Complaint for the Annulment/Rescission of Extra
Judicial Settlement of Estate of a Deceased Person with Quitclaim, Real Estate Mortgage and
Cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Titles against petitioners. Petitioners filed their Answer
interposing the defense that the property subject of the contested deed of extra-judicial settlement
pertained to the properties originally belonging to the parents of Teodora and the titles thereof were
delivered to her as an advance inheritance but the decedent had managed to register them in his
name. They also raised the defense that respondents are not the real parties-in-interest in view of the
pendency of the administration proceedings.
The RTC denied the motion on the ground that respondents, as heirs, are the real parties-in-
interest. Petitioners moved for its reconsideration but was likewise denied. Petitioners appealed before
the CA, but the CA discerned no grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
by the public respondent judge when he denied petitioners motion to set affirmative defenses for
hearing in view of its discretionary nature. A motion for reconsideration was also denied. Hence, this
petition for review.
ISSUE: WON the heirs may bring suit to recover property of the estate pending the appointment of an
administrator.
HELD: Yes. Petitioners vehemently fault the lower court for denying their motion to set the case for
preliminary hearing on their affirmative defense that the proper party to bring the action is the estate
of the decedent and not the respondents. It must be stressed that the holding of a preliminary hearing
on an affirmative defense lies in the discretion of the court. Sec. 5, Rule 16 provides that, Any of the
grounds for dismissal provided for in this rule, except improper venue, may be pleaded as an
affirmative defense, and a preliminary hearing may be had thereon as if a motion to dismiss had been
filed. The provision is clearly indicative of the optional character of the preliminary hearing. It
denotes discretion and cannot be construed as having a mandatory effect.
The lower court cannot likewise be faulted for recognizing the legal standing of the
respondents as heirs to bring the suit. Pending the filing of administration proceedings, the heirs
without doubt have legal personality to bring suit in behalf of the estate of the decedent in accordance
with the provision of Article 777, the rights to succession are transmitted from the moment of the
death of the decedent. Even if administration proceedings have already been commenced, the heirs
may still bring the suit if an administrator has not yet been appointed. In such instances, the heirs
cannot be expected to wait for the appointment of an administrator; then wait further to see if the
administrator appointed would care enough to file a suit to protect the rights and the interests of the
deceased; and in the meantime do nothing while the rights and the properties of the decedent are
violated or dissipated. Even if there is an appointed administrator, jurisprudence recognizes two
exceptions: (1) if the executor or administrator is unwilling or refuses to bring suit; and (2) when the
administrator is alleged to have participated in the act complained of and he is made a party
defendant. Therefore, the rule that the heirs have no legal standing to sue for the recovery of property
of the estate during the pendency of administration proceedings has three exceptions, the third being
when there is no appointed administrator such as in this case.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED. The assailed decision and resolution of the
Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED.
CASE NO. 32
MUNICIPALITY OF BINAN, LAGUNA vs COURT OF APPEALS and JESUS GARCIA
G.R.No. L-94733
FACTS: The petitioner herein filed a civil case against respondents for unlawful detainer, with
preliminary mandatory injunction in MTC Binan, Laguna. The said petitioner alleged that there is no
renewal of 25 years lease of contract however, private respondents opposed to petitioner contending
that the 25 years lease of contract had not yet expired. Assuming that it was expired, indicated
thereof the "renewal for 25 years lease of contract. Petitioner reply to respondent and thereby
respondent filed Motion for Preliminary Hearing as the Dismiss has been Filed" on the ground that
complaint states no cause of action.
After some further exchange of opposition between petitioner and respondent, MTC render its
judgment in favor to petitioner ordering respondent to vacate the premises. Respondents filed a
Notice of Hearing in RTC however petitioner filed Motion for execution pending appeal which was
granted by presiding judge and enforce judgment.
Private respondent filed in Court of appeals for issuance of writ of Preliminary Injunction
assailing that petitioner failed to furnish him a copy of the motion that contrary to Section 6, Rule 15
of Rules of Courts. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the lower court acted in abuse of discretion for not complying the rules under
Section 6, Rule 15 of Rules of Court.
RULING: Yes, The Court of Appeals found out that MTC acted with serious abuse in discretion which is
tantamount lack of excess of jurisdiction to issue a writ of execution pending appeal. Section 5, Rule of
the Rules of Court pertinently provides: Sec. 5. Pleading grounds as affirmative defenses. - Any of the
grounds for dismissal provides for in this Rule, except improper venue, preliminary hearing may be
had thereon as if a motion to dismiss had been filed.Further, CA said that the error committed by the
court is correctible by ordinary appeal and the failure to state cause of action is not necessary in the
case as ruled in "Heirs vs Genato".
.respondent Judge committed an error in conducting a preliminary hearing on the private
respondent's affirmative defenses. It is a well-settled rule that in a motion to dismiss based
on the ground that the complaint fails to state a cause of action, the question submitted to
the court for determination is the sufficiency of the allegations in the complaint itself.
Whether those allegations are true or not is beside the point, for their truth is hypothetically
admitted by the motion. The issue rather is: admitting them to be true, may the court render
a valid judgment in accordance with the prayer of the complaint? Stated otherwise, the
sufficiency of the cause of action must appear on the face of the complaint in order to
sustain a dismissal on this ground. No extraneous matter may be considered nor facts not
alleged, which would require evidence and therefore, must be raised as defenses and await
the trial. In other words, to determine sufficiency of the cause of action, only the facts
alleged in the complaint, and no other should be considered. The respondent Judge departed
from this rule in conducting a hearing and in receiving evidence in support of private
respondent's affirmative defense, that is, lack of cause of action
The determination of sufficient of cause of action can be trace out only in allegation in the complaint
and no other should be consider.
CASE NO. 33
G.R. No. L-27187 July 22, 1971
ANTONIO MONTEJO and CONSOLACION BIBERA, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
VICENTA UROTIA, as heir of JUANA BIBERA, ET AL., defendants-appellees.
(and 8 other cases consolidated herein)
FACTS: The issues in these nine cases are substantially the same, hence decided jointly.
L-27187. On July 2, 1962, plaintiffs Montejo and Bibera filed a complaint with the CFI of
Leyte, seeking a) to prevent the foreclosure of a mortgage on several parcels of land they claim to
own in common with the defendants; b) to have said parcels of land partitioned among its co-owners;
c) the release, from the aforementioned mortgage, of the said personal; and d) the collection of
certain sums of money allegedly due from the defendants. There were 24 defendants under the
original complaint, which was amended to include 20 additional defendants. More a year later, 17
defendants had not been summoned. Said court then issued an order, directing the plaintiffs to exert
efforts to cause said defendants to be summoned. Over two years later, the court dismissed the case
for failure of the plaintiffs to comply with said order.
L-29098. A case was filed for the collection of a sum of money before the City Court of
Manila against defendants Arcellana and the Capital Insurance & Surety Co., Inc. Judgment was
rendered in favor of the plaintiff, People's Car Inc. Capital Insurance & Surety Co., Inc., appealed to the
CFI of Manila. On October 24, 1967, CFI issued a notice to the parties, advising them that the appealed
case had then been docketed in said court. Counsel for the appellant received, on December 18, 1967,
a notice that a pre-trial would be held on January 4, 1968. He, however, failed to appear at said pre-
trial. Hence, the Court dismissed the appeal and the judgment appealed from revived, for failure to
prosecute on the part of said appellant.
L-29373. An action for the recovery of a sum of money was filed before the City Court of
Manila against defendants Bandayrel and Boquer. Boquer was declared in default, while Bandayrel and
plaintiff Bolivar submitted a written "stipulation of facts and compromise agreement," The court
rendered judgment in favor of Bolivar. Bandayrel appealed to the CFI Instance of Manila, which set the
case for pre-trial on February 22, 1967. Both parties submitted a motion stating that they are trying to
settle the case amicably. The court granted them until Feb. 29, 1967 to submit their amicable
settlement or a negative manifestation. The hearing was reset to April 8, 1967. On this date, both
parties appeared before the court. However, counsel for the plaintiff-appellee manifested that the
defendants have not submitted any proposed settlement terms and moved that the appeal be
dismissed, which was granted immediately.
L-29454. An action to restrain the defendants "from performing any and all acts which will
tend to prejudice" the alleged rights of plaintiff Pagadian Iron Mines over a given iron lode claim as
well as to recover damages was filed before the CFI of Zamboanga. After the issues were joined, the
case was set for trial. Six days before the trial, the same was cancelled upon motion of the parties who
alleged that there are negotiations for amicable settlement. The same was several times reset for
hearing, often postponed mostly upon the same ground. After thirteen (13) postponements, the case
was, set for hearing on December 8, 1966, which both parties moved again to be postponed for the
same reason. However, the case had been pending for over six (6) years; the court ordered the case
dismissed "for failure to prosecute." A reconsideration of this order was later denied.
 L-29542. On August 28, 1963, Maderazo brought an action to recover a sum of money from
defendant Lim Lian Khoan, before the Pasay City Court. Said court dismissed the case. Maderazo,
appealed to the CFI of Rizal, which notified the parties that the appeal had been docketed with said
court and that the period to file pleadings would commence from receipt of said notice. However, the
case was ordered dismissed "for failure to prosecute for an unreasonable length of time."
L-30711. An action for the recovery of a sum of money against Antonio Buhat, was instituted
in the Municipal Court of General Santos. The case having been dismissed upon the ground of
prescription, plaintiff, Republic of the Philippines, appealed to the Court of First Instance. Both parties
were notified that the record of the case had been received by the latter court, which, on January 30,
1969, dismissed it upon the ground of failure of the plaintiff to prosecute the same for an
unreasonable length of time.
L-30744. , Plaintiff Santos seeks to recover from defendant Taniongon the possession of a
parcel of land. She filed a complaint before the CFI of South Cotabato. Defendant filed, on August 3,
1967, his answer with a counterclaim, to which plaintiff replied, on August 14, 1967 with an answer to
the counterclaim. On January 23, 1969, the case was dismissed for failure to prosecute, plaintiff
having done nothing in the meantime.
L-30933. The complaint for reconveyance filed by plaintiffs Gudmalin and Sabijon filed with
the CFI of Zamboanga del Sur, was dismissed for lack of cause of action.Plaintiffs then filed, on March
31, 1962, their notice of appeal, appeal bond and record on appeal. When the latter was considered
for approval, counsel for the defendants pointed out that its caption did not set forth the full names of
all parties. Thereupon, the Judge stated that the court will approve the record on appeal. Plaintiffs
claim to have later amended the same "by inclusion of all parties in handwriting duly initialed" in the
original Record on Appeal, although without giving respondents the notice required in Section 7 of Rule
41 of the Rules of Court. Over five (5) years later, the appeal was dismissed for failure of the plaintiffs
to submit an amended record on appeal, in accordance with said provision of the Rules of Court.
L-31072. Petitioner Olilang filed a special civil action for certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus, with the CFI of Manila, on September 2, 1967, to annul and set aside a decision of
respondent Conrado F. Estrella, as Governor of the Land Authority, approving the sale of a parcel of
land, to private respondent Nocon, after said lot had been allegedly sold to Olilang, and to require said
Governor Estrella to allocate the disputed land to Olilang. The court issued an order setting the case
for hearing on February 6, 1969, but, despite notice given to counsel for Olilang, he did not appear
before the court on that date. Thus, the case was dismissed. Olilang's counsel filed a motion for Relief
or Reconsideration upon the ground that, in making the memorandum of said hearing, his office
secretary had erroneously made the corresponding entry for February 11, 1969, instead of February 6,
1969. This motion was denied.
ISSUE: WON the dismissal of the action due to failure to prosecute is warranted.
HELD: Yes. Section 3 of Rule 17 reads, If plaintiff fails to appear at the time of the trial, or to
prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time, or to comply with these rules or any order of
the court, the action may be dismissed upon motion of the defendant or upon the court's own motion.
This dismissal shall have the effect of adjudication upon the merits, unless otherwise provided by
court. Construing this provision, it was held that the dismissal of an action pursuant to this rule rests
upon the sound discretion of the court. As to what constitutes an "unreasonable length of time," it
"depends upon the circumstances of each particular case." Thus, the Court refused to disturb orders of
dismissal for failure of the plaintiffs to prosecute for a period of four (4) years, about three (3)
years, over a year, less than a year, and even less than three (3) months, as well as for failure of the
plaintiffs to comply, for less than two (2) months, with an order directing him to file a bill of
particulars.
WHEREFORE, the orders appealed from in each one of these nine (9) cases are hereby
affirmed, with costs against the respective appellants, except appellant in L-30711, which is the
Government.
CASE NO.34
G.R. No. L-29098, July 22, 1971
PEOPLE'S CAR, INC.,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
-versus-
JOSE ARCELLANA, and THE CAPITAL
INSURANCE AND SURETY CO., INC.,
Defendants,
THE CAPITAL INSURANCE AND
SURETY CO., INC.,
as Defendant-Appellant.
FACTS: On April 20, 1966, appellee initiated a case for the collection of a sum of money against
defendants JOSE ARCELLANA and THECAPITAL INSURANCE and SURETY CO.,INC., the herein appellant.
Judgment for plaintiff People's Car Inc., having been rendered, on September 7, 1967, defendant
Capital Insurance & Surety Co., Inc., appealed to the Court of First instance of Manila. On October 24,
1967, the latter issued a notice to the parties, advising them that the appealed case had then been
docketed in said court. Counsel for the appellant received, on December 18, 1967, notice to the effect
that a pre-trial would be held on January 4, 1968. He, however, failed to appear at said pre-trial. The
said counsel alleged that his failure to appear at the pre-trial, on January 4, 1968, was due to the fact
that he then had to attend the trial of another case; that he had filed, on December 27, 1967, a
motion for postponement of said pre-trial upon such ground; and that, although the motion was
denied on December 29, 1967, notice of the order to this effect was not received by him until January
12, 1968, or eight (8) days after the scheduled pre-trial. Hence, the Court forthwith ordered the appeal
dismissed and the judgment appealed from revived, for failure to prosecute on the part of said
appellant.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CFI erred in dismissing the appeal based on the ground of failure to
prosecute despite the fact that the reason the appellant failed to appear during pre-trial was because
the Order for the denial of the Motion for Postponement was received by the latters counsel (8) days
after the scheduled pre-trial.
HELD: No, the CFI was correct in dismissing the appeal.
Section 3 of Rule 17 of the present Rules of Court, which is a reproduction of Section 3 of Rule 30 of
the Rules of Court effective July 1, 1940, reads:
Failure to prosecute. If plaintiff fails to appear at the time of the trial,
or to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time, or to comply with
these rules or any order of the court, the action may be dismissed upon motion
of the defendant or upon the court's own motion. This dismissal shall have the
effect of an adjudication upon the merits, unless otherwise provided by court.
As to what constitutes an "unreasonable length of time," within the purview of the above-quoted
provision, it was ruled that it "depends upon the circumstances of each particular case"; that "the
sound discretion of the court" in the determination of said question "will not be disturbed, in the
absence of patent abuse"; and that "the burden of showing abuse of judicial discretion is upon
appellant since every presumption is in favor of the correctness of the court's action."
Appellants late receipt of the Order denying his of Motion for Postponement which allegedly caused
his non-appearance on the date of trial is insufficient to warrant a reversal of the order appealed from.
Appellant was represented by the "Achacoso, Ocampo and Simbulan" Law Firm, on behalf of which
Atty. Sabino P. Palomares, Jr. had appeared. If Atty. Palomares had another case set for trial on January
4, 1968, any of the three (3) members of the law firm could have and should have appeared at the
pre-trial of the case at bar. Moreover, in the absence of an order granting said motion for
postponement, appellant's counsel was not justified in assuming that the motion would be
granted.
Motions for postponement are left to the sound discretion of the trial court and unless
there be an abuse of such discretion the appellate court will not interfere with the
exercise of that discretion.
The order appealed from was affirmed.
CASE NO. 35
GR No. 139337, August 15, 2001
MA. CARMINIA C. ROXAS, petitioner,
-versus-
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and JOSE ANTONIO F. ROXAS, respondents. 2. Whether or not, in case the CA erred in holding the petitioner guilty of forum shopping, the
private respondent may question the validity of the proceedings and such decision by Judge Bautista-
Ricafort.
FACTS: On November 4, 1997, petitioner filed with the RTC of Paranaque City an action for declaration
HELD: 1. Yes, the CA erred in holding the petitioner guilty of forum shopping. The proceedings and
of nullity of marriage against her husband, the private respondent herein, with an application for
orders issued by Judge Bautista-Ricafort in the application for support pendente lite(and the main
support pendente lite for their four (4) minor children. The case was raffled to Branch 257 of the RTC
complaint for annulment of marriage) in the re-filed case in Civil Case No. 97-0608 were not rendered
of Paranaque City presided by Judge Rolando C. How. The petitioner thereafter filed in the said RTC
null and void by the omission of a statement in the certificate of non-forum shopping regarding the
Branch 257 a Notice of Dismissal to dismiss the complaint, without prejudice, pursuant to the provision
prior filing and dismissal without prejudice of Civil Case No. 97-0523 which involves the same parties
of Section 1, Rule 17, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, considering that summons has not yet been
and issues.
served and no responsive pleading has yet been filed.
Forum shopping is an act of a party against whom an adverse judgment has been rendered in
The same complaint, now docketed as Civil Case No. 97-0608, was re-filed on November 25,
one forum of seeking and possibly getting a favorable opinion in another forum, other than by appeal
1997. It was raffled in due course to Branch 260 of the RTC of Paranaque City presided by Judge Helen
or the special civil action of certiorari, or the institution of two or more actions or proceedings
Bautista-Ricafort.
grounded on the same cause on the supposition that one or the other court would make a favorable
The trial court after pre-trial then issued its Order dated May 13, 1998 declaring the proceedings
disposition. It exists where the elements of litis pendencia are present, and where a final judgment in
on the application for support pendente lite terminated and deemed submitted for resolution; and set
one case will amount to res judicata in the other. For the principle of res judicata to apply, the
the case for pre-trial for the declaration of nullity of marriage on June 15, 1998. On May 19, 1998,
following must be present: (1) a decision on the merits; (2) by a court of competent jurisdiction; (3)
Judge Bautista-Ricafort, issued an Order granting the application for support pendente lite.
the decision is final; and (4) the two actions involve identical parties, subject matter and causes of
On July 22, 1998, the petitioner filed a manifestation and motion praying the trial court to cite
action.
private respondent in contempt of court after the latter failed to comply with the said Order dated May
In the case at bar, there was no adverse decision against the petitioner in Civil Case No. 97-
19, 1998 of the trial court. Private respondent, through his counsel, Atty. Alberto Diaz, filed a counter-
0523. The dismissal without prejudice of the complaint at the instance of the petitioner was pursuant
manifestation and a motion praying that the manner and mode of payment of his contribution to the
to Section 1, Rule 17 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure considering that it was done before service of
expenses of his minor children be modified. On September 23, 1998, Judge Bautista-Ricafort issued an
answer or any responsive pleading. The dismissal does not amount to litis pendencia nor to res
Order directing the private respondent to comply fully with the Order of this Court dated May 19, 1998,
judicata. There is no litis pendencia since the first case before Judge How was dismissed or withdrawn
within five (5) days from his receipt hereof under pain of legal sanctions if he still fails to do so.
by the plaintiff (herein petitioner), without prejudice, upon her filing of a notice of dismissal, pursuant
On September 28, 1998, or about four (4) months later, private respondent, through his new
to Section 1, Rule 17 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Neither is there res judicata for the reason
counsel, Atty. Francisco Ma. Guerrerro, filed an Omnibus Motion (1) applying to be authorized to
that the order of dismissal was not a decision on the merits but a dismissal without prejudice. Section
discharge Atty. Alberto Diaz as his counsel and to substitute him with the new counsel; (2) to re-open
5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure must be so interpreted and applied to serve as an
hearing on the Motion for Support Pendente Lite; and (3) to temporarily stay execution of the Orders
instrument to promote and facilitate the orderly administration of justice and should not be
dated May 19, 1998 and September 23, 1998. The omnibus motion was set for hearing on October 2,
interpreted with such absolute literalness as to subvert its own ultimate and legitimate objective or
1998. Private respondent requested that before the omnibus motion is heard the May 19, 1998 Order
the goal of all rules or procedure which is to achieve substantial justice as expeditiously as possible.
be temporarily suspended. When the presiding judge did not grant that request of private respondent,
2. No, the private respondent is estopped in questioning the proceedings and orders of Judge
the latters new counsel refused to proceed with the hearing of his omnibus motion.
Bautista-Ricafort. He tacitly acknowledged the validity of the proceedings and the orders issued by the
On October 8, 1998, Judge Bautista-Ricafort issued an Order giving private respondent ten (10)
said trial judge by participating actively in the hearing on the application for support pendente lite and
days to comply with the May 19, 1998 Order, otherwise, he would be cited for contempt of court.
by praying for the modification of the Order of May 19, 1998 in that he should be allowed to directly
On October 23, 1998, private respondent filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari
pay to the persons or entities to which payments of such expenses are intended in connection with the
questioning the Orders of the trial court dated May 19, 1998, September 23, 1998 and October 8,
required support pendente lite of their minor children. It is also too late for the private respondent to
1998. Meanwhile, on November 27, 1998, Judge Bautista-Ricafort issued another Order, charging the
claim wrong venue in the RTC of Paranaque City as alleged proof of forum shopping. He should have
private respondent guilty of Contempt of Court.
raised that ground in his answer or in a motion to dismiss. But he did not, so it is deemed
By virtue of the arrest warrant for being found guilty of contempt of court, private respondent
waived. Besides, petitioner is also a resident of Paraaque where the family of her parents reside.
was arrested on December 14, 1998 but he was released on the following day after the appellate court
The petition for certiorari in the case at bar on the ground of alleged forum shopping in the trial
temporarily enjoined Judge Bautista-Ricafort from enforcing her November 27, 1998 Order as well as
court is premature for the reason that there is an adequate and speedy remedy available in the
her Orders dated May 19, 1998, September 23, 1998, and October 8, 1998. When the temporary
ordinary course of law to private respondent, i.e., a motion to dismiss or a motion for reconsideration
restraining order lapsed on March 11, 1998, the respondent was again arrested by virtue of a warrant
on the ground of either litis pendencia or res judicata and a hearing conducted thereon before the
of arrest issued by Judge Bautista-Ricafort. After depositing with the clerk of court of the trial court the
trial court. But private respondent did not file such a motion based on either of said grounds. The
amount of support in arrears stated in the Orders of the trial court, private respondent was released
same ground cannot be raised in a petition for certiorari before the appellate court while the main
from custody.
action in the trial court is still pending for the reason that such ground for a motion to dismiss can be
On April 21, 1999, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision in favor of private respondent,
raised before the trial court any time during the proceedings and is not barred by the filing of the
declaring the proceedings/actions taken by respondent Judge on the matter of support pendente
answer to the complaint.
lite as NULL and VOID. The appellate court nullified the Orders and the proceedings of the trial court
Where the ground is short of res judicata or litis pendencia, as in the case at bar, the Court of
for the reason that the certificate of non-forum shopping of the petitioner did not mention the prior
Appeals acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction when it granted the
filing of Civil Case No. 97-0523 before the sala of Judge How and the dismissal thereof without
petition for certiorari filed by herein private respondent. The trial court should have been given an
prejudice.
opportunity to rule on the matter of alleged forum shopping in consonance with the hierarchy of
courts.
ISSUE: 1. Whether or not the CA erred in holding the petitioner guilty of forum shopping for not
The Decision and Resolution dated April 21, 1999 and July 20, 1999 respectively, of the Court of
having mentioned the prior filing and dismissal without prejudice of Civil Case No. 97-0523 before the
Appeals are REVERSED, and the Orders dated May 13, 1998, May 19, 1998 and September 23, 1998 of
sala of Judge How upon her institution of a similar action in Civil Case No. 97 before the sala of Judge
the Regional Trial Court of Paraaque City, Branch 260, are REINSTATED.
Bautista-Ricafort.
Case No. 36
INTERNATIONAL CONTAINER TERMINAL SERVICES, INC., vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS,
ET AL.,
G.R. No. 90530 dated October 7, 1992
Facts: This case stemmed from the filing of the complaint for prohibition with prayer for preliminary
injunction by the Sharp, Inc., against the Secretary of Transportation and Communications, the
Philippine Port Authority (PPA), E. Razon, Inc., and the International Container Terminal Services, Inc.,
before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 9.
The trial court issued a writ of preliminary injunction upon the posting by the Sharp of a bond
issued by the Integrated Bonding and Insurance Co., in the sum of P10,000,000.00. The herein
Petitioner filed its Answer with Counterclaim against Sharp for its alleged unfounded and frivolous
action wherein it had suffered injuries which would amount to more than P10,000,000.00. The said
preliminary injunction was nullified by the Supreme Court on the ground that the Sharp was not a
proper party and the petition was premature because it did not exhaust the administrative remedies
available to the latter. Thus, the PPA filed its Motion to Dismiss the said complaint based from the said
grounds. Thereafter, the trial court dismissed the complaint as well as the counterclaim. However,
not contended with the dismissal of the counterclaim, the CCTSI filed a Motion for Reconsideration of
the said order, but said motion was denied. Thereafter, it was appealed before the Court of Appeals,
which upheld the lower courts decision. Hence, the filing of this instant petition.
ISSUE:1. WON the Petitioners counterclaim is compulsory?
2. WON the dismissal of the Complaint on petitioners own motion operated to also
dismiss the counterclaim questioning the complaint?
HELD:1. Yes. The Supreme Court consistently held that a counterclaim is compulsory where: (1) it
arises out of, or is necessarily connected with, the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter
of the opposing partys claim; (2) it does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties of
whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction; and (3) the court has jurisdiction to entertain the claim.
Tested by these requirements, the petitioners counterclaim was clearly compulsory. The petitioner
itself so denominated it. There is no doubt that the same evidence needed to sustain it would also
refute the cause of action alleged in the private respondents complaint; in other words, the
counterclaim would succeed only if the complaint did not. It is obvious from the very nature of the
counterclaim that it could not remain pending for independent adjudication, that is, without
adjudication by the court of the complaint itself on which the counterclaim was based.
2 Yes. The Court notes that the petitioner itself joined the PPA in moving for the
dismissal of the complaint; or put passively, it did not object to the dismissal of the private
respondents complaint. Secondly, the compulsory counterclaim was so intertwined with the
complaint that it could not remain pending for independent adjudication by the court after the
dismissal of the complaint which had provoked the counterclaim in the first place. As a consequence,
the dismissal of the complaint (on the petitioners own motion) operated to also dismiss the
counterclaim questioning that complaint. Furthermore, had the counterclaim not been dismissed with
the dismissal of the complaint, the petitioner could have introduced evidence to show that it was
prejudiced by the filing of the complaint and the obtention of the writ of preliminary injunction by
Sharp. But the petitioner itself aborted that effort when it joined PPA in moving for the dismissal of
Sharps complaint, knowing that it was the basis of its own compulsory counterclaim. For failing to
object when it should have, to keep its counterclaim alive, and instead moving to dismiss the
complaint from which the counterclaim derived its life, the petitioner must now bear the
consequences of its own negligence.
Case No. 37
PRODUCERS BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.,
G.R. No. 125468 dated October 9, 2000
Facts:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks the reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals, which
affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 139, dismissing the complaint.
This case stemmed from the Trial Courts dismissal of the instant case for failure to prosecute. It was
alleged by the former that the latter issued a Promissory Note for the said amount which would
mature in 55 days. The said promissory note was renewed once, however, Private Respondents failed
to pay the loans on their due dates. Thus, the complaint was filed before the Regional Trial Court
which granted the writ and approved the attachment bond. Thereafter, Petitioner filed a motion for
the issuance of summons which was granted by the trial court. However, only private respondent Kho
served summons through substituted service considering that the whereabouts of the other
defendants were unknown and the corporation had already ceased its operations. Thus, only Kho filed
an answer to the said complaint. On February 27, 1990, Petitioner filed a Motion to Reinstate the
Order of Attachment which was opposed by the Private Respondent Kho. During the hearing of the
said motion, the court noted that there was no return of service of the summonses to New Cotton, Lan
Shing Chin and Shin May Wan. Kho filed a manifestation with motion alerting the trial court that the
trial had not yet commenced, one and a half year, since the case was filed by the Petitioner. Thus,
Kho moved for scheduling of pre-trial conference and thereafter trial, without having to await for the
return of the service of summonses, however, it was denied by the court and ordered the courts
process server to immediately serve the summonses on the other respondents. Again, the
summonses remained unserved. On July 6, 1990, Petitioner filed a motion for service of summons by
publication against the three respondents which was granted by the court and the summonses and a
copy of the complaint were published in The Philippine Star. On November 20, 1990, respondent Kho
moved to dismiss the Complaint for failure to prosecute which was denied by the court. Then, the
case was set for pre-trial conference on August 13, 1991. The pre-trial conference took one year and
seven months due to Petitioners filing of numerous motion for resetting of the said conference. Even
before the trial began, on January 18, 1993, again Petitioner filed an urgent motion to reset scheduled
hearings wherein Kho did not object and was granted by the Court with stern warning that should
petitioner fail to present its evidence on the scheduled date, the latter would consider petitioners
right to present evidence deemed waived. Now, the final setting of presentation of petitioners
evidence was scheduled on July 13, 15, 20 and 27, 1993, however, the petitioners counsel filed a
motion for postponement of said scheduled hearings. Hence, respondent opposed any further
postponements and undue delays and moved for the dismissal of the instant case. The Court upon
finding no merit in the reasons for postponement issued an order dismissing the complaint. Petitioner
filed its Motion for Reconsideration, almost a month from the said dismissal. Petitioner appealed
before the Court of Appeals but the said Decision was affirmed by the latter. Hence, the filing of this
petition.
ISSUE:1) WON the appellate court err in affirming the trial court's ruling that the complaint ought to
be dismissed was due to failure to prosecute? Should the dismissal be with or without prejudice?
HELD:
1) No, the Appellate Court did not err in affirming the trial courts ruling that the complaint
ought to be dismissed was due to failure to prosecute. Undoubtedly, in the present case, five years
have been an unreasonably long time for a defendant to wait for the outcome of a trial which has yet
to commence and on which his family, fortune and future depend. Postponements should not be
allowed except on meritorious grounds, in light of the attendant circumstances. Deferment of the
proceedings may be allowed or tolerated especially where the deferment would cause no substantial
prejudice to any party. "The desideratum of a speedy disposition of cases should not, if at all possible,
result in the precipitate loss of a party's right to present evidence and either in the plaintiff's being
non-suited or of the defendant's being pronounced liable under an ex-parte judgment." While a court
can dismiss a case on the ground of non-prosequitur, the real test for the exercise of such power is
whether, under the circumstances, plaintiff is chargeable with want of due diligence in failing to
proceed with reasonable promptitude.
The present case involves as plaintiff/petitioner a prominent bank, that employs a staff of
lawyers and possesses significant resources. It cannot plead paucity of means, including legal talent it
could retain. Petitioner's counsel inexplicably failed to secure the presence of witnesses when
required, failed to appear during pre-trial and trial duly set, failed to seasonably appeal, failed to
timely move for reconsideration, failed to brief his substitute lawyer; and failed to diligently pursue the
service of summonses. These are acts of negligence, laxity and truancy which the bank management
could have very easily avoided or timely remedied. One's sympathy with the bank and its counsel
could not avail against apparent complacency, if not delinquency, in the conduct of a litigation. For
failure to diligently pursue its complaint, it trifled with the right of respondent to speedy trial. It also
sorely tried the patience of the court and wasted its precious time and attention.
Lastly, to declare the dismissal in this case without prejudice would open the floodgate to
possible circumvention of Section 3, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court on dismissal with prejudice for
failure to prosecute. It would frustrate the protection against unreasonable delay in the prosecution of
cases and violate the constitutional mandate of speedy dispensation of justice which would in time
erode the people's confidence in the judiciary. Thus, the Supreme Court find that, as held by the trial
court and concurred in by the appellate court, the dismissal of petitioner's complaint is with prejudice
and should have the effect of adjudication on the merits.
Case No. 38
CONRADO CALALANG vs.CA and FILIPINAS MANUFACTURERS BANK
G.R. No. 103185
January 22, 1993
FACTS:
On April 29, 1980, respondent Bank filed a complaint for collection of a sum of money against
petitioner Calalang and 3 other defendants namely, Arca, Salceda and the Acropolis Trading Corp. with
the CFI.
Petitioner, after having been served with summons on May 19, 1980, filed a Motion to Dismiss on
June 2, 1980. Arca being summoned filed a Motion for Bill of Particulars on June 5, 1980. Acropolis
Trading Corporation and Salceda were also summoned but only a clerk-employee of the Acropolis
Trading Corporation received the summons while Salceda was no longer residing at his given address.
Over a year after, the Motion for Bill of Particulars was granted. On May 25, 1983, RTC issued an
order wherein Calalang's motion to dismiss, dated May 31, 1980 and the Counter Manifestation and
motion to dismiss dated November 25, 1981, filed by defendant Arca, are DENIED for lack of merit.
RTC, on March 6, 1987, issued an Order wherein the Court shall not consider defendant Acropolis
Trading Corporation as having been properly brought under the jurisdiction of this Court in view of the
improper service of summons on said corporation.
Respondent bank then moved for the issuance of Alias Summons on the said defendants.
On March 24, 1987, petitioner Calalang moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that
respondent bank failed to prosecute the case for an unreasonable length of time.
On May 8, 1987, respondent bank moved for the issuance of alias summons on defendant
Acropolis Trading Corporation through its President/Director Calalang or through its director Arca. The
motion for alias summons was granted.
It appears that this case has been set several times for pre-trial (November 29, 1985, January 29,
1986, May 12,1986, November 19, 1986, January 14, 1987 and February 27, 1987).
The case had finally been dismissed for failure of plaintiff's (bank) counsel to appear in spite of
notice and considering that this case has been pending for seven (7) years, without plaintiff having
taken positive steps to prosecute the same. Defendants' counterclaim is likewise dismissed.
The respondent bank filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the order of dismissal to which the CA
granted and this case is ordered remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings.
The petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration having been denied by the Court of Appeals, he filed
this instant petition with this Court
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent Court erred in invoking the liberal application of the rules of
procedure in favor of the respondent bank.
HELD:
Petitioners contention that the fact that respondent bank had not caused service of summons on the
two other defendants, the Acropolis Trading Corporation and Rio Arturo Salceda, for almost seven
years after the complaint was filed on April 29, 1980 indicated "abuse of judicial leniency and
tolerance" is bereft of merit. Summons is issued by the clerk of court upon the filing of the complaint.
When it was informed later on by Judge Alikpala, Jr. in his Order dated March 6, 1987 that there was an
improper service on defendants Acropolis Trading Corporation and Rio Arturo Salceda, respondent
bank, in compliance therewith, filed a motion for alias summons, as permitted by the law.
Considering the judicial reorganization which took place during the pendency of this case and the
numerous instances raised by both petitioner and respondent bank as contributing to the delay,
petitioner cannot now claim that respondent bank's "abuse of judicial leniency and tolerance is the
single greatest component of this delay".
The acts of the respondent bank do not manifest lack of interest to prosecute, in the absence of proof
that it indeed abandoned or intended to abandon its case against petitioner and the other defendants.
Admittedly there was delay in this case, but such delay is not the delay warranting dismissal. To be a
sufficient ground for dismissal, delay must not only be lengthy but also unnecessary and dilatory
resulting in the trifling of judicial processes.
Case No. 39
PCI LEASING AND FINANCE INC. V. MILAN
G.R. No. 151215
April 5, 2010
FACTS:
The instant case was commenced upon the filing of a Complaint for Sum of Money by
petitioner PCI Leasing against respondents Antonio C. Milan and Laura M. Milan. PCI Leasing alleged
that it extended loans to respondents for which Deeds of Assignment were duly executed by
respondents. Under the terms of the Deeds, respondents sold, assigned and transferred to PCI Leasing
the formers rights to various checks for and in consideration of the amounts obtained. Subsequently,
when PCI Leasing presented the checks for payment, the same were dishonoured. Despite repeated
demands, respondents failed to settle their obligation, which amounted to P2,327,833.33. PCI Leasing
was then compelled to litigate to enforce payment of the total loan obligation.
The RTC issued summons to respondents however the summons and the copy of the
complaint were returned unserved for the reason that when the process server went to the
respondents residence, he was told by the neighbours that the respondents had already transferred
to an unknown location.
PCI Leasing filed a Motion for Issuance of Alias Summons, which the RTC scheduled for
hearing. During the hearing of the motion, there was no appearance from both counsels of PCI Leasing
and respondents. Accordingly, the RTC issued an Order dismissing the case. PCI Leasing sought a
reconsideration of the above Order but was denied.
PCI Leasing filed a Notice of Appeal in an attempt to challenge the Order of the RTC. The RTC
rendered a Resolution dismissing the Notice of Appeal, on the ground that the same was filed beyond
the reglementary period.
Without filing a Motion for Reconsideration, PCI Leasing assailed the above Resolution before
the Court of Appeals through a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The appellate
court dismissed outright the petition holding that the petition for certiorari was filed out of time.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing the petition filed by petitioner, depriving petitioner
of its right to recover the sums it had loaned to the private respondents, for being filed out of time
RULING: Yes. The Court held that the rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools designed to
facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in
technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must always be eschewed.
In the instant case, the crux of the controversy involves the property of PCI Leasing, i.e., the sum of
money supposedly owed to it by the respondents. It will not serve the ends of substantial justice if the
RTCs dismissal of the case with prejudice on pure technicalities would be automatically upheld by
appellate courts likewise on solely procedural grounds, unless the procedural lapses committed were
so gross, negligent, tainted with bad faith or tantamount to abuse or misuse of court processes.
In this instance, PCI Leasing would be left without any judicial recourse to collect the amount
of P2,327,833.33 it loaned to the respondents. Corollarily, if PCI Leasing would be forever barred from
collecting the aforesaid amount, respondent Antonio stands to be unjustly enriched at the expense of
PCI Leasing.
CASE NO. 40
G.R. No. 132624 March 13, 2000
Baares II vs. Balising
FACTS:
Petitioners Fidel M. Baares II, Lilia C. Valeriano, Edgar M. Baares, Emilia Gatchialian and Fidel
Besarino were the accused in sixteen criminal cases for estafa filed by the private respondents.After
arraignment, the petitoners filed a Motion to Dismiss the aforementioned cases on the ground that the
filing of the same was premature, in view of the failure of the parties to undergo conciliation
proceedings before the Lupong Tagapamayapa. The MTC denied such motion but upon Motion for
Reconsideration said order was reversed and ordered for the dismissal of the sixteen criminal cases
against petitioners without prejudice. More than two months later, the respondents filed a Motion to
Revive stating that the requirement of referral to the Lupon for conciliation had already been complied
with. This motion was granted by the MTC. The Regional Trial Court, likewise, denied petitioners Motion
for Reconsideration. Petitioners contend that an order dismissing a case or action without prejudice
may attain finality if not appealed within the reglementary period. Hence, if no motion to revive the
case is filed within the reglementary fifteen-day period within which to appeal or to file a motion for
reconsideration of the courts order, the order of dismissal becomes final and the case may only be
revived by the filing of a new complaint or information.Petitioners further argue that after the order of
dismissal of a case attains finality, the court which issued the same loses jurisdiction thereon and,
thus, does not have the authority to act on any motion of the parties with respect to said case. The
respondents on the other hand argues that the instant case is not covered by the rule regarding
finality of decisions and orders under the Revised Rules of Court. Hence, this petition for certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE: WON the attainment of finality of the dismissal order bars the herein respondents to file a
Motion to Revive the case.
HELD: Yes. Upon failure to file a motion for reconsideration within the reglementary period of 15 days,
the order attained finality. Otherwise stated, an order dismissing a case without prejudice is a final
order if no motion for reconsideration or appeal therefrom is timely filed. After dismissal has become
final after the lapse of the fifteen-day reglementary period, the only way by which the action may be
resuscitated or "revived" is by the institution of a subsequent action through the filing of another
complaint and the payment of fees prescribed by law. This is so because upon attainment of finality of
the dismissal through the lapse of said reglementary period, the Court loses jurisdiction and control
over it and can no longer make a disposition in respect thereof inconsistent with such
dismissal.Contrary to the respondents contention, the foregoing rule applies not only to civil cases but
to criminal cases as well. In Jaca vs. Blanco,[38] the Court defined a provisional dismissal of a criminal
case as a dismissal without prejudice to the reinstatement thereof before the order of dismissal
becomes final or to the subsequent filing of a new information for the offense. The doctrine of finality
of judgments is grounded on fundamental considerations of public policy and sound practice that at
the risk of occasional error, the judgments of the courts must become final at some definite date set
by law.
CASE NO. 41
G.R. No. 101883 December 11, 1992
SPOUSES LYDIA VS CA
FACTS: Nelia Ziaga, herein respondent, filed for the rescission of a contract of lease over a parcel of
land with herein petitioner, Lydia Meliton. Alleged as grounds therefor were said petitioner's failure, as
lessee, to deposit the one month rental and to pay the monthly rentals due; her construction of a
concrete wall and roof on the site of a demolished house on the leased premises without the lessor's
written consent; and here unauthorized sublease of the leased property to a third party. The petitioner
denied the allegations and set up three counterclaims for recovery of the value of her kitchenette
constructed on the leased parcel of land and which was demolished by private respondent plus the
value of the furniture and fixtures purchased for use in the kitchenette. The trial court dismissed the
complaint upon motion of private respondent contending that her cause of action had already become
moot and academic by the expiration of the lease contract. The counterclaims were also dismissed for
non-payment of docket fees. Again, the petitioners filed a complaint or recovery of the same amounts
involved and alleged in their counterclaims. The private respondents argue that the cause of action
therein was barred by prior judgment. The RTC denied private respondents motion on the ground that
the dismissal of the petitioner's counterclaimsis not an adjudication on the merits as the court did not
acquire jurisdiction over the counterclaims for failure of petitioner Lydia Meliton to pay the docket fees,
hence the said dismissal does not constitute a bar to the filing of the later complaint. The CA reversed
such decision holding that the counterclaim is a compulsory one, the failure of the respondents to
seek a reconsideration of the dismissal of their counterclaim or to take an appeal therefrom rendered
the dismissal final. Such dismissal barred the prosecution of their counterclaim by another action.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUES: 1. WON the counterclaims of petitioners are compulsory in nature?
2. WON petitioners, having failed to seek reconsideration of or to take an appeal from the
order of dismissal of their counterclaims, are already barred from asserting the same in
another action?
HELD:
1 A counterclaim is compulsory if (a) it arises out of, or is necessarily connected with, the
transaction or occurrence which is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim; (b) it
does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the court cannot
acquire jurisdiction; and (c) the court has jurisdiction to entertain the claim. In the instant
case, all these requisites are present. Private respondent's complaint was for rescission of the
contract of lease due to petitioner Lydia Meliton's breach of her obligations under the said
contract. On the other hand, petitioner's counterclaims were for damages for unlawful
demolition of the improvements she introduced pursuant to her leasehold occupancy of the
premises, as well as for the filing of that civil suit which is contended to be clearly unfounded.
Both the claims therein of petitioners and private respondent arose from the same
contract of lease. The rights and obligations of the parties, as well as their
potential liability for damages, emanated from the same contractual relation.
Petitioners' right to claim damages for the unlawful demolition of the improvements they
introduced on the land was based on their right of possession under the contract of lease
which is precisely the very same contract sought to be rescinded by private respondent in her
complaint. The two actions are but the consequences of the reciprocal obligations imposed by
law upon and assumed by the parties under their aforesaid lease contract. That contract of
lease pleaded by private respondent constitutes the foundation and basis relied on by both
parties for recovery of their respective claims.
The relationship between petitioners' counterclaims and private respondent's complaint is
substantially the same as that which exists between a complaint for recovery of land by the
owner and the claim for improvements introduced therein by the possessor.
2 It is a rule that a counterclaim not set up shall be barred if it arises out of or is necessarily
connected with the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing
party's claim and does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties of whom
the court cannot acquire jurisdiction. However, said rule is not applicable to the case at
bar.It must be remembered that the petitioners counterclaim were duly set-up but was only
dismissed due to non-payment of docket fees.
Where a compulsory counterclaim is made the subject of a separate suit, it may be abated
upon a plea of auter action pendant or litis pendentia and/or dismissed on the ground of res
judicata, depending on the stage or status of the other suit. Both defenses are unavailing to
private respondent. In order that a prior judgment will constitute a bar to a subsequent case,
the following requisites must concur: (1) the judgment must be final; (2) the judgment must
have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3)
the judgment must be on the merits; and (4) there must be between the first and second
actions, identity of parties, of subject matter, and of causes of action.
The dismissal on the first case is without prejudice, and hence, was not
adjudicated based on the merits. On that ground, res judicata will not
apply.Further, the Court relaxed the rule on compulsory counterclaims stating that the
failure of petitioners to seek reconsideration of or to take an appeal from the
 order of dismissal of the counterclaim should not prejudice their right to file their
claims in a separate action because they were thereby made to understand and
believe that their counterclaims were merely permissive and could be the subject
of a separate and independent action. Under the Rules, there is no need to pay docket
fees for a compulsory counterclaim. Furthermore, under the Manchester doctrine, the defect
cannot be cured by an amendment of the complaint or similar pleadings, much less the
payment of the docket fee. Hence, the only remedy left for the petitioners was to file
a separate action for their claims and to pay the prescribed docket fees therein
within the applicable and reglementary period, which is what they did in the case
at bar in obedience and deference to the judicial mandate laid down in their case.
At any rate, the ambivalent positions adopted by the lower court can be considered cured by
what we have construed as effectively a reservation in its order of dismissal for the filing of a
complaint based on the causes of action in the dismissed counterclaims.
CASE NO. 1
ANTONIO MONTEJO vs. VICENTA UROTIA
G.R. No. L-27187 July 22, 1971
Facts:
Plaintiffs in their complaint, filed with the Court of First Instance of Leyte, on July 2, 1962,
Antonio Montejo and Consolacion Bibera seek: a) to prevent the foreclosure of a mortgage on several
parcels of land they claim to own in common with the defendants, as well as on several personal
properties allegedly belonging exclusively to plaintiff Antonio Montejo; b) to have said parcels of land
partitioned among its co-owners; c) the release, from the aforementioned mortgage, of the said
personal properties and of plaintiffs' shares in said land; and d) the collection of certain sums of
money allegedly due from the defendants to plaintiff Antonio Montejo. There were 24 defendants
under the original complaint, which was amended to include 20 additional defendants. Inasmuch as 17
defendants had not been summoned as of September 27, 1963, said court then issued an order, inter
alia, directing the plaintiffs to exert efforts to cause said defendants to be summoned. Over two years
later, or on October 25, 1965, the court dismissed the case for failure of the plaintiffs to comply with
said order.
Plaintiffs-appellants assail the order of dismissal appealed from upon the ground that 1.) the
duty to serve summons upon the defendants devolves upon the clerk of court not upon the plaintiffs
and 2.) that service of summons by publication is not feasible. The appellants contend that under
sections 1, 2, and 3, of Rule 31, Rules of Court, it is the duty of the clerk of court and not of the
plaintiff to include a case in the trial calendar after the issues are joined and that it is also the duty of
the clerk of court and not the plaintiff to fix the date for trial and to cause a notice to be served upon
the parties. But the duty imposed upon the clerk in these sections of the Rules does not relieve the
plaintiff of his own duty to prosecute the case diligently, for the non-performance of that duty by
plaintiff is by section 3 of Rule 30 made an express ground for dismissing the action. If the clerk,
therefore, in the present cases had been negligent, it was plaintiff's duty to call the court's attention to
that fact so that the administration of justice would not suffer delay.
The second ground did not justify plaintiffs' inaction for three (3) years. If there was no means
of summoning any of the defendant's, plaintiffs should have so informed the court and moved for their
exclusion from the complaint, within a reasonable period of time, so that the case could be disposed
on one way or another instead of being left pending indefinitely, the contributing to the clogging of our
court dockets. Besides, plaintiffs could have asked that the defendants be summoned by publication,
pursuant to sections 16 and 17 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, the action being one for partition of
real properties in the Philippines.
Issue: Whether or not Section 3 of Rule 17 of Rules of Court will apply
Held:
Section 3 of Rule 17 of Rules of Court which is a reproduction of Section 3 of Rule 30 of the
Rules of Court as reads:
Failure to prosecute. If plaintiff fails to appear at the time of the trial, or to prosecute his action for
an unreasonable length of time, or to comply with these rules or any order of the court, the action
may be dismissed upon motion of the defendant or upon the court's own motion. This dismissal shall
have the effect of an adjudication upon the merits, unless otherwise provided by court.
As to what constitutes an "unreasonable length of time," within the purview of the above-
quoted provision, We have ruled that it "depends upon the circumstances of each particular case that
the sound discretion of the court in the determination of said question will not be disturbed, in the
absence of patent abuse and that the burden of showing abuse of judicial discretion is upon appellant
since every presumption is in favour of the correctness of the court's action.
Thus, the Court refused the orders of dismissal for failure of the plaintiffs to prosecute for a
period of four (4) years, about three (3) years, over a year, less than a year, and even less than three
(3) months, as well as for failure of the plaintiffs to comply, for less than two (2) months, with an order
directing him to file a bill of particulars.
The duty imposed upon the clerk does not relieve the plaintiff of his own duty to prosecute
the case diligently, for the non-performance of that duty by plaintiff is by section 3 of Rule 30 made an
express ground for dismissing the action. If the clerk, therefore, in the present cases had been
negligent, it was plaintiff's duty to call the court's attention to that fact so that the administration of
justice would not suffer delay.
CASE NO. 2
G.R. No. L-29098 July 22, 1971
PEOPLE'S CAR, INC. vs. JOSE ARCELLANA, and THE CAPITAL INSURANCE AND SURETY CO.,
INC.,
FACTS:
This is an appeal from order of dismissal for failure to prosecute.
This is a case for the collection of a sum of money from defendants Jose Arcellana and the
Capital Insurance & Surety Co., Inc. It was initiated in the City Court of Manila, on April 20, 1966.
Judgment for plaintiff People's Car Inc., having been rendered, on September 7, 1967, defendant
Capital Insurance & Surety Co., Inc., appealed to the Court of First instance of Manila. On October 24,
1967, the latter issued a notice to the parties, advising them that the appealed case had then been
docketed in said court. Counsel for the appellant received, on December 18, 1967, notice to the effect
that a pre-trial would be held on January 4, 1968. He, however, failed to appear at said pre-trial.
Appellant alleges that the failure of his counsel to appear at the pre-trial was due to the fact
that he then had to attend the trial of another case; that he had filed, on December 27, 1967, a
motion for postponement of said pre-trial upon such ground; and that, although the motion was
denied on December 29, 1967, notice of the order to this effect was not received by him until January
12, 1968, or eight (8) days after the scheduled pre-trial.
Hence, the Court forthwith ordered the appeal dismissed and the judgment appealed from
revived, for failure to prosecute on the part of said appellant.
ISSUE: Whether or not the order of dismissal of the motion was proper
HELD: YES. Section 3 of Rule 17 of the present Rules of Court, which is a reproduction of Section 3 of
Rule 30 of the Rules of Court effective July 1, 1940, reads:
Failure to prosecute. If plaintiff fails to appear at the time of the trial, or to
prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time, or to comply with these
rules or any order of the court, the action may be dismissed upon motion of the
defendant or upon the court's own motion. This dismissal shall have the effect of an
adjudication upon the merits, unless otherwise provided by court.
Construing this provision, it was held in Smith Bell & Co. v. American President Lines, Ltd., and this
view was reiterated in subsequent cases, that "... (t)he dismissal of an action pursuant to this rule
rests upon the sound discretion of the court ... ." .
Appellant was represented by the "Achacoso, Ocampo and Simbulan" Law Firm, on behalf of which
Atty. Sabino P. Palomares, Jr. had appeared. If Atty. Palomares had another case set for trial on January
4, 1968, any of the three (3) members of the law firm could have and should have appeared at the
pre-trial of the case at bar. Moreover, in the absence of an order granting said motion for
postponement, appellant's counsel was not justified in assuming that the motion would be granted.
The fact that the plaintiffs had filed a motion for continuance ... does not entitle the plaintiffs to
presume that their motion for continuance would be granted. Motions for postponement are left to the
sound discretion of the trial court and unless there be an abuse of such discretion this Court will not
interfere with the exercise of that discretion.
improve his chances of obtaining a favorable decision or action where no unfavorable decision has
ever been rendered against him in any of the cases he has brought before the courts.
In the case at bar, there was no adverse decision against the petitioner in Civil Case No. 97-0523
which was the first case filed and raffled to the sala (Branch 257) of Judge How. The dismissal without
prejudice of the complaint in Civil Case No. 97-0523 at the instance of the petitioner was pursuant to
Section 1, Rule 17 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure15 considering that it was done before service
of answer or any responsive pleading. The dismissal does not amount to litis pendencia nor to res
judicata. There is no litis pendencia since the first case before Judge How was dismissed or withdrawn
by the plaintiff (herein petitioner), without prejudice, upon her filing of a notice of dismissal, pursuant
to Section 1, Rule 17 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. To use the wording of that rule, Judge Hows
order is one merely "confirming the dismissal" of the complaint by the plaintiff (herein petitioner).
Neither is there res judicata for the reason that the order of dismissal was not a decision on the merits
but a dismissal "without prejudice".

CASE NO. 3
G.R. No. 139337 August 15, 2001
MA. CARMINIA C. ROXAS vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and JOSE ANTONIO F. ROXAS
Case No. 4
International Container Terminal Services Inc. vs Court of Appeals, C.F. Sharp Inc.,
FACTS: On November 4, 1997, petitioner Ma. Carminia C. Roxas filed with the Regional Trial Court of
G.R. No. 90530
Paraaque City, Civil Case No. 97-0523, which is an action for declaration of nullity of marriage on the
ground of psychological incapacity on the part of her husband, Jose Antonio F. Roxas, private
Facts:
respondent herein, with an application for support pendente lite for their four (4) minor children. The
Respondent Sharp Inc. filed a complaint for prohibition with prayer for preliminary injunction
case was raffled to Branch 257 of the Regional Trial Court of Paraaque City presided by Judge Rolando
against petitioner and the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) where the trial court issued a writ of
C. How. But the petitioner, soon thereafter, filed in the said RTC Branch 257 a Notice of Dismissal
preliminary injunction upon the posting by Sharp of a bond issued by the Integrated Bonding and
dated November 20, 1997, to dismiss the complaint, without prejudice, pursuant to the provision of
Insurance Co. Petitioner filed an answer with a compulsory counterclaim against Sharp claiming that
Section 1, Rule 17, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, considering that summons has not yet been
as a consequence of the complaint and the writ of preliminary injunction, it had suffered injuries. The
served and no responsive pleading has yet been filed.
PPA, together with petitioner, filed a motion to dismiss Sharps complaint where the same was granted
The same complaint, now docketed as Civil Case No. 97-0608, was re-filed on November 25, 1997. It
by the court and further resulting to the dismissal of the counterclaim. Petitioner filed a motion for
was raffled in due course to Branch 260 of the Regional Trial Court of Paraaque City presided by
reconsideration but the same was denied. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts
Judge Helen Bautista-Ricafort.
decision stating that the counterclaim for damages being compulsory in nature, for which no filing fee
On May 13, 1998, when the case was called for a pre-trial conference, the matter of plaintiffs
has been paid, was correctly dismissed after the dismissal of the complaint. Petitioner then filed a
(petitioners) application for support pendente lite of their four (4) minor children was taken up. On
petition for review with the Supreme Court.
May 19, 1998, Judge Bautista-Ricafort, issued an Order granting the application for support pendente
lite. On July 22, 1998, the petitioner filed a manifestation and motion praying the trial court to cite
ISSUE: Whether or not the dismissal of the complaint operated to dismiss the counterclaim.
private respondent in contempt of court after the latter failed to comply with the said Order. Private
respondent, filed a counter-manifestation and motion praying that the manner and mode of payment
HELD: The Supreme Court held that the petitioner itself joined the PPA in moving for the dismissal of
of his contribution to the expenses of his minor children be modified such that he will pay directly to
the complaint, hence it did not object to the dismissal of the respondents complaint. The compulsory
the entities or persons to which the payment for such expenses are intended. On September 23, 1998,
counterclaim was so intertwined with the complaint that it could not remain pending for independent
Judge Bautista-Ricafort issued an Order directing the private respondent "to comply fully with the
adjudication by the court after the dismissal of the complaint which had provoked the counterclaim in
Order within 10 days otherwise, he would be cited for contempt of court.
the first place. As a consequence, the dismissal of the complaint on the petitioners own motion will
Private respondent filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari questioning the Orders of the
also dismiss the counterclaim questioning that complaint.
trial court. The appellate court nullified the Orders and the proceedings of the trial court for the reason
The Rules provides that, if a counterclaim has been pleaded by a defendant prior to the
that the certificate of non-forum shopping of the petitioner did not mention the prior filing of Civil Case
service upon him of the plaintiffs motion to dismiss, the action shall not be dismissed against the
No. 97-0523 before the sala of Judge Rolando C. How and the dismissal thereof without prejudice.
defendants objection unless the counterclaim can remain pending for independent adjudication by
Hence this appeal.
the court.
The fact that petitioner caused the dismissal of its counterclaim when it not only did not
ISSUES: Whether or not the case at bar requires a certification of non-forum shopping.
object to, but actually moved for, the dismissal of the complaint. The petitioner cannot undo that act.
Petitioner should have had objected to the dismissal of the complaint or at least reserved its right to
HELD: NO. Forum shopping is an act of a party against whom an adverse judgment has been prosecute it.
rendered in one forum of seeking and possibly getting a favorable opinion in another forum, other
than by appeal or the special civil action of certiorari, or the institution of two or more actions or Case No. 5
proceedings grounded on the same cause on the supposition that one or the other court would make a Producers Bank of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, et.al
favorable disposition. Since a party resorts to forum shopping in order to increase his chances of GR No. 125468, October 9, 2000
obtaining a favorable decision or action, it has been held that a party cannot be said to have sought to
FACTS:
 Petitioner Producers Bank filed a complaint with a prayer for preliminary attachment. It was filed
before the RTC of Makati and the latter granted the writ. Petitioner also filed a motion for issuance of
summons, which the RTC granted. Only private respondent Wilson Kho was served through substituted
service. The whereabouts of the other defendants were unknown.
The Bank moved for reinstatement of the writ. It was at this time when the trial court observed
that there were no returns of the service of summonses from the three other defendants. Without any
manifestation from either parties, nor any application for service of summonses by publication, the
RTC deferred deliberations on the motion to reinstate the writ of attachment until the summonses
were served. When Respondent Kho moved that pre-trial be set without having to wait for the service
of summonses upon the other defendants, the RTC ruled to deny the motion.
There was also inordinate delay during pre-trial proceedings. In four instances, specifically on
August 3, 1991, September 17, 1991, May 8, 1992, and July 13, 1992, pre-trial conferences were re-
set either because Banks counsel for witnesses could not appear. Finally, when trial commenced, the
Bank moved for postponements for three times.
The Banks counsel filed a motion for postponement of the hearings scheduled. He cited as reason
his having to leave for the province to arbitrate a peaceful settlement of a land dispute among
members of his family. In his stead, he sent Atty. Cotaco to attend the hearing and to inform the court
about his predicament. Kho opposed any further postponements and undue delays and prayed for the
dismissal of the case.
The RTC finding no merit in the reasons for postponement and finding Kho's opposition well taken,
issued an order dismissing the complaint for failure of the petitioner to prosecute the case. A
subsequent motion for reconsideration filed by the Bank was denied. The Bank appealed to the Court
of Appeals. The CA issued the assailed decision, dismissing the appeal and affirming the order of the
lower court.
ISSUE: WON the CA erred and abused its discretion when it affirmed the RTCs dismissal of the
complaint for failure to prosecute.
HELD: No. The CA did not err nor abuse its discretion when it upheld the RTCs dismissal of
complaint for failure to prosecute for five years. The RTC in dismissing the complaint, and the CA in
affirming the RTC, applied Section 3, of Rule 17 of the Rules of Court which states that: Sec. 3. Failure
to prosecute. - If plaintiff fails to appear at the time of the trial, or to prosecute his action for an
unreasonable length of time, or to comply with these rules or any order of the court, the action may
be dismissed upon motion of the defendant or upon the court's own motion. This dismissal shall
have the effect of an adjudication upon the merits, unless otherwise provided by the court.
Undoubtedly, five years have been an unreasonably long time for a defendant to wait for the
outcome of a trial which has yet to commence and on which his family, fortune and future depend. In
a number of previous cases, the SC have consistently warned that courts must ensure that litigations
are prosecuted and resolved with dispatch. SC also held that although the grant or denial of
postponements rests entirely on the sound discretion of the judge, SC cautioned that the exercise of
that discretion must be reasonably and wisely exercised. Postponements should not be allowed except
on meritorious grounds, in light of the attendant circumstances. Deferment of the proceedings may be
allowed or tolerated especially where the deferment would cause no substantial prejudice to any party.
"The desideratum of a speedy disposition of cases should not, if at all possible, result in the precipitate
loss of a party's right to present evidence and either in the plaintiff's being non-suited or of the
defendant's being pronounced liable under an ex-parte judgment." While a court can dismiss a case
on the ground of non-prosequitur, the real test for the exercise of such power is whether, under the
circumstances, plaintiff is chargeable with want of due diligence in failing to proceed with reasonable
promptitude.
To declare the dismissal in this case without prejudice would open the floodgate to possible
circumvention of Section 3, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court on dismissal with prejudice for failure to
prosecute. SC held that the dismissal of petitioner's complaint is with prejudice and should have the
effect of adjudication on the merits.
Case No. 6
GR NO. 103185 CONRADO CALALANG, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and FILIPINAS
MANUFACTURERS BANK, respondents.
FACTS
A complaint for a collection of a sum of money was filed by private respondent against
Calalang who filed a motion to dismiss which was denied. Respondent's bank failed to appear during
the first two scheduled hearings for pre-trial causing the dismissal of the case. The dismissal was set
aside upon respondent's motion for reconsideration. On the two scheduled dates of hearing, counsel
for defendant Hugo Arca failed to appear. The court informed the plaintiff that it shall not consider
Acropolis trading Corp as having brought under their jurisdiction in view of improper service of
summons. Calalang filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that respondent bank failed to prosecute
the case for an unreasonable length of time. The court resolved that if plaintiff was not able to cause
service of alias summons then this court will dismiss the complaint. At the pre-trial conference, the
case had been dismissed for failure of the plaintiff's counsel to appear despite notice and considering
that his case had been pending for 7 years. A motion for reconsideration was filed citing that said
counsel arrived late due to heavy traffic. Such motion was denied and so respondent bank appealed in
the CA which reversed the decision and ordered the case to be remanded to the court of origin for
further proceedings.
ISSUE: WON the acts of respondent bank manifest lack of interest hence respondent court's decision
to set aside the dismissal of said case an abuse of discretion.
HELD: No. petitioner's contention that the fact that respondent bank had not caused service of
summons on the two other defendants, the Acropolis Trading Corporation and Rio Arturo Salceda, for
almost seven years after the complaint was filed on April 29, 1980 indicated "abuse of judicial
leniency and tolerance" is bereft of merit. Summons is issued by the clerk of court upon the filing of
the complaint. When it was informed later on by Judge Alikpala, Jr. in his Order dated March 6, 1987
that there was an improper service on defendants Acropolis Trading Corporation and Rio Arturo
Salceda, respondent bank, in compliance therewith, filed a motion for alias summons, as permitted by
the law. Considering the judicial reorganization which took place during the pendency of this case and
the numerous instances raised by both petitioner and respondent bank as contributing to the delay,
petitioner cannot now claim that respondent bank's "abuse of judicial leniency and tolerance is the
single greatest component of this delay". The acts of the respondent bank do not manifest lack of
interest to prosecute, in the absence of proof that it indeed abandoned or intended to abandon its
case against petitioner and the other defendants. Admittedly there was delay in this case, but such
delay, the SC held that, is not the delay warranting dismissal. To be a sufficient ground for dismissal,
delay must not only be lengthy but also unnecessary and dilatory resulting in the trifling of judicial
processes. While it is true that the dismissal of an action on grounds specified under Section 3, Rule 17
of the Revised Rules of Court is addressed to their discretion such discretion must be exercised
soundly with a view to the circumstances surrounding each particular case. If facts obtain that serve
as mitigating circumstances for the delay, the same should be considered and dismissal denied or set
aside, especially where the suit appears to be meritorious and the plaintiff was not culpably negligent
and no injury results to defendant. It is true that the allowance or denial of petitions for postponement
and the setting aside of orders previously issued, rest principally upon the sound discretion of the
judge to whom they are addressed, but always predicated on the consideration that more than the
mere convenience of the courts or of the parties of the case, the ends of justice and fairness would be
served thereby. IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is DISMISSED. The decision of the Court of
Appeals is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
CASE NO. 7
G.R. No. 151215 April 5, 2010
PCI LEASING and FINANCE, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
ANTONIO C. MILAN, Doing Business Under the Name and Style of "A. MILAN TRADING," and
LAURA M. MILAN, Respondents.
FACTS:
Petitioner filed on February 18, 2000 a Complaint for Sum of Money against herein
respondents Antonio and Laura Milan, alleging that it extended loans on different dates to respondents
for which Deeds of Assignment were duly executed by respondents. Under the terms of the Deeds,
respondents sold, assigned and transferred to PCI Leasing the formers rights to various checks for and
in consideration of the various amounts obtained and in case of default or nonpayment of the checks, misuse of court processes. Section 3 of Rule 17 of the Rules of Court states that: If, for no
respondents were obligated to pay the face value of the checks, interests and late payment charges. justifiable cause, the plaintiff fails to appear on the date of the presentation of his evidence
Petitioner then presented the checks for payment but were dishonored for different reasons. It in chief on the complaint, or to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time, or to
thereafter demanded from respondents to settle its obligations, but the latter failed to do so comply with these Rules or any order of the court, the complaint may be dismissed upon
prompting the petitioner to institute the complaint in the RTC of Quezon City to enforce payment of motion of the defendant or upon the courts own motion, without prejudice to the right of the
the total loan obligation. The RTC issued summons to respondents, addressed to their place of defendant to prosecute his counterclaim in the same or in a separate action. This dismissal
residence as stated in the complaint yet it was for naught because the respondents had already shall have the effect of an adjudication upon the merits, unless otherwise declared by the
transferred to an unknown location thus, returned unserved. Petitioner filed a motion to archive the court. The Court thus found that the RTC grievously erred in dismissing Civil Case No.
case for it was conducting an investigation in order to ascertain the whereabouts of the respondents, Q-00-40010 because the dismissal were due to the absence of petitioners counsel at the
subject to its reinstatement after the same was determined. It was however denied because the hearing scheduled for that day and due to the directive of the RTC to petitioner to "take the
circumstances of the case were not within the purview of the provisions of paragraph II (c) of necessary steps to actively prosecute its case, otherwise, the same shall be dismissed."
Administrative Circular No. 7-A-92 (Guidelines in the Archiving of Cases). The RTC then ordered the While trial courts have the discretion to impose sanctions on counsels or litigants for
petitioner "to take the necessary steps to actively prosecute the instant case within ten days from tardiness or absence at hearings, such sanctions should be proportionate to the offense and
receipt" under pain of dismissal of the case "for lack of interest." The petitioner filed motion for should still conform to the dictates of justice and fair play. It does not escape this Courts
issuance of alias summons but both were denied and the case was subsequently dismissed due to the notice that PCI Leasing failed to successfully prosecute the case for several months due to
absence of the counsel for the latter during the hearing for the second motion filed by it. Subsequent the difficulties it encountered in locating respondents, who appeared to have a propensity for
motion for reconsideration and ex-parte motion for reconsideration were also denied by the court. A changing addresses and refusing to accept court processes. Under these circumstances, the
notice of appeal was filed by the petitioner in attempt to challenge the order rendered by the trial delay in the trial court proceedings was not entirely the fault of PCI Leasing. Verily, it can
court which the latter later on dismissed because the same was filed beyond the reglementary period. hardly be said that PCI Leasing engaged in a pattern or scheme to delay the disposition of the
Petitioner then assailed the above Resolution before the Court of Appeals through a Petition for case or committed a wanton failure to observe the mandatory requirement of the rules.
Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court but it was dismissed outright holding that its appeal had
been taken out of time. Citing Section 13, Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that
CASE NO. 8
the trial court may, motu proprio or on motion, dismiss the appeal for having been taken out of time. It
FIDEL M. BAARES II, LILIA C. VALERIANO, EDGAR M. BAARES, EMILIA GATCHALIAN and
further holds that it has no jurisdiction over the petition since it only involves question of law. Thus,
FIDEL BESARINO, petitioners,
the instant petition.
vs.
ISSUE:
ELIZABETH BALISING et al.,respondents
1 WON the appeal was filed out of time.
G.R. No. 132624 March 13, 2000
2 WON the petitioner is deprived of \ its right to recover the sums it had loaned to the
FACTS:
respondents.
Petitioners Fidel M. Baares II, Lilia C. Valeriano, Edgar M. Baares, Emilia Gatchialian and
HELD:
Fidel Besarino were the accused in sixteen criminal cases for estafa2 filed by the private respondents.
1 YES. The Court hold that the conclusion of the RTC that PCI Leasing belatedly filed its appeal
The cases were assigned to the Municipal Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal, Branch II.After the petitioners
was correct, but the premise therefor was evidently mistaken. In accordance with Section 3,
were arraigned and entered their plea of not guilty,3 they filed a Motion to Dismiss the
Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, an ordinary appeal of a judgment by the RTC shall be taken
aforementioned cases on the ground that the filing of the same was premature, in view of the failure
within fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or final order appealed from. Said period
of the parties to undergo conciliation proceedings before the Lupong Tagapamayapa of Barangay
shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or reconsideration. In Neypes v. Court of
Dalig, Antipolo, Rizal. The municipal trial court issued an Order denying petitioners' motion to dismiss
Appeals, the Court had the occasion to clarify the rule regarding the period within which an
on the ground that they failed to seasonably invoke the non-referral of the cases to the Lupong
appeal may be taken should a motion for new trial or reconsideration be filed. Thus: To
Tagapamayapa or Pangkat ng Tagapagkasundo. It added that such failure to invoke non-referral of the
standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to
case to the Lupon amounted to a waiver by petitioners of the right to use the said ground as basis for
appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within
dismissing the cases. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforementioned Order,
which to file the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of the
claiming that nowhere in the Revised Rules of Court is it stated that the ground of prematurity shall be
order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration. Contrary to the
deemed waived if not raised seasonably in a motion to dismiss. On November 13, 1995, the municipal
findings of the RTC, the period within which to file the Notice of Appeal should be reckoned
trial court issued an Order dismissing the sixteen criminal cases against petitioners without prejudice,
from the date which denied the Ex Parte Motion for Reconsideration of PCI Leasing. As PCI
pursuant to Section 18 of the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure. Then, private respondents
Leasing was not able to file the Notice of Appeal within the reglementary period allowed
through counsel, filed a motion to revive the abovementioned criminal cases against petitioners,
therefor, the RTC Order dismissing the case should be deemed final and executory.
stating that the requirement of referral to the Lupon for conciliation had already been complied with.
2 NO. Notwithstanding the doctrine on immutability of final judgments, the Court finds, after a
Petitioners filed a comment and opposition to motion to revive claiming that the Order of the
thorough review of the records, that compelling circumstances are extant in this case, which
municipal trial court, dated November 13, 1995 dismissing the cases had long become final and
clearly warrant the exercise of its equity jurisdiction. Invariably, rules of procedure
executory; hence, private respondents should have re-filed the cases instead of filing a motion to
should be viewed as mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice.
revive . The municipal trial court issued an Order granting private respondents' motion to revive.
Their strict and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend to
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforementioned Order which was denied by the
frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must always be eschewed. Even
municipal trial court. Petitioners thereafter filed with the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal, a
the Rules of Court reflects this principle. The power to suspend or even disregard
petition for certiorari, injunction and prohibition assailing the Order, dated March 18, 1996 of the
rules can be so pervasive and compelling as to alter even that which this Court
municipal trial court. The regional trial court, likewise, denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration
itself had already declared to be final. It will not serve the ends of substantial justice if
of the aforementioned decision for lack of merit. Hence, this petition.
the RTCs dismissal of the case with prejudice on pure technicalities would be perfunctorily
ISSUES: 1. Whether or not an order dismissing a case or action without prejudice may attain finality
upheld by appellate courts likewise on solely procedural grounds, unless the procedural
if not appealed within the reglementary period, as in the present case; and
lapses committed were so gross, negligent, tainted with bad faith or tantamount to abuse or
2. Whether or not the action or case that had been dismissed without prejudice may be revived by
motion after the order of dismissal had become final and executory.
HELD:
1.YES. An order dismissing a case without prejudice is a final order if no motion for reconsideration or
appeal therefrom is timely filed.
In Olympia International vs. Court of Appeals, 32 we stated, thus:
The dismissal without prejudice of a complaint does not however mean that said dismissal
order was any less final. Such Order of dismissal is complete in all details, and though without
prejudice, nonetheless finally disposed of the matter. It was not merely an interlocutory order
but a final disposition of the complaint.
The law grants an aggrieved party a period of fifteen (15) days from his receipt of the court's decision
or order disposing of the action or proceeding to appeal or move to reconsider the same. After the
lapse of the fifteen-day period, an order becomes final and executory and is beyond the power or
jurisdiction of the court which rendered it to further amend or revoke. A final judgment or order cannot
be modified in any respect, even if the modification sought is for the purpose of correcting an
erroneous conclusion by the court which rendered the same. After the order of dismissal of a case
without prejudice has become final, and therefore becomes outside the court's power to amend and
modify, a party who wishes to reinstate the case has no other remedy but to file a new complaint.
Thus, the regional trial court erred when it denied the petition for certiorari, injunction and prohibition
and ruled that the order of the municipal trial court, dated November 13, 1995 dismissing without
prejudice the criminal cases against petitioners had not attained finality and hence, could be
reinstated by the mere filing of a motion to revive.
2.) NO. The action or case that had been dismissed without prejudice cannot be revived by motion
after the order of dismissal had become final and executory.
Section 18 merely states that when a case covered by the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure
is dismissed without prejudice for non-referral of the issues to the Lupon, the same may be revived
only after the dispute subject of the dismissed case is submitted to barangay conciliation as required
under the Local Government Code. There is no declaration to the effect that said case may be revived
by mere motion even after the fifteen-day period within which to appeal or to file a motion for
reconsideration has lapsed. Moreover, It is but logical to infer that the foregoing principle also applies
to cases subject to summary procedure especially since the objective of the Rule governing the same
is precisely to settle these cases expeditiously. To construe Section 18 thereof as allowing the revival
of dismissed cases by mere motion even after the lapse of the period for appealing the same would
prevent the courts from settling justiciable controversies with finality, thereby undermining the
stability of our judicial system.
CASE NO. 9
SPS. LYDIA AND VIRGILIO MELITON VS. COURT OF APPEALS,
G.R. NO. 101883 DECEMBER 11, 1992
Facts:
In June 1988, Nelia Ziga filed a complaint for rescission of a contract of lease over a parcel of
land before RTC Naga, Branch 27 against Lydia Meliton on the ground of breach of contract. She
alleged that Meliton failed to pay the monthly rentals due, constructed a concrete wall and roof on the
leased premises and subleased the property without her consent.
Meliton filed an answer and set up counterclaims for the recovery of the value of her
kitchenette constructed on the leased parcel of land and which was demolished by Ziga.
In May 2009, Ziga filed a motion to dismiss her complaint alleging that her cause
of action had become moot and academic by the expiration of the lease contract. The RTC dismissed
the complaint. The counterclaims of Meliton were also dismissed for non-payment of docket fees.
In December 1989, Meliton filed a complaint against Ziga for the recovery of the amounts
involved in her counterclaims. Ziga filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the cause
of action was barred by prior judgment.
The RTC denied the motion on the ground that the dismissal of the counterclaims in the
earlier case is not an adjudication on the merits as the court did not acquire jurisdiction over the
counterclaims for failure of Meliton to pay the docket fees, hence the said dismissal does not
constitute a bar to the filing of the later complaint.
The CA reversed the RTC's decision and ordered the dismissal of the case stating that the
failure of the respondents to seek a reconsideration of the dismissal of their counterclaim or to take an
appeal therefrom rendered the dismissal final. Such dismissal barred the prosecution of their
counterclaim by another action.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the counterclaims of petitioners are compulsory in nature
2. Whether or not petitioners, having failed to seek reconsideration of or to take an appeal from the
order of dismissal of their counterclaims, are already barred from asserting the same in
another action.
Held:
1. The counterclaims of petitioner are compulsory in nature.
Section 4 of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court provides that a counterclaim is compulsory if (a) it arises
out of, or is necessarily connected with, the transaction or occurrence which is the subject matter of
the opposing party's claim; (b) it does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties of
whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction; and (c) the court has jurisdiction to entertain the claim.
The "one compelling test of compulsoriness" is the logical relationship between the claim alleged in
the complaint and that in the counterclaim, that is, where conducting separate trials of the respective
claims of the parties would entail a substantial duplication of effort and time, as where they involve
many of the same factual and/or legal issues.
In the aforesaid Civil Case No. 88-1480, all the requisites of a compulsory counterclaim are present.
The counterclaims are logically related to the complaint. Private respondents complaint was for
rescission of the contract of lease due to petitioner's breach of her obligations under the said contract.
On the other hand, Petitioner's counterclaims were for damages for unlawful demolition of the
improvements she introduced pursuant to her leasehold occupancy of the premises, as well as for the
filing of that civil suit which is contended to be clearly unfounded.
Both the claims arose from the same contract of lease. The rights and obligations of the parties, as
well as their potential liability for damages, emanated from the same contractual relation. That
contract of lease pleaded by private respondent constitutes the foundation and basis relied on by both
parties for recovery of their respective claims.
2. Petitioners are not barred by res judicata.
In order that a prior judgment will constitute a bar to a subsequent case, the
following requisites must concur: (1) the judgment must be final; (2) the judgment must have been
rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) the judgment must
be on the merits; and (4) there must be between the first and second actions, identity of parties, of
subject matter, and of causes of action.
The first case, Civil Case No. RTC 88-1480, was dismissed upon motion of private respondent, plaintiff
therein, under Section 2 of Rule 17. Dismissal thereunder is without prejudice, except when otherwise
stated in the motion to dismiss or when stated to be with prejudice in the order of the court. The order
of dismissal of the first case was unqualified, hence without prejudice and, therefore, does not have
the effect of an adjudication on the merits. On a parity of rationale, the same rule should apply to a
counterclaim duly interposed therein and which is likewise dismissed but not on the merits thereof.
In the order of dismissal of the complaint, the counterclaims of herein petitioners were dismissed by
reason of the fact the court a quo had not acquired jurisdiction over the same for non-payment of the
docket fees. The said dismissal was without prejudice, since a dismissal on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction does not constitute res judicata, there having been no consideration and adjudication of
the case on the merits.
The dismissal of the case without prejudice indicates the absence of a decision on the merits and
leaves the parties free to litigate the matter in a subsequent action as though the dismissal action had
not been commenced. The discontinuance of a case not on the merits does not bar another action on
the same subject matter. Evidently, therefore, the prior dismissal of herein petitioners' counterclaims
is not res judicata and will not bar the filing of another action based on the same causes of action.
CASE NO. 10
G.R. No. 159699. March 16, 2005
ACANCE VS CA
FACTS: Angela Quijano got married to Jesus Acance in 1990 after her former husband's death in 1989.
Upon death of Jesus, his children, together with Angela registered the disputed property on the Acance
siblings name who are all resideing in the U.S. Upon knowledge of such, the children of Angela with
her first spouse, the Quijano siblings, herein respondents, filed an amended complaint in the RTC. The
complaint was to annul the extrajudicial settlement of the estate of deceased Jesus Acance. The
quijanos claim that the subject properties were acquired during the existence of their deceased father
and Angela. Petitioners failed to file an answer and was declared in default. The Acances, through their
attorney in fact, Rosalino Acance, filed a motion to lift/set aside the order of default. Rosalno alleges
non-receipt of the complaint THe motion was denied. Petitioner filed before the CA for grave abuse of
discretion. They maintained that the court a quo did not acquire jurisdiction over the petitioners
because no valid extraterritorial service of summons was made on them. The CA denied for their
omission of the motion for reconsideration with the lower court. Hence the petition.
Issue: WON petitioners were served a valid extraterritorial service of summons.
HELD: NO. The procedural requirement that a motion for reconsideration must first be filed before
resorting to the special civil action of certiorari may be glossed over to prevent a miscarriage of justice
and, among other recognized instances, when the need for relief is extremely urgent and certiorari is
the only adequate and speedy remedy available.4 Among other remedies, a petition for certiorari to
declare the nullity of a judgment by default is available if the trial court improperly declared a party in
default, or even if the trial court properly declared a party in default, if grave abuse of discretion
attended such declaration
Section 15, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court " Sec. 15. Extraterritorial service. When the defendant
does not reside and is not found in the Philippines, and the action affects the personal status of the
plaintiff or relates to, or the subject of which is, property within the Philippines, in which the defendant
has or claims a lien or interest, actual or contingent, or in which the relief demanded consists, wholly
or in part, in excluding the defendant from any interest therein, or the property of the defendant has
been attached within the Philippines, service may, by leave of court, be effected out of the Philippines
by personal service as under Section 6; or by publication in a newspaper of general circulation in such
places and for such time as the court may order, in which case a copy of the summons and order of
the court shall be sent by registered mail to the last known address of the defendant, or in any other
manner the court may deem sufficient. Any order granting such leave shall specify a reasonable time,
which shall not be less than sixty (60) days after notice, within which the defendant must answer."
There was obviously no proof of service presented by respondents. While the respondents claimed
that they had complied with the service of summons by publication in a newspaper of general
circulation,10 it does not appear that they had presented to the court a quo the "affidavit of the
printer, his foreman, or principal clerk, or of the editor, business or advertising manager" of the
"Remate," where the publication was allegedly made, to prove such service by publication. The failure
to strictly comply correctly with the requirements of the rules regarding the mailing of copies of the
summons and the order for its publication is a fatal defect in the service of summons. Petition granted.
CASE NO. 11
ALEJANDRO BAYOG and JORGE PESAYCO, JR., petitioners, vs. HON. ANTONIO M. NATINO,
Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 12, San Jose, Antique, and ALBERTO
MAGDATO, respondents.
G.R. No. 118691. July 5, 1996
Facts:
On 16 June 1973, petitioner Alejandro Bayog and private respondent Alberto Magdato
entered into an Agricultural Leasehold Contract over a lot with an area of 0.8 hectares located in
Centro Pojo, Bugasong, Antique, with Bayog as the LANDOWNER-LESSOR and Magdato as TENANT-
LESSEE. On 19 April 1983, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos, pursuant to P.D. No. 27, R.A. No. 3844,
and P.D. No. 1425, issued a Certificate of Agricultural Leasehold to Magdato. On 3 September 1990,
Bayog, in consideration of P250,000.00, executed a so-called Deed of Equitable Mortgage, with right of
redemption within five years, in favor of Santiago Pesayco. In a letter dated 19 October 1992, Bayog
asked Magdato to remove his house from Bayog's land. As Magdato did not comply, Bayog and Jorge
Pesayco, Jr. filed with the Third MCTC for Ejectment and/or Abatement of Nuisance with Prayer for
Demolition. Magdato had then ten days from service of summons to file his Answer, but he filed it 13
days after. Magdato alleged that the court had no jurisdiction over the case, It being an agrarian
dispute. On 20 September 1993, the MCTC issued an Order holding that since Magdato's Answer was
filed outside the reglementary period, it could not take cognizance thereof without exceeding its
jurisdiction under Section 36 of B.P. Blg. 129. Magdato filed a petition for relief from judgment with
injunction and prayer to litigate as a pauper with the RTC. Bayog filed a Motion to Dismiss. RTCs
decision is to set aside the MCTCs decision and let the case be remanded back to that court for proper
disposal, thus, this petition by certiorari.
Issue: Whether or not the MCTC could take cognizance of the answer belatedly filed.
Held: Yes. The MCTC should have met and ruled squarely, on the issue of jurisdiction, instead of
simply adopting a strange theory that it could not take cognizance of the answer belatedly filed
without exceeding its jurisdiction under Section 36 of B.P. Blg. 129. Plainly, there is nothing in the said
section which bars the MCTC from taking cognizance of the answer. The Revised Rule on Summary
Procedure, as well as its predecessor, does not provide that an answer filed after the reglementary
period should be expunged from the records. As a matter of fact, there is no provision for an entry of
default if a defendant fails to file his answer. It must likewise be pointed out that Magdato's defense of
lack of jurisdiction may have even be raised in a motion to dismiss as an exception to the rule on
prohibited pleadings in the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure. The Answer asserted that the MCTC
had no jurisdiction over the case in light of the agricultural tenancy relationship between Bayog and
Magdato, which is clearly evidenced by their Agricultural Leasehold Contract and the Certificate of
Agricultural Leasehold issued in Magdato's favor by then President Marcos. While this assertion, per
se, did not automatically divest the MCTC of its jurisdiction over the ejectment case, nevertheless, in
view of Magdato's defense, the MCTC should have heard and received the evidence for the precise
purpose of determining whether or not it possessed jurisdiction over the case. And upon such hearing,
if tenancy was shown to be at issue, the MCTC should have dismissed the case for lack of
jurisdiction. Verily, if indeed Magdato were an agricultural lessee under agrarian law, then the MCTC
was devoid of jurisdiction over the ejectment case.
CASE NO. 12
G.R. No. 146262 January 21, 2005
HEIRS OF EUGENIO LOPEZ, SR., petitioners, vs. HON. ALFREDO R. ENRIQUEZ, in his capacity
as Administrator of the Land Registration Authority and the REGISTER OF DEEDS OF
MARIKINA CITY, respondents.
FACTS:
Sandoval and Ozaeta, Jr. filed an application for registration of title before the RTC of Pasig
City. The land registration court issued an order of general default and hearings on the application
followed. The land registration court granted the application. The decision became final and executory,
the National Land Titles and Deeds Administration (now LRA) issued Decree in the names of Sandoval
and his wife Rosa Ruiz, and Ozaeta and his wife Ma. Salome Lao.
Petitioners Eugenio Lopez, Jr., et. al heirs of Eugenio Lopez, Sr., filed a motion in LRC alleging
that Sandoval and Ozaeta sold the lots subject of the application to the late Eugenio Lopez, Sr. and
praying that the court issue the decree of registration in their names as the successors-in-interest of
Eugenio Lopez, Sr.
The Register of Deeds of Marikina City issued the corresponding OCT in favor of Sandoval and
Ozaeta and their spouses only.
Petitioners filed another motion to declare void Decree. Petitioners questioned the
inconsistencies in the dates and requested the LRA to recall the decrees. The LRA Administrator
denied the request and explained the inconsistencies.
Petitioners filed with the Register of Deeds of Marikina City an application to annotate the notice of lis
pendens at the back of OCT on the ground that petitioners have filed with the land registration court a
motion to declare OCT void, however the ROD of Marikina City denied the application to annotate the
notice of lis pendens.
Thus, petitioners elevated the denial in consulta to the LRA. The LRA agreed with the Register of
Deeds that a notice of lis pendens based on a motion is not registrable. Relying on Section 24, Rule 14
of the Rules of Court, the LRA ruled that only a party to a case has the legal personality to file a notice
of lis pendens relative to the pending case.
The LRA declared that petitioners are not parties in LRC No. N-18887. Since a land registration case is
a proceeding in rem, an order of general default binds the whole world as a party in the case.
Petitioners are mere movants whose personality the court has not admitted. Based on Section 26 of
PD 1529, the LRA ruled that petitioners should have filed a motion to lift the order of general default.
Undaunted, petitioners filed before the CA a petition for review. The appellate court dismissed the
petition for lack of merit. Reiterating the LRAs ruling that only a party to a case has the legal
personality to file a notice of lis pendens. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: WON PETITIONERS MOTION TO DECLARE VOID THE DECREES IS A PROPER BASIS FOR FILING
THE NOTICE OF LIS PENDENS.
HELD:
The SC held that the petition has no merit. Petitioners have not complied with the requisites.
Both the LRA and the appellate court denied the application for a notice of lis pendens because
petitioners are mere movants, and not original parties, in LRC No. N-18887. As petitioners are not
parties to an action as contemplated in Section 76 of PD 1529, they failed to present the requisite
pleading to the ROD of Marikina. The Supreme Court hold that the Register of Deeds correctly denied
the application for a notice of lis pendens.
Section 14, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
SECTION 14. Notice of lis pendens. In an action affecting the title or the right of possession
of real property, the plaintiff and the defendant, when affirmative relief is claimed in his
answer, may record in the office of the registry of deeds of the province in which the property
is situated a notice of the pendency of the action. Said notice shall contain the names of the
parties and the object of the action or defense, and a description of the property in that
province affected thereby. Only from the time of filing such notice for record shall a
purchaser, or encumbrancer of the property affected thereby, be deemed to have
constructive notice of the pendency of the action, and only of its pendency against the
parties designated by their real names.
Section 76 of PD 1529 states:
SECTION 76. Notice of lis pendens. No action to recover possession of real estate, or to
quiet title thereto, or to remove clouds upon the title thereof, or for partition or other
proceedings of any kind in court directly affecting the title to land or the use or occupation
thereof or the buildings thereon, and no judgment, and no proceeding to vacate or reverse
any judgment, shall have any effect upon registered land as against persons other than the
parties thereto, unless a memorandum or notice stating the institution of such action or
proceeding and the court wherein the same is pending, as well as the date of the institution
thereof, together with a reference to the number of the certificate of title, and an adequate
description of the land affected and the registered owner thereof, shall have been filed and
registered.
Petitioners committed a fatal procedural error when they filed a motion in LRC No. N-18887. The
remedy of petitioners is an action for reconveyance against Sandoval, Ozaeta and their spouses.
The Court stated that petitioners position is in conflict with their 25 November 1998 motion to have
the decree and the titles declared void. Petitioners now assume the roles of both successors-in-interest
and oppositors. This confusion of roles brought about petitioners grave error in procedure.
Furthermore, petitioners filed both motion to consider the deed of sale in the registration and
motion to have the decrees declared viod, long after the decision in LRC No. N-18887 became final
and executory.
Consequently, Petitioners failed to lift the order of general default. Records disclosed that
without first filing a motion to lift the order of general default, petitioners filed a motion to declare as
null and void the decrees and titles. Until the order of general default is lifted by the court, petitioner
could not be considered as a party to the action. They are deemed movants whose personality as far
as the case is concerned is not yet admitted by the court considering that the order of default has not
been lifted.
In Lim Toco v. Go Fay A party declared in default loses his standing in court. As a result of
his loss of standing, a party in default cannot appear in court, adduce evidence, be heard, or be
entitled to notice. A party in default cannot even appeal from the judgment rendered by the court,
unless he files a motion to set aside the order of default under the grounds provided in what is now
Section 3, Rule 9 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Considering the facts and arguments as presented above, The SC hold that the motion filed by
petitioners is insufficient to give them standing in the land registration proceedings for purposes of
filing an application of a notice of lis pendens.
The SC stated that Indeed, it requires a delicate balancing act between the objective of the
Rules of Court to secure a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding and
the strict requirements for a notice of lis pendens. .The facts in this case show that petitioners have
not complied with the requirements.
WHEREFORE, The SC DENY the petition and AFFIRM the Decision of the CA. SO ORDERED.
CASE NO. 13
G.R. No. 88954 October 29, 1992
DATU SAMAD MANGELEN, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, PEDRO HABALAYUS and HABALAYUS ENTERPRISES,
INC., respondents.
FACTS:
Assailed in this petition for review is the Resolution of the public respondent Court of Appeals
reversing its previous Decision which affirmed in toto the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Manila in favor of herein petitioner ordering private respondents to pay the former the sum of
P600,000 plus 12% interest and moral damages (P50,000), exemplary damages (P10,000) and
attorneys fees (P100,000).
The controversy arose from a compromise settlement between the parties regarding a
logging concession of the plaintiff (herein petitioner) located somewhere in Datalblao, Columbia,
Sultan Kudarat which appears to be included in the logging concession located on same general
vicinity granted to private respondent, Habalayus Enterprises. It is stated therein that the
consideration for the Compromise Agreement would be the waiver on the part of the plaintiff (herein
petitioner) of whatever rights he may have over his logging concession in favor of the defendants
(herein private respondents) and that private respondents shall pay petitioner the total amount of
P600,000.00, one fourth of the amount of P150,000.00 shall be paid and/or delivered on February 28,
1983 and the remaining balance of P300,000.00 shall be paid in three (3) equal installments.
Private respondent refused to issue checks in compliance therewith, thus prompting
petitioner to complain to the Bureau of Forest Development which directed Habaluyas Enterprises,
Inc., to refrain from continuing with the logging operation inside the area complained of by the
petitioner. Thereafter, private respondent issued two (2) post-dated checks in favor of the petitioner
but both checks were dishonored on the ground of insufficiency of funds. Demands were made but
there was no favorable response. Plaintiff was thus constrained to write a formal demand letter yet it
still did not heed the demands of the petitioner. The latter was compelled to initiate two criminal
complaints for Violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 in RTC.
RTC ruled in favor of petitioner. Instead of filing an Answer, private respondent submitted a
motion to dismiss the case on the ground of improper venue, a supplemental motion to dismiss on the
ground of pendency of another case in the RTC Quezon City and a second supplemental motion to
dismiss on the ground of lis pendens-- all of which were denied. Although they received a copy of the
denial order, private respondents still did not file any answer to the complaint. Consequently,
petitioner filed a motion to declare defendants in default and to be allowed to present evidence ex-
parte, which the trial court granted.
Private respondent filed a motion to set aside the order of default and to hold in abeyance
further proceedings on the ground that they had filed with the then Intermediate Appellate Court a
petition for certiorari raising the issues of improper venue, lack of jurisdiction and litis pendencia
which it also denied. Still unable to accept the verdict, private respondent filed a motion to reconsider
the decision. Court of Appeals then reversed its earlier decision stating that Habaluyas Enterprises Inc.
has good and valid defenses as amplified in their motion for reconsideration and remanded the case to
the lower court for further proceedings.
Hence, this recourse under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUES: W/N the trial courts decision (declaring private respondents in default for failure to answer
the complaint within the reglementary period in view of the pendency of the motion to dismiss and the
motion for reconsideration, and authorizing the petitioner to present his evidence ex-parte) was
correct?
1 W/N Court of Appeals seriously erred in remanding the case to the Lower Court for
further proceedings?
2 W/N the Court of Appeals seriously erred in finding that herein respondents have a valid
and good defense?
RULING:
1 YES. The pleadings disclose facts which, as earlier summarized, clearly reveal respondents'
attempt, through different procedural maneuvers, to delay a simple case. It is obvious that
they were unmoved by any sense of urgency to protect their interests. It appeared, that the
filing of the petition much later was but part of a well-planned strategy to gain more time to
delay the case. If the trial court aborted such strategy, private respondents have only
themselves to blame. The trial court acted correctly and in accordance with Section 1, Rule
18 of the Rules of Court in declaring private respondents in default and in authorizing
petitioner to present his evidence ex-parte.
2 YES. Public respondent ordered the remand of the case to the trial court for further
proceedings, placing the latter in a quandary as to what it was supposed to do. The trial court
would not know what "further proceedings" means as the public respondent neither nullified
the order of default nor set aside the evidence received ex parte. Thus, the former would be
hard pet at finding a satisfactory solution to the problem presented for its resolution.
Petitioner claims that it is for the waiver of his rights over a portion of a logging concession
mentioned in the Compromise Agreement; on the other hand, private respondent claim that
it is for the maintenance of peace and order by the petitioner. Both the trial court and the
public respondent in its 30 January 1989 decision upheld the theory of the petitioner. The
Supreme Court is thus unable to see how further proceedings by the trial court could produce
a result consistent with the theory of private respondents. Besides, the interpretation of the
Compromise Agreement involves a question of law; the remand of the case would thus serve
no useful purpose.
3 YES. Whether private respondents had a valid or good defense is entirely irrelevant
considering the circumstances obtaining. CA gravely erred in "reversing" its decision of 30
January 1989 on the basis of respondents "good and valid defenses".
Section 3, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 3 Relief from order of default. A party declared in default may at any time after
discovery thereof and before judgment file a motion under oath to set aside the order of
default upon proper showing that his failure to answer was due to fraud, accident, and
meritorious defense. In such case the order of default may be set aside on such terms and
conditions as the judge may impose in the interest of justice.
A meritorious defense, which public respondent considers as synonymous to a "good and
valid defense," is not the only basis for the lifting of an order of default; it is merely one of
two requisites which a party must comply with. The first is the existence of fraud, accident,
mistake or excusable neglect. Needless to say, these two requisites must concur.
While it is not required for the court to inquire into the nature, character and quality of the
defense interposed by private respondents, it should nevertheless be stated here that such a
defense relates to the interpretation of the provision in the Compromise Agreement regarding
the purpose of the P600,000.00 consideration.
CASE NO. 14
HUTAMA-RSEA/SUPERMAX PHILS., J.V., Petitioner,
vs.
KCD BUILDERS CORPORATION, represented by its President CELSO C. DIOKNO,Respondent.
G.R. No. 173181
Facts:
On 10 December 2001, appellee KCD Builders Corporation filed a complaint for sum of money
against appellants before the RTC of Makati. Its cause of action arose from a written contract which
was the Notice to Proceed executed by the parties whereby appellant [Hutama] as principal contractor
contracted with appellee [KCD] as sub-contractor for the said project. The final billing was submitted
to appellant Charles H.C. Yang, and despite a joint evaluation by the parties through their respective
representatives who agreed on the amount [of] P2,967,164.71 as HUTAMAs total obligation to appellee
[KCD], and a letter of demand, appellant corporation [Hutama] failed and refused to pay.
Summons was served on appellants which was received by their secretary, Ms. Evelyn
Estrabela in behalf of the two defendants [Hutama and Yang]. On 21 February 2002, their counsel filed
an Entry of Appearance and Motion for Extension of time to File Responsive Pleading. They were given
a 20-day extension period to file the responsive pleading, or until 16 March 2002.
On 11 April 2002, appellee [KCD] filed a Motion to Declare Defendant/s [Hutama and Yang] in
Default for failure to file the responsive pleading within the extended period, and set the same for
hearing on 26 April 2002.
On 23 April 2002, appellant Charles H.C. Yang filed a Motion to Dismiss for failure of the
complaint to state a case of action against him, On the same date, appellant HUTAMA filed an Urgent
Motion to Admit Attached Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim, together with the said answer.
During the hearing on appellees motion to declare defendant/s in default, the trial court
noted the filing of appellants respective motion to dismiss and answer with counterclaim but noted
that the filing thereof on 27 March 2002 was too late considering that they were only given an
extended period up [to] 16 March 2002 to do the same. Thus, the trial court granted the motion to
declare defendants in default and directed, upon appellees motion, the presentation of evidence ex-
parte before the branch clerk of court who was appointed as commissioner to received evidence.
Appellants filed an Urgent Motion to Set Aside Order of Default. During the hearing, the trial
court ordered appellee to file an opposition or comment. After the Manifestation filed by appellee on
24 June 2002, the trial court set anew the hearing on the motion to set aside order of default on 22
August 2002, but appellants failed to appear. The trial court then denied the said motion in the Order
dated 19 September 2002.
 During the ex-parte presentation of evidence, appellees witness Celso C. Dioko testified that
there was a contract executed between appellants and appellee regarding the construction of Package
2 Site Works in Philips Semiconductor Phils. Inc., Calamba, Laguna where appellee was the sub-
contractor as evidenced by a Notice to Proceed.After the completion of the project, he [Dioko] billed
them the total amount of P3,009,954.05. After they received the bill, they asked him [Dioko] to have a
joint evaluation by their engineer and his engineer on site. The authorized engineer to evaluate the
amount arrived at was Engr. Jose De Asis. Thus, their authorized engineers came out with the total
amount of P2,967,164.71 as cost of the project. After the joint evaluation, he [Dioko] again sent the
bill to appellant Charles H.C. Yang and wrote a letter to HUTAMA to pay the final billing. The appellants,
however, failed to comply with the demand. Upon the filing of this case, appellee paid P30,000.00
acceptance fee and P3,000.00 per appearance fee and a contingency of 15% of the total amount due
as attorneys fees.
Engr. Jose De Asis testified that he is an employee of appellee corporation and knows the
appellants to be the representatives of HUTAMA. He and appellants were present when the agreement
was prepared and the amount agreed upon was promised to be paid to Dioko.
Issues:
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO COMMITTED SERIOUS, REVERSIBLE ERROR,
WHEN IT FAILED TO CONSIDER THAT RESPONDENT ABANDONED THE PROJECT AND
IT IS THE LATTER (sic) LIABLE TO PETITIONER;
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO COMMITTED SERIOUS, REVERSIBLE ERROR,
WHEN IT DENIED PETITIONERS RIGHTS TO PRESENT ITS EVIDENCE IN VIOLATION OF
ITS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS TO DUE PROCESS; AND
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO COMMITTED SERIOUS, REVERSIBLE ERROR,
WHEN IT FAILED TO CONSIDER THAT RESPONDENT FAILED TO COMPLY WITH
SECTION 5, RULE 7 OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE ON VERIFICATION AND
CERTIFICATION OF NON-FORUM SHOPPING;
WON CA COMMITED A SERIOUS, REVERSIBLE ERROR, IF NOT GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION,
IN DENYING PETITIONER[S] MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION WITHOUT STATING CLEARLY AND
DISTINCTLY THE FACTUAL AND LEGAL BASIS THEREOF.
Held:
A petition under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court shall raise only questions of law. As a rule, findings of
fact of a trial judge, when affirmed by the CA, are binding upon the Supreme Court. This rule admits of
only a few exceptions.
The RTC acted within the confines of its discretion when it issued the order of default upon the motion
of KCD when Hutama failed to file an answer within the extended period. The RTC did not hastily issue
the order of default. It gave Hutama the opportunity to explain its side. On August 22, 2002, the
motion to set aside the order of default was set for hearing, but neither Hutamas counsel, nor any
other representative of petitioner corporation, appeared.
A pleading is verified by an affidavit that an affiant has read the pleading and that the allegations
therein are true and correct as to his personal knowledge or based on authentic records. The party
does not need to sign the verification. A party's representative, lawyer, or any person who personally
knows the truth of the facts alleged in the pleading may sign the verification. The power of a
corporation to sue and be sued is lodged in the board of directors that exercises its corporate powers.
However, it is settled and we have so declared in numerous decisions that the president of a
corporation may sign the verification and the certification of non-forum shopping.
The CA ruled that it found no plausible reason to depart from its earlier decision wherein all the issues
had been exhaustively passed upon. That ruling contained a sufficient legal reason or basis to deny
the motion. There was no need for the CA to restate the rationale for its decision that the petitioner
wanted reconsidered.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision dated October
14, 2005 and the Resolution dated June 19, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 78262 are
hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
CASE NO. 15
GR No. 120496
FIVE STAR BUS CO., INC. and CARLOS SALONGA, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, KALOOKAN CITY, BR. 129 and PEDRO and LYDIA SANTOS,
Respondents.
FACTS:
Sps. Salonga filed a suit against herein petioner, Five Stat Bus Co. For breach of carriage and
damages for the indemnification of the death of their son who died aboard in the accident met by the
bus along the way. Subsequently trial court set the pre-trial and instructed counsels for both parties to
notify their respective clients and file pre-trial brief. Nevertheless, on the day of the pre-trial, petitioner
failed to appear and file a pretrial briefs which caused to declare them as default and present their
evidence. On the next schedule pre-trial the defendants failed to appear and declared in default and
to present evidence ex-parte by the plaintiff. The trial court rendered in favour of the respondents. On
appeal, CA affirmed the decision of the lower. Hence this petition.
ISSUE: WON the counsels served with notice of pre-trial is charged with the duty of notifying the party
represented by him.
HELD: YES. The SC ruled that when the court schedule a case for pre-trial, notices must be served
on the party separately from his counsel which may be made directly to both party and counsel. It is
preferred, however, that service of such notice on a party be made through or care of his counsel at
counsels address "with the express imposition upon counsel of the obligation of notifying the party of
the date, time and place of pre-trial conference." It is the duty of counsel upon whom a pre-trial notice
is served to see to it that his client receives such notice and attends the pre-trial.
CASE NO. 16
CASE NO. 17
Meralco vs La Campana
GR No. 97535, Aug 4, 1995
Facts:
A complaint filed by la campana against meralco for recovery of money w/ prelim injunction
after it receive a notice of disconnection and for alleged non payment of the following: differential
billing of 65k as value of electric energy used but it was not registered in the meter due to alleged
tampering discovered on sept 22 1986 and the underbilling of 169k (w/ balance of 28k) due to meter
multiplier failure. Summons and copy of complaint was received by meralco on aug 23 1990. RTC
judge QC Lopez inhibited and was reraffled to Judge Dayaw. Meralco filed a motion for extension of
time of 15 days within which to file an answer at the clerk, allegedly refused the same. And the motion
not acted upon bec it did not contain a notice of hearing as req at sec 4 &5 Rule 15. Meralcos Answer
w/ counterclaim was received on Sept 21 1990.(beyond the period to answer. La campana filed
exparte motion to declare meralco in default, (granted) Instead of appealing to CA, Meralco filed on
dec 3 1990 a motion to set aside judgement by default and/or for new trial that it filed it answer and
the judgement by default was obtained by fraud. Denied by Judge Dayaw, that the motion for
extention did not containany notice of date and place of hearing, also stated that the motion to set
aside judgment by default and/or for new trial was a pro forma motion because it did not set forth the
facts and circumstances which allegedly constituted the fraud upon which the motion was grounded.
Meralco filed a notice of appeal, but opposed by la campana on gorund of out of time and since the
motion to set aside judgment by default and/or for new trial did not stop the running of the period to
appeal, which expired on Dec 14, 1990, or 15 days from the time Meralco received the decision on
Nov 29, 1990. TC denied notice of appeal and granted the execution of la campana. Meralco filed the
instant petition for certiorari and profibitionclaming judge commited grave abuse of discretion.
Issue: W/N judge dayaw commited grave abuse of discretion in its order.
Held: No. The case of Gozon, et al vs CA: It is well-entrenched in this jurisdiction that a motion which
does not meet the requirements of Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court is considered a
worthless piece of paper which the clerk has no right to receive and the court has no authority to act
upon. Meralco was aware of the importance of such a notice since it insisted in its motion to set aside
judgment by default and/or for new trial that it should have received notice of hearing of the motion to
declare it in default which La Campana filed ex parte. When it filed in Branch 78 its answer with
counterclaim on Sep 21, 1990, fourteen days after the expiration of the period within which to file an
answer, Meralco was already in default and, naturally, it had to bear all the legal consequences of
being in default. It chose to play it safe. Under the Rules, what an aggrieved party seeks to set aside is
the order of default, an interlocutory order which is, therefore, not appealable, and not the judgment
by default, which is a final disposition of the case and appealable to the CA. Notice that in the
following pertinent provisions, the Rules expressly state that what may be set aside is the order of
default, while the judgment itself may be appealed to a higher court: sec 3 relief from order of default,
Sec 9 Service upon party in default and Sec 2 judgement or orders subject to appeal. While a motion
for new trial grounded on fraud, thisMeralco's motion likewise fails to convince. Meralco claims that
the reason for the ex-parte motion was "to deprive the defendant of the opportunity to oppose it,
knowing that defendant actually filed its answer." But how could La Campana have known about the
answer with counterclaim when it was actually received only on Oct, 1990, as evidenced by the
registry return receipt attached to Meralco's Annex "H,"while the ex-parte motion to declare Meralco in
default was filed much earlier on Sep 27, 1990? "Fraud, as a ground for new trial, must be extrinsic or
collateral, that is, it is the kind of fraud which prevented the aggrieved party from having a trial or
presenting his case to the court, or was used to procure the judgment without fair submission of the
controversy."Meralco's failure to go to trial in this case is solely attributable to its failure to comply
with the Rules of Court. Judge correct a pro forma motion, it did not interrupt the running of the period
to appeal. Accordingly, having received the decision on Nov 29, 1990, Meralco had until Dec 14, 1990,
within which to file a notice of appeal. The notice of appeal which it filed on Jan 28, 1991, was clearly
filed out of time. Hence, Dismissed
CASE NO. 18
G.R. No. 101256. March 8, 1993.
SPOUSES PEPITO AND LORETO LAUS, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON.
SALVADOR C. CEGUERA, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 82; NILO SM. CABANG, in his capacity as Deputy Sheriff of Quezon City
and CONSUELO P. TORRES, respondents.
Facts:
This case arises from the complaint filed by Private Respondent Conseulo P. Torres against
herein petitioner for a collection of sum of money. 10 October 1989, Deputy Sheriff Nilo Cabang then
went to petitioners' address at 122 Molave Park Subdivision, Paraaque, Metro Manila to serve the
summons and a copy of the complaint. Failing to serve the summons personally upon the petitioners
after waiting for ten (10) minutes, he resorted to a substituted service through one Josephine Areola,
who purportedly represented herself to be the maid of the said petitioners. Petitioner did not file an
answer. Consequently, upon the motion of the plaintiff, the petitioner-defendant was held in default
and subsequently the trial court rendered judgment by default in favor of the plaintiff. It is only On 2
February 1990, before receiving a copy of the 22 January 1990 decision, petitioners, by way of a
special appearance, filed a motion to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction over their persons. They
allege that the service of summons was ineffective because it was not indicated in the return that the
sheriff had first exerted efforts to serve the same personally before resorting to substituted service.
They alleged that Josephine Areola is not known to them. The motion was dismissed as well as the MR,
thus, the petitioner-defendant appealed in Court of Appeals. The CA affirmed the rulings of the RTC
citing that the motion is rather too late in the day for the defendants-petitioners' motion to dismiss to
be considered by the respondent Court. A motion to dismiss on the ground that the Court has no
jurisdiction over the person of the defendants is proper only when made within the reglementary
period for filing a responsive pleading and before such responsive pleading is filed. Hence, this present
petition.
Issue: Whether or not the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the persons of the
petitioners by virtue of the substituted service of summons effected by Deputy Sheriff
Cruz
Held:
NO. THE SUBSTITUTED SERVICE SUMMON IS NOT VALIDLY EFFECTED.
It is all too obvious that no earnest efforts were exerted by Deputy Sheriff Cruz to effect the
personal service of summons. Deputy Sheriff Cruz resorted to a substituted service on his first and
only attempt to effect a personal service. Upon being informed that the petitioners were not around
at that time, he immediately resorted to a substituted service through Josephine Areola, a person
whose age he did not even know or attempt to discover. He did not even inquire about the
whereabouts of the petitioners, the time they were expected to return home, the hours of the day they
could be contacted at their house or the location of their offices, if any, in order that he could faithfully
comply with the requirement of personal service.
It must be noted that the substituted service should be availed only when the defendant
cannot be served promptly in person. Impossibility of prompt service should be shown by stating the
efforts made to find the defendant personally and the failure of such efforts. The statement should be
made in the proof of service. This is necessary because substituted service is in derogation of the
usual method of service.
Since the substituted service of summons in this case was not validly effected, the trial court
did not acquire jurisdiction over the persons of the petitioners. The order of default, the judgment by
default, the writ of execution issued by it, as well as the auction sale of the petitioners' properties
levied on execution are, therefore, all null and void.
CASE NO. 19
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN (SPECIAL FIRST DIVISION), FERDINAND E. MARCOS
(REPRESENTED BY HIS ESTATE/HEIRS: IMELDA R. MARCOS, MARIA IMELDA [IMEE] MARCOS-
MANOTOC, FERDINAND R. MARCOS, JR. AND IRENE MARCOS-ARANETA) AND IMELDA
ROMUALDEZ MARCOS, respondents.
G.R. No. 152154 July 15, 2003
Facts:
Petitioner Republic, through the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG),
represented by the OSG, filed a petition for forfeiture before the Sandiganbayan. In said case,
petitioner sought the declaration of the aggregate amount of US$356 million deposited in escrow in
the PNB, as ill-gotten wealth. In addition, the petition sought the forfeiture of US$25 million and US$5
million in treasury notes which exceeded the Marcos couple's salaries, other lawful income as well as
income from legitimately acquired property. The treasury notes are frozen at the Central Bank of the
Philippines, now Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, by virtue of the freeze order issued by the PCGG. Before
the case was set for pre-trial, a General Agreement and the Supplemental Agreements dated
December 28, 1993 were executed by the Marcos children and then PCGG Chairman Magtanggol
Gunigundo for a global settlement of the assets of the Marcos family. Subsequently, respondent
Marcos children filed a motion for the approval of said agreements and for the enforcement thereof.
Hearings were conducted by the Sandiganbayan on the motion to approve the General/Supplemental
Agreements. Respondent Ferdinand, Jr. was presented as witness for the purpose of establishing the
partial implementation of said agreements. Petitioner filed a motion for summary judgment and/or
judgment on the pleadings. Respondent Mrs. Marcos filed her opposition thereto which was later
adopted by respondents Mrs. Manotoc, Mrs. Araneta and Ferdinand, Jr. The Sandiganbayan denied
petitioner's motion for summary judgment and/or judgment on the pleadings on the ground that the
motion to approve the compromise agreement "(took) precedence over the motion for summary
judgment." Respondent Mrs. Marcos filed a manifestation on May 26, 1998 claiming she was not a
party to the motion for approval of the Compromise Agreement and that she owned 90% of the funds
with the remaining 10% belonging to the Marcos estate. After the pre-trial and the issuance of the pre-
trial order and supplemental pre-trial order dated October 28, 1999 and January 21, 2000,
respectively, the case was set for trial.
Issue: Whether or not the respondents admission made during the pre-trial tenders no genuine
issue or controversy as to any material fact in present action, thus warranting the rendition of
summary judgment.
Held: No, there was no genuine issue raised. The pre-trial brief of Mrs. Marcos was adopted by the
three Marcos children. In said brief, Mrs. Marcos stressed that the funds involved were lawfully
acquired. But, as in their answer, they failed to state and substantiate how these funds were acquired
lawfully. They failed to present and attach even a single document that would show and prove the
truth of their allegations. It is unquestionably within the court's power to require the parties to submit
their pre-trial briefs and to state the number of witnesses intended to be called to the stand, and a
brief summary of the evidence each of them is expected to give as well as to disclose the number of
documents to be submitted with a description of the nature of each. The tenor and character of the
testimony of the witnesses and of the documents to be deduced at the trial thus made known, in
addition to the particular issues of fact and law, it becomes apparent if genuine issues are being put
forward necessitating the holding of a trial. Likewise, the parties are obliged not only to make a formal
identification and specification of the issues and their proofs, and to put these matters in writing and
submit them to the court within the specified period for the prompt disposition of the action. Mrs.
Marcos did not enumerate and describe the documents constituting her evidence. Neither the names
of witnesses nor the nature of their testimony was stated. What alone appeared certain was the
testimony of Mrs. Marcos only who in fact had previously claimed ignorance and lack of knowledge.
And even then, the substance of her testimony, as required by the rules, was not made known either.
Such cunning tactics of respondents are totally unacceptable to this Court. We hold that, since no
genuine issue was raised, the case became ripe for summary judgment.
CASE NO. 20
G.R. No. 135384. April 4, 2001
MARIANO DE GUIA and APOLONIA DE GUIA, petitioners, vs. CIRIACO, LEON, VICTORINA,
TOMASA and PABLO, all surnamed DE GUIA, respondents.
FACTS:
Petitioners filed a complaint for partition of land against defendants. Shortly after defendants
filed their traverse, an amended complaint was admitted by the lower court, in which plaintiff Tomasa
De Guia was impleaded as one of the defendants for the reason that she had become an unwilling co-
plaintiff. The Clerk of Court issued a Notice setting the case for pre-trial conference on June 18, 1992
at 8:30 a.m. Copies of said notices were sent by registered mail to parties and their counsel. It turned
out that both defendants and counsel failed to attend the pre-trial conference. Hence, upon plaintiffs
motion, defendants were declared as in default and plaintiffs were allowed to present their evidence
ex-parte. The defendants alleged upon filing their Motion for Reconsideration that they received the
Notice in the afternoon of the scheduled date, giving them no chance to appear. Plaintiffs contended
however, as evidenced by a Postal Delivery Receipt, that defendants' counsel received the notice 1
day before the pretrial. The RTC denied the MR. CA ruled in favor of respondents and ruled that they
were not in default.
ISSUE: WON the CA erred in not finding respondents in default.
HELD:
No. The case happened in 1992, hence, the applicable rule was Sec. 1, Rule 20, which mandates for
the separate service of notice upon the parties and the counsels. While service of such notice to party
may be made directly to the party, it is best that the trial courts uniformly serve such notice to party
through or care of his counsel at counsels address with the express imposition upon counsel of the
obligation of notifying the party of the date, time and place of the pre-trial conference. Hence, before
being declared non-suited or considered in default, parties and their counsel must be shown to have
been served with notice of the pretrial conference.[10]Moreover, if served only on the counsel, the
notice must expressly direct him or her to inform the client of the date, the time and the place of the
pretrial conference. In this case, although the Notice was also sent to their counsel, it did not contain
any imposition or directive that he inform his clients of the pretrial conference. Such belated receipt of
the notice, which was not attributable to respondents, amounted to a lack of notice. WHEREFORE, the
Petition is DENIED.
***applicable provision now is Sec. 3, Rule 18
CASE NO. 21
Alberto G. Pinlac vs CA
G.R No. 91486 September 10, 2003
FACTS:
The controversy is this case stemmed from a Petition for Quieting of Title filed by petitioners
over 3 vast parcels of land known as Lot Nos. 1, 2 & 3. Lot No. 1 is covered by TCT No. 5690, while
Lot Nos. 2 and 3 were originally covered by OCT No. 614 and OCT No. 333, respectively. On March 21,
1988, the trial court rendered a Partial Decision in favor of petitioners and against the defendants who
were declared in default, including respondent owners of Vilmar-Maloles (Vilma) Subdivision whose
properties were within Lot No. 2. The dispositive portion of which reads:
1 Declaring petitioners through the principal petitioners hereof, to wit: Alberto G. Pinlac, Atty.
Eriberto H. Decena, Rodolfo T. Reyes, Felipe Briones and Juanito S. Metilla as absolute owners
in fee simple title of the aforesaid Lots 1, 2 & 3 hereof by virtue of extra-ordinary prescription,
with the exception of the lands covered by the respective transfer certificate of title
belonging to the non-defaulted respondents
2 Declaring Original Certificate of Title No. 614, TCT No. 5690 and TCT No. 3548 of the Register
of Deeds of Quezon City, and the subsequent TCTs issued therefrom, with the exception of
those titles belonging to the non-defaulted respondents, as null and void ab initio
3 Ordering the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to cancel OCT No. 614, TCT No. 5690 and TCT
No. 3548 as well as the subsequent TCTs issued and emanating therefrom, with the exception
of those titles belonging to the non-defaulted respondents, from its record;
4 Declaring the area of TCT No. 333 in excess of its true and actual area of 4,574 Sq. Meters, as
well as the TCTs subsequently issued by the Register of Deeds of Quezon City, covering the
area in excess of said actual area, with the exception of those belonging to non-defaulted
respondents, as null and void ab initio
5 Ordering the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to cancel all TCTs subsequently issued based
on OCT No. 333 in excess of the actual area of 4,574 Sq. Meters, with the exception of those
titles belonging to the non-defaulted respondents;
Vilma, filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition to Annul the Partial Decision of the trial court,
which was granted in a decision Petitioners filed motion for reconsideration of the said decision and
but it was denied for lack of merit and affirming the Judgment of the Court of Appeals. Petitioners filed
a Motion for Reconsideration contending, inter alia, that Lot no. 3 should not be annulled because the
petition for annulment of judgment filed by the respondents concerned only Lot No. 2. They prayed
that the January 19, 2001 decision of the Court which affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals be
reconsidered insofar as Lot No. 3 is concerned.
On November 20, 2001, the Court issued a Resolution partially granting petitioner's motion for
reconsideration by reinstating paragraphs 4 and 5 of the dipositive portion of the trial court's Partial
Decision pertaining to Lot No. 3,
On July 22, 2002, the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Land Registration Authority
(LRA), thru the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a motion for intervention and a Petition-In-
Intervention praying that judgment be rendered declaring:
1) That OCT No. 333 is a valid and existing title in line with the decisions this Honorable Court
had already rendered;
2) That OCT No. 333 was never expanded from its original area of 52,949,737 square meters;
3) That the land occupied by petitioners is not forest land and is covered by OCT No. 333;
4) That the proceedings conducted in Civil Case No. Q-35673 with respect to OCT No. 333 are
null and void; and
5) That the proceedings conducted in Civil Case No. Q-35672 is null and void, no notice of the
hearings/proceedings having been sent to the Republic and other interested parties
The OSGs prayer that OCT No. 333 be held as a valid and existing title. The Republic likewise prays for
such other relief as may be just and equitable under the circumstances.
ISSUES:
1 Whether or not intervention is allowed notwithstanding the rendition of the judgement by the trial
court
2 Whether or not the judgment of annulment in partial decision in OCT No. 333 null and void.
HELD:
1 Yes, intervention is allowed even when the petition for review of the assailed judgment were
already submitted for decision in the Supreme Court. Clearly. The rule on intervention, like all
other rules of procedure is intended to make the powers of the Court fully and completely
available for justice. It is aimed to facilitate a comprehensive adjudication of rival claims
overriding technicalities on the timeliness of the filing thereof. The intervention of the
Republic is necessary to protect public interest as well as government properties located and
projects undertaken on Lot No. 3. The Constitutional mandate that no person shall be
deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law can certainly be invoked by
the Republic which is an indispensable party to the case at bar. As correctly pointed out by
the Solicitor General, while the provision is intended as a protection of individuals against
arbitrary action of the State, it may also be invoked by the Republic to protect its properties.
2 The Court of Appeals held that the annulment of the trial courts Partial Decision with respect
to the declaration of nullity of paragraphs 4 and 5 of the dispositive portion of the decision a
quo concerning Lot No. 3, renders the disposition in paragraph 1 insofar as it affects Lot No.
3, also void. Under the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure, specifically Rule 47, Section 7 thereof,
a judgment of annulment shall set aside the questioned judgment or final order or resolution
and render the same null and void, without prejudice to the original action being re-filed in
the proper court.
CA noted that paragraph 4 does not at all specify which portions are in excess of the 4,574
square meter area of OCT No. 333 and which areas belong to the defaulted and non-
defaulted respondents. Neither did the body of the trial courts decision state the metes and
bounds that would serve as basis in implementing the dispositive portion thereof. Verily, the
flaw goes into the very identity of the disputed land Paragraphs 4 and 5 are therefore null
and void for having been rendered in violation of the constitutional mandate that no decision
shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and
the law on which it is based. Hence, the November 20, 2001 Resolution reinstating
paragraphs 4 and 5 of the trial courts Partial Decision should be modified.
CASE NO. 22
G.R. No. 111159 July 13, 2004
NORDIC ASIA LIMITED and BANKERS TRUST COMPANY, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, et. Al., respondents.
Facts:
When the day that an extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings was initiated by herein
petitioners-mortgagee over the vessel M/V Fylyppa against the mortgagor Sextant Maritime,
respondents Nam Ung Marine Co., Ltd, manning agent of the vessel, and 27 of its crew members filed
a collection case before the RTC against the M/V "Fylyppa" (the vessel), Maritime (the registered owner
of the vessel), P.V. Christensen Lines (time-charterer of the vessel), TheilBolvinkel Shipping, A.S. (ship
manager) and Jibfair Shipping (the alleged local ship agent of the vessel)
Upon learning of the collection case, petitioners filed with the RTC a motion for leave to
intervene in the collection case, alleging that they hold a mortgage over the vessel and that their
intervention is only for the purpose of opposing the crew members' unfounded and grossly
exaggerated claim. The RTC eventually rendered a decision, in favor of the plaintiff, against the
defendants and the petitioner- intervenor. Petitioner elevated his case to the CA and, aggrieved with
its decision, elevated the same to the SC. The SC on its June 10, 2003 decision dismissed the petition
based on two grounds: 1) Petitioners have no right to intervene because the complaint-in-intervention
fails to state a cause of action and because the requisites for intervention are not present; and 2)
Petitioners are guilty of forum shopping. Petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration.
Issue:
1. Whether or not the complaint-in-intervention state a cause of action
2. Whether or not the requisites for intervention are present.
Held:
1. Petitioners, in their motion for reconsideration, insist that their cause of action springs from the
bloated and exaggerated claims of respondents so that nothing will be left to answer for their own
claims. Thus, they should be allowed to intervene, even if it is only to oppose the claims of the
manning agent and crewmen. The Court finds no merit in this argument.
2. No. The requirements for intervention are: [a] legal interest in the matter in litigation; and [b]
consideration must be given as to whether the adjudication of the rights of the original parties may be
delayed or prejudiced, or whether the intervenor's rights may be protected in a separate proceeding
or not. Petitioners failed to meet both requirements.
Legal interest, must be in the matter in litigation and of such direct and immediate character that the
intervenor will either gain or lose by direct legal operation and effect of the judgment. Petitioners'
remedies as unpaid mortgagees remain preserved as the collection case will not preclude the
foreclosure of the vessel. Also, that petitioners would be adversely affected by the disposition of the
property is contingent upon two eventualities: 1) the successful foreclosure on the vessel; and 2) the
proceeds of the sale being insufficient to cover the loan amount. Clearly, the outcome of the collection
case has no "direct" effect on petitioners.
As for the second requisite for intervention, petitioners' rights were already protected through their
extrajudicial foreclosure proceeding, while on the other hand, the rights of the manning agent and
crewmen, who are the original plaintiffs, have been unduly delayed or prejudiced. The decision of the
RTC, rendered in October 30, 1987, has not attained finality, even though the actual judgment obligors
did not appeal. The only parties prolonging the case are the intervenors, in the persons of petitioners.
Petitioners claimed that a lien or statutory right of preference clothed them as intervenor with an
interest in the subject-matter in litigation. Petitioners herein prayed that they be allowed to intervene,
on the basis of their secondary right as unpaid mortgagees. The SC found no merit for such claim
because petitioners prayer was merely to oppose the claims of respondents and not for the purpose
of enforcing their own claims.
Petitioner further claimed that their intervention was in the nature of an intervention pro interessesuo,
arguing that intervention pro interessesuo is a mode of intervention wherein a stranger desires to
intervene for the purpose of asserting a property right which is the subject matter of litigation without
becoming a formal plaintiff or defendant. The SC found no merit for such claim since petitioners
wanted only to oppose the claims of respondents without asserting their unpaid mortgage.
CASE NO. 23
Francisco vs House of Representatives
GR No 160261, November 10, 2003
FACTS:
An impeachment complaint against Chief Justice HilarioDavide and seven Associate Justices
was filed on 2 June 2003 but was dismissed by The House Committee on Justice on 22 October 2003
for being insufficient in substance. On 23 October 2003, Representative Gilbert Teodoro and Felix
Fuentabella filed a new impeachment complaint against the Chief Justice. Thus arose the instant
petitions against the House of Representatives et al, most of which contend that the filing of the
second impeachment complaint is unconstitutional as it violates the provision of Section 5, Article XI
of the Constitution, no impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more
than once within the period of one year.
Among those who filed the petitions are Atty. Jaime Soriano, who filed a "Petition for Leave to
Intervene"; Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc. who filed a
Motion for Intervention; and World War II Veterans Legionnaires of the Philippines, Inc. who also filed a
"Petition-in-Intervention with Leave to Intervene"
Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., in his own behalf, filed a Motion to Intervene and Comment,
praying that "the consolidated petitions be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction of the Court over the
issues affecting the impeachment proceedings and that the sole power, authority and jurisdiction of
the Senate as the impeachment court to try and decide impeachment cases, including the one where
the Chief Justice is the respondent, be recognized and upheld pursuant to the provisions of Article XI of
the Constitution."
ISSUE: Whether or not the interventions must be admitted.
HELD:
Rule 19, Section 1 of the Rules of Court requires an intervenor to possess a legal interest in
the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so
situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of
the court or of an officer thereof. While intervention is not a matter of right, it may be permitted by the
courts when the applicant shows facts which satisfy the requirements of the law authorizing
intervention.
Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc., et. al. sought to
join petitioner Francisco invoking their right as citizens to intervene, alleging that "they will suffer if
this insidious scheme of the minority members of the House of Representatives is successful," this
Court found the requisites for intervention had been complied with.
Alleging that the issues raised in the petitions were of transcendental importance, World War
II Veterans Legionnaires of the Philippines, Inc. filed a "Petition-in-Intervention with Leave to Intervene"
to raise the additional issue of whether or not the second impeachment complaint against the Chief
Justice is valid and based on any of the grounds prescribed by the Constitution.
Finding that Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc., et
al. and World War II Veterans Legionnaires of the Philippines, Inc. possess a legal interest in the matter
in litigation the respective motions to intervene were granted.
Senator Aquilino Pimentel, on the other hand, sought to intervene for the limited purpose of
making of record and arguing a point of view that differs with Senate President Drilon's. He alleges
that submitting to this Court's jurisdiction as the Senate President does will undermine the
independence of the Senate which will sit as an impeachment court once the Articles of Impeachment
are transmitted to it from the House of Representatives. Clearly, Senator Pimentel possesses a legal
interest in the matter in litigation, he being a member of Congress against which the herein petitions
are directed. For this reason, and to fully ventilate all substantial issues relating to the matter at hand,
his Motion to Intervene was granted.
As to Jaime N. Soriano's motion to intervene, the same must be denied for, while he asserts
an interest as a taxpayer, he failed to meet the standing requirement for bringing taxpayer's suits. In
praying for the dismissal of the petitions, Soriano failed even to allege that the act of petitioners will
result in illegal disbursement of public funds or in public money being deflected to any improper
purpose. Additionally, his mere interest as a member of the Bar does not suffice to clothe him with
standing.
MAIN ISSUE: Whether or not the filing of the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice
Hilario G. Davide, Jr. with the House of Representatives is constitutional.
RULING: Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings which
were approved by the House of Representativesare are unconstitutional. Consequently, the second
impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, is barred under paragraph 5, section 3
of Article XI of the Constitution.
CASE NO. 24
G.R. No. 147950. December 11, 2003
CALIFORNIA BUS LINES, INC, vs. STATE INVESTMENT HOUSE, INC.
FACTS:
State Investment House, Inc.(SIHI) granted Delta Motors Corporation(Delta) a credit line
for P25,000,000.00. Meanwhile, petitioner California Bus Lines, Inc. (hereafter CBLI), purchased on
installment basis 35 units of buses and 2 units of engines from Delta, secured by 16 promissory notes .
When CBLI defaulted on its payments, it entered into a restructuring agreement with Delta. It provided
for new schedule of payments and a management takeover clause. Delta executed a Continuing Deed
of Assignment of Receivables in favor of SIHI as security for the payment of its obligations to SIHI per
the credit agreements. CBLI continued having trouble meeting its obligations to Delta. This prompted
Delta to threaten CBLI with the enforcement of the management takeover clause. To pre-empt the
take-over, CBLI filed on May 3, 1982, a complaint for injunction docketed as Civil Case No. 0023-P.
Pursuant to the Memorandum of Agreement, Delta executed a Deed of Sale assigning to SIHI five (5)
of the sixteen (16) promissory notes. SIHI demanded payment from CBLI for the five promissory notes,
but the latter replied informing SIHI of Civil Case No. 0023-P and of the fact that Delta had taken over
its management and operations.
Thereafter, Delta and CBLI entered into a compromise agreement. CBLI agreed that Delta
would exercise its right to extrajudicially foreclose on the chattel mortgages over the 35 bus units. On
the other hand, SIHI applied for a writ of preliminary attachment and was thereafter followed by a
motion to sell the buses. The trial court ruled that the best interest of the parties might be better
served by denying further sales of the buses and to go direct to the trial of the case on the merits.
The trial court discharged CBLI from liability. The CA reversed this decision. On appeal, CBLI
contends that the compromise agreement discharged the subject five promissory notes. It argues that
SIHI is estopped from questioning the compromise agreement because SIHI failed to intervene in Civil
Case No. 0023-P after CBLI informed it of the takeover by Delta of CBLIs management and operations
and the resultant impossibility for CBLI to comply with its obligations in the subject promissory notes.
ISSUE: WON SIHI is estopped from questioning the compromise agreement because it failed to
intervene in Civil Case No. 0023-P.
HELD:
No. The assignment of the promissory notes had the effect of separating the five promissory
from CBLIs other obligations with Delta. Thus, any breach of these independent obligations gives rise
to a separate cause of action in favor of SIHI against CBLI. Considering that Deltas assignment to SIHI
of these five promissory notes had the effect of removing the said notes from Civil Case No. 0023-P,
there was no reason for SIHI to intervene in the said case. SIHI did not have any interest to protect in
Civil Case No. 0023-P. Moreover, intervention is not mandatory, but only optional and permissive.
Notably, Section 2, Rule 12 of the then 1988 Revised Rules of Procedure uses the word may in
defining the right to intervene. The present rules maintain the permissive nature of intervention in
Section 1, Rule 19 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
In light of the foregoing, SIHIs refusal to intervene in Civil Case No. 0023-P in another court
does not amount to an estoppel. This is especially so since it does not appear that a separate
proceeding would be inadequate to protect fully SIHIs rights. Indeed, SIHIs refusal to intervene is
precisely because it considered that its rights would be better protected in a separate and
independent suit.
CASE NO. 25
51 SCRA 363
Reyes vs. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 118492, August 15, 2001
Facts:
Godofredo, Casheir of the Philippine Racing Club (PCRI), went to respondent bank to apply for a
demand draft in the amount AU$1,610.00 payable to the order of the 20th Asian Racing Conference
Secretariat of Sydney, Australia. He was attended to by respondent banks assistant cashier, Mr. Yasis,
who at first denied the application for the reason that respondent bank did not have an Australian
dollar account in any bank in Sydney. Godofredo asked if there could be a way for respondent bank to
accommodate PRCIs urgent need to remit Australian dollars to Sydney. Yasis of respondent bank then
informed Godofredo of a roundabout way of effecting the requested remittance to Sydney thus: the
respondent bank would draw a demand draft against Westpac Bank in Sydney, Australia (Westpac-
Sydney) and have the latter reimburse itself from the U.S. dollar account of the respondent in Westpac
Bank in New York, U.S.A. (Westpac-New York).
However, upon due presentment of the foreign exchange demand draft, the same was
dishonored, with the notice of dishonor stating that there is No account held with Westpac.
Meanwhile, Wespac-New York sent a cable to respondent bank informing the latter that its dollar
account in the sum of AU$ 1,610.00 was debited. In response to PRCIs complaint about the dishonor
of the said foreign exchange demand draft, respondent bank informed Westpac-Sydney of the
issuance of the said demand draft, drawn against the Wespac-Sydney and informing the latter to be
reimbursed from the respondent banks dollar account in Westpac-New York. The respondent bank on
the same day likewise informed Wespac-New York requesting the latter to honor the reimbursement
claim of Wespac-Sydney. Upon its second presentment for payment, the demand draft was again
dishonored by Westpac-Sydney for the same reason, that is, that the respondent bank has no deposit
dollar account with the drawee Wespac-Sydney. Gregorio Reyes and Consuelo Puyat-Reyes arrived in
Sydney on a separate date and both were humiliated and embarrassed in the presence of
international audience after being denied registration of the conference secretariat since the foreign
exchange draft was dishonored. Petitioners were only able to attend the conference after promising to
pay in cash instead which they fulfilled
Issue: Whether or not respondent bank is liable for damages due to the dishonor of the foreign
exchange demand drafts.
Held: Yes. The evidence also shows that the respondent bank exercised that degree of diligence
expected of an ordinary prudent person under the circumstances obtaining; the respondent bank
advised Westpac-New York to honor the reimbursement claim of Westpac-Sydney and to debit the
dollar accountof respondent bank with the former. The degree of diligence required of banks, is more
than that of a good father of a family where the fiduciary nature of their relationship with their
depositors is concerned. In other words banks are duty bound to treat the deposit accounts of their
depositors with the highest degree of care. But the said ruling applies only to cases where banks act
under their fiduciary capacity, that is, as depositary of the deposits of their depositors. But the same
higher degree of diligence is not expected to be exerted by banks in commercial transactions that do
not involve their fiduciary relationship with their depositors. The case at bar does not involve the
handling of petitioners deposit, if any, with the respondent bank. Instead, the relationship involved
was that of a buyer and seller.
CASE NO. 26
LORENA O. COLLADO vs. TERESITA G. BRAVO, Clerk of Court, Municipal Trial Court of
Naguilian, La Union
A.M. No. P-99-1307
April 10, 2001
FACTS
Complainant Collado charged respondent Bravo with Grave Misconduct and/or Conduct
Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service when the latter issued a subpoena directed to the former
to appear before the court but with no complaint having been filed against Collado. The complainant
claimed that she felt humiliated, harassed and experienced extreme nervousness as a result of the
issuance of the subpoena. Respondent averred that her only purpose in issuing the subpoena was to
enable the complainant and the Baterinas, the labor recruiter of complainants son, to settle their
differences.
The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) recommended that the complaint be docketed as
an administrative matter and respondent be fined P5k for Grave Misconduct with a Warning that the
commission of a similar act would merit a more serious penalty.
ISSUE: WON the subpoena was properly issued.
HELD:
No. The subpoena was issued without power nor authority.
A subpoena is a process directed to a person requiring him to attend and to testify at the
hearing or the trial of an action, or at any investigation conducted by competent authority, or for the
taking of his deposition. The process is the means whereby a court compels the appearance of the
defendant before it; or a compliance with its demands. Hence, absent any proceedings, suit, or
action commenced or pending before a court, a subpoena may not issue.
In this case, respondent knew there was no case filed against complainant. Neither had
complainant commenced any proceeding against the Baterinas for whose benefit the subpoena was
issued. Respondent, then, had absolutely neither the power nor the authority nor the duty to issue a
subpoena to the complainant.
Respondent is found GUILTY of Grave Misconduct and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest
of the Service.
CASE NO. 27
[G.R. No. 139665. August 9, 2001]
MA. VILMA S. LABAD, petitioner,
vs.
THE UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHEASTERN PHILIPPINES, THE BOARD OF REGENTS/HON. RICARDO
GLORIA (DECS Secretary) Chairman, DR. EDMUNDO B. PRANTILLA, Vice Chairman and USP
President, and NEDA DIR. SANTIAGO ENGINCO, JR., Member, and EVA M. ANTEPUESTO, USP
PTA-LABORATORY SCHOOL PRESIDENT, ET AL., respondents.
FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Resolution of the Court of Appeals dismissing the
appeal of Ma. Vilma S. Labad herein petitioner, and the Resolution denying the motion for
reconsideration of petitioner.
Petitioner was a probationary faculty member of the University of Southeastern Philippines (hereafter
respondent) Laboratory (high school). Sometime in February 1996, the officers and members of
respondent universitys Parents Teachers Association filed a letter-complaint with the president of
respondent university, charging petitioner with Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, and Unfitness as a
Teacher. Petitioner denied the charges against her. The Office of the President of respondent university
then created an Investigating Committee to investigate the complaint which later recommended
penalty of dismissal from the service through the non-renewal of petitioners probationary status on
the ground of dishonesty and misconduct, which the universitys Board of Regents subsequently
approved.
Petitioner appealed said decision to the Civil Service Commission but it affirmed the decision of
respondent universitys Board of Regent. A motion for reconsideration was filed but likewise denied.
Petitioner then filed with the Court of Appeals a Motion for Extension of Period to File Petition for
Review asking for 15 days from December 28, 1998 or until January 12, 1999 to do so.
On January 12, 1999, petitioner filed her Petition for Review with the Court of Appeals. However,
petitioner through counsel received a copy of the CA Resolution dated January 28, 1999, granting an
extension of 15 days from December 26, 1998, or until January 10, 1999, to file the petition for review
which meant that petitioner was already 2 days late in the filing of her petition for review.
Because of this, a resolution was issued by the Court of Appeals, dismissing Labads petition for
review. A motion for reconsideration was filed but likewise denied.
Hence the petition.
Petitioner contends that since December 26, 1998 was a Saturday, it was on the next business day,
December 28, 1998 which was a Monday, that petitioner filed a Motion for Extension of Period to File
Petition for Review instead of filing her petition for review.
She insists that the 15-day extension was timely sought since December 28, 1998, a Monday should
be considered as the fifteenth day of filing her appeal, not December 26, 1998, which was a Saturday.
In support of her claim, petitioner relies on Section 1, Rule 22 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUES:
 1 whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition for review filed by
petitioner before it on the ground that the petition was filed late
2 When should the 15-day extension be reckoned, should it be counted from December 26,
1998 or December 28, 1998?
RULING:
1 YES.
Based on Section 1, Rule 22 of the Rules of Court and as applied in several cases,
where the last day for doing any act required or permitted by law falls on a Saturday, a
Sunday, or a legal holiday in the place where the court sits, the time shall not run until the
next working day. In this case, petitioner still had until December 28, 1998, a Monday and the
next business day to move for a 15-day extension considering that December 26, 1998, the
last day for petitioner to file her petition for review fell on a Saturday. The motion for
extension filed on December 28, 1998 was thus filed on time since it was filed before the
expiration of the time sought to be extended
2 It should be from December 28, 1998.
The extension should be tacked to the original period and commence immediately
after the expiration of such period. Petitioner specifically manifested that she be granted an
extension of 15 days from December 28, 1998 or until January 12, 1999 for her to file her
petition for review. Hence, the period for reckoning the commencement of the additional 15
days should have been from December 28, 1998, and not December 26, 1998. Thus, the
petition filed by petitioner with the Court of Appeals on January 12, 1998, exactly 15 days
from December 28, 1998, was filed on time.
Petitioner would be outright denied her right to appeal if the original period of
December 26, 1998 would be the basis of the 15day extension period. While the right to
appeal is a statutory, not a natural right, nonetheless it is an essential part of our judicial
system and courts should proceed with caution so as not to deprive a party of the right to
appeal, but rather, ensure that every party-litigant has the amplest opportunity for the proper
and just disposition of his cause, freed from the constraints of technicalities.
CASE NO. 28
Russel vs. Ebasan & Austria
G.R. No. 184542 April 23, 2010
FACTS:
The petition stems from a complaint for forcible entry filed by petitioner Russel against
respondents Ebasan and Austria. The MTCC of Iligan City heard the ejectment proceedings and
rendered judgment on in favor of petitioner. The trial court ordered respondents to vacate the property
involved and to pay attorneys fees and costs.Prejudiced by the ruling, respondents appealed to the
RTC. The RTC, in its March 28, 2007 Decision, reversed the ruling of the MTCC and ordered the
dismissal of the complaint.
Petitioner received her copy of the RTC decision on April 13, 2007. Inclined to appeal the
adverse ruling to the CA, petitioner, on April 20, 2007, filed a motion for an extension of 15 days
from the expiry of the reglementary period for the filing of a petition for review. Petitioner attached to
her motion postal money orders representing the filing and docket fees. She consequently
filed via registered mail her petition for review with the appellate court on May 15, 2007.
In the assailed June 18, 2007 Resolution, the CA dismissed the appeal on several grounds,
one of which is that the petition is filed out of time, in violation of Sec. 1, Rule 42. Even if petitioners
Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for Review were granted, the Petition would have still been
filed six (6) days late from the requested extension of time. Petitioner received her copy of
the June 18, 2007 Resolution on July 18, 2007. On July 27, 2007, petitioner filed by registered mail
her MR and admission of her amended petition. She pointed out in her motion that the petition was
filed within the extended reglementary period.
The appellate court, however, in the assailed August 26, 2008 Resolution, denied petitioners
motion. It ruled that the MR was filed only on October 4, 2007, or 63 days after the expiry of the
reglementary period for the filing thereof. Aggrieved, petitioner elevated the matter to this
Court via the instant petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for review and motion for reconsideration before the CA were filed
well within the reglementary period for the filing thereof.
HELD:
Yes, the petition and MR were filed within the reglementary period for the filing thereof.
It must be noted that petitioner received her copy of the RTC decision on April 13, 2007.
Following the Rules of Court, she had 15 days or until April 28, 2007 to file her petition for review
before the CA. Section 1 of Rule 42 provides the time for filing an appeal stating in part that: the
petition shall be filed and served within fifteen (15) days from notice of the decision sought to be
reviewed or of the denial of petitioners motion for new trial or reconsideration filed in due time after
judgment. Upon proper motion and the payment of the full amount of the docket and other lawful fees
and the deposit for costs before the expiration of the reglementary period, the Court of Appeals may
grant an additional period of fifteen (15) days only within which to file the petition for review. No
further extension shall be granted except for the most compelling reason and in no case to exceed
fifteen (15) days.
On April 20, 2007, petitioner filed before the CA, via registered mail, her motion for
extension of time to file the petition for review. She pleaded in her motion that she be granted an
additional 15 days, counted from the expiry of the reglementary period. Petitioner likewise attached to
her motion postal money orders representing the docket fees. Fifteen days from April 28, 2007 would
be May 13, 2007. This was, however, a Sunday. May 14, 2007, the following day, was a legal holiday
that is the holding of the national and local elections. Section 1 of Rule 22 on how to compute time
states that: in computing any period of time prescribed or allowed by these Rules, or by order of the
court, or by any applicable statute, the day of the act or event from which the designated period of
time begins to run is to be excluded and the date of performance included. If the last day of the
period, as thus computed, falls on a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday in the place where the
court sits, the time shall not run until the next working day.
Therefore, when petitioner filed her petition for review with the appellate court on May 15,
2007, the same was well within the extended period for the filing thereof. Petitioners MR was likewise
filed on time. She received a copy of the June 18, 2007 CA Resolution on July 18, 2007. Under Section
1 of Rule 52, she had 15 days from notice, or until August 2, 2007, to file an MR. Petitioner filed by
registered mail her MR on July 27, 2007. The fact of mailing on the said date is proven by the registry
return receipt, the affidavit of service, and the certification of the Office of the Postmaster of Iligan
City. Section 3, Rule 13 of the ROC provides that: if a pleading is filed by registered mail,
then the date of mailing shall be considered as the date of filing. It does not matter when the
court actually receives the mailed pleading. Thus, in this case, as the pleading was filed by registered
mail on July 27, 2007, within the reglementary period, it is inconsequential that the CA actually
received the motion in October of that year.
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