CDA 2015 Annual Conference

Congrs annuel 2015 de lACB

CANADIAN DAM ASSOCIATION Mississauga, ON, Canada
ASSOCIATION CANADIENNE DES BARRAGES 2015 Oct 5-8

DAM SAFETY CONSTRUCTION RISK MANAGEMENT FOR

A TAILINGS DAM UPGRADE IN NORTHERN ONTARIO

Randy Donato, P.Eng., Vale Canada, Ontario Operations, Sudbury, ON, Canada

ABSTRACT

Vale milling and smelting operations near Sudbury, Ontario, rely on the Upper Pond to recycle and store water for
their processes. Extensive Vale infrastructure, known as the Copper Cliff Complex, is positioned downstream of the
Upper Pond Area (UPA) where more than 1000 Vale employees and contractors work in various plants. In addition,
the community of Copper Cliff is located further downstream. The UPA was first operated during the 1930s. Over
the course of various dam risk management studies it was determined that several upgrades to the dams were
required to allow the UPA to continue supplying process water. These upgrades were completed between the years
2012 and 2015 and the facility now meets the Canadian Dam Association Dam Safety Guidelines. During the design
stage of the South Dam (SD), the project team identified key construction aspects that warranted enhanced risk
management techniques designed to secure dam stability during construction.

This paper provides an overview of Vales Tailings Review Board (TRB) process and describes the TRBs
involvement with the SD project. It also describes the risk management process used by Vale to ensure the upgrades
were completed in accordance with Vales commitment to Zero Harm. One of the fundamental risk control measures
was frequent involvement of Vales TRB during the entire design and construction process.

RESUME

Les oprations de traitement de minerais de Vale Copper Cliff, situes prs de Sudbury, en Ontario, comptent sur
le bassin suprieur Upper Pond pour le recyclage et le stockage deau de procd. Lnorme complexe industriel
de Copper Cliff est positionn en aval de la zone du bassin suprieur Upper Pond Area (UPA), o plus de 1000
employs et sous-traitants travaillent dans diverses installations de Vale. Immdiatement en aval du complexe
industriel se trouve la communaut de Copper Cliff. La zone de l'UPA a commenc tre exploite comme bassin
de rsidus du traitement du minerai pendant les annes 1930. Au cours de diverses tudes de gestion des risques
pour les barrages associs au bassin, il a t dtermin que plusieurs modifications aux barrages taient ncessaires
afin de permettre l'UPA de continuer fournir l'eau de procd. Ces amliorations furent ralises entre 2012 et
2015 et le bassin de rsidus est maintenant conforme aux Recommandations de scurit des barrages publies par
lAssociation canadienne des barrages. Durant la phase de conception du barrage sud (SD), l'quipe du projet a
identifi les principaux aspects de construction qui ont justifi les amliorations aux techniques de gestion des
risques visant assurer la stabilit du barrage pendant la construction.

Ce document donne un aperu du processus suivi par la Commission de rvision des rsidus (TRB) institue par
Vale et il dcrit la participation du TRB au projet SD. Il expose galement le processus de gestion des risques utilis
par Vale pour confirmer que les mises niveau furent effectues conformment avec les politiques de Vale touchant
la sant, la scurit et lenvironnement. L'une des mesures fondamentales du contrle du risque tait la participation
frquente de la TRB pendant tout le processus de conception et de construction.

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1 GENERAL

Vale Canada Limited (Vale) owns a number of mining facilities within the City of Greater Sudbury,
Ontario, some of which have been operating since the late 1800s (Donato, 2011). The subject facilities
of this article are Vales tailings containment areas near Sudbury, Ontario; specifically the Upper Pond
Area (UPA) and the Central Tailings Area (CTA). While the UPA is the primary subject matter, the CTA
is also discussed in general terms for context. At one time Vale operated three mills near Sudbury: Frood-
Stobie, Creighton and Clarabelle Mill. In 1989 milling was consolidated at the Clarabelle Mill that uses
the CTA to manage tailings.

Figure 1 includes a Google Earth inset showing the City of Greater Sudbury location within central
Canada. The figure presents a plan view of the UPA and CTA sites and demonstrates their urban settings
adjacent to the communities of Copper Cliff and Lively and proximity to Vales central mining and
mineral processing plants.

Within the CTA and UPA are a number of tailings dams that were constructed before modern
geotechnical engineering practice was utilized for mining dams. Vales predecessor INCO had been a
pioneer in applying geotechnical engineering to evaluate existing tailings dams as well as new designs;
beginning with the M Area South Dam site assessment and engineering evaluation in 1957. This was one
of the earliest engineering assessments of a tailings dam in Canada.

Milling in Vales Ontario operations first began at the Copper Cliff Mill August, 1930 (Canadian Mining
Journal 1946). Originally tailings were deposited into an exhausted sand pit that likely supplied aggregate
to the mines. The sand pit area eventually reached capacity and further storage used embankments
constructed of tailings to create the current UPA. The UPA dams were likely formed using the very early
method of coarse tailings sand bed load separation that occurred during flow transport along a
trestle/sluice arrangement. Once the UPA reached capacity, tailings containment moved to the CTA.

The CTA has been in operation as a tailings management facility since the late 1930s, beginning with A
Area, and is expected to remain in-service for tailings management for at least twenty more years. Since
1985 R Area has been the active tailings management site within the CTA; where the exterior dams are
raised in the upstream direction using engineered: foundation treatment, under-drainage and outer
compacted tailings shells (Martin 1996 and Van Cruyningen 1987). It is likely that the original A Area
dam was developed using methods similar to those of the UPA. Following A Area, the M and P Area
perimeters were established using (at the time) a more advanced upstream construction method compared
to that of the UPA. Vale refers to the UPA, A, M and P tailings areas as the Old Stack. While they are
no longer used for active tailings deposition, some of the remaining ponds function as important process
and storm water management reservoirs, the UPA is a case in point.

Vales Ontario Operations and its predecessor company INCO have long maintained an inspection and
maintenance program for its tailings dams. In 2001, Vale engaged a prominent Canadian seismologist to
complete a site wide seismic hazard assessment for the tailings areas. The assessment demonstrated that
the extreme design earthquake ground motions have the potential to trigger seismic liquefaction, despite
the low seismicity in the Sudbury area. Since this finding, the post seismic event loading condition has
generally governed the stability requirements for Vales tailings dam designs. This has had profound
implications to the Old Stack tailings dams, as seismic loading was not a material consideration in their
original planning and construction. Vale has subsequently embarked on an ambitious campaign to
upgrade the stability of each of its Old Stack exterior perimeter dams. The progress of this ongoing work
is summarized in Table 1 and examples are shown in Figure 2. The dam upgrade work typically involved

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foundation treatment, piping controls and a stability buttress. The spillways were sized to pass the
probable maximum flood.

Table 1: Summary of Completed Old Stack Tailings Dam Upgrades

Design and Construction
Area Dam Name
Duration
A A Area Dam and spillway tunnel 2004 to 2007
P Kallio and Cecchetto Dams and P Area 2008 to 2013
Spillway
UPA Upper Pond North and South Dam (UPND 2012 to 2015
and UPSD) and spillway

Canada Stobie
Sudbury N Mine
Clarabelle Mill

USA Copper Cliff Mine,

North Side
Upper Pond
Area
A
Central Pond
Tailings
Creighton
R Area M Copper Cliff
Pond Pond Complex
Mine
P Copper Cliff
Pond
Copper Cliff Mine,
South Side
Lively Nickel Regional Road 55
Refinery
Figure 1: Vale Canadas Ontario Operations near Sudbury, Ontario

Kallio Dam

P Area
Spillway

Figure 2: Upgraded Kallio Dam and the P Area Spillway

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2 VALES TAILINGS MANAGEMENT PRACTICES

This section introduces Vale Ontario Operations safety, health and environmental management systems
(SHE-MS) and describes how Vales tailings management practices fit into the SHE-MS system. Vales
Tailings Review Board process is also described

2.1 Vales Journey to Zero Harm and the Mining Association of Canada

Vale is committed to achieving Zero Harm to its people and workplaces and in the communities in which
it operates and to the environment. In the journey to Zero Harm, Vale has continued to evolve its
workplace SHE-MS. Over the last several years Vale has adopted explicit risk assessment and control
practices into managing workplace safety hazards as well as hazards posed to its neighbor communities
and the natural environment. The latest evolution of the SHE-MS is the HomeSafe program. HomeSafe
recognizes that every industry has hazards that create risk. That risk can result in harm to people, our
workplace, our community and the environment. While it is not possible to achieve zero risk, Zero Harm
is attainable. The expectation of HomeSafe is that every worker goes home safe and that every Vale
employee has a responsibility in the journey to Zero Harm. Vales membership in the Mining Association
of Canada (MAC) is consistent with the HomeSafe program and Zero Harm principles.

Vale is a full member of MAC and subscribes to MACs Towards Sustainable Mining initiatives (MAC
2011 a) and the MAC tailings management framework. Vale therefore manages its tailings facilities
according to the fundamental MAC tailings management system framework elements: Policy and
Commitment, Planning, Implementation, Checking and Corrective Action and Annual Review (MAC
2011 b).

Given the urban setting and critical function of Vales tailings facility, risk management is a fundamental
requirement of its tailings management system. Vales Tailings Review Board (TRB) fulfills a critical
role in this regard.

2.2 Vales Tailings Review Board

Vales predecessor INCO began the process of external peer review of its tailings operations in the late
1980s. Currently, Vales TRB panel includes four prominent engineers recognized internationally for
their experience with tailings and water management facilities. While each board member is a highly
qualified and experienced geotechnical engineer, each bring specialized skill sets and experience. This
specialty experience includes more than fifty years of site specific experience at Vale, and expertise in
seismicity and liquefaction, rock mechanics, geochemistry and construction.

While Vale are in frequent communications with the TRB (monthly), an annual formal review meeting
takes place on site and typically requires a calendar week to complete. The general scope of service
includes independent assessment of the facilitys tailings management system, and review of the
following:

Salient operational issues.

Relevant capital improvement projects.

Specialized studies and assessments.

Review of Comprehensive Improvement Plan.

5 Year expenditure plan.
While specific topics and review agenda are set by Vale, the agenda is circulated to the board for input
well in advance of the meeting.

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The formal TRB meetings are organized and chaired by the Tailings Engineer and attended by the first
and second line facility managers. The annual review begins with aerial reconnaissance over the entire
CTA and UPA followed by about eight to ten hours of site inspection. Field inspections are coordinated
over several days such that the board has viewed a site before the related presentations are delivered.
Presentations are typically given by Vale staff and consultants. The last presentation is Vales five year
expenditure plan to solicit feedback as to whether there are apparent omissions. On the final day, the
board delivers a formal presentation to Vales executive management and a final report within six weeks.

Recommendations made by the board are prioritized by the Tailings Engineer and plant manager and
catalogued into an action registry database. Recommendations are usually accepted and a decision not to
proceed with a particular recommendation would need to be approved by the plants general manager. As
action plans are prepared and implemented the registry is updated. Vales progress at completing the
boards recommendations is reviewed during the following annual meetings.

During Vales operating history there have been two man-made incidents relating to liquefaction
triggered by construction activity. Following each event both the TRB and the Ministry of Labor were
involved. In 1987, one incident involved placement of natural granular fills for a temporary internal
divider dyke over a pond by end dumping methods where heavy equipment vibration was considered to
have been the trigger. A more recent event was a shallow slough of a tailings slope during the foundation
investigation for Cecchetto Dam in February 2011. In this case a shallow test trench excavation to
confirm the presence of bedrock was considered to be the trigger.

Vale has established emergency response plans and resources to respond to unexpected events and is
currently working with the emergency services group of Greater Sudbury to develop off-site emergency
response plans.

3 UPPER POND DAMS GEOTECHNICAL SETTING AND PROJECT OVERVIEW

Vales milling and smelting operations rely on the Upper Pond (UP) to store and supply water to their
continuous and critical processes. Extensive Vale infrastructure, known as the Copper Cliff Complex, is
positioned downstream of the UP where more than one thousand Vale employees and contractors work in
various plants. In addition, the community of Copper Cliff is located in this vicinity. The UPA dams were
first operated in the 1930s and are the Ontario operations oldest tailings dams, and possibly among the
oldest tailings dams in Canada. Upgrades to the UPA dams were designed and constructed between the
years of 2012 and 2015 and now meet the Canadian Dam Association Dam Safety Guidelines (CDA
2007) and Ministry of Natural Resources requirements (MNR 1999, 2010, 2011 a and b). Figure 3
compares the site between 2013 and circa 1930.

The UPA is bound by the North Dam, South Dam (UPSD) and elevated topography. The UPSD is 2,500
ft (762 m) long and comprises two different sections separated to the northwest and southeast by a
prominent bedrock outcrop. The northwest section is the primary focus in this paper. It is about 700 ft
(213 m) long, 50 ft (15 m) high with a narrow tailings beach on the upstream side. The known details of
the original construction and operation are presented in various technical reports. The salient aspects
relating to this article are:

Loose, saturated tailings up to 20 ft (6 m) deep that comprise the UPSD foundation.

A narrow tailings beach that remains today.

As a result of process water treatment, a lime hydroxide sludge layer lining the UP that is
partially dredged twice a year for storage requirements. This sludge lining is considered to
attenuate seepage through the northwest section of the UPSD and benefit stability.

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An out-of-service decant chimney and box culvert.

Two additional in-service (at the time of construction) conduits through the dam.

Southeast
Section

Northwest
Section

Southeast
Section A

Northwest Section
2013 Circa 1930
Figure 3: Upper Pond South Dam in 2013 and circa 1930, note tailings deposited in the flat area marked with an A
are loose and saturated and form the foundations for the present UPSD

The out-of-service decant chimney and box culvert and in-service conduits are shown in Figures 4 and 5,
respectively. Experience with one of the operating conduits during construction of the UPSD project is
shared as a lesson learned, herein.

Over the course of various dam safety risk management studies and meetings with Vales Tailings
Review Board, it was determined that extensive upgrades were required to enhance the integrity of the
dams to allow their continued process water supply function. The upgrades to the UPSD were completed
this year; the general scope is presented in Figure 6.

The scope of upgrades to the northwest section of the UPSD included:

Foundation treatment using stone columns.

Relocating and decommissioning utilities through the left abutment and along the downstream
crest.

Construction of a rockfill buttress with granular filters against the downstream slope.

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Details of the foundation conditions and UPSD upgrades are presented in another paper at this conference
(Viles et al. 2015). During the design stage of the UPSD, the team identified key construction aspects that
warranted enhanced risk management techniques to secure dam stability.

Figure 4: Out-of-service decant chimney and concrete box culvert that was inspected and grouted on a priority basis
in 2012

Inlet Outlet 2014, During Construction

2013 Outlet Process Water

Line

Inlet

Figure 5: Conduits in-service during construction

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 Decant chamber re-purpose
and conduits decommissioning
New emergency
spillway

Pipe line
relocation
Pipe line
relocation

Upgrade dam
Northwest Section

Upgrade
dam Southeast
Pipe line
Section
decommissioning/relocation

Figure 6: General Scope for the UPSD Project, photo is pre-construction

4 TRB INVOLVEMENT DURING PRELIMMINARY DESIGN OF THE UPSD PROJECT

Vale utilizes a Front End Loading (FEL) project engineering model. The general objectives of the FEL
model are to ensure that proposed projects that are expected to lead to capital expenditure are indeed
required. If so, the project then moves to advance engineering to execution (detailed design and
construction) in a staged approach with the scope, schedule and budget understood to the +/-10%
confidence range before capital funds are committed. The FEL process uses three stages of engineering,
scope definition and cost estimation. These are summarized in Table 2.

The UP risk reduction project formally began in 2005 with a dam safety risk characterization study of
Vales Old Stack tailings areas. This work fulfilled the FEL 1 requirement and confirmed that the UPND
and UPSD needed upgrading if the UP was to remain in service. Between 2005 and 2012 Vale evaluated
options to decommission the UP and relocate its function elsewhere or replace it with a water treatment
plant. Upgrading the dams was eventually selected for economic reasons.

Vales TRB have been involved in each stage of the UPSD project. During the annual 2012 TRB
meetings the board received a FEL 2 presentation of the UPSD risk reduction measures that identified a
rockfill buttress as the preferred alternative to improve the dams stability. The board highlighted the
hazards of even minor construction work within the downstream toe area given the wide extent of
historic, saturated, loose tailings beneath the existing dam and well beyond the downstream toe area (see
A in Figure 3).

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In fact, recognition of these sub-surface conditions and visual assessment of the concrete box culvert
resulted in impacts to a major smelter upgrade project (Clean AER) on a priority basis in 2012:

Rearrangement of proposed plants and services requiring excavation within 1,000 ft (305 m) of
the UPSD toe with excavation plans to be reviewed by the TRB.

Stringent blasting controls for bedrock excavation 1000 ft (305 m) downstream of the UPSD.

Table 2: FEL Process Summary

FEL Stage Objective Percent Engineering Complete
FEL 1 To confirm whether or not there is a business 10%
need that should be advanced to FEL 2
FEL 2 To identify options that meet the business 25%
need, and advance each option sufficiently to
enable selection of a preferred alternative.
Engineering is completed to advance the
preferred alternative to a +20/-10% confidence
level.
FEL 3 To advance the preferred alternative to the 30%
+15/-10% confidence level.

Following an assessment of several in-situ soil improvement methods, the board recommended that Vale
consider stone columns/vibro-replacement as a potential foundation treatment during FEL 3. In addition,
it was recommended that Vale undertake a full-scale field trial of stone columns construction to
demonstrate whether this technique would be effective in achieving the required tailings density and to
better understand the potential risks posed by such methods. In 2013, FEL 3 was advanced on the basis
of stone columns with a full-scale field trial scheduled for summer 2013.

The trial was considered critical to the project; if unsuccessful, it was considered that excavate and
replace was the only other viable foundation treatment. However, this would require revisiting the FEL
3 design and developing strain limiting excavation methods that would avoid static liquefaction of the
dam and its foundation. It was recognized that such excavation techniques would likely be higher risk
and considerably more costly than stone columns (by more than $1M).

Prior to beginning the stone columns trial design, the project team recognized the need to have a geo-
foundation specialist contractor retained for the project. The contractor was selected using a competitive
tender process under the general contractor, managed by Vale. The trial design team included the
designer, the general and geo-foundation specialist contractors and the Vale project team.

During the design of the stone columns trial, the bottom feed method of supplying aggregate to the
column was selected given the soft saturated tailings. It was also decided that air should be used to
fluidize the aggregate as opposed to water to reduce the potential for the matrix tailings mobilizing into
the stone column aggregate. Also identified during the design was the potential for pressurized air pulses
to propagate towards the dam toe that could generate increased pore pressures and create preferential
seepage flow paths. Review of this risk with the geo-foundation specialist contractor lead to the
development of a stone fence installation between the stone columns trial area and the dam toe. The
stone fence would function as an air pressure relief conduit to surface should air pulses propagate
towards the dam toe. The stone fence involved installation of three sacrificial rows of stone columns
using primarily vibration as opposed to compressed air to place the aggregate. The trial design was
reviewed with the TRB before beginning work in August 2013.

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During the trial it was realized that the feeder tube could potentially block as the vibroflot penetrated to
the design depth. Under these conditions only compressed air could be used to clear the blockage. When
this happened it was visually evident by sudden heaving of the ground proximate to the stone column.
When this occurred the trial was halted and the TRB consulted. The team re-grouped to identify further
controls to mitigate uncontrolled air pulses during installation. Field modifications to the vibroflot
equipment were made to control compressed air flow as well changes in vibroflot procedure to the fill the
feeder tube with aggregate before ground penetration. The trial resumed and was completed without
further unexpected events.

Piezometer monitoring during the trial indicated that:

Successive adjacent installations could lead to cumulative pore pressure increases.

Pressures quickly dissipated as the vibroflot was removed.

The zone of influence was local to the installation point with peak ru values in the range of 0.8.

In late November 2013, a special meeting was held in Sudbury with the TRB to formally present the stone
columns trial results and discuss their continued basis for the detailed design scope. While use of stone
columns was endorsed as the basis for foundation treatment, it was at this milestone that the TRB
emphasized the need for enhanced construction risk control measures. Before beginning construction the
TRB recommended the following be in place:

A manual for dam safety construction risk management that would include procedures for all
work identified as high risk (without controls).

An emergency response plan.

A designated responsible person from Vale with the authority and responsibility to ensure
appropriate risk control measures were in place and provide communications between the TRB
and the project team.

Vale committed to implementing each of the TRB recommendations. The author was designated the
Responsible Person given his:

Project role as the Owners Representative as this would avoid assigning the potentially
competing interests of the Responsible Person and Project Manager (scope, schedule and budget)
to a single person.

Existing relationship with the TRB.

Knowledge of the project background and technical issues.

5 UPPER POND DAM SAFETY CONSTRUCTION RISK MANAGEMENT PROCESS

The following describes the dam stability construction risk management process from detailed design
through construction. It is recognized that risk management of health and safety hazards to workers is
fundamental to any construction project. While these aspects were managed according to Vale
requirements they will not be elaborated on further, except to say the deliverables resulting from the
process described herein were appended into the hazards and controls review document (process hazards
review, PHR) prepared prior to construction beginning.

It is important to note that Vales project management group recognized the importance of flexible
contracts (on a time and materials basis) to allow full engagement in the risk management process on the
parts of the designer, construction manager and contractor. It was also recognized at the outset of the dam
stability construction risk management process that:

The project schedule required a number of the anticipated controls and procedures at the
beginning of construction.

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The dam safety related construction risks would be present over the majority of the schedule.

A phased approach was required to facilitate the risk management process without delaying
construction.

Given Vales previous local experience with static liquefaction and the UPSD stability factor of safety
(FoS) of 1.2 at the start of construction, the project team agreed that the performance objectives of the risk
management program were 1) the factor of safety for stability could not be materially lowered and 2) that
excessive strain and vibration in saturated tailings must be avoided.

The key project personnel met to review the drawings and scope and break the project down to into four
phases and 16 tasks. These were used to identify milestone dates for the risk document deliverables and
TRB review. The phases, tasks and approximate construction periods are summarized in Table 3.

Table 3: UPSD Construction Phase Summary

Phase Work Summary 2014 Construction Period
1 5 tasks: install drive point piezometers, flood mid-March to mid-April
light removal, access to immediate
downstream toe, wick drains and
semiconductor piezometer installation
2 4 tasks: mobilization, stone fence and columns mid-April to mid-August
installation, foundation confirmatory testing
3 5 tasks: excavate and replace foundation mid-June to mid-October
treatment at left and right abutments, new
utilities installation, remove/relocate existing
utilities and fluming active decant to avoid
work areas
4 2 tasks: first 5 ft (1.5 m) of fill placement over mid-July to mid-November
the foundation treatment area and the
remaining placement of engineered fills

The same key personnel then met according to the construction phasing and schedule requirements to
work through the risk identification, analysis and control requirements. During these sessions, the tasks
for each phase were further broken down in to sub-tasks (36 in all). For example, Phase 2 stone column
installation was broken down to the following sub-tasks: inserting the vibroflot into the ground, feeding
gravel into the ground and compaction of the gravel.

For each sub-task the following considerations were compiled as input into the risk analysis:

Construction method, equipment and access requirements.

Potential dam stability hazards (i.e. excess pore pressures due to vibration, rapid loading or
disturbance of the sludge layer lining the pond).

Potential failure modes (i.e. static liquefaction, piping due to hydraulic fracturing or excess pore
pressures).

Risk analysis considering likelihood and consequence was then completed for each sub-task according to
the Vale HomeSafe risk assessment framework, shown in Figure 7. Nearly all sub-tasks were
characterized as potentially high or extreme hazards to dam stability without controls. Controls were then
identified to reduce the hazard probability to unlikely and if practical, to rare.

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Typically, several mitigation measures were identified for an individual sub-task that involved individual
and collaborative efforts from the team. For example:

Construction procedures and equipment modifications by the general and geo-foundation
specialist contractors and construction manager with input from Vale and the designer.

Instrumentation programs, geotechnical monitoring criteria and continuous on site representation
by the designer

Emergency Response Plan (ERP) preparation and interface with operations for pond level
control, dredging and reservoir management procedures by Vale.

Overall risk management review by the TRB and Vale.

The designers also supplied drafting support to the contractor and prepared the overall risk management
document.

While a detailed review of each sub-task, associated risks and controls is not practical in this forum, the
following summarizes some of the controls implemented that reflect the risk profile of the UPSD project.

Inspection of the site construction on three separate occasions by members of the TRB. The
second inspection involved an unannounced field test of the emergency response plan, assuming a
piping event had occurred.

Development and full scale testing of the ERP. The ERP incorporated the resources available
during construction and was presented to the entire project team before work began. Throughout
the project, select emergency response scenarios, actions and responsibilities were reviewed as
part of the daily tool box safety meetings. The ERP was reviewed by the TRB and each board
members contact information and availability were incorporated into the plan.

A triple array network of 42 semiconductor piezometers (approximately one instrument per 600
2 2
ft (56 m ) to monitor real-time pore pressures within 50 ft (15 m) of the dam toe. This required a
dedicated site engineer that reported results to the lead geotechnical site engineer. Pore pressure
response was reviewed continuously by the designer and periodically with the TRB throughout
the project via conference calls and screen sharing.

Periodic stability analysis during construction to verify subsequent work would not reduce the
FoS below original condition.

Installation of a triple array zone of non-production stone columns (stone fence) between the
foundation improvement zone and the downstream toe (where the semiconductor piezometers
were located) to dampen the potential effects of compressed air pulses on dam stability.

Excavation avoidance of saturated loose tailings. Other excavation was avoided unless risk
reviewed and approved by the designer and owners representative.

Detailed construction procedures including equipment, methodology, traffic and stockpile plans
with field delineation of traffic and stockpile zones.

When subsurface conditions varied materially from what was considered during the risk analysis,
the work was halted, the task(s) re-assessed and construction procedures revised accordingly.

Continuous (24/7) dam safety inspections until the stabilizing buttress reached one quarter the of
the design height.

Scheduling the emergency spillway blasting until the stabilizing buttress had reached half the
design height.

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 CONSEQUENCES
LIKELIHOOD
Low Minor Moderate Major Severe
Certain
Moderate High Extreme Extreme Extreme
(> 1/month)
Likely
Moderate High High Extreme Extreme
(every 1 - 2 years)

Possible Low Moderate High High Extreme

(every 2 - 10 years)
Unlikely
(every 10 - 30 Low Moderate Moderate High High
years)
Rare
(1/lifetime of Low Low Low Moderate High
facility)
CONSEQUENCES
Low Minor Moderate Major Severe
HEALTH & SAFETY
No injury or health First aid treatment Medical treatment or Lost time injury or Fatality or permanent
effect or reversible reversible health severe reversible disability or
health effect of effect of concern health effect of concern irreversible health
little concern effect of concern

ENVIRONMENT
Normal operation Minimal Short term Significant reversible Some long term
variances environment environmental impact environmental impact environmental
impacting impact impact
environment

SOCIAL
Community suffers Community suffers Community suffers Community suffers Community suffers
no adverse impact minor adverse some adverse impact significant adverse irreparable adverse
impact impact impact

$ IMPACT

< $10,000 $10-100,000 $100,000-1 Million $1-10 Million > $10 Million
Figure 7: Vale HomeSafe Risk Assessment Framework

6 LESSON LEARNED

Despite the project teams rigorous efforts to manage dam stability construction related risks, the project
was not completed without encountering unforeseen problems. This is described with a lesson learned.

On October 7, 2014, during excavation along the original downstream dam toe, a large process water line
was unknowingly ruptured. The excavation was 10 ft (3 m) deep through loose to compact unsaturated
tailings. The contractor was in the process of installing granular filters to bedrock near the left abutment
of the Northwest Section. The pipe line was under about 15 ft (5 m) of gravity head at the point of
contact. The pipe line had partially separated at a mechanical joint and resulted in rapid and vigorous
upwelling of water and tailings about 20 ft (6 m) below the dam crest. Initially this appeared to be a
piping event or release of a perched water table, despite measuring the phreatic surface at several ft (more
than 1 m) below the excavation grade prior to beginning this task.

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The ERP was immediately activated and the area was rapidly buried over with 10 ft (3 m) of 12 inch (0.3
m) minus waste rock before the owners representative arrived on site. This was in accordance with the
corrective action called for in the ERP. Emergency notifications of the event were communicated to the
general manager level. Evacuation of the downstream Copper Cliff Complex was not activated as flow
and solids loss did not increase and flow was visibly clearing within an hour of the owner representatives
arrival on site. The owners representative advised the TRB by email and returned to the UPSD to manage
the event until it was apparent that dam stability was not at increased risk. Dam safety monitoring by the
designer on a 24 hours per day basis resumed until flow through the pipe could be halted. Photos of the
site shortly after the emergency response measures were implemented are shown in Figure 8.

9:30 am

8:26 am

Figure 8: Inadvertent disturbance of an 18 inch process water line and clearing flow an hour after ERP actions

Prior to beginning construction, the potential to disturb buried pipelines was identified and considered
unlikely given the efforts to identify sub-surface utilities during design. During detailed design all above
and below ground services within the site limits were to be identified using specialty consultant services.
This process requires that the excavation plan and expected depths be reviewed along with information
from Vales archived drawings. These details were included on the construction drawings and before
work began, sub-surface utilities were marked in the field by the specialty consultant. However, at the
time of the event, the field stakes marking the process water line were 50 ft (15 m) away (beyond the
advancing face of the excavation). Follow up investigation revealed there was a buried pipe line at the
marked location that was no longer in service. This information was not on the archive drawings.

In order to avoid a similar incident elsewhere in the future, buried services will be exposed and surveyed
in the field as part of detailed design.

7 CLOSING REMARKS

The costs related to dam stability construction risk management were approximately 8.5% of direct
construction. This includes Vale, the TRB, the Designer, the general and sub-contractors and
instrumentation. In terms of deliverables, these were:

Dam Stability Construction Risk Management Manual and Training.

Instrumentation purchase and install.

Designer site representation.

These efforts represent a considerable investment in the HomeSafe risk management tools and
demonstrate Vales commitment to achieving Zero Harm. Prior to and following the process water line
rupture noted above, the project was executed without another incident relating to dam stability.

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Considering the potential hazards, the dam safety risk management efforts employed by Vale for this
project are in the authors view an example of best practice in dam safety management and in the use of
external tailings review boards. Vale intends to adopt this process as standard practice for the remaining
perimeter dam upgrades over the next several years.

8 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The author extends thanks to the entire project team, the TRB, and Vale management for their support in
this article. He also appreciates his wifes patience in order to meet the submission time lines.

9 REFERENCES

CDA (Canadian Dam Association). 2007. Dam Safety Guidelines.

Donato, R. 2011. Closure considerations while operating a tailings management facility in northern Ontario,
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MAC (Mining Association of Canada). 2011 a. TSM Assessment Protocol A Tool for Assessing Tailings
Management Performance.

MAC (Mining Association of Canada). 2011 b. A Guide to the Management of Tailings Facilities.

Martin, T. E. and Tissington, I. 1996. Design Evolution of Tailings Dams at Inco Sudbury. Tailings and Mine Waste
96, Balkema, Rotterdam.

MNR (Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources). 1999. Ontario Dam Safety Guidelines - Draft.

MNR (Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources). 2010. Technical Guidelines and Requirements for Approval under
the Lakes and Rivers Improvement Act.

MNR (Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources). 2011 a. Seismic Hazard Criteria, Assessment and Considerations.
Technical Bulletin.

MNR (Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources). 2011 b. Classification and Inflow Design Flood Criteria. Technical
Bulletin.

Van Cruyningen J. P. and Puro, M.J. 1987. Tailings Disposal Area Development at Inco Sudbury Operations. 25th
Canadian Mineral Processors Anniversary Conference, Ottawa, Ontario.

Viles et al. 2015. The Use of Stone Columns to Densify Tailings and Improve Stability of a Tailings Dam. CDA
2015 Annual Conference, Mississauga, Ontario.

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