SEARCHES AND SEIZURES
Attached to the information were the resolution
HO VS NARCISO
The Case
This is the main question raised in these two consolidated petitions
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court challenging the Sandiganbayans
August 25, 1992 Resolution[1] which answered the said query in the affirmative.
The Facts
Both petitions have the same factual backdrop. On August 8, 1991, the Anti-
Graft League of the Philippines, represented by its chief prosecutor and investigator,
Atty. Reynaldo L. Bagatsing, filed with the Office of the Ombudsman a
complaint[2] against Doris Teresa Ho, Rolando S. Narciso (petitioners in G.R. Nos.
106632 and 106678, respectively), Anthony Marden, Arsenio Benjamin Santos and
Leonardo Odoo. The complaint was for alleged violation of Section 3 (g) of Republic
Act 3019[3] prohibiting a public officer from entering into any contract or transaction
on behalf of the government if it is manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the
latter, whether or not the public officer profited or will profit thereby. After due
notice, all respondents therein filed their respective counter-affidavits with supporting
documents. On January 8, 1992, Graft Investigation Officer Titus P. Labrador
(hereafter, GIO Labrador) submitted his resolution [4] with the following
recommendations:
WHEREFORE, all premises considered, it is respectfully recommended that an
information for violation of Section 3 (g) of R.A. 3019 as amended be filed against
respondent Rolando S. Narciso before the Sandiganbayan.
It is likewise recommending that the case against the other respondents be
DISMISSED for insufficiency of evidence.
However, after a review of the above resolution, Special Prosecution Officer
Leonardo P. Tamayo (hereafter, SPO Tamayo) recommended that both Rolando
Narciso and Doris Teresa Ho be charged with violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A.
3019. The resolution of GIO Labrador, as modified by the memorandum [5] of SPO
Tamayo, was approved by Ombudsman Conrado M. Vasquez on May 5, 1992. Thus,
herein petitioners were charged accordingly before the Sandiganbayan in an
information[6] filed on May 18, 1992.
of GIO Labrador and the memorandum of SPO Tamayo. The said information reads:
The undersigned Special Prosecution Officer III, Office of the Special Prosecutor,
hereby accuses ROLANDO NARCISO and DORIS TERESA HO, President of
National Marine Corporation, of violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019, as amended,
committed as follows:
That on or about April 4, 1989, and for sometime prior and/or subsequent thereto, in
the City of Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused ROLANDO NARCISO, a public officer, being then the
Vice-President of the National Steel Corporation (NSC), a government-owned or
controlled corporation organized and operating under the Philippine laws, and DORIS
TERESA HO, a private individual and then the President of National Marine
Corporation (NMC), a private corporation organized and operating under our
Corporation law, conspiring and confederating with one another, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and criminally, with evident bad faith and through manifest
partiality, cause undue injury to the National Steel Corporation (NSC), by entering
without legal justification into a negotiated contract of affreightment disadvantageous
to the NSC for the haulage of its products at the rate of P129.50/MT, from Iligan City
to Manila, despite their full knowledge that the rate they have agreed upon was much
higher than those offered by the Loadstar Shipping Company, Inc. (LSCI) and
Premier Shipping Lines, Inc. (PSLI), in the amounts of P109.56 and P123.00 per
Metric Ton, respectively, in the public bidding held on June 30, 1988, thereby giving
unwarranted benefits to the National Marine Corporation, in the total sum of One
Million One Hundred Sixteen Thousand Fifty Two Pesos and Seventy Five Centavos
(P1,116,052.75), Philippine Currency, to the pecuniary damage and prejudice of the
NSC in the aforestated sum. The said offense was committed by Rolando S. Narciso
in the performance of his official functions as Vice-President of the National Steel
Corporation.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Acting on the foregoing information, the Sandiganbayan issued the now
questioned warrant of arrest against Petitioners Ho and Narciso. Petitioner Ho initially
questioned the issuance thereof in an Urgent Motion to Recall Warrant of
Arrest/Motion for Reconsideration which was adopted by Petitioner Narciso. They
alleged that the Sandiganbayan, in determining probable cause for the issuance of the
warrant for their arrest, merely relied on the information and the resolution attached
thereto, filed by the Ombudsman without other supporting evidence, in violation of
the requirements of Section 2, Article III of the Constitution, and settled
jurisprudence. Respondent Sandiganbayan denied said motion in the challenged
Resolution. It ratiocinated in this wise:
Considering, therefore, that this Court did not rely solely on
the certification appearing in the information in this case in the determination of
whether probable cause exists to justify the issuance of the warrant of arrest but also
on the basis predominantly shown by the facts and evidence appearing in the
resolution/memorandum of responsible investigators/ prosecutors, then the recall of
the warrant of arrest, or the reconsideration sought for, cannot be granted. More so,
when the information, as filed, clearly shows that it is sufficient in form and substance
based on the facts and evidence adduced by both parties during the preliminary
investigation. To require this Court to have the entire record of the preliminary
investigation to be produced before it, including the evidence submitted by the
complainant and the accused-respondents, would appear to be an exercise in futility.
Thus, these petitions.
The Issue
Petitioner Ho raises this sole issue:
May a judge determine probable cause and issue [a] warrant of arrest solely on the
basis of the resolution of the prosecutor (in the instant case, the Office of the Special
Prosecutor of the Ombudsman) who conducted the preliminary
investigation, without having before him any of the evidence (such as complainants
affidavit, respondents counter-affidavit, exhibits, etc.) which may have been
submitted at the preliminary investigation?[7]
In his separate petition, Rolando S. Narciso adopts the foregoing and raises no
other distinct issue.
Petitioners Ho and Narciso similarly contend that a judge, in personally
determining the existence of probable cause, must have before him sufficient evidence
submitted by the parties, other than the information filed by the investigating
prosecutor, to support his conclusion and justify the issuance of an arrest
warrant. Such evidence should not be merely described in a prosecutors
resolution. Citing People vs. Inting,[8] petitioners insist that the judge must have
before him the report, the affidavits, the transcripts of stenographic notes (if any), and
all other supporting documents which are material in assisting the judge to make his
determination.
The Courts Ruling
The petitions are meritorious.
The pertinent provision of the Constitution reads:
Section 2 [, Article III]. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and
for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall
issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things
to be seized. (Underscoring supplied.)
In explaining the object and import of the aforequoted constitutional mandate,
particularly the power and the authority of judges to issue warrants of arrest, the
Court elucidated in Soliven vs. Makasiar[9]:
What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the
issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. In satisfying
himself of the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the
judge is not required to personally examine the complainant and his
witnesses. Following established doctrine and procedure, he shall: (1) personally
evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding
the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or
(2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscals
report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in
arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause.[10] [underscoring
supplied]
We should stress that the 1987 Constitution requires the judge to determine
probable cause personally. The word personally does not appear in the corresponding
provisions of our previous Constitutions. This emphasis shows the present
Constitutions intent to place a greater degree of responsibility upon trial judges than
that imposed under the previous Charters.
While affirming Soliven, People vs. Inting[11] elaborated on what determination
of probable cause entails, differentiating the judges object or goal from that of the
prosecutors.
First, the determination of probable cause is a function of the Judge. It is not for the
Provincial Fiscal or Prosecutor nor for the Election Supervisor to ascertain. Only the
Judge and the Judge alone makes this determination.
Second, the preliminary inquiry made by a Prosecutor does not bind the Judge. It
merely assists him to make the determination of probable cause. The Judge does not
have to follow what the Prosecutor presents to him. By itself, the Prosecutors
certification of probable cause is ineffectual. It is the report, the affidavits the
transcripts of stenographic notes (if any), and all other supporting documents behind
the Prosecutors certification which are material in assisting the Judge to
make his determination.
And third, Judges and Prosecutors alike should distinguish the preliminary inquiry
which determines probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest from the
preliminary investigation proper which ascertains whether the offender should be held
for trial or released. Even if the two inquiries are conducted in the course of one and
the same proceeding, there should be no confusion about the objectives. The
determination of probable cause for the warrant of arrest is made by the Judge. The
preliminary investigation proper -- whether or not there is reasonable ground to
believe that the accused is guilty of the offense charged and, therefore, whether or not
he should be subjected to the expense, rigors and embarrassment of trial -- is the
function of the Prosecutor.[12]
And clarifying the statement in People vs. Delgado[13] -- that the trial court may
rely on the resolution of the COMELEC to file the information, by the same token
that it may rely on the certification made by the prosecutor who conducted the
preliminary investigation, in the issuance of the warrant of arrest -- this Court
underscored in Lim Sr. vs. Felix[14]that [r]eliance on the COMELEC resolution or the
Prosecutors certification presupposes that the records of either the COMELEC or the
Prosecutor have been submitted to the Judge and he relies on the certification or
resolution because the records of the investigation sustain the recommendation. We
added, The warrant issues not on the strength of the certification standing alone but
because of the records which sustain it. Summing up, the Court said:
We reiterate the ruling in Soliven vs. Makasiar that the Judge does not have to
personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. The Prosecutor can perform
the same functions as a commissioner for the taking of the evidence. However, there
should be a report and necessary documents supporting the Fiscals bare
certification. All of these should be before the Judge.
The extent of the Judges personal examination of the report and its annexes depends
on the circumstances of each case. We cannot determine beforehand how cursory or
exhaustive the Judges examination should be. The Judge has to exercise sound
discretion for, after all, the personal determination is vested in the Judge by the
Constitution. It can be as brief or as detailed as the circumstances of each case
require. To be sure, the Judge must go beyond the Prosecutors certification and
investigation report whenever necessary. He should call for [the] complainant and
[the] witnesses themselves to answer the courts probing questions when the
circumstances of the case so require.[15] [underscoring supplied]
The above rulings in Soliven, Inting and Lim Sr. were iterated in Allado vs.
Diokno[16] where we explained again what probable cause means. Probable cause for
the issuance of a warrant of arrest is the existence of such facts and circumstances that
would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent person to believe that an offense has
been committed by the person sought to be arrested. [17] Hence, the judge, before
issuing a warrant of arrest, must satisfy himself that based on the evidence submitted
there is sufficient proof that a crime has been committed and that the person to be
arrested is probably guilty thereof. [18] At this stage of the criminal proceeding, the
judge is not yet tasked to review in detail the evidence submitted during the
preliminary investigation. It is sufficient that he personally evaluates such evidence in
determining probable cause.[19] In Webb vs. De Leon,[20] we stressed that the judge
merely determines the probability, not the certainty, of guilt of the accused and, in
doing so, he need not conduct a de novo hearing. He simply personally reviews the
prosecutors initial determination finding probable cause to see if it is supported by
substantial evidence.
In the recent case of Roberts Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, [21] this Courts application
of the dictum laid down in Soliven -- affirmed and fortified in Inting, Lim Sr.,
Allado and Webb --should lay to rest the issue raised in the instant
petitions. In Roberts Jr., this Court, through Mr. Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., set
aside the order of the respondent judge directing inter alia the issuance of warrants of
arrest against the accused, reasoning that said judge did not personally determine the
existence of probable cause, since he had only the information, amended information,
and Joint Resolution as bases thereof. He did not have the records or evidence
supporting the prosecutors finding of probable cause.
In like manner, herein Respondent Sandiganbayan had only the information filed
by the Office of the Ombudsman, the thirteen-page resolution of the investigating
officer and the three-page memorandum of the prosecution officer, when it issued the
warrant of arrest against the petitioners. The latter two documents/reports even had
dissimilar recommendations -- the first indicting only Petitioner Narciso, the second
including Petitioner Ho. This alone should have prompted the public respondent to
verify, in the records and other documents submitted by the parties during the
preliminary investigation, whether there was sufficient evidence to sustain the
Ombudsmans action charging both petitioners with violation of Sec. 3(e) of Anti-
Graft law. But in its initial justification of the issuance of the warrant, the
Sandiganbayan simply said:
JUSTICE ESCAREAL:
xxx xxx xxx
But in this particular case we believe there is a prima facie case based on our
examination of the resolution because we believe, we think the Ombudsman will not
approve a resolution just like that, without evidence to back it up.[22]
In attempting to further justify its challenged action, the public respondent
explained in its assailed Resolution:
In the instant case, there are attached to the information, two (2)
Memorandum/Resolution (sic) emanating from the Offices of the Ombudsman and
the Special Prosecutor (Pp. 4-6, 7-19, respectively, Record) which clearly and
indubitably established, firstly, the conduct of a due and proper preliminary
investigation, secondly, the approval by proper officials clothed with statutory
authority; and thirdly, the determination and ascertainment of probable cause based
on the documentary evidence submitted by the complainant (Anti-Graft League of the
Philippines), foremost among which is the Contract of Affreightment entered into
between National Steel Corporation (NSC), and National Marine Corporation (NMC)
and the COA-NSC audit report, together with the counter-affidavits of accused
Rolando Narciso and NMC officials, among whom is accused-movant. Outlined in
detail in the aforesaid Resolution of Titus P. Labrador, Graft Investigation Officer II,
which was reviewed by Attys. Romeo I. Tan and Arturo Mojica, Director, Community
Coordination Bureau and Assistant Ombudsman, PACPO, [respectively,] are the facts
leading to the questioned transaction between NSC and NMC, together with an
evaluation of the propriety and legality of the bidding process involved therein and
which revealed that there were supposed non-compliance with proper bidding
procedures. GIO Labradors findings and recommendations, extensively set out in his
thirteen-page resolution, is complemented by the three-page Memorandum of Special
Prosecution Officer II Leonardo P. Tamayo, both of which meticulously delved into
the merits and demerits of the evidence presented by the complainant and accused-
respondents and which resulted in their respective recommendation which led the
Honorable Conrado M. Vasquez to approve the recommendations of Deputy Special
Prosecutor Jose de G. Ferrer and Special Prosecutor Aniano A. Desierto for the filing
of the information in the case at bar.
xxx xxx xxx
Considering, therefore, that this Court did not rely solely on
the certification appearing in the information in this case in the determination of
whether probable cause exists to justify the issuance of the warrant of arrest but also
on the basis predominantly shown by the facts and evidence appearing in the
resolution/memorandum of responsible investigators/ prosecutors, then the recall of
the warrant of arrest, or the reconsideration sought for, cannot be granted. More so,
when the information, as filed, clearly shows that it is sufficient in form and substance
based on the facts and evidence adduced by both parties during the preliminary
investigation. To require this Court to have the entire record of the preliminary
investigation to be produced before it, including the evidence submitted by the
complainant and the accused-respondents, would appear to be an exercise in futility.
[23]
In light of the aforecited decisions of this Court, such justification cannot be
upheld. Lest we be too repetitive, we only wish to emphasize three vital matters once
more: First, as held in Inting, the determination of probable cause by the prosecutor is
for a purpose different from that which is to be made by the judge. Whether there is
reasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilty of the offense charged and
should be held for trial is what the prosecutor passes upon. The judge, on the other
hand, determines whether a warrant of arrest should be issued against the
accused, i.e. whether there is a necessity for placing him under immediate custody in
order not to frustrate the ends of justice. [24]Thus, even if both should base their
findings on one and the same proceeding or evidence, there should be no confusion as
to their distinct objectives.
Second, since their objectives are different, the judge cannot rely solely on the
report of the prosecutor in finding probable cause to justify the issuance of a warrant
of arrest.Obviously and understandably, the contents of the prosecutors report will
support his own conclusion that there is reason to charge the accused of an offense
and hold him for trial. However, the judge must decide independently. Hence, he must
have supporting evidence, other than the prosecutors bare report, upon which to
legally sustain his own findings on the existence (or nonexistence) of probable cause
to issue an arrest order. This responsibility of determining personally and
independently the existence or nonexistence of probable cause is lodged in him by no
less than the most basic law of the land. Parenthetically, the prosecutor could ease the
burden of the judge and speed up the litigation process by forwarding to the latter not
only the information and his bare resolution finding probable cause, but also so much
of the records and the evidence on hand as to enable His Honor to make his personal
and separate judicial finding on whether to issue a warrant of arrest.[25]
Lastly, it is not required that the complete or entire records of the case during the
preliminary investigation be submitted to and examined by the judge. [26] We do not
intend to unduly burden trial courts by obliging them to examine the complete records
of every case all the time simply for the purpose of ordering the arrest of an
accused. What is required, rather, is that the judge must have sufficient supporting
documents (such as the complaint, affidavits, counter-affidavits, sworn statements of
witnesses or transcripts of stenographic notes, if any) upon which to make his
independent judgment or, at the very least, upon which to verify the findings of the
prosecutor as to the existence of probable cause. The point is: he cannot rely solely
and entirely on the prosecutors recommendation, as Respondent Court did in this
case. Although the prosecutor enjoys the legal presumption of regularity in the
performance of his official duties and functions, which in turn gives his report the
presumption of accuracy, the Constitution, we repeat, commands the judge
to personally determine probable cause in the issuance of warrants of arrest. This
Court has consistently held that a judge fails in his bounden duty if he relies merely
on the certification or the report of the investigating officer.
True, in Webb vs. De Leon, we found that the painstaking recital and analysis of
the parties evidence made in the DOJ Panel Report satisfied both judges that there
[was] probable cause to issue warrants of arrest against petitioners. This statement
may have been wrongly construed by the public respondent to mean that the narration
or description of portions of the evidence in the prosecutors report may serve as
sufficient basis to make its own independent judgment. What it should bear in mind,
however, is that, aside from the 26-page report of the DOJ panel, the sworn
statements of three witnesses and counter-affidavits of the petitioners in Webb were
also submitted to the trial court, and the latter is presumed to have reviewed these
documents as well, prior to its issuance of the warrants of arrest.
In the instant case, the public respondent relied fully and completely upon the
resolution of the graft investigation officer and the memorandum of the reviewing
prosecutor, attached to the information filed before it, and its conjecture that the
Ombudsman would not have approved their recommendation without supporting
evidence. It had no other documents from either the complainant (the Anti-Graft
League of the Philippines) or the People from which to sustain its own conclusion that
probable cause exists. Clearly and ineluctably, Respondent Courts findings of the
conduct of a due and proper preliminary investigation and the approval by proper
officials clothed with statutory authority are not equivalent to
the independent and personal responsibility required by the Constitution and settled
jurisprudence. At least some of the documentary evidence mentioned (Contract of
Affreightment between National Steel Corporation and National Marine Corporation,
the COA-NSC audit report, and counter-affidavits of Rolando Narciso and NMC
officials), upon which the investigating officials of the Ombudsman reportedly
ascertained the existence of probable cause, should have been physically present
before the public respondent for its examination, to enable it to determine on its own
whether there is substantial evidence to support the finding of probable cause. But it
stubbornly stood pat on its position that it had essentially complied with its
responsibility. Indisputably, however, the procedure it undertook contravenes the
Constitution and settled jurisprudence.Respondent Court palpably committed grave
abuse of discretion in ipso facto issuing the challenged warrant of arrest on the sole
basis of the prosecutors findings and recommendation, and without determining on its
own the issue of probable cause based on evidence other than such bare findings and
recommendation.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED and the assailed Resolution is SET
ASIDE. The warrant issued by the Sandiganbayan (Second Division) on May 20,
1992 in Case No. 17674 for the arrest of Petitioners Doris Teresa Ho and Rolando
Narciso is hereby declared NULL AND VOID.
Go vs CA
G.R. No. 101837, February 11, 1992
Facts:
Rolito Go while traveling in the wrong direction on a one-way street,
nearly bumped Eldon Maguans car. Go alighted from his car, shot
Maguan and left the scene. A security guard at a nearby restaurant was
able to take down petitioners car plate number. The police arrived shortly
thereafter at the scene of the shooting. A manhunt ensued.
Six days after, petitioner presented himself before the San Juan Police
Station to verify news reports that he was being hunted by the police; he
was accompanied by two (2) lawyers. The police forthwith detained him.
An eyewitness to the shooting, who was at the police station at that time,
positively identified petitioner as the gunman.
Petitioner posted bail, the prosecutor filed the case to the lower court,
setting and commencing trial without preliminary investigation. Prosecutor
reasons that the petitioner has waived his right to preliminary investigation
as bail has been posted and that such situation, that petitioner has been
arrested without a warrant lawfully, falls under Section 5, Rule 113 and
Section 7, Rule 112 of The 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure which
provides for the rules and procedure pertaining to situations of lawful
warrantless arrests.
Petitioner argues that he was not lawfully arrested without warrant because
he went to the police station six (6) days after the shooting which he had
allegedly perpetrated. Thus, petitioner argues, the crime had not been just
committed at the time that he was arrested. Moreover, none of the police
officers who arrested him had been an eyewitness to the shooting of
Maguan and accordingly none had the personal knowledge required for
the lawfulness of a warrantless arrest. Since there had been no lawful
warrantless arrest, Section 7, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court which
establishes the only exception to the right to preliminary investigation,
could not apply in respect of petitioner.
Issue/s:
Whether or not a lawful warrantless arrest had been effected by the San
Juan Police in respect of petitioner Go;
Whether petitioner had effectively waived his right to preliminary
investigation
Held:
1. No. The Court does not believe that the warrantless arrest or detention
of petitioner in the instant case falls within the terms of Section 5 of Rule
113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure which provides as follows:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a
private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person;
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed
it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a
penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested
without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station
or jail, and he shall be proceeded against in accordance with Rule 112,
Section 7.
Petitioners arrest took place six (6) days after the shooting of Maguan.
The arresting officers obviously were not present, within the meaning of
Section 5(a), at the time petitioner had allegedly shot Maguan. Neither
could the arrest effected six (6) days after the shooting be reasonably
regarded as effected when [the shooting had] in fact just been committed
within the meaning of Section 5 (b). Moreover, none of the arresting
officers had any personal knowledge of facts indicating that petitioner
was the gunman who had shot Maguan. The information upon which the
police acted had been derived from statements made by alleged
eyewitnesses to the shooting one stated that petitioner was the gunman;
another was able to take down the alleged gunmans cars plate number
which turned out to be registered in petitioners wifes name. That
information did not, however, constitute personal knowledge.
It is thus clear to the Court that there was no lawful warrantless
arrest of petitioner within the meaning of Section 5 of Rule 113.
2. No. In the circumstances of this case, the Court does not believe that by
posting bail, petitioner had waived his right to preliminary investigation.
In People v. Selfaison, the Court held that appellants there had waived
their right to preliminary investigation because immediately after their
arrest, they filed bail and proceeded to trial without previously claiming
that they did not have the benefit of a preliminary investigation.
In the instant case, petitioner Go asked for release on recognizance or on
bail and for preliminary investigation in one omnibus motion. He had thus
claimed his right to preliminary investigation before respondent Judge
approved the cash bond posted by petitioner and ordered his release on 12
July 1991. Accordingly, the Court cannot reasonably imply waiver of
preliminary investigation on the part of petitioner. In fact, when the
Prosecutor filed a motion in court asking for leave to conduct preliminary
investigation, he clearly if impliedly recognized that petitioners claim to
preliminary investigation was a legitimate one.
People v. Tiu Won Chua 405 scra 280
Facts:
Accused Tiu Won Chua a.k.a. Timothy Tiu and Qui Yaling y Chua
a.k.a. Sun Tee Sy y Chua were charged and convicted by the lower
court for violation of Section 16, Article III of the dangerous drug act
of 1972, for their illegal possession of a regulated drug, shabu.
They appealed the decision of the lower court questioning the legality
of the search warrant and the search and arrest conducted pursuant
thereto, and the correctness of the judgment of conviction imposed by
the RTC. Accused contends that the defect in the issuance of the search
warrant, for it was issued in the name of Timothy Tiu and did not
include appellant Qui Yaling, would make the search conducted and
consequently, the arrest, illegal. That the evidence presented cannot be
serve as basis for their conviction being fruits of an illegal
search.
Issues:
1. Whether or not their was a valid search warrant.
2. Whether or not the court correctly imposed judgment of conviction
to the accused.
Ruling:
1.There are only four requisites for a valid warrant, i.e,: (1) it must be
issued upon "probable cause"; (2) probable cause must be determined
personally by the judge; (3) such judge must examine under oath or
affirmation the complainant and the witnesses he may produce; and (4)
the warrant must particularly describe
the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. A
mistake in the name of the person to be searched does not invalidate the
warrant, especially since in this case, the authorities had personal
knowledge of the drug-related activities of the accused by virtue of the
surveillance and test-buy operations of the said authorities. In fact, a
"John Doe" warrant satisfies the requirements so long as it contains a
descriptio personae such as will enable the officer to identify the
accused. Moreover, a mistake in the identification of
the owner of the place does not invalidate the warrant provided the
place to be searched is properly described. However, the court affirms
the illegality of the search conducted on the car for it was not part of
the description of the place to be searched mentioned in the warrant.
2.In a prosecution for illegal possession of a dangerous drug, it must be
shown that (1) appellants were in possession of an item or an object
identified to be a prohibited or regulated drug, (2) such possession is
not authorized by law, and (3) the appellants were freely and
consciously aware of being in possession of the drug.
Since the crime is malum prohibitum, hence, lack of criminal intent or
good faith does not exempt appellants from criminal liability. Mere wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously enter the house of the herein complainant by destroying the
backdoor of said house, and once inside, take, rob and carry away the following:
possession of a regulated drug without legal authority is punishable
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

(1) one gold bracelet 24K Php8,000.00

under the Dangerous Drugs Act. In the case at bar, the prosecution
(3) necklace (1) one 24K and (2) two 18K Php42,000.00
sufficiently proved that the packs of shabu were found inside a room in
the unit subject of the search warrant, more particularly inside the (2) two digicam Sony player Php22,000.00
mans handbag and ladies handbag owned respectively by the accused. (1) one DVD portable Php5,000.00
As to the penalties imposed, the court did not sustain the
trial courts decision attributing to both appellants the illegal possession (1) one wrist watch Tagheur Php30,000.00
of the same amount of shabu. Since no conspiracy was proven, the (1) one sun glass Guess P Php5,000.00
amount of the shabu from each accused was made the basis of the
(1) one camera Canon Php2,500.00
penalty imposed. Thus, since 234.5 grams of shabu were found inside
the mans handbag, deemed to be owned by Tiu (1) one Gameboy advance Php5,000.00
Won, he is guilty of violating Section 16, Article III of R.A. No. 6425,
(1) one calculator Php1,500.00
while Qui Yaling, whose handbag contained only 20.3673 grams of
shabu is guilty of violating Section 20 thereof. Section 16, in (1) one discman Sony Php3,000.00
connection with Section 20 (1st paragraph), provides the penalty of (2) two pcs. 100.00 US dollar bills
reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred
thousand pesos to ten million pesos where the amount of shabu (22) twenty two pcs. Php500.00 bills

involved is 200 grams or more. Where the amount is less than 200 (2) two necklace 18K worth Php30,000.00
grams, Section 20 punishes the offender with the penalty ranging from
(2) two bracelet worth Php11,500.00
prision correccional to reclusion perpetua
(2) two gold ring worth Php8,000.00
EDUARDO CELEDONIO, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
(1) one wedding ring worth 14K worth Php1,500.00
DECISION (1) one wrist watch swiss military worth Php10,000.00

MENDOZA, J.: (1) one cellphone NOKIA 8250 worth Php3,000.00

(3) three pairs of earrings worth Php15,000.00

This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by Eduardo
Celedonio (Celedonio) assails the April 8, 2013 Decision1 and the September 17, 2013 Resolution2 of
(3) three pcs. of 100.00 US dollars worth Php15,000.00
the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. CR No. 34472, affirming the August 18, 2011 Decision 3 of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 73, Malabon City (RTC), in Criminal Case No. 35668-MN.
(60) sixty pcs. of Php50.00 bills worth Php3,000.00
4
The Information, dated April 25, 2007, charged Celedonio with the crime of Robbery with Force
(100) one hundred pcs. of Php20.00 bills worth Php2,000.00
Upon Things, the accusatory portion of which reads: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

That on or about the 22nd day of April 2007, in the Municipality of Navotas, Metro Manila,
(15) fifteen pcs. of Php100.00 bills worth Php1,500.00
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent
owned and belonging to CARMENCITA DE GUZMAN y SERRANO, to the damage and prejudice
to gain and by means of force upon things, and without the consent of the owner, did then and there,
of the herein complainant, in the aforementioned amount of Php223,000.00.

Contrary to law.5
Version of the Prosecution
The evidence for the prosecution shows that on the evening of April 21, 2007, a certain Adriano
Marquez (Marquez) witnessed the robbery perpetrated in the house of Carmencita De Guzman (De
Guzman) while she was away to attend to the wake of her deceased husband. No one was left in the
house. Marquez, whose house was opposite the house of De Guzman and Celedonio, which were
adjacent to each other, identified Celedonio as the culprit. Upon learning of the incident, De Guzman
reported it to the police and requested that Celedomo be investigated for possibly having committed
the crime, based on the account of Marquez.
Later, a follow-up operation was conducted by PO1 Rommel Roque (PO1 Roque) and SPO2 Adrian
Sugui (SPO2 Sugui), accompanied by Marquez. They proceeded to Raja Humabon St., Navotas, to
survey the area for the possible identification and apprehension of the suspect. On their way,
Marquez pointed to a man on a motorcycle and said, "Sir, siya po si Eduardo Celedonio." The police
immediately flagged down Celedonio. PO1 Roque asked him if he was Eduardo Celedonio, but he
did not reply and just bowed his head.
SPO2 Sugui informed Celedonio of a complaint for robbery against him. Celedonio still remained
silent and just bowed his head. SPO2 Sugui asked him, "Where are the stolen items?" Celedonio then
alighted from his motorcycle and opened its compartment where PO1 Roque saw some of the stolen
items, as per report of the incident, such as the portable DVD player and a wristwatch, among
others.6
chanrobl eslaw
PO1 Roque asked Celedonio if the same were stolen, to which the latter answered, "Iyan po."7 Thus,
Celedonio was arrested and was informed of his constitutional rights. More items were seized from
Celedonio at the police station.
Version of the Accused
After the prosecution rested its case, Celedonio filed his Demurrer to Evidence (with leave of court)
citing as his ground the alleged illegality of his arrest and the illegal search on his motorcycle. The
RTC denied the demurrer, stating that the question of the legality of Celedonio's arrest had been
mooted by his arraignment and his active participation in the trial of the case. It considered the
seizure of the stolen items as legal not only because of Celedonio's apparent consent to it, but also
because the subject items were in a moving vehicle. 8 chanrobleslaw
In his defense, Celedonio claimed that he was at home with his wife, sleeping, at the time of the
incident. His wife corroborated his statement.
In its Decision, dated August 18, 2011, the RTC found Celedonio guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of Robbery with Force Upon Things. The dispositive portion of the RTC
decision9 reads:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, finding the accused EDUARDO CELEDONIO y MONIS GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt for the offense of Robbery with Force Upon Things as defined and penalized under
Article 299 (a)2 of the Revised Penal Code, he is therefore sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of 4
years and 2 months of prision correccional as minimum to 8 years and 1 day of prision mayor as
maximum. He is also ordered to pay private complainant the amount of Php108,000.00 which is the
worth of what has not been recovered from the loss she suffered by reason of the robbery.
SO ORDERED.10
The trial court was convinced that the prosecution clearly established that: 1) a robbery had been
committed; 2) it was committed recently; 3) several of the stolen items including cash were found in
Celedonio's possession; and 4) Celedonio had no valid explanation for his possession of the stolen
goods.11chanrobl eslaw
Insisting on his innocence, Celedonio appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), arguing that the RTC
erred: 1) in convicting him of the crime despite the insufficiency of the circumstantial evidence; 2) in
not finding that the search was illegal, rendering the articles recovered inadmissible; and 3) in not
finding that the prosecution witness Marquez was ill-motivated in testifying against him. 12 chanrobleslaw
The CA, however, affirmed the RTC in toto. It found that the totality of circumstances warranted the
finding that Celedonio was solely and directly responsible for the crime. 13chanrobl eslaw
In addition, the CA brushed aside Celedonio's argument that he was illegally arrested and that the
items seized should be excluded as evidence. It stressed that Celedonio was not arrested when he
voluntarily opened the compartment of his motorcycle. He was only brought to the police for
investigation after some of the stolen items were found in his motorcycle compartment. 14 Further,
Celedonio's failure to raise the issue before his arraignment constituted a waiver on his part to
question the legality of his arrest.15
chanrobleslaw
Celedonio moved for reconsideration, but his motion was denied.
Hence, the present petition.
ISSUES
I
WHETHER THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING THAT THE PETITIONER'S GUILT WAS
PROVEN BASED ON CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.
II
WHETHER THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT
FINDING THAT THE SEARCH CONDUCTED ON THE PETITIONER WAS ILLEGAL,
RENDERING THE ARTICLES RECOVERED INADMISSIBLE.
III
WHETHER THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT
FINDING THAT THE PROSECUTION WITNESS ADRIANO MARQUEZ WAS ILL-
MOTIVATED IN TESTIFYING AGAINST THE PETITIONER.
The petition lacks merit.
Jurisprudence tells us that direct evidence of the crime is not the only matrix from which a trial court
may draw its conclusion and finding of guilt. The rules on evidence allow a trial court to rely on
circumstantial evidence to support its conclusion of guilt. The lack of direct evidence does not ipso
facto bar the finding of guilt against the appellant. As long as the prosecution establishes the accused-
appellant's participation in the crime through credible and sufficient circumstantial evidence that
leads to the inescapable conclusion that he committed the imputed crime, the latter should be
convicted.16chanrobl eslaw
Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if: 1) there is more than one circumstance; 2) the
facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and 3) the combination of all the
circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. 17 chanrobl eslaw
In this case, the prosecution sufficiently laid down the circumstances that, when taken together,
constituted an unbroken chain that led to a reasonable conclusion that Celedonio was the perpetrator.
The CA opined that: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
xxx As correctly pointed out by the trial court, these circumstances are: accused was a next door
neighbor of private complainant; he was seen by another neighbor going over the concrete fence
separating their houses and ransacking a room in complainant's house; during the time, no one was
inside complainant's house as all of them were at the wake of private complainant's recently demised
husband; two (2) days after, most of the items discovered to have been stolen that night were found
in the compartment of the accused's motorcycle which he was riding on when accosted by the police;
the items recovered from him were identified by the complainant as her stolen property; during the
trial accused denied that the stolen items were found in his possession and claimed that they were
"planted" by the police investigators to frame him up of the robbery. In short, the accused could not
explain his possession of the recently stolen items found in his sole possession.
xxxx
We find the conviction of accused-appellant based on circumstantial evidence factually and legally
tenable, as the facts from which the aforementioned circumstances arose have been proved through
the positive testimony of Adriano Marquez, POi Rommel Roque and Carmencita de Guzman. 18
The defense does not refute the existence of the commission of robbery. In fact, Celedonio himself
acknowledged that the prosecution's circumstantial evidence, although weak, ambiguous and
inconclusive, established that 1) a robbery had been committed; 2) it was committed recently; 3)
several of the stolen items including cash were found in his possession; and 4) he had no valid
explanation for his possession of the stolen goods. 19 Celedonio, however, still insisted that he cannot
be convicted of the crime of robbery because 1) he was not caught in exclusive possession of the
stolen items; 2) the search conducted on him was illegal thereby rendering the seized articles
inadmissible; and 3) the witness Marquez was ill-motivated in testifying against him.
These arguments, however, do not hold water.
First, Celedonio was, in fact, caught in exclusive possession of some of the stolen items when the
police officers flagged down his motorcycle during their follow-up operation. He failed to give a
reasonable explanation as to his possession of the said items. Section 3(j), Rule 131 of the Revised
Rules of Court provides that a person found in possession of a thing taken in the doing of a recent
wrongful act is the taker and the doer of the whole act; otherwise, that thing which a person
possesses, or exercises acts of ownership over, is owned by him.
Celedonio never claimed ownership of the subject items. When the alleged stolen items were found
in his motorcycle compartment which he had control over, the disputable presumption of being the
taker of the stolen items arose. He could have overcome the presumption, but he failed to give a
justifiable and logical explanation. Thus, the only plausible scenario that could be inferred therefrom
was that he took the items.
Second, no illegal search was made upon Celedonio. When the police officers asked where the stolen
items were, they merely made a general inquiry, and not a search, as part of their follow-up
operation. Records did not show that the police officers even had the slightest hint that the stolen
items were in Celedonio's motorcycle compartment. Neither was there any showing that the police
officers frisked Celedonio or rummaged over his motorcycle. There was no showing either of any
force or intimidation on the part of the police officers when they made the inquiry. Celedonio himself
voluntarily opened his motorcycle compartment. Worse, when he was asked if the items were the
stolen ones, he actually confirmed it.20 The police officers, therefore, were left without any recourse
but to take him into custody for further investigation. At that instance, the police officers had
probable cause that he could be the culprit of the robbery. He did not have any explanation as to how
he got hold of the items. Moreover, taking into consideration that the stolen items were in a moving
vehicle, the police had to immediately act on it.
Third, contrary to Celedonio's argument, Marquez was a credible witness. Jurisprudence also tells us
that where there is no evidence that the witnesses of the prosecution were actuated by ill motive, it is
presumed that they were not so actuated and their testimony is entitled to full faith and credit. 21 chanrobl eslaw
In this case, if only to discredit Marquez, Celedonio claimed that they once had a fight over a water
meter. As correctly observed by the CA, however, such allegation was too insignificant that it could
not destroy whatever credibility Marquez possessed as a witness. The CA, thus, posited: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
xxx It is true that under the Rules of Court, a witness may be impeached by evidence that his general
reputation for truth, honesty or integrity is bad. However, a witness cannot be impeached by evidence
of particular wrongful acts, unless there is a showing of previous conviction by final judgment such
that not even the existence of pending information maybe shown to impeach him.
More so, in this case, wherein no information was filed against the witness, but only the mere say so
of the accused on Marquez' alleged involvement in a quarrel with him over a water meter.
Furthermore, no testimony was presented to show that the reputation of Marquez for truth, honesty or
integrity is bad; no evil motive has been established against prosecution witness Marquez that might
prompt him to testify falsely against accused-appellant Celedonio. 22
Alibi and denial were the only defenses of Celedonio. Unless he can strongly support his claims that
the items were "planted" and that it was physically impossible for him to be in De Guzman's house
other than the mere averment that he was asleep at the time, his defenses cannot prevail over the
strong circumstantial evidence.23chanrobleslaw
Having established the sufficiency of the prosecution's evidence, the CA did not commit any
reversible error in upholding the RTC. In the absence of any indication that the RTC and the CA
overlooked facts or circumstances that would result in a different ruling in this case, the Court will
not disturb their factual findings.24 chanrobl eslaw
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED
RODEL LUZ y ONG, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

SERENO, J.:
FACTS:
PO2 Emmanuel L. Alteza testified that he saw the accused driving a
motorcycle without a helmet and this prompted him to flag down the
accused for violating a municipal ordinance which requires all
motorcycle drivers to wear helmet while driving said motor vehicle.
He invited the accused to come inside their sub-station since the
place where he flagged down the accused is almost in front of the
sub-station to where he is assigned as a traffic enforcer. While he
and SPO1 Rayford Brillante were issuing a citation ticket for
violation of municipal ordinance, he noticed that the accused was
uneasy and kept on getting something from his jacket. He was
alerted and so, he told the accused to take out the contents of the
pocket of his jacket as the latter may have a weapon inside it. The
accused obliged and slowly put out the contents of the pocket of his
jacket which included two (2) plastic sachets of suspected shabu.
The RTC convicted petitioner of illegal possession of dangerous
drugs. It found the prosecution evidence sufficient to show that he
had been lawfully arrested for a traffic violation and then subjected
to a valid search, which led to the discovery on his person of two
plastic sachets later found to contain shabu. Upon review, the CA
affirmed the RTCs Decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not the search and seizure of the alleged subject
shabu was incident to a lawful arrest.
HELD: Court of Appeals decision is reversed.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: search and seizure incident to a
lawful arrest
There was no valid arrest of petitioner. When he was flagged down
for committing a traffic violation, he was not, ipso facto and solely
for this reason, arrested.
Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he or she
may be bound to answer for the commission of an offense. It is
effected by an actual restraint of the person to be arrested or by that
persons voluntary submission to the custody of the one making the
arrest. Neither the application of actual force, manual touching of the
body, or physical restraint, nor a formal declaration of arrest, is
required. It is enough that there be an intention on the part of one of
the parties to arrest the other, and that there be an intent on the part
of the other to submit, under the belief and impression that
submission is necessary. Under R.A. 4136, or the Land
Transportation and Traffic Code, the general procedure for dealing
with a traffic violation is not the arrest of the offender, but the
confiscation of the drivers license of the latter.
At the time that he was waiting for PO3 Alteza to write his citation
ticket, petitioner could not be said to have been under arrest. There
was no intention on the part of PO3 Alteza to arrest him, deprive
him of his liberty, or take him into custody. Prior to the issuance of
the ticket, the period during which petitioner was at the police
station may be characterized merely as waiting time. In fact, as
found by the trial court, PO3 Alteza himself testified that the only
reason they went to the police sub-station was that petitioner had
been flagged down almost in front of that place. Hence, it was only
for the sake of convenience that they were waiting there. There was
no intention to take petitioner into custody.
Even if one were to work under the assumption that petitioner was
deemed arrested upon being flagged down for a traffic violation and
while awaiting the issuance of his ticket, then the requirements for a
valid arrest were not complied with. At the time a person is arrested,
it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to inform the latter of the
reason for the arrest and must show that person the warrant of arrest,
if any. Persons shall be informed of their constitutional rights to
remain silent and to counsel, and that any statement they might make
could be used against them. It may also be noted that in this case,
these constitutional requirements were complied with by the police
officers only after petitioner had been arrested for illegal possession
of dangerous drugs.
GRANTED.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. BRIAN
MERCADO Y SARMIENTO, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
Before this Court is an appeal from the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR HC
No. 04942 affirming the Decision2 in Criminal Case Nos. C-77992 and C-77993 rendered by the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 120 of Caloocan City. The RTC Decision found accused-
appellant Brian Mercado y Sarmiento (accused-appellant) guilty beyond reasonable doubt for
violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 (R.A. No. 9165), otherwise
known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
The Facts
The accused-appellant was charged of violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, in
two (2) Informations, both dated 31 July 2007, which respectively read as follows:
Crim. Case No. 77992 (For violation of Section 5, R.A. No. 9165)
That on or about the 27th day of July, 2007 in Caloocan City, Metro Manila and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without authority of law, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell and deliver to PO3 RAMON GALVEZ, who posed, as
buyer, a plastic sachet containing METHYLAMPHETAMINE HYDROCHLORIDE (Shabu)
weighing 0.02 gram, a dangerous drug, without corresponding license or prescription therefore,
knowing the same to be such.3
Crim. Case No. 77993 (For violation of Section 11, R.A. No. 9165)
That on or about the 27th day of July, 2007 in Caloocan City, Metro Manila and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without being authorized by law, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, custody and control Two
(2) sachets containing METHYLAMPHETAMINE HYDROCHLORIDE (Shabu) weighing 0.02
gram & 0.02 gram, respectively, when subjected for laboratory examination gave positive result to
the tests of Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride, a dangerous drug. 4
Upon arraignment, the accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to said charges. 5 Trial thereafter
proceeded.
Based on the evidence presented and on the stipulations and admitted facts entered into by the
parties, the summary of factual findings is stated as follows:
The Version of the Prosecution
[A]t around 10:00 a.m. on July 27, 2007, acting on a tip from a confidential informant that accused-
appellant was selling shabu, the Station Anti-Illegal Drugs Special Operation Unit (SAID-SOU) of
the Philippine National Police (PNP) organized a buy-bust operation [with] SPO2 Wilfredo Quillan
as team leader, PO3 [Ramon] Galvez as poseur-buyer, and SPO1 [Fernando] Moran, PO2 Eugene
Amaro, PO2 Celso Santos and PO3 Jose Martirez as members. After SPO2 Quillan briefed the buy-
bust team, a pre-operation report was prepared. PO3 Galvez was provided with two (2) one hundred-
peso bills which he marked on the right portion with his initials RG. Then, the team and the
informant boarded a passenger jeepney and proceeded to Phase 3-D, Camarin, Caloocan City. When
the informant pointed to accused-appellant, PO3 Galvez approached him and said, [p]re, pa-iskor
naman, offering to buy P200.00 worth of shabu. He then handed the buy-bust money and accused-
appellant brought out from his pocket three (3) pieces of plastic sachets, chose one (1) sachet and
gave it to PO3 Galvez. As the sale was already consummated, PO3 Galvez introduced himself as a
police officer, arrested accused-appellant, and gave the pre-arranged signal to his companions by
scratching his nape. When SPO1 Moran rushed in, PO3 Galvez marked the plastic sachet with
BMS/RG and told SPO1 Moran about the remaining two (2) plastic sachets in accused-appellants
pocket. SPO1 Moran then frisked him and confiscated the items which he marked as BMS/FM-1
and BMS/FM-2. Thereafter, they brought accused-appellant and the confiscated items to the
SAID-SOU office in Samson Road, Caloocan City, and turned them over to the investigator, PO2
[Randulfo] Hipolito, who prepared the corresponding evidence acknowledgment receipt and request
for laboratory examination.
Qualitative examination conducted on the confiscated three (3) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets
containing white crystalline substance, each weighing 0.02 gram, yielded positive for
methylampethamine hydrochloride or shabu, a dangerous drug.6
The Version of the Defense
On July 26, 2007, at around 9:30 to 10:00 in the evening, accused-appellant returned the jeepney he
was driving to the garage of Phase 3-B, Camarin, Caloocan City. He was walking home when a
jeepney with police officers on board suddenly stopped in front of him. PO3 Galvez asked accused-
appellant where he came from. He answered that he just came from driving his jeepney showing the
police officers his drivers license. Accused-appellant was then forced to ride in the jeepney where
he saw eight (8) persons in handcuffs. He was brought to the police station and was told to produce
ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00) in exchange for his liberty, otherwise, a case would be filed against
him. Unable to produce the money, accused-appellant faced the present charges. 7

The Ruling of the RTC
After trial on the merits, the RTC rendered a Decision 8 finding the accused-appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165. The dispositive
portion of which is hereunder quoted, to wit:
Premises considered, this court finds and so holds that:
(1) The accused Brian Mercado y Sarmiento GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for violation of
Sections 5 and 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 and imposes upon him the following:
(a) In Crim. Case No. C-77992, the penalty of Life Imprisonment and a fine of Five Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00); and
(b) In Crim. Case No. C-77993, the penalty of Imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to
Fourteen (14) years and a fine of Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (P300,000.00).
The drugs subject matter of these cases are hereby confiscated and forfeited in favor of the
government to be dealt with in accordance with law.9
The trial court concluded that the evidence presented by the prosecution sufficiently satisfied the
quantum required for accused-appellants conviction. It declared that the fact of sale was sufficiently
established upon showing the complete detailed manner of negotiation of said sale, exchange of
consideration, and handing of the subject of the sale. The court a quo ruled that, as long as the police
officer went through the operation as a buyer and his offer was accepted by the accused-appellant,
and the dangerous drugs delivered to the former, the crime is considered consummated by the
delivery of goods.10 Likewise, the testimonies of the police officers who participated in the buy-bust
operation appear credible and reliable since absence of any showing of ill-motive on their part to
concoct trumped charges, they enjoy the presumption of regularity in the performance of their
duties.11 On the other hand, the denial of the accused-appellant and his mere allegation of extortion
were found to be unsubstantiated by any convincing and credible evidence. Hence, being considered
as negative, weak, and self-serving evidence, accused-appellants bare denial cannot prevail over the
positive testimony of the prosecutions witnesses and the physical evidence which supported said
judgment of conviction.12
The Ruling of the CA
On intermediate appellate review, the CA affirmed the RTCs Decision in convicting the accused-
appellant. It ruled that failure to comply with Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 will not render the arrest
of the accused illegal, nor will it result to the inadmissibility in evidence against the accused of the
illegal drugs seized in the course of the entrapment operation. What is of utmost relevance is the
preservation of the integrity and maintenance of the evidentiary value of the confiscated illegal
drugs, for in the end, the same shall necessarily be the thrust that shall determine the guilt or
innocence of the accused. The prosecution therefore must simply show that the seized item recovered
from appellant was the same item presented in court and found to be an illegal/prohibited drug.
These were all established and proven beyond reasonable doubt in the instant case. 13 Accordingly,
the prosecution was able to sufficiently bear out the statutory elements of the crime of illegal sale and
illegal possession of such drugs committed by accused-appellant. The disposal on appeal reads:
It is well-settled that objection to the admissibility of evidence cannot be raised for the first time on
appeal; when a party desire the court to reject the evidence offered, he must so state in the form of
objection. Thus, as the trial was already concluded, [w]e can no longer turn back to find out the
justifiable grounds for the omission of the legal requisites.
In any case, the procedural lapse did not render accused-appellants arrest illegal or the evidence
adduced inadmissible. If there is non-compliance with Section 21, the issue is not of admissibility,
but of weight evidentiary merit or probative value to be given the evidence. After a scrutiny of
the records, [w]e find the evidence adduced more than sufficient to prove the charges against
accused-appellant. Therefore, considering that no circumstance exists to put the trial courts findings
in error, [w]e apply the time-honored precept that findings of the trial courts which are factual in
nature and which involve credibility are accorded respect when no glaring errors, gross
misapprehension of facts and speculative, arbitrary and unsupported conclusions can be gathered
from such findings.
FOR THESE REASONS, [w]e DENY the appeal and AFFIRM the assailed February 23, 2011
Decision of the Caloocan City Regional Trial Court, Branch 120. 14
Moreover, the appellate court emphasized that, during trial, accused-appellant neither suggested that
there were lapses in the safekeeping of the suspected drugs that could affect their integrity and
evidentiary value nor objected to their admissibility. Accused-appellant was then precluded from
raising such issue which must be timely raised during trial.15
Upon elevation of this case before this Court, the Office of the Solicitor General manifested that it
will no longer file its supplemental brief and, instead, will adopt all the arguments in its brief filed
before the CA.16 On the other hand, accused-appellant raised the issue that the court a quo gravely
erred in convicting him notwithstanding the police operatives patent non-compliance with the strict
and mandatory requirements of R.A. No. 9165.
The Issue
Whether or not the RTC and the CA erred in finding that the evidence of the prosecution was
sufficient to convict the accused of the alleged sale and possession of methamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu, in violation of Sections 5 and 11, respectively, of R.A. No. 9165.
Our Ruling
We sustain the judgment of conviction.
The Court finds no valid reason to depart from the time-honored doctrine that where the issue is one
of credibility of witnesses, and in this case their testimonies as well, the findings of the trial court are
not to be disturbed unless the consideration of certain facts of substance and value, which have been
plainly overlooked, might affect the result of the case. 17
Upon perusal of the records of the case, we see no reason to reverse or modify the findings of the
RTC on the credibility of the testimony of prosecutions witnesses, more so in the present case, in
which its findings were affirmed by the CA. It is worthy to mention that, in addition to the legal
presumption of regularity in the performance of their official duty, the court a quo was in the best
position to weigh the evidence presented during trial and ascertain the credibility of the police
officers who testified as to the conduct of the buy-bust operation and in preserving the integrity of the
seized illegal drug.
This Court has consistently ruled that for the successful prosecution of offenses involving the illegal
sale of drugs under Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, the following elements must be proven:
(1) the identity of the buyer and seller, the object and consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing
sold and the payment therefor.18 In other words, there is a need to establish beyond reasonable doubt
that the accused actually sold and delivered a prohibited drug to another, and that the former indeed
knew that what he had sold and delivered to the latter was a prohibited drug. 19 To reiterate, what is
material to the prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the proof that the transaction or sale
actually took place, plus the presentation in court of corpus delicti as evidence.20 On the other hand,
we have adhered to the time-honored principle that for illegal possession of regulated or prohibited
drugs under Section 11 of the same law, the prosecution must establish the following elements: (1)
the accused is in possession of an item or object, which is identified to be a prohibited or regulated
drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously
possessed the drug.21
disturbed on appeal.25
To reiterate, in the absence of any showing that substantial or relevant facts bearing on the elements
of the crime have been misapplied or overlooked, this Court can only accord full credence to such
factual assessment of the trial court which had the distinct advantage of observing the demeanor and
conduct of the witnesses during the trial. Absent any proof of motive to falsely charge an accused of
such a grave offense, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty and the
findings of the trial court with respect to the credibility of witnesses shall prevail over his/her bare
allegation.26
Furthermore, this Court has time and again adopted the chain of custody rule, 27 a method of
authenticating evidence which requires that the admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence
sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be. This
would include testimony about every link in the chain, from the moment the item was picked up to
the time it is offered in evidence, in such a way that every person who touched the exhibit would
describe how and from whom it was received, where it was and what happened to it while in the
witness possession, the condition in which it was received and the condition in which it was
delivered to the next link in the chain. These witnesses would then describe the precautions taken to
ensure that there had been no change in the condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not
in the chain to have possession of the same.28

Undoubtedly, the prosecution had indeed established that there was a buy-bust operation 22 showing
that accused-appellant sold and delivered the shabu for value to PO3 Ramon Galvez (PO3 Galvez),
the poseur-buyer. PO3 Galvez himself testified that there was an actual exchange of the marked-
money and the prohibited drug. Likewise, accused-appellant was fully aware that what he was
selling was illegal and prohibited considering that when PO3 Galvez told him, pre, pa-iskor
naman, the former immediately answered, magkano?, then when the poseur-buyer replied, dos
lang, it resulted to the production of three (3) pieces of plastic sachets from accused-appellants
pocket. Thereafter, the corpus delicti or the subject drug was seized, marked, and subsequently
identified as a prohibited drug. Note that there was nothing in the records showing that he had
authority to possess them. Jurisprudence had pronounced repeatedly that mere possession of a
prohibited drug constitutes prima facie evidence of knowledge or animus possidendi sufficient to
convict an accused in the absence of any satisfactory explanation. 23 Above all, accused-appellant
likewise failed to present contrary evidence to rebut his possession of the shabu. Taken collectively,
the illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs by accused-appellant were indeed
established beyond reasonable doubt.
By way of emphasis, in cases involving violations of Dangerous Drugs Act, credence should be
given to the narration of the incident by the prosecution witnesses especially when they are police
officers who are presumed to have performed their duties in a regular manner, unless there is
evidence to the contrary.24 In this regard, the defense failed to show any ill motive or odious intent
on the part of the police operatives to impute such a serious crime that would put in jeopardy the life
and liberty of an innocent person, such as in the case of accused-appellant. As a matter of fact, aside
from accused-appellants mere denial and alleged extortion against him, no evidence was ever
presented to prove the truthfulness of the same. Incidentally, if these were simply trumped-up
charges against him, it remains a question why no administrative charges were brought against the
police officers. Moreover, in weighing the testimonies of the prosecutions witnesses vis--vis that of
the defense, it is a well-settled rule that in the absence of palpable error or grave abuse of discretion
on the part of the trial judge, the trial courts evaluation of the credibility of witnesses will not be
It is essential for the prosecution to prove that the prohibited drug confiscated or recovered from the
suspect is the very same substance offered in court as exhibit. Its identity must be established with
unwavering exactitude for it to lead to a finding of guilt. 29
Alongside these rulings are our pronouncements, just as consistent, that failure to strictly comply
with the prescribed procedures in the inventory of seized drugs does not render an arrest of the
accused illegal or the items seized/confiscated from him inadmissible. What is essential is the
preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would be
utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused. 30 Thus:
From the point of view of jurisprudence, we are not beating any new path by holding that the failure
to undertake the required photography and immediate marking of seized items may be excused by
the unique circumstances of a case. In People v. Resurreccion, we already stated that marking upon
immediate confiscation does not exclude the possibility that marking can be at the police station or
office of the apprehending team. In the cases of People v. Rusiana, People v. Hernandez, and People
v. Gum-Oyen, the apprehending team marked the confiscated items at the police station and not at the
place of seizure. Nevertheless, we sustained the conviction because the evidence showed that the
integrity and evidentiary value of the items seized had been preserved. To reiterate what we have
held in past cases, we are not always looking for the strict step-by-step adherence to the procedural
requirements; what is important is to ensure the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary
value of the seized items, as these would determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. We
succinctly explained this in People v. Del Monte when we held:
We would like to add that non-compliance with Section 21 of said law, particularly the making
of the inventory and the photographing of the drugs confiscated and/or seized, will not render
the drugs inadmissible in evidence. Under Section 3 of Rule 128 of the Rules of Court, evidence is
admissible when it is relevant to the issue and is not excluded by the law or these rules. For evidence
to be inadmissible, there should be a law or rule which forbids its reception. If there is no such law
or rule, the evidence must be admitted subject only to the evidentiary weight that will [be] accorded
it by the courts. x x x
We do not find any provision or statement in said law or in any rule that will bring about the
non-admissibility of the confiscated and/or seized drugs due to non-compliance with Section 21
of Republic Act No. 9165. The issue therefore, if there is non-compliance with said section, is
not of admissibility, but of weight evidentiary merit or probative value to be given the
evidence. The weight to be given by the courts on said evidence depends on the circumstances
obtaining in each case.31 (Emphases supplied and citations omitted)
From the testimonies of the police officers in the case at bench, the prosecution established that they
had custody of the drug seized from the accused from the moment he was arrested, during the time
he was transported to the police station, and up to the time the drug was submitted to the crime
laboratory for examination. The same witnesses also identified the seized drug with certainty when
this was presented in court. With regard to the handling of the seized drugs, there are no conflicting
testimonies or glaring inconsistencies that would cast doubt on the integrity thereof as evidence
presented and scrutinized in court. It is therefore safe to conclude that, to the unprejudiced mind, the
testimonies show without a doubt that the evidence seized from the accused-appellant at the time of
the buy-bust operation was the same one tested, introduced, and testified to in court. This fact was
further bolstered by the stipulations entered into between the parties as to the testimony of Forensic
Chemical Officer of the Northern Police District Crime Laboratory Office, Caloocan City, Police
Chief Inspector Albert S. Arturo.32 In other words, there is no question as to the integrity of the
evidence against accused-appellant.
Accordingly, we hereby affirm the position taken by the CA when it expounded on the matter:
It is well-settled that objection to the admissibility of evidence cannot be raised for the first time on
appeal; when a party desires the court to reject the evidence offered, he must so state in the form of
objection. Thus, as the trial was already concluded, [w]e can no longer turn back to find out the
justifiable grounds for the omission of the legal requisites.
In any case, the procedural lapse did not render accused-appellants arrest illegal or the evidence
adduced inadmissible. If there is non-compliance with Section 21, the issue is not of admissibility,
but of weight evidentiary merit or probative value to be given the evidence. After scrutiny of the
records, [w]e find the evidence adduced more than sufficient to prove the charges against accused-
appellant. Therefore, considering that no circumstance exists to put the trial courts findings in error,
[w]e apply the time-honored precept that findings of the trial courts which are factual in nature and
which involve credibility are accorded respect when no glaring errors, gross misapprehensions of
facts and speculative, arbitrary and unsupported conclusions can be gathered from such findings. 33
Again, although this Court finds that the police officers did not strictly comply with the requirements
of Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, such noncompliance did not affect the evidentiary weight
of the drug seized from the accused-appellant, because the chain of custody of the evidence was
shown to be unbroken under the circumstances of the case. As correctly found by the appellate court:
The following links must be established in the chain of custody in a buy-bust operation: first, the
seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the
apprehending officer; second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to
the investigating officer; third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the
forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked
illegal drug seized from the forensic chemist to the court. A circumspect study of the evidence
movements reveal the integrity and the evidentiary value of the suspected drugs were safeguarded.
PO3 Galvez and SPO1 Moran testified that they marked the suspected drugs with BMS/RG,
BMS/FM-1 and BMS/FM-2 in the presence of accused-appellant immediately upon
confiscation. Then, they brought accused-appellant and the confiscated items to their office,
entrusting custody to investigator PO2 Hipolito. Contrary to accused-appellants claim, there is no
hiatus in the third and fourth link in the chain of custody. The defense admitted that, upon receipt of
the items, PO2 Hipolito prepared the corresponding evidence acknowledgment receipt and request
for laboratory examination. The request for laboratory examination, which the prosecution offered as
part of its documentary evidence, bears a stamp stating PO2 Hipolito was the one who delivered the
marked confiscated items to PNP Crime Laboratory, with forensic chemist PSI Arturo as the
receiving officer. PSI Arturo then conducted the examination which yielded positive for
methylamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. When the prosecution presented the marked plastic
sachets in court, PO3 Galvez and SPO1 Moran positively identified them as those recovered from
accused-appellant in the buy-bust operation. Considering that every link was adequately established
by the prosecution, the chain of custody was unbroken.34
In fine, considering the pieces of evidence presented by the prosecution, the denial and allegation of
extortion of the accused-appellant fails. Courts generally view the defense of denial with disfavor
due to the facility with which an accused can concoct it to suit his or her defense. As evidence that is
both negative and self-serving, this defense cannot attain more credibility than the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses who testify clearly, providing thereby positive evidence on the various aspects
of the crime committed.35 Consequently, we find no cogent reason to disturb the decisions of the
RTC and the CA. Accused-appellant Bryan Mercado y Sarmiento is guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The CA Decision in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 04942 dated 26
September 2012, is AFFIRMED in all respects.
Manalili vs CA
Facts:
This is a petition for certiorari seeking the reversal of CAs decision in
affirming TCs decision on convicting Manalili of illegal
possession of prohibited drug violating RA 6425. Police operatives
Espiritu, Lumabas and driver Enriquez conducted surveillance along
the front of Kalookan Cemetery based on the information that drug
addicts were roaming around in the area, saw a man who appeared to
be high on drugs and introduced themselves as policemen. Said man
avoided them and tried to resist, when they asked what the man was
holding in his hand, the man held out his wallet and allowed Espiritu to
examine it, who found what he suspected to be crushed mj leaves. The
man was brought to the Anti-Narcotics Unit and turned out to be
Manalili. The substance found on Manalilis wallet was sent to NBI
Foresic Chemistry Section and was confirmed as mj. Manalilis version
of the story was that early afternoon he was riding in a tricycle when 3
policemen stopped the tricycle and informed them of the suspected
possession of mj, the policemen bodily searched both Manalili and the
driver and upon finding nothing illegal on their persons, let the driver
go but brought Manalili along to the police station. Manalili while on
the way to the station saw a neighbor whom he signaled to follow them
and when he was again searched in the station, he was asked to strip his
pants where they found nothing illegal. Said neighbor then asked the
policemen to let Manalili go seeing as they had not found anything
illegal but Manalili was put on a cell who was brought to a fiscal later
that day and was told not to say anything despite his saying that the
policemen had not found mj on his person. Said tricycle driver and
neighbor testified on court as to
how the 2 searches yielded nothing illegal on Manalilis person.
Issues:
1.W/N evidence seized during a stop-and-frisk is admissible.
2.W/N Manalilis actions constituted a waiver of his rights.
3.W/N the evidence is sufficient to prove Manalilis guilt.
Ruling:
I.I. In Terry vs Ohio, a stop-and-frisk was defined as the vernacular
designation of the right of a police officer to stop a citizen on the street,
interrogate him and pat him for weapons: W)here a police officer
observes an unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in
light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the
persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently
dangerous, where in the course of investigating this behavior he
identified himself as a policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, and
where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his
reasonable fear for his own or others' safety, he is entitled for the
protection of himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully
limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to
discover weapons which might be used to assault him. Such a search is
a reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment, and any weapon
seized may properly be introduced in evidence against the person from
whom they were taken. It did not, however abandon the rule that the
police must, whenever practicable, obtain advance judicial approval of
searches and seizures through the warrant procedure, excused only by
exigent circumstances. As People vs Lacerna enumerated 5 recognized
exceptions to the rule against warrantless searches and seizures: 1)
search incidental to lawful
arrest; 2) search of moving vehicles; 3) seizure in plain view; 4)
customs search; 5) waiver of the accused of his rights against
unreasonable searches and seizures. From Espiritus experience as a
member of the Anti -Narcotics Unit of Caloocan City Police, Manalilis
suspicious behavior was characteristic of drug addicts who were high.
II.
SGs contention that Manalili effectiv
ely waived the inadmissibility of the evidence illegally obtained when
he failed to raise this issue or object during trial. A valid waiver of right
against unreasonable searches and seizures require the concurrence of
these requisites: 1) the right to be waived existed; 2) the person waiving
it had knowledge; and 3) he/she had actual intention to relinquish the
right. In this case however, it is deemed that Manalili has waived such
right for failure to raise its violation before the trial court, at the earliest
opportunity possible. Issues not raised below cannot be pleaded for the
first time on appeal.
III.
Manalilis contention that the charge was trumped up to extort money
and testimonies of the arresting officers were inconsistent, it held that
the trial courts assessment of the credibility of the witnesses
particularly when affirmed by CA is accorded great weight and respect
as it had opportunity to observe their demeanor and deportment as they
testified before it. The elements of illegal possession of mj are: a) the
accused is in possession of an item or object which is identified to be a
prohibited drug; b) such possession is not authorized by law; and c) the
accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug. The substance
found on Manalilis wallet was identified as mj which was prohibited
and knowingly without authority. Considering that he was high and
tried to avoid and resist, such behavior clearly shows that he knew he
was holding mj and it was prohibited by law
PEOPLE V MUSA
Facts: A civilian informer gave the information that Mari Musa was
engaged in selling marijuana in Suterville, Zamboanga City. Sgt. Ani was
ordered by NARCOM leader T/Sgt. Belarga, to conduct a surveillance and
test buy on Musa. The civilian informer guided Ani to Musas house and
gave the description of Musa. Ani was able to buy one newspaper-wrapped
dried marijuana for P10.00.
The next day, a buy-bust was planned. Ani was to raise his right hand if he
successfully buys marijuana from Musa. As Ani proceeded to the house,
the NARCOM team positioned themselves about 90 to 100 meters away.
From his position, Belarga could see what was going on. Musa came out
of the house and asked Ani what he wanted. Ani said he wanted more
marijuana and gave Musa the P20.00 marked money. Musa went into the
house and came back, giving Ani two newspaper wrappers containing
dried marijuana. Ani opened and inspected it. He raised his right hand as a
signal to the other NARCOM agents, and the latter moved in and arrested
Musa inside the house. Belarga frisked Musa in the living room but did not
find the marked money (gave it to his wife who slipped away). T/Sgt.
Belarga and Sgt. Lego went to the kitchen and found a cellophane colored
white and stripe hanging at the corner of the kitchen. They asked Musa
about its contents but failed to get a response. So they opened it and found
dried marijuana leaves inside. Musa was then placed under arrest.
Issue: Whether or Not the seizure of the plastic bag and the marijuana
inside it is unreasonable, hence, inadmissible as evidence.
Held: Yes. It constituted unreasonable search and seizure thus it may not
be admitted as evidence. The warrantless search and seizure, as an incident
to a suspects lawful arrest, may extend beyond the person of the one
arrested to include the premises or surroundings under his immediate
control. Objects in the plain view of an officer who has the right to be in
the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented
as evidence. The plain view doctrine is usually applied where a police
officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but nonetheless
inadvertently comes across an incriminating object. It will not justify the
seizure of the object where the incriminating nature of the object is not
apparent from the plain view of the object.
In the case at bar, the plastic bag was not in the plain view of the police.
They arrested the accused in the living room and moved into the kitchen in
search for other evidences where they found the plastic bag. Furthermore,
the marijuana inside the plastic bag was not immediately apparent from
the plain view of said object.
Therefore, the plain view does not apply. The plastic bag was seized
illegally and cannot be presented in evidence pursuant to Article III
Section 3 (2) of the Constitution.
PEOPLE vs GO Case Digest
PEOPLE OF THE PHILLIPINES v. BENNY GO
411 SCRA 81 (2003), THIRD DIVISION (Carpio Morales, J.)
The search and seizure of articles must be limited to those which are
particularly described in the search warrant.
FACTS: A raiding team armed with a warrant entered the home of appelant
Benny Go in search of evidence for the violation of Republic Act 6425
(Dangerous Drugs Act), otherwise know as the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 . Upon their entry, they met Jack
Go, son of the Go and restrained him. As the former was the only one present at
the time they then called on two baranggay kagawads to act as witnesses on the
said search. They then siezed properties and objects even those which were not
included in the warrant. When they were almost finished with their search Go
arrived and immediately together with the two witnesses was made to sign the
inventory reciept.
Based on the evidence taken from the search Go was charged for violation of
R.A. 6425. Upon hearing, testimonies as well as evidences were presented by the
prosecution against Go. However, the two witnesses questioned the validity of
some of the evidence presented such as the inventory receipt as well as the illegal
drugs said to have been seized from the search.
The Regional Trial Court of Manila convicted Go for violation of the offense
cahrged. On appeal, Go assails the decision of the RTC as well the validity of the
search performed by the raiding team and the admissibility of the evidence taken
therefrom. Go also asks for the return of the properties seized that were not
included in the search warrant.
ISSUE: Whether or not the properties not included in the search warrant may be
returned to Go
HELD: It bears reiterating that the purpose of the constitutional requirement that
the articles to be seized be particularly described in the warrant is to limit the
things to be seized to those, and only those, particularly described in the search
warrant - to leave the officers of the law with no discretion regarding what articles
they should seize. At the same time, the raiding team characterized the seizure of
the assorted documents, passports, bankbooks, checks, check writer, typewriter,
dry seals and stamp pads as seizure of evidence in plain view. Under the plain
view doctrine, objects falling in the plain view of an officer who has a right to
be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented as
evidence.
To be sure, the policemen also filed a complaint against Go for alleged possession
of instruments or implements intended for the commission of falsification under
paragraph 2 of Article 176 of the Revised Penal Code on the basis of dry seals and
rubber stamps also found in appellants residence.
The counterfeit nature of the seals and stamps was in fact not established until
after they had been turned over to the Chinese embassy and Bureau of
Immigration and Deportation for verification. It is, therefore, incredible that
SPO1 Fernandez could make such determination from a plain view of the
items from his vantage point in the sala.
In sum, the circumstances attendant to the case at bar do not warrant the
application of the plain view doctrine to justify the seizure and retention of the
questioned seized items. The things belonging to appellant not specifically
mentioned in the warrants, like those not particularly described, must thus be
ordered returned to him.
Be that as it may, considering that the two (2) dry seals and eight (8) of the rubber
stamps have been certified to be counterfeit by the Bureau of Immigration and
Deportation, they may not be returned and are hereby declared confiscated in
favor of the State to be disposed of according to law.
Moreover, the various bankbooks and passports not belonging to appellant may
not be ordered returned in the instant proceedings. The legality of a seizure can be
contested only by the party whose rights have been impaired thereby, and the
objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and cannot be
availed of by third parties.
Disini, et al. v. The Secretary of Justice, et al.,
G.R. No. 203335, 11 February 2014
31
JUL
FACTS
Petitioners lament that libel provisions of the penal code and, in effect,
the libel provisions of the cybercrime law carry with them the
requirement of presumed malice even when the latest jurisprudence
already replaces it with the higher standard of actual malice as a basis
for conviction. Petitioners argue that inferring presumed malice from
the accuseds defamatory statement by virtue of Article 354 of the penal
code infringes on his constitutionally guaranteed freedom of
expression.
ISSUE
Whether or not Section 4(c)(4) of the Cybercrime Prevention Act on
cyberlibel affected the requirement of actual malice as opposed to
presumed malice as basis for conviction of libel.
RULING
The prosecution bears the burden of proving the presence of actual
malice in instances where such element is required to establish guilt.
The defense of absence of actual malice, even when the statement turns
out to be false, is available where the offended party is a public official
or a public figure, as in the cases of Vasquez (a barangay official) and
Borjal (the Executive Director, First National Conference on Land
Transportation). Since the penal code and implicitly, the cybercrime
law, mainly target libel against private persons, the Court recognizes
that these laws imply a stricter standard of malice to convict the
author of a defamatory statement where the offended party is a public
figure. Societys interest and the maintenance of good government
demand a full discussion of public affairs.
But, where the offended party is a private individual, the prosecution
need not prove the presence of malice. The law explicitly presumes its
existence (malice in law) from the defamatory character of the assailed
statement. For his defense, the accused must show that he has a
justifiable reason for the defamatory statement even if it was in fact
true.
PESTILOS V GENEROSO
FACTS:
The petitioners were indicted for attempted murder. Petitioners filed an
Urgent Motion for Regular Preliminary Investigation on the ground that
there no valid warrantless took place. The RTC denied the motion and
the CA affirmed the denial.
Records show that an altercation ensued between the petitioners and
Atty. Moreno Generoso. The latter called the Central Police District to
report the incident and acting on this report, SPO1 Monsalve
dispatched SPO2 Javier to go to the scene of the crime and render
assistance. SPO2, together with augmentation personnel arrived at the
scene of the crime less than one hour after the alleged altercation and
saw Atty. Generoso badly beaten.
Atty. Generoso then pointed the petitioners as those who mauled him
which prompted the police officers to invite the petitioners to go to
the police station for investigation. At the inquest proceeding, the City
Prosecutor found that the petitioners stabbed Atty. Generoso with a
bladed weapon who fortunately survived the attack.
Petitioners aver that they were not validly arrested without a warrant.
ISSUE:
Are the petitioners validly arrested without warrant when the police
officers did not witness the crime and arrived only less than an hour
after the alleged altercation?
HELD:
YES, the petitioners were validly arrested without warrant. Section
5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides
that:
When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause to
believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the
person to be arrested has committed it.
The elements under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure are: first, an offense has just been committed; and
second, the arresting officer has probable cause to believe based on
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be
arrested has committed it.
The Court's appreciation of the elements that "the offense has just been
committed" and ''personal knowledge of facts and circumstances that
the person to be arrested committed it" depended on the particular
circumstances of the case. The element of ''personal knowledge of facts
or circumstances", however, under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure requires clarification.
Circumstances may pertain to events or actions within the actual
perception, personal evaluation or observation of the police officer at
the scene of the crime. Thus, even though the police officer has not
seen someone actually fleeing, he could still make a warrantless arrest
if, based on his personal evaluation of the circumstances at the scene of
the crime, he could determine the existence of probable cause that the
person sought to be arrested has committed the crime.
However, the determination of probable cause and the gathering of
facts or circumstances should be made immediately after the
commission of the crime in order to comply with the element of
immediacy. In other words, the clincher in the element of ''personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances" is the required element of
immediacy within which these facts or circumstances should be
gathered.
With the facts and circumstances of the case at bar that the police
officers gathered and which they have personally observed less than
one hour from the time that they have arrived at the scene of the crime,
it is reasonable to conclude that the police officers had personal
knowledge of the facts and circumstances justifying the petitioners
warrantless arrests.
Hence, the petitioners were validly arrested and the subsequent inquest
proceeding was likewise appropriate.