CIVIL SERVICE

1. JOCOM VS REGALADO 201 SCRA 73

G.R. No. 77373 August 22, 1991

EDMUNDO C. JOCOM, petitioner,

vs.
THE HON. ANDRES C. REGALADO, Presiding Judge of the Regional Court, 5th Judicial
Region, Branch XXV, Naga City and JESSIE M. ROBREDO, respondents.

Romero, Lagman, Torres, Arrieta & Evangelista for petitioner.

Luis General, Jr. for private respondent.

PADILLA, J.:p

This is a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, with prayer for the issuance of a writ
of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order, to annul the temporary restraining
order issued by the Regional Trial Court of Naga City, Branch XXV contained in its orders dated
3 and 9 February 1987 1 and its orders dated 11 and 18 February 1987 denying petitioner's
motion for raffle of the case and motion to dismiss, respectively. 2Petitioner also seeks to enjoin
the respondent judge from further enforcing the disputed orders and from proceeding with the
hearing of the case before the court a quo, and to compel private respondent Jessie M.
Robredo to vacate the Office of Project Director of the Bicol River Basin Development Program
(hereinafter referred to as BRBDP, for brevity), and to order him (Robredo) to turn over the said
office to herein petitioner Eduardo C. Jocom. The factual background of the case is as follows:

On 7 May 1973, the Bicol River Basin Council was created under PD 412, to oversee, unify and
integrate the administration and implementation of the pilot river basin development program of
the country. The Council was headed by an Executive Director and four (4) Deputy Directors.

On 28 April 1978, PD 926 modified the organizational structure of BRBDP by placing it under
the supervision and direction of the Cabinet Coordinating Committee on Integrated Rural
Development Projects of the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA). Under
Sec. 5 of said law, the Cabinet Committee Coordinator for the Program had the power to
appoint the "Program Director" as head of the program office and other heads of major
organizational subdivisions of the program. The "Program Director" had the following powers
and functions:

See. 6. Powers and Functions of the Program Director. The Program Director
shall exercise the following powers and functions:
 a. Execute and administer the policies and decisions of the Cabinet Committee;
b. Directly coordinate the activities of all implementing departments and agencies
in the planning and implementation of the projects;
c. Subject periodic financial and work accomplishment reports relating to project
implementation to the Cabinet Committee, the Budget Commission and other
Agencies concerned through the Cabinet Committee Coordinator;
d. Consolidate, for the approval of the Cabinet Committee Coordinator, requests
for budget releases of projects of the implementing departments and agencies in
accordance with consolidated plans, budgets and work programs approved by
the Cabinet Committee;
e. Collect and consolidate all project accounts under the Program maintained by
the implementing departments and agencies;
f. Organize and manage the Program Office and adopt administrative rules and
procedures for its internal management.
g. Call upon any department, bureau, office, agency, instrumentality or any
political subdivision of the Government to assist in the Planning and
implementation of the Program;
h. Enter into contracts with private or public entities in connection with the
functions of the Program Office, subject to the approval of the Cabinet
Committee Coordinator; and
i. Perform such other functions as may be assigned by the Cabinet Committee
Coordinator. 3

On 17 May 1978, PD 1378 created the National Council on Integrated Area Development
(NACLAD) in lieu of the Cabinet Coordinating Committee on Integrated Rural Development
Projects, with the President of the Philippines as Chairman. Despite the abolition of the Cabinet
Coordinating Committee, the "Project Directors" of the various on-going projects, such as the
Mindoro, Bicol, Samar and Cagayan Projects, retained their respective powers, functions,
tenures and compensation.

On 11 June 1978, PD 1553 amended certain provisions of PD 926 modifying the organizational
structure of BRBDP.

On 4 July 1981, Executive Order No. 708 transferred the Chairmanship of the National Council
on Integrated Area Development (NACIAD) to the Prime Minister.

On 16 September 1981, Executive Order No. 835 revised the charter of NACIAD, Sec. 7 thereof
authorized the Council to establish ad hoc support staffs as may be necessary for particular
integrated area development projects, which shall exist for the duration of said projects. Each
project support staff shall be headed by a "Project Director." The Prime Minister as Chairman of
the Council was vested with power to appoint the "Project Directors" of the various integrated
area development projects.
After the February 1986 revolution, Vice-President Salvador H. Laurel was appointed by the
President to be the Minister and he ipso facto became the Chairman of the National Council on
Integrated Area Development (NACIAD), with the power to appoint the Project Directors of the
various integrated area development projects in the country 4 which include the Bicol River
Basin Development Program (BRBDP) 5

In the exercise of his powers as Chairman of NACIAD before the proclamation of the Freedom
Constitution, on 25 March 1986, Vice-President Laurel appointed private respondent Jessie M.
Robredo to the position of "Program Director" of BRBDP vice Carmelo Villacorta. 6

In the late afternoon of that same day (25 March 1986), President Aquino issued Proc. No. 3
(Freedom Constitution), Article 1 of which declared that Art. XI of the 1973 Constitution and the
amendments thereto dealing with the Prime Minister and the Cabinet were deemed superseded.

However, on 27 January 1987, Vice-President Laurel appointed petitioner Jocom to the position
of "Project Director" of BRBDP. 7 Simultaneous with petitioner Jocom's appointment, private
respondent Robredo was informed of his termination from office without stating the ground for
his dismissal. 8

Armed with his appointment, petitioner attempted to assume the Office of "Project Director" of
BRBDP but private respondent, allegedly with some armed men, prevented petitioner from
assuming said office by barricading the building of BRBDP, located at Pili, Camarines Sur.

To compel petitioner Jocom to desist from attempting to assume the Office of Project Director of
BRBDP, private respondent Robredo filed a petition for injunction with the RTC of Naga City,
Branch XXV, docketed as RTC-87-1131 On 3 February 1987, the trial court issued an order
"enjoining respondent Edmundo C. Jocom, for a period of twenty (20) days from the date
hereof, to desist from assuming the above-named office such as exercising the powers and
performing the functions thereof," and set the hearing for issuance of preliminary injunction. 9

Based on the amended petition filed by private respondent Robredo, alleging that the finds of
BRBDP deposited with the Philippine National Bank were frozen by the bank, which could result
in paralyzing the operations of BRBDP, and in order to give force and effect to the 3 February
1987 order granting the temporary restraining order, the trial court issued another order dated 9
February 1987, 10 ordering Messrs. Vicente B. de la Vina and Ramon Encina, in their capacities
as Branch Manager and Cashier of PNB, respectively, "to honor all the checks of the BRBDP
under petitioner, Jessie M. Robredo, as Project Director and until further orders."

On 3 February 1987, petitioner Jocom moved for the raffle of the case, claiming that there was
no raffle committee which conducted a special raffle of the case. In an order dated 11 February
1987, the court a quo denied said motion on the ground that the same should have been
addressed to the Executive Judge who presided over such special raffle; and that insofar as the
court a quo was concerned, the legal presumption of regularity of performance of duty in
conducting the raffle holds. 11
Petitioner then moved to dismiss the private respondent's petition, on jurisdictional ground,
relying on Sec. 4 of Executive Order No. 17 which provides that no restraining order or
preliminary injunction can be issued by any court to enjoin the separation/replacement of any
official or employee in the government service. On 18 February 1987, the trial court denied said
motion, holding that the prohibition against the issuance of an injunction and/or restraining order
is not applicable to an appointee under the Freedom Constitution, who is actually a replacement
to an employee appointed under the 1973 Constitution. Hence, this petition.

To support his claim as the rightful and legal appointee to the Office of Project Director of
BRBDP, petitioner argues that private respondent Robredo is not qualified for the position of
"Project Director" because he was below the required age of thirty (30) years provided under the
law at the time of his appointment; that a "Project Director" performs an executive function and
the position is without a fixed term, thus, the appointee may be removed with or without cause
upon the discretion of the appointing authority; and that Sec. 4 of Executive Order No. 17 does
not allow the court to enjoin or restrain the separation/replacement of government employees in
the course of a reorganization process; that private respondent's recourse for his alleged
removal should not have been an independent action for injunction but a petition for
reconsideration before the Committee created by E.O. No. 17.

On the other hand, private respondent Robredo alleges that petitioner's appointment is void,
because all the executive powers and functions devolving upon Vice-President Laurel as Prime
Minister, including his power as Chairman of NACIAD to appoint the Project Director of BRBDP
had reverted to the President after the promulgation of the Freedom Constitution, which
abolished the position of Prime Minister.

In a recent Executive Order (No. 374) promulgated on 30 May 1989, the BRBDP was abolished
and its functions were transferred to the Regional Development Council and to the Governors of
Camarines Sur and Albay. 12 All qualified personnel affected by such abolition are entitled to
receive retirement benefits. 13 The abolition of BRBDP notwithstanding, we find it necessary to
settle the issue as to who was the proper appointee to the position of Program/Project Director
of BRBDP, entitled to hold said office prior to said abolition, to determine the party entitled to
receive the separation benefits provided by law.

We find insufficient merit in the petition.

After a careful study of the various laws affecting the creation of BRBDP, it appears that the
position of "Program Director" under PD 926 (creating BRBDP) and the position of "Project
Director" under PD 1378 and Executive Order Nos. 731 and 835 (charter of NACIAD), are one
and the same position, with the main function of heading the BRBDP. The power to appoint the
Program/Project Director to head the BRBDP originally belonged to the Cabinet Committee
Coordination, but with the subsequent amendments to the organizational structure of BRBDP
and that of NACIAD, the power was delegated to the Chairman of NACIAD.

During Vice-President Laurel's short tenure as Prime Minister, he became the Chairman of
NACIAD, with the power to appoint the Program/Project Directors of the various integrated area
development projects, including the BRBDP. However, after the promulgation of the Freedom
Constitution, all provisions regarding the Office of the Prime Minister were deleted, which
indicated the abolition of said office. The control over all ministries and other functions and
powers pertaining to the Prime Minister reverted to the President. In view of the abolition of the
Office of Prime Minister, the functions of Vice-President Laurel as Chairman of NACIAD also
ceased, and the Chairmanship became part of the executive functions of the President.

As Chairman of NACIAD, the President thru her Deputy Executive Secretary, exercised the
functions and powers of said office and informed the Congressmen of the different provinces of
the Bicol Region of the development projects of NACIAD in their provinces thru BRBDP, as
contained in her letters dated 8 July 1987. 14

At the time of petitioner's appointment, Vice-President Laurel had already ceased to be

Chairman of NACIAD. His appointment of herein petitioner to the position of Program/Project
Director and the removal of private respondent from said position, were in the exercise of power
that already belonged to the President. Hence, such appointment and removal were null and
void, and petitioner cannot claim to have had a valid right to the position of Program/Project
Director of BRBDP.

But, even assuming that Vice-President Laurel still had the power to appoint herein petitioner as
Program/Project Director of BRBDP, private respondent could not be removed from said
position, without just cause. There was thus no vacancy in the office justifying the appointment
thereto of petitioner Jocom.

All branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies of the government, including

government owned and controlled corporations with original charters are covered by the civil
service and its rules and regulations. Appointments to the civil service are based on merit and
fitness determined by competitive examinations, except appointments to positions which are
policy determining, primarily confidential or highly technical. 15 The Civil Service Law classifies
the positions in the civil service into career and non-career service positions. The career service
is characterized by (1) entrance based on merit and fitness to be determined as far as
practicable by competitive examinations, or based on highly technical qualifications; (2)
opportunity for advancement to higher career positions; and (3) security of tenure; 16 while a
non-career position is characterized by (1) entrance on bases other than those of the usual tests
of merit and fitness utilized for the career service; and (2) tenure which is limited to a period
specified by law, or which is coterminous with that of the appointing authority or subject to his
pleasure, or limited to the duration of a particular project for which purpose employment was
extended. 17

Regardless of the classification of the position held by a government employee covered by civil
service rules, be it a career or non-career position, such employee may not be removed without
just cause. An employee who belongs to the non-career service is protected from removal or
suspension without just cause and non-observance of due process.

xxx xxx xxx

 As an employee in the civil service and as civil service eligible, respondent is
entitled to the benefits, rights and privileges extended to those belonging to the
service. He cannot be removed or dismissed without just cause, much less,
without formal charge or prior notice. The fact that his position falls under the
unclassified service or the non-career service does not remove him from the
protective mantle of the Civil Service Law. Persons in the unclassified service are
merely so designated because the nature of their work and qualifications are not
subject to classification unlike those in the classified service. ... 18

The constitutional and statutory guarantee of security of tenure is extended to both those in the
career and non-career service positions, and the cause under which an employee may be
removed or suspended must naturally have some relation to the character or fitness of the
officer or employee, for the discharge of the functions of his office 19 or expiration of the project
for which employment was extended.

The law 20 modifying the organizational structure of BRBDP enumerated the following
qualifications of the appointee to the position of "Project Director," namely: (a) a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines; (b) at least thirty (30) years of age; and (c) of proven record of
executive competence in the field of public administration and/or infrastructure projects and/or in
the management of agricultural, industrial or commercial enterprises. Although petitioner claims
that private respondent was below the age of 30 years at the time of his appointment to qualify
to the position of Program-Project Director, no sufficient proof was presented to substantiate
such claim.

With regard to the tenure of the appointee to the position of Program/Project Director, PD 926 is
silent on the matter. However, in the Revised Charter of NACIAD, 21 the Council is given the
authority to establish ad hocsupport staffs as may be necessary for particular integrated area
development projects to be headed by a "Project Director," which shall exist only for the duration
of said projects. The Council is likewise given the power to re-organize or abolish project
support staffs under its supervision and control.

From the foregoing provisions of law, it would appear that the position of Program/Project
Director falls under the classification of a non-career position where the tenure of the appointee
is subject to the duration of the project, while entrance to the position is based on the fact that
the appointee possess all the qualifications required by law for the position. However, despite
the classification of the position of Program/Project Director as a non-career position, the
appointee was nonetheless protected by the rules on security of tenure, and could not be
removed from office at the whim and caprice of the appointing authorities without just cause and
without observing the rules on due process. The termination of private respondent from the
office of Program/Project Director failed to state the ground of such removal from office, thus,
his removal from office was without just cause.

Sec. 4 of Exec. Order No. 17, 22 which prohibits the issuance of any restraining order or writ of
preliminary injunction to enjoin the separation/replacement of any official or employee in the
government service, is intended to prevent delay in the government reorganization process
provided under the Freedom Constitution. However, such ban cannot apply in the case at bar
because petitioner Jocom's appointment was not made pursuant to a valid reorganization. At
the time of his appointment, Vice-President Laurel was no longer the Chairman of NACIAD and
had lost the power to appoint the Program/Project Director, or even reorganize the BRBDP.

ACCORDINGLY, petition is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

2.ACHACOSO VS MACARAIG 195 SCRA 235

G.R. No. 93023 March 13, 1991

TOMAS D. ACHACOSO, petitioner

vs.
CATALINO MACARAIG and RUBEN D. TORRES, in their capacities as Executive
Secretary and Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE),
respectively; and JOSE N. SARMIENTO,respondents.

Padilla, Jimenez, Kintanar and Asuncion Law Office for petitioner.

CRUZ, J:p
The petitioner invokes security of tenure against his claimed removal without legal cause. The
respondents assert he is not entitled to the guaranty because he is not a career official. These
are the legal issues. The facts are as follows:

Tomas D. Achacoso was appointed Administrator of the Philippine Overseas Employment

Administration on October 16, 1987, and assumed office on October 27, 1987. On January 2,
1990, in compliance with a request addressed by the President of the Philippines to "all
Department Heads, Undersecretaries, Assistant Secretaries, Bureau Heads," and other
government officials, he filed a courtesy resignation. This was accepted by the President on
April 3, 1990, "with deep regrets." On April 10, 1990, the Secretary of Labor requested him to
turn over his office to the Deputy Administrator as officer in-charge. In a letter dated April 19,
1990, he protested his replacement and declared he was not surrendering his office because
his resignation was not voluntary but filed only in obedience to the President's directive. On the
same date, respondent Jose N. Sarmiento was appointed Administrator of the POEA, vice the
petitioner. Achacoso was informed thereof the following day and was again asked to vacate his
office. He filed a motion for reconsideration on April 23, 1990, but this was denied on April 30,
1990. He then came to this Court for relief.

In this petition for prohibition and mandamus, this Court is asked to annul the appointment of
Sarmiento and to prohibit the respondents from preventing the petitioner from discharging his
duties as Administrator of the POEA.

Achacoso contends that he is a member of the Career Service of the Civil Service and so
enjoys security of tenure, which is one of the characteristics of the Career Service as
distinguished from the Non-Career Service. 1Claiming to have the rank of undersecretary, he
says he comes under Article IV, Section 5 of P.D. 807, otherwise known as the Civil Service
Decree, which includes in the Career Service:

3. Positions in the Career Executive Service; namely, Undersecretary, Assistant

Secretary, Bureau Director, Assistant Bureau Director, Regional Director,
Assistant Regional Director, Chief of Department Service and other officers of
equivalent rank as may be identified by the Career Executive Service Board, all
of whom are appointed by the President.

His argument is that in view of the security of tenure enjoyed by the above-named officials, it
was "beyond the prerogatives of the President" to require them to submit courtesy resignations.
Such courtesy resignations, even if filed, should be disregarded for having been submitted
"under duress," as otherwise the President would have the power to remove career officials at
pleasure, even for capricious reasons. In support of this contention, he invokesOrtiz
vs. Commission on Elections, 2 where we observed that "to constitute a complete and operative
act of resignation, the officer or employee must show a clear intention to relinquish" and that "a
courtesy resignation cannot properly be interpreted as a resignation in the legal sense for it is
not necessarily a reflection of a public official's intention to surrender his position." He concludes
that as his removal was illegal, there was no vacancy in the disputed office to which respondent
Sarmiento could have been validly appointed.

In his Comment, the Solicitor General concedes that the office of POEA Administrator is a
career executive service position but submits that the petitioner himself is not a career executive
service official entitled to security of tenure. He offers the following certification from the Civil
Service Commission to show that the petitioner did not possess the necessary qualifications
when he was appointed Administrator of the POEA in 1987:

C E R T I F I C AT I O N

This is to certify that per records of the Career Executive Service Board (CESB),
Mr. Tomas D. Achacoso III has not participated in a Career Executive Service
Development Program (CESDP) and is not a CES eligible. This is to certify
further that Mr. Achacoso was not appointed to a rank in the CES and is not
therefore a member of the Career Executive Service.

xxx xxx xxx

(Sgd.)
ELMO
R D.
JURIDI
CO
Execut
ive
Directo
r

Reference is also made to the following rules embodied in Part III, Article IV, Integrated
Reorganization Plan as approved by P.D. 1 and amended by P.D. 336 and P.D. 337, on the
career executive service:

c. Appointment. Appointment to appropriate classes in the Career Service shall

be made by the President from a list of career executive eligibles recommended
by the Board. Such appointments shall be made on the basis of rank; provided
that appointments to the higher ranks which qualify the incumbents to
assignments as undersecretary and heads of the bureaus and offices and
equivalent positions shall be with the confirmation of the Commission on
Appointments. The President may, however, in exceptional cases, appoint any
person who is not a Career Executive Service eligible, provided that such
appointee shall subsequently take the required Career Executive Service
examination and that he shall not be promoted to a higher class until he qualifies
in such examination. (Emphasis supplied.)
The respondents contend that as the petitioner was not a career executive service eligible at the
time of his appointment, he came under the exception to the above rule and so was subject to
the provision that he "shall subsequently take the required Career Executive Service
examination and that he shall not be promoted to a higher rank until he qualifies in such
examination." Not having taken that examination, he could not claim that his appointment was
permanent and guaranteed him security of tenure in his position.

It is settled that a permanent appointment can be issued only "to a person who meets all the
requirements for the position to which he is being appointed, including the appropriate eligibility
prescribed." Achacoso did not. At best, therefore, his appointment could be regarded only as
temporary. And being so, it could be withdrawn at will by the appointing authority and "at a
moment's notice," conformably to established jurisprudence.

The Court, having considered these submissions and the additional arguments of the parties in
the petitioner's Reply and the Solicitor-General's Rejoinder, must find for the respondents.

The mere fact that a position belongs to the Career Service does not automatically confer
security of tenure on its occupant even if he does not possess the required qualifications. Such
right will have to depend on the nature of his appointment, which in turn depends on his
eligibility or lack of it. A person who does not have the requisite qualifications for the position
cannot be appointed to it in the first place or, only as an exception to the rule, may be appointed
to it merely in an acting capacity in the absence of appropriate eligibles. 3 The appointment
extended to him cannot be regarded as permanent even if it may be so designated.

The purpose of an acting or temporary appointment is to prevent a hiatus in the discharge of

official functions by authorizing a person to discharge the same pending the selection of a
permanent or another appointee. 4 The person named in an acting capacity accepts the position
under the condition that he shall surrender the office once he is called upon to do so by the
appointing authority.

In these circumstances, the acting appointee is separated by a method of terminating official

relations known in the law of public officers as expiration of the term. His term is understood at
the outset as without any fixity and enduring at the pleasure of the appointing authority. When
required to relinquish his office, he cannot complain that he is being removed in violation of his
security of tenure because removal imports the separation of the incumbent before the
expiration of his term. 5 This is allowed by the Constitution only when it is for cause as provided
by law. The acting appointee is separated precisely because his term has expired. Expiration of
the term is not covered by the constitutional provision on security of tenure.

There is a long line of cases affirming the rule that:

. . . One who holds a temporary appointment has no fixed tenure of office; his
employment can be terminated at the pleasure of the appointing power, there
being no need the show that the termination is for cause. 6
The petitioner contends that his appointment was really intended to be permanent because
temporary appointments are not supposed to exceed twelve months and he was allowed to
serve in his position for more than three years. This is unacceptable. Even if that intention were
assumed, it would not by itself alone make his appointment permanent. Such an appointment
did not confer on the petitioner the appropriate civil service eligibility he did not possess at the
time he was appointed, nor did it vest him with the right to security of tenure that is available
only to permanent appointees.

The case of Luego vs. Civil Service Commission 7 is not applicable because the facts of that
case are different. The petitioner in Luego was qualified and was extended
a permanent appointment that could not be withdrawn on the ground that it was merely
temporary. In the case at bar, the petitioner was not eligible and therefore could be appointed at
best only in a temporary capacity. The other cases he cites, viz. Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng
Maynila vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 8 Palma-Fernandez vs. De la Paz, 9 and Dario
vs. Mison, 10 are also not pertinent because they also involved permanent appointees who could
not be removed because of their security of tenure.

It should be obvious from all the above observations that the petitioner could have been validly
replaced even if he had not filed his courtesy resignation. We therefore do not have to rule on its
legality. Suffice it to say that it could have been a graceful way of withdrawing him from his office
with all the formal amenities and no asperity or discord if only he had not chosen to contest it.
But it was his right to do so, of course, although his challenge has not succeeded.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, with costs against the petitioner. It is so ordered.

3. HOME INSURANCE VS CSC 220 SCRA 148

G.R. No. 95450 March 19, 1993

HOME INSURANCE AND GUARANTY CORPORATION (HIGC), petitioner,
vs.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION and DANIEL R. CRUZ, respondents.

The Government Corporate Counsel for petitioner.

The Solicitor General for public respondent.

Jacinto D. Jimenez for private respondent.

BELLOSILLO, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari 1 seeking to set aside the Resolutions 2 of respondent Civil Service
Commission which directed petitioner Home Insurance and Guaranty Corporation (HIGC) to
reappoint private respondent Daniel R. Cruz albeit to a position next lower in rank to Vice-
President in petitioner corporation, and to pay him backwages from the date of his dismissal
making as basis his old salary rate as Vice-President.

Private respondent was the Vice President, Finance and Administrative Group of the Home
Financing Corporation, now known as the Home Insurance and Guaranty Corporation (HIGC),
from 1 June 1986 to 8 July 1988, when he was not reappointed as a result of the reorganization
of petitioner firm.

Initially, the appointment of private respondent Cruz was approved as temporary by the Civil
Service Commission(COMMISSION for brevity) subject to his completion of the Executive
Leadership and Management Program. On a reconsideration, the COMMISSION changed the
appointment from temporary to permanent but still subject to his completion of the leadership
program within three (3) years from the effectivity date of his appointment, otherwise he would
be reverted to temporary status.

Sometime in 1987, Cruz was found responsible by an investigating committee for simple neglect
of duty arising from his inefficient supervision over his subordinates arising from the loss of six
(6) Land Bank checks.

In July 1988, HIGC underwent a reorganization which resulted among others in the reduction of
the number of Vice President positions from (6) to three (3). Respondent Cruz was one of those
not reappointed as he was found to have no civil service eligibility.

On appeal to the HIGC Reorganization Appeals Board, Cruz invoked his permanent
appointment and insisted that the question of his eligibility should be left for determination by the
COMMISSION.
In the meantime, Cruz sought to avail of the Early Separation Incentive Package (ESIP) granted
by HIGC to those who were not reappointed and then withdrew his appeal.

On 7 December 1988, Cruz refiled his appeal after he was not granted ESIP benefits by HIGC.

On 8 December 1988, Cruz elevated his appeal for reinstatement with the COMMISSION.

On 20 February 1989, the HIGC Reorganization Appeals Board dismissed Cruz's appeal.

On 2 August 1989, however, the COMMISSION issued Resolution No.

89-543 finding Cruz to be a holder of a permanent career position at HIGC, hence, may be
reappointed to a position next lower in rank to Vice President under the Finance Group without
reduction in salary, pursuant to CSC Memorandum Circular No. 10, s. 1986, and that in case
Cruz could not be reappointed then his application to avail of the Early Separation Incentive
Package (ESIP) should be approved. It further ruled that Cruz should be paid all the benefits
and privileges due him as Vice President of HIGC in connection with his reassignment to the
Office of the President and Bliss Development Corporation.

Resolving petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution, the COMMISSION issued
on 18 December 1989 Resolution No. 89-973 holding that since Cruz had not received the early
retirement benefits he applied for, he should be reappointed to the position next lower to the
Vice President of the Finance Group, such as Manager of the Comptrollership Department,
Treasury or other Department, and that he should be paid his back salaries from the time of his
termination on the basis of his old salary rate as Vice-President.

On 5 September 1990, the COMMISSION issued Resolution No. 90-823 denying petitioner's
motion for reconsideration of modified Resolution No.
89-973. Hence, this petition for certiorari.

On 6 November 1990, We issued a temporary restraining order, effective immediately and to

continue until further orders from the Court, enjoining respondent COMMISSION to cease and
desist from enforcing its Order of 10 October 1990, 3 as well as the resolutions in question.

Petitioner now contends that respondent COMMISSION committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it issued the questioned Resolutions for being
contrary to established principles governing the civil service career system and of the basic
constitutional mandate that appointments to the civil service shall be made only according to
merit and fitness; and, that the non-reappointment of Cruz was the result of a valid
reorganization.

We grant the petition.

The principal issue to be resolved is whether the COMMISSION committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it ruled that respondent Cruz was a
permanent employee enjoying security of tenure and thus may be removed from office only for
cause.

Respondent Cruz contends that he was extended a permanent appointment as indicated in his
appointment papers. 4 He asserts that it is not necessary for him to pass any competitive civil
service examination to become eligible for he belongs to the third level in the career service,
which covers positions in the Career Executive Service, and which does not require passing a
competitive civil service examination.

But law and jurisprudence do not support the contention of private respondent. Presidential
Decree No. 807, otherwise known as the "Civil Service Decree of the Philippines," provides the
following levels of positions in the career service: (a) the first level, which includes clerical,
trades, crafts and custodial service positions involving non-professional or sub-professional
work in a non-supervisory or supervisory capacity requiring less than four years of collegiate
studies; (b) the second level, which includes professional, technical and scientific positions
involving professional, technical, or scientific work in a non-supervisory or supervisory capacity
requiring at least four years of college work up to Division Chief level; and, (c) the third level,
which includes positions in the Career Executive Service. 5

Positions in the Career Executive Service consist of Undersecretary, Assistant Secretary,

Bureau Director, Assistant Bureau Director, Regional Director, Assistant Regional Director, Chief
of Department Service and other officers of equivalent rank as may be identified by the Career
Executive Service Board, all of whom are appointed by the President. 6

Entrance to the first two levels shall be through competitive examinations, while entrance to the
third level shall be prescribed by the Career Executive Service Board. 7

The Constitution clearly mandates that appointments in the civil service shall be made only
according to merit and fitness to be determined as far as practicable, and except to positions
which are policy-determining, primarily confidential or highly technical, by competitive
examination. 8

Respondent Cruz has not satisfactorily shown that his former position as Vice President in the
HIGC belongs to the third level in the career service as prescribed by law. His former position as
Vice President is not among those enumerated by law as falling under the third level, nor has he
established that it is one of those identified by the Career Executive Service Board as of
equivalent rank to those listed by law. Neither is it claimed that he was appointed by the
President.

We agree then with petitioner HIGC that the position of Vice President to which Cruz was
formerly appointed belongs to the second level position which under the law includes
professional, technical and scientific positions involving professional, technical or scientific work
in a non-supervisory or supervisory capacity requiring at least four years of college work up to
Division Chief level.
Entrance to this second level is through competitive examination. In other words, a person
occupying a position in this level must possess a civil service eligibility, i.e., he must have
obtained a passing grade in a civil service examination, or has been granted a civil service
eligibility and whose name is accordingly entered in the register of eligibles. 9 Clearly, eligibility
then is a sine qua non to acquiring a permanent appointment, except those positions which are
not required by law to be filled with civil service eligibles. A permanent appointment is defined as
one issued to a person who meets all the requirements for the position to which he is being
appointed, including the appropriate eligibility prescribed in accordance with the provisions of
law, rules and standards promulgated in pursuance thereof. 10

In the case before Us, it is not disputed that respondent Cruz is without any civil service
eligibility as shown by his appointment papers. 11 As such, respondent Cruz cannot be legally
conferred a permanent appointment for the law is clear that career positions, particularly the first
and second level positions in the service, require civil service eligibility. Thus the attestation by
respondent COMMISSION that respondent Cruz's appointment is permanent must be struck
down for being contrary to law. As correctly observed by the Solicitor General: "The permanent
appointment of a non-civil service eligible to a career position is, from a legal viewpoint, a nullity.
Not even the CSC can validate the error, as it cannot rise higher than the law that created it
the same law that requires civil service eligibility for a permanent appointment to any of the two
positions subject of the present petition." 12Consequently, respondent Cruz's appointment being
merely temporary in the context of the Civil Service Law, it follows that Cruz's appointment can
be terminated at the pleasure of the appointing power. 13

There can therefore be no question that petitioner HIGC acted legally when, after effecting a
reorganization, it no longer reappointed respondent Cruz. We agree with petitioner HIGC that
the qualifications of respondent Cruz are definitely inferior to those of the incumbents of the
next-lower-in-rank positions who have civil service eligibilities and are at the same time certified
public accountants. As we have noted earlier, respondent Cruz is not a civil service eligible;
neither is he a certified public accountant who can be vested with civil service eligibility upon
examination under R.A. 1080. 14 After all, a non-eligible shall not be appointed to any position in
the civil service whenever there is a civil service eligible actually available for and ready to
accept appointment. 15

It is certainly erroneous for respondent COMMISSION to direct HIGC to reappoint respondent

Cruz, a non-civil service eligible, to a position which requires a first grade civil service eligibility.
As We have repeatedly held, appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be
exercised by the officer in whom it is vested according to his best lights, the fundamental
requisite being that the appointee must possess the qualifications required by law. If he does,
then the appointment cannot be faulted on the ground that there are others better qualified who
should have been appointed. This is a political question involving considerations of wisdom
which only the appointing authority can decide. 16

We also find reasonable, fair and valid the reorganization carried out by petitioner HIGC which
led to the separation from the service of respondent Cruz. Significantly, respondent
COMMISSION does not question but appears in fact to concede the validity of the
reorganization effected by petitioner HIGC as reflected in the questioned CSC Resolution No.
89-543

It is admitted that this reorganization of the HIGC resulted in the reduction in the
number of positions of Vice President from six (6) to three (3) only. And, after due
assessment and evaluation, Cruz was found to be one of the least competent
and qualified to be reinstated to the same or comparable position as shown by
the comparative analysis of the qualifications of the appellant and the re-
appointed Vice Presidents, Carlo P. Doble, Fernando M. Miranda and Wilfredo F.
Hernandez . . . . 17

As We ruled in Dario v. Mison, 18 "[R]eorganizations in this jurisdiction have been regarded as

valid provided they are pursued in good faith. As a general rule, a reorganization is carried out in
'good faith' if it is for the purpose of economy or to make bureaucracy more efficient. In that
event, no dismissal (in case of dismissal) or separation actually occurs because the position
itself ceases to exist. And in that case, security of tenure would not be a Chinese wall.

In sum, We find that respondent COMMISSION committed grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it insisted in holding respondent Cruz eligible for
reappointment to a permanent position in a government owned and controlled corporation in
derogation of the provision of law categorically proscribing such a conclusion.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The questioned CSC Resolutions Nos. 89-543, 89-
973 and 90-823 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, respondent Daniel R. Cruz is
declared ineligible for reappointment in petitioner Home Insurance and Guaranty Corporation for
lack of civil service eligibility as required by law.

SO ORDERED.