Spectral Dilemma

Leon Niemoczynski

Meillassouxs spectral dilemma is a dilemma pitting the injustice of terrible

deaths (odious deaths, the death of children, violent deaths) against the
existence or non-existence of God. Meillassouxs solution to the dilemma does
not appeal to theism (God exists) nor does it reject God absolutely in a form of
atheism (God does not exist). Meillassoux formulates a third position which he
calls divinology a position that features an inexistent God (linexistence
divine), a virtual God, who is not culpable for the injustice of deaths which have
occurred in the past due to the fact that it did not exist during the time of those
deaths, but who may come to be at some point in the future in order to create a
new world where the dead are resurrected and past injustices absolved. This
would be a world where our rational ends and universal aspirations involving
truth, beauty, and justice are finally met.

In his article Spectral Dilemma Meillassoux identifies specters that is, those
dead who have not been properly mourned and therefore who haunt us.
Meillassoux is here referring to not only the terrible mass deaths of the twentieth
century Auschwitz and genocide, world wars, atomic destruction but to the
senseless and premature deaths throughout all of history: children, innocents,
and deaths which cannot be come to terms with. Properly mourning these
deaths means forming a bond where we would be able to live in a non-morbid
relation with the departed. Meillassoux ask whether it would ever be possible on
the traditional alternatives of theism and atheism to properly face the sorts of
deaths that have befallen those who have died without life hearing their
complaints. A spectral dilemma becomes apparent: one is either to believe in
the existence of God or not believe in the existence of God given the injustice of
these terrible deaths throughout all of history. (It is also possible of course to
not believe in an existing God in the sense that one simply revolts against
God, thus choosing not to follow God. But this is more of a matter of disbanding
faith in God rather than outright denying Gods existence.)

Both of the traditional alternatives, theism and atheism, lead to despair according
to Meillassoux. Without Gods existence the atheist cannot hope for any
redemption for the dead as there is no God and no afterlife. Life becomes an
absurdity where it is impossible to bring justice for the departed. On the other
hand, a theist posits God and believes in an afterlife where there may be justice
in the next world. Yet this God has allowed these terrible deaths to occur despite
being able to stop them. But why would a beneficent, omnipotent God allow the
injustice of such odious deaths to occur in the first place? The traditional
answers to the problem of evil (that the sufferings of life and the reality of death
are a mystery, or that they contribute to a greater good, or that they are self-
inflicted), to Meillassoux, are perverse. But Meillassoux also states that both
the theists position and atheists position are unsatisfactory. The theist enters
into despair upon having hope for the dead with a God who has allowed unjust
deaths to take place; the atheist enters into despair believing that another life is
impossible and that there is no God to offer the dead a chance to live again.
Cynicism and sadness result. Only the third option believing in a God that
does not exist now but someday may exist makes sense. God is not held
blameworthy for injustice associated with terrible deaths and a resurrection of the
dead is possible.

Regarding the third option, one may legitimately hope for the appearance of a
divine being given the nature of the radically contingent ground or hyperchaos
(surcontingence) responsible for issuing any event. The details of how a divine
being may emerge and the sort of the future world of justice that is to be brought
about with its emergence are all developed in Meillassouxs dissertation
LInexistence divine (The Divine Inexistence). According to Meillassouxs thesis
of radical contingency a contingency responsible for whatever appears in the
world - because there is nothing preventing the emergence of a future divine
being there is no reason why a virtual God could not appear in the future. Thus
human beings cannot be prohibited from hoping for it. As Meillassoux writes, a
contingent effect of Chaos God can once more be desirable.