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" g a t t l e Experienc~i.~:.fi wilL be p~).blishe?

: r e g u l a r l y by t h i s h e a d q u a r t e r s en-
able uilits ia t r a i n i n ? t o p r o f i t from t h e 1a t e s t cornbald e x p e r i e n c e s of' our t r o c p 5
riow f ' i d i t i n g t h e Ckrnzns i n Ra11ce~. blthoug:!-i $he e x y ~ e r i e c c e sof c e r t a i n u n i t s at.
a p ~ ~ t i c u l z1ocai;ion
r are no% n e c e s s a r i l y ap:nlicable t o a l l u n i t s i n a l l s i t u -
a t i o n s , t h e i t e m p u b l i s h e d ~11.1b,: t h o s e based on ~ r a c t i c a le x p e r i e n c e a n d a e
se~onmsntieiif o r c a r e f u l c~nsidoi~a:!~onby umi-;s ~ i h i c bmay e:?.::ounter s i m i l a r pro1j.-
l e i L e p o r t s of co~robol-.utj.-:yoi. c o n t r a y t?xp:;,riencea are p a r t i c u l a r l y d e s i r e d
i n o r d e r t h a t t h e valid2i;y of t h e i r i d i c a t e d b a t t l e l e s s o n s rnay be- determined0

aLu N. SilADUY
L$ ten,. USA
Comn~andirg

NCYllE: Tho i t e m b e l o x have beex r e p o r t e d by o w t r o o p s i n Italy,. The r e p o r t


rsolll riliich t h e s e e x t r s c t s t a r e ril;;d~:d i d n o t i d s n t i f y s o u r c e s *

19. G e ~ c r . 1 , It v i m 93P i n o u r d i v i s i o n t h a t a l l com.bak p a t r o l s be l e d by


a n o f f i c e r , Rc;connai.s~uncep a t r o l ? were of -5hree cr f o u r men ooZyo P - a y mre
o f t e n used t o l o c a t e t h e eneriV3 r e t u r n , . and :Lend a cornbat p a t r o l t o t h e l o c a t i o n *
Combat p a t r o l s conoistod of 1 C ' t o 30 EGn, Each b a t t a l i o n had to-send o u t a t
hast. olio c c ~ b ~ . .patrol;
l; each nigh.t.

2, lTi,c?ht Patrol2.inc, Qa E ~ h pt a t r o l s should f i r e t h e i r r i f l e s . o n l y &en


t h e i r t e r g e t is cle?Lrly dofined find t ] l e i r si[;hts m e v i s i b l e , . o t k ~ e r ~ i sfire e is
i n a c c u r a t e * I b n d greazde:: a r e b e t t e r tjsa:pon:; a t n i g h t . R i f l e f i r e alriays d i s -
closes the patrol's position.
tji Oily one rnissioa s h o u l d be ~ F v s nt o a n i g h t patrol.. O r d e r s should r m c h
a l l members i n time t o a l l o ~ ic o m r ~ l e t ed z y l i r h t p r e p a r a t i o n , . Lhcluding s t u d y of
terrain..
c.. Inexperienced men shoulC n o t be sen.1; on re@= p a t r o l s , . a s t h s y jeopax-
diza t h e e n t i r e p a t ~ o l . . ,'aj.r:inp; s h o u l d be ~ ~ c c o n ; p l i a h ~by; dsending nt.71 p a t r o l s
under experj.&r;ced l e a d e r t v o o r t h r o e bunired y a r d s beyond our l i n e s , . and grnd-
uzl13: iircrezsing t h e d i f f i c u l t y of th:;.ir m i s ~ i o n . . It i s irrportant t h a t a ccfipany
aornnonder know t h e c ~ p a b i l i t i e sof t h e p e r s o r x e l h e i z t e n d s t o u s e on p a t r o l
missions,

1, h e i n f a l l t r y b a t t a l i o n commander said. ~ ~ ad ils cli p l i n a r y .matters caused


t h s moot d i f f i c u l t y i i ~ c p c r a t i o n s . EIe cii;sd t h o s e i n s t a n c e s . : Radio o p e r a t o r s .
heving no e x t r a batteries, iG'CCtn, g o i n 2 or? p a t r o l w i t h o u t wire c u t t e r s , s o l d i e r s
i n d i f f ' i c u l t t e r r a i n thro::lng atray bend grenedeo aid arrmun.ition and 1a t e r r u n n i n g
o u t of w?1u;nition, He b e l i e v e s : lC.Ofa are n o t g i v e n cnou& r e s p o n s i b i l i t y d u r i n g
traini~lg..
I -.- -
I?\PAI~mY-mTILLSIY
-,
C OCPEBATI OX*
lo & t i 11 e r - o b s e r v e r s m u s t be a b l e t o - s d h r e c t h i t s , t o hock out
prepared defenses.. I n sever l e r y piece, p r e c i s i o n adjusted
OE a uef ense omplaccs:~ent, has been e f f e c t ' i v e where a r e a f i r e of a b a t t a l i o n h a s

20 U n i t s r e c e i v i n g s h e l l - f i s a must l e a r n t o r e p o r t it prcmpJ~ly,g i v i n g d a t a
a s to i1ui13e:r of rcunds, ca!-iber, t i m , approxinatc azimuth t o e n e r a grrls as infii-
ailtell hy sho!-l ~E'TZ~OTJS, e t c ., ,%ell f-remnts, e s p e c i a l l y those c o n t a i n i n g :,or-
-$ions of' bai_?&, par.+iculm:y desired. ?-his w i l l a i d i n bringing i n
quick cow1tc.r-bettery f i r e t o s t o p t h e s h e l l i ~ g ,

1, The enemy w i 1 1 o c c ~ l p yt h e forl-~ards l o p e of a h i 11 ririth s k e l e t o n forces:


~+i.th au8crr.atic i:~eapocs, Tne m a j o r i t y of t h e 6efending t r o o p s t r i l l be on
ttre re7rer;;e s l o ? e , & t h e a t t a c k e ~ aapproac!~, t h e s e occxpjr prepared p o s i t i o n s o n
the f o r n a ? slopeo

2,. To counter t h e s e netbods o m a r t L l i e r y must f i r e o?l t h e forward p o s i t i o r s


and t h o u r L d ~il7,ded
f area j.35 i n : r ~ ; t u ? of thein u n t i l t h e 1a s t p o s s i b l e moment t o
prevent rei~iforce~nclilts s n c ~ i n govo:? t h e c r e s t ,

I, It rjas r e p o r t e d t h a t one b a t t a l i o n i n advancing !lad each ccmpany l a y two


l i n e s for2wards. I f ' cne l i n e ren18ined in.tnct W e n tlie o b j e c t i v e ms reached, the
b a t t a l i o n cori~lll;aiiderconsidzred l i i ~ x u l f1uclc.y.

2c. B z e r o boxed tias fcu?.id t o 5e invalu.z;3le i n , l a r g e r u l i i t s , It w 10-


o ~ l ; e dup t o 5GC! y a d s from t h e inaln srjri.taliboard a r ~ da 1 1 c i r c u i t t e s t l r g VZS doile
from t h e r e ,

3~. Yfilen p c s s i b l o keep rad-ios i n a d e f i l a d e d p o s i t i o n * Tne Germans hava


a c c u r a t e i n t e r c e p t o r s aild r i i l i . bring f i r e on a r a d i o p c s i t i o n e Relay messages by
u s e of y o m r ~ l l o n oor iilc;.seengero. 30 ~ I O T p l a c e r u d i o s c l o s e t o trc.ops0 l? send-
i n g x i e s s q p s by r a d i o from a c z r , . Lun t!:.c car up a ~ doer: d t h e road orid send f i . 0 1 ~
Liiff o r e e t l o c a t i o ~ i s ,

Bulldozes o p o s a t o r s r.lwt be t r a i n > ? d t o c o n s t r u c t by-2ssses a t n i g h t o Tho


o p e r a t o r must be a b l e t o f e e l t h s ~ i o r k i l - gof t h e blzde c;itl~out s e e i n g it,

1+ :Ju.nior o f f i c e r e ~ " 5I.;COfs skould t r y t o a s e i g , r t3e l o c a t i o ~of each f o x


bole0: btlierrrisc t h e y wiil I i z ~ eno tz..c"ccal value but tiill m w e l y p r o t e c t t h e in-
dividuzl,

2.. Tiler! should :Je placed i n pairs v i t h two yards b e t ~ e e r ii n d i v i d u a l s , P a i r s


should be s o e ~ ~ p l l s c ctl:.:<td f z c n t , f l a n k s Z Q . ~ r e a r u e defended, 811 i n d i v i d u n l s
m u s t Irll-ioq- t!iis p r f n c i p l c 2.16 EL-mth o w -id^iere t h e o t h e r members OF i 3 e squad are.
mat la-~ot;ladgexi11 ircrec.co t h e confidonco i n t h e u n i t ' s a b i l i t y t o defand.

h o l r zbout 3c f e e t 'oeyond *ifliere t k e t r a c e r s begin t o burr: i n order t o l o -


c a t e t h -f~ospon+
- 2 -
" B & t l e - ~ x p c r i e n ~ c s \ ~ zp u b l i s h e d r e , y l m T y by t h i s hear3qumtc.r~:t o
EnsbTe units ir train?-np: t o p r o f i - t t h e lcTtest c;onb;r', eex>crienc!cs of our
~ W nomSfighti.tlg *::LC Germi;l~?nsi n F r m c e . A1thou;ll-i t h e e.zzperic?ncc:: of ccr-
t z i n u n i t s a t E,' @.rticul.ar l o c a t i o n a r c n o t necctseary c?pplicc?hlc: t o a l l 7-1ni.k~
i n a!-1 situ;;.ticn.s, t h e iten.,=: publj-:~;hed;.rillb? t h o s e based on prac!;-ical cx-
p e r i c i l c c and m e rco~.cj:~eficle& fc-;rcarcf1.1.7 so:ns.idera-biox by u n i t s a h i c h IM:T en-
e c u n t e r s h i l a r proSlc:as.. Eapor.t;c of cr>rrCjboyative oy c o o t r < ? r y c x p o r i e n c c s m e
p m t i c u l a r l y s o s i r e d i~ o r 2 c r t h a t tlt,e vclidi-i;y cf' t h e indicu";r,d b z . i - % llcssons
~
may be cietemired.

2, I A sli:;htly d l f f c T c ~ - ?-t::,cl:.iic:~-~.e
, i no z
of a r t i l l . : r y e ~ ~ . p l ~ : ~ m nt
s i m i l a r s i t u a t 5 . o ~i s in<.icr.tcd- i n t:10 f ~ l l - o ~ ~r ic -: p~ogr t of ",1e Co~:!r!lil.nZin,.; lCeg-
,
e r a 1 9 t h D i v l sion:
"Best r e s u l t s x r e crbtr-in(-,?.:;hm 8-i.7 S r x ~ b tool.: ? plcZcc when the as-
s ~ u linz. t ~ Y O O ~aer.; ~ S ,
not; ;;ic,rlj %hall I*::cTO ;;~'P~;.Y!S I"rrr7 - t ' b t3i.,;c-l; and r:hon -t!~.r;y
movsd in r q i d l y 2 2 ,300n ,?T; t k 6 . ':prn7-,~yC;y1'cnn::J;::! OVCIT, S?;?CO cvcn .I;b.is li7:lited
zilbsncc . requ.in.,d va].u.abl_c? tir:;:: , i:; i7L8 f m1n.d bf..st to C zvc!? t!lr.: t~.1";;!-:t l,,Jitll
l i g h t a r t i 11e r y F e r e u.n";l thi: ,?t-C,ec!rc~rshzd ~.dvzxccdt o E p o i n t n o t l-iorc thm.
4CW :mrds f r & t!7_f3 t z r g c t , a t ~~hicl:t i s c t?:o li~m-;~- r ~ . r t i l l . o r yconcc:l.l;~At!OTI c.o~:~cI
b e dclivcrcd., folloi;-cd Fin?li!di.r;.to?L;~'h;ia r,?.pi.d , 7 1 1 ~ ? ? i l i : i ~ . 02 t ! ~ c'5.nfz~n.t;~::;-. 'fi1.c.n
. .
moh t a c t i c s ar;rc c;nl,?loys?j, si-lccrss j.nvz.yi_:~.?il;yf ol loricd. If, cf11 thk? @l;?ic;.'h 2 ~ d
a i r bcmb~rdrr.~2n*. took p l e c e 8.k t o o , g c r t c 6:s-truzcc; ?i'.-arn t h e zttncki:!..; t r o o p s , i-'c
w m found h ~ b i t u . z l l ; r /t.l l a t t h e d e f c r ~ d c r ahsc? n ~~:j8or-f;:~~5:k>r
, t g rccOy:.:r i ' L ~ C P 50. nan
t h e i r p o s i t i o n s hr<for!:: thd e-b-L?c7:ors co1.1.ld a ~ - ? i v c ~In . ';J:.e f i n 2 1 ~ s : ; ~ l ~Wnk- l~%j
d c s t r o y a r s a ~ 57 d mg .%ny, if tl.lc;i- CQ.!-:~. 5:. s p r o d f y m ~.1JL:31~:::? rc..lc, n c r e
found moot useI'u1. i a :i.i.~.i__n_~-'nt the: q~ertur;:;:; of s t r o n g ?c!=:~--i-c: ti: ccTrcr -the zd--
v m c e of d.c:m.oli%>on p-rt5.c,coi'
3";. " D i f f i a u l t i e s of a i r m p p o r t tJere mostly due t o l a c k of marking t h o
t m g c t , Usc of m o k c t o m ~ r l ;f r i e n d l y f r o n t l i n e s u s u i ~ l l ybrought a r t i l l c r y
f i r c from t h c cnemy; .princls i;cro hc;ttcr,. The i d c a l d i s t a n c e f o r c i r supp6X't
5s 6m y ~ r d 5i n f r o n t of t h c infan-try.. Dive b m b i n g i s t h c most ~ ? c c u r a t e , "
c - - R ~ g t l C@, Lth Div,.

& "Tnc'plan must be simple.. C o o r d i n n t i o n ' i s cchicved by keyin? tKc i'nh


f c - n t r y S - t t c c k , 1 6 t h i t s p l a n of s u p p o r t i n g f i r e s , t o t h e hour s e t for 'the dive
bombing. Prci?rrcnging such a schemc r c q u i r c s a t leosi; f o u r hours t o a.ssurc
t h a t f r o n t l i n e clcmcnts a r e g i v e n f u l l i n f o m ~ c ~ t i oof n t h o plans.. I n tllc 10%
mn, i t v r i l l s c v d a g r c z t d e a l of time i f - n n e x t r a hour o r t n o i s used f o r m-
ordination. ! ' -412, 7 9 t h Giv,

11 ~ S C X U GGS
Z TACTICAL O E ~ V ' T I O?JS

I,. ' T h c r c ' a c n o such t h i n g s a s s e c u r e fl,?nks u n l e s s c-perimeter d e f e n s e


is c s t z b l i s h c d ~ . . B > t t a ~ . i o n sr l r ~ a y ss e t u p p e r i m e t e r der?cllscs t o guard & g a i n s t
enemy p z t ~ o l zor~ mxll v.nits t h a t have been ~ ~ - ~ z s s c d . ! ' - - I n fR e @ l CO, 4 t h
Div,

2%'. "'bbr'car cre7;:s must be tcmg'nt t o r ' r l m ~ sd i , - p l a c e I c r t c r o l T y ' z f t e r firing


2s t h e y a-lcx:v~s &rrn;rcncmy f i r e i n r e t u r n , " --Inf R c g t l CO, 4t3 D i v .

3.. "Instznccs hzve bccn reported nhdrc: i n f e n t r y t?as n o t reedy t o move


c f ' t c r m-cxncnr;i~:ca r t i l l e r y grc:paretion,. Sfir~ei n f c a t r y u.fiit.s eppLrrently do
n o t r e a l i z e t h a t s u p p o r t i n g f i r e , ? (10 n o t dentro:i thi efieqr, S u t merely f o r m
him u n d e r ~ r o u n d .f o r a 1;rlct pcriod." 'I --CG, 77t3 Div.

I;.. "R%zn d i ~ : , g i k gi n ct x i g h t , ,-rc<?s near l a r g e tr::es should 3e c<voided'as


the c n m y fi.rr:s i i l t n tlleso t r c c s ?.;it12 I-Z? ~ F o l l st o obtz-in a i r * bursts.." --Inf Bn
CO, 9 t h Div,

3,. "~Ie6i.czLpersonnol sbou,illd have ':?ore i n f a n t r y t s a i n i n g , e s p e c i a l l y i n


rfi3-p end c m p z s o o o r k , <*la othc!r sub- 11
such sub j c c t r ; as co-ccr rind c::~nc~-.almcnt,
j c & s t h a t v i l l cnable such pc!rsc2nc!l t o s r o - L ~ e tt-hemselvcs from onerny f i re..
--Inf Rcgtl S u r , 9 t h DFv,

6 . "As s - b ~ j2l .s positi.c;ns a r c tzken., esgec?l~:ll.;r high ground, 2j.11 boxes,.


s t r o n g p o i n t s , t h e cncmy o?cns f i s o 011 t h e s e positions--on r-ihLch he h n s FTC-
v i o ~ j - s l yzcrjc?. ir,--hcncc t h e r~.cce,-sityf o r c o n t i ~ i - ~ apushing
l l ~ ~ cn.."-Jhr.Vh>ns
P l z t Lec.d.er, 79th Div,.

7. 'Snipers i n b u i l d i n g s ,yenernlly f i r e r i f l e s frcm high poiii-ts, and


ma-chine p i s t o 1 s fror:;. lo-,T ~ ~ o i n t s --KT
w " Plp113 ?Tat k a d c s , 79-bi2 Di.7,

8. "Send c ~ l ;-;T.i-?o . ~ o r t l l r c ~me2 fol!-oi:rcd by a 3-rn ton:? t c I.oc?_tc cllcmy


p o s i t i o n s-. m11-~cr e s t or" covor 2nd. p r o t e c t t h e i r
s q n d should r c ~ ; ~ c ~ljl~ci~r
iu

.,
srpprozcfi. Efzcvy machina'p~ns arc Gsed t o s p r c y t a l l e r t r e e s Likely t o c o n t d n
snipers.' 4 3 c . t LcsAcr, 83rd Dlv

9.. "1 reccdix.dnd. *.:c 3m tecrns,on? rn z d d i t i o n a l Tornmy gun t o a squad Tor


h e d g e r o ~Tightins."-l.?
~ P l a t Le~C?c_r,7 7 t h D j v .
t i. - ,:$
-'$ . >?ji.,;:-,:y*-
HQ FUSAG, APO 655

BATTLE EXPERIENCES
No. 7 26 JULY 1944
*'Eattle Zxpe~+ieilces"arep u b l i s l ~ s dr e g u l a r l v by this head-
q rters t o enair'le u n i t s i n training t o profit- from t h e l a t e s t
combat experiences cf our troops now f i g h t i n g t h e Germans in
France, Although the experiences of c e r t a i n u n i t s a t a particu-
l a r location a r e riot n e c e s s a r i l y apy:licable t o a 1 1 units i n a 11
s i t u a t i o n s , t h e items published w i 1 1 be those based on practical
experience and are r e c c ~ ~ e n d ef do r c a r e f u l consideration by m i t s
-ivbich mzy encounter* similar problems. Reports of corroborative
o r contrary experiences a r e particularly desired i n order t h a t
the =%idity of t h e indicated battle lesson ,nay be determined,

OWR N, BRADLEY
L t Gen., USA
Co~icbing

1, G e n e r a r A recent r e p o r t of t h e VII Corps i n France describes a s u c c e s s f u l ac-


-%*onon- 1
9a involvi,ng e x c e l l e n t coordinatioa of infantry, tanks and a r t i l l e r y ,
Tkilc %he q T l o d s used corifon: Lo those prescribed i n current t r a i n i n g manuXLs, the
f a s t s a r e pu ished t o enph:~si.ze t h a t corfomance 1~5th the prescribed methods, which
does n o t t o o frequentl;r occur, brought success,

2: PmlhLinzm Ac-kPun, Tf?e tank ' m ~ t t a 3 . Zccmmnder


- ~~ received t h e alert order f o r
aEsr 13ii9, 30 3 w e . Ee immdi~2,eXyi n i t i a t e d rou.te reconnaissance
.hpe!~d.kz zCtack, Z ~ Jabout a 0 0 he a d certain m e m b e r s 3f h i s
eaciqcartcrs of t:iw i n f a n t r y b a t t a l i o n t o covL*zr. w i t h t h a t b a t t a l i o n
commander, his s-k~ff ,
ai:d ~3f:ii:>'i:.);;,r ccrr~mnders

3, Crc!o.es, Flaas :.;en% ccoo;-(.i.lrr,at;edad t h e o r d e r i s s ~ l e da".,<his tirie, Eie orders


-w..*-

providna:
e I H-hour was 0933, 1 July,
'0: C k cornpaw of s-ix -hn'i:s ;.lo'd-d su-cx:ort each of the tt'a lhfantry assault con-
A d r : sand one ~:ro!dcE k 'in 3z:;eral su.ppost,
c, A r t i l l e r y prepar:it:i;>n ~~,o:nlr!prececle the :, *
jump-off a d when th3.s preparation
l i f t e d ';kc tar1.c r.rr.ta~.s-;~cxd;2. :fire .Crux >os::.cl{jns in rear of the 1;D a-t s u s p c t e d AT
positj.o:~s ;

: ::rc:ll:.j 1 ~ :-!e:\.::
>J7_J. .iA%;"J:s : 2bo.u.: 5.5s;ra.rds j.1~r2zr of t,he La and t h e sup-
p o r t +;3:c.k ~u':5f,sv!o~;.Ld ~ccitcfs:-.;inrZ in " , b e ~ C cross I t n e SI) ;%L*Lilt h e irS.antq a t H-hour.
e, ale i n f a n t v batt,.zlion commander wodd be f u r n i s h e d a t a n k r a d i o t o permit con-
t5nuous c o n t a c t with t h e tank commander.

4. Action,.
a, -tack - on t i m e . The Lmks moved forward slol~rlyon both s i d e s of
began
hedzes r,irallelin.; t h e d i r e c t i o n of advance, avoldklg roads, A s t h e y advanced, Lhey
s p r q ~ e d the
. hedges 1~5thmachine gm f i r e . r l d ~ + ~k ,idmortcrs,
- and a r t i l l e r y s he1 l e d
crossroads and o t h e r suspected AT l o c a t i o n s , usir,g '::P =d E3, A r t i l l e r y forward
observers accompanied t h e Icading wave of tanks.
5 , The i n f a n t r y kept a b r e a s t c.T t,he k ~ l i sand protected t h e n f r g m h o s t i l e i n f a n t r y
armed AT 3renades o r ri.Plss, The i nfante ~ l s mopped o u p and, in %he absence of
o t h e r +asgets, f i r e d a t . t . h e most l i k e l p eneny cover i n s i g h t , '/hen AT p s were en-
c o u n t e ~ ? d >i n f a n t r y mortar and a u t o m t i c f i r e was brought t o bear on them in a d d i t i o n
t o the s h e l l i n g , a d t h e infa3nt.x-y moved i n t o outflank t h e p o s i t i o n s ,
e; The supyjc.rting t ~ q kcompany t h e -infantry r e s e r v e company advmeed slowly
W h d T i - i s 1-eadirlg wave, napping up 'cypassed r e s i s t a n c e and prepared t o meet counter-
attack,

5. R e s u l t s , a t t a c k gained 2,COO vards through determined r e s i s t a n c e , w e l l


o r g a n i , r e d open a ~ concrete
d replacements. The o b j e c t i v e m s s e i z e d a t 15CO
secured zt 1600,
6, -IIighli@tst These a r e s o m of t h e p o i n t s c r e d i t e d by V I I Corps with t h e sue-
cess cZ t:?.e cperst,%on:
a "i'n2ly co_risulQ.tlion and careful coordination,
b, Ample +,he f o r t h e tanks t o rnelce r l a y l i g l ~ tpreparztions, Three hours 3.s con-
sidered. nssent:ial f o r a Lanlc compar::r; 5 hours f o r c?. k x k b a t t a l i o n ,
c, T~zn.1;~ hel&v;ell behind t h e LD u n t i l I!-hour.
d, .&ick .mtual support was insured by continual l i a i s o n and c l o s e prrz+Lty of
5n.fa~t.qz . t a~n k element,^ and a r t i l l e r y r"omraxi observers, 3ach d i d t h e job f o r
,,,~c_ch3.5 l;,a!.c?
,,c:>.~ :%st s u i t e d .

:B?i.t,ish nqpor-L tell:: g f r3ethods adopted tip a grc2p of about 30 pan-a't~ocpr;j:to


c l e a r a s r s l l p t c h of -;:20ds of hc=.stileresistar:czn, ma1. I e group advanced i.r; +;KC ?r~.vsS,
the l.ea2L~gwave a ~ : e d 1evr;.th . Sten::, t h e second w i t h grexades, The sei:ond 7;.'zve (evi-
denf;ly ?t a sreatl;,: rcdzcerl d.ist.?nce) w o - d d throv:. a volley of g~c,,cldes v~f:rt1:.9 heads
of LF~,
L
,;, , ' 7 ;:ad?r_< Ymve i n f ; ~t h e th-iclr ~~ii,'l?rgro-:~th ,ql::ea:i. ?>S tke <r~:ixi~r3s m2?1crled, t l ? ~
leading vmvs r ~ ~ s h er'o~;.zrd d :~hoi;c 10 yards, fi r i x g t.1-iefr Sbsns , 'Thj..:, process v.Qs 1.3-
pate.:. t:-~.-t,<y. ?:I 7 c o . i :lli;~c l e a r e d , I!.l~?e';ecn I ^ J ~ ~ T . W l;:ere
, I ~ ~ 11I11~d
<;r,d or.5 c.:;_:tf~red,
* B a t t l e m e r i e n o e s H are p u b l i s h e d r e g u l a r l y by % h i s h e a d q u a r t e r s t o e n a b l e
u n i t s - i n t r a i n i n g t o p r o f i t f r o m t h e l a t e s t cornbat e x p e r i e n c e s of our t r o o p s noE
f i g h t i n g t h e Germans i n f i a n c e , Although t h e e x p e r i e n c e s of c e r t a i n a
p r t i c u l a r l o c a t i o n a r e n o t n e c e s s a r i l y a p p l i c a b l e t o a l l its i n a l l s i t u a t i o n s ,
t h e items p u b l i s h e d w i 1 1 be t h o s e based on p r a c t i c a l e x p e r i e n c e and are recommendd
f o r o a r e f u l c o n s i d e r a t i o n by u n i t s wliich m y e:ncounter similar problems.. R e p o r t s
of c o r r o b o r a t i v e o r c o n t r a r y e x p e r i e n c e s are p s t i c u l a r l y d e s i r e d i n o r d e r t h a t
t h e v a l i d i t y of t h e i n d i c a t e d b a t t l e l e s s o n ma;y be d a t e r ~ d n e d .

' h e 2n8 IT, S. f i z a n t r y D i v i s i o n h a s prcec:5.bod, i n entbstance, t h e f o l l o w i r ~ g


proceilure f o r infantry-t,x:k z t t a c k s i n hedgerow country:

2. Use of Tank liusapons, Lxiiscrirrdnzte : ? i r i ~ by ~ g t a n k weapcns i n an codea-


u o r t o b l a n k e t a l l hedgero~isa ~ . dc o r n e r s t o frcx-it 2nd flanks, i s p r o h i b i t e d , The
l i m i t e d ammunition c a r r i e d by t a i l l s and t h e s a : f e t y of il3farrtry elements adva icing
through a d j a c e n t f i e l d s r e q u i r e t h a t c l o s e su;~;?ort t a n k s use only machine gun f i r o
t o t h e f r o l i t u n t i l z c t u l t a r g e t s ae.locotod. Plis l b i t a t i o n i n no m y z c t s t o
p r e v e n t f i r i n g of' a l l t a n k osay~onsa t l o c e t c d c~neinqp o s i t i o ~ l so r t a r g e t s of op-
wrtunity.

2, S p e a i d Tack E q u i p m n t . In adCFtien .to t h e i r norjnal equipment, tarllrs


carry ;
a Nine s e t s of p r e p a r e d d e m o l i t i o n ohpxges ( c a p s i n s e p a r a t e co:itainer )
for use i n breaching hedges.
One telephone i n s t r u m e n t momted an r e a r of t m k acd corlnected t o
inter-phone c i r c u i t i n o r d e r t o p r o v i d e v o i c e c:om~micction b e t m o n i n f a n t r y end
tank conrinanders,

3,. Team Yorimtion. The l e a d i n g t e n k of eac!l c l o s e s u p p o r t t a n k c ~ l m


o p e r a t e s a s a -menber of a t e r n c o n s i s t i n g of one r i f l e st;und, o m e n g i c e e r demo-
1i t i o n detachmerit of f o u r men aid ollo tan):, The enginec:? G.e;!:olit ion detecliment
acaompanies t h e tai.." tti?_rougiiout t h e o p e r e t i o n -;o a s s i s t i t s advcrlce by b r e e c h i n g
hedges w i t h demo1i";os~ cl:ol-cos and t o p r o v i d e :: measure of l c c a l p r o t e c t i o n against
AT grenades and rocl:et launcliers. The ?'.~Xs~itr:: squad does s o t l i r j l i t i t s r a t e of
a h a n c e t o t h a t of t B 3 t m k , b u t contir!.ucs t h e a t t a c k wher? t h e t a n k is s t o p p e d
o r delayed f o r acy rcason,
4, Operation. fi;lenelts* of t h e t a m taove f r o m oze hedgerovr t o t h e n e x t , .
usually i n t h e Pollovi5ng sequence: i:?l"c~;tl-.yat:outs, covered by t h e f i r e of t h e
a t l i e r i n f a t r y a - d t m k s ; t h e i ~ f a n t r yaui~,m~~.t:ic
V E Z ~ O E B j t h e remainder of t h e
2 - -
i n f a n t r y s q ~ i a d , accompanied by t a n engir:eers who s e l e c t a f i r i n g p o s i t i o n a t t h e
new hodge f o r t h e tar.k end ~ i g n a l ' i forvxrd,
t The r ~ e nt a n k p o s i t i o r - ~l:.ouldba
n e a r , buC' n o t i n , an e x i s t i n g goy, ar z,t a plan:_led ,yep t ~ l l i c h ill a f f o r d obeer-
v s t i o n and a f i e l d of f i r e and a l s o f a c i l i t a t e tke tank's f u r t h m rno~rc~:;sr.t for-
wzrd.. The tziz~k, accorr.pnnied by .t;l>e t n o r e r a i n i n g el-~ginecrsi s t h e 1a s t olenezlt
t c move f orvi-jard..

5 , Light tar&. Tlic l i g h t t a n k c o q n n y of e. medium t z ~ kb a t t a l i o n n o r -


mally w i l l be i n r e s e r v e .

(2111 July e l o n ~ i n t sof t h e 2nd C i c i s i o n a-t;tccl.;ed nnd czsttzrad h i 11 192.. The


. s uscd . a d crzoditeci ~ i i t l ; .boixt;: r e -
t e c h n i q u e r e s c r i b o c l is t h e ebove p ~ r a g r ~ p 1 l tiras
s p o n s i b l e f o r t h e s u c c e s s of tlx c t t c c k iiitil v e r y f a n c a s x a l t i a s . E ' G L ~prevS.ous
a t t a c k s i n -the sane area b~~cl failcd. w f i c e r o a::d or:liztod rlcri who took p m t
i n tlio a t t a c k brought oilt t h e f'ollo-;,.irig poiu.ts:
1, Engineers accompanj-i~lgt k e l e a d i n g t z ~ i ki n each te5.1 c a r r i e d pi-ne de-
t e c t o r s , and a l a n e v~zs swept tk!rougi: uac?i f i e l d . .

2.. Tho r i f l e r - e n p e r s q w d tj-ert. a s s i c a e d t h e j c b of tor& p r o t e c t o r s . They


moved t o t h e f l a n k and year of tile 1eadlc.g trArikias a dof onse n g z i n s t i ~ l d i v i d u . a l
eneny i n s p i e o r h o l e s .

One i1oliQ t k 3 s u p p c r t squad of sec'r: p l a t o o n o_norai;od i n each a e s a ? l l t


s q u a d 2 0 n e , usuall;: f r c n m e t o ~ I T Z B !?e~;eroii~.behind t'.e n o s ~ : ~ . l squad,
t f o r the
piwpose of c l e a q i n p o u t s n i p e r s , k h a t t a l i 0 2 C C s t z t e d tk3.t no cesixcl.tits vere
czused by s n i ~ p e r a2 ~ l r i i i gt h i s z t t L c k ; i!?;e~',>%s, i n a ~ r ~ ~ v i ad~cccs
o ~ t s ~ m d c~ i t h o u t
use of t h i s tecl-r,ique, s l l i p ~ r sC ~ L ~ . S Onore C t h e n or15 I..nlf 09 tilt ca.cll-1.alties.

1.. The b a t t a l i o n c o r ~ e r ~ d e71,r2.C:c mire l i : ? ~ ( 3 - 1 3 ~ ) t o s z c h c o n p ~ ~d y


uring
t h e a t t a c k , C o ~ ~ l u ! l i ~ c t i bct-,q,2e;;
on ip-,?,-;.l;ry c l d tcrlkc! ~rai!itair:cd effec t , i v ~ l y
th2oug.h uee of a u G t.;lzp3ane m o ! ~ t ~c:~. d -tkl% ro:-a7of t2ro J ~ ~ g ~ jiktra :,. telep?lolles
must be i s s u e d - f o r t h i s g w p c e ~ , . g i t h a r a 1o::go~ coyd, o r rli1.e; C O . : I - ~ ~ G C ~ G T Sa r c
needed t o a v o i d brea!ciry t h e hand s c t ccrd i f t k e tank nloves svLddcn3$-,,.

3.. TO f a c i l i t a t e c o n t r o l , ezcl; f i s l d -;;cis as:!ig.red a rvm'o(?r = ~ d progreES


was r e p o r t e d by t h e s e r i d ~.u:bor c5 tl-I;: f i e l d i n x i l i c h t h e r e p o r t e d elocjont
l o c a t e d . . TILL=t h e 1oc.ation of t h s f r 6 n . t liilo ms el;izz:ys h o r n ~ ~ 5 ct ehr t a i z t j r .

6, Each kedgerow ~ u s be t a phese l i n e - othervsise, a lenfiing squad may


be exposed t o Planki!rlg Tire.

7.. One roulld f r o 3 t h e t a n k c a m o n should be f i r p d i r t o e ~ c i ' lcorner of t h e


f i e l d t 0 be covcrea i g tlie n e x t , bou_?d befc're a n y advance is ::-i;ti?;-?:>t~?. &p s u s -
p e c t e d a u t o m ~ t i c-r:.zapol-!s po::ition;; sl;ouicl a l s o be ; l . : f ; l l , ~ ~ . Leln;; f u r e s sh0uld
. ., .
be m e d ; t z ; & crLfi 121,z.ntry c o r ( ~ ~ ; ~ -XTZre
~ ~ e ~posi:sLtQ
s ,:L1:;~ut.t::;l~ ]
?

8,. & t i l l c r y support riu;;-t b s ~ l ~ c es


e dc u l l e d r'cr b s c a v z , ~t h e ?e.te of ad-
vance cannot be p r c i i i c i ~ d ,

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