INTERPRETING JIHAD: IMITATION OR INNOVATION

A Thesis

Presented

to the Faculty of

California State University Dominguez Hills

In Partial Fulfillment

of the Requirements for the Degree

Master of Arts

in

Humanities

by

Robert Reinebach

Spring 2013
 UMI Number: 1523689

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THESIS: INTERPRETING JIHAD: IMITATION OR INNOVATION

AUTHOR: ROBERT REINEBACH

APPROVED:

William M. Hagan, S.T.D

Thesis Committee Chair

Daniel Greenspan, Ph.D.

Committee Member

Anita L. Chang, D.M.A.

Committee Member
 TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE

APPROVAL PAGE.................................................................................................................ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS.......................................................................................................iii

ABSTRACT........................................................................................................................... iv

CHAPTER

1. INTRODUCTION............................................................................................................... 1

2. VOICES OF ISLAM ..........................................................................................................6

3. JIHAD.................................................................................................................................12

4. JIHADISM......................................................................................................................... 20

5. IJTIHAD DEFINED..........................................................................................................28

6. IJTIHAD APPLIED...........................................................................................................36

7. A NEW IJTIHAD.............................................................................................................. 45

8. CONCLUSION.................................................................................................................. 52

WORKS CITED.................................................................................................................... 55

iii
 ABSTRACT

Jihadism, in Islam, shares several family resemblances with other religious

fundamentalist movements. One of these noteworthy traits is militance against

secularism and non-fundamentalist belief. While traditional scholars interpret jih a d

(literally a struggle) primarily as spiritual battle and secondarily as physical warfare,

jihadists interpret the term as global holy war, and some extremists encourage

unrestricted tactics such as suicide bombing and targeting non-combatants. Although

traditional Sunni Islam has, for centuries, favored scriptural exegesis based on taqlid

(imitation or acceptance o f prior jurists), jihadists use ijtihad (innovation or independent

judicial reasoning) to re-interpret the Quran based on their perception of the world today.

Ijtihad, however, appears to be re-emerging as a tool for moderate Muslims as well, who

argue for an interpretation of the Quran that endorses peaceful coexistence with non-

Muslims and advocates other humanitarian values.

 1
CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

There are undoubtedly conflicting opinions over the meaning o f the word jihad.

For example, Syed Mirza, in an article entitled An Exegesis on Jihad claims that For

1400 years, Muslims always understood the meaning of Jihad as Islamic Holy War or

fighting for the cause of religion. Every Islamic scholar, mullah, maulana or imam in the

world agreed with this meaning of Jihad (Shienbaum 77). On the other hand, Irfan

Omar, in an article entitled Keeping Sharia and Reclaiming Jihad states, Jihad,

contrary to popular belief, has never been translated by Muslims as holy war except of

course by the terrorists of our time. War in Islam was always regarded as a necessary

evil but never holy or sacred (709). The September 11 attacks and their aftermath

accelerated a debate in the West over the nature o f the religion of Islam and more

specifically the exact meaning of the term jihad. Recently this debate has only escalated,

probably reheated by the tenth anniversary o f the terrorist attacks and the recent death of

Osama bin-Laden. Scholars have written hundreds of academic books and journal

articles on the subject in the past decade and this paper includes some of the most recent

to help create a snapshot on the meaning o f jihad from both a traditional and

fundamentalist point of view. One recurring theme in the academic discussion o f jih a d is

the claim that jihadists are religious fundamentalists.

Religious fundamentalism, widely debated by scholars during the twentieth

century, has become a topic of particular interest in the past decade. Originally coined by
 2
Protestant Christian groups in the United States in the early 1900s, the term was

attributed to factions from every major religion across the globe by the end of the century

(Armstrong xii). The scholarly discussion o f global fundamentalism was significantly

enhanced by Martin Marty and Scott Applebees The Fundamentalism Project o f the

1990s which produced seventy-five scholarly monographs published in five volumes

authored by experts in various fields of religious studies. These concepts have been

discussed and debated in hundreds o f books and journal articles in the years since

(Appleby 9).

Although the label fundamentalism or fundamentalist is often rejected by

those in the groups under examination and by a multitude o f academic scholars for a

variety of reasons, Marty and Appleby stress that the term fundamentalism is here to

stay and argue that groups labeled as such across the globe and across all the major

religions share, if nothing else, what Wittgenstein proposed as family resemblances

(Marty, Observed ix). The editors of The Fundamentalism Project believe that, despite

the multitude of intrinsic differences in the major world religions, fundamentalist

movements in each share certain key traits. One example o f a key shared trait is the

fundamentalist tendency to favor strict adherence to the literal interpretation of scriptural

texts over accepting some stories as figurative or metaphorical. Many fundamentalists

also favor dogmatic imitation of the ancient founders o f the faith over the acceptance o f

later religious traditions. The trait most applicable to this discussion is the fundamentalist

tendency . . . to separate from fellow believers. . . [in] disciplined opposition to

nonbelievers and lukewarm believers alike. These groups according to The

 3
Fundamentalism Project adopt. . . a set of strategies for fighting back (Marty,

Comprehended 1).

Appleby, in his post September 11 addendum to The Fundamentalism Project

entitled Strong Religion, emphasizes that a critical family resemblance between

fundamentalist groups is the tendency to engage in militant struggle against real or

perceived threats to their respective religion (2). These threats are typically

secularization, modernism, and religious liberalism. More recently, Richard Antoun in

Understanding Fundamentalism argues that the worldview and ethos o f fundamentalism

is the same across cultures and that Its ethos is one of minoritarian protest and outrage

at the progressive displacement o f religion from one institution after another in an

increasingly secularized society. All fundamentalists share this worldview and ethos

(16).

Since 2001 fundamentalist Muslim groups have gained an increased level of

scrutiny in the West. Malise Ruthven, for example, in his book Fundamentalism: The

Search fo r Meaning mentions, The most spectacular fundamentalist atrocity o f all was

the suicide hijacking of three [sic] airliners by Islamist militants belonging to the al-

Qaeda network led by the Saudi dissident Osama bin Laden, on 11 September 2001 (1-

2). Ruthvens recent work, along with many others detailing this particular Muslim

variety of fundamentalism, echoes Marty and Applebees proposal that global

fundamentalism can be identified by family resemblances and that one critical shared

trait is the militant struggle against real or perceived threats to a particular religion or

faith. It would be grossly inaccurate to compare all fundamentalist groups with al-Qaeda,
however. Fundamentalist militance does not connote violence in most cases. As

Armstrong notes, . . . it is only a small minority of fundamentalists who commit such

acts of terror, but even the most peaceful and law-abiding are perplexing, because they

seem so adamantly opposed to many of the most positive values of modem society (xi).

The struggle these fundamentalists undertake in the defense o f the faith is

critical to this discussion, however. Likewise, the meaning o f the word jih a d lies at the

center o f the debate over whether or not Islam is a religion of peace, a discourse that has

been accelerated in the West since the terrorist attacks. Jihad, which can roughly be

translated a struggle, has recently come to mean holy war (Zaidi 21).

The topic and context o f this paper springs from the theoretical framework

proposed by Marty and others that religious fundamentalism is a significant global

phenomenon found in all the worlds major religions and that these movements share

certain family resemblances, one o f which is the tendency toward militant struggle o f the

fundamentalist against secularism and non-fundamentalist belief to include traditionalism

and religious liberalism. This paper will specifically analyze and critique the debate over

the meaning of the word jih a d as holy war versus inner spiritual struggle. It will also

review scholarly reactions to various fundamentalists viewpoints as to whether jih a d as

warfare may be utilized at will or should be reserved, in the case o f violence, for only

those defensive scenarios defined in the context o f Just War (Blankinship 416).

Prior to any in depth analysis of this dialogue, it is first necessary to identify the

various competing voices that speak for Islam which include several broad categories.

The non-fundamentalist voice includes traditional and liberal believers as well as secular
humanists and other non-Muslims. The fundamentalist voice includes both activists

committed to peaceful reform and those who endorse varying levels of violence (although

the focus of this paper is on the latter). The traditional definition o f jih ad will then be

presented and contrasted with the development o f jihadism which has emerged from the

fundamentalist ideology.

I find that the interpretation of jihad by the fundamentalists as seen in Sayyid

Qutbs Milestones and expanded to the extreme by the ideologue he influenced, al-

Qaedas Ayman al-Zawahiri, strays far from most traditional Muslim interpretations

(Cook 180-1). Furthermore, it appears that this separation by the fundamentalists from

the traditionally accepted interpretations of the scriptures requires the use o f ijtihad (the

verb form of jihad, connoting the use innovation, or independent reasoning to interpret

the Quran). Ijtihad was, until recently, widely considered no longer permissible by

Sunni Muslim scholars who endorsed the practice instead of taqlid (imitation, or

acceptance of the rulings o f early jurists). Other competing ideas regarding the meaning

o f jihad will also be discussed as applied by more moderate traditional scholars and

liberal believers. Because this paper addresses Islamic scriptures and analyzes the works

o f Muslim ideologues and scholars, it is worth acknowledging that I personally write

from the perspective of a non-Muslim in the context of comparative world religions and

that this work is primarily rooted in the secular disciplines o f philosophy, history and

religious literature.
 6
CHAPTER 2

VOICES OF ISLAM

The term jihad has become associated with Islamic based terrorism in popular

Western thought in the aftermath of September 11 (Greaves 55). Prior to any in-depth

debate over the various interpretations of jihad, two important questions must be

addressed. First o f all, what is Islam? Secondly, who speaks for Islam? The second

question correctly implies that the Muslim world is not a homogenous group o f religious

adherents unified by a single voice, although there are theoretically several basic unifying

principles and practices shared by all Muslims. The voices that emerge can be roughly

categorized as fundamentalist, non-fundamentalist believer (both traditional and liberal

Muslims) and finally the other (which broadly encompasses both the secular and

religious non-Muslim voice for sake o f this study). For the sake of clarity and simplicity

the paper will furthermore refer to these voices as traditional, fundamentalist, liberal and

secular.

What then, is Islam? Historically Islam begins with Muhammad around 610 AD

in present day Saudi Arabia, making it the youngest of the major world religions. It was

spread after Muhammads death primarily through the introduction to Arab tribes from

conquered lands. Muslim believers, however, view Islam as the oldest and only true

religion. Beginning with its inception, Islam has required renewal due to human

corruption or lack of understanding by various prophets throughout history until its final
revelation to Muhammad in the Quran (Greaves 2). John Esposito, a leading Western

scholar on Islam, states,

Islam today is the dominant symbolic and ideological force in the Muslim

world informing social institutions (education, clinics, hospitals, social

welfare services, and banks) and politics. In contrast to the expectations

of only a few decades ago, Islam . . . has reemerged as a significant force

in public life. (1)

In a world, however, where Islam, with an estimated population of nearly 1.5

billion adherents, is the leading religion in over 57 different countries, there are bound to

be many variations in theological preferences and religious practices. These variations

historically have been most notable between the belief and practices o f Sunni and Shi a

Muslims, the former, which this discussion is primarily limited to, claims approximately

eighty-five percent of Muslim adherents (Esposito 1). Despite the diversity, however,

there are several key characteristics that are definitive to Islam. To summarize, all

Muslims believe in five core principles and must strive to adhere to five core practices or

the pillars of Islam. The principles all Muslims believe in include the Oneness o f

God, the prophets (Muhammad being the last and greatest), the Quran, angels, and the

Day of Judgment. The pillars that all Muslims must strive to practice include the

declaration of faith, prayer five times a day, alms-giving, fasting during the month o f

Ramadan, and the pilgrimage to Mecca (Esposito 1).

Despite these unifying traits, there are certainly differences o f opinion and

practice as highlighted in this debate concerning the definition and role of jih ad in the
 8
Muslim community. Who, then, are the various competing voices o f Islam? In 2006 a

panel of experts led by Mustafa Tlili collaborated to answer this question as part o f The

Center fo r Dialogues conference at New York University. Leaders from the conference

posted an article entitled Who Speaks for Islam. This essay categorizes the voices of

Islam as: the Ulama, Multiple Sovereignties and Nation-States, Self-Proclaimed Islamic

States, The Islamists, Transnational Islamist Networks, and finally the Voices o f a New

Ijtihad. To simplify the above categories, each fits into either the traditional,

fundamentalist or liberal classification.

The traditional voice of Islam includes the ulama (the recognized group o f

scholars, jurists and religious leaders) along with state or political actors. The essay

mentions, Traditionally the U lam a. . . the scholars of jurisprudence, were guardians of

the Islamic faith and the leading authorities in religious matters. . . but even in the

classical age, there was no single source of religious authority for the entire Muslim

world (Tlili 2). During the classical period, Shari a law was developed by these

scholars and jurists based first and foremost on the Sunna, which includes the guidance

either directly from the Quran or secondarily from the hadith (the collected stories o f the

life and teachings of the Prophet recorded and passed along by early followers). This

group of scholars and jurists from the various judicial schools are still traditionally

considered the leading voice for the community o f believers of Islam today. Examples of

the present day ulama would include scholars, jurists and religious leaders with degrees

or qualifications from the leading Muslim institutions o f higher learning such as Al-
 9
Azhar, Sunni Islams most esteemed institution o f theological learning. . . the worlds

oldest university (Tlili 3-4).

Along with the ulama, the political leadership o f Muslim countries plays a role in

the traditional concept of authority in Islam, although this can be problematic in the

current fragmented state o f global affairs. Concerning Muslim state leaders, historically

The Muslim world had fragmented into several autonomous polities in the very first

centuries of Islam . . . Muhammad elected not to nominate a political successor,

preferring that the community of believers choose its own leader after his death (Tlili 5).

This immediately proved problematic in the Islamic world and the role o f the caliphate

remains a source of controversy. Today various governmental systems vie for

recognition as a voice in the unfolding narrative o f Islam. Secular governments o f

primarily Muslim countries, such as Turkey, Egypt, Syria, Iraq and Libya currently fill

such a gap, although the stability and future of many of these examples remains uncertain

in light of the Arab Spring. Countries such as Saudi Arabia (Sunni) and more recently

Iran (Shi a), on the other hand, have developed Islamic states which are, in theory,

theocracies and identify themselves as such based on their adherence in matters of

governance to Islamic scripture and theology (Tlili 7).

At best, the role of Islam in the current political structure of the Muslim world is

confusing or disjointed, and more and more westerners, influenced by . . . the media,

have come to believe that it is the most extremist among the Islamists who represent and

speak for, Islam . . . many Westerners confuse the terms Islamist and fundamentalist with

the term ulama (1). These fundamentalists, also known as revivalists . . . reformists . . .
 10
jihadists, Islamists and Islamic militants also strive for recognition as the authoritative

voice for Islam (Greaves 90). Tlili notes,

Many Muslims, especially the Islamists, came to consider the ulama

incapable of providing a political vision for the future. The ulama seemed

preoccupied with the finer points o f theological interpretation and with

legal precedents that did not apply to the contemporary situation.

Furthermore, the ulama were accused . . . of detracting from the religions

innate dynamism by closing the gates of ijtihad. (9)

Examples of individuals and groups who stepped in to fill the gap include ideologues

from various levels of scholarship - most of whom would not meet the traditional

qualifications required to be considered members o f the ulama. These ideologues have

championed movements (to be discussed later in this project) such as salaffism,

wahabbism and jihadism, and have led various fundamentalist groups such as the Muslim

Brotherhood, Jamaa a-Islami, al-Jihad, and most notoriously, al-Qaeda. One key

characteristic of these fundamentalist ideologues is that they typically stray from many

Muslim traditions. They champion the use of independent reason to re-interpret the

Quran in light of a perceived crisis. Their ultimate goal is to usher in social and political

reform in the Muslim world.

Alongside the traditional and fundamentalist voices speaking for Islam is the

liberal voice. The Who Speaks for Islam article notes, In contrast to the Islamists, a

new group of Muslim thinkers, which has emerged during the past several decades, seeks

to apply contemporary intellectual methods to the task o f reforming Islam (12). These
 11
thinkers, belong to a reformist tradition stretching back to the mid-19th century . . . who,

influenced by the European Enlightenment, applied positivist and rationalist thought to

reconcile Islamic turath (tradition) with the challenges o f modernity (12). The

resurgence of independent reason in Islam, then, may provide more than just a call to

arms to restore an ancient way o f life as the fundamentalists advocate. This may, instead,

provide a path for Islam to reconcile its religion with enlightenment values and put the

Muslim world on what the West would consider a more conciliatory path with the rest of

the world.
 12
CHAPTER 3

JIHAD

Manzar Zaidi, in a recent article from Arab Studies Quarterly entitled A

Taxonomy of Jihad asserts,

Jihad derives from the Arabic root j h d, signifying intense struggle or

effort. Besides denoting an armed struggle, it has the connotations o f a

moral struggle within ones own self. It thus carries the hermeneutical

meaning o f a moral endeavor directed towards ones own improvement or

self-elevation on a moral plane which Muslim jurists o f eminence have

been quoted as calling . . . [the] bigger jihad. (21)

Merriam-Websters Dictionary, however, currently defines jihad first as a holy war

waged on behalf o f Islam as a religious duty and then as a personal struggle in devotion

to Islam especially involving spiritual discipline. Finally, the dictionary classifies jih a d

as a crusade for a principle or belief. Although the above definitions include only

slightly dissimilar concepts, the overarching definition of jihad according to the English

dictionary seems to emphasize jih ad as warfare; this is not, however, where most Muslim

scholars believe the emphasis should be placed.

The traditional Muslim understanding of jihad has developed from a systematic

process of interpretation. Indira Falk Gesink neatly summarizes this methodology in a

book entitled Islamic Reform and Conservatism, part of the Library o f Modern Religion

series published in 2009. She mentions that interpretation on any matter always began
with the Quran. Verses with obvious meanings were binding; while verses that appear

ambiguous were to be interpreted through three additional methods. First of all, scholars

used the hadith, or the traditions of the life and teachings of the Prophet that were

collected and validated during the first few centuries of Islam and categorized by varying

levels of suspected authenticity. Secondly, if further interpretation on a matter was still

required, consensus (imja) of the community of scholars could validate a judgment.

Finally the use of analogy (qiyas) was permitted. Ijtihad, innovation or independent

reason, was required for early rulings that had no direct answer but still had to be

validated by consensus or analogy or both. Once a ruling had been made on an issue,

scholars typically favored the principle o f taqlid, or imitation of earlier rulings based on

set precedents (63-5).

With this in mind, the place to begin in determining the proper definition o f jihad

is to review the traditional scholarly Muslim interpretation from the Quran on the topic.

For Muslims, the Quran is the direct word of God, revealed exclusively with Gods

authorship and human penmanship. Therefore, the Quran is the main knowledge source

for all aspects of life (Amjad-Ali 240). In a recent Journal on Qur anic Studies article,

Muhammad Abdel Haleem laments that the word jih a d . . . has become, to some extent,

divorced from its significance as a Quranic term. He stresses, then, his aim to deal

with the subject. . . [solely] on the basis of the linguistic analysis o f the text o f the

Quran itself (147). In a separate work he published in 2010 entitled Understanding the

Qur an: Themes and Styles, Haleem discusses several critical, traditionally-accepted

principles of Quranic exegesis. These principles include context and internal

 14
relationships. Haleem asserts that the classical science o f Quranic exegesis (tafsir)

hinges on these principles. This includes the context of the situation that revolves

around knowing the requirements o f the situation during the discourse from the point of

view of the discourse itself, the discursant, the discursee or all of them together (163).

The principle of internal relationships, or intertextuality, is that passages from different

parts of the Quran are complementary and that the best way to discern the meaning o f an

unclear verse is to reference it in light of the Quran as a whole. To emphasize the

supremacy of these principles in classical exegesis he asserts,

The importance o f context in determining the meaning o f any discourse ..

. is now established beyond a doubt. The style of the Quran being self-

referential, the importance o f internal relationships in understanding the

text of the Quran cannot be seriously challenged. . . [and] must surely

take priority over any other approach to understanding and explaining the

Quran. (165)

In his detailed study, then, Haleem analyzes the occurrences of the root j h d (to strive)

alongside the root q 11 (to kill) where applicable and arrives at a contextually based

conclusion as to the meaning of jihad.

Haleem stresses several key points that are echoed by other scholars. First o f all,

jihad in relation to violence or warfare occurs less often than jihad in relation to other

non-violent activities. Charles Amjad-Ali in another article notes that of the thirty-five

occurrences of the word jihad in the Quran only four clearly indicate war while eleven

are clearly pacific. The other twenty can be interpreted either way (246). The term is
 15
often times used in the context of ''jihad of the heart or o f 1jihad o f the tongue which

implies the importance of jihad as either a spiritual struggle or a struggle through debate,

preaching or other rhetorical device.

Secondly, in the case o f military jihad, or jihad of the sword, specific guidelines

are implied. Haleem discusses a statement from the Quran (22:39) in which the Prophet

relays, Those who are attacked are permitted to take up arms because they have been

wronged. . . (qtd. in Quranic Jihad: 150) and demonstrates that this passage signifies

permission for war in self-defense. He then notes that Quran 2:191 includes the

controversial phrase kill them wherever you find them (151). Haleem argues that in

the context of the rest of the passage, this statement comes along with many restrictions

and indicates that the Muslims should not initiate fighting or fight non-combatants, be

disproportionate in their response, or continue to fight when the enemy has stopped

(152).

Haleem also addresses the passage that has been used to support violent jihadist

ideology more than any other. He discusses the infamous sword verse that states . . .

slay the idolaters wherever ye find them, and take them (captive), and besiege them, and

prepare for them each ambush {The Meaning o f the Glorious Qur an 9:5). Jihadists

point out that this passage contains the final revelation on warfare in the Quran if looked

at from a chronological perspective. Based on the principle of abrogation, they argue,

guidance from this verse overrules all earlier restrictions on warfare. Haleem concedes,

It is an acknowledged exegetical position that these core restrictions on initiating combat

were rescinded in later revelations (152). He argues, however, that even with the
 16
principle of abrogation in mind these conclusions are inaccurate and misleading if one

looks at the Quran as a whole (154). Amjad-Ali echoes this sentiment, concluding that

these problematic verses must be read in context and stresses that every verse in the

Quran must be read and interpreted against the background of the Quran as a whole . . .

The Quran nowhere demands that the Muslims should remain permanently at war with

the non-believers (246). Haleem concludes his argument asserting,

. . . jihad is undoubtedly an important subject in the Quran, whether it is

non-military or military. Military jihad is prescribed only for self-defense

and defense of the oppressed . . . The Quran sets very stringent conditions

and limitations for fighting . . . Without taking context into account. . .

gross and wild misunderstandings of the subject have arisen. (163)

Haleems findings, though not in and of themselves authoritative, basically echo the

traditional interpretation ofjihadthat is that jihad, when it is found in the Quran,

seldom authorizes violence but is primarily embedded in the context of self-defense and

carries with it multiple restrictions.

Using the aforementioned Quranic principles, the early ulama developed a basic

system of Just War. Many books and articles have been written on comparative Just

War theory. For example, James Turner Johnson in his book Ethics and the Use o f

Force: Just War in Historical Perspective, dedicates an entire chapter to Just War and

Jihad. Johnson stresses jihad as the obligation to a spiritual struggle versus actual

warfare in the Quran and states, the origins of a systematic normative conception o f

jihad of the sword as an element of Islamic law come . . . with the rise o f formal Islamic
 17
jurisprudence (fiqh) early in the Abbasid period (54). The development o f the concept

of warfare within the community of these early jurists, he notes, sprang from a more

underlying necessity to define the nature of the relationship o f the community of Islam

with the non-Muslim world. He states,

In doing this they took the idea of jihad, striving or effort in the path o f

God, building on the essentially moral conception o f the Quran itself, and

extended it to refer to the use of armed force for the twin, but linked,

purposes o f protecting the Islamic community and serving the end of

bringing the entire world into submission to God. (54)

A critical aspect of this conception was the development of the view that the world was

divided into two realms, the Abode of Islam (dar al-Islam) and the Abode of War (dar

al-harb). Jihad as war, under the Abode o f Islam, fell under the authority of a

legitimate ruler, the caliph, and it was the collective duty o f Muslims to support this

effort whether the requirement was for a tactically offensive war against a general threat

or a collective defensive effort against an attacker. Johnson notes, There are striking

similarities, as well as important differences, between this conception of collective jihad

of the sword and the classical idea of just war (55).

Although the Just War concept in Islam and the West are not identical, Khalid

Blankinship in a 2011 essay for The Muslim World journal mentions that both traditions

set criteria to initiate war which include just cause, right intention, legitimate authority,

proportionality, probability of success, and last resort (414-6). Muslim tradition, like

Western tradition, also considers proper execution of warfare. Blankinship notes, In

 18
classical Muslim doctrine on w a r. . . genuine non-combatants are not to be harmed . . .

the main criterion distinguishing combatants from non-combatants is that the latter do not

fight and do not contribute to the war effort (416). Finally, he notes that the end of

warfare, or the principles governing how best to bring about peace at the conclusion of

warfare, is essential to both traditions (417).

Ron Greaves in his 2010 book Islam Today likewise asserts that Muslims can

legitimately prosecute both a defensive and even in some cases offensive war (against a

perceived threat), but that the war must be fought under several conditions according to

the Shari a (Islamic Law). These conditions include that the war must not be prosecuted

for material gain, that non-combatants must be protected, that crops must not be

destroyed, that the elderly, women, children and invalids must not be harmed, that places

of worship and the clergy must be respected, that prisoners o f war must not be tortured

and finally that the war must be only fought in defense o f the faith (56).

Traditionally the restrictions above, however, applied only to Muslims residing in

the Abode of Islam. In the notional Abode of War Muslims had an individual duty

to protect the community. Johnson notes, This is the jihad o f emergency defense. . . in

the time o f dire emergency caused by overt aggression and in this context the same rules

that governed the collective duty o f jihad in the abode of Islam did not apply (57).

Jihadists interpret history and the state o f the contemporary world to fit the

emergency scenario introduced above. This traditional concept gives credibility to their

call for unrestricted warfare. Such arguments are found in the jihadist literature o f groups

such as al-Qaeda and other less extreme fundamentalists. Johnson, however, rebuts this
interpretation when he insists, This representation of jihad makes several critical

assumptions not found in the traditional conception or in contemporary mainstream

theory (59). He asserts that, the idea of the jihad of individual duty is a harsh one, one

that implicitly rejects the majority of the actual history of Muslim societies and o f

Muslim faith . . . It also leaves no room for difference of interpretation as to what Islam

requires (59-60). In response to the claims of the legitimacy of total and indiscriminate

warfare advocated by some jihadists, John Kelsay in a 2010 article entitled Just War,

Jihad, and the Study of Comparative Ethics also weighs in stating no one writing in the

jihad tradition thinks that indiscriminate or total war can be justified. Thus [the jihadists]

. . . insofar as [their] militant pronouncements [advocating] a practice o f indiscriminate

targeting . . . are wrong on Islamic grounds (233).

To recap, the traditional understanding of jihad includes several key factors. First

o f all, most scholars agree that the use o f the word jih a d in the Quran has over many

centuries primarily signified a moral or spiritual struggle and secondarily indicated the

permission for violence. Quranic guidance on jih a d as warfare, however, when taken in

context, allowed fighting primarily for defensive purposes and included multiple

restrictions. Secondly, from a historical standpoint, traditional Islamic scholars

developed a theoretical and practical concept of jih a d o f the sword with many

similarities to the Western concept of Just War. However, using the exegetical

principle of abrogation and the traditional concept of the Abode o f War, some

fundamentalist ideologues have endorsed unrestricted warfare.

 20
CHAPTER 4

JIHADISM

The West was reawakened to the concept o f jihad as Muslim holy war shortly

after the events of September 11, 2001, when the attacks were assessed to be part o f a

jihad effort made by several radical Islamic groups led by al-Qaeda. Investigators

quickly unearthed an overlooked, or at least underestimated, fatwa (a legal opinion or

decree issued by a recognized authority and derived from Islams roots o f jurisprudence)

from an article in an Arabic newspaper entitled, The World Islamic Fronts Declaration

to wage Jihad Against the Jews and Crusaders issued by Osama bin-Laden and Ayman

al-Zawahiri in February of 1998 (Ibrahim xix). The message stated,

The ruling to kill the Americans and their alliescivilians and military

is an individual obligation incumbent upon every Muslim who can do it

and in any countrythis until the Aqsa Mosque (Jerusalem) and the Holy

Mosque (Mecca) are liberated from their grip, and until their armies

withdraw from all the lands of Islam, defeated, shattered, and unable to

threaten any Muslim. This is in accordance with the Word of the Most

High. (Ibrahim 13)

The above quote was embedded amidst multiple references from the Quran reminding

Muslims of their individual duty to answer the call ofjihad. Although many critics

from the West originally saw this call to jih a d from bin-Laden and al-Zawahiri as

primarily a political, economic, or personally motivated solicitation covered by a thin

 21
coat of religious ideology, it is now argued and widely accepted that there exists a strong

philosophical and even theological root to this message that has foundations deep in the

history of Islam (Habeck 4-5). Although the theological and scriptural interpretations of

the meaning of jihad found in al-Qaedas logic conflict with those of traditional Islam (as

alluded to in the previous chapter), it is certainly possible to trace the theological

foundations of these groups back to the Quran, the hadith and to the early history o f

Islam. In this chapter the development o f jihadism, a radical subset o f fundamentalist

Islam, will be analyzed. The purpose o f this exercise is not to rebut the jihadists

ideology, but to set the stage for analysis of the relationship of ijtihad (independent

reasoning) and taqlid (acceptance from prior jurists) used by these jihadist ideologues in

their non-traditional interpretation of jihad.

Mary Habeck succinctly defines jihadism, a term gaining acceptance in

scholarly circles, as part of a radical faction of the multifaceted Islamist belief system.

She explains that,

This faction. . . has very specific views about how to revive Islam, how to

return Muslims to a political power, and what needs to be done about its

enemies . . . The main difference between jihadis and other Islamists is the

extremists commitment to the violent overthrow of the existing

international system and its replacement by an all-encompassing Islamic

state. To justify their resort to violence, they define jihad . . . as fighting

alone. (4-5)
 22
Jihadist ideology typically involves an alternate version of history and conflicting

interpretation of the state of the modem Muslim world from that of most traditional and

secular scholars of Islam. Jihadists are classified by most scholars into a group o f Islamic

fundamentalists labeled Salafis. David Johnston in a recent post Whence the Salafis?

mentions, The Arabic adjective Salafi comes from the plural noun salaf, that is,

ancestor [or]. . . companions o f the Prophet. . . the salaf are the first leaders o f early

Muslim community. . . those pious companions who passed on reports (hadith) of

Muhammads words and deeds after his death (1). Salafis view the first few centuries

o f Islam as a sort of golden period in which the traditions o f the Prophet were upheld and

passed down, but they are quick to point out that corruption began early on. During the

classical period of Islam under the Abbasids, Johnston mentions, a class o f Muslim

intellectuals appeared with a thirst for learning. . . which gave birth to the explosion of

science and philosophy. . . and the rise of the main schools o f Islamic law (2). This turn

to intellectualism and secular philosophy, however, greatly disturbed some Sunni

scholars, and the seed of modem day Islamic fundamentalism was bom as

. . . the conservative, textualist Sunni trend lived on always patrolling the

theological and legal waters in order to denounce and eradicate . . . any

recourse to human reason . . . and especially the import o f Greek

philosophy . . . Just stick to the texts was their motto, starting with the

Sunna. (2)

One of the earliest Muslim theologians from this more fundamentalist lineage was Ibn

Hanbal who lived during the first half o f the ninth century and who was later honored as
the founder of the Hanbali school of law, the strictest and most literal of the four main

Sunni law schools (2). Hanbals school of law gave birth to the ideology of the scholar

Ibn Taymiyyah, who became known as a prominent figure in the thirteenth century when

he incited rebellion against the Mongol government during that period through a series of

fatwas. Although the Mongol leadership had converted to Islam, the Muslim community

generally saw the Mongol version and practice o f Islam as being corrupt. Yahya Michot

notes,

It was Ibn Taymiyyah o f Harran, a scholar from the strict Hanbali school.

.. who renounced the Mongols as hypocrites rather than real Muslims . . .

and argued it was a religious obligation for real Muslims to wage jihad

on these apostates. In the modem age, radical Islamists groups . . . have

referred to this fatwa by Ibn Taymiyyah in order to denounce and attack

Muslims who disagree with their interpretation of the Sharia. (141)

Although both Hanbal and Taymiyyah were seen as rebels in the eyes o f their

contemporary governments (and each spent time in prison), both were and still are

considered respected scholars and members of the ulama of traditional Islam. Michots

article points out the misinterpretation and misuse of Taymiyyahs fatw as by the modem

day jihadists, but the fact remains that his rebellion against the Mongols and his

interpretation of the legitimacy o f the use o f jihad against foreign governments and false

Muslim regimes has served as a rallying cry and provides ideological legitimization for

jihadists today.
 24
After Taymiyyah, Muhammad Ibn-Abd-al-Wahhab stands in line as a widely

recognized forefather of the jihadist ideology. Wahhab, of eighteenth century Saudi

Arabia, was heavily influenced by Taymiyyah and was highly instrumental in the

development of Salaffism (his specific brand, Wahhabism, is still practiced in modem day

Saudi Arabia). Wahhabs followers see themselves as purists who only honor the

original revealed sources. Devin Springer notes, In his teachings . . . Wahhab rejected

all Islamic practices after the third century of the Muslim Era (approximately 950 C.E.)

... as . . . heretical innovations . . . [and] called for a literal interpretation o f the Quran

free of analogies and metaphors (30). Wahhab also reintroduced the concept o f takfir,

the process o f declaring another Muslim to be an apostate and in turn, saying that their

murders are legitimate (30).

Egyptians Rashid Rida and Muslim Brotherhood founder Hassan al-Banna, along

with Pakistani Abu-al-ATa Mawdudi, are also widely recognized in the development of

present day jihadism during the early twentieth century, adding to the basic principles

passed down from Hanbal, Taymiyyah and Wahhab. Rida made a significant ideological

step employing the Quranic term jahiliyya to characterize Muslim lands o f his own

time (Springer 31). He thus classified most of the Muslim world as godless, barbaric or

in a state of ignorance because of the widespread failure to implement Shariah law in

Muslim lands (31). Hassan al-Bana took the next step after his contemporary Rida and

argued that violent jihad was necessary, making it an obligation o f all Muslims to repel

the invaders and reject governments that were not Islamic (31). Mawdudi, then, saw

Western influence as corrupt and argued against the secularization o f Muslim society.
 25
These concepts were each foundational to the overall development o f the ideology o f bin-

Laden and al-Zawahiri, but no scholar has arguably had more influence than Sayyid

Qutb.

Qutb was bom in 1906 and was executed by the Egyptian government in 1966

after he was accused of being part of a Muslim Brotherhood assassination conspiracy.

During his life Qutb transitioned from a college educated literary critic with secular

leanings to a devout Islamic fundamentalist author and activist. The transformation was

apparently due to his brief stay in the United States during which he became disenchanted

with the West because of the rampant sexual promiscuity, drunken behavior and

capitalism he observed during his time at the University o f Northern Colorado in the late

1940s (Springer 34). Qutb, upon his return to Egypt, became active in the Muslim

Brotherhood and was imprisoned in the 1950s after he was implicated in an earlier

assassination attempt. During approximately ten years in prison he wrote many

influential works including Milestones. In this volumes fourth chapter entitled Jihad in

the Cause of Allah, Qutb states the primary treatise for basic jihadist ideology. Qutbs

theory stresses jihad as permissibly offensive, militant and global. He asserts that

Muslims must use jihad to free the entire world from any system that would pose an

obstacle to any individuals freedom to choose Islam. This includes the use o f force (if

required) to overthrow any non-Islamic government. Although Qutb was not a faqih

(doctor of Islamic law), virtually every jihadist group in the last forty years has used his

philosophyor at least parts of itto propagate and protect Islam by violent means

(Springer 33).
 26
Another Egyptian, Mohammad Faraj (who was a disciple of Qutbs), wrote Jihad

the Absent Obligation which has also proved influential to many jihadists and advocated

jihad as a pillar of Islam to be regarded as equal, if not greater, than its other pillars.

Faraj, also hung by the Egyptian government for his involvement in an assassination plot,

was greatly influential to our final ideologue, namely Ayman al-Zawahiri (Bergesen 5-6).

A key disciple of Qutb and Faraj, al-Zawahiri was a leading ideologue and

strategist to the late Osama bin-Laden. He took Qutbs already radical interpretation o f

jihad to the absolute extreme as evidenced in both the fatw a declaring war on the United

States (see earlier reference in this paper) and even more so in his essay, Jihad,

Martyrdom, and the Killing of Innocents published by Raymond Ibrahim in a book o f

translated writings and speeches attributed to al-Qaeda. This essay argues for what most

Muslims, even those of the radical Salaji-Jihad tradition, never advocated until

recentlythe authorization and call for suicide bombings and indiscriminate targeting of

non-combatants to include women, children, the elderly, and even professing Muslims.

To summarize, the basic philosophy of jihadism as developed by these ideologues

centers on several key tenants. First of all, that the final and abrogating guidance from

the Quran directs Muslims to take up their individual duty and engage in militant and

violent jih a d in a state of emergency so as to ensure the survival and spread o f Islam.

Secondly, that the modem day world is, in fact, in this state o f emergency due to a variety

o f factors including widespread ignorance (jahiliyya) throughout Islam arid the nearly

universal disappearance o f true Muslims. Thirdly, that in this state of emergency

restrictions on warfare do not applythus unlimited, offensive, and unregulated tactics

 27
are permissible including suicide bombings and targeting o f non-combatants. Since these

principles stray from the accepted traditional Muslim view o f jihad accumulated over

centuries of scholarship based on taqlid, jihadists use ijtihad, or the idea o f independent

reason, to interpret the Quran based on the present situation, while at the same time

professing strict and direct adherence to the teachings o f the Prophet and his earliest

companions.
 28
CHAPTER 5

HTIHAD DEFINED

According to traditional Islamic scholars, jihad as a physical struggle must be

defensive in nature, appropriately approved by a legitimate authority, and free from

certain harsh tactics. However, jihadist ideologues argue for a different interpretation.

Beginning with a specific methodology of exegesis, Sayyid Qutb, for example, argues

that final guidance revealed to the Prophet abrogates all other Quranic instruction

concerning warfare. He then urges true Muslims to engage in offensive jih a d to

eliminate all obstacles that hinder worldwide acceptance of Islam. Following in this

tradition, al-Zawahiri takes an even more extreme step by arguing that any type o f

warfare is justified in order to achieve this end, including suicide bombing and

indiscriminate targeting o f women, children and professing Muslims.

These jihadist interpretations require the use of independent reasoning, or ijtihad,

a practice typically considered to be discontinued (or at least carefully regulated) by

traditional Islamic scholars. The final chapters o f this thesis will explore this concept o f

independent reasoning in Islam and then demonstrate the way in which Qutb and al-

Zawahiri apply it. This will then lead to observations on how moderate groups in Islam

use ijtihad to come to arguably more enlightened conclusions.

At first glance it seems counterintuitive to associate the idea o f independent

reason with Islamic fundamentalism. Salafis, for example, carefully resort to a strict

literalist interpretation of the scriptures and the traditions of the pious ancestors and, upon
first glance, taqlid would seem to be a more appropriate methodology. The use o f ijtihad,

nonetheless, is a recurring theme in the discussion of jihadist ideology. In his

Fundamentalism Project article on the Sunni Arab World (that predated the 9/11 terrorist

attacks by ten years) John Voll mentions, Islamic fundamentalists have . . . advocated

ijtihad, the use of informed independent judgment in interpreting and applying the basic

sources of Islam, rather than simply adhering to the inherited interpretations of the great

medieval scholars (Marty, Observed 350).

The insistence by scholars that Muslim fundamentalists use (or misuse) the

principle of ijtihad over taqlid has continued into the most current debate. Lawrence

Pintak, in a 2010 book (partially quoting Bruce Lawrence) notes, Where ijtihad was

once the purview of ulama. . . migrant engineer theologians changed all that by

distributing authority among Muslim cybemauts. Tech-sawy clerics, militant Islamist

groups, and democracy-hungry political movements across the Muslim world can all be

counted among these . . ( 8 9 - 9 0 ) .

What exactly, then, is the nature of this ijtihad, and what are its implications?

Mohammad Namazi offers a specific and technical definition,

Literally ijtihad means a total expenditure of effort in the attempt to

achieve something whose realization is burdensome and difficult. In

jurisprudence. . . it means a total expenditure of effort in seeking an

opinion regarding a religious ruling such that the one (putting forth the

effort) senses within himself an inability to do more (than he has done).

Furthermore, Gesink systematically analyzes the development of ijtihad from the first

few centuries of Islam in her book. She begins by highlighting several widely accepted

hadith in which the Prophet clearly indicates endorsement o f the use o f independent

reason in the absence of clear authority from the Quran. She then demonstrates the

specific historical examples in which this guidance was used by the Prophets early

companions after his death. She mentions that the tradition continued amongst the early

Muslim community which performed ijtihad for the first few centuries but notes that

unregulated ijtihad eventually presented problems for the scholars and leadership of

Islam. Concerning this controversy Pintak mentions,

The principle of ijtihad . . . dictates that reason and independent judgment

are used to articulate the applicable truths of the Quran that are relevant at

any given time and place. This fundamental concept is subject to multiple

interpretations and has for centuries been at the heart o f Islamic

theological debate over whether, and to what degree, interpretation is

allowed. (89)

According to Gesink, this debate began even before the formation o f the Sunni

legal schools (madhhabs). She says, ijtihad was an inherently subjective process . . .

there was no way to ensure that the rulings of individual jurists agreed in any meaningful

w a y . . . Thus some early jurists were understandably eager to limit ijtihads use (63).

Limitations on the use of ijtihad became formalized with rise of the madhhabs. Al-

Shafii, founder of one of these four schools of jurisprudence in the ninth century,

outlined the hermeneutical steps to be used in the development of Shari a law. He

 31
emphasized that, first and foremost, unambiguous verses in the Quran were the most

authoritative source of guidance. Ambiguous verses, however, were to be analyzed using

a very specific method of interpretation in which case the individual was instructed to

look to the sunna, or the normative principles drawn from the hadith, sayings o f the

Prophet and the members of his early community (64). Some of these hadith appeared

more authentic and thus were seen as more reliable and authoritative. The third principle

after the Quran and hadith had been considered was the consensus (imja) of the jurists

for, According to a hadith, Muhammad once said that his community could not agree on

something in error. Thus if the community could come to consensus on the validity o f a

ruling, it must truly be valid (64). Therefore, consensus could essentially validate

independent reasoning provided it did not contradict the scriptures. Fourth and finally,

analogy (qiyas) was permitted, but it was the least authoritative way to come to a ruling

on a matter since it relied most heavily on human reasoning. Since this process still

allowed for human reasoning and therefore human error, al-Shafii suggested that only

scholars be permitted to perform ijtihad, and as the schools o f Islamic jurisprudence took

shape, more and more restrictions developed on who was qualified to use ijtihad. Gesink

mentions,

By the 1300s, some jurists had begun to argue that only the most

knowledgeable ulama should be allowed to perform ijtihad at a l l . . . Some

ulama even claimed that the gate o f ijtihad was closed; that independent

ijtihad was no longer performed . . . After the 1300s, with some

exceptions, it came to be expected that the majority o f legal scholars as

 32
well as ordinary Muslims would adhere to Taqlidthat is, that they would

base their judgments upon the accepted rulings of their madhahib (legal

school). (65)

Pintak also summarizes this theory; he states that around the fourteenth century,

the leading scholars of Islam effectively saw to it that the gates o f ijtih a d were closed

out of fear that accessibility to the written word by the general public would lead to

dilution of the religion. He notes that Islamic scholars were concerned that the spread o f

the written word was opening the way to misinterpretation and distortion . . . [so] the

ulama effectively . . . set in place stringent criteria for who could transmit such

knowledge. This is one o f several moments in history at which the gates o f ijtihad . . .

are said to have closed (93).

This simplification, however, is not without controversy, and several other

scholars have debated this theoretical closing o f the gates o f ijtihad in greater detail.

Wael Hallaq, for example, argues strongly against the notion that the gates of ijtihad were

ever actually closed in a much cited 1984 article. He asserts that although the practice o f

ijtihad appears to have waned from the middle ages until its apparent resurgence in the

modem era, it can be clearly observed in the Sunni Muslim tradition during the entirety o f

this supposed absence and that there is no Quranic or traditional authority to insist that it

was closed or was meant to have been closed. Hallaq further states, The continuity o f

ijtihad throughout Islamic history suggests that developments in positive law, legal

theory, and the judiciary have indeed taken place (33-4).

 33
In her more recent project, however, Gesink lays out a theory regarding the

details of the closing and reopening of the gates o f ijtihad. She begins by tracing the

heart of the matter to a specific period at Egypts Al-Azhar University in the late 1800s.

While Gesink acknowledges Hallaqs argument, stating that research in the last decade

has demonstrated that no consensus ever existed on the closure of the gate o f ijtihad,

she documents that by the late 1800s strong influential claims had been made to the

contrary. Not only does Gesink address the closure debate but more specifically she

discusses a resurgence in the use o f ijtihad.

Previously, Rudolph Peters in a 1980 article summarized the evolution o f ijtihad

and taqlid in the modem era advocating that the resurgence of independent reason was

led by fundamentalist reformers in response to traditional scholars. He says,

[Fundamentalist] Reformers claimed the right to interpret the Koran and

the Sunnah independently from the prevailing opinions o f the lawyers of

the four madhhabs, who held that since long [ago] nobody was qualified

anymore to interpret the sources on his own, and that all Moslems were

nowadays bound to abide by the decisions o f the scholars o f the

madhhabs. (131)

Gesink, however, attributes this trending toward ijtihad to modernist or progressive

reformers who hoped to further Enlightenment values in Islam and not to the

fundamentalists, at least not initially. She sets the stage in late nineteenth century Egypt

at Al-Azhar University at which a conservative ulama were promoting a stringent

theological battle against a perceived progressive threat to traditional Muslim values.

 34
Several modernist reformist scholars (most notably al-Tahtawi and al-Afghani) led an

effort against the conservatives in the hope of reconciling Enlightenment values with

Islam and in their effort redefined the concepts of ijtihad and taqlid. Gesink states that in

this debate, Taqlid was recast as a cause of social stagnation and ijtihad as a mechanism

of social growth . . . Furthermore, reformers taught that the meaning o f the Quran was

inherently present in the text, so ijtihad was something any educated Muslim could do.

This redefinition would change the world (59).

Although the resurgence o f ijtihad may yet serve its purpose in bringing Islam

into synchronization with the West, another significant application o f the practice has

become evident. In a recent article regarding the implications of ijtihad in Muslim

criminal law but with obvious applications for jih a d theory as well, Ilias Bantekas notes,

. . . the proliferation of ijtihad. . . has culminated i n . . . the perpetration

and incitement of so-called Islamic jihad, including the indiscriminate

killing of civilian unbelievers, under the pretext that it is mandated by the

Quran and the Prophet. Fatwas and rulings are issued without coherency

. . . from all comers o f the Islamic world . . . derived from informal actors

that preach a militant Islam on the basis of their own self-interested

ijtihad. (659)

It is noteworthy that the resurgence of ijtihad seems to mirror the tradition o f

jihadism, Ibn Taymiyyah used ijtihad in his fatw a against the Mongols when most

scholars already favored taqlid. Wahhab used it in establishing his brand o f Salaffism as

he re-interpreted the Quran by reverting to an earlier taqlid (Meijer 42-3). Rida, al-
Bana and the other ideologues previously mentioned in their path toward jihadism were

also said to have used ijtihad, which necessitates a more comprehensive discussion o f

ijtihad in relation to the writings o f Sayyid Qutb and Ayman al-Zawahiri.

 36
CHAPTER 6

IJTIHAD APPLIED

Sayyid Qutbs application of ijtihad includes two parts, the first being his

approach to the Islamic scriptures and the second, his approach to history. Concerning

Qutbs approach to Islamic scriptures, Albert Bergesen notes, Clearly Qutb fits this

pattern of independent judgment. His interpretation of the Quran is not based upon

previous interpretations o f medieval jurists, imams, or clerics, but o f his own independent

opinion (9). For example, Qutb, in his treatise on jihad in Milestones, starts with a very

specific interpretation of the Prophets revealed guidance on warfare from the Quran and

hadith.

In Qutbs narrative, the Prophet was first instructed to recite the revelation in his

own heart and later to preach the message o f Islam to others. Qutb further states that

Muhammad was then .. .commanded to migrate, and later permission was given to fight.

Then he was commanded to fight those who fought him, and to restrain himself from

those who did not make war with him. Later he was commanded to fight the polytheists

until Gods religion was fully established (31). Qutb adds that this command

ultimately included war against the Christians and Jews (or People o f the Book), until

they submitted to Islam or paid a tax.

Based on this chronological reading of the Quran and according to his

application of the principle of abrogation, Qutb then concludes that all true Muslims are

called to fight through offensive and violent means (if necessary) in order to destroy all
 37
types of government and man-made institutions that detract from the message o f Islam.

Qutbs theory stresses jihad as permissibly offensive, militant and global. He asserts that

Muslims must use jihad to free the entire world from any system that would pose an

obstacle to any individuals freedom to choose Islam. This includes the use o f force (if

required) to overthrow any non-Islamic government. He says, Islam is not merely a

belief, so that it is enough merely to preach it. Islam, which is a way o f life, takes

practical steps to organize a movement for freeing man . . . it is the duty o f Islam to

annihilate all such systems, as they are obstacles in the way of universal freedom (85).

While Qutb emphasizes that there is no compulsion in Islam, he still advocates

that fighting is required until all non-Islamic governments are overthrown so that each

individual will be free to voluntarily chose Islam. He mentions definitively that, The

Jihad of Islam is to secure complete freedom for every man throughout the world by

releasing him from servitude to other human beings so that he may serve his God, Who Is

One and Who has no associates [sic]. This is in itself a sufficient reason for Jihad (44).

Qutbs call to global jihad as warfare goes against many of the collected

principles laid down in the Quran as interpreted over the centuries by the traditional

schools of Shari a (Islamic Law). For example, in his historical account entitled Arguing

the Just War in Islam, Kelsay discusses noted Islamic scholar Muhammad al-Shaybanis

formative writings during the time of the founding o f the Islamic schools of

jurisprudence. According to Kelsay, in the eighth and ninth centuries these schools

helped in the establishment of jihad as Just War in traditional Islam and established

procedures to determine when to wage war for the cause:

 38
The procedures outlined . . . establish a notion of war as a means o f

pursuing goals considered legitimate . . . war is not the first or primary

means recommended for pursuing these goals. Fighting is prescribed only

when other means have failed . . . Thus the tradition o f Sharia reasoning

already provides an equivalent to the just-war criteria o f legitimate

authority, just cause, righteous intention, and (at least) timely reso rt. . .

(1103)

In contrast, Qutbs global call for offensive militant jihad does not match these

principles, at least not without major caveats.

Qutbs goal of establishing a world in which all secular governments are

destroyed to pave the way for individual freedom for all people to choose Islam is not

evidenced in this Muslim tradition, and it is very questionable if this goal would meet any

traditionally accepted criteria of legitimacy. Furthermore, it seems doubtful that he is

endorsing the principle o f last resort. Whether or not Qutbs extreme call to jih a d meets

the criteria of just cause and righteous intention are debatable, but he most certainly lacks

any legitimate or traditionally prescribed authority behind his message and certainly does

not have the consensus o f Muslim scholarship to endorse his interpretations. Although

Qutb argues that the principles of abrogation validate his views on jihad, none o f the

schools of Islamic jurisprudence ever disregarded all of the Prophets prohibitions on war

and violence as liberally as Qutb does based on this principle. The fact of the matter is

that, through the selective use of traditionally accepted methods of Quranic exegesis and

subtle tweaking of recognized principles, Qutb arrives at a non-traditional conclusion.

 39
Qutb argues like other jihadists before and after him, however, that in the context

of history and the current global climate, his interpretation o f Quranic jih a d is, in fact,

both accurate and in accordance with traditional Islamic doctrine. Qutb subscribes to a

grand narrative that does not seem to correspond to the teachings o f the traditional

schools of Islam. Bergesen reminds his readers that, Qutb theorizes an organic

connection between religion and politics based upon his understanding o f the early days

o f the Prophet. . . He argues that the manner in which religion and politics were

connected in the first generation of Muslims constitutes a viable model for today (14).

Qutbs second application of ijtihad stems from his interpretation of history. He

bases this on the grand narrative that the present world is in a state o f ignorance and that

few true Muslims currently exist, similar to the earliest days of Islam.

This reopening of the door o f ijtihad is what enables the historiography

that characterizes Qutbs project. . . his historiography constitutes and

sustains in a worldly way the Allah-ordained civil order o f Muhammad in

the present by reiterating the methodology o f the salaf. (Judy 146)

To Qutb, Islam is in danger of extinction due to the oppression from secular

governmental systems that keep individuals enslaved in ignorance and block them from

the opportunity to choose to accept the true message o f Islam. In this emergency state in

which the entire world is found to be in the Abode of War, the traditions of Just War

and its resulting restrictions on unlimited jih a d do not apply. In this context, all o f his

principles on jihad are theoretically permissible, even in accordance with traditional

jurisprudence. If one accepts Qutbs version of world history and the present state o f
 40
Islam, it is theoretically possible to accept his interpretation of jihad. One must ask,

however, does Qutb have the authority to make these assertions?

It is interesting to note Qutbs personal insight on ijtihad. In M ilestones he

endorses sound principles of traditional scriptural exegesis stating,

Allahs religion is not a maze . . . If there is a clear text available from the

Quran (or from the traditions of the Prophet) . . . there will be no room for

Ijtihad (analogical judgment). If no such clear judgment is available, then

the time comes for Ijtihad - and that according to well-defined principles

which are consistent with Allahs religion. . . The principles o f Ijtihad

and deduction are well known and there is no vagueness or looseness in

them. (96)

Qutb seems to imply here that his interpretations are clearly in line with both the

scriptures and the traditions of Islamic jurisprudence, and if ijtihad is required in his own

assumptions, he carefully adheres to these well-defined principles. As previously

mentioned, however, Qutbs philosophy on jih ad differs in several key areas from the

traditional view of jihad as Just War widely accepted by most Muslim scholars.

To recap, ijtihad is to only be used in the case that the Quran does not clearly address an

issue. In this case ijtihad is only to be accomplished by highly qualified members o f the

ulama who have methodically given adequate consideration to the Sunna, scholarly

consensus, legal precedence and to the narrowly defined rules of abrogation and analogy.

Regarding qualifications to practice ijtihad, traditionally it was a practice reserved

for scholars with a certain level distinction. Hallaq summarizes the medieval scholar
 41
Mohammad al-Ghazaiis authoritative criteria for one to reach the rank o f mujtahid and

be allowed to practice ijtihad. This included knowledge of the following: the 500 verses

o f the Quran required for the practice o f law, the relevant hadith literature and the

accepted methods of evaluation, the established precedents set in Islamic law to avoid

deviation, the methods o f legal derivation, the Arabic language, and the basic rules o f

abrogation (6).

At first glance, Qutb meets much of the criteria above. Qutb had memorized the

entire Quran by the age o f ten and, despite his lack of credentials as part of the

recognized ulama, while in prison he also penned a thirty volume commentary or

scriptural exegesis entitled In the Shade o f the Qur an demonstrating that he obviously

had a good grasp of the Quran and the Arabic language. In fact, this commentary

continues to be extremely popular in not only the Arab world but also has been translated

into many languages, including, very recently, English (Bergesen 3-4). When it comes to

his qualifications to practice ijtihad, however, Qutb falls short in two significant areas.

First of all, he was not formally trained in Muslim law (he held a degree in literature

instead of law or theology), and secondly, he disregards the principle o f consensus and

legal precedence in his assertions.

It is fair to conclude, then, that although Qutb advocates a strict adherence to

prescribed principles in the use o f ijtihad, he himself does not meet traditional

requirements to practice ijtihad and the ijtihad he practices does not meet the traditionally

prescribed criteria he endorses. It is safe to argue that Qutbs work demonstrates the use

o f unregulated ijtihad, a practice taken to the extreme by our next ideologue.

 42
Qutb writings, although certainly full of fundamentalist and jihadist ideology, go

nowhere near advocating the extreme form of jih ad that al-Zawahiri endorses. Ayman al-

Zawahiri, in an article entitled Jihad, Martyrdom, and the Killing of Innocents, expands

Qutbs concept of the permissibility of global offensive jih a d to a form o fjihad in which

the suicide bombing and targeting of non-combatants are both permissible and

encouraged (Ibrahim 143). To demonstrate Zawahiris practice of ijtihad, Ibrahim notes

that the above document (clearly either written or authorized directly by al-Zawahiri) is

fashioned in the form of a fatwa. Ibrahim states, Zawahiri uses the fatwa form to remind

the Muslim ulama of their obligations . . . [and since] the questions o f martyrdom and the

killing of innocents. . . are not universally agreed on in Islam . . . [this document] can be

considered a fatwa (3). Even though Zawahiri, like Qutb, does not carry the traditional

credentials of a member o f the ulama (he was a medical doctor), he argues in the form of

a fatw a that suicide bombers are actually martyrs, the greatest of the holy warriors

(<mujahidin). He furthermore advocates the legitimacy o f the bloodshed o f women,

children and Muslims, in jihad raids or attacks such as 9/11, two contestable and far

from agreed upon issues in Islam (Ibrahim 4).

Despite the injunction from the Quran (4:29) Do not destroy yourselves (qtd.

in Ibrahim: 139), Zawahiri redefines suicide bombings as a form o f martyrdom and

selects several compelling hadiths to demonstrate its legitimacy through analogy.

Ibrahim notes, . . . there are countless hadiths demonstrating the legitimacy of fighting to

certain death and mentions that Zawahiri uses several of the most relevant to strike a

chord with Muslims and build a logical and emotionally compelling analogy (139).
 43
Although Zawahiri pulls from legitimate traditions in forming his arguments, Ibrahim

concludes that Zawahiri is somewhat stretching in his quest to find theological backing

for suicide bombings (138 -9). Even more so, he is undoubtedly stretching the limits of

his qualifications to use ijtihad and speak for the Muslim community.

When it comes to legitimizing the targeting of non-combatants, Ibrahim notes that

Zawahiri stresses an authentic hadith from Bukhari that contradicts the ban on

bombarding infidels if they have women and children among them and that was carried

out at the hands of the Muslim Prophet himself (139). Zawahiri argues,

But the biographers relay (in a hadith) that the Prophet besieged the

inhabitants of Tai f . . . and fired at them with catapults, despite his ban on

killing women and children. He did so knowing full well that women and

children would be struck, for it was not possible to differentiate between

them. This demonstrates that if Muslims are intermingled with the people

o f war, it is still permissible to fire at them, as long as the intended targets

are the idolaters. (Ibrahim 165)

Zawahiri argues warding off an invader from (our) sanctities and religion . . . is a

unanimously accepted duty. After belief, there is no greater duty than to repulse the

invading enemy who corrupts faith and the world. There are no rules or conditions for

this; he must be expelled by all possible means (Ibrahim 170).

In the tradition of Qutb, Zawahiri clearly uses ijtihad to justify his message with

total disregard for consensus or legal precedent despite his lack of credentials. Thus the

opening of the gates of ijtihad has, in this case, allowed for several radical and
 44
destructive interpretations of jihad. While Pintak points out that Ijtihad was once the

purview of the ulama . . ( 8 9 ) , Gesink cautions, Ijtihad is now understood by many

Muslims as something anyone with a good understanding o f Arabic and a copy o f the

Quran can do . . . That has led to a proliferation o f interpretations . . . To use the most

obvious example. . . leaders o f militant Islamic groups issued a fatwa (w hich). . .

preceded al-Qaidas attack on the U.S. (233).

Gesink further asserts that despite the fact that neither bin-Laden nor al-Zawahiri

met any of the qualifications that were once so specifically regulated by scholars and

jurists, those of the Muslim public who approved or applauded their actions (and those of

the other jihadists) have endorsed the acceptance o f this concept of lay ijtihad (233). This

resurgence of unregulated ijtihad, then, is not merely the responsibility o f those who

advocate for non-traditional Quranic interpretations but also for those who accept their

rulings as authoritative (233).

Thus it appears that the Muslim community may hold real power today when it

comes to legitimizing the practice o f ijtihad. This seems to have proven dangerous in the

case of jihadism. On the other hand, if ideologues such as Qutb and Zawahiri can gain

support from some in the Muslim community by using ijtihad in such an unrestricted

manner to reinterpret the Quran in light of the current state o f the world, might not

traditional and liberal Muslim scholars also be able to use ijtihad as a tool to combat this

logic and to promote or advocate more moderate and enlightened conclusions?

 45
CHAPTER 7

A NEW IJTIHAD

Jihadist ideology has been seductive to many Muslims, especially the young and

poorly educated. Unfortunately the entire world has been exposed to a loud and ugly,

albeit minority, Islamic voice and many in the West have accepted it as the true

representation of Islam (Qadri 3,134). It is true that Zawahiris extremist position has

been renounced by most of the scholarly Muslim world. Qutb, on the other hand,

remains a respected and influential voice to many Muslims. This is likely because he did

not approach the absolute extremism that Zawahiri endorsed when he advocated

unlimited tactics in jihad.

In fact, not all scholars agree that Qutb was even literally advocating a specific

violent jihad. Springer notes, He died before being able to clarify his concept of

worldwide Jahiliyah and its various implications. Because he never declared if his

pronouncement was to be taken literally or allegorically, the concept has often been taken

in the most literal form by todays jihadists (37). Surprisingly enough, several recent

scholars actually use Qutbs philosophy to support peaceful coexistence between

Muslims and the non-Muslim world due to his emphasis on the Quranic principle that

there is no compulsion in religion (Abdelkader 181). Muqtedar Khan notes,

As a liberal Muslim I see themes in the works of Qutb which are not too

far from those that adorn enlightenment thinking. . . [he]. . . could be read

as [an] advocate o f Islamic democracy and gradual and peaceful

 46
Islamization. . . In his most controversial book Milestones, Qutb

repeatedly argues that Islams ultimate objective is to liberate, enlighten

and elevate humanity . . . For some he is the key ideologue o f Islamic

militancy, and for some he is the key intellectual of Islamic reform and

revival. (7)

Regardless of the true aim of Qutbs jihadist treatise from Milestones (whether literal or

allegorical), neither his nor Zawahiris interpretation of jih a d represents the entire

Muslim world or even the majority of the fundamentalist Muslim groups. The jihadists

message, however, does serve as a compelling example o f the power o f independent

reason. Even though ijtihadhas been demonstrated to be the tool used by fundamentalist

jihadists to justify their non-traditional and even extreme interpretations o f the Muslim

scriptures, moderate and liberal scholars also have ijtihad at their disposal today.

Bantekas mentions,

From the point of view o f a Western academic, like myself, the intentional

closing of the gates of ijtihad entailed the introduction o f the equivalent o f

Europes Dark Ages in which no new knowledge was accepted. This was

devastating for what was by that time a free-thinking, scientific-led and

thriving Islamic culture and civilization that had made a significant

influence on Europe. (657)

He summarizes his argument stating, Islam possesses a plethora o f outstanding legal

scholars that should be allowed to contribute to an ijtihad! scholarly revolution (651).

 47
Two scholars who serve as examples of the use of ijtihad to reach more peaceful

conclusions on the topic o f jihad are Said Nursi, an influential Muslim cleric from

Turkey (a contemporary of Sayyid Qutb), and Muhammad Tahir-ul-Qadri, a

contemporary of al-Zawahiri and one of todays leading Pakistani scholars of Islamic

Law. In a recent article, Zeki Saritoprak, contrasts the exegesis of Qutb and Nursi. He

uses as an example a controversial statement from the Quran commented on by both

ideologues. A segment o f the verse states . . . Whoso judgeth not by that which Allah

hath revealed: such are disbelievers. (The Meaning o f the Glorious Qur an 5:44). This

passage has been used by some to broadly label infidels. Saritoprak contrasts the

commentaries. He first notes that Qutb proclaims, The issue here is the issue o f belief. .

. and ignorance . . . There is no middle way between these issues, no truce, no peace . . .

Non-believers are the tyrants, the licentious ones, those who do not judge in accordance

with what God has revealed. . . they are infidels (121). Saritoprak then references

Nursis commentary which states, Some o f the ulama exaggerated in their interpretation

of this verse . . . and attacked the people o f jurisprudence by accusing them o f infidelity.

. . (122). Saritoprak continues by arguing that Nursi never approved of violence as a

political tool. . . Because o f his understanding of spiritual jihad, he suggested that the

physical sword should be sheathed. For nearly a century, no evidence has emerged that

Nursi or his students ever supported violence as a legitimate means for social change

(122). When it comes to an interpretation o f the overarching Quranic notion aijihad.

Nursi chooses a reading o f that favors peaceful coexistence while Qutb argues that there

can be no peace until the entire world is free of any hindrances to global acceptance o f
Islam. In Nursis understanding, there is no place for violence in the name of Islam on

any level, apart from defense against foreign attacks. He said, The duty o f a Muslim is

merely to convey the message of Islam and not to compel people towards Islam. The

rest, acceptance or rejection by the people, is Gods concern (122).

In 2010, Zawahiris contemporary, Tahir-ul-Qadri, published a 475 page treatise

entitled Fatwa on Terrorism and Suicide Bombings in which he categorically denounces

the extreme fundamentalist position on jihad. For example, Qadri declares,

. . . when the Prophet sent his Companions for war, he ordered them to

avoid burning their enemies. But in the wake of the recent bomb blasts

and suicide attacks that bum the harmless people and tear them to pieces,

the so-called Muslim terrorist groups . . . convey to the world that the

Muslims concept of jihad is barbaric and oppressive. The opposite,

however, is true and Islam has nothing to do with any o f this. (134)

Qadri also argues, The perpetrators o f these crimes justify their actions in the name o f

jihad, and thus they distort, twist and confuse the sacred Islamic concept o f jihad (3),

and that .. .whatever false implications and foul justifications these rebels, criminals and

bmtes may put forth to prove their atrocities as acts of jihad, they have nothing to do with

the teachings of Islam whatsoever (17).

Since issuing a fatw a arguably necessitates at least some use o f ijtihad, Qadri

exemplifies its use to condemn the jihadists position and instead interprets the Quran as

promoting peace. Both Qadri and Nursi are examples o f qualified members of the ulama

who use ijtihad to refute jihadism. In fact, Qadri (who unlike Zawahiri meets all o f al-
 49
Ghazis criteria to practice ijtihad) has had his fatw a endorsed by Egypts Al-Ahzar

University, which is about as close to traditional scholarly consensus as a Muslim scholar

can reach today. Nursi as well was widely accepted as a leading scholar by many

Muslims, yet he arguably came to different conclusions than that o f even traditional

Muslims in his complete advocacy of non-violence in jihad.

While Nursi and Qadri do not speak for the entire Muslim world, they do

represent a moderate voice from the ulama of Islam. It may be, however, that the re

opening of the gates of ijtihad will allow for the use o f ijtihad by all Muslims, even those

who do not meet the criteria of a scholar or mujtahid. (This is, indeed, somewhat parallel

to the Protestant Reformation of Christianitys middle ages.) In the above case, Qutb and

Zawahiri may hold a valid claim to their use of ijtihad. Peters mentions, The most

radical fundamentalists claim [was], therefore, that through assiduous study any Moslem

can obtain the rank of mudjtahid (133). However, if this radical claim is accepted as

valid, there are certainly more moderate conclusions the average Muslim lay-person

might chose to settle on. Concerning the use of this type o f ijtihad, Khan states, Today,

liberal and progressive Muslims argue that ijtihad should be employed as a rethinking

tool to bridge the gap between Islamic texts and our contemporary context (8).

Concerning the use of ijtihad to interpret the meaning of jih a d he asserts,

. . . moderate Muslims have a very idealistic view o f the Islamic duty o f

Jihad. They argue, based on a tradition o f Prophet Muhammad, that Jihad

is essentially a struggle to purify the self and to establish social justice . . .

They do, however, maintain that Muslims can and must struggle for
 50
justice and freedom while strictly obeying Islamic and international norms

of just warfare. For Muslim moderates Islam is a religion o f peace

without being pacifist. (3)

Jihad is not the only topic liberal Muslims are addressing through the lens o f the

New Ijtihad. Several recent articles have argued that the liberal use o f ijtihad will

facilitate better criminal and womens rights in the Muslim world. Concerning criminal

law Bantekas mentions,

We cannot. . . continue to ignore the beneficial role o f ijtihad that should

be utilized at least as a forum for discussion about bridging classic Islamic

criminal law with contemporary Muslim needs. Many contemporary

issues in Islamic criminal law are evidently based on prejudice and culture

and less on a coherent understanding of Islamic theology itself. (651)

Fauzia Ahmed in an article from late in 2011 argues for several models o f ijtihad

that will promote better human rights in the Muslim world. One model, according to

Ahmed, ...which has a [followership] of practicing Muslim women, facilitates self-

worth through ijtihad, allowing women to seek self-definition through their own

interpretation of the Quran and the other model, creates solidarity between and among

its following of practicing and non-practicing Muslims and non-Muslim men and women

. . . Ijtihad . . . creates equality and respect, the basis of sustainable alliances (494).

Although Outbs example o f ijtihad serves as a springboard for many jihadists,

Khan argues that Qutb serves just as strongly as an example for less violent reformers.

He argues that, As a liberal Muslim seeking reform, the quality that most appeals to me
is . . . Qutbs use of Ijtihad. Ijtihad is an Islamic juristic tool that is employed to

articulate Islamic legal positions on a specific issue using independent reasoning when

traditional Islamic sources are silent on it (8). Khan concludes this argument stating,

For me, Ijtihad is a philosophy of renewal that allows me to drink from the

reservoir of Islamic wisdom in guiding my life in the here and the now. If

Islam must take its rightful place in the world today, then Muslims will

have to embrace Ijtihad. It is the ticket to the renewal o f Islamic

civilization and the Muslim community. (8)

 52
CHAPTER 8

CONCLUSION

In the context of a theoretical framework, the jihadist movement falls under the

broad umbrella of religious fundamentalism, a global phenomenon in which family

resemblances are observed across the major world religions. Fundamentalist groups

typically exhibit traits of militant struggle against modernism, secularism and liberalism,

although militance when applied to fundamentalism in general need not connote

violence.

The concept of jihad in Islam has multiple levels of meaning including anything

from an individuals spiritual struggle to an all-out holy war. The traditional view o f

Muslim scholars is that jihad should be interpreted as a spiritual struggle first and as

warfare second. As w a r f a r e , i s historically considered permissible only in the

context of a well-defined system of Just War. Through the lens o f radical Islamic

fundamentalism, however, jihadist groups have argued that true Muslims are called to

engage in an offensive violent struggle against all enemies until the world is free o f any

opposition to Islam. This view is exhibited in Qutbs influential treatise on jih a d in

Milestones. In extreme cases, jihadists like Ayman al-Zawahiri have rationalized that this

interpretation of jihad permits the use o f traditionally unsanctioned tactics such as suicide

bombings and the targeting of non-combatants.

The jihadists ideology contradicts the traditional scriptural interpretation o f jihad

and thus requires the use o f ijtihad (innovation, or independent reasoning). Traditional
 53
scholars have considered the gates of ijtihad either closed or reserved for only the most

stringently qualified jurists in Sunni Islam. These scholars have instead endorsed the

practice of taqlid or the imitation of the rulings o f early jurists, at least until recently.

Even though independent reasoning has served as the source o f legitimization for

terrorism, resurgence of ijtihad is also emerging in moderate and liberal Islamic

discussions. In stark contrast to the jihadists, these liberal ideologues are arguing for

better human rights. They are also advocating an interpretation, or in some cases

reinterpretation, of the Quran that emphasizes peaceful coexistence and cooperation with

non-Muslims.

This paper by no means is able to address all the implications surrounding the

interpretation ofjihad in light of the resurgence o f independent reason. Huntingtons

clash of civilizations theory and the concept of the new crusades are both topics that

warrant projects of their own in this context. An entire paper could also be written

contrasting Christianitys Reformation with the current state of reform in Islam as the two

movements share so many similarities. For example, in both cases these periods of

reform occur approximately fourteen centuries after the religions birth, both seem to

center on the emergence of new technology that makes the scriptures more accessible to

the lay person (e.g. the printing press and the internet respectively) and each involves the

argument over whether or not the individual adherent should approach the scriptures from

independent reason or should instead defer to the interpretations of sanctioned priests or

scholars. Even updated research specifically focused on comparing or contrasting the

Christian fundamentalist movement (from which the term fundamentalist was coined) o f
the early twentieth century with that of recent Islamic Salaffism would provide enough

material for an entire thesis.

Finally, a most definitive conclusion regarding the meaning o f the word jih a d is

difficult to determine even after synthesizing many scholarly sources. Farish Noor in a

2011 essay entitled Ten Years after 9/11: Controversy over the Meaning of Jihad

Remains, As It Always Will, points out that the meanings of words are never privately

determined; rather, they are determined in a public context, for language is a rule

governed exercise. He continues stressing that, The word jihad when used by Sufi

mystics refers to the great internal battle against the ego . . . In the hands o f political

Islamists, on the other hand, the same signifier may refer to a political struggle to win

control of the state apparatus. In the hands o f others, it may refer to holy war. With this

in mind it is tempting to enter the debate and argue over what jihad should mean versus

what it has come to mean. But Noor concludes,

Since 9/11, a debate over the meaning of the word jihad has ensued, and

this debate will probably continue in the years and decades to come.

Scholars who seek precise and final meanings for terms may be frustrated

by this, but it is not necessarily a bad thing. For what it shows is that

Muslim discourse and debate are ongoing, alive, and dynamic as Muslim

society is constantly changing as well. In the process, more research is

being done on Islam and Muslims, and the world understands by now that
4

Muslim society is not as simple and monolithic as some make it out to be.

And, surely, that cannot be a bad thing.

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