Conference Papers

Fully Utilizing the Intelligent Electronic Device Capability to

Reduce Wiring in Rural Electric Distrubition Substations

Jakov Vico
Terrence Smith
Richard Hunt

Paper No.
10 C3
978-1-4244-5473-0/10/$26.00 2010 IEEE

C3
 Fully Utilizing the Intelligent Electronic Device Capability to
Reduce Wiring in Rural Electric Distribution Substations

Jakov Vico Terrence Smith Richard Hunt

Senior Member IEEE Member IEEE Senior Member IEEE
GE Multilin GE Multilin GE Multilin
Markham, ON, Canada Birchwood, TN, USA Apex, NC, USA
jakov.vico@ge.com terrence.smith@ge.com richard.hunt@ge.com

Abstract -- Each wired termination in a I. INTRODUCTION

substation represents a cost associated with
engineering, installing and testing that wired point.
These costs include the obvious financial labor costs,
but also include intangible costs such as installation
and commissioning time, potential for human error,
panel space, increased resistive burden in circuits,
and larger raceways. Additionally, each wired
termination represents stranded engineering time
that is used design these terminations rather than
allowing the engineering staff to solve problems.
Most rural electric distribution wiring design
practices are taken for granted without thought as
to the true cost and reliability of the practice and
whether or not the function can be implemented
with less wiring. Some standard rural electric
distribution practices have evolved that seek to
minimize wiring. An example of this practice is the
use of multifunction microprocessor based relays
that can logically develop a trip bus from protective
elements rather than having to wire individual
elements to create the same trip bus.
This paper seeks to expose some of the hidden
financial costs and reliability costs associated with
copper process wiring. Additionally this paper will
discuss ways in which modern IEDs can be fully
implemented to further reduce wiring. The cost and
reliability benefits associated with the reduced
wiring will be discussed and quantified. Some of the
solutions to be addressed include the use of breaker
IEDs as an interface for breaker control, IED to
DCS communications, IEC 61850 IED to IED
communications, internal lockout Relays, IED
pushbutton control, and process bus. Each of these
solutions are currently available in todays market
place and have varying degrees of acceptance within
the industry. The benefits and liabilities of each
solution using traditional IED implementation
versus maximized IED implementation shall be
discussed.
The benefits of reducing wiring are so great that
reduction of wiring is not a new concept. As protection
and control designs have evolved, several methods of
reducing wiring have also evolved. The most notable
example is the use of trip functions developed in logic
inside a microprocessor based IED verses a wired trip
bus with discrete electromechanical relays as shown in
Figure 1. In Figure 1, the wired trip bus on the right
represents traditional wiring where protection and
control logic was performed discretely by wiring
components. Parallel components represent OR gates
and series components representing AND gates. The
logical trip bus on the left of Figure 1 accomplishes the
same functionality in digital logic as the wired trip bus
performs using wiring.
A-Phase B-Phase C-Phase Neutral A-Phase B-Phase C-Phase
TOC TOC TOC TOC IOC IOC IOC
Figure 1: Trip Logic verses wired Trip Bus
The title of this paper might draw the reader to
conclude that the industry has a problem with wiring.
There is in fact, no problem with wiring. Protection
and control wiring has been successfully used for about
one hundred years. The problem actually lies with the
labor and the time needed to design and install the
wiring and the business environment of the rural
electric distribution industry. The current rural electric
distribution environment will see a loss of qualified
engineers and construction personnel at a time when the
electrical infrastructure needs a major overhaul.
Funding for future projects as well as time to
implement those projects will continue to be condensed.
The decisions engineers make in design affect the cost
and the time to implement protection and control
projects. In the quest to lower costs and time to
implement, most of the low hanging fruit (SCADA to

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IED communications, IED to IED communications and typically shown in a point-to-point method where one
IED as breaker control) is well documented and has terminal end shows the opposite terminal end device
varying degrees of acceptance within the industry. and terminal designation as shown in Figure 3. A
significant amount of time is spent designing and then
Newer designs, which eliminate wiring, must be
drafting each termination.
evaluated to insure that the solution is reliable, secure,
and cost effective. In evaluating the cost effectiveness
of a solution the true costs of the solution must be
quantifiably measured against the true costs of the
current design. Additionally, several questions must be
considered, included among those questions are: How
and why is this saving cost? Does this solution save
cost in one category, but cause other cost to increase?
Does this solution trade one problem for another and
cause hidden costs? Is the cost savings solution based
on open standards and protocols, which will continue to
be supported at the end of life of the IEDs?
In order to answer the questions above, a thorough
knowledge of the true costs of wired terminations must
be understood. The majority of the costs associated Figure 3: Typical Point-to-Point Wiring Diagram
with wired terminations center around the labor needed
The more time spent with a particular drawing and
to install the termination rather than the material being
the higher the information density on the drawing, the
installed. Based on this cost breakdown, it is easy to
understand that the greatest potential for cost savings on more likely the drawing will have errors. In the design-
build process, the earlier an error is made and the
protection and control projects come from reducing the
longer it persists through the process, the more costly
labor necessary to implement the project. The actual
labor to implement the project centers around three the consequences of and correction for the error. This
causes the designer to insure every precaution is taken
categories: engineering, installation, and
to reduce human error. The quest to reduce error
commissioning.
introduces a check or peer review process, in which an
individual, untainted with the design process to date,
checks the complete design. The checker must review
each point of the elementary diagrams, each termination
on the wiring diagrams, and then verify the correctness
of each letter and line on the drawing. Errors
discovered by the checker, then go back to the designer
and the design goes back through the design, draft, and
Terminal Block. check process. The complete design process is shown
Point on a in Figure 4 below, with the block size representing the
Schematic Diagram
approximate time for each of the steps in the process
with the wiring design occupying the most time. Each
Figure 2: Typical Points on a Schematic Diagram step in the process requires design, drafting, and
During the engineering phase of a traditional checking as shown in the process chart to the right of
protection and control project, each wired termination Figure 4. The design process is further complicated
starts its life as a point on a schematic or elementary because the design, draft, and check process is carried
drawing as shown on Figure 2. Each point on each out by different individuals. As each individual
schematic must in some way communicate to the hands-off his work package, it must go into the next
installing wireman how this point will physically individuals work queue, which slows down the flow of
connect terminations with wires. This is typically done the process.
with wiring diagrams that are developed from the
elementary diagrams. These wiring diagrams must
show how equipment is physically wired internal to a
piece of equipment or panel and must also show all of
the wired interface cables that piece of equipment has
with the outside world. This results in the designer
developing drawings for the equipment that have
hundreds if not thousands of terminations. Wiring is

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 Engineer Prepares/Recieves project management, procurement support, and
Work Scope installation support.
Engineer Table 1: Estimate of Engineering Hours for
Single Line Diagram Prepares Breaker Addition Drawings
Elementary
Diagrams Handoffs Extended Extended Extended
Number of Eng. Draft Check Engineer Draft Check
Three Line Diagram Drawing Name Drawings Hours Hours Hours Hours Hours Hours
Drafter Single Line
Creates/ Diagram 1 8 8 4 8 8 4
Modifies Three Line
Diagram 1 8 8 4 8 8 4
Elementary Diagrams Drawing
Has Errors Schematics 6 12 16 4 72 96 24

Engineer Panel Wiring 5 16 20 8 80 100 40

Breaker
Checks 5 8 8 4 40 40 20
Wiring
Drafters work
Total 208 252 92

Error Free
Wiring Diagrams
Cable Schedules
Bill of Materials
Engineer Issues
Completed Package
Figure 4: Engineering Process, block size
representing approximate time for each process
For a typical high voltage breaker, the engineer
would create up to six schematic diagrams that would
include: Breaker AC/DC motor control, breaker and
IED alarms, breaker trips, breaker close and IED
control, CT connections, and breaker failure. The
typical high voltage breaker would have eight wiring
diagrams associated with it that include: Breaker CT
terminations, Breaker mechanism internal wiring,
breaker mechanism external wiring, and up to five
sheets of panel wiring to describe the sections of the
relay panel located in the control house. For a single
high voltage breaker this equates to as many as fifteen
drawings for one breaker. The time necessary to create,
draft and check these drawing can vary widely due to
several diverse factors that range from information
density on the drawing to ability and experience of
personnel creating or modifying the drawings. Typical
estimation numbers are shown in Table 1 below. This
estimate shows a total for design hours of five hundred
and fifty two hours to create the drawings necessary to
implement a breaker addition. This estimate would not
include administrative costs such as scoping the project,
Each wire identified in the wiring diagrams is
housed in a multi-conductor cable. The wireman must
identify each cable and its route from drawings and
install those cables by pulling them from one
destination to another. At this point, a termination must
be identified from the wiring diagrams, the physical
wire located in its multi-conductor cable, and then split
out from the cable that it is housed in, terminated, and
landed on the device. Wires must then be labeled, and
trained into a neat and uniform manner to facilitate
future revision or maintenance. The majority of the
wiremans labor is consumed not in actually performing
the termination, but in preparing for the termination by
reading drawings and locating the correct wire. The
more wires the wireman has to deal with, the more
complex his task and the longer it takes him to
complete each termination. Since such a large portion
of the wiremans time is spent deciphering the
drawings, each eliminated wiring termination simplifies
the wiremans task and pays an exponential return on
reducing the necessary labor to complete the entire
project. If the wireman has a constant percentage of
errors, each eliminated termination also reduces the
total number of errors the wireman will make.
Additionally, each wired termination is a possible
point of failure. The failure point may arise from faulty
workmanship, incorrectly landing a wire, faulty
materials or incorrect design. These possible failures
may not manifest themselves immediately, but lay
dormant for years. The consequences of these failures
have the potential to create nuisance outages or failure
to properly clear a fault. These types of failures cannot
be tolerated on the electrical system so every precaution
must be taken to find these points of failures and
eliminate them prior to energization of the system. This
necessitates a commissioning process for the wired
protection and control system. This commissioning
process requires that each termination be evaluated to
ensure that is correct and properly performed.
Additionally, the protection and control system must be
functionally commissioned to ensure that each

C3-3
component of the system performs it proper functions, projects. Reducing the raceway requirements shortens
and that the system is dependable and secure. The installation time and in retrofit situations where
personnel who perform the commissioning process raceway is limited have the potential to make a project
must be capable of understanding the engineering feasible that otherwise would not be. Reducing the
design, the installation process, and protection and panel space necessary for the protection and control
control principles. This results in a need for a highly design provides the obvious benefit of needing fewer
skilled commissioning workforce resulting in high labor panels, which equates to a smaller control house. Life
rates. Energization of the completed project is usually cycle costs can also be affected by fewer wired
tied to a fixed date. Since the commissioning process terminations. IED replacement is also greatly simplified
occurs at the end of the design/installation process it when fewer wiring terminations are involved.
carries a large risk factor for project completion. Any
The following discussion describes typical
schedule overruns throughout the project effect the start
protection and control wiring practices and how those
of the commissioning process. This causes the
practices can be optimized to reduce the number of
commissioning process to be the most likely to incur
wired terminations in the design. Five case studies will
premium costs associated with overtime. The
be analyzed: a medium voltage switchgear where relay
combination of expensive labor rates and overtime
pushbuttons, internal lockouts, and SCADA
premium cause the commissioning process to have a
communications are used to simplify the trip and close
very high cost. Each wired termination that can be
circuits, a breaker and a half scheme where IED to
eliminated reduces the commissioning time not only
SCADA communications, a control IED, and IED
because there are less terminations to commission, but
pushbuttons are used to optimize the design, a
also because fewer terminations simplifies the design.
transformer alarm circuit where a control IED is used as
A simpler design makes resolution of errors quicker.
an alarm aggregator, and a process bus solution used to
Costs for an average termination can easily be eliminate copper process wiring between the IEDs and
obtained by dividing the number of terminations for a primary substation equipment
project by the total time to design and install, and then
multiplying by the loaded labor rate. This gives a II. MEDIUM VOLTAGE SWITCHGEAR
loaded labor cost. When comparing a solution to
The trip circuit of a typical medium voltage
reduce wiring, this loaded labor cost is used to compare
time and cost savings. The labor cost of a wired switchgear breaker is shown in Figure 5. The IED
termination, however, ignores several intangible associated with this switchgear is underutilized and
there are several areas where the trip circuit can be
benefits associated with reducing wiring and wiring
time. One of the unquantifiable benefits that is ignored simplified by using IED logic and communications.
is the true benefit of freeing the labor to do other The IED actual trips a lockout relay that then trips the
tasks. Electric utilities operate in a business switchgear. There are six lockout relays, a DCS
environment where the limiting factor is the number of (SCADA) contact, and a control switch that trip the
breaker. The control switch and the lockout relays can
qualified, trained humans available to perform work on
the power system. Freeing labor has the obvious be eliminated with the use of IED logic,
benefit of increasing productivity, as the same communications and pushbuttons.
personnel can complete projects faster. In this case,
there is the less obvious benefit of freeing labor from
the mundane and routine tasks of developing wiring
diagrams and terminating wires, to allow humans to do
the things that humans are good at: solving problems.
Beyond the obvious labor costs of reduced wiring
there are other intangible benefits to eliminating wired
terminations in the protection and control design.
These benefits include: reduced installation and
commissioning time, reduced engineering time, reduced
raceway requirements, reduced panel space, and lower
life cycle cost of the project. Reducing the installation
and commissioning time bring the obvious benefit of Figure 5: Switchgear Trip Circuit
reducing the outage time necessary to install and Most IEDs can now be optioned with control
commission the project. Reducing the combined pushbuttons on the IED. These pushbuttons allow the
engineering, installation, and commissioning time elimination of discrete control switches on the relay
reduces the overall project schedule from conception to panel. This saves cost by simple material reduction, as
energization, which is beneficial to fast-track well as eliminating the need to install and wire the

C3-4
switches, and from freeing up panel space. Figure 5 logical trip circuit has been designed to receive GOOSE
shows a trip circuit that can be simplified if IED messages from adjacent IEDs and to latch elements to
pushbutton control is used with internal lockout relays. create logical trip functions.
IEDs can be optioned with non-volatile latches and
mechanically latching output contacts that allow these
lockout relays to be created inside relay logic. Non-
volatile latches provide a permanent logical flag inside
the IED that is safely stored and will not reset upon
reboot of the IED. The non-volatile latch may be used
inside of IED logic such that devices that would
normally trip a lockout relay set the latch. The latch set
operand can then be paralleled with other trip functions
to create a common logical trip bus. Mechanically
latching output contacts are output contacts that are
mechanically bi-stable and controlled by two separate
coils (open and close). Mechanically latching output
contacts retain their state even when the IED is not
powered.

Figure 7: Switchgear Trip Logic

A. SWITCHGEAR CLOSE CIRCUIT

Lockout relays are used to not only trip equipment,

but also prevent re-energization of the equipment until
operational requirements are met, and the lockout relay
is reset. When the protective zones interlock with
several other protective zones the lockout contacts in
the close string can become cumbersome as seen in the
medium voltage metal-clad switchgear circuit of Figure
8. A transformer lockout, a switchgear main lockout, a
breaker failure lockout, a tie breaker lockout, and a unit
lockout are wired in series to prevent close until each of
Figure 6: Simplified Switchgear Trip Circuit these lockouts is reset.
The combinations of the control pushbutton and the
internal lockout relays can reduce the trip circuit from
eight parallel contacts to the one IED contact output
and one DCS contact as shown in Figure 6. The IED
contact has to be driven by the control pushbutton and
the latches that create the internal lockout relays.
Several of the lockout relays used in this trip circuit,
such as the transformer lockout 86-TA and the unit
lockout 86-U, are tripped by protective elements in
adjacent protective zones, not the switchgear IED.
Since the protective functions for these lockouts are in
adjacent IEDs it becomes necessary for those IEDs to
communicate to the switchgear IEDs that those
protective functions have operated and the associated
latches should be set. Several vendor specific
communications protocols exist that can perform this
type of messaging. However, since this information is
required by multiple IEDs from multiple vendors the
message must be an open protocol, multi-cast message.
The protocol that most easily meets this requirement is
Figure 8: Close Circuit with multiple lock-out
IEC 61850 GOOSE messaging. In the IED logic of, the
relays

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 This close circuit uses contacts from five lockout DCS control. The DCS output contact can be
relays wired in series with an IED contact that closes incorporated into relay logic and is shown as the second
when the sources on either side of the switchgear meet input element remote open in Figure 7. This further
synchronous conditions. This permissive string of reduces the trip circuit to only one IED contact output.
contacts is then wired to a parallel string of close The original trip circuit had eight parallel contacts and
contacts that actually serve to close the breaker. This has now been reduced to one contact with the use of
close circuit has been recreated with relay logic in communications, IED pushbuttons, and IED logic. This
Figure 9. In this logic diagram, each of the discrete has the benefit of simplifying the control circuit design
contacts that cause close have been replaced with relay and wiring, which can reduce engineering and
operands and or-ed together in the upper left corner installation time. Additionally the physical control
of the diagram. Non-volatile latches are used for each circuit can be identical for all applications. Only the
of the lockout functions and the negative logic of the logic needs to be changing for different applications. If
latch (not) is and-ed with the IED synchronism future revision is necessary, only changes to logic are
operand and the close functions to create the close required, rather than wiring changes. Commissioning
supervision. The logic of Figure 9 replaces the wired the simplified circuit can be optimized, since
contacts of Figure 8 with one output contact. The wired commissioning the IED can be performed through
contacts string requires forty-two wired terminations to bench testing the IED logic and communications. This
build the circuit while the single contact required for reduces the amount of commissioning time required in
Figure 9 requires two terminations. The installation the field after installation.
cost savings are obvious due to the reduced number of
wires, but this configuration also has the ability to C. OPTIMIZATION BENEFITS AND
reduce the engineering labor. The relay logic can be DETRIMENTS
documented by the relay setup software and eliminate
the need to document this information on schematic
The optimizations techniques discussed above have
diagrams as well as wiring diagrams. Most IEDs are
obvious benefits, including reduction in wiring and
capable of being configured with graphical based logic
design time, reduced commissioning time, and
diagrams like Figure 9 and once the relay is configured
repeatability. However, there are some potential
the logic can be printed to serve as the document of
drawbacks to consider. In the case of using IED to IED
record of the configuration.
communications, or IEDs to DCS communications, a
CONTROLPUSHBUTTON2ON
communications infrastructure is necessary. This will
AutoCloseOn(VO7) 20
OR 21 Cont Op2(H2)
require additional equipment to be purchased, designed,
22 AND
RemoteCloseOn(VI2) CloseBRKR(VO2) Operate I on
I off and installed, resulting in additional costs. These costs
Von
Seal-In
ContIp1On(H5a) Voff should be fully understood and recognized as part of the
Latch1
TRIPBUS1OP Set On 86A(VO1) overall protection and control system design. There are
CONTROLPUSHBUTTON3ON Reset Of also several operational considerations that must be
Latch2
addressed when using IED pushbuttons and internal
23
R 86TATrippedOn(RI1) Set On 86TA(VO3) lockout relays. Most operations personnel are
R 86TResetOn(RI4) Reset Of
accustomed to operating with discrete devices. The
Latch3
24
operational procedures associated with these devices
BKRFAIL1TRIPOP Set On 86BF(VO4)
are well understood and accepted. Utilization of IED
PUSHBUTTON4ON Reset Of
logic to accomplish these functions will require
R
Latch4
25
thoroughly training operations personnel in the correct
86TTrippedOn(RI3) Set On 86Tie(VO5)

R 86TResetOn(RI4) Reset Of
use of the functions, and may require rewriting
operational procedures. The effort necessary to train
R 86UTrippedOn(RI5)
Latch5
Set On 86U(VO6)
26 and rewrite must be weighed against the benefits of the
R 86UResetOn(RI6) Reset Of
simplified control circuit. Tying DCS communications
directly to IEDs for status and control simplifies
SYNC1CLSOP
physical wiring design, and also reduces the size and
cost of the RTU or communications gateway. There are
Figure 9: Internal Lockout Relays used to block some potential drawbacks in terms of operations and
close organization issues. Typically the protection and
control design groups and the DCS groups have
B. SWITCHGEAR DCS/SCADA operated independent of one another with different
COMMUNICATIONS procedures and practices. If DCS communications are
used to control the switchgear, any changes to DCS are
The simplified trip circuit of Figure 6 can be now changes to the protection and control design and
further simplified with IED communications to the must be managed as changes to the design. This means

C3-6
that protection and control practices that deal with
design review, implementation, and configuration
control will now apply to DCS changes, which
historically has not been the case. The DCS group will
have to be organized such that it can accommodate
those changes and the efforts to organize the group
must be compared with the benefits perceived from the
changes.
III. BREAKER / RECLOSER
Before methods of reducing wiring for the breaker
and/or recloser can be analyzed, it is necessary to
understand what must be wired and how it is typically
wired. If the feeder is protected by redundant
protective relaying, the process information necessary
for one breaker / recloser would be AC currents,
breaker status, and alarms to the Relays, SCADA and
DFR. Process control to the breaker would include Trip
and Close from the Relays, from SCADA, and to the
DFR (status only). These process inputs can reach a
total of sixty wires for one breaker.
Most process inputs have multiple process
destinations where the information is needed. Consider
the breaker status contact 52a. This contact needs to
pass information to each IED, and SCADA for a total
of six wires for this one contact. Historically, the need
for current transformer inputs was accomplished by
wiring SCADA transducers in series with the IEDs. It
has become well accepted within the utility industry to
eliminate the current transducers and allow the SCADA
master to poll the relay for these analog process values.
This same method can be applied to the digital inputs
and digital output of the process information to reduce
the total number of wires. The SCADA master can
read the breaker status and alarms from the IEDs and
can write control points for trip and close to the IED
using the same communications cables that the IED
uses to read analog values from the IED. Utilizing the
communications between SCADA and the IED has
reduced the number of wires from sixty-two wires per
breaker to forty-eight wires per breaker. Since each
wire has a termination on each end, this reduces the
number of terminations per breaker from one hundred
twenty four to ninety-six. When discrete digital process
values are needed by multiple devices, the value of
wiring those signals once and communicating them to
the rest of the devices increases as the number of
devices increases.
A. BREAKER CONTROLLER IED
IED to IED communications protection schemes
enable IED controller schemes where one IED or set of
IEDs act as a protective IEDs and a separate IED acts
as a controller. The protective IED may be placed in
relay panels inside the control house while the control
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IED is mounted either inside the switchgear or in close
proximity to the switchgear. This scheme allows the
protective IEDs to pass protection and control outputs
to the control IED via communications, which can
reduce the amount of cable that is routed from the
control house to the switchgear. A cost benefit is
derived from routing less cable due to the obvious cost
of the cable, but also because the cable raceway may be
reduced in size. Additionally, the control IED may be
mounted and wired by the breaker manufacture,
meaning that the breaker and controller will arrive to
the job-site pre-wired and tested, saving the time it
would normally take to wire and test these function on-
site.
SCADA
Protective IED
Ethernet Switch
Control House
Communication Message
passes Switchgear status,
alarms and control from the
Control House to the
Switchgear
Switchgear
Trip
Close
52b
52
52a
Gas Alarm
Spring Alarm
Maint. Alarm
TCM
CCM
Control IED
Figure 10: Control IED used for Breaker Controller
In a breaker and a half scheme, the control IED,
located at the switchgear, is tasked with control
functions of the breaker as well as passing status and
alarm indication from the breaker to the protective IEDs
or the SCADA Master. A typical breaker will be
required to have control functions of trip control and
close control and will be required to send status for
breaker status, spring alarm, breaker gas alarm,
maintenance mode alarm, trip coil monitor, and close
coil monitor. If this is applied to the breaker, additional
wires and wired terminations can be eliminated with the
assumption that all discrete inputs and outputs will be
passed to the protective IEDs via communications,
except the trip circuits which will still be hardwired.
The total wired reduction using communications for
discrete inputs and outputs to SCADA and the Control
IED has reduced the total number of terminations to be
performed on-site from one hundred twenty four per
breaker to fifty-two per breaker.
 B. IED PUSHBUTTONS temperature trip, low oil level alarm, low oil level trip,
sudden pressure alarm, loss of cooling, and Buckholtz
alarm. If each of these alarms requires two wires, this
Typical control functions that would normally
has the potential to eliminate an eighteen-conductor
control the IED are: reclose enabled/disabled,
cable that would normally be routed from the control
local/remote, breaker maintenance, breaker trip, and
house to the transformer. The control IED could also
breaker close. Each of these control functions have the
be optioned with RTD inputs that could be wired to
ability to reduce two wired terminations at the control
transformer RTDs. Typical temperature inputs that are
switch and two more at either a terminal block for the
measured by SCADA are: winding temperature, oil
trip and close functions or at the IED in the case of the
temperature, and ambient temperature. The SCADA
IED control functions. Table below shows the potential
master poll these temperatures from the IED. The
savings associated with utilizing the control
control IED could also serve as an aggregator to other
pushbuttons of the IED. In Table 2, fourteen wires
transformer IEDs such as on-line dissolved gas
have been eliminated which eliminates twenty-eight
monitors, with alarms or analog inputs wired to the
wired terminations. For the breaker the combination of
control IED rather than running cables back to the
SCADA communications, an IED controller and
control house. Total wired savings by using a control
pushbuttons on the IED have eliminated eighty-six
IED as an alarm aggregator is shown in Table 3. In
wired terminations per breaker.
Table 3, twenty-seven wires can be eliminated causing
The real estate benefit of IED pushbuttons is fifty-four wired terminations to be eliminated.
realized by comparing the number of relays that can be
Table 3: Transformer Process Inputs/Outputs
accommodated onto a relay panel. External discrete
Showing IED Controller
control switches can take as much panel space as the
relay itself. This means that incorporating the control Sets of
switches into the relay allows twice as many relays to Sets of Wires Req.
be accommodated onto the same panel, meaning that Wires Req. at Control
half as many panels are needed and also meaning the to Hardwire House
physical size of the control building must accommodate Process Alarms and with IED
half as many panels. A smaller control building is Process Point Destination Control Controller
cheaper because it lowers cost of material, labor, and Winding High
transportation and creates a smaller footprint on the Temp. Alarm SCADA 2 0
site. Winding High
Table 2: Control Wiring Temp. Trip Alarm SCADA 2 0
Oil Temperature
Wires Req. Alarm SCADA 2 0
Wires Req. with Oil Temperature
to pushbutton Trip Alarm SCADA 2 0
Control Function Hardwire control Low Oil Level
Trip 2 0 Alarm SCADA 2 0
Close 2 0 Low Oil Level
Reclose Enabled 2 0 Trip Alarm SCADA 2 0
Reclose Disabled 2 0 Supped Pressure
Local Mode 2 0 Trip Alarm SCADA 2 0
Buckholtz Trip
Remote Mode 2 0
Alarm SCADA 2 0
Breaker Maintenance 2 0 Loss of Cooiling
Total 14 0 AC SCADA 2 0
Windind Temp.
IV. TRANSFORMER ALARM AGGREGATOR (RTD) SCADA 3 0
Control IEDs are not limited to breaker control. Oil Temperature
They may also be used as alarm and data aggregators (RTD) SCADA 3 0
for primary equipment such as transformers. In this Ambient Temp.
scenario, the IED is placed at the primary equipment (RTD) SCADA 3 0
and communicates messages back to protective IEDs or Total 27 0
the SCADA master. Typically, discrete alarms for a
transformer are: winding high temperature alarm,
winding temperature trip, oil temperature alarm, oil

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 The IED controller scheme also adds benefit in that
the controller can be mounted by either the transformer
manufacturer or switchgear manufacturer and wired by
that manufacturer. This eliminates the construction
time necessary for wireman to wire these functions in
the field. Since it can be commissioned at the
manufacturers facility, it eliminates the need to
commission these functions in the field. In essence the
only work required when the controller arrives with the
primary equipment is to connect the communications
cables to the controller and functionally test the
communications. This has the potential to create a
large labor savings and outage-time savings.
The major challenge to implementing the IED
controller scheme is in the utilities interpretation of
NERC CIP critical cyber asset identification. Currently
NERC CIP identifies a critical cyber assets as a device
that communicates via a routable protocol. and as All
critical cyber assets must be maintained inside a six-
walled physical security perimeter, which would limit
the IEDs ability to be located at the primary equipment.
This paper has proposed that communication from
control IEDs be carried out via IEC 61850 GOOSE
messaging, which by definition is a layer two protocol
and is non-routable. IED communicating with this
protocol would not be classified as a critical cyber
asset. However, if the rural electric distribution has
taken a more conservative interpretation of NERC CIP,
use of this scheme will be either limited or unavailable.
V. IED WITH ETHERNET MODULES
This paper makes the recommendation that
communications, such as IEC 61850 GOOSE
messaging, and internal relay logic, be used to replace
control logic performed with copper wiring and
auxiliary devices. The logic behind this
recommendation is to simplify the physical design of
the protection and control system, thereby speeding up
overall design, installation, and commissioning time.
Replacing contact logic with communications does not
necessarily lead to a reduction in material costs. Copper
wiring is replaced with communications equipment,
including Ethernet switches and routers. However, the
communications network between devices can use the
same communications network as SCADA or DCS
systems. Like all wiring, careful design of the
communications network is necessary to ensure
operational reliability in a cost-effective manner.
As communications is fully utilized inside a rural
electric distribution protection and control design, the
communications wiring may become congested,
especially if a redundant Ethernet topology is used with
central switches located in the control house. An
optimization method must be addressed which
simplifies the communications design of the control
schemes. Using IEDs that are optioned with Ethernet
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switches inside the IED can eliminate a large portion of
the communications cabling and simplify the routing of
communication cables. This topology along with the
traditional communication topology is shown in Figure
11 below. If the IEDs house Ethernet switches, a
complete ring topology can be created by simply
connected each IED to the IED below it in the panel
and IEDs at the top and bottom of the panels can be
connected to the IEDs in adjacent panels. This
topology reduces the communications cabling because
external Ethernet switches are no longer necessary and
the cable routing to these switches is also not necessary.
As seen in Figure 11 the traditional communications
scheme requires two Ethernet cables to be routed from
each IED to the Ethernet switches. The length of each
of these cables must reach from the IED to the Ethernet
switch. The switch module communications still
requires two Ethernet cables per IED, but since the
cables are routed to switch modules in adjacent IEDs
the cable runs are much shorter.
Traditional Communications Switch Module Communications
Station Topology Station Topology
Station Layout Station Layout
Figure 11: Traditional Communications verses IED
Switch Module Communications
VI. PROCESS BUS
The protection and control system is actually a
process control system. Process measurements such as
equipment status, current, and voltage, are connected to
process controllers, specifically protective relays.
Protective relays analyze these quantities, and take
control actions, such as opening circuit breakers to
isolate faulted pieces of the power system. The process
measurement system includes all the wiring between
primary equipment in the switchyard and protective
relays (and other IEDs) in the control house. Process
bus is nothing more than the concept of using a digital
communications architecture to replace the copper
wiring between primary station equipment and the
control house.
The solutions described in this paper focus on
improving the design of the protection and control
Communications and programmable logic replace
contact logic and auxiliary devices. This results in great
savings in design and installation time, and increases
the reliability of the system. However, these solutions
do not address the large number of copper wires, and
resulting copper terminations, to transmit data across
the switchyard.
The IEC 61850 communications standard provides
the framework for actual, practical process bus
solutions. IEC 61850-9-2 describes the data formats
necessary to send analog sampled values between an
interface device in the substation (known as a merging
unit) and protective relays in the control house.[4]
Functionally, this moves analog-to-digital conversion,
and analog data sampling, from protective relays to the
merging unit. IEC 61850 GOOSE messages can be
transmitted between relays and contact I/O devices in
the switchyard for control and status information.
It is typical to pull 11 multi-conductor copper
cables between the control house and the circuit
breaker. There are 67 copper wiring terminations to Figure 12: Process bus architecture
make, by hand, in the field, once the circuit breaker This allows for a simple, intuitive design, very similar
arrives on site. These same copper wires must be
to todays copper wiring. Also, such as topology is very
terminated in the control house as well. With process
flexible and scalable, is straightforward to install,
bus, it is possible to have the circuit breaker supports zones of protection as the industry understands
manufacturer install Process Interface Units (PIUs)
them, and allows simple isolation of equipment for
during their manufacturing process. A PIU consists of
testing, maintenance, and operational reasons. Similar
merging units to acquire currents and voltages, and to the breaker controller IED discussed previously,
contact inputs and outputs to provide equipment status
process bus installations may be considered a critical
and equipment control. Each PIU is wired to acquire
cyber asset, and may require additional cyber security
signals from 2 sets of CTs, and all necessary status and protection.
control points. The installation process on site then
becomes connecting fiber optic cable to the PIUs. The
VII. FUTURE DIRECTIONS
only field terminations necessary for the breaker are
then those for DC and AC power. Microprocessor relaying and digital
communications have lowered total installation costs
With process bus, the physical interface for
and operational costs for protection and control
protective relays is always the same: a PIU connected
systems, while increasing the overall reliability.
to a fiber optic cable. The reductions in design and
Multiple functions, including protection, control,
installation time for protection and control systems can
communication, metering, and oscillography have been
therefore be immense. In this specific example, process
converged in to the microprocessor relays. The practical
bus provides a 60% reduction in design, installation,
limit to further convergence has been the physical
and commissioning of the copper wiring across the
limitations of connecting copper wiring to each
switchyard, with some additional equipment cost.
protective relaying. Process bus allows protective relays
The IEC 61850 standard describes data message to be divorced from the physical limitations of copper
formats for transmitting data in the substation, wiring.
including analog sampled values. However, IEC 61850
One future direction that protective relaying can
does not describe architectures for communications
take is that of providing multiple zones of protection
networks. The communications network architecture is
inside of one microprocessor device. Multiple input
an especial challenge for process bus. The architecture
feeder protection and transformer protection relays
should be such that the system is robust, reliable,
already exist. Their practical application with copper
flexible, and scalable. Most importantly, it must be
wiring is limited, due to physical wiring challenges.
intuitive to design, install, and operate. There are
However, with process bus the installation becomes
commercially available process bus solutions available
simple and cost effective, as in Figure 13.
in the marketplace. These systems, to date, have chosen
to use a star (point-to-point) topology, similar to Figure
12.

C3-10
 Feeder Protection Relay increasing load, aging facilities, and an aging technical
IED workforce. The solutions recommended here are all
simple suggestions that can increase the productivity of
the technical workforce at little or no cost. For your
specific rural electric distribution system it is important
to look past the tradition of designing protection and
control system, and to look at these solutions from a
business perspective. Do these solutions really require
less time to design and install? What will it take to
5 5 5 5 5 5 implement them? Are they really cost effective? It is, of
2 2 2 2 2 2
course, vital to ensure any solution will maintain or
PIU
increase the reliability of the system. But the goal is to
break system design to the most basic level. Spend your
time designing the protection and control system to
meet specific application requirements, not designing
Figure 13: Multiple feeder protection with process wiring schedules and copper terminations.
bus
REFERENCES:
However, this is only the first step. It is simple to
[1] B. Kasztenny, The Myth of Complexity -
envision a device that provides all zones of protection
Configuration Mechanisms of Modern
and control necessary for a complete distribution
Microprocessor-Based Relays, Presented to the
substation or small transmission substation. Physical
56th Annual Georgia Tech Protective Relay
design then becomes the matter of designing the
Conference, May 1-3, 2002.
process bus system. All control functions are carried
[2] J. Holbach, T. Dufaure, Comparison of IEC
out inside this substation in a box. Design then
61850 GOOSE messages and control wiring
becomes a matter of selecting the right pieces, and
between protection relays, Presented to the 62
configuration.
Annual Georgia Tech Protective Relay conference.
May 21-23, 2008.
VIII. CONCLUSION [3] D60 Line Distance Relay Instruction Manual, GE
Each step in the processes discussed above has sought Publication GEK-113519.
to further reduce wiring to as few locations as possible. [4] IEC International Standard Communication
Since some contacts must be wired, it would be networks and systems in substations - Part 9-2:
impossible to totally eliminate the copper wire for Specific Communication Service Mapping (SCSM)
process signals from a substation. It does leads to a Sampled values over ISO/IEC 8802-3, IEC
protection and control rule of thumb of: wire a process Reference number IEC/TR 61850-9-2:2004(E),
value once and only once. When this rule is obeyed, IEC, Geneva, Switzerland.
all other locations that need the process value for [5] North American Electric Reliability Corporation,
protection or reporting purposes can receive the Cyber Security - Critical Cyber Asset
information from IED communications. This will Identification, Standard CIP-002-1
speed engineering, construction, and commissioning.
The second rule of thumb is: if a function does not
have to be wired, then dont. In the case of alarm and
status points these rules cause the status and alarm
points to be wired to the IED and passed via
communication to the other devices that need these
process values. The if a function does not have to be
wired, then dont rule leads to the use of pushbuttons
for control, internal lockout relays, and process bus.
Every application described in this paper is
possible today. The solutions recommended here are
non-proprietary, commercially, available, and
technically proven. The important message to take
away from this paper is this: there is no better time to
leverage the power of microprocessor relays and digital
communications than right now. The challenges facing
the rural electric distribution industry are well known:

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