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[G.R. No. 84378. July 4, 1991.]
NENITA L. LEANO, Petitioner, v. HON. EUFEMIO C. DOMINGO,
Chairman, Commission on Audit, HON. BARTOLOME C.
FERNANDEZ, JR., Commissioner on Audit, HON. ALFREDO P.
CRUZ, Commissioner on Audit, LUCILA B. AFRICA, Auditor,
National Quarantine Office, MA. ATHENA O. FLORES, Director,
National Govt. Audit Office II, COA, Respondents.
DECISION
The Cashiers Office, between 7:00 P.M. of December 17, 1984 to 8:45
A.M. of December 18, 1984, was allegedly robbed of its cash
amounting to P12,500.00 representing the year-end bonus of several
employees who failed to get them during office hours of December 17,
1984 (Ibid., p. 7; Petition, p. 2). The incident was reported by Luisito
Diaz, Payroll Clerk, to the Western Police District at 10:00 A.M. of
December 18, 1984, and the subsequent ocular investigation
conducted by the WPD police officers resulted in the following findings:
(1) the unknown suspects got inside the Cashiers Office thru the
tellers window and opened the steel cabinet, possibly with the use of
the original key which was left inside a small wooden box near the
steel cabinet or with the use of false key or other similar instrument
since no sign of force on the cabinet was traced; and (2) the cash
amounting to P12,500.00 was taken by the suspects in the pay
envelopes, leaving several envelopes with cash. (Ibid., p. 19). Upon
receipt of the report of the incident and request of petitioner Leano, a
cash count was conducted by the resident auditor on December 18,
1984, yielding the following findings and recommendations:
"1. The Acting Cashier Ms. Nenita Leano incurred a shortage in her
accountabilities for account 8-70-500 in the amount of P12,500.00 and
overage for account 8-70400 in the amount of P16,910.00 (collection
from Cagayan de Oro).
Recommendation:l
The agency should immediately relieve the defaulting officer from her
duties as accountable officer due to negligence.
2. The Acting Cashier did not use the safe in keeping the collections
and other cash items, but utilized instead a steel cabinet. Change of
safe combination was recommended several times.
Recommendation:
The Cashier should utilize the safe in keeping the collections and other
cash items. Likewise, a new safe combination should be installed, the
use of which should be limited to the cashier.
3. Some subsidiary ledger entries were found erroneous and not kept
up to date.
Recommendation:
On December 26, 1984, petitioner filed with COA a request for relief
from accountability of the P12,500.00 lost in the robbery (Ibid., p. 16).
". . . Ms. Nenita Leano was negligent in the handling of her cash
accountability. She failed to use the safe for keeping her
accountabilities as recommended by the auditor. Instead she used a
steel cabinet leaving the key inside a small box placed near said steel
cabinet. Also, she allowed other persons to have access to the cash
box with pay envelopes and releasing the same.
". . . Every person accountable for government funds shall be liable for
all losses resulting from the unlawful or improper deposit, use or
application thereof and for all loss attributable to negligence in keeping
of the same." (Ibid., p. 15).
This Court, after the respondents filed their comment which was
considered as answer to the petition, resolved to give due course to
the petition and calendar the case for deliberation (Ibid., p.
57).chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library
The sole issue in this case is whether or not COA acted with grave
abuse of discretion in denying petitioners request for relief from
accountability of the P12,500.00 lost in the robbery (Rollo, p. 9; p. 4,
Petition).
"Allowing one or two employees of the Cashiers Office to give out pay
envelopes and handle minor cash disbursements is a very general
practice in all cashiering offices in the government service national,
provincial, city or municipal. It is anchored on eventualities, such as,
when the Cashier is indisposed or not available for several hours and
there is immediate or emergency needs to give the pay envelopes,
disbursed (sic) funds and/or cash checks. This is a safety measure
intended to satisfy a need or requirement that may arise at any
inopportune (sic) time. It is not questioned by office superiors as in
fact, it is being tolerated due to emergent necessities (Ibid., p. 20;
Petition, p. 6).
Applying the stated test to the facts of this case, it is evident that
petitioner fell short of the demands inherent in her position. As aptly
argued by the Solicitor General, an exercise of proper diligence
expected of her position would have compelled petitioner to request an
immediate change of the combination of the safe. However, the record
is bare of any showing that petitioner had, at least, exerted any effort
to have the combination changed, content with the fact that, according
to her, the former cashier also used the steel cabinet as depository of
the funds.
In addition, it was found that the use of the steel cabinet was not a
wise and prudent decision. The steel cabinet, even when locked, at
times could be pulled open, thus it can be surmised that even without
the use of a key, the robbery could be committed once the culprits
succeed in entering the room (Progress Report of the Police dated
February 28, 1985). Moreover, the original key of the steel cabinet was
left inside a small wooden box placed near the steel cabinet; it is
therefore highly possible that the said steel cabinet was opened with
the use of its original key (Police Alarm Report).
SO ORDERED.
Case No. 2
G.R. No. 77679 September 30, 1987
VICENTE VERGARA, petitioner, vs.THE COURT OF APPEALS and
AMADEO AZARCON, respondents.
An action for damages based on quasi-delict (Art. 2176 of the Civil
Code) was filed by private respondent against petitioner. The action
arose from a vehicular accident that occurred on 5 August 1979 in
Gapan, Nueva Ecija, when Martin Belmonte, while driving a cargo truck
belonging to petitioner, rammed "head-on" the store-residence of the
private respondent, causing damages thereto which were inventoried
and assessed at P53,024.22.
In his answer to the complaint, the petitioner alleged principally: "that
his driver Martin Belmonte operated said cargo truck in a very diligent
(and) careful manner; that the steering wheel refused to respond to his
effort and as a result of a blown-out tire and despite application of his
brakes, the said cargo truck hit the store-residence of plaintiff (private
respondent) and that the said accident was an act of God for which he
cannot be held liable."
Petitioner also filed a third party complaint against Travellers Insurance
and Surety Corporation, alleging that said cargo truck involved in the
vehicular accident, belonging to the petitioner, was insured by the
third party defendant insurance company. Petitioner asked that the
latter be ordered to pay him whatever amount he may be ordered by
the court to pay to the private respondent.
The trial court rendered judgment in favor of private respondent. Upon
appeal to the Court of Appeals, the latter court affirmed in toto the
decision of the trial court, which ordered Petitioner to pay, jointly and
severally with Travellers Insurance and Surety Corporation, to the
private, respondent the following: (a) P53,024.22 as actual damages;
(b) P10,000.00 as moral damages; (c) P10,000.00 as exemplary
damages; and (d) the sum of P5,000.00 for attorney's fees and the
costs. On the third party complaint, the insurance company was
sentenced to pay to the petitioner the following: (a) P50,000.00 for
third party liability under its comprehensive accident insurance policy;
and (b) P3,000.00 for and as attorney's fees.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
Petitioner's contention that the respondent court erred in finding him
guilty of fault or negligence is not tenable. It was established by
competent evidence that the requisites of a quasi-delict are present in
the case at bar. These requisites are: (1) damages to the plaintiff; (2)
negligence, by act or omission, of which defendant, or some person for
whose acts he must respond, was guilty; and (3) the connection of
cause and effect between such negligence and the damages.
It is undisputed that private respondent suffered damages as a result
of an act or omission of petitioner. The issue of whether or not this act
or omission can be considered as a "negligent" act or omission was
passed upon by the trial court. The findings of said court, affirmed by
the respondent court, which we are not prepared to now disturb, show
that the fact of occurrence of the "vehicular accident" was sufficiently
established by the policy report and the testimony of Patrolman
Masiclat. And the fact of negligence may be deduced from the
surrounding circumstances thereof. According to the police report, "the
cargo truck was travelling on the right side of the road going to Manila
and then it crossed to the center line and went to the left side of the
highway; it then bumped a tricycle; and then another bicycle; and then
said cargo truck rammed the store warehouse of the plaintiff."
According to the driver of the cargo truck, he applied the brakes but
the latter did not work due to mechanical defect. Contrary to the claim
of the petitioner, a mishap caused by defective brakes cannot be
consideration as fortuitous in character. Certainly, the defects were
curable and the accident preventable.
Furthermore, the petitioner failed to adduce any evidence to overcome
the disputable presumption of negligence on his part in the selection
and supervision of his driver.
Based on the foregoing finding by the respondent Court that there was
negligence on the part of the petitioner, the petitioner's contention
that the respondent court erred in awarding private respondent actual,
moral and exemplary damages as well as attorney's fees and costs, is
untenable.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Case No. 3
G.R. No. 174269 May 8, 2009
POLO S. PANTALEON, Petitioner, vs. AMERICAN EXPRESS
INTERNATIONAL, INC., Respondent.
DECISION
The petitioner, lawyer Polo Pantaleon, his wife Julialinda, daughter
Anna Regina and son Adrian Roberto, joined an escorted tour of
Western Europe organized by Trafalgar Tours of Europe, Ltd., in October
of 1991. The tour group arrived in Amsterdam in the afternoon of 25
October 1991, the second to the last day of the tour. As the group had
arrived late in the city, they failed to engage in any sight-seeing.
Instead, it was agreed upon that they would start early the next day to
see the entire city before ending the tour.
The following day, the last day of the tour, the group arrived at the
Coster Diamond House in Amsterdam around 10 minutes before 9:00
a.m. The group had agreed that the visit to Coster should end by 9:30
a.m. to allow enough time to take in a guided city tour of Amsterdam.
The group was ushered into Coster shortly before 9:00 a.m., and
listened to a lecture on the art of diamond polishing that lasted for
around ten minutes. Afterwards, the group was led to the stores
showroom to allow them to select items for purchase. Mrs. Pantaleon
had already planned to purchase even before the tour began a 2.5-
karat diamond brilliant cut, and she found a diamond close enough in
approximation that she decided to buy. Mrs. Pantaleon also selected for
purchase a pendant and a chain, all of which totaled U.S. $13,826.00.
To pay for these purchases, Pantaleon presented his American Express
credit card together with his passport to the Coster sales clerk. This
occurred at around 9:15 a.m., or 15 minutes before the tour group was
slated to depart from the store. The sales clerk took the cards imprint,
and asked Pantaleon to sign the charge slip. The charge purchase was
then referred electronically to respondents Amsterdam office at 9:20
a.m.
Ten minutes later, the store clerk informed Pantaleon that his
AmexCard had not yet been approved. His son, who had already
boarded the tour bus, soon returned to Coster and informed the other
members of the Pantaleon family that the entire tour group was
waiting for them. As it was already 9:40 a.m., and he was already
worried about further inconveniencing the tour group, Pantaleon asked
the store clerk to cancel the sale. The store manager though asked
plaintiff to wait a few more minutes. After 15 minutes, the store
manager informed Pantaleon that respondent had demanded bank
references. Pantaleon supplied the names of his depositary banks, then
instructed his daughter to return to the bus and apologize to the tour
group for the delay.
At around 10:00 a.m, or around 45 minutes after Pantaleon had
presented his AmexCard, and 30 minutes after the tour group was
supposed to have left the store, Coster decided to release the items
even without respondents approval of the purchase. The spouses
Pantaleon returned to the bus. It is alleged that their offers of apology
were met by their tourmates with stony silence. The tour groups
visible irritation was aggravated when the tour guide announced that
the city tour of Amsterdam was to be canceled due to lack of
remaining time, as they had to catch a 3:00 p.m. ferry at Calais,
Belgium to London. Mrs. Pantaleon ended up weeping, while her
husband had to take a tranquilizer to calm his nerves.
It later emerged that Pantaleons purchase was first transmitted for
approval to respondents Amsterdam office at 9:20 a.m., Amsterdam
time, then referred to respondents Manila office at 9:33 a.m, then
finally approved at 10:19 a.m., Amsterdam time. The Approval Code
was transmitted to respondents Amsterdam office at 10:38 a.m.,
several minutes after petitioner had already left Coster, and 78
minutes from the time the purchases were electronically transmitted
by the jewelry store to respondents Amsterdam office.
After the star-crossed tour had ended, the Pantaleon family proceeded
to the United States before returning to Manila on 12 November 1992.
While in the United States, Pantaleon continued to use his AmEx card,
several times without hassle or delay, but with two other incidents
similar to the Amsterdam brouhaha. On 30 October 1991, Pantaleon
purchased golf equipment amounting to US $1,475.00 using his AmEx
card, but he cancelled his credit card purchase and borrowed money
instead from a friend, after more than 30 minutes had transpired
without the purchase having been approved. On 3 November 1991,
Pantaleon used the card to purchase childrens shoes worth $87.00 at
a store in Boston, and it took 20 minutes before this transaction was
approved by respondent.
On 4 March 1992, after coming back to Manila, Pantaleon sent a letter
through counsel to the respondent, demanding an apology for the
"inconvenience, humiliation and embarrassment he and his family
thereby suffered" for respondents refusal to provide credit
authorization for the aforementioned purchases. In response,
respondent sent a letter dated 24 March 1992, stating among others
that the delay in authorizing the purchase from Coster was attributable
to the circumstance that the charged purchase of US $13,826.00 "was
out of the usual charge purchase pattern established." Since
respondent refused to accede to Pantaleons demand for an apology,
the aggrieved cardholder instituted an action for damages with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 145. Pantaleon prayed
that he be awarded P2,000,000.00, as moral damages; P500,000.00,
as exemplary damages; P100,000.00, as attorneys fees; and
P50,000.00 as litigation expenses.
On 5 August 1996, the Makati City RTC rendered a decision in favor of
Pantaleon, awarding him P500,000.00 as moral damages, P300,000.00
as exemplary damages, P100,000.00 as attorneys fees, and
P85,233.01 as expenses of litigation. Respondent filed a Notice of
Appeal, while Pantaleon moved for partial reconsideration, praying that
the trial court award the increased amount of moral and exemplary
damages he had prayed for. The RTC denied Pantaleons motion for
partial reconsideration, and thereafter gave due course to respondents
Notice of Appeal.
On 18 August 2006, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision reversing
the award of damages in favor of Pantaleon, holding that respondent
had not breached its obligations to petitioner. Hence, this petition.
The key question is whether respondent, in connection with the
aforementioned transactions, had committed a breach of its obligations
to Pantaleon. In addition, Pantaleon submits that even assuming that
respondent had not been in breach of its obligations, it still remained
liable for damages under Article 21 of the Civil Code.
The RTC had concluded, based on the testimonial representations of
Pantaleon and respondents credit authorizer, Edgardo Jaurigue, that
the normal approval time for purchases was "a matter of seconds."
Based on that standard, respondent had been in clear delay with
respect to the three subject transactions. As it appears, the Court of
Appeals conceded that there had been delay on the part of respondent
in approving the purchases. However, it made two critical conclusions
in favor of respondent. First, the appellate court ruled that the delay
was not attended by bad faith, malice, or gross negligence. Second, it
ruled that respondent "had exercised diligent efforts to effect the
approval" of the purchases, which were "not in accordance with the
charge pattern" petitioner had established for himself, as exemplified
by the fact that at Coster, he was "making his very first single charge
purchase of US$13,826," and "the record of [petitioner]s past
spending with [respondent] at the time does not favorably support his
ability to pay for such purchase."
On the premise that there was an obligation on the part of respondent
"to approve or disapprove with dispatch the charge purchase,"
petitioner argues that the failure to timely approve or disapprove the
purchase constituted mora solvendi on the part of respondent in the
performance of its obligation. For its part, respondent characterizes the
depiction by petitioner of its obligation to him as "to approve
purchases instantaneously or in a matter of seconds."
Petitioner correctly cites that under mora solvendi, the three requisites
for a finding of default are that the obligation is demandable and
liquidated; the debtor delays performance; and the creditor judicially or
extrajudicially requires the debtors performance. Petitioner asserts
that the Court of Appeals had wrongly applied the principle of mora
accipiendi, which relates to delay on the part of the obligee in
accepting the performance of the obligation by the obligor. The
requisites of mora accipiendi are: an offer of performance by the
debtor who has the required capacity; the offer must be to comply with
the prestation as it should be performed; and the creditor refuses the
performance without just cause. The error of the appellate court,
argues petitioner, is in relying on the invocation by respondent of "just
cause" for the delay, since while just cause is determinative of mora
accipiendi, it is not so with the case of mora solvendi.
We can see the possible source of confusion as to which type of mora
to appreciate. Generally, the relationship between a credit card
provider and its card holders is that of creditor-debtor, with the card
company as the creditor extending loans and credit to the card holder,
who as debtor is obliged to repay the creditor. This relationship already
takes exception to the general rule that as between a bank and its
depositors, the bank is deemed as the debtor while the depositor is
considered as the creditor. Petitioner is asking us, not baselessly, to
again shift perspectives and again see the credit card company as the
debtor/obligor, insofar as it has the obligation to the customer as
creditor/obligee to act promptly on its purchases on credit.
Ultimately, petitioners perspective appears more sensible than if we
were to still regard respondent as the creditor in the context of this
cause of action. If there was delay on the part of respondent in its
normal role as creditor to the cardholder, such delay would not have
been in the acceptance of the performance of the debtors obligation
(i.e., the repayment of the debt), but it would be delay in the extension
of the credit in the first place. Such delay would not fall under mora
accipiendi, which contemplates that the obligation of the debtor, such
as the actual purchases on credit, has already been constituted.
Herein, the establishment of the debt itself (purchases on credit of the
jewelry) had not yet been perfected, as it remained pending the
approval or consent of the respondent credit card company.
Still, in order for us to appreciate that respondent was in mora
solvendi, we will have to first recognize that there was indeed an
obligation on the part of respondent to act on petitioners purchases
with "timely dispatch," or for the purposes of this case, within a period
significantly less than the one hour it apparently took before the
purchase at Coster was finally approved.
The findings of the trial court, to our mind, amply established that the
tardiness on the part of respondent in acting on petitioners purchase
at Coster did constitute culpable delay on its part in complying with its
obligation to act promptly on its customers purchase request, whether
such action be favorable or unfavorable. We quote the trial court, thus:
As to the first issue, both parties have testified that normal approval
time for purchases was a matter of seconds.
Plaintiff testified that his personal experience with the use of the card
was that except for the three charge purchases subject of this case,
approvals of his charge purchases were always obtained in a matter of
seconds.
Defendants credit authorizer Edgardo Jaurique likewise testified:
Q. You also testified that on normal occasions, the normal approval
time for charges would be 3 to 4 seconds?
A. Yes, Maam.
Both parties likewise presented evidence that the processing and
approval of plaintiffs charge purchase at the Coster Diamond House
was way beyond the normal approval time of a "matter of seconds".
Plaintiff testified that he presented his AmexCard to the sales clerk at
Coster, at 9:15 a.m. and by the time he had to leave the store at 10:05
a.m., no approval had yet been received. In fact, the Credit
Authorization System (CAS) record of defendant at Phoenix Amex
shows that defendants Amsterdam office received the request to
approve plaintiffs charge purchase at 9:20 a.m., Amsterdam time or
01:20, Phoenix time, and that the defendant relayed its approval to
Coster at 10:38 a.m., Amsterdam time, or 2:38, Phoenix time, or a total
time lapse of one hour and [18] minutes. And even then, the approval
was conditional as it directed in computerese [sic] "Positive
Identification of Card holder necessary further charges require bank
information due to high exposure. By Jack Manila."
The delay in the processing is apparent to be undue as shown from the
frantic successive queries of Amexco Amsterdam which reads:
"US$13,826. Cardmember buying jewels. ID seen. Advise how long will
this take?" They were sent at 01:33, 01:37, 01:40, 01:45, 01:52 and
02:08, all times Phoenix. Manila Amexco could be unaware of the need
for speed in resolving the charge purchase referred to it, yet it sat on
its hand, unconcerned.
xxx
To repeat, the Credit Authorization System (CAS) record on the
Amsterdam transaction shows how Amexco Netherlands viewed the
delay as unusually frustrating. In sequence expressed in Phoenix time
from 01:20 when the charge purchased was referred for authorization,
defendants own record shows:
01:22 the authorization is referred to Manila Amexco
01:32 Netherlands gives information that the identification of the
cardmember has been presented and he is buying jewelries worth US
$13,826.
01:33 Netherlands asks "How long will this take?"
02:08 Netherlands is still asking "How long will this take?"
The Court is convinced that defendants delay constitute[s] breach of
its contractual obligation to act on his use of the card abroad "with
special handling." (Citations omitted)
xxx
Notwithstanding the popular notion that credit card purchases are
approved "within seconds," there really is no strict, legally
determinative point of demarcation on how long must it take for a
credit card company to approve or disapprove a customers purchase,
much less one specifically contracted upon by the parties. Yet this is
one of those instances when "youd know it when youd see it," and
one hour appears to be an awfully long, patently unreasonable length
of time to approve or disapprove a credit card purchase. It is long
enough time for the customer to walk to a bank a kilometer away,
withdraw money over the counter, and return to the store.
Notably, petitioner frames the obligation of respondent as "to approve
or disapprove" the purchase "in timely dispatch," and not "to approve
the purchase instantaneously or within seconds." Certainly, had
respondent disapproved petitioners purchase "within seconds" or
within a timely manner, this particular action would have never seen
the light of day. Petitioner and his family would have returned to the
bus without delay internally humiliated perhaps over the rejection of
his card yet spared the shame of being held accountable by newly-
made friends for making them miss the chance to tour the city of
Amsterdam.
We do not wish do dispute that respondent has the right, if not the
obligation, to verify whether the credit it is extending upon on a
particular purchase was indeed contracted by the cardholder, and that
the cardholder is within his means to make such transaction. The
culpable failure of respondent herein is not the failure to timely
approve petitioners purchase, but the more elemental failure to timely
act on the same, whether favorably or unfavorably. Even assuming that
respondents credit authorizers did not have sufficient basis on hand to
make a judgment, we see no reason why respondent could not have
promptly informed petitioner the reason for the delay, and duly
advised him that resolving the same could take some time. In that
way, petitioner would have had informed basis on whether or not to
pursue the transaction at Coster, given the attending circumstances.
Instead, petitioner was left uncomfortably dangling in the chilly autumn
winds in a foreign land and soon forced to confront the wrath of foreign
folk.
Moral damages avail in cases of breach of contract where the
defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith, and the court should find
that under the circumstances, such damages are due. The findings of
the trial court are ample in establishing the bad faith and unjustified
neglect of respondent, attributable in particular to the "dilly-dallying"
of respondents Manila credit authorizer, Edgardo Jaurique. Wrote the
trial court:
While it is true that the Card membership Agreement, which defendant
prepared, is silent as to the amount of time it should take defendant to
grant authorization for a charge purchase, defendant acknowledged
that the normal time for approval should only be three to four seconds.
Specially so with cards used abroad which requires "special handling",
meaning with priority. Otherwise, the object of credit or charge cards
would be lost; it would be so inconvenient to use that buyers and
consumers would be better off carrying bundles of currency or
travellers checks, which can be delivered and accepted quickly. Such
right was not accorded to plaintiff in the instances complained off for
reasons known only to defendant at that time. This, to the Courts
mind, amounts to a wanton and deliberate refusal to comply with its
contractual obligations, or at least abuse of its rights, under the
contract.
xxx
The delay committed by defendant was clearly attended by unjustified
neglect and bad faith, since it alleges to have consumed more than
one hour to simply go over plaintiffs past credit history with
defendant, his payment record and his credit and bank references,
when all such data are already stored and readily available from its
computer. This Court also takes note of the fact that there is nothing in
plaintiffs billing history that would warrant the imprudent suspension
of action by defendant in processing the purchase. Defendants witness
Jaurique admits:
Q. But did you discover that he did not have any outstanding
account?
A. Nothing in arrears at that time.
Q. You were well aware of this fact on this very date?
A. Yes, sir.
Mr. Jaurique further testified that there were no "delinquencies" in
plaintiffs account.
It should be emphasized that the reason why petitioner is entitled to
damages is not simply because respondent incurred delay, but
because the delay, for which culpability lies under Article 1170, led to
the particular injuries under Article 2217 of the Civil Code for which
moral damages are remunerative. Moral damages do not avail to
soothe the plaints of the simply impatient, so this decision should not
be cause for relief for those who time the length of their credit card
transactions with a stopwatch. The somewhat unusual attending
circumstances to the purchase at Coster that there was a deadline for
the completion of that purchase by petitioner before any delay would
redound to the injury of his several traveling companions gave rise to
the moral shock, mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings
and social humiliation sustained by the petitioner, as concluded by the
RTC. Those circumstances are fairly unusual, and should not give rise
to a general entitlement for damages under a more mundane set of
facts.
We sustain the amount of moral damages awarded to petitioner by the
RTC. There is no hard-and-fast rule in determining what would be a fair
and reasonable amount of moral damages, since each case must be
governed by its own peculiar facts, however, it must be commensurate
to the loss or injury suffered. Petitioners original prayer for
P5,000,000.00 for moral damages is excessive under the
circumstances, and the amount awarded by the trial court of
P500,000.00 in moral damages more seemly.
Likewise, we deem exemplary damages available under the
circumstances, and the amount of P300,000.00 appropriate. There is
similarly no cause though to disturb the determined award of
P100,000.00 as attorneys fees, and P85,233.01 as expenses of
litigation.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the
Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 145 in Civil Case No. 92-1665 is
hereby REINSTATED. Costs against respondent.
SO ORDERED.
Case No. 4
G.R. No. 116100. February 9, 1996]
SPOUSES CRISTINO and BRIGIDA CUSTODIO and SPOUSES LITO
and MARIA CRISTINA SANTOS, petitioners, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS, HEIRS OF PACIFICO C. MABASA and REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT OF PASIG, METRO MANILA, BRANCH 181, respondents.
DECISION
This petition for review on certiorari assails the decision of respondent
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 29115, promulgated on November
10, 1993, which affirmed with modification the decision of the trial
court, as well as its resolution dated July 8, 1994 denying petitioners
motion for reconsideration.
On August 26, 1982, Civil Case No. 47466 for the grant of an easement
of right of way was filed by Pacifico Mabasa against Cristino Custodio,
Brigida R. Custodio, Rosalina R. Morato, Lito Santos and Maria Cristina
C. Santos before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig and assigned to
Branch 22 thereof.
The generative facts of the case, as synthesized by the trial court and
adopted by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:
Perusing the record, this Court finds that the original plaintiff Pacifico
Mabasa died during the pendency of this case and was substituted by
Ofelia Mabasa, his surviving spouse [and children].
The plaintiff owns a parcel of land with a two-door apartment erected
thereon situated at Interior P. Burgos St., Palingon, Tipas, Taguig, Metro
Manila. The plaintiff was able to acquire said property through a
contract of sale with spouses Mamerto Rayos and Teodora Quintero as
vendors last September 1981. Said property may be described to be
surrounded by other immovables pertaining to defendants herein.
Taking P. Burgos Street as the point of reference, on the left side, going
to plaintiffs property, the row of houses will be as follows: That of
defendants Cristino and Brigido Custodio, then that of Lito and Maria
Cristina Santos and then that of Ofelia Mabasa. On the right side (is)
that of defendant Rosalina Morato and then a Septic Tank (Exhibit D).
As an access to P. Burgos Street from plaintiffs property, there are two
possible passageways. The first passageway is approximately one
meter wide and is about 20 meters distan(t) from Mabasas residence
to P. Burgos Street. Such path is passing in between the previously
mentioned row of houses. The second passageway is about 3 meters in
width and length from plaintiff Mabasas residence to P. Burgos Street; it
is about 26 meters. In passing thru said passageway, a less than a
meter wide path through the septic tank and with 5-6 meters in length
has to be traversed.
When said property was purchased by Mabasa, there were tenants
occupying the premises and who were acknowledged by plaintif
Mabasa as tenants. However, sometime in February, 1982. one of said
tenants vacated the apartment and when plaintif Mabasa went to see
the premises, he saw that there had been built an adobe fence in the
first passageway making it narrower in width. Said adobe fence was
first constructed by defendants Santoses along their property which is
also along the first passageway. Defendant Morato constructed her
adobe fence and even extended said fence in such a way that the
entire passageway was enclosed (Exhibit 1-Santoses and Custodios,
Exh. D for plaintiff, Exhs. 1-C, 1-D and I -E) And it was then that the
remaining tenants of said apartment vacated the area. Defendant Ma.
Cristina Santos testified that she constructed said fence because there
was an incident when her daughter was dragged by a bicycle pedalled
by a son of one of the tenants in said apartment along the first
passageway. She also mentioned some other inconveniences of having
(at) the front of her house a pathway such as when some of the
tenants were drunk and would bang their doors and windows. Some of
their footwear were even lost. x x x (Italics in original text; corrections
in parentheses supplied)
On February 27, 1990, a decision was rendered by the trial court, with
this dispositive part:
Accordingly, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1) Ordering defendants Custodios and Santoses to give plaintiff
permanent access - ingress and egress, to the public street;
2) Ordering the plaintiff to pay defendants Custodios and Santoses the
sum of Eight Thousand Pesos (P8,000) as indemnity for the permanent
use of the passageway.
The parties to shoulder their respective litigation expenses.
Not satisfied therewith, therein plaintiff represented by his heirs, herein
private respondents, went to the Court of Appeals raising the sole issue
of whether or not the lower court erred in not awarding damages in
their favor. On November 10, 1993, as earlier stated, the Court of
Appeals rendered its decision affirming the judgment of the trial court
with modification, the decretal portion of which disposes as follows:
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the lower court is hereby
AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION only insofar as the herein grant of
damages to plaintiffs-appellants. The Court hereby orders defendants-
appellees to pay plaintiffs-appellants the sum of Sixty Five Thousand
(P65,000) Pesos as Actual Damages, Thirty Thousand (P30,000) Pesos
as Moral Damages, and Ten Thousand (P10,000) Pesos as Exemplary
Damages. The rest of the appealed decision is affirmed to all respects.
On July 8, 1994, the Court of Appeals denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration. Petitioners then took the present recourse to us,
raising two issues, namely, whether or not the grant of right of way to
herein private respondents is proper, and whether or not the award of
damages is in order.
With respect to the first issue, herein petitioners are already barred
from raising the same. Petitioners did not appeal from the decision of
the court a quo granting private respondents the right of way, hence
they are presumed to be satisfied with the adjudication therein. With
the finality of the judgment of the trial court as to petitioners, the issue
of propriety of the grant of right of way has already been laid to rest.
For failure to appeal the decision of the trial court to the Court of
Appeals, petitioners cannot obtain any affirmative relief other than
those granted in the decision of the trial court. That decision of the
court below has become final as against them and can no longer be
reviewed, much less reversed, by this Court. The rule in this jurisdiction
is that whenever an appeal is taken in a civil case, an appellee who has
not himself appealed may not obtain from the appellate court any
affirmative relief other than what was granted in the decision of the
lower court. The appellee can only advance any argument that he may
deem necessary to defeat the appellants claim or to uphold the
decision that is being disputed, and he can assign errors in his brief if
such is required to strengthen the views expressed by the court a quo.
These assigned errors, in turn, may be considered by the appellate
court solely to maintain the appealed decision on other grounds, but
not for the purpose of reversing or modifying the judgment in the
appellees favor and giving him other affirmative reliefs.
However, with respect to the second issue, we agree with petitioners
that the Court of Appeals erred in awarding damages in favor of private
respondents. The award of damages has no substantial legal basis. A
reading of the decision of the Court of Appeals will show that the award
of damages was based solely on the fact that the original plaintiff,
Pacifico Mabasa, incurred losses in the form of unrealized rentals when
the tenants vacated the leased premises by reason of the closure of
the passageway.
However, the mere fact that the plaintiff suffered losses does not give
rise to a right to recover damages. To warrant the recovery of
damages, there must be both a right of action for a legal wrong
inflicted by the defendant, and damage resulting to the plaintiff
therefrom. Wrong without damage, or damage without wrong, does not
constitute a cause of action, since damages are merely part of the
remedy allowed for the injury caused by a breach or wrong.
There is a material distinction between damages and injury. Injury is
the illegal invasion of a legal right; damage is the loss, hurt, or harm
which results from the injury; and damages are the recompense or
compensation awarded for the damage suffered. Thus, there can be
damage without injury in those instances in which the loss or harm was
not the result of a violation of a legal duty. These situations are often
called damnum absque injuria. in order that a plaintiff may maintain an
action for the injuries of which he complains, he must establish that
such injuries resulted from a breach of duty which the defendant owed
to the plaintiff - a concurrence of injury to the plaintiff and legal
responsibility by the person causing it. The underlying basis for the
award of tort damages is the premise that an individual was injured in
contemplation of law. Thus, there must first be the breach of some
duty and the imposition of liability for that breach before damages may
be awarded; it is not sufficient to state that there should be tort liability
merely because the plaintiff suffered some pain and suffering)
Many accidents occur and many injuries are inflicted by acts or
omissions which cause damage or loss to another but which violate no
legal duty to such other person, and consequently create no cause of
action in his favor. In such cases, the consequences must be borne by
the injured person alone. The law affords no remedy for damages
resulting from an act which does not amount to a legal injury or wrong.
In other words, in order that the law will give redress for an act causing
damage, that act must be not only hurtful, but wrongful. There must be
damnum et injuria. If, as may happen in many cases, a person sustains
actual damage, that is, harm or loss to his person or property, without
sustaining any legal injury, that is, an act or omission which the law
does not deem an injury, the damage is regarded as damnum absque
injuria.
In the case at bar, although there was damage, there was no legal
injury. Contrary to the claim of private respondents, petitioners could
not be said to have violated the principle of abuse of right. In order
that the principle of abuse of right provided in Article 21 of the Civil
Code can be applied, it is essential that the following requisites concur:
(1) The defendant should have acted in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy; (2) The acts should be willful;
and (3) There was damage or injury to the plaintiff.
The act of petitioners in constructing a fence within their lot is a valid
exercise of their right as owners, hence not contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy. The law recognizes in the owner the right to
enjoy and dispose of a thing, without other limitations than those
established by law. It is within the right of petitioners, as owners, to
enclose and fence their property. Article 430 of the Civil Code provides
that (e)very owner may enclose or fence his land or tenements by
means of walls, ditches, live or dead hedges, or by any other means
without detriment to servitudes constituted thereon.
At the time of the construction of the fence, the lot was not subject to
any servitudes. There was no easement of way existing in favor of
private respondents, either by law or by contract. The fact that private
respondents had no existing right over the said passageway is
confirmed by the very decision of the trial court granting a compulsory
right of way in their favor after payment of just compensation. It was
only that decision which gave private respondents the right to use the
said passageway after payment of the compensation and imposed a
corresponding duty on petitioners not to interfere in the exercise of
said right.
Hence, prior to said decision, petitioners had an absolute right over
their property and their act of fencing and enclosing the same was an
act which they may lawfully perform in the employment and exercise
of said right. To repeat, whatever injury or damage may have been
sustained by private respondents by reason of the rightful use of the
said land by petitioners is damnum absque injuria.
A person has a right to the natural use and enjoyment of his own
property, according to his pleasure, for all the purposes to which such
property is usually applied. As a general rule, therefore, there is no
cause of action for acts done by one person upon his own property in a
lawful and proper manner, although such acts incidentally cause
damage or an unavoidable loss to another, as such damage or loss is
damnum absque injuria. When the owner of property makes use
thereof in the general and ordinary manner in which the property is
used, such as fencing or enclosing the same as in this case, nobody
can complain of having been injured, because the inconvenience
arising from said use can be considered as a mere consequence of
community life.
The proper exercise of a lawful right cannot constitute a legal wrong for
which an action will lie, although the act may result in damage to
another, for no legal right has been invaded. One may use any lawful
means to accomplish a lawful purpose and though the means adopted
may cause damage to another, no cause of action arises in the latters
favor. Any injury or damage occasioned thereby is damnum absque
injuria. The courts can give no redress for hardship to an individual
resulting from action reasonably calculated to achieve a lawful end by
lawful means.
WHEREFORE, under the compulsion of the foregoing premises,
the appealed decision of respondent Court of Appeals is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the judgment of the trial court is
correspondingly REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
Case No. 5
G.R. No. L-12191 October 14, 1918
JOSE CANGCO, plaintiff-appellant, vs.MANILA RAILROAD CO.,
defendant-appellee.
At the time of the occurrence which gave rise to this litigation the
plaintiff, Jose Cangco, was in the employment of Manila Railroad
Company in the capacity of clerk, with a monthly wage of P25. He lived
in the pueblo of San Mateo, in the province of Rizal, which is located
upon the line of the defendant railroad company; and in coming daily
by train to the company's office in the city of Manila where he worked,
he used a pass, supplied by the company, which entitled him to ride
upon the company's trains free of charge. Upon the occasion in
question, January 20, 1915, the plaintiff arose from his seat in the
second class-car where he was riding and, making, his exit through the
door, took his position upon the steps of the coach, seizing the upright
guardrail with his right hand for support.
On the side of the train where passengers alight at the San Mateo
station there is a cement platform which begins to rise with a
moderate gradient some distance away from the company's office and
extends along in front of said office for a distance sufficient to cover
the length of several coaches. As the train slowed down another
passenger, named Emilio Zuiga, also an employee of the railroad
company, got off the same car, alighting safely at the point where the
platform begins to rise from the level of the ground. When the train
had proceeded a little farther the plaintiff Jose Cangco stepped off also,
but one or both of his feet came in contact with a sack of watermelons
with the result that his feet slipped from under him and he fell violently
on the platform. His body at once rolled from the platform and was
drawn under the moving car, where his right arm was badly crushed
and lacerated. It appears that after the plaintiff alighted from the train
the car moved forward possibly six meters before it came to a full stop.
The accident occurred between 7 and 8 o'clock on a dark night, and as
the railroad station was lighted dimly by a single light located some
distance away, objects on the platform where the accident occurred
were difficult to discern especially to a person emerging from a lighted
car.
The explanation of the presence of a sack of melons on the platform
where the plaintiff alighted is found in the fact that it was the
customary season for harvesting these melons and a large lot had
been brought to the station for the shipment to the market. They were
contained in numerous sacks which has been piled on the platform in a
row one upon another. The testimony shows that this row of sacks was
so placed of melons and the edge of platform; and it is clear that the
fall of the plaintiff was due to the fact that his foot alighted upon one of
these melons at the moment he stepped upon the platform. His
statement that he failed to see these objects in the darkness is readily
to be credited.
The plaintiff was drawn from under the car in an unconscious condition,
and it appeared that the injuries which he had received were very
serious. He was therefore brought at once to a certain hospital in the
city of Manila where an examination was made and his arm was
amputated. The result of this operation was unsatisfactory, and the
plaintiff was then carried to another hospital where a second operation
was performed and the member was again amputated higher up near
the shoulder. It appears in evidence that the plaintiff expended the
sum of P790.25 in the form of medical and surgical fees and for other
expenses in connection with the process of his curation.
Upon August 31, 1915, he instituted this proceeding in the Court of
First Instance of the city of Manila to recover damages of the defendant
company, founding his action upon the negligence of the servants and
employees of the defendant in placing the sacks of melons upon the
platform and leaving them so placed as to be a menace to the security
of passenger alighting from the company's trains. At the hearing in the
Court of First Instance, his Honor, the trial judge, found the facts
substantially as above stated, and drew therefrom his conclusion to the
effect that, although negligence was attributable to the defendant by
reason of the fact that the sacks of melons were so placed as to
obstruct passengers passing to and from the cars, nevertheless, the
plaintiff himself had failed to use due caution in alighting from the
coach and was therefore precluded form recovering. Judgment was
accordingly entered in favor of the defendant company, and the
plaintiff appealed.
It can not be doubted that the employees of the railroad company were
guilty of negligence in piling these sacks on the platform in the manner
above stated; that their presence caused the plaintiff to fall as he
alighted from the train; and that they therefore constituted an effective
legal cause of the injuries sustained by the plaintiff. It necessarily
follows that the defendant company is liable for the damage thereby
occasioned unless recovery is barred by the plaintiff's own contributory
negligence. In resolving this problem it is necessary that each of these
conceptions of liability, to-wit, the primary responsibility of the
defendant company and the contributory negligence of the plaintiff
should be separately examined.
It is important to note that the foundation of the legal liability of the
defendant is the contract of carriage, and that the obligation to
respond for the damage which plaintiff has suffered arises, if at all,
from the breach of that contract by reason of the failure of defendant
to exercise due care in its performance. That is to say, its liability is
direct and immediate, differing essentially, in legal viewpoint from that
presumptive responsibility for the negligence of its servants, imposed
by article 1903 of the Civil Code, which can be rebutted by proof of the
exercise of due care in their selection and supervision. Article 1903 of
the Civil Code is not applicable to obligations arising ex contractu, but
only to extra-contractual obligations or to use the technical form of
expression, that article relates only to culpa aquiliana and not to culpa
contractual.
Manresa (vol. 8, p. 67) in his commentaries upon articles 1103 and
1104 of the Civil Code, clearly points out this distinction, which was
also recognized by this Court in its decision in the case of Rakes vs.
Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Co. (7 Phil. rep., 359). In commenting upon
article 1093 Manresa clearly points out the difference between "culpa,
substantive and independent, which of itself constitutes the source of
an obligation between persons not formerly connected by any legal tie"
and culpa considered as an accident in the performance of an
obligation already existing . . . ."
In the Rakes case (supra) the decision of this court was made to rest
squarely upon the proposition that article 1903 of the Civil Code is not
applicable to acts of negligence which constitute the breach of a
contract.
Upon this point the Court said:
The acts to which these articles [1902 and 1903 of the Civil Code] are
applicable are understood to be those not growing out of pre-existing
duties of the parties to one another. But where relations already
formed give rise to duties, whether springing from contract or quasi-
contract, then breaches of those duties are subject to article 1101,
1103, and 1104 of the same code. (Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific
Co., 7 Phil. Rep., 359 at 365.)
This distinction is of the utmost importance. The liability, which, under
the Spanish law, is, in certain cases imposed upon employers with
respect to damages occasioned by the negligence of their employees
to persons to whom they are not bound by contract, is not based, as in
the English Common Law, upon the principle of respondeat superior
if it were, the master would be liable in every case and unconditionally
but upon the principle announced in article 1902 of the Civil Code,
which imposes upon all persons who by their fault or negligence, do
injury to another, the obligation of making good the damage caused.
One who places a powerful automobile in the hands of a servant whom
he knows to be ignorant of the method of managing such a vehicle, is
himself guilty of an act of negligence which makes him liable for all the
consequences of his imprudence. The obligation to make good the
damage arises at the very instant that the unskillful servant, while
acting within the scope of his employment causes the injury. The
liability of the master is personal and direct. But, if the master has not
been guilty of any negligence whatever in the selection and direction
of the servant, he is not liable for the acts of the latter, whatever done
within the scope of his employment or not, if the damage done by the
servant does not amount to a breach of the contract between the
master and the person injured.
It is not accurate to say that proof of diligence and care in the selection
and control of the servant relieves the master from liability for the
latter's acts on the contrary, that proof shows that the responsibility
has never existed. As Manresa says (vol. 8, p. 68) the liability arising
from extra-contractual culpa is always based upon a voluntary act or
omission which, without willful intent, but by mere negligence or
inattention, has caused damage to another. A master who exercises all
possible care in the selection of his servant, taking into consideration
the qualifications they should possess for the discharge of the duties
which it is his purpose to confide to them, and directs them with equal
diligence, thereby performs his duty to third persons to whom he is
bound by no contractual ties, and he incurs no liability whatever if, by
reason of the negligence of his servants, even within the scope of their
employment, such third person suffer damage. True it is that under
article 1903 of the Civil Code the law creates a presumption that he
has been negligent in the selection or direction of his servant, but the
presumption is rebuttable and yield to proof of due care and diligence
in this respect.
The supreme court of Porto Rico, in interpreting identical provisions, as
found in the Porto Rico Code, has held that these articles are applicable
to cases of extra-contractual culpa exclusively. (Carmona vs. Cuesta,
20 Porto Rico Reports, 215.)
This distinction was again made patent by this Court in its decision in
the case of Bahia vs. Litonjua and Leynes, (30 Phil. rep., 624), which
was an action brought upon the theory of the extra-contractual liability
of the defendant to respond for the damage caused by the
carelessness of his employee while acting within the scope of his
employment. The Court, after citing the last paragraph of article 1903
of the Civil Code, said:
From this article two things are apparent: (1) That when an injury is
caused by the negligence of a servant or employee there instantly
arises a presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of
the master or employer either in selection of the servant or employee,
or in supervision over him after the selection, or both; and (2) that that
presumption is juris tantum and not juris et de jure, and consequently,
may be rebutted. It follows necessarily that if the employer shows to
the satisfaction of the court that in selection and supervision he has
exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family, the
presumption is overcome and he is relieved from liability.
This theory bases the responsibility of the master ultimately on his
own negligence and not on that of his servant. This is the notable
peculiarity of the Spanish law of negligence. It is, of course, in striking
contrast to the American doctrine that, in relations with strangers, the
negligence of the servant in conclusively the negligence of the master.
The opinion there expressed by this Court, to the effect that in case of
extra-contractual culpa based upon negligence, it is necessary that
there shall have been some fault attributable to the defendant
personally, and that the last paragraph of article 1903 merely
establishes a rebuttable presumption, is in complete accord with the
authoritative opinion of Manresa, who says (vol. 12, p. 611) that the
liability created by article 1903 is imposed by reason of the breach of
the duties inherent in the special relations of authority or superiority
existing between the person called upon to repair the damage and the
one who, by his act or omission, was the cause of it.
On the other hand, the liability of masters and employers for the
negligent acts or omissions of their servants or agents, when such acts
or omissions cause damages which amount to the breach of a contact,
is not based upon a mere presumption of the master's negligence in
their selection or control, and proof of exercise of the utmost diligence
and care in this regard does not relieve the master of his liability for
the breach of his contract.
Every legal obligation must of necessity be extra-contractual or
contractual. Extra-contractual obligation has its source in the breach or
omission of those mutual duties which civilized society imposes upon it
members, or which arise from these relations, other than contractual,
of certain members of society to others, generally embraced in the
concept of status. The legal rights of each member of society
constitute the measure of the corresponding legal duties, mainly
negative in character, which the existence of those rights imposes
upon all other members of society. The breach of these general duties
whether due to willful intent or to mere inattention, if productive of
injury, give rise to an obligation to indemnify the injured party. The
fundamental distinction between obligations of this character and
those which arise from contract, rests upon the fact that in cases of
non-contractual obligation it is the wrongful or negligent act or
omission itself which creates the vinculum juris, whereas in contractual
relations the vinculum exists independently of the breach of the
voluntary duty assumed by the parties when entering into the
contractual relation.
With respect to extra-contractual obligation arising from negligence,
whether of act or omission, it is competent for the legislature to elect
and our Legislature has so elected whom such an obligation is
imposed is morally culpable, or, on the contrary, for reasons of public
policy, to extend that liability, without regard to the lack of moral
culpability, so as to include responsibility for the negligence of those
person who acts or mission are imputable, by a legal fiction, to others
who are in a position to exercise an absolute or limited control over
them. The legislature which adopted our Civil Code has elected to limit
extra-contractual liability with certain well-defined exceptions to
cases in which moral culpability can be directly imputed to the persons
to be charged. This moral responsibility may consist in having failed to
exercise due care in the selection and control of one's agents or
servants, or in the control of persons who, by reason of their status,
occupy a position of dependency with respect to the person made
liable for their conduct.
The position of a natural or juridical person who has undertaken by
contract to render service to another, is wholly different from that to
which article 1903 relates. When the sources of the obligation upon
which plaintiff's cause of action depends is a negligent act or omission,
the burden of proof rests upon plaintiff to prove the negligence if he
does not his action fails. But when the facts averred show a contractual
undertaking by defendant for the benefit of plaintiff, and it is alleged
that plaintiff has failed or refused to perform the contract, it is not
necessary for plaintiff to specify in his pleadings whether the breach of
the contract is due to willful fault or to negligence on the part of the
defendant, or of his servants or agents. Proof of the contract and of its
nonperformance is sufficient prima facie to warrant a recovery.
As a general rule . . . it is logical that in case of extra-contractual culpa,
a suing creditor should assume the burden of proof of its existence, as
the only fact upon which his action is based; while on the contrary, in a
case of negligence which presupposes the existence of a contractual
obligation, if the creditor shows that it exists and that it has been
broken, it is not necessary for him to prove negligence. (Manresa, vol.
8, p. 71 [1907 ed., p. 76]).
As it is not necessary for the plaintiff in an action for the breach of a
contract to show that the breach was due to the negligent conduct of
defendant or of his servants, even though such be in fact the actual
cause of the breach, it is obvious that proof on the part of defendant
that the negligence or omission of his servants or agents caused the
breach of the contract would not constitute a defense to the action. If
the negligence of servants or agents could be invoked as a means of
discharging the liability arising from contract, the anomalous result
would be that person acting through the medium of agents or servants
in the performance of their contracts, would be in a better position
than those acting in person. If one delivers a valuable watch to
watchmaker who contract to repair it, and the bailee, by a personal
negligent act causes its destruction, he is unquestionably liable. Would
it be logical to free him from his liability for the breach of his contract,
which involves the duty to exercise due care in the preservation of the
watch, if he shows that it was his servant whose negligence caused the
injury? If such a theory could be accepted, juridical persons would
enjoy practically complete immunity from damages arising from the
breach of their contracts if caused by negligent acts as such juridical
persons can of necessity only act through agents or servants, and it
would no doubt be true in most instances that reasonable care had
been taken in selection and direction of such servants. If one delivers
securities to a banking corporation as collateral, and they are lost by
reason of the negligence of some clerk employed by the bank, would it
be just and reasonable to permit the bank to relieve itself of liability for
the breach of its contract to return the collateral upon the payment of
the debt by proving that due care had been exercised in the selection
and direction of the clerk?
This distinction between culpa aquiliana, as the source of an obligation,
and culpa contractual as a mere incident to the performance of a
contract has frequently been recognized by the supreme court of
Spain. (Sentencias of June 27, 1894; November 20, 1896; and
December 13, 1896.) In the decisions of November 20, 1896, it
appeared that plaintiff's action arose ex contractu, but that defendant
sought to avail himself of the provisions of article 1902 of the Civil
Code as a defense. The Spanish Supreme Court rejected defendant's
contention, saying:
These are not cases of injury caused, without any pre-existing
obligation, by fault or negligence, such as those to which article 1902
of the Civil Code relates, but of damages caused by the defendant's
failure to carry out the undertakings imposed by the contracts . . . .
A brief review of the earlier decision of this court involving the liability
of employers for damage done by the negligent acts of their servants
will show that in no case has the court ever decided that the
negligence of the defendant's servants has been held to constitute a
defense to an action for damages for breach of contract.
In the case of Johnson vs. David (5 Phil. Rep., 663), the court held that
the owner of a carriage was not liable for the damages caused by the
negligence of his driver. In that case the court commented on the fact
that no evidence had been adduced in the trial court that the
defendant had been negligent in the employment of the driver, or that
he had any knowledge of his lack of skill or carefulness.
In the case of Baer Senior & Co's Successors vs. Compania Maritima (6
Phil. Rep., 215), the plaintiff sued the defendant for damages caused
by the loss of a barge belonging to plaintiff which was allowed to get
adrift by the negligence of defendant's servants in the course of the
performance of a contract of towage. The court held, citing Manresa
(vol. 8, pp. 29, 69) that if the "obligation of the defendant grew out of a
contract made between it and the plaintiff . . . we do not think that the
provisions of articles 1902 and 1903 are applicable to the case."
In the case of Chapman vs. Underwood (27 Phil. Rep., 374), plaintiff
sued the defendant to recover damages for the personal injuries
caused by the negligence of defendant's chauffeur while driving
defendant's automobile in which defendant was riding at the time. The
court found that the damages were caused by the negligence of the
driver of the automobile, but held that the master was not liable,
although he was present at the time, saying:
. . . unless the negligent acts of the driver are continued for a length of
time as to give the owner a reasonable opportunity to observe them
and to direct the driver to desist therefrom. . . . The act complained of
must be continued in the presence of the owner for such length of time
that the owner by his acquiescence, makes the driver's acts his own.
In the case of Yamada vs. Manila Railroad Co. and Bachrach Garage &
Taxicab Co. (33 Phil. Rep., 8), it is true that the court rested its
conclusion as to the liability of the defendant upon article 1903,
although the facts disclosed that the injury complaint of by plaintiff
constituted a breach of the duty to him arising out of the contract of
transportation. The express ground of the decision in this case was that
article 1903, in dealing with the liability of a master for the negligent
acts of his servants "makes the distinction between private individuals
and public enterprise;" that as to the latter the law creates a rebuttable
presumption of negligence in the selection or direction of servants; and
that in the particular case the presumption of negligence had not been
overcome.
It is evident, therefore that in its decision Yamada case, the court
treated plaintiff's action as though founded in tort rather than as based
upon the breach of the contract of carriage, and an examination of the
pleadings and of the briefs shows that the questions of law were in fact
discussed upon this theory. Viewed from the standpoint of the
defendant the practical result must have been the same in any event.
The proof disclosed beyond doubt that the defendant's servant was
grossly negligent and that his negligence was the proximate cause of
plaintiff's injury. It also affirmatively appeared that defendant had been
guilty of negligence in its failure to exercise proper discretion in the
direction of the servant. Defendant was, therefore, liable for the injury
suffered by plaintiff, whether the breach of the duty were to be
regarded as constituting culpa aquiliana or culpa contractual. As
Manresa points out (vol. 8, pp. 29 and 69) whether negligence occurs
an incident in the course of the performance of a contractual
undertaking or its itself the source of an extra-contractual undertaking
obligation, its essential characteristics are identical. There is always an
act or omission productive of damage due to carelessness or
inattention on the part of the defendant. Consequently, when the court
holds that a defendant is liable in damages for having failed to exercise
due care, either directly, or in failing to exercise proper care in the
selection and direction of his servants, the practical result is identical
in either case. Therefore, it follows that it is not to be inferred, because
the court held in the Yamada case that defendant was liable for the
damages negligently caused by its servants to a person to whom it was
bound by contract, and made reference to the fact that the defendant
was negligent in the selection and control of its servants, that in such a
case the court would have held that it would have been a good defense
to the action, if presented squarely upon the theory of the breach of
the contract, for defendant to have proved that it did in fact exercise
care in the selection and control of the servant.
The true explanation of such cases is to be found by directing the
attention to the relative spheres of contractual and extra-contractual
obligations. The field of non- contractual obligation is much more
broader than that of contractual obligations, comprising, as it does, the
whole extent of juridical human relations. These two fields, figuratively
speaking, concentric; that is to say, the mere fact that a person is
bound to another by contract does not relieve him from extra-
contractual liability to such person. When such a contractual relation
exists the obligor may break the contract under such conditions that
the same act which constitutes the source of an extra-contractual
obligation had no contract existed between the parties.
The contract of defendant to transport plaintiff carried with it, by
implication, the duty to carry him in safety and to provide safe means
of entering and leaving its trains (civil code, article 1258). That duty,
being contractual, was direct and immediate, and its non-performance
could not be excused by proof that the fault was morally imputable to
defendant's servants.
The railroad company's defense involves the assumption that even
granting that the negligent conduct of its servants in placing an
obstruction upon the platform was a breach of its contractual
obligation to maintain safe means of approaching and leaving its
trains, the direct and proximate cause of the injury suffered by plaintiff
was his own contributory negligence in failing to wait until the train
had come to a complete stop before alighting. Under the doctrine of
comparative negligence announced in the Rakes case (supra), if the
accident was caused by plaintiff's own negligence, no liability is
imposed upon defendant's negligence and plaintiff's negligence merely
contributed to his injury, the damages should be apportioned. It is,
therefore, important to ascertain if defendant was in fact guilty of
negligence.
It may be admitted that had plaintiff waited until the train had come to
a full stop before alighting, the particular injury suffered by him could
not have occurred. Defendant contends, and cites many authorities in
support of the contention, that it is negligence per se for a passenger
to alight from a moving train. We are not disposed to subscribe to this
doctrine in its absolute form. We are of the opinion that this proposition
is too badly stated and is at variance with the experience of every-day
life. In this particular instance, that the train was barely moving when
plaintiff alighted is shown conclusively by the fact that it came to stop
within six meters from the place where he stepped from it. Thousands
of person alight from trains under these conditions every day of the
year, and sustain no injury where the company has kept its platform
free from dangerous obstructions. There is no reason to believe that
plaintiff would have suffered any injury whatever in alighting as he did
had it not been for defendant's negligent failure to perform its duty to
provide a safe alighting place.
We are of the opinion that the correct doctrine relating to this subject is
that expressed in Thompson's work on Negligence (vol. 3, sec. 3010)
as follows:
The test by which to determine whether the passenger has been guilty
of negligence in attempting to alight from a moving railway train, is
that of ordinary or reasonable care. It is to be considered whether an
ordinarily prudent person, of the age, sex and condition of the
passenger, would have acted as the passenger acted under the
circumstances disclosed by the evidence. This care has been defined
to be, not the care which may or should be used by the prudent man
generally, but the care which a man of ordinary prudence would use
under similar circumstances, to avoid injury." (Thompson,
Commentaries on Negligence, vol. 3, sec. 3010.)
Or, it we prefer to adopt the mode of exposition used by this court in
Picart vs. Smith (37 Phil. rep., 809), we may say that the test is this;
Was there anything in the circumstances surrounding the plaintiff at
the time he alighted from the train which would have admonished a
person of average prudence that to get off the train under the
conditions then existing was dangerous? If so, the plaintiff should have
desisted from alighting; and his failure so to desist was contributory
negligence.
As the case now before us presents itself, the only fact from which a
conclusion can be drawn to the effect that plaintiff was guilty of
contributory negligence is that he stepped off the car without being
able to discern clearly the condition of the platform and while the train
was yet slowly moving. In considering the situation thus presented, it
should not be overlooked that the plaintiff was, as we find, ignorant of
the fact that the obstruction which was caused by the sacks of melons
piled on the platform existed; and as the defendant was bound by
reason of its duty as a public carrier to afford to its passengers facilities
for safe egress from its trains, the plaintiff had a right to assume, in the
absence of some circumstance to warn him to the contrary, that the
platform was clear. The place, as we have already stated, was dark, or
dimly lighted, and this also is proof of a failure upon the part of the
defendant in the performance of a duty owing by it to the plaintiff; for
if it were by any possibility concede that it had right to pile these sacks
in the path of alighting passengers, the placing of them adequately so
that their presence would be revealed.
As pertinent to the question of contributory negligence on the part of
the plaintiff in this case the following circumstances are to be noted:
The company's platform was constructed upon a level higher than that
of the roadbed and the surrounding ground. The distance from the
steps of the car to the spot where the alighting passenger would place
his feet on the platform was thus reduced, thereby decreasing the risk
incident to stepping off. The nature of the platform, constructed as it
was of cement material, also assured to the passenger a stable and
even surface on which to alight. Furthermore, the plaintiff was
possessed of the vigor and agility of young manhood, and it was by no
means so risky for him to get off while the train was yet moving as the
same act would have been in an aged or feeble person. In determining
the question of contributory negligence in performing such act that
is to say, whether the passenger acted prudently or recklessly the
age, sex, and physical condition of the passenger are circumstances
necessarily affecting the safety of the passenger, and should be
considered. Women, it has been observed, as a general rule are less
capable than men of alighting with safety under such conditions, as the
nature of their wearing apparel obstructs the free movement of the
limbs. Again, it may be noted that the place was perfectly familiar to
the plaintiff as it was his daily custom to get on and of the train at this
station. There could, therefore, be no uncertainty in his mind with
regard either to the length of the step which he was required to take or
the character of the platform where he was alighting. Our conclusion is
that the conduct of the plaintiff in undertaking to alight while the train
was yet slightly under way was not characterized by imprudence and
that therefore he was not guilty of contributory negligence.
The evidence shows that the plaintiff, at the time of the accident, was
earning P25 a month as a copyist clerk, and that the injuries he has
suffered have permanently disabled him from continuing that
employment. Defendant has not shown that any other gainful
occupation is open to plaintiff. His expectancy of life, according to the
standard mortality tables, is approximately thirty-three years. We are
of the opinion that a fair compensation for the damage suffered by him
for his permanent disability is the sum of P2,500, and that he is also
entitled to recover of defendant the additional sum of P790.25 for
medical attention, hospital services, and other incidental expenditures
connected with the treatment of his injuries.
The decision of lower court is reversed, and judgment is hereby
rendered plaintiff for the sum of P3,290.25, and for the costs of both
instances. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Street and Avancea, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
MALCOLM, J., dissenting:
With one sentence in the majority decision, we are of full accord,
namely, "It may be admitted that had plaintiff waited until the train
had come to a full stop before alighting, the particular injury suffered
by him could not have occurred." With the general rule relative to a
passenger's contributory negligence, we are likewise in full accord,
namely, "An attempt to alight from a moving train is negligence per
se." Adding these two points together, should be absolved from the
complaint, and judgment affirmed.
Johnson, J., concur.
Case No. 6
G.R. No. 1719 January 23, 1907
M. H., RAKES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.THE ATLANTIC, GULF AND
PACIFIC COMPANY, defendant-appellant.
Separate Opinions
WILLARD, J., dissenting:
The knowledge which the plaintiff had in regard to the condition of the
track is indicated by his own evidence. He testified, among other
things, as follows:
Q. Now, describe the best you can the character of the track that
ran from the place where you loaded the irons from the barge up to the
point where you unloaded them on the ground.
A. Well, it was pretty bad character.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. And you were familiar with the track before that its
construction?
A. Familiar with what?
Q. Well, you have described it here to the court.
A. Oh, yes; I knew the condition of the track.
Q. You knew its conditions as you have described it here at the time
you were working around there?
A. Yes, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. And while operating it from the side it was necessary for you to
step from board to board on the cross-ties which extended out over the
stringers?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And these were very of irregular shape, were they not?
A. They were in pretty bad condition.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. And it was not safe to walk along on the outside of these
crosspieces?
A. It was safe if the car stayed on the track. We didn't try to hold
the load on. We tried to hold the car back, keep it from going too fast,
because we knew the track was in bad condition just here, and going
down too fast we could be liable to run off most any time.
Q. You knew the track was in bad condition when you got hold?
A. Sure, it was in bad condition.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. And the accident took place at that point where you believed it
to be so dangerous?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. But you knew it was dangerous?
A. Why certainly, anybody could see it; but a workingman had to
work in those days or get arrested for a vag here in Manila.
The court below, while it found that the plaintiff knew in a general way
of the bad condition of the track, found that he was not informed of the
exact cause of the accident, namely, the washing away of the large
crosspiece laid upon the ground or placed upon the posts as the
foundation upon which the stripers rested. This finding of fact to my
mind is plainly and manifestly against the weight of the evidence. Ellis,
a witness for the plaintiff, testified that on the morning of the accident
he called the attention of McKenna, the foreman, to the defective
condition of the track at his precise point where the accident
happened. His testimony in part is as follows:
A. I called Mr. McKenna. I showed him the track and told him I didn't
think it was safe working, and that if he didn't fix it he was liable to
have an accident; I told him I thought if he put fish plates on it would it.
He said, you keep on fishing around here for fish plates and you will be
fishing for another job the first thing you know." He says, "You see to
much."
xxx xxx xxx
Q. Who else was present at the time you had this conversation with
Mr. McKenna?
A. Well, at that conversation as far as I can remember, we were all
walking down the track and I know that McCoy and Mr. Blakes was
along at the time. I remember them two, but we were all walking down
the track in a bunch, but I disremember them.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. Was that the exact language that you used, that you wanted
some fish plates put on?
A. No, sir: I told him to look at that track. I says get some fish
plates. I says if there was any fish plates we would fix that.
Q. What did the fish plates have to do with that?
A. It would have strengthened that joint.
Q. Why didn't you put the 8 by 8 which was washed crossways in
place?
A. That would have been taken the raising of the track and digging out
along this upright piece and then putting it up again.
The plaintiff himself testified that he was present with Ellis at the time
this conversation was had with McKenna. It thus appears that on the
morning in question the plaintiff and McKenna were standing directly
over the place where the accident happened later in the day. The
accident was caused, as the court below found, by the washing away
or displacement of the large 8 by 8 piece of timber. This track was
constructed as all other tracks are, all of it open work, with no floor
over the ties, and of course see the ground and the entire construction
of the road, including these large 8 by 8 pieces, the long stringers
placed thereon, the ties placed on these stringers, and the rails placed
on the ties. The plaintiff himself must have seen that the 8 by 8 piece
of timber was out of place.
If the testimony of the plaintiff's witnesses is to be believed, the
displacement was more markedly apparent even than it would appear
from the testimony of the defendant's witnesses. According to the
plaintiff's witnesses, the water at high tide reached the place in
question and these 8 by 8 pieces were therefore not laid upon the
ground but were placed upon posts driven into the ground, the height
of the posts at this particular place being, according to the testimony
of the plaintiff's witnesses, from a foot to two feet and a half. As has
been said, Ellis testified that the reason why they did not put the 8 by
8 back in its place was because that would have required the raising
up of the track and digging out along this upright piece and then
putting it up again.
It conclusively appears from the evidence that the plaintiff, before the
accident happened, knew the exact condition of the track and was
informed and knew of the defect which caused the accident. There was
no promise on the part of McKenna to repair the track.
Under the circumstances the plaintiff was negligent in placing himself
on the side of the car where he knew that he would be injured by the
falling of the rails from the car when they reached this point in the
track where the two stringers were without any support of their ends.
He either should have refused to work at all or he should have placed
himself behind the car, on the other side of it, or in front of it, drawing
it with a rope. He was guilty of contributory negligence and is not
entitled to recover.
It is, said however, that contributory negligence on the part of the
plaintiff in a case like this is no defense under the law in force in these
Islands. To this proposition I can not agree. The liability of the
defendant is based in the majority opinion upon articles 1101 and 1103
of the Civil Code.
In order to impose such liability upon the defendant, it must appear
that its negligence caused the accident. The reason why contradictory
negligence on the part of the plaintiff is a defense in this class of cases
is that the negligence of the defendant did not alone cause the
accident. If nothing but that negligence had existed, the accident
would not have happened and, as I understand it, in every case in
which contradictory negligence is a defense it is made so because the
negligence of the plaintiff is the cause of the accident, to this extent,
that if the plaintiff had not been negligent the accident would not have
happened, although the defendant was also negligent. In other words,
the negligence of the defendant is not alone sufficient to cause the
accident. It requires also the negligence of the plaintiff.
There is, so far as I know, nothing in the Civil Code relating to
contributory negligence. The rule of the Roman law was: "Quod quis ex
culap sua damnum sentit, no intelligitur damnum sentire." (Digest,
book, 50, tit. 17, rule 203.)
The partidas contain the following provisions:
The just thing is that a man should suffer the damage which comes to
him through his own fault, and that he can not demand reparation
therefor from another. (Law 25, tit. 5, partida 3.)
And they even said that when a man received an injury through his
own acts, the grievance should be against himself and not against
another. (Law 2, tit. 7, partida 2.)
In several cases in the supreme court of Spain the fact has been
negligence that the plaintiff was himself guilty of negligence, as in the
civil judgments of the 4th of June, 1888, and of the 20th of February,
1887, and in the criminal judgments of the 20th of February 1888, the
90th of March, 1876, and the 6th of October, 1882. These cases do not
throw much light upon the subject. The judgment of the 7th of March,
1902 (93 Jurisprudencia Civil, 391), is, however, directly in point. In
that case the supreme court of Spain said:
According to the doctrine expressed in article 1902 of the Civil Code,
fault or negligence is a source of obligation when between such
negligence and the injury thereby caused there exists the relation of
cause and effect; but in the injury caused should not be the result of
acts or omissions of a third party, the latter has no obligation to repair
the same, even though such acts or omissions were imprudent or
unlawful, and much less when it is shown that the immediate cause of
the injury was the negligence of the injured person party himself.
Found the reasons above stated, and the court below having found
that the death of the deceased was due to his own imprudence, and
not therefore due to the absence of a guard at the grade crossing
where the accident occurred, it seems clear that court in acquitting the
railroad company of the complaint filed by the widow did not violate
the provisions of the aforesaid article of the Civil Code.
For the same reason, although the authority granted to the railroad
company to open the grade crossing without a special guard was
nullified by the subsequent promulgation of the railroad police law and
the regulations for the execution of the same, the result would be
identical, leaving one of the grounds upon which the judgment of
acquittal is based, to wit, that the accident was caused by the
imprudence of the injured party himself, unaffected.
It appears that the accident in this case took place at a grade crossing
where, according to the claim of the plaintiff, it was the duty of the
railroad company to maintain husband was injured by a train at this
crossing, his negligence contributing to the injury according to the
ruling of the court below. This judgment, then, amounts to a holding
that a contributory negligence is a defense according to the law of
Spain. (See also judgment of the 21st of October, 1903, vol. 96 p. 400,
Jurisprudencia Civil.)
Although in the Civil Code there is no express provision upon the
subject, in the Code of Commerce there is found a distinct declaration
upon it in reference to damages caused by collission at sea. Article 827
of the Code of Commerce is as follows:
If both vessels may be blamed for the collission, each one shall for
liable for his own damages, and both shall jointly responsible for the
loss and damages suffered to their cargoes.
That article is an express recognition of the fact that in collision cases
contributory negligence is a defense,
I do not think that this court is justified in view of the Roman law, of the
provisions of the Partidas, of the judgment of March 7, 1902, of article
827 of the Code of Commerce, and in the absence of any declaration
upon the subject in the Civil Code, in saying that it was the intention
rule announced in the majority opinion, a rule dimetrically opposed to
that put in force by the Code of Commerce.
The chief, is not the only, reason stated in the opinion for adopting the
rule that contradictory negligence is not a defense seems to be that
such is the holding of the later French decisions.
As to whether, if any liability existed in this case, it would be necessary
in accordance with the provisions of the Penal Code, or primary, in
accordance with the provision of the Civil Code, I express no opinion.
The judgment should, I think, be reversed and the defendant acquitted
of the complaint.
Case No. 7
G.R. No. 84698 February 4, 1992
PHILIPPINE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION, JUAN D.
LIM, BENJAMIN P. PAULINO, ANTONIO M. MAGTALAS, COL.
PEDRO SACRO and LT. M. SORIANO, petitioners, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS, HON. REGINA ORDOEZ-BENITEZ, in her capacity as
Presiding Judge of Branch 47, Regional Trial Court, Manila,
SEGUNDA R. BAUTISTA and ARSENIA D. BAUTISTA, respondents.
Case No. 8
G.R. No. L-47745 April 15, 1988
JOSE S. AMADORA, LORETA A. AMADORA, JOSE A. AMADORA
JR., NORMA A. YLAYA PANTALEON A. AMADORA, JOSE A.
AMADORA III, LUCY A. AMADORA, ROSALINDA A. AMADORA,
PERFECTO A. AMADORA, SERREC A. AMADORA, VICENTE A.
AMADORA and MARIA TISCALINA A. AMADORA, petitioners vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, COLEGIO DE SAN JOSE-
RECOLETOS, VICTOR LLUCH SERGIO P. DLMASO JR., CELESTINO
DICON, ANIANO ABELLANA, PABLITO DAFFON thru his parents
and natural guardians, MR. and MRS. NICANOR GUMBAN, and
ROLANDO VALENCIA, thru his guardian, A. FRANCISCO ALONSO,
respondents.
Separate Opinions
Separate Opinions
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring and dissenting:
I concur, except with respect to the restricted meaning given the term
"teacher" in Article 2180 of the Civil Code as "teacher-in-charge." This
would limit liability to occasions where there are classes under the
immediate charge of a teacher, which does not seem to be the
intendment of the law.
As I understand it, the philosophy of the law is that whoever stands in
loco parentis will have the same duties and obligations as parents
whenever in such a standing. Those persons are mandatorily held
liable for the tortious acts of pupils and students so long as the latter
remain in their custody, meaning their protective and supervisory
custody.
Thus Article 349 of the Civil Code enumerates the persons who stand
in loco parentis and thereby exercise substitute parental authority:
Art. 349 The following persons shall exercise substitute parental
authority:
xxx xxx xxx
2) Teachers and professors
xxx xxx xxx
4) Directors of trade establishments, with regard to apprentices;'
Article 352 of the Civil Code further provides:
Art. 362. The relations between teacher and pupil, professor and
student, are fixed by government regulations and those of each school
or institution....
But even such rules and regulations as may be fixed can not
contravene the concept of substitute parental authority.
The rationale of liability of school heads and teachers for the tortious
acts of their pupils was explained in Palisoc vs. Brillantes (41 SCRA
548), thus:
The protective custody of the school heads and teachers is mandatorily
substituted for that of the parents, and hence, it becomes their
obligation as well as that of the school itself to provide proper
supervision of the students' activities during the whole time that they
are at attendance in the school, including recess time, as well as to
take the necessary precautions to protect the students in their custody
from dangers and hazards that would reasonably be anticipated,
including injuries that some students themselves may inflict wilfully or
through negligence on their fellow students. (Emphasis supplied)
Of course, as provided for in the same Article 2180, the responsibility
treated of shall cease when the persons mentioned prove that they
observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent
damage.
And while a school is, admittedly, not directly liable since Article 2180
speaks only of teachers and schools heads, yet, by virtue of the same
provision, the school, as their employer, may be held liable for the
failure of its teachers or school heads to perform their mandatory legal
duties as substitute parents (Sangco, Philippine Law on Torts &
Damages, 1978 ed., p. 201). Again, the school may exculpate itself
from liability by proving that it had exercised the diligence of a good
father of the family.
Art. 2180. x x x
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees
and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks,
even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.
xxx xxx xxx
Parenthetically, from the enumeration in Article 349 of the Civil Code,
supra, it is apparent that the Code Commission had already segregated
the classification of "teachers and professors" vis-a-vis their pupils,
from "directors of trade establishments, with regard to their
apprentices."
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring:
I concur in the Court's opinion so carefully analyzed and crafted by
Justice Isagani A. Cruz. However, I would like to stress the need for a
major amendment to, if not a complete scrapping of, Article 2180 of
the Civil Code insofar as it refers to teachers or heads of
establishments of arts and trades in relation to pupils and students or
apprentices. The seventh paragraph of Art. 2180 is a relic of the past
and contemplates a situation long gone and out of date. In a Palisoc v.
Brillantes (41 SCRA 548) situation, it is bound to result in mischief and
injustice.
First, we no longer have masters and apprentices toiling in schools of
arts and trades. Students in "technological" colleges and universities
are no different from students in liberal arts or professional schools.
Apprentices now work in regular shops and factories and their
relationship to the employer is covered by laws governing the
employment relationship and not by laws governing the teacher
student relationship.
Second, except for kindergarten, elementary, and perhaps early high
school students, teachers are often no longer objects of veneration
who are given the respect due to substitute parents. Many students in
their late teens or early adult years view some teachers as part of a
bourgeois or reactionary group whose advice on behaviour,
deportment, and other non-academic matters is not only resented but
actively rejected. It seems most unfair to hold teachers liable on a
presumption juris tantum of negligence for acts of students even under
circumstances where strictly speaking there could be no in loco
parentis relationship. Why do teachers have to prove the contrary of
negligence to be freed from solidary liability for the acts f bomb-
throwing or pistol packing students who would just as soon hurt them
as they would other members of the so-called-establishment.
The ordinary rules on quasi-delicta should apply to teachers and
schools of whatever nature insofar as grown up students are
concerned. The provision of Art. 2180 of the Civil Code involved in this
case has outlived its purpose. The Court cannot make law. It can only
apply the law with its imperfections. However, the Court can suggest
that such a law should be amended or repealed.
Case No. 9
G.R. No. 112576 October 26, 1994
METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, petitioner, vs. THE
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, RURAL BANK OF PADRE GARCIA, INC.
and ISABEL R. KATIGBAK, respondents.
`
PEDRO ELCANO and PATRICIA ELCANO, in their capacity as
Ascendants of Agapito Elcano, deceased, Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v. REGINALD HILL, minor, and MARVIN HILL, as father and
Natural Guardian of said minor, Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City
dated January 29, 1965 in Civil Case No. Q-8102, Pedro Elcano Et. Al. v.
Reginald Hill Et. Al. dismissing, upon motion to dismiss of defendants,
the complaint of plaintiffs for recovery of damages from defendant
Reginald Hill, a minor, married at the time of the occurrence, and his
father, the defendant Marvin Hill, with whom he was living and getting
subsistence, for the killing by Reginald of the son of the plaintiffs,
named Agapito Elcano, of which, when criminally prosecuted, the said
accused was acquitted on the ground that his act was not criminal,
because of "lack of intent to kill, coupled with mistake."
Actually, the motion to dismiss based on the following grounds:
"1. The present action is not only against but a violation of section 1,
Rule 107, which is now Rule III, of the Revised Rules of Court;
"2. The action is barred by a prior judgment which is now final and or in
res-adjudicata;
"3. The complaint had no cause of action against defendant Marvin Hill,
because he was relieved as guardian of the other defendant through
emancipation by marriage." (P. 23, Record [p. 4, Record on Appeal.])
was first denied by the trial court. It was only upon motion for
reconsideration of the defendants of such denial, reiterating the above
grounds that the following order was issued:
"SO ORDERED.
"Quezon City, Philippines, January 29, 1965." (p. 40, Record [p. 21,
Record on Appeal.)
I
"THE PRESENT ACTION IS NOT ONLY AGAINST BUT ALSO A VIOLATION
OF SECTION 1, RULE 107, NOW RULE 111, OF THE REVISED RULES OF
COURT, AND THAT SECTION 3(c) OF RULE 111, RULES OF COURT IS
INAPPLICABLE;
II
"THE ACTION IS BARRED BY A PRIOR JUDGMENT WHICH IS NOW FINAL
OR RES-ADJUDICATA;
III
"THE PRINCIPLES OF QUASI-DELICTS, ARTICLES 2176 TO 2194 OF THE
CIVIL CODE, ARE INAPPLICABLE IN THE INSTANT CASE; and
IV
"THAT THE COMPLAINT STATES NO CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST
DEFENDANT MARVIN HILL BECAUSE HE WAS RELIEVED AS GUARDIAN
OF THE OTHER DEFENDANT THROUGH EMANCIPATION BY MARRIAGE."
(page 4, Record.)
2. May Article 2180 (2nd and last paragraphs) of the Civil Code be
applied against Atty. Hill, notwithstanding the undisputed fact that at
the time of the occurrence complained of, Reginald, though a minor,
living with and getting subsistence from his father, was already legally
married?
The first issue presents no more problem than the need for a
reiteration and further clarification of the dual character, criminal and
civil, of fault or negligence as a source of obligation which was firmly
established in this jurisdiction in Barredo v. Garcia, 73 Phil. 607. In that
case, this Court postulated, on the basis of a scholarly dissertation by
Justice Bocobo on the nature of culpa aquiliana in relation to culpa
criminal or delito and mere culpa or fault, with pertinent citation of
decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain, the works of recognized
civilians, and earlier jurisprudence of our own, that the same given act
can result in civil liability not only under the Penal Code but also under
the Civil Code. Thus, the opinion holds:
"The above case is pertinent because it shows that the same act may
come under both the Penal Code and the Civil Code. In that case, the
action of the agent was unjustified and fraudulent and therefore could
have been the subject of a criminal action. And yet, it was held to be
also a proper subject of a civil action under article 1902 of the Civil
Code. It is also to be noted that it was the employer and not the
employee who was being sued." (pp. 615-616, 73 Phil.)
"It will be noticed that the defendant in the above case could have
been prosecuted in a criminal case because his negligence causing the
death of the child was punishable by the Penal Code. Here is therefore
a clear instance of the same act of negligence being a proper subject
matter either of a criminal action with its consequent civil liability
arising from a crime or of an entirely separate and independent civil
action for fault or negligence under article 1902 of the Civil Code. Thus,
in this jurisdiction, the separate individuality of a cuasi-delito or culpa
aquiliana under the Civil Code has been fully and clearly recognized,
even with regard to a negligent act for which the wrongdoer could
have been prosecuted and convicted in a criminal case and for which,
after such a conviction, he could have been sued for this civil liability
arising from his crime." (p. 617, 73 Phil.)
"It is most significant that in the case just cited, this Court specifically
applied article 1902 of the Civil Code. It is thus that although J. V.
House could have been criminally prosecuted for reckless or simple
negligence and not only punished but also made civilly liable because
of his criminal negligence, nevertheless this Court awarded damages in
an independent civil action for fault or negligence under article 1902 of
the Civil Code." (p. 618, 73 Phil.)
"Firstly, the Revised Penal Code in articles 365 punishes not only
reckless but also simple negligence. If we were to hold that articles
1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code refer only to fault or negligence not
punished by law, accordingly to the literal import of article 1093 of the
Civil Code, the legal institution of culpa aquilina would have very little
scope and application in actual life. Death or injury to persons and
damage to property through any degree of negligence even the
slightest would have to be indemnified only through the principle of
civil liability arising from a crime. In such a state of affairs, what sphere
would remain for cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana? We are loath to
impute to the lawmaker any intention to bring about a situation to
absurd and anomalous. Nor are we, in the interpretation of the laws,
disposed to uphold the letter that killeth rather than the spirit that
giveth life. We will not use the literal meaning of the law to smother
and render almost lifeless a principle of such ancient origin and such
full-grown development as culpa aquiliana or cuasi-delito, which is
conserved and made enduring in articles 1902 to 1910 of the Spanish
Civil Code.
Although, again, this Article 2177 does seem to literally refer to only
acts of negligence, the same argument of Justice Bacobo about
construction that upholds "the spirit that giveth life" rather than that
which is literal that killeth the intent of the lawmaker should be
observed in applying the same. And considering that the preliminary
chapter on human relations of the new Civil Code definitely establishes
the separability and independence of liability in a civil action for acts
criminal in character (under Articles 29 to 32) from the civil
responsibility arising from crime fixed by Article 100 of the Revised
Penal Code, and, in a sense, the Rules of Court, under Sections 2 and 3
(c), Rule 111, contemplate also the same separability, it is "more
congruent with the spirit of law, equity and justice, and more in
harmony with modern progress", to borrow the felicitous relevant
language in Rakes v. Atlantic. Gulf and Pacific Co., 7 Phil. 359, to hold,
as We do hold, that Article 2176, where it refers to "fault or
negligence," covers not only acts "not punishable by law" but also acts
criminal in character, whether intentional and voluntary or negligent.
Consequently, a separate civil action lies against the offender in a
criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found
guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, if
he is actually charged also criminally, to recover damages on both
scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger
award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. In
other words, the extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of
Section 3, Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil liability founded on
Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the
same act considered as a quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not
extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the
criminal act charged has not happened or has not been committed by
the accused. Briefly stated, We here hold, in reiteration of Garcia, that
culpa aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent acts which may be
punishable by law.
WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is reversed and the trial court is
ordered to proceed in accordance with the foregoing opinion. Costs
against appellees.
Separate Opinions
Article 2176 of the Civil Code comprehends any culpable act, which is
blameworthy, when judged by accepted legal standards. "The idea
thus expressed is undoubtedly board enough to include any rational
conception of liability for the tortious acts likely to be developed in any
society." (Street, J. in Daywalt v. Corporacion de PP. Agustinos
Recoletos, 39 Phil. 587, 600). See article 38, Civil Code and the ruling
that "the infant tortfeasor is liable in a civil action to the injured person
in the same manner and to the same extent as an adult" (27 Am. Jur.
812 cited by Bocobo, J., in Magtibay v. Tiangco, 74 Phil. 576, 579).