Al-GHAZA LI AND SCHOPENHAUER ON KNOWLEDGE

AND SUFFERING

Zain Imtiaz Ali

Department of Philosophy, University of Auckland

The major Islamic philosophers, writes Deborah Black, produced no works dedi-
cated to aesthetics, although their writings do address issues that contemporary phi-
losophers might study under that heading. 1 The aim of this essay is to show how
classical Islamic philosophy may be studied within a framework of aesthetics. To
achieve this goal, I will bring together the metaphysics of Abu Hamid al-Ghazal
(10581111)2 and the aesthetics of Arthur Schopenhauer (17881860). In compar-
ing and contrasting al-Ghazal with Schopenhauer the focus will be on the underly-
ing themes common to both thinkers. The two central themes involve the issues of
suffering and knowledge. There are, in addition, five shared themes that will emerge
from the analysis to follow. The commonalities that emerge will also serve to high-
light important differences, especially with regard to presuppositions made by each
author. Importantly, though, it will be argued that due to the shared themes, Scho-
penhauers aesthetics can act as a framework to view the metaphysics of al-Ghazal
as a theory of aesthetics.

Al-Ghazal on Suffering

The source of suffering, for al-Ghazal, was located in his desire for the essence of
knowledge. Suffering for him began in his youth, when the realization dawned on
him that within his community there existed a parity among the different faiths. He
noted that the tendency was for the Christian children to grow up as Christians,
young Jews to grow up in Judaism, and young Muslims in Islam.3 This observed par-
ity subsequently had the effect of loosening the grip of tradition and conformism. Al-
Ghazal then describes an upsurge of a powerful interior force within him, desiring
only certainty about the essence of knowledge:

Certain knowledge is that in which the thing known reveals itself without leaving any
room for doubt or any possibility of error or illusion, nor can the heart allow such a
possibility. One must be protected from error, and should be so bound to certainty
that any attempt, for example, to transform a stone into gold or a stick into a serpent
would not raise doubts or engender contrary probabilities. I know very well that ten is
more than three. If anyone tries to dissuade me by saying, No three is more than
ten, and wants to prove it by changing in front of me this stick into a serpent, even
if I saw him changing it, still this fact would engender no doubt about my knowledge.
Certainly, I would be astonished at such a power, but would not doubt my knowl-
edge.

Philosophy East & West Volume 57, Number 4 October 2007 409419 409
> 2007 by University of Hawaii Press
 Thus I came to know that whatever is known without this kind of certainty is doubtful
knowledge, not reliable and safe; that all knowledge subject to error is not sure and cer-
tain.4

The quest for certainty leads al-Ghazal on what is best described as an episte-
mological odyssey in search of the essence of knowledge. His journey is the subject
of his book Munqidh min al-dalal. The book, mainly autobiographical in nature, dis-
cusses the various epistemologies he encounters and subsequently rejects. The de-
sire for the essence of knowledge drives him to physical and mental paralysis. He
notes his inability to continue lecturing at Baghdad University and the eventual
onset of skepticism. The eventual solution, and perhaps cure, was what he describes
as a light from God entering his heart (an illumination event):

My disease grew worse and lasted almost two months, during which I fell prey to scepti-
cism, though neither in theory nor in outward expression. At last, God the Almighty cured
me of that disease and I recovered my health and mental equilibrium. The self-evident
principles of reason again seem acceptable; I trusted them and in them felt safe and cer-
tain. I reached this point not by well ordered or methodical argument, but by means of a
light God the Almighty cast into my breast, which light is the key to most knowledge.5

Following this illumination event, al-Ghazal then contends that the essence of
knowledge cannot be revealed through well-reasoned arguments, theology, or tradi-
tion, but is only accessible through the mercy of God. He remarks that anyone who
believes that the unveiling of truth is the fruit of well-ordered arguments is guilty of
disparaging the mercy of God.6 Consequently, suffering, for al-Ghazal, is very much
on a personal level and within the context of a believer desiring knowledge. It does
not seem that al-Ghazal at any time detaches himself from Islam or theism. His suf-
fering involves coming to terms with a belief that could count as infallible knowl-
edge. To better appreciate al-Ghazals views on the nature of the illumination event,
we need to look at his metaphysics.

The Metaphysics of al-Ghazal

Al-Ghazals metaphysics revolves around two main themes: first the distinction be-
tween the visible world and the unseen world, which is referred to as the world of
Dominion, and second the Quranic parable of light and the parable of darkness.
With regard to the first theme, the world of everyday experience is seen as a shadow
or an effect that proceeds not directly from God but from the world of Dominion (the
unseen world). It is the world of Dominion that directly emanates from God, while
the visible world exists as a secondary effect.7 Al-Ghazals emphasis is on the visible
world as being a reflection of the unseen world of Dominion. To clarify the nature of
this relationship, al-Ghazal presents an exegesis of two Quranic parables, that of
light and that of darkness. The parable of light is narrated as follows:

God is the light of the heavens and the earth; the likeness of his light is as a niche wherein
is a lamp, the lamp in a glass, the glass as it were a glittering star kindled from a blessed

410 Philosophy East & West

 tree, an olive that is neither of the East nor of the West, whose oil well-nigh would shine,
even if no fire touched it; light upon light; god guides to His light whom He will.8

According to al-Ghazal, each of the five features mentioned in the parable rep-
resents the five faculties of the human soul. David Buchman summarizes the Gha-
zalian interpretation of the five faculties:
[T]he lamp, the niche, the glass, the tree and the olive of the Light Verse are all visible,
existent things whose characteristics point to the attributes of these five faculties; senses,
imagination, reflection, the rational faculty, and the prophetic faculty.9
Furthermore, Buchman notes that al-Ghazal envisions the aim of a believer as
being the purification of the soul; thus, the greater the souls purification, the more
one is able to perceive Gods light and gain true knowledge of things. 10 Hence, for
al-Ghazal, the essence of knowledge resides in the perception of the Divine light.11
Returning for a moment to the faculties of the soul and the parable of light, I will
consider the reasoning behind al-Ghazals explanation of the soul (and its five fac-
ulties). The senses are equated with the niche, since when you consider its specific
characteristics, you find that its lights come out of numerous holes, like two ears, two
nostrils. 12 The imagery here is of the lamp being positioned within an alcove that
directs its light to illuminate the room. In the same way the five senses focus our
minds on the world around us; illumination through the senses allows the world to
be perceived and understood.
The faculty of imagination is equated with the glass case of the lamp and is seen
as the organizer of rational knowledge,13 the idea being that conceptual, abstract
thought is made possible by the imagination, which also preserves a sense of coher-
ency. Similarly glass, once refined and polished, far from obstructing the light, is able
to focus and perhaps polarize the light, which may initially be chaotic in nature. The
reflective spirit of the soul is equated with a tree. It appears that the intent of al-
Ghazal here is to emphasize the use of reason and argument. The reflective spirit
allows us to use canons of reasoning in a way that allows knowledge to grow and
flourish.
The prophetic spirit is equated with the oil of the lamp.14 Like oil, the prophetic
spirit symbolizes purity, which is distilled and thus becomes a source of light. The oil
can itself be luminous or can be ignited to produce illumination. Hence, within the
soul there exists a faculty to receive Divine illumination. The rational spirit, which
acts as a source of illumination, is equated with the lamp itself; therefore it is through
the rational spirit that an apprehension of the Divine takes place. Thus, al-Ghazal
describes prophets as light-giving lamps.15 Importantly, it is the rational spirit that
has the task of selecting and adopting as exemplars those who have already been
illuminated.
According to al-Ghazal, the parable of light is meant to reveal the nature of the
soul and its path to illumination. God is seen as the Light of lights, and our journey
toward the Divine can only be through the illumination of the various aspects of the
soul. Once we have begun the journey toward illumination, we get closer to God
and the essence of knowledge. The second parable, concerning darkness, is also

Zain Imtiaz Ali 411

 interpreted as revealing the nature of the soul. The difference, however, is that the
parable of light gives an insight into the faculties of the soul, whereas the parable of
darkness concerns diagnosing the state of the soul. The parable reads:
. . . in a fathomless ocean covered by a wave above which is wave above which are
clouds, darkness piled one upon the other.16

As with the parable of light, al-Ghazal assigns an interpretation to each symbol

within the parable. The ocean and the fathomless symbolize the world, since
within it are destructive dangers, harmful occupations and blinding murkiness. 17
The first wave symbolizes the bestial attributes, such as the preoccupation with sen-
sory pleasures, so that people will eat and enjoy just as cattle eat and enjoy. 18 The
second wave symbolizes the predatory attributes, such as anger, enmity, malice,
vainglory, and arrogance.19 The clouds symbolize loathsome beliefs, lying opinions,
and corrupt imaginings, which veil knowledge of the Real. 20 The soul is said to be
veiled in darkness if it is covered (or consumed) by the waves and clouds. Thus the
nature of humans corresponds to their position on the spectrum (or veils) of light and
darkness. For al-Ghazal the spectrum consists of three broad categories, those
veiled in darkness alone, those veiled by sheer light and those who are veiled by
light along with darkness. 21
Al-Ghazal then spells out the various character types depending on their posi-
tion on the spectrum. For example, persons veiled by total darkness are described as
suffering from various vices such that their ultimate end of searching in this world is
to achieve wishes, to obtain objects of appetite, and to obtain bestial pleasures by
means of women, food, and clothing. 22 Persons veiled by sheer light, on the other
hand, encounter the august glories of the face of God. They encounter the ruling au-
thority of majesty and thus become extinct from themselves, so that they cease
observing themselves. 23 The quest for the essence of knowledge rests ultimately
on the illumination of the soul. More precisely it would rest on the souls encounter
with the world of Dominion, or the Divine. In Schopenhauerian terms, the soul
would be said to enter a state of pure consciousness filled and occupied by a single
image of perception. The cure for al-Ghazals skepticism involves an illumination
event, where he claims to have apprehended the Divine, and thus the essence of
knowledge.

Schopenhauers Aesthetics

Schopenhauers aim is to unmask the naive set of views humans are prone to hold
about the nature and attainability of happiness. The thought comes across very
clearly in Schopenhauers parable of the cloud, which describes happiness as al-
ways in the future, or else in the past, and the present may be compared to a small
dark cloud driven by the wind over a sunny plain.24 The idea is that we can see it is
brighter everywhere else, but we are always in the clouds shadow. . . . [W]e look
back on the former events and realize we were happy without appreciating it when
they were present, or we aspire to unparalleled fulfilment if only some set of events

412 Philosophy East & West

will come somewhere ahead of the present cloud. 25 The source of suffering is the
inability of the Will to stop striving. The Will is incapable of final satisfaction in itself;
it goes on forever, striving.26 Schopenhauer affirms that all striving springs from
want of deficiency, from dissatisfaction with ones own state or condition, and there-
fore suffering so long as it is not satisfied. 27
Also, as long as the Will dominates we will never obtain happiness or peace.
The way out for Schopenhauer lies in a state of Will-free contemplation. The con-
cept of freeing the Will is akin to Platos desire to purify the soul. As Christopher Jan-
away notes:

[F]or Plato purifying the soul of its contamination by the body will bring it tranquillity of
apprehending the being itself of the eternal forms. Schopenhauers notion of freeing
oneself from the Will bears close similarity to this, as he himself recognised: when Plato
deplores the souls connection with the body and wishes to be liberated from it, Schopen-
hauer comments: we understand the real and true meaning of this complaint in so far as
we recognize . . . that the body is the Will itself.28

In order to liberate ourselves from the Will, Schopenhauer recommends that we

transcend four features characteristic of ordinary consciousness.29 The first feature is
that of identifying oneself as an individual in the world of experience. 30 This fea-
ture is what allows us to locate objects in space and time, but also establishes an
awareness of causal relations. The second feature is that we find objects interest-
ing, where we want them to be in certain states and want to prevent them being
in other states. 31
The third feature resides in the Will falsifying consciousness. An example of the
falsifying nature of the Will is that when things go well the whole world assumes
a bright colour and smiling aspect[;] when it goes badly it appears dark and
gloomy. 32 The final feature is the awareness of a disjunction between how I want
the world to be and how it is; the awareness of this disparity constitutes suffering.33
Once we are able to transcend each of the features of ordinary consciousness, we
then enter the realm of aesthetic consciousness. The state of aesthetic consciousness
is marked by the removal of the subject-object distinction. As Schopenhauer
explains, aesthetic consciousness entails that we are no longer able to separate
the perceiver from the perception, but the two have become one, since the entire
consciousness is filled and occupied by a single image of perception. 34
Once in a state of aesthetic consciousness, the suffering anxious character of
ordinary consciousness disappears; since I no longer demand anything of the world
there remains no possibility of a disjunction between what I demand and what it
offers. 35 Perception of what would otherwise be objects within a spatiotemporal di-
mension having causal relations and being affected by our subjective states is no lon-
ger an object, but has been transformed into an Idea, a Platonic form. Thus aesthetic
consciousness involves a double transformation: at one stroke the individual thing
becomes the idea . . . and the perceiving individual the pure subject of knowing. 36
It was this double transformation, suggests Schopenhauer, that was in Spinozas
mind when he wrote the mind is eternal insofar as it conceives things from the

Zain Imtiaz Ali 413

 standpoint of eternity. 37 Thus, it is through the apprehension of the Platonic forms
that we encounter the eternal and thereby alleviate the suffering, anxious character
of ordinary consciousness.

Analogies and Dis-analogies

From the preceding exposition, we observe that both Schopenhauer and al-Ghazal
incorporate Platonic and Neoplatonic notions into their metaphysical framework.
Within the context of Islamic philosophy, Valerie Gonzalez explains that the
approach taken many Muslim philosophers, including al-Ghazal, was to incorpo-
rate Greek thought into Islamic theology. Gonzalez writes:

[F]ollowing the Neo-platonic cosmological schema, instead of separating the lower

earthly sphere and the superior divine sphere into two entities . . . [,] the Muslim metaphy-
sicians put both spheres in reflexive relationship underpinned by the principle of emana-
tion. The universe emanates from the superior divine world and is consequently a reflec-
tion of it, graduated in various levels.38

In al-Ghazal, we encounter Platonic doctrines incorporated within Islamic the-

ology as a tool for exegesis. The Greek exemplars are incorporated when there is a
corresponding notion found with the Quran or Islamic tradition. Accordingly, for al-
Ghazal, the Platonic realm corresponds to the unseen world referred to in the Quran
and within Islamic tradition. He also adopts the Greek concept of emanation, where
the world of Dominion is said to flow from God. Importantly, though, al-Ghazals
concern over purification parallels the Platonic belief in the soul and the need for its
purification. As Janaway has pointed out, Platos desire is to purify the soul, thereby
attaining tranquility in being able to apprehend the being itself of the eternal forms.
In addition, Plato, like al-Ghazal, desired that there be genuine, secure knowledge of
entities not infected by appearance and change, a knowledge that would provide
peace for the soul.39 Similarly for al-Ghazal, the being itself is God, from whom
we apprehend the essence of knowledge. Thus, putting an end to his epistemological
strife meant entering the world of Dominion (the Platonic realm). It is in this realm
where the soul is bathed in veils of light and where infallible knowledge is to be
found. From Schopenhauers perspective, arguing for the perception of the Platonic
forms, through aesthetic consciousness, was primarily a strategy to rebut Platos pejo-
rative attitude toward art. Plato dismissed art as an inauthentic source of knowledge.
In his critique of art, Plato articulates two arguments, first that art was cognitively
deficient, and second that it caused psychological harm.40 The deficiency of art was
due to its inauthentic representation of the forms. For Plato art was not a route to
knowledge (i.e., the forms) but could simply masquerade as one.41 As for art being
a psychological defect, Plato accuses art of appealing to the undisciplined emo-
tional part of our nature, bypassing the rational control and concern for the overall
good that should rule the healthy soul. 42 As a result, Schopenhauers doctrine of
aesthetic experience can be construed as a defense of art within a Platonic frame-
work. As part of his defense Schopenhauer equates the Will with the body (for Plato

414 Philosophy East & West

the body acted as source of contamination of the soul). Thus, the Will that domi-
nated ordinary consciousness also acted as a source of contamination and had to
be bypassed. Once we are able to transcend the Will we are able to access the bet-
ter consciousness or aesthetic experience. The entrance into aesthetic conscious-
ness, claims Schopenhauer, is through art, since it allows us to transcend the features
of ordinary consciousness.
Thus, aesthetic experience allows access to objective knowledge (i.e., the forms)
while providing a release from everyday suffering. The key here is that through art
we can encounter the eternal Platonic forms and achieve peace for the soul. Hence,
Schopenhauer has undone Platos objections to art. The uniting feature of Schopen-
hauer and al-Ghazal is their preference of objective, Will-free knowledge over sub-
jective, Will-bound ways of considering the world.43 Both authors justify their posi-
tion by claiming that knowledge can be achieved if we are to adopt their respective
frameworks. A difference between the authors, however, arises over the context of
suffering and the type of knowledge being pursued. For al-Ghazal, suffering
involves a purge of knowledge whereby doubt is replaced with certainty. Schopen-
hauer, however, desires to be purged, not from skepticism, but from himself:
[A]esthetic pleasure in the beautiful consists, to large extent, in the fact that, when we
enter the state of pure contemplation, we are raised for the moment above all willing,
above all desires and cares, [and] we are so to speak rid of ourselves.44
For al-Ghazal, encountering the world of Dominion is to apprehend the unseen
world directly emanating from God. It is in this world that the essence of knowledge
and the key to unlocking human nature is to be found. The expositions of the
Quranic parables highlight the view of human nature from the world of Dominion.
The nature of man consists of a soul with five features, which need to be refined so
that the world of Dominion may be entered. As part of the purification process the
soul would need to be purged of vice and instilled with virtue. To enter the Platonic
realm of Ideas, for Schopenhauer, involves transcending the features of ordinary
consciousness. There is no process of purification, but a simple desire to be free
from Will-bound consciousness. Individuals, through aesthetic consciousness, in-
volve themselves in an escape from the everyday world of suffering and anxiety.
The nature of man for al-Ghazal is created to be conducive to perception of the
eternal. While for Schopenhauer the perception of the eternal is hindered by human
nature, both recognize that the perception of the eternal is not possible for everyone,
but is reserved for the elite, which Schopenhauer terms genius and al-Ghazal terms
the prophet. Genius, for Schopenhauer, is defined as
the capacity to remain in a state of pure perception, to lose oneself in perception, to re-
move from the service of the will the knowledge which originally existed only for this
service . . . [,] the ability to leave entirely out of sight our own interest, our own willing,
and our aims . . . in order to remain pure knowing subject, the clear eye of the world.45
The genius is an individual who completely transcends ordinary consciousness,
thereby achieving the most complete objectivity.46 While the potential for genius
exists in all minds it is only a few who are able to exercise this potential. As Janaway

Zain Imtiaz Ali 415

 suggests, Schopenhauer views the existence of art as a sufficient condition for the
presence of genius.47 Within the Islamic tradition, genius is easily equated with the
prophets due to the pureness of their souls and their intimacy with the Divine. In
Schopenhauerian terms, objectivity is available through genius. So, too, within the
Ghazalian framework the prophet is associated with having the most complete ob-
jectivity. As with genius, the prophetic spirit for al-Ghazal, while present in all, is
used to its full potential by only a few. Additionally, in the way we rely on genius for
art the prophet is seen as the messenger from the world of Dominion (bringing Di-
vine discourse and revelation). The overarching function of genius and the prophet is
to deliver objectivity. Thus, for Schopenhauer, objectivity is seen as the pure, Will-
free state of contemplation (transcending ordinary consciousness), while al-Ghazal
would view objectivity as describing the type of knowledge gained from the world of
Dominion (due to the perfection of ordinary consciousness).
We find in both authors the merging of variant traditions: art with Platonism,
resulting in the concept of the aesthetic experience, and Islam with Platonism, from
which we get a philosophy of illuminationism. The key here is that both authors
have fused variant traditions to create a broader metaphysical horizon. The notion
is best expressed by Gadamer:
The concept of horizon suggests itself because it expresses the superior breadth of vision
that the person who is trying to understand must have. To acquire a horizon means that
one learns to look beyond what is close at handnot in order to look away from it but to
see it better, within a larger whole and in truer proportion.48

Analysis and Conclusion

In bringing together the works of al-Ghazal and Schopenhauer, we find six areas
where an overlap of ideas and methodology emerges. The first shared notion is that
both thinkers acknowledge themselves to be within some form of suffering. Suffering
for al-Ghazal is due to a lack of infallible knowledge, while Schopenhauers focus is
on repression by the Will. The second shared notion is the desire for some form of
objectivity to overcome suffering. Al-Ghazal desires objectivity in terms of appre-
hending the essence of knowledge, while Schopenhauer desires objectivity in terms
of freedom from the Will. The third shared notion is the assimilation of Platonism. Al-
Ghazal uses the concept of the Platonic realm and the Platonic notion of emana-
tion. Schopenhauer uses the Platonic notion of Idea or forms. The fourth shared
notion is that through transcending the world of appearance, or ordinary conscious-
ness, we gain knowledge. For al-Ghazal an encounter with the Platonic realm was
an encounter with the mind of God (i.e., the essence of knowledge). For Scho-
penhauer the encounter with the Idea or forms was a pure form of knowing, which
results in a tranquil, Will-free contemplation.
The fifth shared notion is that of the genius and the prophet. Both al-Ghazal and
Schopenhauer posit the uniqueness of encountering the Idea or the Divine. The en-
counter is limited to a select few, who may be termed genius or prophet. Perhaps the
key shared notion is the intention of the authors to initiate a fusion of traditions.

416 Philosophy East & West

While the traditions they incorporate vary considerably, it is nonetheless an underly-
ing methodological principle. A problem is perceived (i.e., a lack of knowledge or
repression by the Will), and a solution is then crafted within a synthesis of variant
traditions. The effect, as Gadamer noted, is very much a fusion, or broadening of
horizons, hence the problem is better understood and better answered.
To take our analysis a step further, we want to show that al-Ghazals meta-
physics could be viewed as a theory of aesthetics. It is hoped that the six shared
themes expose genuine structural resemblances between the two authors, as op-
posed to superficial similarities. Perhaps the fundamental feature that allows us to
interpret al-Ghazal in concert with Schopenhauers aesthetics is the shared desire
to apprehend the eternal. Schopenhauers aesthetics begins with the acknowledg-
ment of suffering, and then the desire for objectivity, which is met through a percep-
tion of the Platonic idealizations (and it is the genius who perceives the idealizations
who then presents it to others as art). Al-Ghazal also acknowledges suffering and the
need for objectivity, which is met by perception of the Dominion (the Platonic ideal-
izations or the mind of God), and it is the prophet (akin to the genius) who appre-
hends the Dominion who then informs others of it (as revelation). Both thinkers de-
sire to apprehend the eternal and display a similar thought process as to how it may
be achieved. For Schopenhauer an encounter with the eternal is to be liberated from
the Will and thus suffering. For al-Ghazal the encounter also involves apprehending
objectivity, which also acts as liberation from suffering. The encounter (or perhaps
liberation) is what Schopenhauer regards as the aesthetic consciousness, while for
al-Ghazal it is labeled as an illumination event where the apprehension of the Di-
vine may take place. Relating aesthetic consciousness with the concept of illumina-
tion seems promising, and it is a move also endorsed by Schopenhauer:
If however it should be absolutely insisted on that somehow a positive knowledge is to be
acquired of what philosophy can express only negatively as denial of the will, nothing
would be left but to refer to that state which is experienced by all who have attained to
complete denial of the will and which is denoted by the names ecstasy, rapture, illumi-
nation, union with God and so on.49
In conclusion, there are three main reasons why al-Ghazals metaphysics can
be studied in conjunction with Schopenhauers aesthetics. First, there are the six
major areas of overlap between the metaphysical theories, second the funda-
mental desire of both authors to apprehend the eternal, and lastly Schopenhauers
admission that aesthetic consciousness is analogous to illuminationism.

Notes

Special thanks is due to Tamara Albertini and Robert Wicks for their helpful com-
ments and suggestions.
1 Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy (1998), s.v. Aesthetics in Islamic phi-
losophy, by Deborah L. Black; see http://www.rep.routledge.com.ezproxy
.auckland.ac.nz/article/H020/ (accessed June 18, 2004).

Zain Imtiaz Ali 417

 2 Described as one of Islams greatest jurists, theologians, and mystical thinkers.
3 Al-Ghazal also relates his observation to a tradition, where Muhammad, the
prophet of Islam, is said to have said: everyone is born with a sound nature,
it is ones parents who make one into a Jew, Christian or a Magian (Deliver-
ance from Error and Mystical Union with the Almighty: Munqidh min al-dalal,
English trans. with introd. by Muhammad Abulaylah Nurshif Abdul-Rahim
Rifat, introd. and notes by George F. McLean [Washington, D.C.: Council for
Research in Values and Philosophy, 2001], p. 62).
4 Ibid., pp. 6263.
5 Ibid., p. 67.
6 Ibid.
7 Al-Ghazal, The Niche of Lights / Mishkat al-anwar, trans., introd., and annot.
by David Buchman (Brigham Young University Press, 1998), p. 12.
8 Ibid., p. xvii.
9 Ibid., p. xxxiii.
10 Ibid.
11 Al-Ghazals exegesis of the Quranic parable is by no means unique. The par-
able of light has historically been the focus of extensive theological and philo-
sophical exegesis. The interpretation that al-Ghazal presents reflects his reli-
ance on Ibn Sinas teachings on psychology. See Frank Griffel, Al-G azals
Concept of Prophecy: The Introduction of Avicennan Psychology into Assrite
Theology, Arabic Sciences and Philosophy 14 (2004): 101114.
12 Ibid., pp. 3940.
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid.
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid., p. 42.
17 Ibid.
18 Ibid.
19 Ibid.
20 Ibid.
21 Ibid., p. 44.
22 Ibid., p. 45.
23 Ibid., p. 52.
24 Christopher Janaway, Schopenhauers Pessimism, in The Cambridge Com-
panion to Schopenhauer, ed. Christopher Janaway (Cambridge University
Press, 1999), p. 323.

418 Philosophy East & West

25 Ibid.
26 Ibid., p. 326.
27 Ibid., p. 328.
28 Christopher Janaway, Knowledge and Tranquillity: Schopenhauer on the
Value of Art, in Schopenhauer, Philosophy, and the Arts, ed. Dale Jacquette
(Cambridge University press, 1996), p. 42.
29 Julian Young, The Standpoint of Eternity: Schopenhauer on Art, Kant-Studien
78 (1987): 424426.
30 Ibid.
31 Ibid.
32 Ibid.
33 Ibid.
34 Ibid., p. 427.
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid., p. 428.
37 Ibid.
38 Valerie Gonzalez, Beauty and Islam (Islamic Publications Ltd., 2001), p. 12.
39 Janaway, Knowledge and Tranquillity, p. 42. A similar observation is made
by Tamara Albertini in Crisis and Certainty of Knowledge in al-Ghazal
(10581111) and Descartes (15961650), Philosophy East and West 55 (1)
(January 2005): pp. 114.
40 Janaway, Knowledge and Tranquillity, p. 44.
41 Ibid.
42 Ibid.
43 Ibid.
44 Arthur Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation, trans. E.F.J.
Payne (New York: Dover Publications, 1969), vol. 1, p. 390.
45 Janaway, Knowledge and Tranquillity, p. 48.
46 Ibid.
47 Ibid.
48 Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, 2nd, rev. ed. (New York: Contin-
uum, 1993), p. 305.
49 Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation, p. 410.

Zain Imtiaz Ali 419