Manchester vs CA

149 SCRA 562 Remedial Law Civil Procedure Payment of Docket Fees Claimed
Damages must be Stated in the BODY and PRAYER of pleadings

A complaint for specific performance was filed by Manchester Development Corporation against
City Land Development Corporation to compel the latter to execute a deed of sale in favor
Manchester. Manchester also alleged that City Land forfeited the formers tender of payment for
a certain transaction thereby causing damages to Manchester amounting to P78,750,000.00. This
amount was alleged in the BODY of their Complaint but it was not reiterated in the PRAYER of
same complaint. Manchester paid a docket fee of P410.00 only. Said docket fee is premised on
the allegation of Manchester that their action is primarily for specific performance hence it is
incapable of pecuniary estimation. The court ruled that there is an under assessment of docket
fees hence it ordered Manchester to amend its complaint. Manchester complied but what it did
was to lower the amount of claim for damages to P10M. Said amount was however again not
stated in the PRAYER.

ISSUE: Whether or not the amended complaint should be admitted.

HELD: No. The docket fee, its computation, should be based on the original complaint. A case is
deemed filed only upon payment of the appropriate docket fee regardless of the actual date of
filing in court. Here, since the proper docket fee was not paid for the original complaint, its as if
there is no complaint to speak of. As a consequence, there is no original complaint duly filed
which can be amended. So, any subsequent proceeding taken in consideration of the amended
complaint is void.

Manchesters defense that this case is primarily an action for specific performance is not merited.
The Supreme Court ruled that based on the allegations and the prayer of the complaint, this case
is an action for damages and for specific performance. Hence, it is capable of pecuniary
estimation.

Further, the amount for damages in the original complaint was already provided in the body of
the complaint. Its omission in the PRAYER clearly constitutes an attempt to evade the payment
of the proper filing fees. To stop the happenstance of similar irregularities in the future, the
Supreme Court ruled that from this case on, all complaints, petitions, answers and other similar
pleadings should specify the amount of damages being prayed for not only in the body of the
pleading but also in the prayer, and said damages shall be considered in the assessment of the
filing fees in any case. Any pleading that fails to comply with this requirement shall not bib
accepted nor admitted, or shall otherwise be expunged from the record.

Magaspi Vs. Ramolete

115 SCRA 193 Remedial Law Rule 141 Payment of Docket Fees

Civil Procedure Pleadings Amendments

In September 1970, Mario Magaspi et al filed a civil complaint against The Shell Co. of the
Philippines (Shell) for recovery of ownership and possession of a parcel of land with damages.
Magaspi paid Php 60.00 for docket fees.

Shell then filed a motion requesting the court to direct Magaspi to pay the correct docket fees.
The court then ordered the Clerk of Court to make the appropriate computation. The Clerk of
Court made the following summary in computing the docket fee:

Assessed value of the real estate in dispute: Php 17,280.00

Moral damages claimed: Php 500,000.00

Attorneys Fees claimed: Php 25,000.00

Rentals due: Php 890,633.24

TOTAL: Php 1,657,913.24

Pursuant to Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, the docket fee for said amount claimed is Php
3,164.00 plus Php 2.00 for Legal Research fee.

The trial court then ordered Magaspi to pay recomputed docket fee minus the Php 60.00 Magaspi
already paid.

Instead of paying Php 3,104.00, Magaspi filed a motion for leave to amend the complaint. In the
amended complaint, Magaspi lowered their claims for attorneys fees, moral damages, and
rentals due.

Shell then filed a motion requesting the court to order Magaspi et al to pay the correct docket
fees and that said docket fees should be computed based on the original complaint and not on the
amendment complaint.

Eventually, RTC Judge Jose Ramolote ruled that the complaint is deemed to have never been
filed because the proper docket fee was not paid.
ISSUE: Whether or not the complaint is deemed to have never been filed due to nonpayment of
the correct amount of docket fees.

HELD: No. The rule is, a case is deemed filed only upon payment of the docket fee regardless of
the actual date of its filing in court. In this case, the case filed by Magaspi is already deemed
filed because in fact, they already paid the docket fees, albeit the wrong amount. Accordingly,
the trial court had acquired jurisdiction over the case and the proceedings thereafter had were
proper and regular.

Magaspi must however pay the correct amount of the docket fees and such correct amount
should already be based on the amended complaint and not on the original complaint. When a
pleading is amended, the original pleading is deemed abandoned.

Sun Insurance v Asuncion Digest

G.R. Nos. 79937-38 February 13, 1989

Facts:

Petitioner Sun Insurance (or SIOL) files a complaint for the annulment of a decision on the
consignation of fire insurance policy. Subsequently, the Private Respondent (PR) files a
complaint for the refund of premiums and the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment in a
civil case against SIOL. In addition, PR also claims for damages, attorneys fees, litigation costs,
etc., however, the prayer did not state the amount of damages sought although from the body of
the complaint it can be inferred to be in amount of P 50 million. Hence, PR originally paid only
PhP 210.00 in docket fees.The complaint underwent a number of amendments to make way for
subsequent re-assessments of the amount of damages sought as well as the corresponding docket
fees. The respondent demonstrated his willingness to abide by the rules by paying the additional
docket fees as required.

Issue: Did the Court acquire jurisdiction over the case even if private respondent did not
pay the correct or sufficient docket fees?

YES.

It was held that it is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but
the payment of the prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject
matter or nature of the action. Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by
payment of the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but
in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglamentary period. Same rule goes for
permissive counterclaims, third party claims and similar pleadings.
In herein case, obviously, there was the intent on the part of PR to defraud the government of the
docket fee due not only in the filing of the original complaint but also in the filing of the second
amended complaint. However, a more liberal interpretation of the rules is called for considering
that, unlike in Manchester, the private respondent demonstrated his willingness to abide by the
rules by paying the additional docket fees as required.

Where a trial court acquires jurisdiction in like manner, but subsequently, the judgment awards a
claim not specified in the pleading, or if specified the same has been left for determination by the
court, the additional filing fee shall constitute a lien on the judgment. It shall be the responsibility
of the Clerk of Court or his duly authorized deputy to enforce said lien and assess and collect the
additional fee.

G.R. No. 85879 September 29, 1989

NG SOON, petitioner,
vs.
HON. ALOYSIUS ALDAY, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, QUEZON CITY, BILLIE GAN

AND CHINA BANKING CORPORATION, respondents.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:

Applying literally the ruling on docket fees enunciated in Manchester Development Corporation
vs. Court of Appeals (L-75919, May 7, 1987, 149 SCRA 562), respondent Judge, on 11 August
1988, ordered (1) that petitioner's Complaint below (in Civil Case No. Q-52489), for
reconstitution of a savingsACCOUNT , and payment of damages and attorney's fees, be
expunged; and (2) that the case be dismissed. He also denied, on 21 October 1988, the
reconsideration sought by petitioner of that Order.

The aforementioned savings account was allegedly maintained with the China Banking
Corporation (CBC) by Gan Bun Yaw, both of whom are respondents herein. Petitioner, Ng Soon,
claims to be the latter's widow.

The pertinent portions of the Complaint and Prayer read as follows:

2. During his lifetime, Mr. Gan Bun Yaw opened Savings Account No. 17591-2
with CBC wherein he deposited P900,000.00 more or less.

3. Before his death on January 3, 1987 he lapsed into a coma until he finally took
his last breath. But his passbook still showed a deposit of P900,000.00 more or
less.

xxx xxx xxx

5. For almost three (3) long years, she looked for the deposit passbook with the
help of her children to no avail.

xxx xxx xxx

7. She discovered further that aforesaid savingsACCOUNT was closed by

defendant CBC on December 8, 1988. x x x.

8. She discovered finally that defendant Billie T. Gan connived and colluded with
the officers and officials of CBC to withdraw all of the aforesaid savings account
of Mr. Gan Bun Yaw by forging his signature. This has to be done because Mr.
Gan Bun Yaw slipped into a comatose condition in the hospital and could not sign
any withdrawal slip.

xxx xxx xxx

11. Due to the wanton and unfounded refusal and failure of defendants to heed her
just and valid demands, she suffered actual damages in the form of missing
money in aforesaid savings account and expenses of litigation.

12. Due also to the unfounded and malicious refusal of defendants to heed her just
and valid demands, she suffered moral damages, the amount whereof she leaves
to the discretion of the Court.

13. Due likewise to the unfounded and wanton refusal and failure of defendants to
heed her just and valid demands, she suffered exemplary damages, the amount
whereof she leaves to the discretion of the Court.

14. Due finally to the unfounded and wanton refusal and failure of defendants to
heed her just and valid demands, she was constrained to hire the services of
counsel, binding herself to pay the amount equivalent to twenty percent payable
to her, thereby suffering to the tune thereof.
 PRAYER

WHEREFORE, plaintiff respectfully prays that this Honorable Court render

judgment:

1. Ordering defendants China Banking Corporation to reconstitute Savings

Account No. 47591-2 in the name of Mr. Gan Bun Yaw in the amount of
P900,000.00 with interest from December 8,1977 or ordering them both to pay
her the principal and interest from December 9, 1977, jointly and severally.

2. Ordering both defendants to pay moral and exemplary damages of not less than
P50,000.00.

3. Ordering both defendants to pay her attorney's fees equivalent to twenty

percent of all amounts reconstituted or payable to her, but not less than
P50,000.00.

She prays for such other and further relief to which she may be entitled in law and
equity under the premises. [Emphasis supplied] (pp. 11-13, Rollo)

For the filing of the above Complaint, petitioner paid the sum of P3,600.00 as docket fees.

Respondent Billie Gan and the Bank, respectively, moved for the dismissal of the Complaint.
Subsequently, respondent Gan, joined by the Bank, moved to expunge the said Complaint from
the record for alleged non-payment of the required docket fees.

On 11 August 1988, respondent Judge issued the questioned Order granting the "Motion to
Expunge Complaint." He explained:

It can thus be seen that while it can be considered at best as impliedly specifying
the amount (namely, P900,000.00, more or less) of what is referred to in its par.
11 as 'missing money 'which apparently is the main part of the alleged actual
damages), the body of the complaint does not specify the following, to wit: the
amount of the rest of the alleged actual damages; the amount of the alleged moral
damages; the amount of the alleged exemplary damages; and, the amount of the
alleged attorney's fees. As regards the alleged attorney's fees, in particular, the
clause 'the amount equivalent to twenty percent payable to her' is vague and
indefinite. It leaves to guesswork the determination of the exact amount relative to
which the 'twenty percent' shall be reckoned. Is it the amount of P900,000.00,
more or less? Or is it the total amount of all the actual damages? Or is it the grand
total amount of all the damages-actual, moral, and exemplary-'payable to her'?
 As regards the prayer of the complaint, while it may be regarded as specific
enough as to the principal sum of P900,000.00 as actual damages, it cannot be so
regarded with respect to the amount of moral and exemplary damages (No. 2 of
the prayer) and attorney's fees (No. 3 of the prayer); for, evidently, the phrase 'not
less than P50,000.00' in each of Nos. 2 and 3 of the prayer merely fixes the
minimum amount, but it does not mean that plaintiff is not praying for an
unspecified sum much higher than said minimum. And, again, the clause
'equivalent to twenty percent of all amounts reconstituted or payable to her' in No.
3 of the prayer is as vague and indefinite as the similar clause found in the
complaint's body referred to earlier. What exactly is the amount relative to which
the 'twenty percent' shall be determined? Is it the amount of P900,000.00, more or
less? Or is it the total amount of all the actual damages? Or is it the grand total
amount of all the damages-actual, moral, and exemplary-'payable to her'?
Certainly, the great difference between any of these amounts, on the one hand,
and the amount of P50,000.00 in the phrase 'not less than P50,000.00' in No. 3 of
the prayer, on the other hand, is quite too obvious to need underscoring.

Needless to state, implicit in the obligation to specify is the duty to be clear and
definite. A purported specification which is vague and indefinite obviously is no
specification at all; indeed, it will serve no purpose other than to evade the
payment of the correct filing fees by misleading the docket clerk in the
assessment of the filing fees.

xxx xxx xxx

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby grants defendants' aforesaid 'MOTION TO

EXPUNGE COMPLAINT and hereby denies plaintiffs aforesaid 'URGENT
OMNIBUS MOTION (ETC.)' and 'OPPOSITION (ETC.)' inclusive of all the
prayers contained therein and, accordingly, plaintiff's complaint herein is hereby
deemed EXPUNGED from the record. Further, being rendered moot and
academic as a result hereof, defendant Billie T. Gan's 'MOTION TO DISMISS'
dated April 25,1988 and defendant China Banking Corporations' 'MOTION TO
DISMISS' dated May 25,1988 are hereby dismissed. (pp. 16-18, Rollo)

Petitioner's Motion for the reconsideration of the said Order having been denied, she asks for its
review, more properly for a Writ of Certiorari.

The Petition is anchored on two grounds, namely:

1. The doctrine laid down in the Manchester case was incorrectly applied by
respondent Judge; and
 2. Respondent Judge acted with grave abuse of discretion when he ordered the
Complaint expunged from the record although petitioner had paid the necessary
filing fees.

During the pendency of this case, respondent Gan filed a Manifestation alleging, among others,
that petitioner is an impostor and not the real Ng Soon, wife of Gan Bun Yaw, since the real Mrs.
Gan Bun Yaw (Ng Soon) died on 29 July 1933, as shown by a Certificate issued on 27 April
1989 by, and bearing the seal of, the An Hai Municipal Government.

This allegation was, however, denied by petitioner in her "Sur-rejoinder to Manifestation" filed
on 12 August 1989, to which respondent Gan has countered with a Reply on 9 September 1989.

We resolved to give due course to the Petition and dispensed with the submittal of Memoranda,
the issues having been thoroughly threshed out by the parties.

Upon the facts, the pleadings, and the law, we grant the Petition.

It is true that Manchester laid down the rule that all Complaints should specify the amount of
damages prayed for not only in the body of the complaint but also in the prayer; that said
damages shall be considered in the assessment of the filing fees in any case; and that any
pleading that fails to comply with such requirement shall not be accepted nor admitted, or shall,
otherwise, be expunged from the record.

While it may be that the body of petitioner's Complaint below was silent as to the exact amount
of moral and exemplary damages, and attorney's fees, the prayer did specify the amount of not
less than P50,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages, and not less than P50,000.00 as
attorney's fees. These amounts were definite enough and enabled the Clerk of Court of the lower
Court to compute the docket fees payable.

Similarly, the principal amount sought to be recovered as "missing money" was fixed at
P900,000.00. The failure to state the rate of interest demanded was not fatal not only because it is
the Courts which ultimately fix the same, but also because Rule 141, Section 5(a) of the Rules of
Court, itemizing the filing fees, speaks of "the sum claimed, exclusive of interest." This clearly
implies that the specification of the interest rate is not that indispensable.

Factually, therefore, not everything was left to "guesswork" as respondent Judge has opined. The
sums claimed were ascertainable, sufficient enough to allow a computation pursuant to Rule 141,
section 5(a).

Furthermore, contrary to the position taken by respondent Judge, the amounts claimed need not
be initially stated with mathematical precision. The same Rule 141, section 5(a) (3rd paragraph),
allows an appraisal "more or less." Thus:
 In case the value of the property or estate or the sum claimed is less or more in
accordance with the appraisal of the court, the difference of fee shall be refunded
or paid as the case may be.

In other words, a final determination is still to be made by the Court, and the fees ultimately
found to be payable will either be additionally paid by the party concerned or refunded to him, as
the case may be. The above provision clearly allows an initial payment of the filing fees
corresponding to the estimated amount of the claim subject to adjustment as to what later may be
proved.

.... there is merit in petitioner's claim that the third paragraph of Rule 141, Section
5(a) clearly contemplates a situation where an amount is alleged or claimed in the
complaint but is less or more than what is later proved. If what is proved is less
than what was claimed, then a refund will be made; if more, additional fees will
be exacted. Otherwise stated, what is subject to adjustment is thedifference in the
fee and not the whole amount (Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corp., et als., vs. Court
of Appeals, et als., G.R. No. 76119, April 10, 1989).

Significantly, too, the pattern in Manchester to defraud the Government of the docket fee due, the
intent not to pay the same having been obvious not only in the filing of the original complaint but
also in the filing of the second amended complaint, is patently absent in this case. Petitioner
demonstrated her willingness to abide by the Rules by paying the assessed docket fee of P
3,600.00. She had also asked the lower Court to inform her of the deficiency, if any, but said
Court did not heed her plea.

Additionally, in the case of Sun Insurance Office Ltd., et al., vs. Hon. Maximiano Asuncion et al.
(G.R. Nos. 79937-38, February 13, 1989), this Court had already relaxed the Manchester rule
when it held, inter alia,:

1. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but
the payment of the prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial court with jurisdiction
over the subject matter or nature of the action. Where the filing of the initiatory
pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the court may allow
payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable
prescriptive or reglementary period (Italics ours).

In respect of the questioned Identity of petitioner, this is properly a matter falling within the
competence of the Courta quo, this Court not being a trier of facts.

WHEREFORE, the assailed Orders of respondent Judge, dated 11 August 1988 and 21 October
1988, are SET ASIDE, and he is hereby directed to reinstate Civil Case No. Q-52489 for
determination and proper disposition of the respective claims and rights of the parties, including
the controversy as to the real identity of petitioner. No costs.

BLOSSOM & CO. V. MANILA GAS CORPORATIONS

Facts Blossom & Co. (plaintiff) and Manila Gas Corporations (defendant) entered
intoa contract. The contract provided for the delivery to the plaintiff from month tomonth of
specified amounts of water gas tar. 1 ton of gas was priced at Php65. Itwas agreed that the price
would prevail only so long as the raw materials (coaland crude oil) used by the defendants in the
manufacture of gas should cost the same price as that prevailing at the time of the contract. In the
event of an increase or decrease in the cost of raw materials, there would be a corresponding
increase or decrease in the price of tar.
The contract was later amended to extend the period for ten years. Inconsideration of the modific
ation, the plaintiff agreed to purchase from thedefendant a certain piece of land lying adjacent to
its plant. The defendant soldand conveyed the land to the plaintiff which in turn executed a
mortgage tosecure the payment of the balance of the purchase price. Around 4 years from the
execution of the contract, plaintiff filed an actionagainst the defendant to obtain specific
performance and recovery of damages. Plaintiff alleged that the defendant breached the contract
by ceasing to deliverany coal and water gas tar solely because of the increase in price of tar
productsand its desire to secure better prices than what the plaintiff paid. CFI
Manila ruled in favor of the plaintiff. The court granted the recovery for damages but refused to
order the defendants to resume delivery but left it with its remedy for damages against the
defendants for any subsequent breach
of contract. Later, plaintiff filed another action for damages on the ground that thedefendant
breached the contract once more after refusal to perform its obligation under the same contract.

Issue: Whether or not the plaintiff is barred from filing the second action for damages

Ruling; Yes, the plaintiff is barred from filing the second action for damages. Doctrine

Divisible contracts (as a general rule)

- A contract to do several things at several times is divisible. A judgement for a single breach of a
continuing contract is not a bar to a suit for a subsequent breach.

Entire contract (case at bar)

- When the contract is indivisible and the breach is total, there can only be one action in which
the plaintiff must recover all damages. The recovery of a judgement for damages by reason of a
breach is a bar to another action on the same contract and on account of the continuous breach.
Judicial stability, exceptions???

Error of judgement

Error of jurisdiction

Distinguish cause AND right action

Jurisdiction where will you file??

Summary proceeding

Forum shoppingdirect contempt, indirect contempt.

Cases. Docket fees

Joinder of parties joinder of causes of action