1.

Barredo vs Garcia

Facts: At 1:30 am a taxi collided with a carretela. The carretela had a 16-year old
passenger who died 2 days later because of injuries he sustained from the collision.
Fontanilla, the taxi driver, was convicted in the criminal case. The parents of the boy
brought a separate civil action and sued Barredo, the owner of Malate Taxicab and
employer of Fontanilla. They argued that he is liable under Article 1903 (now article
2180) .There is proof that Barredo was negligent in hiring Fontanilla even though he
had several traffic violations including over speeding. Barredo then argued that
since Article 1903 pertains to those negligent acts or omissions not punishable by
law, it is not applicable since his driver was convicted for an act punishable by a
lawthe Revised Penal Code. And under the RPC, the liability of the employer is
merely subsidiary so the parents should have sued Fontanilla before suing him.

Issue: Is an employer principally or subsidiarily liable under Article 1903?

Ruling: He is primarily liabel under Aticle 1903. The essence of article 1903 is not
that the employer will be punished for the act of another but that he is punished for
his own negligence in failing to avoid the damage since he is the one responsible for
his employee. Hence it is a primary liability. In this case, the parents of the boy
decided to file for a separate civil action under article 1903. Had they not filed a
separate civil action, the civil action would have been tried together with the
criminal making the employee only subsidiarily liable which did not happen in this
case. (Court refused to construe 1903 as punishing only acts omissions not
punishable by law since it would limit the meaning of culpa acquiliana since a lot of
acts or omissions that can be brought in a civil action are also punishable in the
RPC. It would limit then the scope of the culpa acquiliana which is very broad.)

2. Elcano vs. Hill

FACTS:
Reginald Hill, a minor, caused the death of Agapito (son of Elcano). Elcano filed a
criminal case against Reginald but Reginald was acquitted for lack of intent
coupled with mistake. Elcano then filed a civil action against Reginald and his dad
(Marvin Hill) for damages based on Article 2180 of the Civil Code. Hill argued that
the civil action is barred by his sons acquittal in the criminal case; and that if ever,
his civil liability as a parent has been extinguished by the fact that his son is already
an emancipated minor by reason of his marriage.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the present civil action for damages is already barred by the
acquittal of Reginald
2. W/N Atty. Marvin Hill has a vicarious liability being the father of a minor child
who committed a delict

RULING:
1. No. The acquittal of Reginald Hill in the criminal case has not extinguished his
liability for quasi-delicts, hence the acquittal is not a bar to the instant action
against him. To find the accused guilty in a criminal case, proof beyond
reasonable doubt is required unlike in civil cases, preponderance
 of evidence is sufficient. The concept of culpa acquiliana includes acts which
are criminal in character or in violation of the penal law, whether voluntary or
negligent. Also, Art 2177 CC provides that Responsibility for fault
or negligence is separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from
negligence under the Penal Code. However, plaintiff cannot recover damages
twice for the same act or omission.

2. Yes. While it is true that parental authority is terminated

upon emancipation of the child (ART 327 CC), and under Art 397,
emancipation takes place by marriage of the minor, such emancipation is not
absolute and full. Reginald although married, was living with his father and
still dependent from the latter. ART 2180 applies to Atty. Marvin Hill
notwithstanding the emancipation by marriage of Reginald. Article 2180,
"(T)he obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's
own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is
responsible. The marriage of a minor child does not relieve the parents of
the duty to see to it that the child, while still a minor, does not give
answerable for the borrowings of money and alienation or encumbering of
real property which cannot be done by their minor married child without their
consent. Reginald is now of age, as a matter of equity, the liability of Atty. Hill
has become milling, subsidiary to that of his son.

3. Viratavs Ochoa G.R. No. L-46179 January 31, 1978

Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable

Facts: ArsenioVirata died when a passenger jeepney driven by Borillahit him while
he was walking along a road. The heirs of Virata sued Borilla through an action for
homicide through reckless imprudence in the CFI of Rizal. Viratas lawyer reserved
their right to file a separate civil action and later withdrew it.But in June 1976,
pending the criminal case, the Viratas again reserved their right to file a separate
civil action. Borilla was eventually acquitted as it was ruled that what happened was
a mere accident. The heirs of Virata then sued Borilla and Ochoa (the owner of the
jeep and employer of Borilla) for damages based on quasi delict. Ochoa assailed the
civil suit alleging that Borilla was already acquitted and that the Viratas were
merely trying to recover damages twice. The lower court agreed with Ochoa and
dismissed the civil suit.

Issue: Can the Viratas commence a separate action for damages based on quasi-
delict?

Held: Yes.The petitioners are not seeking to recover twice for the same negligent
act.It is settled that in negligence cases the aggrieved parties may choose between
an action under the Revised Penal Code or of quasi-delict under Article 2176 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines. The Viratas already manifested in said criminal case
that they were filing a separate civil action for damages against the owner and
driver of the passenger jeepneybased on quasi-delict.
What is prohibited by Article 2177 of the Civil Code is to recover twice for the same
negligent act. Therefore, under the proposed Article 2177, acquittal from an
accusation of criminal negligence, whether on reasonable doubt or not, shall not be
a bar to a subsequent civil action, not for civil liability arising from criminal
negligence, but for damages due to a quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana. But said
article forestalls a double recovery.
The acquittal of the driver of the crime charged is not a bar to the prosecution of
civil case for damages based on quasi-delict. The source of the obligation sought to
be enforced in the civil case is quasi-delict, not an act or omission punishable by
law. Under Article 115 of the Civil Code, quasi-delict and an act or omission
punishable by law are two different sources of obligation.

4. BANAL VS TADEO 156 SCRA 325

Facts:
Petitioner is one of the complainants in the criminal cases filed against Rosario
Claudio. Claudio ischarged with 15 separate information for violation of BP 22.
Claudio pleaded not guilty, thus trial ensued. Petitioner moved to intervene through
private prosecutor but it was rejected by respondent judge on the ground that the
charge is for the violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 which does not provide for any
civil liability or indemnity and hence, it is not a crime against property but public
order. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied by the
respondent judge. Hence this appeal.

Issue:
Did the Court act with grave abuse of discretion or in excess of its jurisdiction in
rejecting the appearance of a private prosecutor.
Ruling:
Yes. Civil liability to the offended private party cannot thus be denied, The payee of
the check is entitled to receive the payment of money for which the worthless check
was issued. Having been caused the damage, she is entitled to recompense.
Surely, it could not have been the intendment of the framers of Batas Pambansa
Big. 22 to leave the offended private party defrauded and empty- handed by
excluding the civil liability of the offender, giving her only the remedy, which in
many cases results in a Pyrrhic victory, of having to file a separate civil suit. To do
so, may leave the offended party unable to recover even the face value of the check
due her, thereby unjustly enriching the errant drawer at the expense of the payee.
The protection which the law seeks to provide would, therefore, be brought to
naught.
The petitioner's intervention in the prosecution of Criminal Cases 40909 to 40913 is
justified not only for the protection of her interests but also in the interest of the
speedy and inexpensive administration of justice mandated by the Constitution
(Section 16, Article III, Bill of Rights, Constitution of 1987). A separate civil action for
the purpose would only prove to be costly, burdensome, and time-consuming for
both parties and further delay the final disposition of the case. This multiplicity of
suits must be avoided. Where petitioner's rights may be fulIy adjudicated in the
proceedings before the trial court, resort t o a separate action to recover civil
liability is clearly unwarranted.

Adtnl Notes:
A careful study of the concept of civil liability allows a solution to the issue in the
case at bar.
Generally, the basis of civil liability arising from crime is the fundamental postulate
of our law that "Every man criminally liable is also civilly liable" (Art. 100, The
Revised Penal Code). Underlying this legal principle is the traditional theory that
when a person commits a crime he offends two entities namely ( 1) the society in
which he lives in or the political entity called the State whose law he had violated;
and (2) the individual member of that society whose person, right, honor, chastity
or property was actually or directly injured or damaged by the same punishable act
or omission. However, this rather broad and general provision is among the most
complex and controversial topics in criminal procedure. It can be misleading in its
implications especially where the same act or omission may be treated as a crime in
one instance and as a tort in another or where the law allows a separate civil action
to proceed independently of the course of the criminal prosecution with which it is
intimately intertwined. Many legal scholars treat as a misconception or fallacy the
generally accepted notion that, the civil liability actually arises from the crime
when, in the ultimate analysis, it does not. While an act or omission is felonious
because it is punishable by law, it gives rise to civil liability not so much because it
is a crime but because it caused damage to another. Viewing things pragmatically,
we can readily see that what gives rise to the civil liability is really the obligation
and the moral duty of everyone to repair or make whole the damage caused to
another by reason of his own act or omission, done intentionally or negligently,
whether or not the same be punishable by law. In other words, criminal liability will
give rise to civil liability only if the same felonious act or omission results in damage
or injury to another and is the direct and proximate cause thereof. Damage or injury
to another is evidently the foundation of the civil action. Such is not the case in
criminal actions for, to be criminally liable, it is enough that the act or omission
complained of is punishable, regardless of whether or not it also causes material
damage to another. (See Sangco, Philippine Law on Torts and Damages, 1978,
Revised Edition, pp. 246-247).
Article 20 of the New Civil Code provides:
Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage to
another, shall indemnify the latter for the same.

5. Occena vs. Icamina, 181 scra 328

Facts:
Petitioner Eulogio Occena filed a criminal complaint for grave oral defamation
against the private respondent Cristina Vegafria for allegedly uttering insulting
words and statements: "Gago ikaw nga Barangay Captain, montisco, traidor,
malugus, Hudas," which caused great and irreparable damage and injury to his
person and honor. The petitioner did not reserve his right to file separate action for
damages, after the trial the respondent was convicted of the offense of slight oral
defamation but no damages were awarded to petitioner. The petitioner not satisfied
and disagrees, appeals in the regional trial court but was denied because of lack of
merit.

Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to an award of damages

Ruling:
Yes. Civil liability arising from criminal offenses are governed by Art.100 of Revised
Penal Code which provides that every person criminally liable for a felony is also
civilly liable, in relation to Art.2177of Civil Code on quasi-delict, the provisions for
independent civil actions in the chapter of human relations and the provisions
regulating damages, also found in the Civil Code. As a general rule, a person who is
found to be criminally liable offends two entities: the state or society in which he
lives and the individual member of society or private person who was injured or
damaged by punishable act or omission. And the offended party, the petitioners
main contention precisely is that he suffered damages in view of the defamatory
words and statements uttered by the private respondent.
What gives rise to the civil liability is really the obligation of everyone to repair or to
make whole the damage caused to another by reason of his act or omission,
whether done intentional or negligently and whether or not punishable by law.

6. SPOUSES PACIS VS. MORALES

G.R. No. 169467
February 25, 2010

FACTS:
Petitioners filed with the trial court a civil case for damages against respondent
Morales.Petitioners are the parents of Alfred Pacis, a 17-year old student who died in
a shooting incident inside the Top Gun Firearms and Ammunitions Store in Baguio
City. Morales is the owner of the gun store.On the fateful day, Alfred was in the gun
store, with Matibag and Herbolario as sales agents and caretakers of the store while
owner Morales was in Manila. The gun which killed Alfred is a gun owned by a store
customer which was left with Morales for repairs, which he placed inside a drawer.
Since Morales would be going to Manila, he left the keys to the store with the
caretakers. It appears that the caretakers took the gun from the drawer and placed
it on top of a table. Attracted by the sight of the gun, the young Alfred got hold of
the same. Matibag asked Alfred to return the gun. The latter followed and handed
the gun to Matibag. It went off, the bullet hitting the young Alfred in the head.A
criminal case for homicide was filed against Matibag. Matibag, however, was
acquitted of the charge against him because of the exempting circumstance of
accident under Art. 12, par. 4 of the RPC.By agreement of the parties, the
evidence adduced in the criminal case for homicide against Matibag was
reproduced and adopted by them as part of their evidence in the instant case.
The trial court rendered its decision in favor of petitioners, ordering the defendant
to pay plaintiffs indemnity for the death of Alfred, actual damages for the
hospitalization and burial, expenses incurred by the plaintiffs, compensatory
damages, MD and AF. Respondent appealed to the CA, which reversed the trial
courts Decision and absolved respondent from civil liability under Article 2180 of
the Civil Code. MR denied, hence this petition.

ISSUE: Was Morales negligent?

HELD: Petition granted. The CA decision is set aside and the trial courts Decision
reinstated.

YES
This case for damages arose out of the accidental shooting of petitioners son.
Under Article 1161 of the Civil Code, petitioners may enforce their claim for
damages based on the civil liability arising from the crime under Article 100 of the
RPC or they may opt to file an independent civil action for damages under the Civil
Code. In this case, instead of enforcing their claim for damages in the homicide case
filed against Matibag, petitioners opted to file an independent civil action for
damage against respondent whom they alleged was Matibags employer. Petitioners
based their claim for damages under Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code.
**
Unlike the subsidiary liability of the employer under Article 103 of the RPC, the
liability of the employer, or any person for that matter, under Article 2176 of the
Civil Code is primary and direct, based on a persons own negligence. Article 2176
states:

Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault
or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if
there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called quasi-
delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.

This case involves the accidental discharge of a firearm inside a gun store. Under
PNP Circular No. 9, entitled the Policy on Firearms and Ammunition
Dealership/Repair, a person who is in the business of purchasing and selling of
firearms and ammunition must maintain basic security and safety requirements of a
gun dealer, otherwise his License to Operate Dealership will be suspended or
canceled.Indeed, a higher degree of care is required of someone who has in his
possession or under his control an instrumentality extremely dangerous in
character, such as dangerous weapons or substances. Such person in possession or
control of dangerous instrumentalities has the duty to take exceptional precautions
to prevent any injury being done thereby. Unlike the ordinary affairs of life or
business which involve little or no risk, a business dealing with dangerous weapons
requires the exercise of a higher degree of care.As a gun store owner, respondent is
presumed to be knowledgeable about firearms safety and should have known never
to keep a loaded weapon in his store to avoid unreasonable risk of harm or injury to
others. Respondent has the duty to ensure that all the guns in his store are not
loaded. Firearms should be stored unloaded and separate from ammunition when
the firearms are not needed for ready-access defensive use. With more reason, guns
accepted by the store for repair should not be loaded precisely because they are
defective and may cause an accidental discharge such as what happened in this
case. Respondent was clearly negligent when he accepted the gun for repair and
placed it inside the drawer without ensuring first that it was not loaded. In the first
place, the defective gun should have been stored in a vault. Before accepting the
defective gun for repair, respondent should have made sure that it was not loaded
to prevent any untoward accident. Indeed, respondent should never accept a
firearm from another person, until the cylinder or action is open and he has
personally checked that the weapon is completely unloaded. For failing to insure
that the gun was not loaded, respondent himself was negligent. Furthermore, it was
not shown in this case whether respondent had a License to Repair which authorizes
him to repair defective firearms to restore its original composition or enhance or
upgrade firearms.Clearly, respondent did not exercise the degree of care and
diligence required of a good father of a family, much less the degree of care
required of someone dealing with dangerous weapons, as would exempt him from
liability in this case.

7. People v. Amistad
FACTS:Itong Amistad was accused of the crime of Estafa. He sold a parcel of land,
part of which was already previously sold to Mercedes Javellana for P10, 000 and he
had already received from her P5, 000.00, thereby causing damage and prejudice to
said Javellana in the amount of P5,000.The CFI acquitted Amistad holding that "the
case of the prosecution is civil in nature" and that "the guilt of the accused has not
been proven beyond reasonable doubt."Petitioner appealed to CA insofar as the civil
liability of the accused is concerned. CA dismissed the appeal merely on the legal
proposition that an appeal by the complainant from a judgment of acquittal should
be disallowed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an appeal by the complainant for estafa, may be allowed from a
decision acquitting the accused of the crime charged, only insofar as the latter's
civil liability is concerned?
HELD:
NO. Petition is DENIED.
If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal is based upon reasonable doubt, the
court shall so declare. In the absence of any declaration to that effect, it may be
inferred from the text of the decision whether or not the acquittal is due to that
ground.
Petitioners contend that the remedy of appeal is expressly granted to her inasmuch
as the civil action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the
criminal action, there having been no reservation to file a separate civil action or a
waiver of the right to file one. She had in fact hired a private prosecutor to handle,
primarily the civil aspect of the case, the prosecution of the crime remaining under
the direction and control of the prosecuting Fiscal. The private prosecutor presented
evidence bearing on the civil liability of the accused. In a memorandum he filed, he
also discussed extensively the civil liability of the accused, despite which, the trial
court failed to rule on the latter's civil liability to the complainant.
The provision of Article 29 of the Civil Code relied upon by the petitioner clearly
requires the institution of a separate action by the filing of the proper complaint. To
such complaint, the accused as the defendant therein, may file the appropriate
responsive pleading, which may be an answer or a motion to dismiss. In a criminal
action, notwithstanding that the action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly
instituted therewith, if not reserved or waived, the accused is not afforded the same
remedy. Neither is the mandatory pre-trial held as is required of all civil actions. The
obvious reason is that the civil liability recoverable in the criminal action is one
solely dependent upon conviction, because said liability arises from the offense,
with respect to which pre-trial is never held to obtain admission as to the
commission thereof, except on the occasion of arraignment. This is the kind of civil
liability involved in the civil action deemed filed simultaneously with the filing of
criminal action, unless it is reserved or waived, as so expressly provided in Section
1, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court.

If the civil liability arises from other sources than the commission of the offense,
such as from law or contract or quasi-delict, its enforcement has to be by an
ordinary civil action, which, as expressly provided in Article 29 of the Civil Code may
be disposed of as a mere preponderance of evidence would warrant.
The decision of the justice of the peace court which acquitted the defendant of the
charge and did not make any pronouncement holding the defendant civilly liable put
an end to the case, not only by freeing the defendant from criminal responsibility
but also by rejecting all liability for damages arising from the alleged crime of
malicious mischief. The offended parties not having reserved their right to bring a
separate civil action, the aforesaid decision of acquittal covered both the criminal
and the civil aspects of the case under Rule 107, section l (a) of the new Rules of
Court. An appeal from that decision to the Court of First Instance, as intended by the
offended parties, would reopen the question of defendant's civil liability arising from
the alleged crime. And considering that such civil liability must be based on the
criminal responsibility of the defendant (art. 100, Revised Penal Code), any review
or re-examination of the question of civil liability would perforce require a new
determination of defendant's criminal liability. But another trial upon defendant's
criminal responsibility cannot be held, in view of his previous acquittal in the justice
of the peace court. So the appeal from the decision of the justice of the peace court
is not authorized by law.

Brought out in bold relief in the aforequoted ruling is that what is impliedly brought
simultaneously with the criminal action is the civil action to recover civil
liability arising from the offense. Hence, the two actions may rise or fall together.
However, if the civil action is reserved, or if the ground of acquittal is reasonable
doubt as to the guilt of the accused, a separate civil action may be filed, the
complainant alleging a cause of action independent of, and not based on, the
commission of an offense. Only preponderance of evidence would then be required.

Nevertheless, petitioner may not complain, as she does of being denied due process
for disallowing her appeal. She can institute a separate civil action if her cause of
action could come under the category of quasi-delict or one arising from law,
contract or any other known source of civil liability, but certainly not anymore from
the offense of which petitioner had already been acquitted. It is but fair to require
petitioner to take this course of action, not only because she would have to pay for
the lawful expenses for instituting the action to obtain the relief she seeks from
respondent, from which she is spared in the prosecution of a criminal case, but also
for the respondent or defendant to avail of all defenses and remedies as are open to
him in a separate civil action not otherwise available in a criminal action that carries
with it the civil action when deemed simultaneously filed with it, to recover civil
liability arising from the crime charged

8. Jarantilla vs. CA

Facts:
Jose Kuan Sing was side-swiped by a vehicle driven by Edgar Jarantilla in the
evening in lznart Street, Iloilo City and sustained physical injuries as a consequence.
Jarantilla was charged before the City Court of Iloilo for serious physical injuries thru
reckless imprudence in a criminal case. Kuan Sing did not reserve his right to
institute a separate civil action and he intervened in the prosecution of said criminal
case through a private prosecutor. Jarantilla was acquitted in said criminal case "on
reasonable doubt"
Kuan Sing then filed a complaint, a civil action that involved the same subject
matter and act complained of in the criminal case. Jarantilla alleged as a defense a
lack of cause of action on the part of Sing, and bar by prior judgment in the previous
criminal case even if there was a cause of action. the trial court issued an order of
denial for Jarantillas motion to dismiss, suggesting he take the case to the SC via
certiorari.
After trial, the lower court rendered judgment in favor of Sing and ordered Jarantilla
to pay the former the sum for hospitalization, medicines and so forth, other actual
expenses, for moral damages, for attorney's fees, and costs. The CA affirmed.
Issue:
WON Kuan Sing could file a separate civil action arising from the criminal complaint
filed against Jarantilla when Jarantilla had been acquitted for reasonable doubt.
Held:
Yes. It is a settled rule that the same act or omission (in this case, the negligent
sideswiping of private respondent) can create two kinds of liability on the part of the
offender, that is, civil liability ex delicto and civil liability ex quasi delicto. Since the
same negligence can give rise either to a delict or crime or to a quasi-delict or tort,
either of these two types of civil liability may be enforced against the culprit,
subject to the caveat under Article 2177 of the Civil Code that the offended party
cannot recover damages under both types of liability.
When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his guilt
has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the
same act or omission may be instituted. Such action requires only a preponderance
of evidence. Another consideration in favor of Kuan Sing is the doctrine that the
failure of the court to make any pronouncement, favorable or unfavorable, as to the
civil liability of the accused amounts to a reservation of the right to have the civil
liability litigated and determined in a separate action. The rules nowhere provide
that if the court fails to determine the civil liability it becomes no longer
enforceable.
The civil liability sought to be recovered through the application of Article 29 is no
longer that based on or arising from the criminal offense. The acquittal of the
accused foreclosed the civil liability based on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code
which presupposes the existence of criminal liability or requires a conviction of the
offense charged. Divested of its penal element by such acquittal, the causative act
or omission becomes in effect a quasi-delict, hence only a civil action based thereon
may be instituted or prosecuted thereafter, which action can be proved by mere
preponderance of evidence. Since this action is based on a quasi-delict, the failure
of the respondent to reserve his right to file a separate civil case and his
intervention in the criminal case did not bar him from filing such separate civil
action for damages.

9. Hun Hyung Park vs. Eung Won Choi

Facts: A check issued by Choi was dishonored for having been drawn against
insufficient funds. He was charged for violation of BP22. After the prosecution rested
its case, the respondent filed a Demurrer where he alleged that the prosecution
failed to prove that Choi received the notice of dishonor, thus not giving rise to the
presumption of knowledge of insufficiency of funds. The demurrer was granted. Park
appealed the civil aspect of the case, contending that the civil aspect should not be
included in the dismissal.

Issue: does the granting of the demurrer carry with it the extinction of the civil
liability?

Ruling: No. In case of acquittal, the accused may still be civilly liable. The civil action
based on delict may be deemed extinguished if there is a finding on the final
judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from which the civil action
may arise did not exist.
If the evidence presented is insufficient to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt,
it does not follow that the same is insufficient to establish a preponderance of
evidence. If the court grants a demurrer, proceedings on the civil aspect generally
proceeds. The only instance when an acquittal or demurrer carries with it the
dismissal of the civil aspect is when there is a finding that the act or omission from
which the civil liability may arise did not exist.

10.People vs Navoa

11.People vs. Manuel Badeo

FACTS: According to the sole prosecution eyewitness Eega Abrio (Iega Abreo), at
around six o'clock in the evening of March 21, 1981, she was walking on her way
home. Cresenciano Germanes was walking ahead of her. Near the house of
Esperidion Badeo, four men attacked Cresenciano. Being about ten arms length
away, she saw Manuel Badeo hack Cresenciano at the back with a bolo measuring
around fifty-five centimeters in length. Rogelio Badeo then hacked Cresenciano with
another long bolo also at the back. Bonifacio Tangpus followed with a stab at the
right portion of Cresenciano's stomach, after which Esperidion Badeo hacked
Cresenciano's back. Cresenciano fell down on his back and died. On February 8,
1982, an information for murder was filed against Manuel, Esperidion and Rogelio
Badeo and Bonifacio Tangpus. They were charged with having conspired to kill and
treacherously killing Cresenciano. On August 10, 1990, Esperidion died of cardio-
respiratory arrest secondary to pulmonary tuberculosis at the prison hospital in
Muntinlupa, Metro Manila. Inasmuch as no final judgment had as yet been
rendered, in the resolution of August 21, 1991, the case against Esperidion was
dismissed with costs de oficio and entry of judgment was made on August 22,
1991. The Solicitor General filed a motion for the reconsideration of said resolution
alleging that while the criminal liability of appellant Esperidion Badeo had been
extinguished by his death pursuant to Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code, his civil
liability arising from the criminal offense subsisted in accordance with Articles 1231
and 1161 of the Civil Code in relation to Article 112 of the Revised Penal Code.

ISSUE: Is the Civil liability of Esperidion extinguished when he died before final
judgment?

RULING:

NO. As every crime gives rise to a penal or criminal action for the punishment of the
guilty party, and also to a civil action for the restitution of the thing, repair of the
damage and indemnification for the losses whether the particular act or omission is
done intentionally or negligently or whether or not punishable by law, subsequent
decisions of the Court held that while the criminal liability of an appellant is
extinguished by his death, his civil liability subsists. In such case, the heirs of the
deceased appellant are substituted as parties in the criminal case and his estate
shall answer for his civil liability.

12.RolitoCalang and Philtrancovs People of the Philippines

GR No. 190696 03 Aug 2010
Bonganciso, Wiem

Facts: RolitoCalang was a Philtranco bus when its rear left side hit the front left
portion of a jeep coming from the opposite direction. As a result of the collision, the
jeep driver lost control of his vehicle and bumped a bystander who was standing
along the highways shoulder. The jeep turned turtle 3 times before finally stopping
at about 25m from the point of impact. Two of the jeeps passengers were instantly
killed while the others sustained serious physical injuries.

Charged before the RTC, Calang was found guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in
multiple homicide, multiple serious physical injuries and damage to property. The
court ordered Calang and Philtranco, jointly and severally, to pay the damages and
indemnity. Upon appeal, CA affirmed the lower courts ruling. Hence, this petition for
review on certiorari.

Issue: Was it correct to hold Philtranco jointly and severally liable for damages and
indemnities arising from a criminal case?

Ruling: No. Since the cause of action against Calang was based on delict, both the
RTC and CA erred in holding Philtranco jointly and severally liable with Calang based
on quasi-delict under Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code. Such provisions
pertain to the vicarious liability of an employer for quasi-delicts that an employee
has committed. It does not apply to a civil liability arising from delict.

If at all, Philtrancos liability may only be subsidiary on the bases of Articles 102 and
103 of the RPC. Before the employers subsidiary liability is enforced, adequate
evidence must exist establishing that:

(1) They are indeed the employers of the employees;

(2) They are engaged in some kind of industry;
(3) The crime was committed by the employees in the discharge of their duties;
and
(4) The execution against the latter has not been satisfied due to insolvency.

13.FRANCO VS IAC

Facts:

Macario Yuro, the driver of Franco Bus, swer ved to the left side of MacArthur
Highway at Capas, Tarlac to avoid hitting the trailer truck parked along the
cemented pavement of the said highway. Thereby, taking the lane of an incoming
mini bus being driven by Magdaleno Lugue, resulting to the collision opf the two
vehicles. The collision resulted in the deaths of the two drivers Macario Yuro and
Magdaleno Lugue, and two(2) passengers of the mini bus, Romeo Bue and Fernando
Chuay.

Consequently, the registered owner of the mini bus, Antonio Reyes and Mrs. Susan
Chuay, the wife of victim Fernando Chuay, and Mrs. Lolita Lugue, the wife of driver-
victim Magdaleno Lugue, filed an action for damages through reckless imprudence
before the CFI of Pampanga in Angeles City against the owners and operators
of Franco Transpoortation Company. In answer to the complaint, defendants set up,
among others, the affirmative defense that as owners and operators of
the Franco Transportation Company, they exercised due diligence in the selection
and supervision of all their employees, including the deceased driver Macario Yuro.

Issue:

Can Sps Franco as employer invoke the defense of diligence of a good father
of a family in denying their liabilities against the victims.

Ruling:

YES. The action is predicated upon quasi delict, not upon crime. Hence, thede
fense of due diligence can be invoked by the defendants. However, in this case, the
spouses were not able to prove such due diligence. Therefore, they are liablefor
damages under Article 2180 of the Civil Code.

Distinction should be made between the subsidiary liability of the employer

under the RPC and the employers primary liability under the Civil Code, which is
quasi-delictual or tortious in character. The first type of liability is governed by
Articles102 and 103 of the RPC, which provide that employers have subsidiary civil
liability in default of their employees who commit felonies in the discharge of their
duties.

The second kind is governed by Articles 2176, 2177, and 2180 of the
Civil Code on the vicarious liability of employers for those damages caused by their
employees acting within the scope of their assigned tasks. In this second kind, the
employers liability ceases upon proof that he observed all the diligence of a good
father of a family to prevent damage. Under Article 103 of the RPC, the liability of
the employer is subsidiary to the liability of the employee. Before the employers
subsidiary liability may be proceeded against, it is imperative that there should be a
criminal action where the employees criminal negligence are proved. Without such
criminal action being instituted, the employers liability cannot be predicated
under Article 103. In this case, there was no
criminal action instituted because the driver who should stand as accused died in th
e accident. Therefore, there is no basis for the employers subsidiary liability,
without the employees primary liability. It follows that the liability being sued upon
is based not on crime, but on culpa aquiliana, where the defense of the exercise of
the diligence of a good father of a family may be raised by the employer.
 The employers are liable since they failed to prove that they exercised the
diligence of a good father of a family in selecting and/or supervising the driver.
They admitted that the only kind of supervision given to the drivers referred to the
running time between the terminal points of the line. They only had two
inspectors whose duties were only ticket inspections. There is no evidence that they
were really safety inspectors.

14.Cangco vs. Manila Railroad Company

30 Phil 768

FACTS:
On January 20, 1915, Cangco was riding the train of Manila Railroad Co (MRC). He
was an employee of the latter and he was given a pass so that he could ride the
train for free. When he was nearing his destination at about 7pm, he arose from his
seat even though the train was not at full stop. When he was about to alight from
the train (which was still slightly moving) he accidentally stepped on a sack of
watermelons which he failed to notice due to the fact that it was dim. This caused
him to lose his balance at the door and he fell and his arm was crushed by the train
and he suffered other serious injuries. He was dragged a few meters more as the
train slowed down.
Upon August 31, 1915, he instituted this proceeding in the Court of First Instance of
the city of Manila to recover damages of the defendant company, founding his
action upon the negligence of the servants and employees of the defendant in
placing the sacks of melons upon the platform and leaving them so placed as to be
a menace to the security of passenger alighting from the company's trains. The CFI
ruled that although negligence was attributable to the defendant by reason of the
fact that the sacks of melons were so placed as to obstruct passengers passing to
and from the cars, nevertheless, the plaintiff himself had failed to use due caution in
alighting from the coach and was therefore precluded from recovering. Judgment
was accordingly entered in favor of the defendant company, and the plaintiff
appealed.
It was established that the employees of MRC were negligent in piling the sacks of
watermelons. MRC raised as a defense the fact that Cangco was also negligent as
he failed to exercise diligence in alighting from the train as he did not wait for it to
stop.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Manila Railroad Co is liable for damages.

HELD
Yes. It cannot be doubted that the employees of the railroad company were guilty of
negligence in piling these sacks on the platform in the manner above stated; that
their presence caused the plaintiff to fall as he alighted from the train; and that they
therefore constituted an effective legal cause of the injuries sustained by the
plaintiff. It necessarily follows that the defendant company is liable for the damage
thereby occasioned unless recovery is barred by the plaintiff's own contributory
negligence.
It is important to note that the foundation of the legal liability is the contract of
carriage, and that the obligation to respond for the damage which plaintiff has
suffered arises, if at all, from the breach of that contract by reason of the failure of
defendant to exercise due care in its performance.
However Art. 1903 relates only to culpa aquiliana and not to culpa contractual, as
the Court cleared on the case of Rakes v. Atlantic Gulf. It is not accurate to say that
proof of diligence and care in the selection and control of the servant relieves the
master from liability for the latters act. The fundamental distinction between
obligation of this character and those which arise from contract, rest upon the fact
that in cases of non-contractual obligations it is the wrongful or negligent act or
omission itself which creates the vinculum juris, whereas in contractual relations the
vinculum exists independently of the breach of the voluntary duty assumed by the
parties when entering into the contractual relation. When the source of obligation
upon which plaintiffs cause of action depends is a negligent act or omission, the
burden of proof rest upon the plaintiff to prove negligence. On the other hand, in
contractual undertaking, proof of the contract and of its non-performance is
sufficient prima facie to warrant recovery. The negligence of employee cannot be
invoked to relieve the employer from liability as it will make juridical persons
completely immune from damages arising from breach of their contracts. Defendant
was therefore liable for the injury suffered by plaintiff, whether the breach of the
duty were to be regarded as constituting culpa aquiliana or contractual.
As Manresa discussed, whether negligence occurs as an incident in the course of
the performance of a contractual undertaking or is itself the source of an extra-
contractual obligation, its essential characteristics are identical. There is always an
act or omission productive of damage due to carelessness or inattention on the part
of the defendant. The contract of defendant to transport plaintiff carried with it, by
implication, the duty to carry him in safety and to provide safe means of entering
and leaving its trains. Contributory negligence on the part of petitioner as invoked
by defendant is untenable. In determining the question of contributory negligence in
performing such act- that is to say, whether the passenger acted prudently or
recklessly- age, sex, and physical condition of the passenger are circumstances
necessarily affecting the safety of the passenger, and should be considered. It is to
be noted that the place was perfectly familiar to plaintiff as it was his daily routine.
The courts conclusion is there is slightly underway characterized by imprudence
and therefore was not guilty of contributory negligence. The decision of the trial
court is REVERSED.

15. AIR FRANCE, vs. RAFAEL CARRASCOSO and the HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. L-21438
September 28, 1966

FACTS:
In March 1958, Rafael Carrascoso and several other Filipinos were tourists en route
to Rome from Manila. Carrascoso was issued a first class round trip ticket by Air
France. But during a stop-over in Bangkok, he was asked by the plane manager of
Air France to vacate his seat because a white man allegedly has a better right
than him. Carrascoso protested but when things got heated and upon advise of
other Filipinos on board, Carrascoso gave up his seat and was transferred to the
planes tourist class.

After their tourist trip when Carrascoso was already in the Philippines, he sued Air
France for damages for the embarrassment he suffered during his trip. In court,
Carrascoso testified, among others, that he when he was forced to take the tourist
class, he went to the planes pantry where he was approached by a plane purser
who told him that he noted in the planes journal the following:
First-class passenger was forced to go to the tourist class against his will, and that
the captain refused to intervene. The said testimony was admitted in favor of
Carrascoso. The trial court eventually awarded damages in favor of Carrascoso. This
was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.Air France is assailing the decision of the trial
court and the CA. It avers that the issuance of a first class ticket to Carrascoso was
not an assurance that he will be seated in first class because allegedly in truth and
in fact, that was not the true intent between the parties.Air France also questioned
the admissibility of Carrascosos testimony regarding the note made by the purser
because the said note was never presented in court.

ISSUE: Whether or not Air France is liable for damages and on what basis.

HELD:
Yes. It appears that Air Frances liability is based on culpa-contractual and on culpa
aquiliana.

Culpa Contractual
There exists a contract of carriage between Air France and Carrascoso. There was a
contract to furnish Carrasocoso a first class passage; Second, That said contract was
breached when Air France failed to furnish first class transportation at Bangkok;
and Third, that there was bad faith when Air Frances employee compelled
Carrascoso to leave his first class accommodation berth after he was already,
seated and to take a seat in the tourist class, by reason of which he suffered
inconvenience, embarrassments and humiliations, thereby causing him mental
anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings and social humiliation, resulting in moral
damages.
The Supreme Court did not give credence to Air Frances claim that the issuance of
a first class ticket to a passenger is not an assurance that he will be given a first
class seat. Such claim is simply incredible.

Culpa Aquiliana
Here, the SC ruled, even though there is a contract of carriage between Air France
and Carrascoso, there is also a tortuous act based on culpa aquiliana. Passengers do
not contract merely for transportation. They have a right to be treated by the
carriers employees with kindness, respect, courtesy and due consideration. They
are entitled to be protected against personal misconduct, injurious language,
indignities and abuses from such employees. So it is, that any rule or discourteous
conduct on the part of employees towards a passenger gives the latter an action for
damages against the carrier. Air Frances contract with Carrascoso is one attended
with public duty. The stress of Carrascosos action is placed upon his wrongful
expulsion. This is a violation of public duty by the Air France a case of quasi-
delict. Damages are proper.

16.Singson v BPI

FACTS: Singson, was one of the defendants in a civil case, in which judgment had
been rendered sentencing him and his co-defendants therein Lobregat and Villa-
Abrille& Co., to pay a sum of money to the plaintiff therein. Said judgment became
final and executory as only against Ville-Abrille for its failure to file an appeal. A writ
of garnishment was subsequently served upon BPI in which the Singsons had a
current account insofar as Villa-Abrilles credits against the Bank were concerned.
Upon receipt of the said Writ of Garnishment, a clerk of the bank, upon reading the
name of the Singson in the title of the Writ of Garnishment as a party defendants,
without further reading the body and informing himself that said garnishment was
merely intended for the deposits of defendant Villa-Abrille& Co., et al, prepared a
letter informing Singson of the garnishment of his deposits by the plaintiff in that
case.
Subsequently, two checks issued by the plaintiff Julian C. Singson, one in favor of B.
M. Glass Service and another in favor of the Lega Corporation, were dishonored by
the bank. B. M. Glass Service then wrote to Singson that the check was not honored
by BPI because his account therein had already been garnished and that they are
now constrained to close his credit account with them.
Singson wrote to BPI, claiming that his name was not included in the Writ of
Execution and Notice of Garnishment, which was served upon the bank. The
defendants lost no time to rectify the mistake that had been inadvertently
committed.
Thus this action for damages.
ISSUE: WON the existence of a contract between the parties bars a plaintiffs claim
for damages based on torts?
Ruling: NO. The existence of a contract between the parties does not bar the
commission of a tort by the one against the order and the consequent recovery of
damages therefore. Indeed, this view has been, in effect, reiterated in a
comparatively recent case. Thus, in Air France vs. Carrascoso, involving an airplane
passenger who, despite his first-class ticket, had been illegally ousted from his first-
class accommodation and compelled to take a seat in the tourist compartment, was
held entitled to recover damages from the air-carrier, upon the ground of tort on the
latters part, for, although the relation between a passenger and a carrier is
contractual both in origin and nature the act that breaks the contract may also
be a tort.
In view, however, of the facts obtaining in the case at bar, and considering,
particularly, the circumstance, that the wrong done to the plaintiff was remedied as
soon as the President of the bank realized the mistake he and his subordinate
employee had committed, the Court finds that an award of nominal damages the
amount of which need not be proven in the sum of P1,000, in addition to
attorneys fees in the sum of P500, would suffice to vindicate plaintiffs rights.

17.So Ping Bun vs CA

FACTS:
Tek Hua Trading Co, through its managing partner, So Pek Giok, entered into lease
agreements with lessor Dee C. Chuan & Sons Inc. Tek Hua used the areas to store its
textiles. The contracts each had a one-year term. They provided that should the
lessee continue to occupy the premises after the term, the lease shall be on a
month-to-month basis. When the contracts expired, the parties did not renew the
contracts, but Tek Hua continued to occupy the premises Tek Hua Trading Co. was
dissolved. Later, the original members of Tek Hua Trading Co. including Manuel
Tiong, formed Tek Hua Enterprising Corp. Pek Giok died in 1986 and Ping Bun,
occupied the warehouse for his own textile business, Trendsetter Marketing. So Ping
Bun refused to vacate. So Ping Bun requested formal contracts of lease with DCCSI
in favor Trendsetter Marketing. A suit for injunction was filed against so Ping Bun.
Rtc Granted annulment of the four Contracts of Lease without awarding damages

ISSUE: WON the injunction should be upheld and should damages be awarded.

HELD: YES. Damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which results from injury, and
damages are the recompense or compensation awarded for the damage suffered.
One becomes liable in an action for damages for a nontrespassory invasion of
another's interest in the private use and enjoyment of asset if
* (a) the other has property rights and privileges with respect to the use or
enjoyment interfered with,
* (b) the invasion is substantial,
* (c) the defendant's conduct is a legal cause of the invasion, and
* (d) the invasion is either intentional and unreasonable or unintentional and
actionable under general negligence rules
* elements of tort interference are:
* (1) existence of a valid contract;
* (2) knowledge on the part of the third person of the existence of contract; and
* (3) interference of the third person is without legal justification or excuse.

When Ping Bun asked DCCSI to execute lease contracts in its favor, result deprived
DCCSI's property right as a result. Lower courts did not award damages, but this
was only because the extent of damages was not quantifiable. Lack of malice
precludes damages. But it does not relieve petitioner of the legal liability for
entering into contracts and causing breach of existing ones.The injunction saved the
respondents from further damage or injury caused by petitioner's interference.

18.LRT vs. NAVIDAD

FACTS: After purchasing a token representing the fare, Navidad was drunk when he
entered the boarding platform of the LRT. He had an altercation with the security
guard. Navidad fell on the tracks and was killed when a train ran over him.

ISSUE: Who is liable?

RULING: LRT alone is liable.

The provisions of the Civil Code on common carriers require the common carrier to
exercise utmost diligence in ensuring the safety of its passengers. This obligation
exists not only during the course of the trip but for so long as the passengers are
within its premises where they ought to be in pursuance to then contract of
carriage.

If the security agency is to be held liable, it would be for a tort. Once the fault of the
security guard is established, the security agency would be held liable on the
presumption that it did not exercise the diligence of a good father of the family in
the selection and supervision of its employees. However, no sufficient evidence was
presented on the matter.

A liability for tort may arise even under a contract where tort is that which breaches
the contract. When an act which constitutes a breach of contract which would have
itself constituted the source of a quasi-delictual liability had no contract existed
between the parties, the contract can be said to have been breached by tort,
thereby allowing the rules on tort to apply.

Nominal damages cannot co-exist with compensatory damages.

19. CONSOLIDATED BANK and TRUST CORPORATION vs. CA

Facts:
L.C. Diaz and Company (LC Diaz), an accounting firm, has a savings account with
Consolidated Bank and Trust Corporation (Solidbank). On August 14, 1991, the
firms messenger deposited an amount with the bank but due to a long line and the
fact that he still needs to deposit a certain amount in another bank, the messenger
left the firms passbook with a teller of Solidbank. When the messenger returned,
the passbook was already missing. The teller gave the passbook to someone else
instead of him. The next day, LC Diaz made a formal request ordering Solidbank not
to honor any transaction concerning their account with them until the firm is able to
acquire a new passbook. However, in the afternoon of August 14, 1991, an amount
of P300,000.00 was already withdrawn from the firms account. LC Diaz demanded
Solidbank to refund the said amount but the bank refused.
Solidbank contends that under their banking rules, they are authorized to honor
withdrawals if presented with the passbook; that when the P300k was withdrawn,
the passbook was presented. The impostor also presented a withdrawal slip which
bore the signatures of the representatives of LC Diaz.

Issue: WON Solidbank is liable for the amount withdrawn by the impostor?

Held: Yes. Solidbank is liable for breach of contract due to negligence, or culpa
contractual. Solidbanks tellers must exercise a high degree of diligence in insuring
that they return the passbook only to the depositor or his authorized representative.
The tellers know, or should know, that the rules on savings account provide that any
person in possession of the passbook is presumptively its owner. If the tellers give
the passbook to the wrong person, they would be clothing that person presumptive
ownership of the passbook, facilitating unauthorized withdrawals by that person. For
failing to return the passbook to the messenger, the teller presumptively failed to
observe such high degree of diligence in safeguarding the passbook, and in insuring
its return to the party authorized to receive the same. However, L.C. Diaz was guilty
of contributory negligence in allowing a withdrawal slip signed by its authorized
signatories to fall into the hands of an impostor. Thus, the liability of Solidbank
should be reduced.

Note: Article 1172 of the Civil Code provides that responsibility arising from
negligence in the performance of every kind of obligation is demandable. For
breach of the savings deposit agreement due to negligence, or culpa contractual,
the bank is liable to its depositor. In culpa contractual, once the plaintiff proves a
breach of contract, there is a presumption that the defendant was at fault or
negligent. The burden is on the defendant to prove that he was not at fault or
negligent. In contrast, in culpa aquiliana the plaintiff has the burden of proving that
the defendant was negligent. In the present case, L.C. Diaz has established that
Solidbank breached its contractual obligation to return the passbook only to the
authorized representative of L.C. Diaz. There is thus a presumption that Solidbank
was at fault and its teller was negligent in not returning the passbook to Calapre.
The burden was on Solidbank to prove that there was no negligence on its part or its
employees. Solidbank failed to discharge its burden. Solidbank is bound by the
negligence of its employees under the principle of respondeat superior or command
responsibility. The defense of exercising the required diligence in the selection and
supervision of employees is not a complete defense in culpa contractual, unlike in
culpa aquiliana.

20.Crisostomovs CA G.R. No. 138334. August 25, 2003

(Civil liability arising from breach of contract vs tort arising from contract)
Estela L. Crisostomo contracted the services of Caravan Travel and Tours
International, Inc. to arrange and facilitate her booking, ticketing and
accommodation in a tour dubbed "Jewels of Europe". The package tour cost her P74,
322.70.
Menor, her niece, a former ticketing manager of the company, went to Estelas
residence on a Wednesday to deliver petitioners travel documents and plane
tickets. Estela, in turn, gave Menor the full payment for the package tour. Menor
then told her to be at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA) on Saturday, two
hours before her flight on board British Airways.
Without checking her travel documents, Estela went to NAIA on Saturday, to take
the flight for the first leg of her journey from Manila to Hongkong. She discovered
that the flight she was supposed to take had already departed the previous day. She
learned that her plane ticket was for the flight scheduled on June 14, 1991. She thus
called up Menor to complain.
Subsequently, Menor prevailed upon Estela to take another tour the "British
Pageant, which cost P20, 881.00. She gave caravan travel and tours P7, 980.00 as
partial payment and commenced the trip in July 1991.
Upon petitioners return from Europe, she demanded from respondent the
reimbursement of P61, 421.70, representing the difference between the sum she
paid for "Jewels of Europe" and the amount she owed respondent for the "British
Pageant" tour. Despite several demands, respondent company refused to reimburse
the amount, contending that the same was non-refundable.
Estela filed a complaint against Caravan travel and Tours for breach of contract of
carriage and damages.
Issue: Can Estela recover both from breach of contract of carriage and damages?
Held: No to both.
On the matter of breach of contract of carriage, a contract of carriage or
transportation is one whereby a certain person or association of persons obligate
themselves to transport persons, things, or news from one place to another for a
fixed price.
From the above definition, Caravan Travel and Tours is not an entity engaged in the
business of transporting either passengers or goods and is therefore, neither a
private nor a common carrier. Caravan Travel and Tours did not undertake to
transport Estela from one place to another since its covenant with its customers is
simply to make travel arrangements in their behalf. Caravan travel and tours
services as a travel agency include procuring tickets and facilitating travel permits
or visas as well as booking customers for tours.
The contractual relation between Estela and the company is the service of arranging
and facilitating petitioners booking, ticketing and accommodation in the package
tour. In contrast, the object of a contract of carriage is the transportation of
passengers or goods. It is in this sense that the contract between the parties in this
case was an ordinary one for services and not one of carriage. Petitioners
submission is premised on a wrong assumption.
While Estela concededly bought her plane ticket through the efforts of respondent
company, this does not mean that the latter ipso facto is a common carrier. At most,
Caravan Travel and Tours acted merely as an agent of the airline, with whom the
former ultimately contracted for her carriage to Europe.
Note: Since the contract between the parties is an ordinary one for services, the
standard of care required of respondent is that of a good father of a family under
Article 1173 of the Civil Code.
On the matter of damages, Estela still cannot recover.
Caravan Travel and Tours exercised due diligence in performing its obligations under
the contract and followed standard procedure in rendering its services to Estela. The
plane ticket issued to petitioner clearly reflected the departure date and time,
contrary to Estelas contention. The travel documents, consisting of the tour
itinerary, vouchers and instructions, were likewise delivered to her two days prior to
the trip. The Caravan Travel and Tours also properly booked Estela for the tour,
prepared the necessary documents and procured the plane tickets. It arranged
Estelas hotel accommodation as well as food, land transfers and sightseeing
excursions, in accordance with its avowed undertaking.

Furthermore, Menor was not negligent. It is the burden of petitioner Estela to prove
negligence on part of Menor. The plane ticket issued clearly reflected the departure
date and time. The travel documents consisting of the tour itinerary vouchers and
instructions were also delivered two days prior to the trip. Thus, Menor properly
booked the tour and arranged all other aspects of the tour.