Daez v CA

SECTION 6, pp18

Eudosia Daez, now deceased, was the owner of a 4.1685-hectare riceland in Barangay Lawa,
Meycauayan, Bulacan which was being cultivated by respondents Macario Soriente, Rogelio Macatulad,
Apolonio Mediana and Manuel Umali under a system of share-tenancy. The said land was subjected to
the Operation Land Transfer (OLT) Program under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 27 [8] as amended by
Letter of Instruction (LOI) No. 474[9]. Thus, the then Ministry of Agrarian Reform acquired the subject land
and issued Certificates of Land Transfer (CLT) on December 9, 1980 to private respondents as
beneficiaries.

However, on May 31, 1981, private respondents signed an affidavit, allegedly under duress, stating that
they are not share tenants but hired laborers [10]. Armed with such document, Eudosia Daez applied for the
exemption of said riceland from coverage of P.D. No. 27 due to non-tenancy as well as for the
cancellation of the CLTs issued to private respondents

On July 27, 1987, DAR Undersecretary Jose C. Medina issued an Order denying Eudosia Daezs
application for exemption upon finding that her subject land is covered under LOI No. 474, petitioner
being owner of the aforesaid agricultural lands exceeding seven (7) hectares

.[13] Secretary Leong affirmed the assailed order upon finding private respondents to be bonafide tenants
of the subject land. Secretary Leong disregarded private respondents May 31, 1981 affidavit for having
been executed under duress because he found that Eudosias son, Adriano, who was then the incumbent
Vice-Mayor of Meycauayan, pressured private respondents into signing the same

Meantime, on August 6 and 12, 1992, the DAR issued Emancipation Patents (EPs) to private
respondents. Thereafter, the Register of Deeds of Bulacan issued the corresponding Transfer Certificates
of Title (TCTs).

Exemption of the 4.1685 riceland from coverage by P.D. No. 27 having been finally denied her, Eudosia
Daez next filed an application for retention of the same riceland, this time under R.A. No. 6657.

Issue: Whether or not Diaz can retain the parcel of land

Held: We grant the petition.

First. Exemption and retention in agrarian reform are two (2) distinct concepts.

P.D. No. 27 grants each tenant of covered lands a five (5)-hectare lot, or in case the land is irrigated, a
three (3)-hectare lot constituting a family size farm. However, said law allows a covered landowner to
retain not more than seven (7) hectares of his land if his aggregate landholding does not exceed twenty-
four (24) hectares

Petitioner heirs of Eudosia Daez may exercise their right of retention over the subject 4.1685 riceland.

The right of retention is a constitutionally guaranteed right, which is subject to qualification by the
legislature.[21] It serves to mitigate the effects of compulsory land acquisition by balancing the rights of the
landowner and the tenant and by implementing the doctrine that social justice was not meant to
perpetrate an injustice against the landowner [22]. A retained area, as its name denotes, is land which is not
supposed to anymore leave the landowners dominion, thus sparing the government from the
inconvenience of taking land only to return it to the landowner afterwards, which would be a pointless
process. Xsc

In the landmark case of Association of Small Landowners in the Phil., Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian
Reform[23], we held that landowners who have not yet exercised their retention rights under P.D. No. 27
are entitled to the new retention rights under R.A. No. 6657 [24]. We disregarded the August 27, 1985
deadline imposed by DAR Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1985 on landowners covered by OLT.
However, if a landowner filed his application for retention after August 27, 1985 but he had previously filed
the sworn statements required by LOI Nos. 41, 45 and 52, he is still entitled to the retention limit of seven
(7) hectares under P.D. No.27 [25]. Otherwise, he is only entitled to retain five (5) hectares under R.A. No.
6657.

Sec. 6 of R.A. No. 6657, which provides, viz.:

SECTION 6. Retention Limits Except as otherwise provided in this Act, no person may
own or retain, directly or indirectly, any public or private agricultural land, the size of which
shall vary according to factors governing a viable family-size, such as commodity
produced, terrain, infrastructure, and soil fertility as determined by the Presidential
Agrarian Reform Council (PARC) created hereunder, but in no case shall retention by the
landowner exceed five (5) hectares. Three (3) hectares may be awarded to each child of
the landowner, subject to the following qualifications: (1) that he is at least fifteen (15)
years of age; and (2) that he is actually tilling the land or directly managing the farm;
Provided, That landowners whose land have been covered by Presidential Decree No. 27
shall be allowed to keep the area originally retained by them thereunder, further, That
original homestead grantees or direct compulsory heirs who still own the original
homestead at the time of the approval of this Act shall retain the same areas as long as
they continue to cultivate said homestead.

The right to choose the area to be retained, which shall be compact or contiguous,
shall pertain to the landowner. Provided, however, That in case the area selected
for retention by the landowner is tenanted, the tenant shall have the option to
choose whether to remain therein or be a beneficiary in the same or another
agricultural land with similar or comparable features. In case the tenant chooses to
remain in the retained area, he shall be considered a leaseholder and shall lose his
right to be a beneficiary under this Act. In case the tenant chooses to be a
beneficiary in another agricultural land, he loses his right as a lease-holder to the
land retained by the landowner. The tenant must exercise this option within a period of
one (1) year from the time the landowner manifests his choice of the area for retention.

In all cases, the security of tenure of the farmers or farmworkers on the land prior to the
approval of this Act shall be respected.

For as long as the area to be retained is compact or contiguous and it does not exceed the retention
ceiling of five (5) hectares, a landowners choice of the area to be retained, must prevail.
Under R.A. No. 6657, the procedure has been simplified [31]. Only Certificates of Land Ownership Award
(CLOAs) are issued, in lieu of EPs, after compliance with all prerequisites. Thereafter, upon presentation
of the CLOAs to the Register of Deeds, TCTs are issued to the designated beneficiaries. CLTs are no
longer issued.

The issuance of EPs or CLOAs to beneficiaries does not absolutely bar the landowner from retaining the
area covered thereby. Under Administrative Order No. 2, series of 1994 [32], an EP or CLOA may be
cancelled if the land covered is later found to be part of the landowners retained area. Scmis

In the instant case, the CLTs of private respondents over the subject 4.1685-hectare riceland were issued
without Eudosia Daez having been accorded her right of choice as to what to retain among her
landholdings. The transfer certificates of title thus issued on the basis of those CLTs cannot operate to
defeat the right of the heirs of deceased Eudosia Daez to retain the said 4.1685 hectares of riceland.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED

Tenants of Sison v CA

This is a petition for review of the decision dated March 29, 1990 of the Court of Appeals upholding an
order of the Secretary of Agrarian Reform, Philip Ella Juico, setting aside the previous orders of his
predecessors who had issued certificates of land transfer to the tenants of the rice and corn lands of the
late Dr. Jose Sison without due regard for the right of his legal heirs to retain ownership of their shares if
they did not own more than seven (7) hectares of rice or corn land.

Pursuant to the Operation Land Transfer Program of the Government under Presidential Decree No. 27,
certificates of land transfer were issued by the Ministry of Agrarian Reform to the petitioners, tenants of
the Estate of Dr. Jose Sison, for their respective areas of cultivation. Upon discovering that certificates of
land transfer were being issued to the petitioners, the heirs of Dr. Sison protested to the then Minister of
Agrarian Reform, Conrado Estrella, who ordered that the certificates of land transfer be marked, "UNDER
PROTEST."

Minister Estrella ordered an investigation of the case. The investigation report dated November 17, 1980,
revealed that the landholdings of the late Dr. Jose Sison at Bayambang, Pangasinan, were subdivided
among his heirs pro-indiviso under a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition dated April 2, 1966. Consequently, the
acting MAR District Officer of Lingayen, Pangasinan, recommended the cancellation of the certificates of
land transfer that had been issued to the petitioners-tenants.

On February 17, 1987, then Minister Heherson Alvarez dismissed the petition filed by Manuel Sison, as
representative of all the Heirs of Dr. Sison, for exemption of their landholdings from the coverage of
Operation Land Transfer. The heirs' Motion for Reconsideration of said Order was denied on July 6, 1987.

On December 8, 1987, the heirs reiterated their request for reconsideration when Secretary Philip Ella
Juico succeeded Secretary Alvarez. They stressed the fact that their individual landholdings were too
small, not exceeding 7 hectares each, to come under the coverage of the Operation Land Transfer.

Petitioners sought relief in the Court of Appeals which rendered judgment on March 29, 1990, dismissing
their petition for certiorari

The petition has no merit.

Petitioners herein question the propriety and legality of the order of former Secretary Philip Ella Juico of
the Department of Agrarian Reform dated September 7, 1988, reversing and modifying the orders of his
predecessors

The first and fourth grounds of the petition for review are not well-taken. The orders for the issuance of
Certificates of Land Transfer to the petitioners had not become final and executory because the
certificates had been marked "under protest" on orders of Secretary Estrella.

The Court of Appeals correctly observed that the technical rules of court practice and procedure do not
apply to administrative proceedings in the Department (formerly Ministry) of Agrarian Reform:

. . . In the present case, respondent Secretary was not in estoppel when it reconsidered the previous
ruling of his predecessor, because the latter's ruling is plainly and directly against the law. As the order of
September 7, 1986, stated, and to repeat, the concerned heirs are entitled under the law to a retention of
seven (7) hectares of agricultural lands which is mandatory and the office had no discretion to alter the
disposition on the retention limits accorded by law to the landowners. No one, not even the petitioners
tenants, nor any court of justice can deprive or deny the land owners of the retention of seven (7)
hectares which the law has reserved for them. Otherwise, the law would be set to naught or would lose its
very reason for being.

The failure of the private respondents to apply for retention of seven (7) hectares each of their agricultural
landholdings did not constitute an estoppel or waiver of their respective right of retention. The omission
was cured by their timely protest against the issuance of the certificates of land transfer to the petitioners.

There is no merit in the petitioners' contention that the Heirs of Dr. Sison are disqualified to retain their
shares of the agricultural lands of the estate for failure to comply with the requirement that "such
landowner is cultivating such area, or will now cultivate it"

Hence, personal cultivation by the Heirs of Sison is not a mandatory precondition for them to be entitled to
their retention right.

Secretary Juico's interpretation of the owner's right of retention conforms with our own construction
in Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reforms, G.R. No.
78742, August 23, 1990, where we ruled that:

. . . in case the area selected for retention by the landowner is tenanted, the tenant shall have the option
to choose whether to remain therein or be a beneficiary in the same or another agricultural land with
similar or comparable features. In case the tenant chooses to remain in the retained area, he shall be
considered as leaseholder and shall lose his right to be a beneficiary under this Act. In case the tenant
chooses to be a beneficiary in another agricultural land, he loses his right as a leaseholder to the land
retained by the landowner. The tenant must exercise this option within a period of one (1) year from the
time the land owner manifests his choice of the area for retention

WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the decision of the Court of Appeals, the Court hereby
AFFIRMS it in toto.

Rodriguez v Salvador
 On May 22, 2003, respondent Teresita V. Salvador filed a Complaint for Unlawful Detainer,[5] docketed as
Civil Case No. 330, against petitioners Lucia (Lucia) and Prudencia Rodriguez, mother and daughter, respectively
before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Dalaguete, Cebu.[6] Respondent alleged that she is the absolute owner of
a parcel of land covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-27140 [7] issued by virtue of Free Patent No.
(VII-5) 2646 in the name of the Heirs of Cristino Salvador represented by Teresita Salvador; [8]that petitioners
acquired possession of the subject land by mere tolerance of her predecessors-in-interest;[9] and that despite several
verbal and written demands made by her, petitioners refused to vacate the subject land.[10]

In their Answer,[11] petitioners interposed the defense of agricultural tenancy. Lucia claimed that she and her
deceased husband, Serapio, entered the subject land with the consent and permission of respondents predecessors-
in-interest, siblings Cristino and Sana Salvador, under the agreement that Lucia and Serapio would devote the
property to agricultural production and share the produce with the Salvador siblings.[12] Since there is a tenancy
relationship between the parties, petitioners argued that it is the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board
(DARAB) which has jurisdiction over the case and not the MTC.

On September 10, 2003, the MTC promulgated a Decision [15] finding the existence of an agricultural tenancy
relationship between the parties, and thereby, dismissing the complaint for lack of jurisdiction

On January 12, 2004, the RTC rendered a Decision[18] remanding the case to
the MTC for preliminary hearing to determine whether tenancy relationship exists between the parties. On June 23,
2004, the RTC granted the reconsideration and affirmed the MTC Decision dated September 10, 2003.
On August 24, 2005, the CA rendered judgment in favor of respondent. It ruled that no tenancy relationship exists
between the parties because petitioners failed to prove that respondent or her predecessors-in-interest consented to
the tenancy relationship.
Issue:
WHETHER X X X THE COURT OF APPEALS ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN RULING
THAT PETITIONERS-DEFENDANTS ARE NOT TENANTS OF THE SUBJECT LAND.
Held:
Petitioners contend that under Section 5[32] of Republic Act No. 3844, otherwise known as the Agricultural Land
Reform Code, tenancy may be constituted by agreement of the parties either orally or in writing, expressly or
impliedly.[33] In this case, there was an implied consent to constitute a tenancy relationship as respondent and her
predecessors-in-interest allowed petitioners to cultivate the land and share the harvest with the landowners for more
than 40 years.
Respondent, on the other hand, maintains that petitioners are not agricultural tenants because mere cultivation of an
agricultural land does not make the tiller an agricultural tenant.[37]Respondent insists that her predecessors-in-interest
merely tolerated petitioners occupation of the subject land.
The petition lacks merit.
Agricultural tenancy relationship does not exist in the
instant case.

Agricultural tenancy exists when all the following requisites are present: 1) the parties are the landowner and the
tenant or agricultural lessee; 2) the subject matter of the relationship is an agricultural land; 3) there is consent
between the parties to the relationship; 4) the purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production; 5)
there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and 6) the harvest is shared between
landowner and tenant or agricultural lessee.
The statements in the affidavits presented by the petitioners are not sufficient to prove the existence of an
agricultural tenancy.

As correctly found by the CA, the element of consent is lacking. [43] Except for the self-serving affidavit of Lucia, no
other evidence was submitted to show that respondents predecessors-in-interest consented to a tenancy relationship
with petitioners.
As we have often said, mere occupation or cultivation of an agricultural land will not ipso facto make
the tiller an agricultural tenant.[47] It is incumbent upon a person who claims to be an agricultural tenant to
prove by substantial evidence all the requisites of agricultural tenancy.[48]

In the instant case, petitioners failed to prove consent and sharing of harvest between the parties. Consequently, their
defense of agricultural tenancy must fail. The MTC has jurisdiction over the instant case. No error can therefore be
attributed to the CA in reversing and setting aside the dismissal of respondents complaint for lack of
jurisdiction. Accordingly, the remand of the case to the MTC for the determination of the amount of damages due
respondent is proper.
Alita v CA
The facts are undisputed. The subject matter of the case consists of two (2) parcels of land, acquired by
private respondents' predecessors-in-interest through homestead patent under the provisions of
Commonwealth Act No. 141. Said lands are situated at Guilinan, Tungawan, Zamboanga del Sur.

Private respondents herein are desirous of personally cultivating these lands, but petitioners refuse to
vacate, relying on the provisions of P.D. 27 and P.D. 316 and appurtenant regulations issued by the then
Ministry of Agrarian Reform (DAR for short), now Department of Agrarian Reform (MAR for short).

On November 5, 1982, the then Court of Agrarian Relations 16th Regional District, Branch IV, Pagadian
City (now Regional Trial Court, 9th Judicial Region, Branch XVIII) rendered its decision dismissing the
said complaint and the motion to enjoin the defendants was denied.

the present petition for review on certiorari.

The pivotal issue is whether or not lands obtained through homestead patent are covered by the Agrarian
Reform under P.D. 27.

The question certainly calls for a negative answer.

We agree with the petitioners in saying that P.D. 27 decreeing the emancipation of tenants from the
bondage of the soil and transferring to them ownership of the land they till is a sweeping social
legislation, a remedial measure promulgated pursuant to the social justice precepts of the Constitution.
However, such contention cannot be invoked to defeat the very purpose of the enactment of the Public
Land Act or Commonwealth Act No. 141. Thus,

The Homestead Act has been enacted for the welfare and protection of the poor. The law gives a needy
citizen a piece of land where he may build a modest house for himself and family and plant what is
necessary for subsistence and for the satisfaction of life's other needs. The right of the citizens to their
homes and to the things necessary for their subsistence is as vital as the right to life itself. They have a
right to live with a certain degree of comfort as become human beings, and the State which looks after the
welfare of the people's happiness is under a duty to safeguard the satisfaction of this vital right.
, it is worthy of note that the newly promulgated Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 or
Republic Act No. 6657 likewise contains a proviso supporting the inapplicability of P.D. 27 to lands
covered by homestead patents like those of the property in question, reading,

Section 6. Retention Limits. ...

... Provided further, That original homestead grantees or their direct compulsory heirs who still own the
original homestead at the time of the approval of this Act shall retain the same areas as long as they
continue to cultivate said homestead.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals sustaining the
decision of the Regional Trial Court is hereby AFFIRMED.

Republic v Salvador Lopez Agri Business

Subject of this petition are four (4) parcels of land with an aggregate area of 160.1161 hectares
registered in the name of Salvador N. Lopez Agri-Business Corporation. On 1991, Municipal
Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) issued a Notice of Coverage to petitioner with regards to the
aforementioned landholdings which were subsequently placed under Compulsory Acquisition
pursuant to R.A. 6657. Petitioner filed with the Provincial Agrarian Reform Office (PARO) an
Application for Exemption, as the said parcels of land with a total area of 110.5455 hectares are
used for grazing and habitat of petitioners 105 heads of cattle, 5 carabaos, 11 horses, 9 heads
of goats and 18 heads of swine, prior to the effectivity of the (CARL). The MARO then
conducted an onsite investigation on the two parcels of land confirming the presence of the
livestock as enumerated. The DAR Regional Director, after inspecting the properties, denied the
application for exemption of Lots 1454-A and 1296 on the ground that it was not clearly shown
that the same were actually, directly and exclusively used for livestock raising since in its
application, petitioner itself admitted that it needs the lots for additional grazing area, and such
was affirmed by the DAR on appeal. The application for exemption, however of the other two (2)
parcels of land was approved. The CA partially granted the SNLABC Petition and excluded the
two (2) parcels of land from coverage of the CARL. However, it upheld the Decisions of the
Regional Director and the DAR Secretary denying the application for exemption with respect to
Lots 1454-A and 1296. These lots were already covered by a new title under the name of the
Republic of the Philippines (RP T-16356).

ISSUE:

Whether the subject lands of SNLABC can be considered grazing lands for its livestock
business and are thus exempted from the coverage of the CARL.

HELD:

In Luz Farms v. Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform, the Court declared
unconstitutional the CARL provisions that included lands devoted to livestock under the
coverage of the CARP. The transcripts of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission of
1986 on the meaning of the word "agricultural" showed that it was never the intention of the
framers of the Constitution to include the livestock and poultry industry in the coverage of the
constitutionally mandated agrarian reform program of the government. Thus, lands devoted to
the raising of livestock, poultry and swine have been classified as industrial, not agricultural, and
thus exempt from agrarian reform.

Under the rules then prevailing, it was the (MARO) who was primarily responsible for
investigating the legal status, type and areas of the land sought to be excluded; and for
ascertaining whether the area subject of the application for exemption had been devoted to
livestock-raising as of 15 June 1988. As the primary official in charge of investigating the land
sought to be exempted as livestock land, the MAROs findings on the use and nature of the
land, if supported by substantial evidence on record, are to be accorded greater weight, if not
finality. The Court generally accords great respect, if not finality, to factual findings of
administrative agencies because of their special knowledge and expertise over matters falling
under their jurisdiction. Hence, the Court looks with favor on the expertise of the MARO in
determining whether livestock-raising on the Lopez lands has only been recently conducted or
has been a going concern for several years already. Absent any clear showing of grave abuse
of discretion or bias, the findings of the MARO - as affirmed by the DAR Regional Director - are
to be accorded great probative value, owing to the presumption of regularity in the performance
of his official duties.
 BUKLOD NG MAGBUBUKID sa LUPAING RAMOS v EMRASON
Brief Facts:
- Nature: Consolidated Petitions for Review on Certiorari filed by the Buklod ng Magbubukid Sa
Lupaing Ramos, Inc. (Buklod) and the Department of Agrarian Regorm (DAR), assailing a
decision of the Court of Appeals in which it declared the parcels of land owned by E.M. Ramos
and Sons, Inc. (EMRASON) in Cavite exempt from the coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Program (CARP), thus, nullifying and setting aside the Decision of the Office of the
President.
- Several parcels of unirrigated land which form part of a larger expanse originally owned by the
Manila Golf and Country Club was aquired by EMRASON for the purpose of developing the
same into a residential subdivision known as "Traveller's Life Homes".
- The Municipal Council of Dasmarias, Cavite, acting pursuant to Republic Act No. 2264,
otherwise known as the "Local Autonomy Act", enacted Municipal Ordinance No. 1 entitled "An
Ordinance Providing Subdivision Regulation and Providing Penalties for Violation Thereof."
EMRASON applied for an authority to convert and development its property into a residential
subdivision. Them Municipal Council of Dasmarias, Cavite passed Municipal Ordinance No.
29-A approving EMRASON's application.
- The actual implementation of the subdivision project suffered delay because the property was
mortgaged to, and the titles thereto were in the possession of, the Overseas Bank of Manila,
which during the period material was under liquidation.
- On June 15. 1988, Republic Act No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law or CARL, took effect, ushering in a new process of land classification, acquisition
and distribution. Then came the Aquino government's plan to convert the tenanted neighboring
property of the National Development Company (NDC) into an industrial estate to be managed
through a joint venture scheme by NDC and the Marubeni Corporation. Part of the overall
conversion package called for providing the tenant-farmers, opting to remain at the NDC
property, with three hectares each. However, the size of the NDC property turned out to be
insufficient for both the demands of the proposed industrial project as well as the government's
commitment to the tenant-farmers. To address this commitment, the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR) was thus tasked with acquiring additional lands from the nearby areas. The DAR
earmarked for this purpose the subject property of EMRASON. DAR Secretary Benjamin Leong
sent out the first of four batches of notices of acquisition, each of which drew protest from
EMRASON.
- EMRASON filed with the DARAB separate petitions to nullify the notices. The Legal Division
of DAR rendered a decision declaring as null and void all the notices of acquisitions, observing
that the property covered thereby is, pursuant to Department of Justice (DOJ) Opinion No. 44,
series of 1990, exempt from CARP. Supposedly, this was pursuant to a DOJ Opinion rendered by
then Justice Secretary Franklin Drilon, clarifying that lands already converted to non-agricultural
uses before June 15, 1988 were no longer covered by CARP.

Issue/s: Whether the subject property could be placed under the CARP

Held/Ratio: SC affirms the Court of Appeals and rules in favor of EMRASON.

- CARP coverage limited to agricultural land
o Section 4, Chapter II of the CARL, as amended,24 particularly defines the coverage of
the CARP, to wit: SEC. 4. Scope. - The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988
shall cover, regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity produced, all public and
private agricultural lands as provided in Proclamation No. 131 and Executive Order
No. 229, including other lands of the public domain suitable for agriculture: Provided,
 That landholdings of landowners with a total area of five (5) hectares and below shall not
be covered for acquisition and distribution to qualified beneficiaries. More specifically,
the following lands are covered by the CARL: (d) All private lands devoted to or
suitable for agriculture regardless of the agricultural products raised or that can be
raised thereon. Section 3(c), Chapter I of the CARL further narrows down the definition
of agricultural land that is subject to CARL to "land devoted to agricultural activity as
defined in this Act and not classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or
industrial land." The CARL took effect on June 15, 1988. To be exempt from the CARL,
the subject property should have already been reclassified as residential prior to said date.

Milestone Farms v Office of the President

MILESTONE FARMS, INC.,Petitioner,v. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT,Respondent.

NACHURA,J.:
FACTS:

Petitioner Milestone Farms, Inc. was incorporated with the SEC. On June 10, 1988, a new agrarian reform
law, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law
(CARL), took effect, which included the raising of livestock, poultry, and swine in its coverage. However,
on December 4, 1990, this Court, sitting en banc, ruled in Luz Farms v. Secretary of the Department of
Agrarian Reform that agricultural lands devoted to livestock, poultry, and/or swine raising are excluded
from the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP).

Thus, in May 1993, petitioner applied for the exemption/exclusion of its 316.0422-hectare property.
Meanwhile, on December 27, 1993, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) issued Administrative
Order No. 9, Series of 1993 (DAR A.O. No. 9), setting forth rules and regulations to govern the exclusion
of agricultural lands used for livestock, poultry, and swine raising from CARP coverage. Thus, on January
10, 1994, petitioner re-documented its application pursuant to DAR A.O. No. 9.

Acting on the said application, the DARs Land Use Conversion and Exemption Committee (LUCEC) of
Region IV conducted an ocular inspection on petitioners property and arrived at the following findings:

The LUCEC, thus, recommended the exemption of petitioners 316.0422-hectare property from the
coverage of CARP. Adopting the LUCEC's findings and recommendation, DAR Regional Director
Percival Dalugdug (Director Dalugdug) issued an Order dated June 27, 1994, exempting petitioners
316.0422-hectare property from CARP.

The Southern Pinugay Farmers Multi-Purpose Cooperative, Inc. (Pinugay Farmers), represented by
Timiano Balajadia, Sr. (Balajadia), moved for the reconsideration of the said Order, but the same was
denied by Director Dalugdug in his Order dated November 24, 1994.Subsequently, the Pinugay Farmers
filed a letter-appeal with the DAR Secretary.

Correlatively, on June 4, 1994, petitioner filed a complaint for Forcible Entry against Balajadia and
company before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Teresa-Baras, Rizal, docketed as Civil Case
No. 781-T.The MCTC ruled in favor of petitioner, but the decision was later reversed by the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 80, of Tanay, Rizal. Ultimately, the case reached the CA, which, in its Decision dated
October 8, 1999, reinstated the MCTCs ruling, ordering Balajadia and all defendants therein to vacate
portions of the property covered by TCT Nos. M-6013, M-8796, and M-8791. In its Resolution dated July
31, 2000, the CA held that the defendants therein failed to timely file a motion for reconsideration, given
the fact that their counsel of record received its October 8, 1999 Decision; hence, the same became final
and executory.

In the meantime, R.A. No. 6657 was amended by R.A. No. 7881,which was approved on February 20,
1995. Private agricultural lands devoted to livestock, poultry, and swine raising were excluded from the
coverage of the CARL.

On January 21, 1997, then DAR Secretary Ernesto D. Garilao issued an Order exempting from CARP
only 240.9776 hectares of the 316.0422 hectares previously exempted by Director Dalugdug, and
declaring 75.0646 hectares of the property to be covered by CARP.

On February 4, 2000, the Office of the President rendered a decision reinstating Order declared the entire
316.0422-hectare property exempt from the coverage of CARP.

Consequently, petitioner sought recourse from the CA. the CA found that, based on the documentary
evidence presented, the property subject of the application for exclusion had more than satisfied the
animal-land and infrastructure-animal ratios under DAR A.O. No. 9. The CA also found that petitioner
applied for exclusion long before the effectivity of DAR A.O. No. 9, thus, negating the claim that
petitioner merely converted the property for livestock, poultry, and swine raising in order to exclude it
from CARP coverage. Hence, the instant petition is hereby granted.

Finally, petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied by the CA.

ISSUE: Whether the land is exempted from CARL coverage?

HELD: The decision of the Court of Appeals is sustained.

POLITICAL LAW validity of the administrative order

In the case at bar, we find that the impugned A.O. is invalid as it contravenes the Constitution. The A.O.
sought to regulate livestock farms by including them in the coverage of agrarian reform and prescribing a
maximum retention limit for their ownership. However, the deliberations of the 1987 Constitutional
Commission show a clear intent to exclude, inter alia,all lands exclusively devoted to livestock, swine and
poultry-raising. The Court clarified in the Luz Farms case that livestock, swine and poultry-raising are
industrial activities and do not fall within the definition of "agriculture" or "agricultural activity." The
raising of livestock, swine and poultry is different from crop or tree farming. It is an industrial, not an
agricultural, activity. A great portion of the investment in this enterprise is in the form of industrial fixed
assets, such as: animal housing structures and facilities, drainage, waterers and blowers, feedmill with
grinders, mixers, conveyors, exhausts and generators, extensive warehousing facilities for feeds and other
supplies, anti-pollution equipment like bio-gas and digester plants augmented by lagoons and concrete
ponds, deepwells, elevated water tanks, pump houses, sprayers, and other technological appurtenances.

Clearly, petitioner DAR has no power to regulate livestock farms which have been exempted by the
Constitution from the coverage of agrarian reform. It has exceeded its power in issuing the assailed A.O.