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Systemic Balancing and Regional Hedging: ChinaRussia Relations

Hedgingul nu ar trebui inteles ca un fenomen legat de balancing si bandwoganing, ci


mai degraba acesta trebuie folosit pentru un tip de ordin diferita;
Balancing si bandwagoning ul descrie comportamentul marilor puterilor sub
presiunea sistemului, in timp ce hedgingul denota probleme politice in desfasurare la
nivel de stat si la nivel regional.
Hedgingul a fost introdus pentru a descrie modelele comportamentale post RR a
statelor mai mici din S E Asiei, a marilor puteri, precum- China, India, Rusia, SUA,
dar si a marilor puteri europene.
Principala carac. a hedgingului este ca aceasta consta in politici de
contrareactiune(counteracting). Hedgingul reprezinta o strategie de tipul engage and
resist, care este simultan un mix de balansare/indiguire cu engagement, cooperare si
competetie, risk contingency- care poate lua forma balansarii indirecte, return
maximization- care poate lua forma alinierii limitate.
Hedgingul are urmatoarele carac. indirect sau balansare soft, aliniere limitata,
balansare de tip realist, balansare de mica intensitate, balansare.
Cercetatoarea GOH, hedgingul- presupune activarea unei pozitii de mijloc care fie
anticipeaza fie evita alegerea unei parti pe cheltuiala celeilalte, si se refera la orice
comportament care se situeaza intre balansare si aliniere.
Tessman si Wolfe, hedgingul strategic- hedgingul propunere abordarea unei game
mult mai variate decat balansarea de tip hard, dar care in acelasi timp are o conexiune
puternica cu structura sistemului international. Hedgingul este de o intensitate mai
mica decat balansarea, deoarece acesta se limiteaza la formarea aliantelor externe
pentru a balansa liderul sistemului (balansare externa) sau pentru consolidarea interna
a armatei (balansare interna).
Art demonstreaza ca elemente de comportament descriese in literatura de specialitate
ca fiind sinonim cu hedgingul apare cu precadere cand avem interactiune fie la nivel
regional fie la nivel country to country, si ca sunt subiectele circumstantelor
domestice sau a situatiilor din mediul geopolitice proeminent ale celor 2 state.(rusia si
china).
Diferenta cheie dintre hedging si balansare este ca balansarea este un fenomen la nivel
sistemic legat de transformarile macroale polaritatii, intrucat hedgingul este o politica
la nivel de unitate mai bine explcata prin intermediul altor variabile decat presiunea
sistemica.
Singer, for example, discerned only two categories (nation-states and the international
system) and excluded the individual. Wolfers also proposed two levels of
understanding international relations, but his comprise states and individuals, similar
to Waltzs first and second images, and leave out the international system. Banks
argues that international relations should be understood from two points of
referencethe individual person and the whole global systemwhich resembles
Waltzs images one and three. Rosenau agrees with the three-level framework,
suggesting three parameters of world politics, one of which operates at the micro level
of individuals, one at the macro level of collectivities, and one that is a mix of the
two.Hollis and Smith suggest four levels, those of the international system, nation
state, bureaucracy, and individual.Goldstein suggests that, in addition to the levels of
individual, state, and international system, there is also a world level of analysis that
is distinct from the international level. He argues that the international level consists
of the interactions of separable units (sovereign nation-states), whereas the world
level consists of a single holistic system whose parts are mutually constituted rather
than separable. More recently, Mouritzen and Wivel also highlighted a distinction
between system-level and interstate level, so creating a three-fold framework of
system, interstate, and intrastate (unit) levels.
Interstate or intrastate levels, in turn, best explain states day-to-day policies,
agreements and disagreements, minor contradictions and cooperation, or
diversification of trade partners in the states salient geopolitical environment.
In other words, structural realism is a theory of systemic patterns of international
politics which does not explain the plethora of day-to-day agreements and
disagreements between states over certain issues. The key parameters of structural
realismrelative power and securityalone cannot explain the varied motives and
acts of states, particularly powerful ones with ample international opportunity. Thus,
system-level approaches do not claim to explain particular interactions between states.
Which of the abovementioned levels best explains hedging? This article argues that
system-level variables best explain balancing, whereas hedging, which consists of
simultaneous engagement and containment, is best explained by variables on a level
lower than the systemic level and relate more to regional (interstate according to
Mouritzen and Wivel, or international according to Goldstein) and intrastate or
domestic politics. There are two reasonsone theoretical and one empiricalfor this
statement.
The theoretical reason- the root definition of hedging combines engagement with indirect
balancing; cooperation with competition; engagement with soft balancing; balancing and
bandwagoning; and other, but similar, pairs of opposing dimensions. Medeiros, for example,
argued that hedging involves the pursuit of policies that on the one hand, stress engagement
and integration mechanisms, and on the other hand, emphasize realist-style balancing in the
form of external security cooperation . . . and national military modernization programmes.
Nadkarni, analysing interactions and partnerships of second-tier great powers such as China,
Russia, and India, talks about neither classic balancing nor bandwagoning but instead of
engage-and-resist hedging strategies as routine policies responsive to domestic and regional
environments. For example, as Russia or India develops closer ties with China, their mutual
partnership serves as a hedge for each in the event of a downturn in their respective ties with
China.This symbiosis of containment and common pursuit of mutual interests, which is the
how of government behaviour, is what makes presenting hedging purely as a result of
systemic pressure problematic, because this would mean explaining, by the same variable,
both balancing and bandwagoning by the same state, towards the same state, and at the same
time.
structural realists diverge on whether second-tier powers should be expected to either
bandwagon with the system leader or balance against it.Thus, according to Waltz, second-tier
states are prone to worry about their safety in the unbalanced international system, and to
start taking actions to balance against the unipole.Others argue that states are prone to
bandwagon with the system leader. The doublesided nature of hedging and the simultaneous
presence of two opposing sides within it make it incompatible with either version of realism.
Waltz argues that hegemons that possess predominant positions in the global
distribution of power inevitably cause other states to worry about their safety in the
unbalanced international system.
Such other states, therefore, either concentrate efforts on increasing their
capabilities (internal balancing) or on trying to realign with other second-tier states
(externalbalancing). This happens regardless of whether or not the hegemon manages to
control and restrain itself, or seeks to maintain its pre-eminence by employing strategies
based more on benevolence than coercion.
Both China and Russia have attempted to enter into some type of strategic
partnerships with minor regional states, compete for resources in their salient environments,
or engage in the military modernization of smaller states with which they have different
even conflicting types of relations.
Having structural positions within the international system, both enjoy a considerable
degree of freedom as regards foreign policymaking at the regional level. This explains why
the logic of their bilateral regional interactions is at odds with their behaviour in response to
the overall systemic pressure.
The South China Sea Dispute and Russias Arms Exports to Vietnam, CHINA VS
VIETNAM, RUSSIA + VIETNAM.
Competitie diplomatica rusia vs china cu privire la marea nordului (cine detine acasta
cale de transport va beneficia de ieftenirea si scurtarea timpului de transport.) Rusia are un
advantaj direct, deoarece este un stat cu Arctic, dar China As a non-Arctic State that cannot
claim territories bordering the Arctic, China is interested in internationalization of the
region and its resources.
Given the existing approaches to hedging, there is also an issue with differentiating
hedging from normal state behaviour. States will undoubtedly mix competitive and
cooperative elements in their everyday relations with each other; that is the intrinsic attribute
of statecraft. The utility of hedging, however, is in minimizing risk and maximizing benefits.
Hedging implies trying to diversify ones stakes and pursuing multiple policy options. It can
be envisaged as an insurance policy, pursued by states to manage potential economic and
political risks by means of diversification.
Because both China and Russia are nuclear great powers, neither faces an external
existential threat. Therefore, a formal security alliance between the two is not necessary.
Alignment, not alliance, between China and Russia is sufficient to achieve the necessary
security goals and to thwart strategic rivals political projects by pushing forward a non-
Western programme of world order. The existence of sophisticated nuclear weapons
makes it necessary to relax the criteria of external balancing and take strategic alignment
as a legitimate example thereof.