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Warghting and Logistic
Support of Joint Forces
from the
Joint Sea Base
Robert W. Button John Gordon IV Jessie Riposo

Irv Blickstein Peter A. Wilson
Prepared for the United States Navy

Approved for public release; distribution unlimited
NAT IONAL DEFENS E RES EA RC H I NS TI TUTE

The research described in this report was prepared for the United States
Navy. The research was conducted in the RAND National Defense
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sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff,
the Unified Combatant Commands, the Department of the Navy,
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Preface
Sea Basing is a fundamental concept to the Navys operational vision

for the 21st century. NavyMarine Corps concepts for Sea Basing
would enable joint force commanders to accelerate deployment and
employment of naval power-projection capabilities. The overall intent
of Sea Basing is to use the exibility and protection provided by the
sea base while minimizing the presence of forces ashore. The Assess-
ment Division of the Oce of the Chief of Naval Operations (N81)
of the U.S. Navy asked the RAND Corporation to examine how still-
evolving NavyMarine Corps concepts for Sea Basing could be applied
to joint operations beyond the Department of the Navy. N81 par-
ticularly desired insights on the use of Sea Basing to support Army
operations.
This monograph presents the results of research performed by the
RAND National Defense Research Institute for N81. It should be of
interest to the Department of the Navy, the Department of the Army,
the Oce of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), and Congress.
This research was conducted within the Acquisition and Technol-
ogy Policy Center of NDRI, a federally funded research and develop-
ment center sponsored by the Oce of the Secretary of Defense, the
Joint Sta, the Unied Combatant Commands, the Department of the
Navy, the Marine Corps, the defense agencies, and the defense Intel-
ligence Community.
For more information on RANDs Acquisition and Technology
Policy Center, contact the Director, Philip Antn. He can be reached by
email at atpc-director@rand.org; by phone at 310-393-0411, extension
iii
iv Warghting and Logistic Support of Joint Forces from the Joint Sea Base
7798; or by mail at the RAND Corporation, 1776 Main Street, Santa

Monica, California 90407-2138. More information about RAND is
available at www.rand.org.
iv
Contents
Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii
Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii
Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi
Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xiii
Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xxi
Acronyms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xxiii
CHAPTER ONE
Introduction and Objectives. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Study Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Study Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Organization of This Report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
CHAPTER TWO
Operational Concepts and Scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
MPF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
MPF (Future) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Sea State Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Sea Basing Operational Concepts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Marine Corps Concepts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Army Concepts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Operational Scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Scenario AArmy Forces Arrive Inland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Scenario BArmy Forces Enter the Area of Operations Directly. . . . . . . . 15
v
vi Warghting and Logistic Support of Joint Forces from the Joint Sea Base
Scenario CArmy Forces Enter the Area of Operations via the

Sea Base . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
CHAPTER THREE
Scenario Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Scenario AArmy Forces Arrive Inland. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Reducing Distances . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Adding LCACs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Increasing the Ratio of CH-53K to MV-22 Aircraft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
Reducing Sustainment Demand . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
Scenario BArmy Forces Enter the Area of Operations Directly . . . . . . . . . 35
Scenario CArmy Forces Enter the Area of Operations via
the Sea Base . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
Movement Without a JHSV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
Movement with a JHSV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
Increasing the Ratio of CH-53K to MV-22 Aircraft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
Army Helicopters on the Sea Base . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
CHAPTER FOUR
Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
Overall Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
Sustainment Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
Movement Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
Other Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
APPENDIX
A. Additional Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
B. Maritime Pre-positioning Force (Future) Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
C. Army and Marine Corps Ground Elements Evaluated . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
D. Sustainment Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
E. Model Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
Figures
2.1. Test for Motion Reduction in Lee of Cargo Ship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

2.2. Operational Scenario A . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.3. Operational Scenario B . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.4. Operational Scenario C . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
3.1. Required Tons per Day and Lift Capacities, VTOL-Only
Sustainment of the MEB . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
3.2. Relative Lift Capacities in MEB, VTOL-Only
Sustainment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
3.3. Scenario A, VTOL-Only Sustainment of a MEB and
an Army Airborne Brigade, Is Marginal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
3.4. Scenario A, VTOL Plus LCAC Sustainment, Is More
Robust . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
3.5. Scenario A, Breakpoint in Army Sustainment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
3.6. Altered Aircraft Mix in Scenario A Gives More Robust
Sustainment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
3.7. LCACs Plus Altered Aircraft Mix in Scenario A Give
Greater Robustness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
3.8. Scenario A Sustainment, Using LCACs with and without
Bulk Water. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
3.9. SBCT Sustainment in Scenario B, with and without
LCACs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
3.10. HBCT Sustainment in Scenario B, with and without
LCACs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
3.11. SBCT Movement Using Aircraft and LCACs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
3.12. HBCT Movement Using Aircraft and LCACs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
3.13. SBCT Movement in Scenario C, with and without a
JHSV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
vii
viii Warghting and Logistic Support of Joint Forces from the Joint Sea Base
3.14. HBCT Movement in Scenario C, with and without a

JHSV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
3.15. SBCT Movement in Scenario C, with Diering Aircraft
Mixes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
A.1. VTOL Plus LCAC Sustainment in Scenario A, with
MLPs 50 NM from SPOD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
A.2. VTOL Plus LCAC Sustainment in Scenario A, with
LCACs Limited to 12 Hours of Operation per Day. . . . . . . . . . . . 57
A.3. VTOL-Only Sustainment of a MEB and an Army
Airborne Brigade in Scenario A Is Marginal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
A.4. VTOL Plus LCAC Sustainment in Scenario A Is More
Robust . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
A.5. SBME Sustainment in Scenario A, Without MV-22
Aircraft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
A.6. Dedicating Additional Operating Spots for SBME,
Airborne BCT in Heavy Combat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
A.7. MEB Plus SBCT Sustainment in Scenario B, with
MLPs 50 NM from SPOD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
A.8. MEB Plus HBCT Sustainment in Scenario B, with
MLPs 50 NM from SPOD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
A.9. SBCT Sustainment in Scenario B, with Altered
Aircraft Mix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
A.10. HBCT Sustainment in Scenario B, with Altered
Aircraft Mix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
A.11. SBCT Sustainment in Scenario B, with and without
Bulk Water. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
A.12. HBCT Sustainment in Scenario B, with and without
Bulk Water. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
A.13. SBCT Movement for Diering MEB Locations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
A.14. HBCT Movement for Diering MEB Locations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
B.1. LHD-5, USS Bataan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
B.2. T-AKE-1, USNS Lewis and Clark . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
B.3. MPF(F) LMSR Alongside an MLP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
B.4. MLP Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
C.1. Design of the Army IBCT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
C.2. Design of the Army Stryker Brigade Combat Team . . . . . . . . . . . 78
C.3. Design of the Army Heavy Brigade Combat Team . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
D.1. Ground Element Consumption Rates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
D.2. Aggregate Consumption Rates of Ground Element . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
Figures ix
E.1. Flight Operations on an Amphibious Assault Ship . . . . . . . . . . . . 93

E.2. SBME and Army Airborne Brigade in Scenario A . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
E.3. SBME and Army Airborne Brigade in Scenario B . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
E.4. Army Heavy Brigade from a Short Distance in
Scenario A . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
E.5. Army Heavy Brigade in Scenario A, from a Greater
Distance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
E.6. Army Heavy Brigade in Scenario A, Self-Sucient in
Bulk Water. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
E.7. SBCT Movement Through the Sea Base. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
ix
Tables
2.1. Percentage of Sea State 3 or Less Conditions for Various

Littoral Regions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
C.1. Major Equipment in the Infantry Brigade Combat Team . . . . 77
C.2. Major Equipment in the Stryker Brigade Combat Team . . . . . 77
C.3. Major Equipment in the Heavy Brigade Combat Team . . . . . . 80
C.4. Major Equipment in the MPF(F) MEB . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
D.1. Marine Corps Sustainment Requirements. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
D.2. Army Brigade Sustainment Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
xi
Summary
Sea Basing, a fundamental concept in Sea Power 21, the Navys opera-
tional vision for the 21st century, is designed to help joint force com-
manders accelerate deployment and employment of naval power and to
enhance seaborne positioning of joint assets. It will do so by minimiz-
ing the need to build up a logistics stockpile ashore, reducing the oper-
ational demand for sealift and airlift assets, and permitting forward
positioning of joint forces for immediate employment.
The cornerstone of sea-based logistics on the brigade scale is the
Maritime Pre-positioning Force and its future version, the MPF(F). The
Maritime Pre-positioning Force currently consists of three forward-
deployed squadrons of maritime pre-positioning ships, each with ve
or six vessels with weapons, supplies, and equipment sucient to sup-
port a force about the size of a Marine Expeditionary Brigade for up to
30 days. The MPF(F) will be composed of multiple ship types designed
to support a Marine Expeditionary Brigade and provide functions not
currently provided by the MPF, such as at-sea arrival, assembly, sus-
tainment, reconstitution, and redeployment of Expeditionary Forces,
as well as Expeditionary Strike Group interoperability. Current plans
call for an MPF(F) squadron comprising three large-deck amphibious
ships, three Mobile Landing Platform transport ships,1 and eight cargo
ships.
The Assessment Division of the Oce of the Chief of Naval
Operations (OPNAV N81) asked the RAND Corporations National
1 The Mobile Landing Platform is a new-design ship that will carry Landing Craft Air
Cushion (LCAC) connectors for the MPF(F). The LCAC is similar to a large hovercraft.
xiii
xiv Warghting and Logistic Support of Joint Forces from the Joint Sea Base
Defense Research Institute to examine how the still-evolving concepts

for sea basing could be applied to joint operations. The Navy is par-
ticularly interested in how the sea base could support Army operations
while supporting Marine Corps operations. This monograph provides
a high-level analysis of the sea base, its use in operations related to the
Marine Corps, and the viability of Army operations using the sea base
under varying conditions.2 This eort is not a denitive logistics-based
study. Rather, it is conceptual in nature and uses a broad-brush model
to dene throughput capacity (and overcapacity, as discussed below).
The Army has historically deployed its forces for overseas con-
icts by sea, a concept it has again recently emphasized. Although the
Army emphasizes deploying its forces directly into an area of opera-
tions, rather than through at-sea assets, such as the MPF(F), the capa-
bility to perform at-sea transfer of Army forces could greatly benet
the joint force, particularly by providing a means to rapidly introduce
Army forces where a usable port is not available.
Analysis and Scenarios

We examined three operational scenarios, in addition to support of
a Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) alone, that explore potential
joint operations using the sea base to (1) support an Army light or air-
borne brigade that arrives 50 nautical miles (NM) inland in an area
of operations, (2) support an Army medium (Stryker) or heavy brigade
that arrives through a seaport of debarkation, and (3) move ashore an
Army medium or heavy brigade that deploys through the sea base to
the area of operations. In our analysis, we always assumed that the
MPF(F) would support the MEB as its rst priority. Once that mission
was accomplished, any remaining capacity was identied as potentially
available to support other joint forcesspecically, Army brigades of
various types. Our analysis concluded that, in many circumstances,
brigade-level Army and Marine Corps ground elements can be sus-
2 In operations involving both the Marine Corps and the Army, the joint force commander
will determine how and when they will use a sea base.
Summary xv
tained simultaneously using the throughput capacities of planned

MPF(F) components.
The Seabasing Joint Integrating Concept, in its assessment of sea-
basing risks, states, Adverse weather conditions and sea state impact
sea-based operations can aect the rapid build-up of combat power and
timely sustainment of employed forces3 Issues of sustainment under
unfavorable conditions, such as in high sea states with degraded ship-
to-ship movement, can be addressed, in part, using the metric of rela-
tive sustainment capacity, dened as the ratio of maximum sustainment
throughput capacity (in short tons per day) to sustainment require-
ment (also in short tons per day).4 Overcapacity exists under favorable
conditions when this ratio exceeds 100 percent. Overcapacity is needed
to ensure adequate capacity under unfavorable conditions. Overcapac-
ity can also release some sea base assets (notably, MV-22 aircraft) for
support to ground forces under favorable conditions.
Our analysis began with the collection of data from the Army,
Navy, and Marine Corps. Related studies were also collected and
examined. We developed three illustrative scenarios judged most likely
to represent logistic support to Marine Corps and Army ground ele-
ments. We then developed a simulation, the Joint Sea Based Logistics
Model (described in Appendix E), to quantify the capabilities of the sea
base in these three scenarios. This simulation was used for hundreds
of combinations of distances, ground elements to be sustained, levels
of combat, possibilities for reducing sustainment demand, and vari-
ous ship-to-shore connector assets. Our insights and recommendations
derive both from simulation results and from an improved understand-
ing of sea-based logistic support. They led to the following distinct
approaches to increasing sustainment capacity:
3 Department of Defense, Seabasing Joint Integrating Concept, Version 1.0, Washington,

D.C., August 2005, p 12.
4 For presentation purposes, our analysis consolidates all sustainment and lift require-
ments using the simple metric of tons per day. The underlying analysis considers classes of
sustainment.
xvi Warghting and Logistic Support of Joint Forces from the Joint Sea Base
Reducing distances from the sea base to supported ground ele-

ments or seaports of debarkation. Reducing sustainment distances
from the planned distance of 110 NM is the most eective means
of increasing sustainment capacity. Threat conditions can limit
this option, necessitating others.
Adding LCAC surface connectors to CH-53 and MV-22 aircraft
in sustainment. The addition of LCACs could more than double
sustainment throughput.5
Increasing the ratio of CH-53K to MV-22 aircraft. The benets of
increasing the ratio of CH-53K to MV-22 aircraft can be similar
to those from adding LCACs as sustainment assets.
Reducing sustainment requirements. Reducing demand for exter-
nal sustainment, such as that realized by eliminating ground ele-
ments demand for bulk water, can signicantly improve the abil-
ity to sustain ground elements.
We identied the following approaches to reducing Army ground

element movement time from the sea base ashore:
Increasing the ratio of CH-53K to MV-22 aircraft. A modest

reduction in movement time for Army forces can be achieved by
increasing the ratio of CH-53K to MV-22 aircraft. Put another
way, such a change would, as described above, enhance sustain-
ment performance signicantly without increasing movement
time.
Adding Joint High-Speed Vessels to augment LCACs as surface
connectors. Adding a single Joint High-Speed Vessel to augment
LCACs roughly doubles surface connector throughput capacity
and halves the movement time of Army brigade combat teams.
5 Maintenance requirements limit LCACs to not more than 16 hours of operation per day.
Crew fatigue can further limit LCACs to 12 hours or less of operation per day. Sixteen-
hour days are used as a baseline for LCAC operations in the main body of this monograph;
12-hour days are considered as an excursion in Appendix E.
Summary xvii
Sustainment Findings
Our analysis indicates that a Sea Base Maneuver Element, that portion
of a Marine Expeditionary Brigade projected ashore for operations, can
be sustained with some diculty at a range of up to 110 NM from the
sea base, using only CH-53K and MV-22 aircraft. Simultaneously sus-
taining both a Shore Based Maneuver Element and an Army airborne
brigade using only these aircraft would require reducing signicantly
the distance from the sea base to these forces.
Using LCACs to augment sea base aircraft in sustainment has
substantial benets, particularly when LCACs contribute to both
Marine Corps and Army ground element sustainment. When LCACs
can contribute only to Marine Expeditionary Brigade sustainment, the
limitations of airborne sustainment to Army ground elements deter-
mine the feasibility of joint sustainment. The use of a mix of sea base
aircraft more rich in CH-53K aircraft than currently planned could
enable joint sustainment at greater distances.
Reducing sustainment demand (by, for example, eliminating
demand for bulk water from the sea base) is particularly helpful when
sustainment capacity is marginal.
Movement Findings
An Army Stryker or heavy brigade can be transloaded at sea6 and

moved ashore from the sea base in three to six days (depending on the
distance o shore), using MPF(F) assets also sustaining a MEB. The
ability to move an Army brigade ashore in a few days represents a new
capability for the Army.
If a single Joint High-Speed Vessel can augment the LCACs, it
will roughly halve the time required to transport an Army brigade
ashore. This nding reects the observation that, when operable, the
throughput capacity of a single Joint High-Speed Vessel about matches
6 Transloading entails ship-to-ship movement by ramp. Transloading operations are illus-

trated in Figures B.3 and B.4.
xviii Warghting and Logistic Support of Joint Forces from the Joint Sea Base
the combined throughput of MLP LCACs. There are, however, issues

of Joint High-Speed Vessel operability in this role in even moderate sea
states, as well as the need for a small port where the Joint High-Speed
Vessel can ooad.
Other Findings
The CH-53K is better suited than the MV-22 for sustainment;

with external loads the MV-22 loses its speed advantage on ingress
and the CH-53K carries at least twice the load of the MV-22.
CH-53K helicopters are especially valuable under conditions of
heavy sustainment demand or long sustainment distances.
The Sea Basing concept is not consistent with, and in some sense
conicts with, the Armys desire to deploy directly to a port via
High-Speed Ships. The Army has not developed doctrine and has
not funded systems for operating with sea bases. However, our
analysis illustrates that, once ashore, an Army brigade could, in
many situations, be sustained by a sea base if (1) it moves away
from its port of debarkation or (2) enemy action causes that port
to become unavailable for sustainment.
To capitalize on the potential of the sea base, Army shipping should
be congured for selective ooad rather than dense pack. The
interface between Army pre-positioning ships and the MLP is a
potential bottleneck in moving Army forces. To avoid such bot-
tlenecks, a built-in loading system should be considered for the
MLP. Integrating such a loading system into the MLP might be
less expensive in net than integrating it into Army and Navy pre-
positioning ships and might also hasten joint interoperability.
MPF(F) ships can provide deck space for a limited number of Army
helicopters on a temporary basis (12 deck spots per big deck)
without signicant loss of throughput capacity. However, there is
not sucient space on the MPF(F) to base signicant numbers of
Army aircraft as long as large numbers of Marine Corps MV-22
and CH-53K aircraft are based on these ships. Space for Army
Summary xix
aircraft could be created temporarily by moving MV-22 aircraft

ashore, but several problems would remain, including rotor issues
(braking and folding), corrosion, and maintenance.
Key Assumptions
To conduct the analysis, a number of assumptions were made. They

included the following:
Army unit equipment and supplies arrive at the sea base via Army
shipping. Therefore, the Army units would not consume the
MEBs supplies that are on the MPF(F) ships.
Army ships arrive at the sea base combat loaded for selective
ooad, as opposed to dense packed. Combat loaded ships are
lled to roughly 6070 percent of capacity in order to provide
room to move vehicles and equipment below decks so that a spe-
cic item can be ooaded when needed. On the other hand,
dense packed ships are loaded in a manner to maximize their
carrying capacity. In that case, the ship can unload cargo only in
the reverse order from how it was placed in the ship (i.e., the rst
piece of cargo loaded deep inside the ship will be the last item that
can be removed).
The connectors (e.g., ramps) between the Armys ships and the
Mobile Landing Platform vessels will permit the movement of
Army vehicles onto the MLP and its LCACs. Additionally, we
assume that Army vehicle drivers would be properly trained to
move their vehicles on board ships, including onto connecting
ramps between ships.
When LCACs are used to move Army and Marine Corps sup-
plies ashore, sucient trucks are available to move those supplies
inland to where they would be consumed, and those trucks are
adequately protected. It should be noted that an examination of
the required number of trucks was not part of this analysis for the
Navy. This issue, however, clearly merits more detailed analysis.
Acknowledgments
This study beneted from discussions with and data provided by LCDR
Jerey Sinclair (OPNAV N81MF), CAPT Robert Winsor (OPNAV
N81M), LCDR Frank Futcher (OPNAV N42), John Kaskin (OPNAV
N42), CAPT James Stewart (OPNAV N42), Al Sawyers (U.S. Marine
Corps MCCDC), LTC James R. Young (U.S. Army Combined Arms
Support Command), Ed Horres (U.S. Army Training and Doctrine
Command), and Michael W. Smith (Center for Naval Analyses).
We thank Cliord Grammich for his skillful support in the prep-
aration of graphics for this monograph and for improving its readabil-
ity. Finally, we thank ADM Don Pilling, USN (Ret.), and John Friel
for their thoughtful reviews of this study, which beneted from their
insights.
xxi
Acronyms
ABN airborne
ADC(X) Auxiliary Dry Cargo Carrier
AoA Analysis of Alternatives
APOD aerial port of debarkation
BCT Brigade Combat Team
BLT Brigade Landing Team
C2 Command and control
CDD Capabilities Development Document
CLF Combat Logistics Force
CNA Center for Naval Analyses
CNO Chief of Naval Operations
CONOP Concept of Operations
CONUS Continental United States
CSG Carrier Strike Group
DOS days of supply
DS dry stores
EFSS Expeditionary Fire Support System
xxiii
xxiv Warghting and Logistic Support of Joint Forces from the Joint Sea Base
EFV Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle

ESG Expeditionary Strike Group
FBE Forward Base Echelon
FCS Future Combat System
HBCT heavy Brigade Combat Team
HMMWV High-Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled
Vehicle
H2O water
HSC high speed surface connector
HSS High-Speed Ship
IBCT Infantry Brigade Combat Team
ISO International Standards Organization
ITV Internally Transported Vehicle
JHSV Joint High-Speed Vessel
JLOTS Joint Logistics Over the Shore
JSF Joint Strike Fighter
JSLM Joint Seabasing Logistics Model
JTRS Joint Tactical Radio Set
LAV Light Armored Vehicle
LCAC Landing Craft Air Cushion
LCU Landing Craft Utility
LHA Amphibious Assault Ship, general purpose
LHA(R) LHA(Replacement)
LHD Amphibious Assault Ship, multipurpose
Acronyms xxv
LMSR Large Medium-Speed Roll-on/Roll-o

LVS Logistics Vehicle System
MAGTF Marine Air-Ground Task Force
MCCDC Marine Corps Combat Development
Command
MEB Marine Expeditionary Brigade
MEU Marine Expeditionary Unit
MLP Mobile Landing Platform
MPF Maritime Pre-positioning Force
MPF(F) Maritime Pre-positioning Force (Future)
MPG Maritime Pre-positioning Group
MPSRON Maritime Pre-positioning Ship Squadron
MTVR Medium Tactical Vehicle Replacement
MV motor vessel
NDIA National Defense Industrial Association
NM nautical mile
NRAC Naval Research Advisory Committee
OPNAV Oce of the Chief of Naval Operations
POL Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricants
PSYOPS psychological operations
Recon reconnaissance
RSO&I reception, staging, onward movement,
and integration
RSTA reconnaissance, surveillance, and target
acquisition
xxvi Warghting and Logistic Support of Joint Forces from the Joint Sea Base
SBCT Stryker Brigade Combat Team

SBE Sea Base Echelon
SBME Sea Base Maneuver Element
SBSE Sea Base Support Element
SPOD seaport of debarkation
ST short ton
STOM Ship-to-Objective Maneuver
T-AKE dry cargo/ammunition ship
TSV Theater Support Vessel
TUAV tactical unmanned aerial vehicle
UAV unmanned aerial vehicle
VERTREP vertical replenishment
VTOL Vertical Takeo and Landing Aircraft
USAWC U.S. Army War College
USMC United States Marine Corps
USN United States Navy
USNS U.S. Naval Ship
CHAPTER ONE
Introduction and Objectives
Introduction
Sea Basing is a fundamental concept in Sea Power 21, the Navys oper-
ational vision for the 21st century. The overall intent of Sea Basing
is to make use of the exibility and protection provided by the sea
base while minimizing the presence of forces ashore. Sea Basing will
enable joint force commanders to accelerate deployment and employ-
ment of naval power-projection capabilities and will enhance seaborne
positioning of joint assets. It will also minimize the need to build up a
logistics stockpile ashore, reduce the operational demand for sealift and
airlift assets, and permit forward positioning of joint forces for imme-
diate employment.1
Study Objectives
The Assessment Division of the Oce of the Chief of Naval Oper-

ations (OPNAV N81) asked the RAND Corporations National
Defense Research Institute to examine how the still-evolving Navy
Marine Corps concepts for sea basing could be applied to joint opera-
1 Formally, the sea base of the future will be an inherently maneuverable, scalable aggrega-
tion of distributed, networked platforms that enable the global power projection of oensive
and defensive forces from the sea, and includes the ability to assemble, equip, project, sup-
port, and sustain those forces without reliance on land bases within the Joint Operations
Area (Department of Defense, Sea Basing Joint Integrating Concept, Version 1.0, Washing-
ton, D.C., August 2005, p. 18).
1
2 Warghting and Logistic Support of Joint Forces from the Joint Sea Base
tions beyond the Department of the Navy. The Navy was particularly
interested in gaining insights on how the sea base could support Army
operations.
Study Approach
The study began with the collection of data from the Army, Navy, and
Marine Corps. Related studies were also assembled and examined. We
developed three illustrative scenarios judged most likely to represent
logistic support to Marine Corps and Army ground elements. We then
developed a simulation, the Joint Sea Based Logistics Model (described
in Appendix E), to quantify the capabilities of the sea base in these
three scenarios. This simulation was used for hundreds of combina-
tions of distances, ground elements to be sustained, levels of combat,
possibilities for reducing sustainment demand, and various ship-to-
shore connector assets. Our insights and recommendations derive both
from simulation results and from an improved understanding of sea
based logistic support.
Organization of This Report
Chapter Two describes Army and Marine Corps operational concepts

related to sea basing. It then introduces and discusses three operational
scenarios intended to represent most likely cases for Army (airborne,
Stryker, and heavy) brigade interaction with a sea base. Chapter Three
presents a quantitative analysis of these three scenarios to determine
factors in sea base performance and the value of related assets from out-
side the sea basespecically, the Joint High-Speed Vessel (JHSV).
Chapter Four draws together conclusions from the study.
Appendix A provides analytic results for additional cases and
amplies some ndings in the main body of this monograph. Appen-
dix B describes the Maritime Pre-positioning Force (Future) (MPF(F))
vessels in this analysis. Appendix C describes Army and Marine
Corps ground elements in this study. Appendix D describes sustain-
Introduction and Objectives 3
ment requirements for the ground elements described in Appendix C.

Appendix E describes the primary analytic tool for this study, the Joint
Seabasing Logistics Model (JSLM).
CHAPTER TWO
Operational Concepts and Scenarios
Background
Sea Basing is not an entirely new concept; Carrier Strike Groups (CSGs)
and Expeditionary Strike Groups (ESGs) are sea bases. Indeed, during
World War II the United States conducted several large-scale opera-
tions in which all the re and logistic support was provided from o-
shore Navy ships. Scalability is a critical new element of the Sea Basing
construct: whereas an ESG can support a Marine Expeditionary Unit
(MEU) from the sea, future sea bases are expected to support one or
more Marine Corps or Army brigades. Logistic sustainment concepts
and their implementation are therefore key challenges in Sea Basing.
The cornerstone of sea-based logistics on the brigade scale is the Mari-
time Pre-positioning Force (MPF) and its future version, the MPF(F).
MPF
The MPF currently consists of 16 ships organized into three forward-
deployed Maritime Pre-positioning Ship Squadrons (MPSRONs).
Each MPSRON consists of ve or six ships loaded with pre-positioned
weapons, supplies, and equipment sucient to support a Marine
Expeditionary Brigade (MEB)-sized Marine Air-Ground Task Force
(MAGTF) (approximately 17,000 Marines) for up to 30 days.
Current MPF doctrine is to pre-position caches of supplies and
oversized equipment at strategic locations. Forces are assembled and
integrated through a cycle of reception, staging, onward movement,
and integration (RSO&I). In the reception phase, a deploying joint
force is airlifted into theater and received at an aerial port of debarka-
5
tion (APOD). Simultaneously, MPF ships loaded with the deploying

forces equipment arrive at a seaport of debarkation (SPOD). In the
staging phase, deploying forces join with their equipment in marshal-
ling areas near the SPOD. Onward movement is accomplished when
the force departs the staging areas and moves to its assigned area of
operations. Finally, integration occurs when the combat force com-
mander places the force in his order of battle. Sustainment of the
deployed force begins once it is received and transported to its staging
areas and continues until the campaign is completed.
Operation Desert Storm fully demonstrated the MPF concept;
MPF operations provided the rst self-sustaining, operationally capa-
ble force in northern Saudi Arabia. The goal of unloading ships and
marrying equipment with arriving units was achieved within ten days,
and the rst brigade (7th MEB) occupied its defensive positions within
four days of its arrival.1
Existing MPF provides strategic and operational mobility and
limited ooading capabilities absent a port. Typical MPF operations
require ports and airelds to ooad cargo, which makes the deploying
force potentially vulnerable to enemy attack. The MPF concept was
demonstrated in 1990 during Operation Desert Shield using a xed
port system. The Marine Corps armored vehicles aboard the MPF
ships were the rst heavy armor capabilities in that theater.
MPF (Future)
The MPF(F) squadron will be a single group of ships replacing one
existing MPSRON.2 The MPF(F) squadron (described in Appendix B)
will be composed of ve ship types loaded with the equipment needed
to support a MEB. It is being designed to support an MPF(F) MEB of
1 Headquarters, United States Marine Corps, Prepositioning Programs Handbook, Washing-

ton, D.C., March 2005, p. 7.
2 The Marine Corps has stated a need for two MPF(F) MEB squadrons or one MPF(F)
squadron plus two legacy MPSRONs. Ronald ORourke, NavyMarine Corps Amphibious
and Maritime Prepositioning Ship Programs: Background and Oversight Issues for Congress,
Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, RL32513, updated July 26, 2006,
p. 18.
Operational Concepts and Scenarios 7
about 14,500 Marines. These ships will provide functions not provided
by the MPF:
At-sea arrival and assembly of expeditionary forces

Interoperability with ESGs and CSGs
Sea-based sustainment of expeditionary forces
At-sea reconstitution and redeployment of the expeditionary
force.3
An MPF(F) squadron will include equipment, such as rotary wing

aircraft and surface connectors, vital to logistic support. So equipped,
the MPF(F) squadron is referred to as a Maritime Pre-positioning
Group (MPG).
Under Sea Basing logistics concepts, MPF(F) will deliver cargo to
improved ports or over the beach in support of MAGTFs ashore. Main-
tenance, repair, medical treatment, and supply operations will be con-
ducted primarily from sea-based platforms. The logistics infrastructure
will be supported by the MPF(F) and will be maintained aoat and
replenished from ships arriving on station from the continental United
States (CONUS) or from support bases located nearer the operation.
Current plans call for an MPF(F) squadron to consist of two LHA
Replacement (Amphibious Assault Ship, general purpose; LHA(R))
large-deck amphibious ships, one Amphibious Assault Ship, multipur-
pose (LHD) large-deck amphibious ship, three dry cargo/ammunition
(T-AKE) ships, three Large Medium Speed Roll-on, Roll-o (LMSR)
cargo ships, three Mobile Landing Platform (MLP) Landing Craft Air
Cushion (LCAC) transport ships, and two legacy dense pack MPF
ships taken from an existing squadron. These ships are described in
Appendix B.
Sea State Considerations

Several technical challenges are inherent in the MPF(F) concept. Per-
haps the most critical challenge is the diculty of ship-to-ship transfer
in high sea states, which will require precise positioning of ships. Pre-
3 Support Ships, PEO Ships, 2007.

cise positioning may also be needed to provide leeward protection for

MLPs, as shown in Figure 2.1. Transfers of heavy loads using cranes in
high sea states will additionally require new capabilities to compensate
for relative motion between ships and the tendency of crane cargoes to
swing.
As part of its MPF(F) research and development program, the
Program Executive Oce, Ships, assessed technology for automated
ship heading and position control. Such systems were found to have
low technical risk; they are now in commercial use. Further, a Low-
Speed Roll Mitigation System that employs passive anti-roll tanks
could increase large ship stability. It too is in commercial use.
Despite the above technologies, heavy load transfers between
large ships and from large ships to MLPs remain a challenge. A ship
bumper technology, Deep Draft Composite Fenders, for transfers
between large ships, is now in development and has been tested at sea.
It has a high technology readiness level. Commercial container ship
carriers, such as Maersk, Ltd., and others, have successfully demon-
strated stabilized crane technologies and open ocean fendering systems
Figure 2.1
Test for Motion Reduction in Lee of Cargo Ship
SOURCE: Support Ships, PEO Ships.

RAND MG649-2.1
that permit transfer of International Standards Organization (ISO)

containers and even larger loads in heavy sea conditions. The problem
of transferring heavy loads between large ships is therefore manageable
and should be solvable without a large and/or dicult development
program.4 Stabilized crane technology is being improved, but is still
limited in capability.5
A threshold of Sea Base operability through Sea State 3 (associ-
ated with wind speeds of 7 to 10 knots, or 8 to 12 miles per hour,
with waves about 2 feet high) has been set. An objective of operability
through Sea State 4 (associated with winds of 11 to 16 knots, or 13 to
18 miles per hour, with waves about 3 feet high) has been set. Table
2.1 shows the frequency of occurrence for Sea State 3 conditions over
various regions.6
Table 2.1
Percentage of Sea State 3 or Less Conditions for Various Littoral Regions
Western Atlantic 60 Mediterranean Sea 75

Eastern Atlantic 40 Persian Gulf 89
North Sea/English Channel 52 North Arabian Sea 73
Eastern Pacic 45 West Indian Ocean 52
West and So. Caribbean 53 Cape of Good Hope 21
Northeast South America 54 Gulf of Guinea 71
Western South Atlantic 43 Northwest Africa 48
Eastern South Pacic 40 East Coast of Japan 48
Northwest South America 55 East Coast Philippines 62
Western Central America 73 Korean Coast 71
4 Naval Research Advisory Committee, Panel on Sea Basing, Sea Basing, Washngton, D.C.:
Oce of the Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development and Acquisition), March 2005,
p. 37.
5 Defense Science Board, Task Force on Mobility, Enabling Sea Basing Capabilities, Wash-
ington, D.C.: Oce of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and
Logistics, September 2005, p. 60.
6 Defense Science Board, Task Force on Mobility (2005, p. 37).
Using the threshold value of Sea State 3, this table suggests

that undegraded logistics operations from a sea base will be possible
at least 70 percent of the time in the high prole regions of the Per-
sian Gulf and North Arabian Sea, the Mediterranean Sea, the Gulf of
Guinea, and the Korean Coast.
Sea Basing Operational Concepts
This section examines conceptual issues identied as part of this study.

It rst highlights key elements of Marine Corps concepts regarding use
of the sea basespecically, the MPF(F). It then examines key Army
concepts. Finally, we introduce the three operational scenarios used
later in the analysis.
Marine Corps Concepts

The Marines regard the MPF(F) as a major step forward in their abil-
ity to operate from the sea under the rubric of Operational Maneu-
ver from the Sea. Todays Maritime Pre-positioning Ship Squadrons
(MPSRONs) require safe, usable ports in order to ooad cargo. Addi-
tionally, todays MPSRON ships are loaded in a dense pack congu-
ration, which means that several days of work at or near the SPOD are
required before the MEB equipment carried aboard the MPSRON is
operational. While MEUs can deploy and sustain from their three-ship
Expeditionary Strike Groups, the MEU is a battalion-sized task force.
The MPF(F) will give the Marines the ability to deploy and sustain
an entire brigade (less its xed-wing ghters) from the 14 ships of the
squadron.
Discussions with Marine Corps Combat Developments Com-
mand (MCCDC) revealed that the Marines preference is to logisti-
cally support the MEB, once it is ashore, via cargo-carrying aircraft
(MV-22 and CH-53K). This allows the MEB to (1) avoid creating a
traditional iron mountain of shipborne supplies and material on the
shore, and (2) facilitates the MEBs rapidly maneuvering inland once
ashore. Additionally, the Marines want to retain several MV-22s on
the sea base for casualty evacuation (we accordingly dedicated MV-22
aircraft and associated deck spots in our analysis).
The Marines also envision that some number of the available
MV-22 sorties (and possibly some of the CH-53K sorties) would be
used for tactical mobility missions for the forces ashore.7 For example,
depending on the tactical situation, the MEB commander might want
to use some of the aircraft missions to conduct air assaults by company
or battalion-sized forces. In terms of our analysis, the identication
of excess air sorties (MV-22 and/or CH-53K) could be interpreted
as the ability (or not) of the sea base to simultaneously provide logis-
tic support to Marine Corps and Army forces ashore, while retaining
for the MEB commander the capability to conduct other maneuver-
related air missions.
Current plans envision the replacement of one of the three existing
MPSRONs by an MPF(F) squadron. In a future crisis requiring mul-
tiple brigades, it is likely that a combination of ESGs and the MPF(F)
squadron would form the initial Marine Corps force. The traditional
dense packed MPSRON would arrive later, if needed, to bring the
Marine Corps force ashore to division, or larger, size. Meanwhile, some
combination of Army brigades might also arrive.
The Marines envision operating a considerable number of the
MEBs aircraft from the sea base. However, the three large ight decks
of the planned MPF(F) squadron are not sucient to allow the Joint
Strike Fighters (JSFs) of the MEBs air element to conduct sustained
operations from the sea base (small numbers of JSFs could, however,
use the MPF(F) as a base for refueling and for rearming or emergency
landings). This is an important issue, in terms of the Armys concepts
for at-sea basing of its own aircraft. The next section elaborates on this
issue.
The Marines see the primary purpose of the MPF(F) as being to
support the operations of the MEB. A recently concluded Analysis of
Alternatives for the MPF(F) considered a MEB assault conducted from
MPF(F) ships, followed by sustainment of the MEB from the same
MPF(F) ships. Indeed, the MPF(F) as envisioned will be loaded with
7 These preferences are reected in our analysis as rules and data.

the initial supplies and equipment of a MEB. In terms of our analysis,

we always assumed that the MPF(F) would support the MEB as its rst
priority. Once that mission was accomplished, any excess capacity
was identied as potentially available to support other joint forces
specically, Army brigades of various types. Of course, successful sus-
tainment requires that the sustainment needs of both the MEB and the
Army brigade in question be met.
The Army and Marine Corps ground elements of interest are char-
acterized in Appendix C; their sustainment requirements are described
in Appendix D.
Army Concepts
From 1996 until roughly 2002, much of the Armys future concept
development focused on deploying and sustaining the Army via inter-
and intracontinental aircraft. Subsequently, the Army began to move
away from the idea that considerable Army forces (i.e., multiple bri-
gades) could be moved and sustained by air. The high cost of the
number of aircraft required under the Armys concepts has forced the
Army to increasingly move in the direction of deploying and sustain-
ing its forces by seadespite the fact that the Armys Future Combat
System (FCS) is still being designed with airlift factors (vehicle size and
weight) in mind.
Today, the Army increasingly favors deploying and sustaining
its forces from the sea. In a real sense, the Army focus on deploy-
ing its forces by sea has deep historical roots: the Army has deployed
the vast majority of its forces by sea in every major conict since the
Spanish-American War, including in Operation Iraqi Freedom. This
Army move has, of course, implications for the roles and missions of the
ArmyMarine Corps relationship. Nevertheless, the Armys renewed
focus on operations from the sea has substantial potential benet for
the Department of the Navy: the Army could become an advocate for
increased shipbuilding budgets, for example.
The Army emphasizes deploying its forces directly into the opera-
tional area via High-Speed Ships rather than pre-positioning its forces
forward. In this regard, the current NavyMarine Corps sea basing
concepts (centered on the MPF(F)) are not directly compatible with
the Armys desires. However, very little money has actually been ear-
marked for the hypothetical large High-Speed Ship (HSS) that the
Army wants.
The Army places much less emphasis than the NavyMarine
Corps on at-sea transloading of forces in the manner for which the
MPF(F) is currently being designed.8 This analysis suggests, however,
that the capability to perform at-sea transfer of Army forces could
greatly benet the joint force. The quantitative section of this study
provides the detailed results, but as a preview, the analysis indicated
that an Army Stryker Brigade (with about 15,000 tons of supplies and
equipment) or heavy brigade (with about 20,000 tons of supplies and
equipment) could arrive at the sea base and be moved ashore in 2 to
6 days, depending on such key variables as the distance oshore, the
level of combat to be sustained, the availability of a Joint High-Speed
Vessel (JHSV) to supplement the LCACs organic to the MPF(F), and
prevailing sea states. That nding represents a new capability for Army
forces.
As noted above, however, the current conguration of the sea
base, with three large ight decks, limits the large-scale use of the sea
base by Army aircraft. Until and unless most of the MEBs aircraft
move ashore, or have another Navy ship as a base, there simply will not
be room on the MPF(F) for signicant numbers of Army aircraft. Our
analysis does, however, show that there will generally be sucient space
aboard the three large ight decks of the MPF(F) to permit a small
number of Army aircraft (roughly 12 deck operating spots per ship)
to use the sea base on a temporary basis. Another important consider-
ation regarding Army aircraft being based on the MPF(F) is the fact
that most Army aircraft are not built for shipboard usetheir blades
do not fold automatically, and they lack braking systems. Additionally,
few Army pilots are qualied to conduct landings on moving ships. In
light of recent Army and Air Force helicopter operations during con-
tingencies in Grenada, Panama, Somalia, and Haiti, these shortcom-
ings are obviously not disqualifying.
8 Transloading involves ship-to-ship movement by ramp. Transloading operations are illus-

trated in Figures B.3 and B.4.
Note that the Army has three distinctly dierent types of brigades:
light (including airborne), Stryker (generally considered medium forces,
since its armored vehicles are in the 20-ton class and are wheeled as
opposed to tracked), and heavy (armed with M-1 Abramsseries main
battle tanks, Bradley infantry ghting vehicles, and self-propelled artil-
lery). Whereas Marine MEBs are generally similar, the weight (ton-
nage) and daily logistics requirements of the three dierent types of
Army brigades vary widely.9
Operational Scenarios
We developed three operational scenarios for this analysis. These sce-

narios are intended to represent the most likely cases for which con-
ventional Army forces (airborne, Stryker, and heavy brigades) could
interact with a sea base. All cases are in the context of a Major Combat
Operation in which the major elements of a MEB have gone ashore,
are in combat, and are being sustained by the sea base as Army forces
are introduced. With the MEB established ashore, the threat to the
sea base might plausibly be reduced. In no case were Army aircraft
included as lift assets; the Army brigade was considered to have all its
normal organic assets other than aircraft.10
Scenario AArmy Forces Arrive Inland

In this scenario, it is assumed that an Army light or airborne brigade
arrives 50 to 75 nautical miles (NM) inland, possibly as part of a joint
forcible entry operation, soon after the MEBs arrival ashore.11 Two
9 Appendix D provides logistics data for Army and Marine Corps ground elements.
10 Depending on the situation, the Army envisions that considerable numbers of Army air-
craft (UH-60 or CH-47 cargo helicopters, and AH-64 Apache attack helicopters) might be
temporarily located on the sea base. The Army feels that sea basing its aircraft could greatly
increase the combat power of the initial Army forces deployed ashore. In consequence, this
analysis considers the feasibility of placing a signicant number of Army helicopters on a sea
base for some time.
11 With Army forces 50 to 75 NM inland, sustainment from the sea will be from greater
distances. We consider aerial sustainment distances of 75 to 110 NM.
main cases are considered in this scenario. The rst main case is con-
sistent with the Marine Corps preference for aerial sustainment. Here,
both the Army light or airborne brigade and the MEB are sustained
entirely using MV-22 and CH-53K aircraft from the sea base. The
LCACs of the MPF(F) are not utilized in this case (perhaps because
both the Marine Corps and Army forces are so far inland that they can
no longer benet from supplies deposited at the beach by the LCACs).
In the second main case, the MEB can use LCACs to sustain it
through a beach or SPOD.
Scenario A is particularly stressingso much so that this analy-
sis considers means for enhancing sustainment from the sea base. Key
features of Scenario A are depicted in Figure 2.2.
Scenario BArmy Forces Enter the Area of Operations Directly

This scenario represents the Armys preferred option. Today, using
LMSRs, or in the future possibly using HSS vessels, Army forces would
Figure 2.2
Operational Scenario A
m Aerial
75 sustainment
ABN BCT 1
10
MEB 25 NM
110
NM
SPOD
25 LHA(R)/LHD
N (CH-53K/MV-22)
M
Surface
sustainment
MLPs Sea
(LCAC) base
Figure is notional and not drawn to scale.
RAND MG649-2.2
move directly to a usable port, ooad, and then start operations ashore
as soon as possible. In this scenario, we examined the ability of the sea
base to simultaneously support both the MEB and either a Stryker or a
heavy brigade from the Army.
The logistics requirements of these Army brigades are much greater
than those of a light brigade because of the higher fuel requirements of
armored vehicles and the heavier ammunition that these brigades use
compared with a light force (e.g., 155mm howitzers ring 100-pound
shells compared with 105mm weapons ring 33-pound shells).12
A key variable examined in this scenario was the utility of LCACs
as part of the resupply eort. As observed earlier, the Marines prefer
that, once ashore, the MEB is resupplied to the maximum extent pos-
sible by aircraft ying from the sea base. In Scenario B, we examine
that case as well as the case of adding LCACs to the logistics ow. In
the latter case, it was assumed that the MEB and the Army brigade
are (1) either close enough to the coast that it would be easy to pick up
supplies delivered to the beach by LCACs or (2) the units were fairly
deep inland (25 miles or more) but had the ability to send trucks to the
beach to pick up those supplies delivered by LCACs.13
This assumption that the MEB, as well as Army forces being sup-
plied by the sea base, could pick up LCAC-delivered supplies for move-
ment inland by ground transport presumes that the routes from the
beach (or small port that U.S. forces have access to) to the units oper-
ating inland are relatively safe. This may not always be the case, thus
requiring the ground units to escort their supply vehicles and provide
protection for the ooad points at the beach or port.
Note that we did not envision a large amount of infrastructure
being built to support operations at the beachcertainly nothing like
the iron mountains associated with World War IItype amphibious
operations. Sustainment operations would instead maintain only sev-
eral days of supplies ashore. Nevertheless, the MEB commander, the
aected Army commanders, and the Joint Force commander would
12 See Appendix D, Sustainment Requirements, for additional information.

13 See Appendix C, Army and Marine Corps Ground Elements Evaluated, for additional
information.
have to accept the implications of cross-beach supply. The downside

could be the need to provide protection and escort for the supplies
arriving at and moving forward from the beach. The advantage is that,
if LCACs are used to supplement the aerial delivery of supplies from
the MPF(F), the amount of tonnage that could be moved is increased
signicantly.
Note also that, even if aerial resupply alone is being used and the
area between the shoreline and the units operating inland is not com-
pletely secured, the resupply aircraft would also be at risk to enemy re
as they pass over the unsecured area en route to deposit their supplies
at inland locations.
Finally, note that we did not analyze the number of trucks that
would be required for the forward movement of supplies delivered to
the beach by LCACs. It was assumed that sucient numbers of supply
trucks (including trailers) would be available to the Army and Marine
Corps units operating ashore. A detailed examination of this issue,
which was beyond the purview of this study, should be conducted as
part of follow-on analyses.
It could be argued that, if a port were available for the arrival of
Army forces via LMSR or HSS, the sea base would not be needed to
provide logistic support for Army forces. One plausible scenario is that
the port facility is disabled by an enemy attack (e.g., a chemical weap-
ons strike) after the Army force arrives at it. Another plausible scenario
is that, following its arrival, the Army brigade rapidly advances along
the coast away from the port by which it entered, eventually getting
much closer to the location of the MEB/sea base, at which point the
sea base would assume responsibility to support the Army brigade as
well as the MEB.
The situation in Scenario B is depicted in Figure 2.3. Although
the diagram below shows the Army brigade being farther inland than
the MEB, that would not necessarily be the case in an actual opera-
tion. The MEB could be deeper inland than the Army unit at the time
the Army forces come under the purview of the sea base for logistic
support.
Figure 2.3
Operational Scenario B
Aerial
75 sustainment
SBCT/HBCT 1
10
MEB 25 NM
110
NM
SPOD
25 LHA(R)/LHD
N (CH-53K/MV-22)
M
Surface
sustainment
MLPs Sea
(LCAC) base
RAND MG649-2.3
Scenario CArmy Forces Enter the Area of Operations via the Sea
Base
The Army uses the sea base in Scenario C to transload, at sea, an Army
brigade that is then moved ashore by LCACs (or, in some excursions,
LCACs and a JHSV) and, to a lesser extent, by CH-53 and MV-22 air-
crafta natural ship-to-shore movement for the NavyMarine Corps
team since World War II, but much less common for the Army. As
mentioned in Scenario B, the Armys preference is to deploy directly
into a usable port via High-Speed Ships. Army forces rarely practice
transloading troops and equipment at sea. This scenario is important
because it shows how the MPF(F), as conceived by the Department of
the Navy, could introduce an important new capability for the Army.
In this scenario, no usable port may as yet be available to the joint
force commander, who wants to rapidly introduce Army medium or
heavy forces ashore to supplement the MEB that is already ghting
there. Rather than waiting for the seizure (and possible repair) of a port
capable of accepting LMSRs or HSSs, this option would give the joint
force commander the ability to introduce an Army brigade ashore via
the sea base.
As in Scenarios A and B, the MEB is assumed to be ashore, with
the sea base providing its logistic support. While the MEB is engaged
in operations, an Army Stryker or heavy brigade arrives at the sea base.
Importantly, it is assumed that the Army ships are loaded in a way that
allows selective ooad of equipment via ramps onto the three Mobile
Landing Platform ships of the squadron. If the Army ships are dense
packed, they might not be able to capitalize on this capability.14 Addi-
tionally, it is assumed that Army personnel will have received sucient
training in at-sea transfer operations to make the mission feasible.
The Army brigades equipment and personnel are transloaded
from Army shipping onto an MLP and then ashore via the LCACs of
the squadron. It would be advantageous here for most Army person-
nel to travel ashore in the LCACs at the same time as their vehicles,
thus facilitating maintenance of unit integrity as the brigade builds
up ashore. In some excursions, a JHSV was added to supplement the
LCACs. The concept here is that at least two JHSVs would be used to
bring troops into theater. Once in theater, one JHSV would be used to
help move troops to the sea base (possibly from an intermediate stag-
ing base) while a second JHSV moves Army personnel, supplies, and
equipment ashore from the sea base.
The scenario is diagrammed in Figure 2.4. Note that although
the diagram includes an SPOD, the actual debarkation of Army forces
would likely be accomplished by LCACs landing at a beach. When a
JHSV is included, a small port would, of course, be required. In that
case, the LCACs may be able to deposit their loads over the beach,
while the JHSV enters what may be a shing villagesized port to
ooad its cargo and passengers.
14 To access items of interest, selective ooad will be accomplished by moving cargo inter-
nally. The storage eciency of ships capable of selective ooad will be less than that of dense
packed ships, which are loaded to maximize storage eciency. The Army would need addi-
tional pre-positioning ships to achieve capability for selective ooad.
Figure 2.4
Operational Scenario C
Aerial
75 sustainment
1
10
MEB 25 NM
110
NM X
Aerial
SPOD movement
25 LHA(R)/LHD
N SBCT/HBCT
M Surface (CH-53K/MV-22)
sustainment
Surface
movement
MLPs Sea
(LCAC) base
RAND MG649-2.4
CHAPTER THREE
Scenario Analysis
In examining Department of the Navy Sea Basing analyses, we ini-

tially found a seeming disconnect between analyses conducted by the
Strategic Mobility and Combat Logistics branch of OPNAV (N42)
and by MCCDC. N42 analyses, conducted with modeling support
from the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) and SRA International,
concluded that intertheater, intratheater, intrasea base, and tactical
re-supply capabilities under sea basing concepts were adequate to sus-
tain multiple brigades.1 The MCCDC analysis was prepared for the
Capabilities Development Document (CDD) analysis in preparation
for an MPF(F) Analysis of Alternatives (AoA).2 In the scenario that
MCCDC examined, one Sea Base Maneuver Element (SBME)3 is sup-
1 An N42 National Defense Industrial Association (NDIA) 2004 Joint Seabasing Logis-
tics brieng presented in October 2004 (Jonathan Kaskin, Seabasing Logistics CONOPs,
brieng to NDIA 10th Annual Expeditionary Warfare Conference, October 2004) con-
cluded (slide 19) that less than 40 percent of the MPF(F) ships assets and helicopter spots
would be used for Marine Corps MEB sustainment. The analysis points to potential excess
capacity to support joint sustainment, and illustrates potential capability with a Maritime
Pre-positioning Group (i.e., an MPF(F) squadron, together with air and surface connectors
needed to conduct logistics operations) supporting a MEB, a Stryker Brigade Combat Team
(SBCT), and Special Operations Forces (SOF) simultaneously.
2 MCCDC, Mission Area Analysis Branch, MPF(F) CDD Analysis: Results for Seabasing
Capabilities, brieng, March 23, 2006a.
3 The MEB designed for MPF(F) operations, referred to as the MPF(F) MEB, is composed
of a Shore Base Echelon (SBE), a Forward Base Echelon (FBE), and a Sustained Operations
Ashore Echelon. Within the SBE are the Sea Based Maneuver Element (SBME), that por-
tion of the SBE that is projected ashore for operations and its support element, and the Sea
Base Support Element (SBSE). The FBE is made up primarily of xed wing assets organic
21
ported with some diculty from MPF(F) ships.4 Recognizing that dif-
ferences in scenarios and assumptions existed between the two stud-
ies, we used the MCCDC analysis as a starting point for a broader
examination of factors related to successfully sustaining more than one
brigade ashore.
For the Army brigades (light/airborne, Stryker, or heavy), we
examined pure brigadesnot including other units that would nor-
mally accompany a brigade into action. For example, no aviation or
extra supply units were included in the brigade. We recognize that the
Army would want to introduce these elements as quickly as possible
after the arrival of the brigade combat team. In many respects, the
supply throughput capacity of the sea base is providing most of the
logistics needs of the brigades, thus reducing the need for divisional-
level support units to accompany the Army unit, at least for the rst few
days of operations. Additionally, we assumed that the logistics needs of
the Army units would be met by supply ships that would arrive at the
sea base, loaded with Army supplies, thus minimizing the need for the
Army units to have to rely on the MEBs supplies, which are already
loaded aboard the MPF(F) ships.
The initial step in our quantitative analysis was to redo the CDD
analysis using a simulation (described in Appendix E) developed for
this study.
The MPF(F) CDD analysis examined sustainment from MPF(F)
ships using only rotary wing (CH-53K and MV-22) aircraft.5 Sustain-
to the MEB, such as the KC-130 and EA-6 squadrons and their support; its elements will
self-deploy to a forward operating base. The Sustained Operations Ashore Echelon normally
remains in CONUS. The SBME and the entire SBE (i.e., the SBME and the SBSE) are the
only portions of the MEB that might be sustained ashore from the sea base. This study con-
siders sustainment operations for the SBE in heavy combat and in sustained combat opera-
tions, as well as for the SBME in heavy combat operations.
4 Diculty in sustaining the SBME using only CH-53K and MV-22 aircraft is illustrated
by the CDD analysis, which found that an SBME cannot be sustained within a period of
darkness using procedures optimized to do so.
5 The CDD analysis considered both assault and sustainment from MPF(F) ships. It
included ship-to-shore movement over 25 NM, with the landing team moved to the sea base
before the assault and launched from it. Movement was accomplished using 48 MV-22 and
20 CH-53K aircraft, and 18 LCAC surface connectors. Taking into account operational
Scenario Analysis 23
ment was to be provided from a distance of 110 NM and during a

single period of darkness (eight to ten hours). MCCDC supported our
study by providing sustainment rates and lift capacities for CH-53K
and MV-22 aircraft having internal and external loads. CNA provided
additional data. With these data, but using a RAND-developed simu-
lation, we arrived at a conclusion similar to that reached in the CDD
analysis: that an SBME can be sustained with some diculty at a dis-
tance of 110 NM from a sea base.
In this analysis, we categorized sustainment requirements in the
same way that MCCDC did for the CDD analysis, and we used the
same number of lift assets.6 For presentation purposes, our analysis
consolidates all sustainment and lift requirements using the simple
metric of tons per day. The model developed for this study operates
sustainment assets at full capacity for indenite sustainment (i.e., at
a pace that can be maintained for a considerable period as opposed to
surge operations, which can be maintained for only a few days).
We analyzed distances of 25 to 110 NM from the large-deck
LHA(R)/LHD ships to the SBME. The results, which are shown in
availability and the need to withhold MV-22 aircraft for missions such as search and rescue,
the CDD analysis employed 34 MV-22 and 16 CH-53K aircraft, and 17 LCACs. These same
aircraft, but not the LCACs, were used in sustainment.
6 Sustainment requirements are categorized as follows: ammunition, dry stores, bulk Petro-
leum Oil and Lubricants (POL), and bulk water. Both analyses used the elements of the 2015
MEB Air Combat Element: 48 MV-22 and 20 CH-53K aircraft, plus 6 unmanned aerial
vehicles (UAVs). The operational availability of MV-22 aircraft was taken to be 82 percent;
we withheld ve operationally available MV-22 aircraft for casualty evacuation and other
missions (for a total of 34 MV-22 aircraft used in sustainment). Operational availability of
the CH-53K was taken to be 80 percent. We withheld no CH-53K aircraft for other mis-
sions, so that a total of 16 CH-53K aircraft are used in sustainment. The operational avail-
ability of LCACs that have undergone a service life extension program was taken to be 95
percent, a signicant improvement over the current LCAC.
With 95 percent availability and 18 LCACs on the MLPs, 17 LCACS are therefore
used in sustainment. This matter requires some additional discussion. The historical rate at
which LCACs lose operational availability has been about 6 percent per day. For example,
if 17 LCACs are operationally available on a given day, it would be expected that only 16
LCACs would be operationally available the next day, and so on. However, future LCACs
are expected to be more reliable than existing LCACs. Moreover, the MLP and its LCACs
cannot be viewed as a closed system; the MPF(F) LHD can carry three LCACs and has a
substantial capability to maintain and repair LCACs.
Figure 3.1, suggest some diculty in sustaining an SBME conduct-

ing heavy combat operations using only CH-53K and MV-22 aircraft
from a distance of 110 NM.7 Fewer sorties, with smaller payloads,
occur as distance increases. Our analysis further suggests that these
aircraft alone cannot sustain an entire Sea Base Echelon (SBE) from a
Figure 3.1
Required Tons per Day and Lift Capacities, VTOL-Only Sustainment of the
MEB
5,000
SBME heavy combat
4,500
SBE heavy combat
4,000 SBME heavy combat requirement
SBE heavy combat requirement
3,500
Tons per day
3,000
2,500
2,000
1,500
1,000
500
0
25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 100 105 110
LHA(R)/LHD distance to MEB (NM)
RAND MG649-3.1
7 Presentations using tons per day of lift capacity as a metric can oversimplify results in
some regards. The task of moving a ton of bulk liquid is dierent from the task of moving
a ton of ammunition. There is also the factor of distance. For example, moving a ton of
ammunition 25 NM is not the same as moving it 75 NMat longer distances, payloads
are reduced as fuel requirements increase and, with longer ight times, fewer sorties can be
generated. These graphs reect the diering sustainment requirements shown in Appendix
D. Maximum lift capacity per day diers with diering constraints on those sustainment
operations.
distance of 110 NM; the maximum range for which such sustainment
is possible appears to be about 70 NM.8
The above results can also be presented using the metric of relative
lift capacity, dened as the ratio of maximum sustainment capacity (in
tons per day) to average sustainment requirement (also in tons per day).
This metric can be viewed in several ways:
Relative lift capacity reects the robustness of available lift

resources. As background, both the MPF(F) Analysis of Alterna-
tives and this study assume favorable operating conditions, but
they recognize that high sea states and other factors can degrade
sustainment performance. High sea states hinder ship-to-ship
transfer, and they slow and reduce the capacity of LCACs.9 Other
possible factors include the loss of aircraft. In light of the possi-
bility of degraded sustainment capacity, a sustainment force that
can provide little more than a required level of sustainment under
favorable conditions oers no hedge against operational degra-
dation. Given a periodically degraded sustainment capability,
high relative lift capacity, exploited under favorable conditions,
can oset operational degradation experienced under unfavor-
able conditions. Under this concept, sustainment assets attempt
to maintain a xed number of Days of Supply (DOS) for the
ground elements.
Relative capacity also reects the exibility of the sustainment
force under favorable conditions. A sustainment force that can
provide more than the required level of sustainment can spare
assets (such as MV-22 aircraft) for use by ground elements. Simi-
larly, such a sustainment force can meet sustainment requirements
despite aircraft losses.
8 The use of an entire SBE ashore is a worst case for this analysis. It serves to illuminate the
limits of sustainment and failure modes in sustainment.
9 Ship-to-ship transfer capability at the sea base is stated in terms of signicant wave height.
When all wave heights are measured (peak to trough), the signicant wave height is dened
as the mean value of the highest one-third waves. Ship-to-ship transfer is considered unde-
graded for signicant wave heights of no more than three feet, or NATO Sea State 3.
In analytic terms, high relative lift capacity is a hedge against

analytic uncertainty; this analysis deals with notional platforms
(such as MLPs and the JHSV) or platforms still in design (such as
the LHA(R)10 and the CH-53K helicopter), whose performance
is uncertain. LCACs will undergo service life extension programs
before MPF(F) ships enter service and will be replaced in the
period of interest, making future LCAC operating characteristics
uncertain.11 Recognizing these and other uncertainties, we con-
clude that high relative lift capacity provides a margin for error in
performance estimates.
Finally, this metric can help identify and compare factors useful in
achieving robust sustainment capability. For example, lift capac-
ity metrics, such as tons per day, do not readily provide insight
into the benets of reducing lift demand. The relative capacity
metric provides for direct comparisons in this case.
Again, the relative capacity metric is the maximum throughput

capacity (in tons per day) divided by the sustainment requirement (also
in tons per day). The results shown in Figure 3.1 are shown again,
using relative capacity, in Figure 3.2 to illustrate that metric. Because
sustainment is by air only, the distance from the MLPs to the MEB is
irrelevant here; distances are from the large deck MPF(F) ships.
It appears just possible to sustain a single ground element when
maximum sustainment capacity is equal to the required sustain-
ment leveli.e., their ratio is 100 percent. Results shown in Figure
3.2 suggest that maximum lift capacity is about 130 percent of the
10 The LHA(R) might prove to have a smaller aircraft capacity than it is credited as having.
If so, the number of aircraft for sustainment would have to be reduced.
11 An MCCDC, Mission Area Analysis Branch, analysis of surface assault connectors, com-
pleted in April 2006 (Surface Assault Connector Requirements Analysis Update: Overview
to Inform Seabasing Capabilities Study, brieng, April 13, 2006b) considered numerous
possible sets of characteristics for an LCAC replacement. LCACs that have undergone ser-
vice life extension are assumed here to have a maximum load capacity of 72 tons and a
deck space of 1,809 square feet, and to average 35 knots in operationconsistent with the
MCCDC analyses. The NRAC (2005) study of sea basing notes that LCAC speed and range
are strongly aected by sea state.
Figure 3.2
Relative Lift Capacities in MEB, VTOL-Only Sustainment
700
SBME heavy combat

600
SBE heavy combat
500
Capacity (%)
400
300
200
100
0
25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 100 105 110
RAND MG649-3.2
SBME sustainment requirement from a distance of 110 NM. SBME

sustainment then appears possible, but with little margin for opera-
tional degradation: few air assets are available for use by ground forces,
and there is little leeway for uncertainty.
Our initial analysis suggested operational factors useful for
enhancing sustainment capacity or for projecting an Army ground ele-
ment more quickly from the sea base. We selected the following four
options for enhancing sustainment capacity for analysis:
Reducing distances from the large-deck MPF(F) and MLP ships

to supported ground elements or SPODs. The signicance of this
factor was illustrated above. Of course, threat conditions can limit
these distances; other options are needed.
Adding LCACs to CH-53 and MV-22 aircraft in sustainment.
LCAC connectors from MLPs are an attractive addition to rotary
wing aircraft here. These LCACs were used in the MEB assault,
but they represent an unused resource after the assault.
Increasing the ratio of CH-53K to MV-22 aircraft. The air-
craft mix used for sustainment in the MPF(F) AoA reects the
need for mobility rather than for sustainment. In particular,

CH-53K aircraft carry more than twice as much cargo as the
MV-22 and are equally fast on ingress (external loads limit both air-
craft to the same ight speed).12 Increasing the ratio of CH-53K to
MV-22 aircraft, seen to enhance sustainment, would be expected
to enhance sustainment throughput.
nal sustainment might enable sustainment of larger forces or sus-
tainment of a given force at greater distances. For example, the
U.S. Army is creating units to make brigades self-sucient in
bulk water. For perspective, on average, an Army airborne bri-
gade in heavy combat consumes about 150 tons of water per day;
an SBME in heavy combat consumes about 130 tons of water per
day.
Our mobility analysis of the Army ground element in this study

is patterned after the assault analysis in the MPF(F) AoA for consis-
tency. In this analysis, we considered two new factors for improving
performance:
Increasing the ratio of CH-53K to MV-22 aircraft. Little benet

was expected from increasing the ratio of CH-53K to MV-22 air-
craft. The real issue here is assurance that such a change would
not degrade Army ground element movement time in Scenario C.
Adding JHSVs to LCACs as surface connectors. A single JHSV
about equals the combined lift capacities of LCACs from the sea
base. The JHSV is also faster than the LCACs, which suggests
that adding a JHSV to LCACs is an attractive option.13
12 The MV-22s main advantage here over the CH-53K is its higher egress speed. In terms
of moving a ground element, the MV-22 also has speed and survivability advantages in
ingress.
13 The Naval Research Advisory Committee (2005, p. 3) states the value of JHSV (generi-
cally, high-speed surface connectors) strongly:
A high-speed surface connector (HSC)a vessel that can move troops and materiel
between the Sea Base and waters immediately oshorewill prove to be a critical
enabler of Sea Basing. The HSC is essential to our ability to establish the Sea Base at a
These operational factors are explored in the following analysis of

our three scenarios.

Reducing Distances
Previous results indicated that, by reducing the distance from the sea
base to an SBE in heavy combat, the SBE could be sustained using
only CH-53K and MV-22 aircraft. Our analysis suggests that both an
SBE (or an SBME) and an airborne brigade in heavy combat could be
sustained simultaneously at shorter distances using only CH-53K and
MV-22 aircraft.
The capability to sustain both ground elements simultaneously
(Figure 3.3) at shorter distances14 is considered marginal in the con-
text of uncertainties and the potential for performance degradation
through factors such as high sea states or aircraft losses.
Adding LCACs
We now turn to a second means of increasing sustainment capacity:
using LCACs as additional connectors. Here, we see a more robust
sustainment capabilityenough to provide a signicant hedge against
operational uncertainties and potential performance degradation.
secure stand-o distance. We see no realistic near- or mid-term alternatives to an HSC if

the Sea Base is to have the capability of moving heavy materielin particular armored
combat vehiclesto forces ashore. A properly designed HSC will aord important syn-
ergies with the legacy landing craft air cushion (LCAC), which we also regard, for all
its limitations, as an indispensable system oering unique heavy-lift capabilities over
the beach.
14 In Scenarios A and B, the distance from large deck MPF(F) ships to the Army ground
element is assumed to be 50 NM greater than the distance from the sea base to the Marine
Corps ground element. Distances from the sea base to ground elements are then paired as
shown in Figure 3.3.
Figure 3.3
Scenario A, VTOL-Only Sustainment of a MEB and an Army Airborne
Brigade, Is Marginal
300
SBME + ABN BCT heavy combat

250
SBE + ABN BCT heavy combat
200
Capacity (%)
150
100
50
0
25/75 45/95 65/115 85/135 105/155
LHA(R)/LHD distance to MEB/ABN BCT (NM)
RAND MG649-3.3
Sustainment performance using LCACs along with rotary wing

aircraft is shown in Figure 3.4 (solid lines) and compared with the above
result (dashed lines).15 However, some of the robustness shown here is
illusory: the additional capacity provided here by LCACs directly ben-
ets only the MEB; the BCT benets only indirectly as rotary wing
aircraft, no longer needed for MEB sustainment, become available for
BCT sustainment. A breakpoint is reached when the air assets cannot
sustain the BCT (regardless of total sustainment capacity).16
The situation is illustrated in Figure 3.5, which shows the sustain-
ment levels for the SBE and the BCT separately.17 This gure shows
15 In Scenarios A and B, the distance from the MLPs to the SPOD used for sustainment is
taken to be 25 NM.
16Sustainment breakpoints occur only in Scenario A; LCACs augment MPF(F) aircraft in
Army sustainment in Scenario B.
17 Irregularities in the curve for the Army data result from the assumption that the MEB has
rst priority in sustainment and preferences built into the model.
Figure 3.4
Scenario A, VTOL Plus LCAC Sustainment, Is More Robust
500 SBME + ABN BCT heavy combat w/ LCACs

SBE + ABN BCT heavy combat w/ LCACs
SBME + ABN BCT heavy combat w/o LCACs
400
SBE + ABN BCT heavy combat w/o LCACs
Capacity (%)
300
200
100
0
25/75/ 45/95/ 65/115/ 85/135/ 105/155/
25 25 25 25 25
Distances to MEB/ABN BCT/SPOD (NM)
= breakpoint
RAND MG649-3.4
a nearly constant level of sustainment for the MEB, reecting LCAC

sustainment from a xed distance (25 NM).18 It also shows sustain-
ment to the BCT declining as LHA(R)/LHD distance to the BCT
increases (again, sortie rates decline and aircraft payloads decrease)
with the limit of BCT sustainability reached at a distance of about
85 NM. The circle in Figure 3.4 indicates this breakpoint.
As noted earlier, when LCACs were used to augment the move-
ment of supplies ashore, it was assumed that the MEB would be able to
pick the supplies up at the beach and move the supplies inland to the
Marine units needing them.
18 We examined the implications of using a xed 25-NM LCAC movement distance and
found them to be insensitive to this distance. Doubling the movement distance decreases
throughput by about 15 percent, because increasing this distance (1) does not change
CH-53K and MV-22 performance and (2) does not change LCAC load and ooad times;
however, the LCAC sortie rate is then reduced by 25 percent. See Appendix A for a fuller
discussion of this matter.
Figure 3.5
Scenario A, Breakpoint in Army Sustainment
400
SBE + ABN BCT heavy combat

SBE heavy combat
300 ABN BCT heavy combat
Capacity (%)
200
100
0
25/75/ 45/95/ 65/115/ 85/135/ 105/155/
25 25 25 25 25
= breakpoint
RAND MG649-3.5
Increasing the Ratio of CH-53K to MV-22 Aircraft

Changing the aircraft mix used to sustain Army and Marine Corps
ground forces is a third potential means of increasing capability. Our
analysis suggests that sustainment performance can be improved sig-
nicantly by increasing the ratio of CH-53K helicopters to MV-22
aircraft.
The MCCDC analysis used a mix of 16 operational CH-53K and
34 operational MV-22 aircraft for sustainment. For this portion of the
analysis, we reversed that ratio, to 34 operational CH-53K aircraft and
16 operational MV-22 aircraft for sustainment,19 to illuminate how
changing the mix of rotary wing aircraft aboard the MPF(F) ships can
change sustainment performance. We are not proposing this as the
right mix of aircraft.
19 This value does not include the ve MV-22 reserved for casualty evacuation and other
missions. We did not consider aircraft size (spot factor) in this simplistic analysis.
This aircraft mix provides a more robust capability to sustain an

SBME in heavy combat and an improved ability to sustain an entire
SBE (Figure 3.6). However, it does not enable SBE sustainment from
110 NM using only rotary wing aircraft.
The benets of reversing the mix of rotary wing aircraft for sus-
tainment performance are comparable to adding LCACs as connec-
tors. In combination with the addition of LCACs, this mix of CH-53K
and MV-22 aircraft further increases sustainment capacity (Figure
3.7). New results are shown here with solid curves, and the results
from Figure 3.4 are included as dashed curves, for comparison. As in
that gure, airborne sustainment for Army ground forces can be limit-
ing, but the breakpoint in Army sustainment can be pushed to greater
distances by changing the aircraft mix.
Figure 3.6
Altered Aircraft Mix in Scenario A Gives More Robust Sustainment
1000
900 SBME heavy combat 34 CH-53K/16 MV-22

SBE heavy combat 34 CH-53K/16 MV-22
800
SBME heavy combat 16 CH-53K/34 MV-22
SBE heavy combat 16 CH-53K/34 MV-22
700
Capacity (%)
600
500
400
300
200
100
0
25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 100 105 110
RAND MG649-3.6
Figure 3.7
LCACs Plus Altered Aircraft Mix in Scenario A Give Greater Robustness
SBME + ABN BCT heavy combat34 CH-53K/16 MV-22

SBE + ABN BCT heavy combat34 CH-53K/16 MV-22
500 SBME + ABN BCT heavy combat16 CH-53K/34 MV-22
SBE + ABN BCT heavy combat16 CH-53K/34 MV-22
400
Capacity (%)
300
200
100
0
25/75/ 45/95/ 65/115/ 85/135/ 105/155/
25 25 25 25 25
= breakpoint
RAND MG649-3.7
Reducing Sustainment Demand

Eliminating bulk water requirements from the sea base illustrates the
potential for reducing sustainment demand: it would signicantly
increase the capability for combined SBME and airborne brigade sus-
tainment using VTOL and LCACs.
In some operational circumstances, eliminating or signicantly
reducing the requirement for water might be possible, if water sources
are available ashore and eorts to purify water are included; in other
situations, sources of potable water may not exist. Model results sup-
porting this nding are shown in Figure 3.8, and the results shown in
Figure 3.4 are included as dashed curves.
Freed of the requirement of sustaining brigade combat teams with
water by air, better sustainment in fuel, ammunition, and dry stores
Figure 3.8
Scenario A Sustainment, Using LCACs with and without Bulk Water
SBME + ABN BCT heavy combat w/o H2O

600 SBE + ABN BCT heavy combat w/o H2O
SBME + ABN BCT heavy combat with H2O
500 SBE + ABN BCT heavy combat with H2O
400
Capacity (%)
300
200
100
0
25/75/ 45/95/ 65/115/ 85/135/ 105/155/
25 25 25 25 25
= breakpoint
RAND MG649-3.8
(food, consumables, and spare parts) can be provided to the airborne

force.
Scenario BArmy Forces Enter the Area of Operations

Directly
Scenario B diers from Scenario A in two primary regards. First,

Scenario B entails sustaining Stryker or heavy brigades, which have
higher sustainment requirements than the airborne brigade sustained
in Scenario A. In tons per day, the SBCT has a sustainment require-
ment about 30 percent greater than that of the airborne brigade. The
second main dierence is that, whereas the burden of sustaining the
Army brigade combat team fell entirely on CH-53K and MV-22 air-
craft in Scenario A, LCACs directly assist in Army sustainment in
Scenario B. LCACs increase the capability to sustain the Army ground
element (a limiting factor in some cases), and they increase operational

exibility by improving the matching of connectors and payloads.
Our main nding is that the eects of increased ground element
sustainment requirements are largely canceled by the greater opera-
tional exibility in sustainment. The SBCT represents an increase of
less than 10 percent over the airborne brigade in combination with the
SBMEa marginally higher sustainment burden on the sea base. Sim-
ilarly, the HBCT represents an increase of less than 30 percent over the
airborne brigade in terms of overall daily sustainment requirements.20
As in Scenario A, the analysis began with consideration of sus-
tainment performance with and without LCACs. Without LCACs, a
performance reduction commensurate with 10 to 30 percent higher
sustainment demand is seen. With LCACs, the ability to sustain both
an SBME and an SBCT in heavy combat (shown in Figure 3.9) is simi-
lar to that seen for the SBME and an airborne brigade (shown previ-
ously in Figure 3.4). The eect of replacing an SBME with an SBE far
exceeds that of replacing an airborne brigade with an SBCT.
As expected, performance worsens when the sea base must sus-
tain either an SBE or an SBME, along with a heavy brigade, in heavy
combat. As shown in Figure 3.10, sustainment of an SBE or an SBME
with a heavy brigade is feasible with LCACs. Without LCACs, the
ability to sustain both an SBME and an HBCT appears marginal at
best. In addition, without LCACs, the sea base cannot sustain both an
SBE and an HBCT.
Specic ndings of our analysis of Scenario B are as follows:
20 Appendix D describes and compares requirements for Army and Marine Corps brigade
sustainment. Here, briey, are the requirements: an SBME in heavy combat consumes on
average 680 tons of bulk liquids, ammunition, and other supplies per day. An airborne bri-
gade, also in heavy combat, consumes on average 299 tons per day for a total of 979 tons
per day. An SBCT consumes on average 394 tons per day (or an additional 95 tons per day
over that of the airborne brigade, increasing the total consumption rate by less than 10 per-
cent). An HBCT consumes on average 583 tons per day (increasing the total for an airborne
brigade by an additional 284 tons per day, increasing the total consumption rate by just less
than 30 percent). The net aect of substituting an SBCT for an airborne brigade is thus less
than 10 percent and the net aect of substituting an HBCT for an airborne brigade is less
than 30 percent.
Net sustainment requirements are increased less than 30 percent

with an SBCT or an HBCT in place of an airborne brigade as an
Army ground element.
Increased exibility in matching connectors with payloads largely
osets the additional sustainment demand seen above.
The use of LCACs to sustain the Army ground element obviates
the problem seen in Scenario A of the limitations of air-only sus-
tainment of the BCT.
Scenario A is then seen as more stressing than Scenario B, so Sce-

nario B is not analyzed as thoroughly as Scenario A.
Figure 3.9
SBCT Sustainment in Scenario B, with and without LCACs
400 SBME + SBCT w/ LCACs

SBE + SBCT w/ LCACs
SBME + SBCT w/o LCACs
300 SBE + SBCT w/o LCACs
Capacity (%)
200
100
0
25/75/ 45/95/ 65/115/ 85/135/ 105/155/
25 25 25 25 25
Distances to MEB/SBCT/SPOD (NM)
RAND MG649-3.9
Figure 3.10
HBCT Sustainment in Scenario B, with and without LCACs
400
SBME + HBCT w/ LCACs
SBE + HBCT w/ LCACs
300 SBME + HBCT w/o LCACs
SBE + HBCT w/o LCACs
Capacity (%)
200
100
0
25/75/ 45/95/ 65/115/ 85/135/ 105/155/
25 25 25 25 25
RAND MG649-3.10
Scenario CArmy Forces Enter the Area of Operations

via the Sea Base
The MPF(F) Analysis of Alternatives considered a Marine Corps

assault from MPF(F) ships, with those ships inserting an SBME under
cover of darkness. The operational concepts employed in that analysis
are used here. In particular, Army SBCT or HBCT personnel will be
positioned on the MLPs for movement ashore, and movement will use
LCACs and CH-53K and MV-22 aircraft.21 This scenario assumes that
Army LMSR ships are in theater and can immediately ow vehicles,
ammunition, and dry stores onto the MLPs at least as quickly as con-
nectors can take them ashore.
Aside from the insertion of Army ground elements in place of a
Marine Corps ground element, there are three main dierences between
21 LCAC, CH-53K, and MV-22 operations are described in detail in Appendix D. In the
base case, LCACs operate 16 hours a day with overlapping periods of operation for the
MLPs. Similarly, large-deck MPF(F) ships have overlapping ight windows 10 hours long.
this scenario analysis and the AoA. First, in the MPF(F) AoA, there
were no sustainment requirements during the Marine Corps assault;
the diversion of signicant lift assets for MEB sustainment is a clear
impediment to force movement ashore. Second, the Marine Corps
assault was conducted from a distance of 25 NM from the shore. With
the expectation that Army BCT movement cannot be accomplished in
a single cycle of darkness, our analysis considers force movement from
distances of 25 to 50 NM from the objective area. Third, we consider
as an excursion the use of a Joint High-Speed Vessel as an additional
surface connector.
The performance metric for this scenario is the time to complete
Army brigade movement. Here, the MEB is assumed to operate inland,
and its sustainment is delivered 25 NM farther than to the Army objec-
tive area, from distances of 50 to 75 NM instead of 25 to 50 NM for
the Army.22
As noted above, MPF(F) ships aircraft, LCACs (and possibly a
JHSV) are used in Army brigade movement. Army analysts have exam-
ined the transportability of SBCT and HBCT supplies and equipment
by MV-22 aircraft and have found that MV-22 aircraft can transport
the large majority of those supplies and equipment. Our examination
of HBCT data indicates 1,770 vehicles plus an additional 1,957 tons of
miscellaneous equipment need to be moved. Many of the lighter vehi-
cles are trailers and light trucks (weighing about 2 tons each). CH-53K
aircraft could transport 1,396 of the HBCTs 1,770 vehicles a distance
of 110 NM. JHSVs and CH-53K and MV-22 aircraft would be used to
move lighter vehicles and equipment.
The simulation used for this study accomplishes brigade move-
ment with LCACs primarily transporting equipment and heavy vehi-
cles. Rotary wing aircraft are the primary source of MEB sustainment.
The JHSV transports Army supplies and light equipment exclusively;
there is no need to burden a pier with heavy vehicles from a JHSV.
22 In Appendix A, we assume alternatively that the distance from the sea base to the MEB
is the same as the distance from the sea base to the SPOD, such as when the Marines are
operating in the vicinity of the SPOD.
Because assets transporting Army brigades are also used to sus-

tain Marines ashore, the nature of the Marine Corps force ashore and
its level of combat will aect the movement of the Army brigade. The
analysis treats an SBME engaged in heavy combat, an SBE engaged
in sustained combat, and (as a worst case) an SBE engaged in heavy
combat.23 For Army forces transloading ashore via the MPF(F), it was
assumed that the Army personnel had received sucient training that
they could move their vehicles safely from LMSRs via ramps onto the
MLP and LCACs. Additionally, the Armys LMSRs were assumed to
be loaded in a way that would facilitate selective ooading of vehicles
and equipment.
Movement Without a JHSV

The analysis begins with the SBCT movement. Results (shown in
Figure 3.11) suggest that an SBCT could be inserted using sea base
assets in about three to ve days for sea base distances of 25 to 50 NM
to the SPOD. HBCT movement through the sea base (shown in Figure
3.12) would take about a day longer than SBCT movement. Results for
the SBE in sustained combat (not shown) are very similar to those for
the SBME in heavy combat.24 The dierence between the best case (the
SBME in heavy combat) and the worst case (the SBE in heavy combat)
is less than a day, and slight dierences are seen between the cases of
an SBE in sustained combat and an SBME in heavy combat. In opera-
tional terms, with over 20,000 tons of supplies and equipment passing
through the sea base in several days for HBCT movement, the dier-
ence of several hundred tons a day in sustainment is modest.
We conclude that, in the context of moving an HBCT through
the sea base as quickly as possible, SBME or SBE level of battle has a
modest inuence on movement time.
Our simulation used relatively few MV-22 sorties to transport
Army personnel ashore in Scenario C. LCACs transported most Army
23 Consumption rates for these cases are described in Appendix D.

24 This nding is motivated in Appendix D.
Figure 3.11
SBCT Movement Using Aircraft and LCACs
SBE heavy combat

6 SBME heavy combat
Days to complete movement
1
50/25 55/30 60/35 65/40 70/45 75/50
Distance to MEB/SPOD (NM)
RAND MG649-3.11
personnel (24 at a time25) as vehicles and equipment were transported

ashore. As noted earlier, this simplied linking up Army troops with
their vehicles and equipment ashore is a signicant side benet of this
practice. Recall that the operation of the simulation reected certain
preferences, such as the movement of vehicles by LCACs and the move-
ment of personnel by MV-22 aircraft. Further analysis showed that
there is, in fact, no need to transport Army personnel by MV-22 air-
craft in this scenario; LCACs could transport all Army personnel with
their vehicles and equipment.26
25 Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC), MSTP Center, MAGTF

Planners Reference Manual, Quantico, Va.: MSTP Pamphlet 5-0.3, 2006c.
26 In our simulation, LCACs generated over 200 sorties in transporting Army SBCT vehi-
cles and equipment ashore. At 24 passengers per load, this equates to a potential to transport
about 5,000 passengers by LCACs. The Stryker brigade, the Army unit with the most per-
sonnel for this analysis, has 3,929 troopssignicantly fewer than could be transported by
LCACs. This nding also suggests that fewer troops could be transported by LCAC when
passenger weight is an issue.
Figure 3.12
HBCT Movement Using Aircraft and LCACs
SBE heavy combat

6 SBME heavy combat
1
50/25 55/30 60/35 65/40 70/45 75/50
Distance to MEB/SPOD (NM)
RAND MG649-3.12
Movement with a JHSV

We assume now that one JHSV is available to assist LCACs and MPF(F)
aircraft in moving an SBCT or an HBCT through a sea base, and that
prevailing sea states allow the JHSV to transload personnel, supplies,
and equipment at the MLP.27 If the sea state and other factors permit
its use, a single JHSV nearly halves SBCT movement time through
the sea base (Figure 3.13) and roughly halves HBCT movement time
through the sea base (Figure 3.14). Both of these gures indicate reduc-
tions in the eect of Marine Corps sustainment levels.
27 A draft JHSV performance specication, Naval Sea Systems Command, SEA 05, Joint
High Speed Vessel (JHSV) Performance Specication (Draft), Working Paper, April 2007, cir-
culated at the time of this analysis directs that the JHSV ramp system shall be designed, at a
minimum, to support the loads associated with the M1A2 Abrams MBT weighing 80 short
tons and the point loads generated by a fully loaded M1070 Military Truck and Trailer with
a per axle weight of 32 short tons. It further species that the ramp shall be operable with
these loads through Sea State 1 with the discharge end supported aoat. The implications of
this draft requirement for lighter vehicles are unclear.
Figure 3.13
SBCT Movement in Scenario C, with and without a JHSV
7
SBE heavy combat w/o JHSV
SBME heavy combat w/o JHSV
6
SBE heavy combat w/ JHSV

SBME heavy combat w/ JHSV
5
1
50/25 55/30 60/35 65/40 70/45 75/50
Distances to MEB/SPOD (NM)
RAND MG649-3.13
The repeated nding that a JHSV could roughly halve movement

time is explained by three simple observations. First, LCACs are used
here primarily to transport Army vehicles and equipment.28 Second,
MEB sustainment falls naturally to CH-53K and MV-22 aircraft in
this scenario. Finally, the JHSV has load capacity (measured in square
feet or tons) comparable to all 17 LCACs combined and is slightly
faster than an LCAC; JHSV throughput roughly matches the com-
bined throughput capacity of all the LCACs. The throughput of the
JHSV and the LCACs combined is about twice that of the LCACs
alone, resulting in about-halved Army brigade throughput time.
28 The JHSV used in this analysis was taken from a recent JHSV AoA conducted by RAND
(John F. Schank, Irv Blickstein, Mark V. Arena, Robert W. Button, Jessie Riposo, James
Dryden, John Birkler, Raj Raman, Aimee Bower, Jerry M. Sollinger, and Gordon T. Lee,
Joint High-Speed Vessel Analysis of Alternatives, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation,
2006, not available to the general public). Of a number of candidates considered, it is at the
median in capacity. It is also broadly consistent with the draft performance specications for
the JHSV.
Figure 3.14
HBCT Movement in Scenario C, with and without a JHSV
7
SBE heavy combat w/o JHSV
SBME heavy combat w/o JHSV
6
SBE heavy combat w/ JHSV

SBME heavy combat w/ JHSV
5
1
50/25 55/30 60/35 65/40 70/45 75/50
Distances to MEB/SPOD (NM)
RAND MG649-3.14
JHSVs are expected to carry several hundred passengers for short

periods. A single JHSV would then add signicant troop movement
capacity to this operation. A corollary to this is the observation that a
JHSV would further reduce the need for MV-22s as troop transports,
freeing them for other missions.

Our analysis of Scenario A demonstrated that increasing the ratio of
CH-53K to MV-22 aircraft would improve sustainment performance.
However, would this improvement come at the expense of Army BCT
mobility? Our analysis indicates that changing the mix of MPF(F) air-
craft as before would modestly reduce the time required to move an
SBCT or an HBCT through a sea base (see Figure 3.15).
The explanation for this (possibly counterintuitive) nding is
that the original aircraft mix (16 CH-53K and 34 MV-22 aircraft) is
less ecient at sustainment than our changed mix (34 CH-53K and
Figure 3.15
SBCT Movement in Scenario C, with Differing Aircraft Mixes
7
SBE heavy combat16 CH-53K/34 MV-22
SBME heavy combat16 CH-53K/34 MV-22
6
SBE heavy combat34 CH-53K/16 MV-22

SBME heavy combat34 CH-53K/16 MV-22
5
1
50/25 55/30 60/35 65/40 70/45 75/50
Sea base distance to MEB/SPOD (NM)
RAND MG649-3.15
16 MV-22 aircraft). Consequently, with MEB sustainment having

higher priority than Army BCT movement, relatively few aircraft can
be spared for BCT movement. In addition, as previously noted, the
MV-22 is best suited for personnel movements (especially at long dis-
tances). However, there is little demand for airborne movement of per-
sonnel in this scenario. This nding reects the LCACs sidecar capac-
ity for 24 personnel (two more personnel than the MV-22 can carry),
who can be carried along with regular loads. In examining JSLM
output, we found that less than 10 percent of MV-22 sorties were used
for Army personnel movement. For both SBCT and HBCT move-
ment, LCACs generated over 200 sorties to transport Army vehicles
and equipment ashore. At 24 passengers per load, this history implies a
potential for LCACs to transport over 5,000 personnel. The SBCT has
3,929 personnel, and the heavy brigade has 3,114 personnel. With an
excess capacity for personnel movement using LCACs alone, it is clear
why there was little demand for MV-22 sorties to transport personnel.
We turn nally to the Armys desire to operate some of its helicop-

ters from the sea. In the context of owing an Army brigade through
the sea base, we consider the possibility that Army helicopters might be
pre-positioned on the sea base for some time.
Army Helicopters on the Sea Base

Two operational concepts apply here: the use of sea base ships as lily
pads for occasional transfer operations between the sea base and the
shore, and the location of tens of Army helicopters on the sea base.
Under the former concept, Army CH-47 helicopters might peri-
odically use open operational spots on an MPF(F) LHA(R) or the
LHD. Under the latter concept, embarked aircraft would have to be
removed from those ships to make space for Army helicopters. In either
concept, Army helicopter operations would interfere to some degree
with shipboard sustainment operations.
In the lily-pad concept, Army helicopters would spend little time
at sea, so preparing them for operations in a maritime environment
(such as providing corrosion protection) would probably not be an issue.
The question then is, To what extent would such operations interfere
with sustainment operations? We found that operational spots would
not be available at the outset of the ight window as the LHA(R)/
LHD launched CH-53/MV-22 aircraft and recovered those aircraft it
had launched initially. In particular, MPF(F) helicopters unfolding on
operational spots could not readily be moved to accommodate Army
helicopters in this period. However, the aircraft would not operate in
dense waves after a few hours; Army aircraft could then land and take
o with little or no interference with sustainment operations. Even in
the worst case, there would normally be ight spots available for Army-
helicopter takeo and landing. As a worst case, we assumed that one or
more ight spots were assigned for the duration to Army helicopters.
The diculties inherent in operating U.S. Army and Air Force
helicopters from Navy ships are well known; Army and Air Force heli-
copters operated from Navy ships during contingency operations in
Grenada, Panama, Somalia, and Haiti. Moreover, U.S. Army Field
Manual FM 1-564, Shipboard Operations,29 describes the tactics, tech-

niques, and procedures for use by Army aviation units during opera-
tions from Navy and Coast Guard ships. This publication addresses the
problems of operating Army helicopters from Navy ships, including
lack of rotor brakes. Army helicopters lack rotor brakes to rap-

idly slow blades when the helicopter engine is shut o; without
rotor brakes, helicopter blades can windmill for several minutes,
slowing shipboard operations and creating hazardous conditions
for shipboard personnel. The absence of rotor brakes also poses a
threat to the helicopter. FM 1-564 states,
The ship must be kept on a steady course and speed during

rotor engagement or disengagement, engine start and shut-
down for aircraft without rotor brakes, taxiing, and launch
or recovery operations. Deck tilt, centrifugal force, or rapidly
changing wind direction or velocity aerodynamically aects
the controllability of the aircraft and may cause rollover.
blade folding. Army helicopters must be modied for a folding

capability needed to operate on Navy ships. Aircraft modied
with a blade folding capability must deploy with the proper blade
folding kit to allow movement into hangars. When these aircraft
are positioned on the ight deck, they are vulnerable to damage
when the blades ap in the wind.
There are well-known fuel ashpoint issues with Army avia-

tion fuel. Moreover, Army aircraft are not manufactured to the anti-
corrosion standards of Navy aircraft and are prone to corrosion; experi-
ence has shown that unprotected major aircraft components can lose
an estimated 25 to 30 percent of their useful life through saltwater
corrosion. Units should obtain an anticorrosion compound for their
aircraft before embarkation. Freshwater washes may not be conducted
as frequently as desired. Army pilots must be qualied with overwater
training, daytime and nighttime landings, and for any logistics over
29 Headquarters, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C., June 1997.

the shore or vertical replenishments. Unlike the rotor brake and blade
folding problems, these other issues have clearly identied remedial
procedures.
We assume that the above issues can be resolved and look at the
feasibility of positioning Army helicopters on the sea baselanding
them on MPF(F) ships, locating them on spots normally occupied by
aircraft, and ying them o at the appropriate time (again, assum-
ing that MV-22 aircraft have been moved ashore to make space for
CH-47F aircraft). Of the 34 operational MV-22 aircraft earmarked for
sustainment, how many could be moved o the MPF(F) ships with-
out breaking sustainment capability? As above, this analysis is con-
ducted in Appendix E under Scenario A, which is more stressing than
Scenario B on aircraft sustainment operations.
The CH-47F is signicantly smaller than the MV-22 when both
are folded.30 A size comparison suggests that, with 34 MV-22 aircraft
removed (presumably ashore) from the MPF(F) ships, over 40 CH-47F
aircraft could be located on the MPF(F) ships.
Absent LCACs and MV-22s (i.e., using only CH-53K helicop-
ters), MPF(F) ships appear incapable of sustaining an SBME and an
airborne combat brigade in heavy combat. A robust sustainment capa-
bility is seen when LCACs also are used to sustain the SBME. We
conclude that, with corrosion and rotor issues addressed and with all
MV-22 aircraft relocated ashore or elsewhere, over 40 CH-47F heli-
copters could be positioned on the MPF(F) ship while it sustained an
SBME and an airborne brigade.
30The CH-47F is 50 feet long when folded, whereas the MV-22 is 63 feet long when folded.
The CH-47F is 12 feet, 5 inches wide, and the MV-22 is 18 feet, 5 inches wide.
CHAPTER FOUR
Conclusions
Overall Findings
Simultaneous sustainment of brigade-level Army and Marine Corps

ground elements using planned MPF(F) components is feasible. Issues
of sustainment under unfavorable conditions, such as in high sea states
with degraded ship-to-ship movement, can be addressed in part using
the metric of relative sustainment capacity. Overcapacity (under favor-
able conditions) is needed for adequate capacity under unfavorable
conditions.
Additionally, with overcapacity, sea base assets (notably, MV-22
aircraft) can be released to ground forces under favorable conditions.
We identied the following distinct approaches to increasing sus-
tainment capacity, along with the following ndings:
Reducing distances from the large-deck MPF(F) and MLP ships

to supported ground elements or seaports of debarkation. Reduc-
ing sustainment distances from the planned distance of 110 NM
is the most eective means of increasing sustainment capacity.
Threat conditions can, of course, limit this option, necessitating
others.
Adding LCAC surface connectors to CH-53 and MV-22 aircraft
in sustainment. The addition of LCACs operating 16 hours a day
more than doubles sustainment throughput.
Increasing the ratio of CH-53K to MV-22 aircraft. Increasing the
ratio of CH-53K to MV-22 aircraft can have benets similar to
those from adding LCACs as sustainment assets.
49

nal sustainment, such as that realized by eliminating demand by
ground elements for bulk water, can signicantly improve the
ability to sustain ground elements. In particular, it can extend the
maximum distance from the sea base at which ground elements
can be sustained.
The following approaches to reducing times for Army ground ele-

ment movement were identied, along with the following ndings:
Increasing the ratio of CH-53K to MV-22 aircraft. A modest

reduction in movement time can be achieved by increasing the
ratio of CH-53K to MV-22 aircraft. Put another way, it would
enhance sustainment performance signicantly without increas-
ing movement time.
Adding JHSVs to LCACs as surface connectors. A single JHSV
about equals the combined lift capacities of LCACs from the sea
base. In this light, adding a JHSV to LCACs roughly doubles
surface connector movement capacity.
Sustainment Results
Our analysis of SBME sustainment indicates that an SBME can be

sustained, with some diculty, at a range of up to 110 NM from the
sea base, using only CH-53K and MV-22 aircraft. An SBE can be sus-
tained similarly at ranges up to about 70 NM from the sea base. By
reducing the distance from the sea base to the MEB to about 80 NM,
an SBME and an Army airborne brigade can be sustained simultane-
ously using only aircraft.1 An SBE and an airborne brigade can like-
wise be sustained when the MEB distance is up to about 40 NM from
the sea base.
1 This analysis assumes that Army brigades are 50 NM farther away than the MEB from
the sea base. With the MEB 80 NM from the sea base, the airborne brigade would be
130 NM from the sea base.
Conclusions 51
Using LCACs to augment sea base aircraft in sustainment has sub-

stantial benets, particularly when LCACs contribute to both Marine
Corps and Army ground element sustainment. Under conditions in
which LCACs can contribute only to MEB sustainment, the limita-
tions of airborne sustainment to Army ground elements determine the
feasibility of joint sustainment. Here, a mix of sea base aircraft richer in
CH-53K aircraft is less limited than the planned aircraft mix, enabling
joint sustainment at greater distances. As noted earlier, we assumed
that the forward movement of supplies delivered to the shoreline by
the LCACs would be tactically feasible and that sucient Army and
Marine Corps trucks would be available to conduct the movement.
Reducing sustainment demand (by, for example, eliminating
demand for bulk water from the sea base) is particularly helpful when
sustainment capacity is marginal. For example, it would increase by
about 25 NM the distance at which an SBE and an airborne brigade
can be sustained using only aircraft. Note that this study assumes that
supplies for Army units would not come from Marine Corps stocks
aboard the MPF(F) ships. Rather, it was assumed that other shipping
would be available to bring Army supplies into the operational area
for transfer ashore by sea-based aircraft and LCACs. The details of
how that forward movement of supplies would be accomplished was
beyond the purview of this study, but the issue clearly merits additional
analysis of how sensitive the onward movement of supplies would be to
enemy threats and the number of trucks that might be available.
Movement Results
An Army Stryker or heavy brigade can be transloaded at sea and moved

ashore from the sea base in three to six days (depending on the distance
o shore), using MPF(F) assets also sustaining a MEBa new capabil-
ity for the Army.
If a single JHSV can augment the LCACs, it will roughly halve
the time required to transport an Army brigade ashore. This nding
reects the observation that, when operable, the throughput capacity
of a single JHSV about matches the combined throughput of MLP
LCACs. There are, however, issues of JHSV operability in this role in

even moderate sea states (Sea State 2 or higher), as well as the need for
a small port where the JHSV can ooad.
Other Findings
The CH-53K is better suited than the MV-22 for sustainment;

with external loads, the MV-22 loses its speed advantage on
ingress and the CH-53K carries at least twice the load of the
MV-22. CH-53K helicopters are especially valuable under con-
ditions of heavy sustainment demand or long sustainment
distances.
The Sea Base concept is not consistent with, and in some sense
conicts with, the Armys desire to deploy directly to a port via
High-Speed Ships. The Army has not developed doctrine and has
not funded systems for operating with sea bases. However, our
Scenario B analysis illustrates that, once ashore, an Army brigade
could in many situations be sustained by a sea base if it (1) moved
away from its port of debarkation or (2) that port became unavail-
able for sustainment as a result of enemy action.
To capitalize on the potential of the sea base, Army shipping
should be congured for selective ooad or combat load-
ing rather than dense pack. The interface between Army pre-
positioning ships and the MLP is a potential bottleneck in moving
Army forces. Thought should be given to an MLP loading system
built into the MLP to avoid such bottlenecks. Integrating such a
loading system into the MLP might be less expensive in net than
integrating it into Army and Navy pre-positioning ships. It might
also hasten joint interoperability.
MPF(F) ships can provide temporary deck space (12 deck spots
per big deck) for a limited number of Army helicopters with-
out signicant loss of throughput capacity. There is not sucient
space on the MPF(F) to base a signicant number of Army air-
craft as long as a large number of Marine Corps MV-22s and
Conclusions 53
CH-53Ks are based on the MPF(F). Space for Army aircraft could
be created temporarily by moving MV-22 aircraft ashore, but sev-
eral problems would remain, including rotor issues (braking and
folding), corrosion, and maintenance.
APPENDIX A
Additional Cases
This appendix presents cases omitted for brevity in the main body of
this monograph. Our purpose here is to examine additional cases of
interest, to illustrate the generality of ndings in the main body and
to better illuminate dependencies. As in Chapter Three, cases here are
organized by scenario.

MLPs 50 NM from the SPOD
MLPs were assumed in Chapters Two and Three to operate 25 NM
from the SPOD when LCACs were used in sustainment. A minor (10
to 20 percent) reduction in the benets of adding LCACs in sustain-
ment is seen when MLPs operate 50 NM from the SPOD. We infer,
then, that in the range of 25 to 50 NM, this distance is not critical to
our ndings.
Other than the assumption that MLPs are 50 NM from the
SPOD, all other conditions here are identical to those used to gener-
ate Figure 3.4. Results shown in Figure A.1 can be compared with
those shown in Figure 3.4. The loss of sustainment capacity, for both
the SBE and the SBME in this comparison, is uniformly 10 to 20 per-
cent, which is considered minor. The breakpoint for sustainment to the
airborne brigade remains unchanged: changing the distance from the
MLPs to the SPOD does not change CH-53K and MV-22 sustainment
performance, and the breakpoint depends solely on the ability of these
55
Figure A.1
VTOL Plus LCAC Sustainment in Scenario A, with MLPs 50 NM from SPOD
500
SBME + ABN BCT heavy combat w/ LCACs
400
Capacity (%)
300
200
100
0
25/75/ 45/95/ 65/115/ 85/135/ 105/155/
50 50 50 50 50
= breakpoint
RAND MG649-A.1
aircraft to meet Army BCT needs. As for the LCACs, their number of
sorties was reduced by about 25 percent.1 With aircraft performance
unchanged and LCAC throughput decreased by 25 percent, the net
eect of increasing the distance to the SPOD from 25 to 50 NM was
reduction of overall throughput by 10 to 20 percent.
LCACs Operating 12 Hours per Day

Given a single LCAC crew for each LCAC, crew fatigue limits LCACs
to 12 hours or less of operation per day. Marine Corps planners com-
monly assume that LCAC crews are adequate for 16 hours of operation
per day,2 and this assumption was used in Chapters Two and Three.
We now assume that LCACs are limited by crew fatigue to 12 hours
1 LCAC load and ooad times per sortie were unchanged. Hence doubling transit times
did not double sortie durations or halve the number of sorties.
2 MCCDC, MSTP Center, MAGTF Planners Reference Manual, Quantico, Va.: MSTP
Pamphlet 5-0.3, 2006c, p. 35.
Additional Cases 57
of operation per day. As above, a minor (10 to 20 percent) reduction

in the benets of adding LCACs in sustainment is seen when LCACs
operate no more than 12 hours a day. The ability to operate LCACs 16
hours per day is helpful but not critical to our ndings.
All conditions for this analysis (other than the assumption that
LCACs and MLPs operate no more than 12 hours per day) are identi-
cal to those used to generate Figure 3.4; results shown in Figure A.2 can
be compared with those shown in Figure 3.4. The loss of sustainment
capacity seen in this comparison, for both the SBE and the SBME,
is uniformly 10 to 20 percent, again considered minor. The number
of LCAC sorties per day was reduced by about 25 percent, and the
number of aircraft sorties available for Army BCT sustainment was
reduced slightly. The net eect of limiting LCACs to not more than
Figure A.2
VTOL Plus LCAC Sustainment in Scenario A, with LCACs Limited to 12 Hours
of Operation per Day
500 SBME + ABN BCT heavy combat w/ 16-hr LCACs

SBE + ABN BCT heavy combat w/ 16-hr LCACs
SBME + ABN BCT heavy combat w/ 12-hr LCACs
400
SBE + ABN BCT heavy combat w/ 12-hr LCACs
Capacity (%)
300
200
100
0
25/75/ 45/95/ 65/115/ 85/135/ 105/155/
50 50 50 50 50
= breakpoint
RAND MG649-A.2
12 hours of operation per day was reduction of overall throughput by

10 to 20 percent.
SBE in Sustained Operations

MEB results were presented in Chapter Three for an SBE or an SBME
in heavy combat, generally in combination with an Army brigade. We
now add the results for an SBE in sustained combat with the results for
it falling between those for an SBE or an SBME in heavy combat (more
closely resembling those for an SBE in heavy combat).
We begin with air-only sustainment of an SBE in sustained oper-
ations, along with an airborne brigade, as in Figure 3.3. Here, as shown
in Figure A.3, the SBE in sustained operations falls between the SBME
in heavy combat and the SBE in heavy combat.
Further illustration is provided in Figure A.4, which shows the
result of adding LCACs to MPF(F) aircraft in sustainment. More
Figure A.3
VTOL-Only Sustainment of a MEB and an Army Airborne Brigade in
Scenario A Is Marginal
300
250 SBME heavy combat

SBE sustained combat
SBE heavy combat
200
Capacity (%)
150
100
50
0
25/75 45/95 65/115 85/135 105/155
LHA(R)/LHD distance to MEB/ABN BCT (NM)
RAND MG649-A.3
Additional Cases 59
Figure A.4
VTOL Plus LCAC Sustainment in Scenario A Is More Robust
SBME + ABN BCT heavy combat w/ LCACs

SBE sustained combat w/ LCACs
500
400 SBE sustained combat w/o LCACs
Capacity (%)
300
200
100
0
25/75/ 45/95/ 65/115/ 85/135/ 105/155/
25 25 25 25 25
= breakpoint
RAND MG649-A.4
robust capability is again seen, with results for the SBE in sustained
operations falling between the SBE in heavy combat and the SBME in
heavy combat. As noted in the preceding section, breakpoints depend
solely on the ability of MPF(F) aircraft to meet Army BCT needs, so
they are unchanged.
We conclude generally that sustainment results for an SBE in sus-
tained combat fall between those for the SBE in heavy combat and the
SBME in heavy combat.
Sustainment with a Reduced Number of MV-22s

One conclusion of this study is that there is insucient space on the
MPF(F) to base a signicant number of Army aircraft as long as large
numbers of Marine Corps MV-22s and CH-53Ks are based on the
MPF(F). Here, we nd that in SBME sustainment before the arrival
of an Army ground element, all MV-22s could be put ashore to make
room for Army CH-47 helicopters either by using LCACs for sus-
tainment or by reducing the distance from the large deck ships to the
SBME.
Relative sustainment capacity for an SBME in heavy combat is
shown in Figure A.5 for CH-53K helicopters alone and for CH-53K
helicopters working with LCACs. Figure A.3 results with MV-22 air-
craft are also shown here for reference.
As a secondary nding, Figure A.5 also shows that MV-22 air-
craft contribute relatively little to sustainment for large distances (i.e.,
distances approaching 110 NM).
Figure A.5
SBME Sustainment in Scenario A, Without MV-22 Aircraft
1,000 CH-53K + LCAC

CH-53K no LCAC
900
CH-53K + MV-22 + LCAC
800 CH-53K + MV-22 no LCAC
700
Capacity (%)
600
500
400
300
200
100
0
25/75/ 45/95/ 65/115/ 85/135/ 105/155/
25 25 25 25 25
RAND MG649-A.5
Additional Cases 61
Sustainment with Varying Numbers of Operational Flight Spots

Here, we address an issue raised in Chapters Two and Three and con-
sidered in the MPF(F) CDD analysis: the eect of dedicating oper-
ating spots on the three large ight decks for operations other than
sustainment.3
Results of dedicating additional ight spots, with and without
LCACs, are shown in Figure A.6 for an SBME and an airborne bri-
gade in heavy combat. Results with LCACs are shown using sold lines;
results without LCACs are shown using dashed lines. With or without
LCACs, the eect of dedicating one or two additional operating spots
on each of the three large decks is minor.
Figure A.6
Dedicating Additional Operating Spots for SBME, Airborne BCT in Heavy
Combat
Baseline w/LCACs Baseline w/o LCACs

1 additional spot w/ LCACs 1 additional spot w/o LCACs
500
400
Capacity (%)
300
200
100
0
25 30 35 40 45 50
Distance to MEB (NM)
RAND MG649-A.6
3 A general assumption of this study is that one operational spot on each of the three large
decks will be dedicated to MV-22 combat search-and-rescue aircraft.
Scenario BArmy Forces Enter the Area of Operations

Directly
MLPs 50 NM from the SPOD
Paralleling the previous section, how much would the benets of using
LCACs be reduced in Scenario B if the MLP ships operated 50 NM
from the SPOD? Capacity is seen to be reduced by 10 to 20 percent,
again considered minor.
Other than this increase in distance, conditions here match those
used for Figures 3.9 and 3.10, which can be compared against the
results shown in Figures A.7 and A.8.
In both Scenarios A and B, the eect of increasing the MLP dis-
tance to the SPOD when LCACs are used is in the range of 10 to 20
percent. We conclude generally that increasing the distance from the
MLPs to the SPOD from 25 NM to 50 NM has only a minor eect
on relative capacity.
Figure A.7
MEB Plus SBCT Sustainment in Scenario B, with MLPs 50 NM from SPOD
400 SBME + SBCT heavy combat w/ LCACs

SBE + SBCT heavy combat w/ LCACs
SBME + SBCT heavy combat w/o LCACs
300 SBE + SBCT heavy combat w/o LCACs
Capacity (%)
200
100
0
25/75/ 45/95/ 65/115/ 85/135/ 105/155/
25 25 25 25 25
RAND MG649-A.7
Additional Cases 63
Figure A.8
MEB Plus HBCT Sustainment in Scenario B, with MLPs 50 NM from SPOD
400
SBME + HBCT heavy combat w/ LCACs

SBE + HBCT heavy combat w/ LCACs
300 SBME + HBCT heavy combat w/o LCACs
SBE + HBCT heavy combat w/o LCACs
Capacity (%)
200
100
0
25/75/ 45/95/ 65/115/ 85/135/ 105/155/
25 25 25 25 25
Distances to MEB/HBCT/SPOD (NM)
RAND MG649-A.8

Chapters Two and Three considered the implications of using a richer
mix of CH-53K to MV-22 aircraft only in the context of Scenario
A. The topic is taken up again here with the nding that reversing
the ratio of CH-53K to MV-22 aircraft has a signicant advantage in
sustainment.
We consider four cases: sustainment for an SBME plus an SBCT;
for an SBE plus an SBCT; for an SBME plus an HBCT; and for an SBE
plus an HBCT. Only airborne sustainment cases (i.e., cases without
LCACs) were considered to bound the analysis. For all cases, increas-
ing the ratio of CH-53K to MV-22 aircraft signicantly increases both
the robustness of sustainment and the maximum distances from which
sustainment is possible (Figures A.9 and A.10).
Figure A.9
SBCT Sustainment in Scenario B, with Altered Aircraft Mix
300
SBME 34 CH-53K/16 MV-22

SBE 34 CH-53K/16 MV-22
SBME 16 CH-53K/34 MV-22
200 SBE 16 CH-53K/34 MV-22
Capacity (%)
100
0
25/75/ 45/95/ 65/115/ 85/135/ 105/155/
25 25 25 25 25
RAND MG649-A.9
Reducing Sustainment Demand

The implications of reducing sustainment demand, exemplied by
eliminating the need for bulk water from the sea base, were consid-
ered earlier in this monograph in the context of Scenario A. Signi-
cant sustainment benets for Stryker and heavy brigades in heavy
combat, similar to those seen before, are seen in Figures A.11 and A.12,
respectively.
Additional Cases 65
Figure A.10
HBCT Sustainment in Scenario B, with Altered Aircraft Mix
300
SBME 34 CH-53K/16 MV-22

SBE 34 CH-53K/16 MV-22
SBME 16 CH-53K/34 MV-22
200 SBE 16 CH-53K/34 MV-22
Capacity (%)
100
0
25/75/ 45/95/ 65/115/ 85/135/ 105/155/
25 25 25 25 25
RAND MG649-A.10
Figure A.11
SBCT Sustainment in Scenario B, with and without Bulk Water
600 SBME + SBCT heavy combat w/o H2O

SBE + SBCT heavy combat w/o H2O
500 SBME + SBCT heavy combat w/ H2O
SBE + SBCT heavy combat w/ H2O
400
Capacity (%)
300
200
100
0
25/75/ 45/95/ 65/115/ 85/135/ 105/155/
25 25 25 25 25
RAND MG649-A.11
Additional Cases 67
Figure A.12
HBCT Sustainment in Scenario B, with and without Bulk Water
600 SBME + HBCT heavy combat w/o H2O

SBE + HBCT heavy combat w/o H2O
500 SBME + HBCT heavy combat w/ H2O
SBE + HBCT heavy combat w/ H2O
400
Capacity (%)
300
200
100
0
25/75/ 45/95/ 65/115/ 85/135/ 105/155/
25 25 25 25 25
RAND MG649-A.12
Scenario CArmy Forces Enter the Area of Operations

via the Sea Base
Previously, the MEB was assumed to operate inland, and sustain-

ment to it was delivered 25 NM farther than the Army objective area.
In other words, the Army brigade is inserted from distances of 25 to
50 NM, whereas the MEB is sustained from distances of 50 to 75 NM.
Now, we assume that the distance from the sea base to the MEB is the
same as the distance from the sea base to the seaport of debarkation,
such as when the Marines are operating near the SPOD. This dier-
ence (seen in Figures A.13 and A.14) can reduce the time to complete
movement of an SBCT or an HBCT by over a day, depending on dis-
tances to the SPOD.
Figure A.13
SBCT Movement for Differing MEB Locations
SBME at SPOD
6
SBE at SPOD
SBME 25 NM beyond SPOD
5 SBE 25 NM beyond SPOD
1
25 30 35 40 45 50
Distance to SPOD (NM)
RAND MG649-A.13
Figure A.14
HBCT Movement for Differing MEB Locations
6
SBME at SPOD
3
SBE at SPOD
SBME 25 NM beyond SPOD
2 SBE 25 NM beyond SPOD
1
25 30 35 40 45 50
Distance to SPOD (NM)
RAND MG649-A.14
APPENDIX B
Maritime Pre-positioning Force (Future)

Description
At the time of this analysis, the planned Maritime Pre-positioning

Force (Future) (MPF(F)) squadron will comprise two LHA Replace-
ment (LHA(R)) large-deck amphibious ships; one modied LHD
large-deck amphibious ship; three modied Lewis and Clark (T-AKE)
cargo ships; three modied Large, Medium-Speed, Roll-on/Roll-o
(LMSR) sealift ships; three Mobile Landing Platform (MLP) Land-
ing Craft Air Cushion (LCAC) transport ships; and two legacy dense
pack MPF ships taken from existing squadrons.
This appendix describes these ships, except for the existing MPF
ships, which are not relevant to this study.1
LHA(R) and LHD
The notional LHA(R) Flight 0 large-deck amphibious ship will be a

modied version of the LHD-8 amphibious assault ship. Designated
LHA-6, it is notable for its lack of a well deck, which means that it
cannot operate LCACs or landing craft, utility (LCU) ships. It will
have nine Aviation Landing Spots, six on the port side. An MPF(F)
LHA(R) is distinguished from an Expeditionary Strike Group
(ESG) LHA(R) by its simplied command and control system and
lack of active defense systems. It will be able to operate three LCAC-
1 The Programs and Resources Branch of the Marine Corps updates MPF(F) program
information annually.
69
equivalent connectors, and it will have nine Aviation Landing Spots,

seven on the port side. Future LHA(R)s will also be developed in ESG
and MPF(F) versions. The MPF(F) LHD will be a decommissioned
LHD from the eet, modied for MPF(F).
MPF(F) LHA(R) and LHD vessels are to collectively carry a 2015
MEB Air Combat Element to include 48 MV-22, 20 CH-53K, and 18
AH-1 helicopters. Each aviation ship is to carry two SH-60 helicop-
ters.2 Both the LHA(R) and the LHD will store 400,000 gallons of
water and produce 200,000 gallons of water per day.
A current LHD, the USS Bataan (LHD-5), is shown in Figure
B.1, with MV-22 aircraft spotted.
T-AKE Cargo Ships
The T-AKE is a new Combat Logistics Force (CLF) Underway Replen-

ishment Naval vessel, originally known as the Auxiliary Dry Cargo
Carrier (ADC(X)). It has two multipurpose cargo holds, capable of
selective ooad, for dry stores and/or ammunition. It has additional
holds for freeze, chill, and/or dry stores, and three specialty and spare
parts cargo holds. Its cargo capacity for dry cargo/ammunition is
approximately 1,100,000 square feet. Fuel capacity is 1,300,000 gal-
lons. Water capacity is 52,800 gallons, and it has a capacity to produce
28,000 gallons of water per day.
The T-AKE has a single vertical replenishment (VERTREP) sta-
tion. Its design speed is 20 knots. The lead ship of the class, T-AKE-1,
the USNS Lewis and Clark, was delivered to the U.S. Navy in June
2006. It is shown in Figure B.2.
2 The Secretary of the Navy approved this squadron in May 2005.

Maritime Pre-positioning Force (Future) Description 71
Figure B.1
LHD-5, USS Bataan
SOURCE: U.S. Navy, V-22 program Web site.

RAND MG649-B.1
LMSR Cargo Ships
The MPF(F) LMSR will have about 202,000 square feet of cargo space
and two or four aircraft operating spots, and it will berth about 850
personnel. Its design speed is 20 knots. It will store 33,500 gallons of
water, and it will have the capacity to produce 24,000 gallons of water
per day.
Figure B.3 illustrates an MPF(F) LMSR alongside an MLP. Note
the ramp on the LMSR that is lowered between the two ships.
Figure B.2
T-AKE-1, USNS Lewis and Clark
SOURCE: U.S. Navy, Military Sealift Command Ship Inventory.

RAND MG649-B.2
Mobile Landing Platform
The Mobile Landing Platform will be a clean sheet design, leverag-

ing existing oat-on/oat-o technology. It is to carry six LCAC-
equivalent connectors and one Brigade Landing Team (BLT) of equip-
ment, and it will have accommodations for 1,458 personnel. It will
have one aircraft landing spot. Its design speed will be about 20 knots.
Planned fuel capacity will be about 1,200,000 gallons. It is expected
to carry 168,000 gallons of water; its water production capacity is still
under consideration.
LCACs cannot operate 24 hours a day. As discussed in
Appendix E, MLP operating days were matched to the LCAC
operating day.
Maritime Pre-positioning Force (Future) Description 73
Figure B.3
MPF(F) LMSR Alongside an MLP
LMSR
MLP
SOURCE: Ofce of the Chief of Naval Operations (N81).

RAND MG649-B.3
Figure B.4 illustrates an MLP transferring vehicles onto a notional

JHSV while alongside an existing LMSR. Other mooring congura-
tions are possible between the JHSV and the MLP.
Figure B.4
MLP Operations
JHSV
MLP LMSR
SOURCE: Ofce of the Chief of Naval Operations (N81).

RAND MG649-B.4
APPENDIX C
Army and Marine Corps Ground Elements

Evaluated
Army Elements
The Army has three types of brigade combat teams today: the Infantry
Brigade Combat Team (IBCT), the Stryker Brigade Combat Team
(SBCT), and a heavy Brigade Combat Team (HBCT). The airborne
brigade analyzed in this study is a form of Infantry Brigade. This sec-
tion describes the personnel and equipment of the IBCT, SBCT, and
HBCT, respectively.
Infantry Brigade Combat Team

The Infantry Brigade Combat Team, as recently described by the
Army,1 is illustrated in Figure C.1.
The IBCT has about 3,600 soldiers. It has 592 vehicles with a
total weight of 2,105 short tons (ST). The total weight of the IBCT is
2,360 ST. Major equipment items2 in the IBCT are shown in Table
C.1.
1 Secretary of the Army, The Army Modular Force 20042020, brieng, no date.
2 Major equipment lists do not include such items as water or atbed trailers, dump trucks,
loaders, electrical generator sets, or unit equipment.
75

Figure C.1
Design of the Army IBCT
Warfighting and Logistic Support of Joint Forces from the Joint Sea Base
~3.6K soldiers
II II II II II
BTB FIRES SPT
Brigade troops Recon squadron Infantry battalions Fires battalion Support battalion
UA Headquarters Recon Capabilities Combat Maneuver Capabilities Fires Support
Increased staff 2 motorized recon troops 6 infantry companies Joint fires cell
C2 enhancements 1 dismounted recon troop 6 assault platoons 3 x joint tactical air
Deputy commander (motorized) control teams (infantry Maintenance company
Special ops/civil affairs and RSTA battalions)
coordinator 2 scout platoons
Aviation and air defense 2 mortar platoons
Distribution company
HHC HMMWV with
Security platoon long-range advanced
Military police platoon scout surveillance
10 x 105mm howitzers
system
(2 batteries)
2 sniper sections Medical company
Target Acquisition
Signal company
Communications/network Intelligence and Surveillance Capabilities Counterfire and
operations support countermortar
radars 4 forward support
Engineer company
Target acquisition companies (provide
6 engineer squads platoon maintenance and other
Light equipment Military intel company TUAV platoon support to battalions)
Intelligence integration Multi-sensor unit
Battle Command: and analysis Various sensor capabilities
Networked battle command Human intelligence
enabling systems capabilities
RAND MG649-C.1
Army and Marine Corps Ground Elements Evaluated 77
Table C.1
Major Equipment in the Infantry Brigade Combat Team
Major Items of Equipment Items

Lightweight Towed 105mm Howitzer 8
Mortar, 120mm 4
High-Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV)a 75
Stryker Vehicle (M707) 7
Heavy Truck w/ Light Crane (M977/M977A2/M997A2R1) 16
Medium Tactical Vehicle, Cargo (M1084/M1089/M1083) 25
Light Medium Tactical Vehicle, Cargo (M1078) 13
Utility Truck (M1026A1/M966A1/M1113/M1025A2/M998A1/M1097A2) 263
SOURCE: Combined Arms Support Command, Fort Lee, Va.
a All HMMWVs, including ambulances.
Stryker Brigade Combat Team

The Stryker Brigade Combat Team, as described by the Army, is illus-
trated in Figure C.2.
The SBCT has about 3,900 soldiers. It has 1,551 vehicles that
weigh a total of 13,567 ST. The total weight of the SBCT is 14,603 ST.
Major equipment items in the SBCT are shown in Table C.2.
Heavy Brigade Combat Team

The heavy Brigade Combat Team is illustrated in Figure C.3.
Table C.2
Major Equipment in the Stryker Brigade Combat Team

Stryker Vehiclea 302
Medium 155mm Howitzer (XM777) 18
Mortar Carrier, 120mm 30
High-Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) 7
Utility Truck (M1038A1/M1097A2/M1025A2/M998A1/M1113) 381
Cargo Truck (M1083A1/M1084A1) 158
a All Stryker vehicles.

Figure C.2
Design of the Army Stryker Brigade Combat Team
Warfighting and Logistic Support of Joint Forces from the Joint Sea Base
~3.9K soldiers
I II II II II II II
HHC SPT
Headquarters RSTA Maneuver combat Anti-tank Fires battalion Engineer Support battalion
Styker HQs Recon Capabilities Combat Maneuver Capabilities Anti-Tank Fires Engineer
Increased staff 3 Stryker RSTA troops Joint fires cell
C2 enhancements 9 ICV companies
Surveillance troop 5 x joint tactical air
Deputy commander 9 MGS platoons
(UAV and sensors) control teams
PSYOPS/civil affairs 9 mortar sections (infantry, RSTA
Aviation and air 3 chemical recon 127 x infantry 9 Stryker 9 engineer
vehicles 3 scout platoons anti-tank guided battalions and
defense carrier vehicles brigade) squads
53 recon & fires missile vehicles
HHC 3 mobility squads
vehicles with with various
Military police C2 cell long-range advanced equipment
scout surveillance
system
Mortar platoon 30 x 120mm 27 x mobile 16 x 155mm howitzers
6 x 120mm mortar carriers gun systems 2 sniper sections (3 batteries)
Signal company
Communications/
network operations
Intelligence and Surveillance Capabilities Target Acquisition Support
support
Counterfire and
Battle Command: countermortar
radars Distribution company
Networked battle
command enabling Military intel company UAV platoon
systems Intelligence integration RSTA battalion Medical company
and analysis Multi-sensor unit Target
Human intelligence Various sensor acquisition
capabilities capabilities platoon Maintenance company
RAND MG649-C.2
Figure C.3
Design of the Army Heavy Brigade Combat Team
~3.8K soldiers
II II II II II
BTB FIRES SPT
Brigade troops Recon squadron Combined arms Fires battalion Support battalion
Army and Marine Corps Ground elements evaluated

UA Headquarters Combat Maneuver & Recon Capabilities Fires Support
Increased staff 6 tank companies Joint fires cell
C2 enhancements 3 x joint tactical air
4 mechanized companies
Deputy commander control teams (CA and
PSYOPS/civil affairs 3 recon troops Maintenance
95 Bradley scout and armed recon battalions)
Aviation and air 58 M1A1 2 scout platoons company
defense infantry fighting vehicles
tanks 2 mortar platoons
HHC
Security platoon
Military police platoon 16 x 155mm howitzers Distribution
(2 batteries) company
40 HMMWV with
14 x 120mm long-range advanced scout
mortar carriers surveillance system 2 sniper sections
Signal company
Communications/network Intelligence and Surveillance Capabilities Target Acquisition
operations support Medical
Counterfire and Target
company
countermortar acquisition
Engineer company radars platoon
6 engineer squads
Light equipment Military intel company TUAV platoon Protection
Intelligence integration Armed recon/fires company 4 forward support
Battle Command: and analysis UAVs 12 engineer squads companies (provide
Networked battle command Human intelligence Multi-sensor unit (2 engr companies) maintenance and other
Chemical recon
enabling systems capabilities Various sensor capabilities support to battalions)
vehicles Various equipment
RAND MG649-C.3
9
The HBCT has about 3,800 soldiers. It has 1,770 vehicles with a
total weight of 18,964 ST. The total weight of the HBCT is 20,202 ST.
Major equipment items in the HBCT are shown in Table C.3.
MEB Elements
The Marine Corps developed the MPF(F) MEB, or 2015 MEB, for
operation from MPF(F) ships.3 This is the MEB evaluated here.
The 2015 MEB has 14,484 personnel, organized into a Sea Base
Echelon (with 8,397 personnel), a Forward Base Echelon (with 1,907
personnel), and a Sustained Operations Ashore Echelon (with 4,180
personnel). The Sea Base Echelon (SBE) has a Sea Base Maneuver Ele-
ment (SBME) with 4,989 personnel and a Sea Base Support Element
(SBSE) with 3,408 personnel. The SBSE initially supports the SBME
from the sea base; later, much of it will move ashore to better support
the SBME. The Sustained Operations Ashore Echelon normally oper-
ates from the continental United States.
Table C.3
Major Equipment in the Heavy Brigade Combat Team

Main Battle Tank (M1A2) 58
Bradley Fighting Vehicle (M2A3/M3A3) 109
Armored Personnel Carrier (M113A3) 43
Light Armored Vehicle (M1130/M1135) 4
Mortar Carrier, 120mm 14
Recovery Vehicle, Full Track Heavy (M88A1/M88A2) 23
Utility Truck (M1114/M1097A2/M1025A2/M1038A1/M998A1/M1113) 451
Cargo Truck (M1083A1/M1078A1/M985A2R1/M1074) 218
Stryker Vehicle (M707) 5
3 Headquarters, United States Marine Corps, Amphibious Requirements: USN and

USMC Warghter Talks, brieng, Washington, D.C., February 2, 2007.
Army and Marine Corps Ground Elements Evaluated 81
Major equipment of the 2015 MEB include three squadrons of

Joint Strike Fighters, a squadron of EA-18G Electronic Attack aircraft,
and a squadron of light attack helicopters. These aircraft operate from
the large deck MPF(F) ships (the two LHA(R)s and the LHD). Addi-
tional aircraft include 1.25 CH-53 helicopter squadrons (20 helicop-
ters) and 4 MV-22 squadrons (48 aircraft). A KC-130 squadron oper-
ates ashore.
Other major equipment is shown in Table C.4.
Table C.4
Major Equipment in the MPF(F) MEB

Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV) 106
Light Armored Vehicle (LAV) 54
Main Battle Tank (M1A1) 30
Lightweight 155mm Howitzer (LW155) 18
Expeditionary Fire Support System (EFSS) 8
High Mobility Artillery Rocket System 6
Joint Tactical Radio Set (JTRS) 202
Internally Transported Vehicle (ITV) 24
Medium Tactical Vehicle Replacement (MTVR) 236
Logistics Vehicle System (LVS) 131
APPENDIX D
Sustainment Requirements
Army and Marine Corps sustainment is treated, as in the Marine Corps

Capabilities Development Document (CDD) analysis, as ammunition,
dry stores, bulk water, and Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricants (POL) per
day. Ammunition and dry stores are measured in short tons per day.
Bulk water and POL are measured in gallons per day.
MEB consumption data for the cases examined in this study are
shown in Table D.1. Number of personnel drives the consumption
of water and dry stores; this explains the identical entries seen in the
table below. The SBE has 8,397 personnel whereas the SBME has 4,989
personnel.
All Army consumption rates are for heavy combat. They are
shown in Table D.2. For completeness, the airborne Brigade Combat
Team (BCT) has 3,411 personnel; the Stryker BCT has 3,929 person-
nel, and the heavy BCT has 3,117 personnel.
Table D.1
Marine Corps Sustainment Requirements
Ammunition Dry Stores Water POL

(ST/day) (ST/day) (gal/day) (gal/day)
Heavy combat
SBME 250 33 31,621 78,637
SBE 339 51 60,264 230,227
Sustained
SBE 75 51 60,264 176,305
83
Table D.2
Army Brigade Sustainment Requirements
Ammunition Dry Stores Water POL

(ST/day) (ST/day) (gal/day) (gal/day)
Airborne BCT 7 51 36,907 24,640
Stryker BCT 41 71 42,512 29,719
Heavy BCT 62 84 33,726 83,971
The worst case for water consumption ashore is an SBE in combi-

nation with a Stryker BCT, which combine to consume about 103,000
gallons of water per day. This demand could be met by a single LHA(R)
or LHD, or by three LMSRs and two T-AKEs, or by other combina-
tions of MPF(F) ships.
A graphic comparison of these consumption rates is provided
in Figure D.1. Bulk liquid consumption rates have been converted to
short tons per day for clarity. The SBE in heavy combat, reecting high
consumption rates of fuel and ammunition, is seen to have the greatest
sustainment demand for POL and ammunition.
We aggregated the consumption rates shown in Figure D.1 in
Figure D.2 for more direct comparison of ground combat elements
sustainment requirements. The consumption rate of the SBE in heavy
combat is seen to be more than twice that of any other Army or Marine
Corps ground element in heavy combat. Second highest is the con-
sumption rate of the SBE in sustained operations. Finally, Figure D.2
indicates that the SBE in sustained operations is between the SBE in
heavy combat and the SBME in heavy combat. This result motivates
the repeated nding that results for the SBE in sustained operations
were similar to those for the SBME in heavy combat.
Sustainment Requirements 85
Figure D.1
Ground Element Consumption Rates
800
Heavy combat Sustained
combat
700
Ammunition
600
Dry stores
Water
500
Tons per day
POL
400
300
200
100
0
ABN BCT SBCT HBCT SBME SBE SBE
RAND MG649-D.1
Figure D.2
Aggregate Consumption Rates of Ground Element
1600
Heavy combat Sustained
combat
1400
POL
1200
Water
Dry stores
1000
Tons per day
Ammunition
800
600
400
200
0
ABN BCT SBCT HBCT SBME SBE SBE
RAND MG649-D.2
APPENDIX E
Model Description
Model Overview
The Joint Seabasing Logistics Model (JSLM) was developed by study

analysts as a tool to ascertain the feasibility of simultaneously sustain-
ing Marine Corps and Army elements ashore from a sea base or the
feasibility of moving an Army element in a reasonable period while
sustaining a Marine Corps ground element already ashore. It was
designed and developed for this study with knowledge of the uncer-
tainties, unknowns, and analytic simplications required. The design
goal was to provide the ability to examine numerous cases to explore
the feasibility of sustainment operations and identify factors critical to
their success or failure.
Beyond the ability to address these issues, JSLM was designed to
address what-if problems and sensitivity issues. What, for example,
would happen if water were available to forces ashore? What if a Joint
High-Speed Vessel (JHSV) were added as a connector? How would
that change sustainability and movement time? What is the sensitiv-
ity to Marine Corps and Army elements distance from the sea base in
sustainment? What is the sensitivity to the number of ight spots on
the amphibious assault ships for emergency helicopters?
JSLM is an object-oriented model. We can use specic elements of
the study to illustrate the object-oriented concept. Amphibious assault
ships (LHA(R)s and LHDs) and rotary wing aircraft (CH-53s and
MV-22s) are objects in the model acting on each other in well-dened
ways; they can be viewed as independent actors with dened roles and
responsibilities. They are capable of sending and receiving messages,
87
and of processing data. Similarly, Mobile Landing Platforms (MLPs)

and Landing Craft Air Cushion (LCAC) landing craft and Joint
High-Speed Vessels (JHSVs) are objects that interact with each other
within the model,1 creating operational friction. As concrete examples,
an aircraft returning to the sea base can be advised that there is no
landing spot available for it and that it must loiter until one becomes
available. Or a fueled aircraft must wait until another has cleared
the ight deck before it can take o. Aircraft must conclude opera-
tions before the ight window of an amphibious ship ends. A limited
number of LCACs can conduct cyclic operations simultaneously on an
MLP; others may have to wait their turn. The time for a single LCAC,
CH-53, or MV-22 sortie is easy to calculate; it is the friction in the
system that drives the problem.
JSLM code is separated into two parts: one that sets up the initial
conditions and another representing sea base operations. Within sea
base operations, sustainment entails the movement of Petroleum, Oil,
and Lubricants (POL); bulk water; ammunition; and dry stores (food,
consumables, and spare parts). Each ground element has dened aver-
age consumption rates in these categories, according to the nature of
the ground element (for example, an Army Stryker Brigade Combat
Team (SBCT) or a heavy Brigade Combat Team (HBCT)). Consump-
tion rates depend also on the way in which ground forces are operating:
assault operations entail higher consumption rates of fuel and ammu-
nition than do sustained operations ashore. Supplies ashore of POL,
water, ammunition, and dry stores are monitored, and additional sup-
plies are brought in to maintain required days of supply (DOS).
Sustainment has rst priority in the model; connectors are used
only to move Army forces ashore after sustainment requirements are
met. In assigning loads, recognition is given to the special capabilities
of each connector. For example, JSLM uses LCACs preferentially to
transport vehicles ashore; MV-22s are used preferentially to transport
troops ashore; and so on.
1 The object-oriented paradigm is supported using the high-level programming language

C++, which has features facilitating object-oriented programming.
Model Description 89
Operationally, JSLM can be described as a time-stepped deter-

ministic simulation. The time step is one minute, which is needed to
capture such brief events as the delay experienced by one aircraft ready
for takeo as another aircraft takes o. Because it is deterministic, the
model cannot directly treat such issues as equipment failure or aircraft
losses to antiaircraft systems. The model can be used to treat them
indirectly through such techniques as reducing the number of oper-
ational LCACs or aircraft at the outset. The model cannot be used
directly to treat moving ground forces for which the distance from
the sea base is not xed. Such movement can be treated indirectly by
changing distances and rerunning the model. Equally important, there
is no provision for treating variation in daily sustainment demand
(such as days with abnormally high consumption rates of bulk POL or
ammunition).
In cases involving sustainment only, the model is run over a
period long enough to average out some modeling articialities.2 In
cases involving moving the Army through the sea base, the model is
run until Army movement is completed.
Model Procedures
As stated above, JSLM is organized explicitly into two procedures:

setup and operations, with setup completed before operations begin.
This section describes setup and operations procedures within JSLM.
It then briey describes data for the model.
Setup Procedure
Setup consists of preliminary administrative functions; identication
of the scenario to be treated with geographic distances; and inputting
the parameters for the Marine Corps and Army ground elements, the
sea base, and for any JHSVs. It is done entirely from data, rather than
by building such functions into the code. Unless stated otherwise, the
following denition of characteristics is from data.
2 This practice could be used to accommodate ground force movement.

Administrative functions include assigning a user-selected name to

an output le and opening it.
The three analysis cases are indicated to the model. In response,
the model prints a message to the output le briey describing the sce-
nario, to avoid any confusion in interpreting results.
Geographic distances from the sea base to the elements ashore
and to a seaport of debarkation (SPOD) are then read from a data le.
For exibility, the model is designed to accommodate multiple SPODs
(such as one for Marine Corps elements and a second for Army ele-
ments); this capability is not used in this analysis.
Because the Marine Corps element is established on the ground
at the outset of the simulation process, its makeup is irrelevant to
the problem. It is characterized instead through its daily consump-
tion rates of POL and water (both in gallons per day) and ammuni-
tion and dry stores (both in tons per day). In addition, the number of
days of supply required by the Marine Corps element is established.3
The model assumes that the Marines begin with the required DOS for
POL, water, ammunition, and dry stores.
Because the Army element may pass through the sea base, its
makeup can be highly relevant to the problem. The Army elements
makeup is characterized in terms of tons of vehicles, number of per-
sonnel, and tons of supplies (dry stores from the perspective of the sea
base). The Army elements daily consumption rates and required DOS
are characterized exactly as for the Marine Corps element. In addition,
as with the Marines, Army elements begin with the required DOS for
POL, water, ammunition, and dry stores.
The portion of the sea base relevant to this analysis consists of
Mobile Landing Platforms (MLPs), Landing Craft Air Cushion
(LCAC) vehicles, Amphibious Assault Ships (LHA(R)s and LHDs),
3 In fact, the number of days of supply to be maintained is irrelevant to the problem so long
as we assume that the ground elements begin with that supply level. In sustainment, JSLM
is essentially a pipeline model attempting to ow consumables ashore at least as fast as
they are being consumed. DOS levels are included in model output to ease interpretation of
results.
CH-53 helicopters, and MV-22 aircraft.4 Large, Medium-Speed Roll-

on, Roll-o (LMSR) and T-AKE ships are represented only implicitly.
It is assumed that LMSR ships can transfer vehicles, ammunition, and
dry stores onto the MLPs at least as quickly as connectors can take
them ashore.5 Legacy Maritime Prepositioning Force ships are irrel-
evant to the study; existing pre-positioning ships cannot ooad sus-
tainment material at sea and cannot transport Army forces through
the sea base.
LCACs and aircraft are tracked individually in the model. Indi-
vidual LCACs are assigned to the MLPs, and individual available
CH-53s and MV-22s are assigned across the amphibious ships.6 As
stated above, there is no consideration for reliability in the model. The
technique of reducing the number of LCACs, CH-53s, and MV-22s
according to expected availability is used to treat reliability. In addi-
tion, some aircraft may be set aside for purposes such as combat search
and rescue. The result of all of these oine considerations is number of
available LCACs, CH-53s, and MV-22s.
Three MLPs are coded into JSLM. MLPs are characterized as
platforms that partially submerge to allow cargo to oat on and o
them. They would have the ability to pump up and pump down.
This is similar to ships such as the 225-meter MV American Cor-
morant, a oat-on/oat-o heavy lift semisubmersible vessel, and the
pumping characteristics of that vessel were used to represent the MLP.
LCACs cannot go aboard an MLP or come o an MLP while it is in
the up position. It is assumed that the LCACs carried by the MLPs will
need time for maintenance and for crew rest. Accordingly, MLPs are
assigned operating windows (analogous to ight windows for aircraft
carriers or the amphibious assault ships). Finally, MLPs can carry six
4 Aircraft parameters reecting CH-53K and MV-22 aircraft were provided by MCCDC
for this study.
5 In a sense, this analysis suggests requirements for future Army Prepositioning Ship ooad
rates. If those future APS ships cannot keep up with connector movement ashore, the APS
will become a bottleneck.
6 The model does not track non-available aircraft such as operationally unavailable aircraft
or MV-22s reserved for search and rescue operations.
LCACs but cannot load more than two LCACs at a time. This com-
pletes the characterization of the MLP.
LCACs are described in terms of their average speed in operation,
their maximum operating hours per day,7 the number of passengers
they can transport in a passengers-only sortie or while carrying vehicles
or material, load capacities, and load and ooad times for dierent
types of loads. Data used in the model are for LCACs that have gone
through the LCAC service life extension program.8 Finally, what are
deemed bias terms are assigned to payload types. These terms elevate
the threshold at which LCACs are assigned payload types and thus
allow preferences in assigning loads.
Three (LHA(R) and LHD) amphibious assault ships are coded
into JSLM; addition of a fourth amphibious assault ship would require
code modication. Amphibious assault ships are dierentiated in the
model by their parameters; no given ship is designated an LHA(R) or
an LHD. They are characterized by the number of (port side) spots
that can be used for sustainment or to help transport the Army ele-
ment. They are also assigned a schedule for ight operations, consisting
of spotting and unfolding aircraft in preparation for a ight window,
the ight window itself, respotting aircraft at the conclusion of a ight
window, and a standdown period. This cycle is shown in Figure E.1.
Figure E.1 shows operations over a 28-hour period to clarify
the way cycles wrap across days. Again, the gure shows ight opera-
tions for representative cycles and aircraft mixes. Times do not need
to span entire days; instead, they could be assigned, for example, to
limit the ight window to cover of darkness. The number of CH-53
and MV-22 aircraft assigned to each amphibious ship is also an input;
the model does not check that they will all t. Here, each LHA(R)
7 For safety, a limit of 16 hours per day of operation is currently assigned to LCAC crews.
LCACs in the model attempt to complete their last sortie of the day within the assigned time
limit but are not always able to do so; there can be a crush of LCACs at the MLP at times
and these crushes are not predictable as LCAC sorties are planned. The operating time limit
for LCACs is an input. Entering a value greater than 24 hours can eliminate time limits
altogether.
8 Of note, it is about 10 knots faster than existing LCACs.
Figure E.1
Flight Operations on an Amphibious Assault Ship
0000
0100
0200
0300
0400
0500
0600
0700
0800
0900
1000
1100
1200
1300
1400
1500
1600
1700
1800
1900
2000
2100
2200
2300
0000
0100
0200
0300
0400
LHA(R) #1 6 x CH-53K + 11 x MV-22 LHA(R) #1 6 x
RESPOT
SPOT
SPOT
FLIGHT WINDOW:
FLIGHT WI
0100 1100
LHA(R) #2 6 x CH-53K + 11 x MV-22
RESPOT
SPOT
FLIGHT WINDOW:
0900 1900
+ 12 x MV-22 T-LHD 5 x CH-53K + 12 x MV-22

RESPOT
RESPOT
FLIGHT WINDOW:
SPOT
0400
1700 0400
RAND MG649-E.1
is shown as having been assigned 6 CH-53Ks and 11 MV-22s. The

LHD is shown as having been assigned 5 CH-53Ks and 12 MV-22s.9
Of note, the model stumbles somewhat on the rst day, because the
LHD does not commence ight operations with spotting until 1600
in the model. No sorties are carried over from the previous day. This
is one of the articialities ironed out by running the model for several
days.
Once the characteristics of the amphibious assault ships have
been established as above, CH-53 and MV-22 aircraft are dened in
the model. These are the most complex objects in the models, having
complex state vectors and rules governing state transitions and load
assignments, and a relatively large number of parameters. The states are
respotted and folded, spotting, (re)fueling, shipboard takeo, conduct-
9 Again, not counting those MV-22 aircraft withheld for purposes other than
sustainment.
ing ship-to-ship movement, loading (internally or externally), inbound,

landing ashore, ooading, returning to the sea base, loitering (when
an aircraft has returned to the sea base but there is no spot open for it
to land on), shipboard landing, and respotting.
Rules dene the transitions from state to state.10 For example,
from a data le, a representative time for ship-to-ship movement is
known. Once the aircraft takes o from an amphibious ship to take on
a load from another ship, it is in ship-to-ship movement. A rule uses
time of ight to transition the aircraft to loading on the other ship.
Flight speeds with internal and external loads are described. Troop,
bulk liquid, dry stores, and ammunition load capacities are described.
Times to complete the evolutions of refueling, taking o, ship-to-ship
movement, loading, landing, and ooading are provided. Finally, bias
terms (corresponding to those for LCACs) are assigned to potential air-
craft loads. These biases will tend to cause aircraft to be assigned loads
for which they are best suited.
JHSVs are characterized through their speed, load capacities, and
loading and ooading times. Mixed cargoes such as fuel and ammuni-
tion are not allowed. A mean weight is provided for dry stores and vehi-
cle/equipment loads, along with their loading and ooading times.
Inputs to the model were taken from a recent RAND Analysis of Alter-
natives (AoA) for the JHSV. A representative JHSV was used for speed
and load representations: an average speed of 41 knots, 15,000 square
feet of cargo space, and a maximum troop capacity of 970 passengers.11
Passenger capacity comes into play when the JHSV has been used to
10 Rules also govern load locations. Aircraft take POL from the amphibious ship, so there
is no ship-to-ship movement for POL sorties. All other aircraft loads require ship-to-ship
movement. Other than troops, all aircraft loads are external. Aerodynamics limit aircraft
speed with external loads (reducing the MV-22s speed advantage over the CH-53K). Rules
also apply to internal and external loading, and aircraft operation with internal and external
loads.
11 A draft set of JHSV performance specications was in circulation at the time of this
study. It species a threshold troop capacity of 312 passengers. This lesser requirement does
not change simulation results, because results did not hinge on the ability to transport all
Army troops in just a few JHSV loads.
transport troops to the sea base, so it is assumed that the JHSV is con-
gured for maximum troop capacity.
This completes model setup prior to the simulation of sea base
operations.
Operational Procedures
To address the feasibility of simultaneous sustainment operations, the
program runs sustainment operations at the highest possible tempo. If
the days of supply for the Marine Corps and the Army elements do not
drop below the required DOS, simultaneous sustainment is possible.
Otherwise (i.e., operating at a maximum tempo, the required DOS
cannot be maintained), simultaneous operation is not sustainable. As
stated, the model is written so that any surplus sustainment capacity
goes to dry stores (DS; with excess dry cargo building up). This is illus-
trated in portions of sample model output shown in Figure E.2.
The model output below shows ten days of sustainment for an
SBE and an Army airborne brigade in Scenario A, with LCACs used
to sustain the MEB.12 The rst day of sustainment is day 0, and end-
of-day DOS are shown for each sustainment category for the Marine
Corps and Army elements. At the bottom of the gure, following
day-by-day material, there is a summary of the number of LCAC,
CH-53K, and MV-22 sorties by load category, as well as the levels at
which Marine Corps and Army ground elements were sustained.13
The high-level performance metric used in the analysisrelative
throughput rateis shown at the bottom of the output.
12 Again, ten days of sustainment operations are used to average out modeling articialities;
they are not intended to represent some operational reality. In addition, it is recognized that
the sea base could not provide hundreds of days of dry cargo over this period; the buildup of
excess dry cargo quanties surplus connector lift capacity.
13 To assist in interpreting output, JSLM outputs material describing the scenario being
run. It also outputs inputs, including distances, sustainment rates, and MPG data. For brev-
ity, this output is not shown here. In addition, JSLM creates logs of LCAC, MLP, rotary
wing aircraft, and LHA(R)/LHD activities on a minute-by-minute basis. This extensive le
is not shown.
Figure E.2
SBME and Army Airborne Brigade in Scenario A
End of day 0
MEB POL DOS: 10.06; H2O DOS: 10.20; Ammo DOS: 10.24; DS DOS: 47.75
BCT POL DOS: 5.06; H2O DOS: 5.08; Ammo DOS: 5.08; DS DOS: 9.33
End of day 1
End of day 2
End of day 3
End of day 4
End of day 5
End of day 6
End of day 7
End of day 8
End of day 9
LCAC loads: 677 (4.0 sorties per LCAC per day)

1 (0.1%) bulk POL loads
2 (0.3%) bulk water loads
0 (0.0%) personnel loads
51 (7.5%) ammunition loads
623 (92.0%) dry stores loads
0 (0.0%) vehicle/equipment loads
Average hours of operation per day: 18.1
CH-53 loads: 481 (3.0 sorties per CH-53 per day)
MV-22 loads: 846 (2.5 sorties per MV-22 per day)
Average throughput rate: 2743.5 tons per day

Relative throughput rate: 280.2%
Average throughput rate for MEB: 2179.7 tons per day
Relative throughput rate for MEB: 320.5%
Average throughput rate for BCT: 563.8 tons per day
Relative throughput rate for BCT: 188.7%
RAND MG649-E.2
This output illustrates several points made earlier. With a MEB

requirement of ten DOS ashore and an Army requirement of ve DOS
ashore, the sea base was able to sustain the required DOS in POL,
water, and ammunition with a signicant surplus connector capacity
(equivalent to hundreds of days of dry stores built up over a ten-day
period).
Looking at the load results, we can see that most LCAC and
MV-22 aircraft sorties were to move dry stores (i.e., to represent excess
capacity).14 On the other hand, no CH-53K sorties carried dry stores.
With a signicant spare capacity seen for transporting dry stores, the
CH-53K is clearly more productive than the MV-22 here.
The case shown above, an SBME and an airborne brigade in heavy
combat, was run with the MEB 75 NM from the MLPs. Notice that
with LCACs sustaining only the MEB, relative capacity for the MEB
(more than 300 percent) is signicantly higher than that for the BCT
(less than 200 percent).
We now move to Scenario B, in which LCACs can sustain both
the MEB and the BCT, using the same geometry. Partial results of this
scenario are shown in Figure E.3.
Here, the MEB maintains ten days of supplies in all categories,
and all unneeded capacity goes to the BCT.
A more stressing sustainment scenario occurs when all Army
sustainment is airborne. Output for this case is shown in Figure E.4.
The SBE and SPOD are 25 NM from the sea base, and an HBCT is
75 NM from the sea base.
The result here is that the MEB receives 100 percent of its sustain-
ment requirements and the BCT receives 138 percent of its sustain-
ment requirements (overall, the relative capacity is 111 percent). These
percentages are viewed as a minimal performance margin.
14 Recall that JSLM is written so that any surplus sustainment capacity goes to dry stores
(with excess dry cargo building up). With 92 percent of LCAC and 67 percent of MV-22
sorties assigned dry stores payloads, and with dry stores piling up ashore, there is signicant
excess capacity.
Figure E.3
SBME and Army Airborne Brigade in Scenario B
End of day 0
End of day 1
End of day 2
End of day 3
End of day 4
End of day 5
End of day 6
End of day 7
End of day 8
End of day 9


RAND MG649-E.3
Figure E.4
Army Heavy Brigade from a Short Distance in Scenario A
End of day 0
End of day 1
End of day 2
End of day 3
End of day 4
End of day 5
End of day 6
End of day 7
End of day 8
End of day 9


RAND MG649-E.4
Increasing distances by 25 NM (so that the MEB is now 50 NM

from the sea base and the HBCT is 100 NM from the sea base) further
increases the level of stress in sustainment, as shown in Figure E.5.
Here, we can see that aircraft sortie rate is reduced. The MEB,
which has rst priority, still receives 100 percent of its sustainment
requirements and hovers at ten days of supply in all categories. The
BCT receives just 37 percent of its sustainment requirement and
quickly exhausts its supplies other than POL. Inability to sustain dry
stores and bulk water is reected in the day-for-day decline in Army
dry stores levels over the rst days of operation (with 4 DOS at the end
of the rst day, 3 DOS at the end of the second day, and so on). Fur-
ther, the sea base is unable to sustain the HBCT with bulk water (as
reected in the slowly declining level of bulk water for the HBCT).
At the outset of this appendix, we stated that JSLM was developed
to answer questions of feasibility (just illustrated) and sensitivity (what-
if questions). The ability to address what-if questions is illustrated by
modifying the above case with the supposition that the ground ele-
ments could make or obtain bulk waterover 90,000 gallons per
dayso that the sea base would not have to provide bulk water. Partial
output, shown in Figure E.6, was generated by simply zeroing SBE and
HBCT bulk water consumption rates.15
Aircraft-only sustainment is now much closer to success. The SBE
is still being sustained at 100 percent of requirements, and the HBCT
is receiving 87 percent of its requirements.
Thus far, JSLM operation has been illustrated just for sustain-
ment-only operations. We now illustrate Scenario C, in which Army
elements ow through the sea base, using a Marine Corps SBE sus-
tained ashore and an Army SBCT owing through the sea base. The
distance from the sea base to the MEB/SPOD is set to 25 NM here.
With the lowest Marine element sustainment burden, the lighter Army
15 The model still initializes the BCT with 5 DOS in all sustainment areas. The result of
zeroing HBCT demand for bulk water is then (articially) xing BCT bulk water DOS at
5 days.
Figure E.5
Army Heavy Brigade in Scenario A, from a Greater Distance
End of day 0
End of day 1
End of day 2
End of day 3
End of day 4
End of day 5
End of day 6
End of day 7
End of day 8
End of day 9


RAND MG649-E.5
Figure E.6
Army Heavy Brigade in Scenario A, Self-Sufcient in Bulk Water
End of day 0
End of day 1
End of day 2
End of day 3
End of day 4
End of day 5
End of day 6
End of day 7
End of day 8
End of day 9


RAND MG649-E.6
force to be moved through the sea base, and the shortest distance con-
sidered, this is a best case. Model output is illustrated in Figure E.7.16
Here, we can see that all (3,929) Army personnel could be trans-
ported on the rst day. As observed in the main body of this report,
MV-22 aircraft transported a small fraction of all personnel (the large
majority of passengers were moved 24 at a time, by LCACs other-wise
loaded with vehicles and material). With 214 LCAC loads, the LCACs
had the potential to transport over 4,000 passengers. MV-22s could be
used tactically ashore without slowing Army movement.
Figure E.7
SBCT Movement Through the Sea Base
End of day 0
Loaded - BCT pers: 3929; vehicle tons: 4544; DS tons: 1036
At SPOD - BCT pers: 3929; vehicle tons: 4216; DS tons: 1036
End of day 1
Loaded - BCT pers: 3929; vehicle tons: 10816; DS tons: 1036
At SPOD - BCT pers: 3929; vehicle tons: 10460; DS tons: 1036
BCT movement completed at 2:15:41 (2.65 days)

RAND MG649-E.7
16 Output combines MEB sustainment and SBCT movement activities.

Data
This study capitalized upon recent seabasing studies conducted by
Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC) and the
Center for Naval Analyses (CNA), and a RAND AoA for JHSVs. The
MCCDC and CNA analyses examined sustainment using only air-
craft. MCCDC provided the CH-53K and MV-22 parameters used
for this analysis. MLP characteristics are based on a PEO Ships MLP
notional design17 and the MV American Cormorant. LCAC data are
from the MAGTF Planners Reference Manual.18
MCCDC provided SBE and SBME sustainment requirements for
this study. The Armys Combined Arms Support Command provided
Army BCT sustainment requirements for this study.
17 Support Ships, PEO Ships, 2007.

18 MCCDC (revised August 2006c, updated for service life extension).
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THE ARTS This PDF document was made available

ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENT

POPULATION AND AGING

For More Information

Robert W. Button John Gordon IV Jessie Riposo

Prepared for the United States Navy

NAT IONAL DEFENS E RES EA RC H I NS TI TUTE

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available for this publication.

The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit research organization providing

Copyright 2007 RAND Corporation

Sea Basing is a fundamental concept to the Navys operational vision

7798; or by mail at the RAND Corporation, 1776 Main Street, Santa

Scenario CArmy Forces Enter the Area of Operations via the

2.1. Test for Motion Reduction in Lee of Cargo Ship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

3.14. HBCT Movement in Scenario C, with and without a

E.1. Flight Operations on an Amphibious Assault Ship . . . . . . . . . . . . 93

2.1. Percentage of Sea State 3 or Less Conditions for Various

Defense Research Institute to examine how the still-evolving concepts

Analysis and Scenarios

tained simultaneously using the throughput capacities of planned

3 Department of Defense, Seabasing Joint Integrating Concept, Version 1.0, Washington,

Reducing distances from the sea base to supported ground ele-

We identied the following approaches to reducing Army ground

Increasing the ratio of CH-53K to MV-22 aircraft. A modest

An Army Stryker or heavy brigade can be transloaded at sea6 and

6 Transloading entails ship-to-ship movement by ramp. Transloading operations are illus-

the combined throughput of MLP LCACs. There are, however, issues

The CH-53K is better suited than the MV-22 for sustainment;

aircraft could be created temporarily by moving MV-22 aircraft

To conduct the analysis, a number of assumptions were made. They

EFV Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle

LMSR Large Medium-Speed Roll-on/Roll-o

SBCT Stryker Brigade Combat Team

Introduction and Objectives

The Assessment Division of the Oce of the Chief of Naval Oper-

Organization of This Report

Chapter Two describes Army and Marine Corps operational concepts

ment requirements for the ground elements described in Appendix C.

Operational Concepts and Scenarios

tion (APOD). Simultaneously, MPF ships loaded with the deploying

1 Headquarters, United States Marine Corps, Prepositioning Programs Handbook, Washing-

At-sea arrival and assembly of expeditionary forces

An MPF(F) squadron will include equipment, such as rotary wing

Sea State Considerations

3 Support Ships, PEO Ships, 2007.

cise positioning may also be needed to provide leeward protection for

SOURCE: Support Ships, PEO Ships.

that permit transfer of International Standards Organization (ISO)

Western Atlantic 60 Mediterranean Sea 75

Using the threshold value of Sea State 3, this table suggests

Sea Basing Operational Concepts

This section examines conceptual issues identied as part of this study.

Marine Corps Concepts

7 These preferences are reected in our analysis as rules and data.

the initial supplies and equipment of a MEB. In terms of our analysis,

8 Transloading involves ship-to-ship movement by ramp. Transloading operations are illus-

We developed three operational scenarios for this analysis. These sce-

Scenario AArmy Forces Arrive Inland

Scenario BArmy Forces Enter the Area of Operations Directly

Figure is notional and not drawn to scale.

12 See Appendix D, Sustainment Requirements, for additional information.

have to accept the implications of cross-beach supply. The downside

Figure is notional and not drawn to scale.

Figure is notional and not drawn to scale.