12) VIRGINIA GARCIA FULE vs. CA, PRECIOSA B. GARCIA and
AGUSTINA B. GARCIA, 74 SCRA 189 (1976) J. Martin/Adobo
Doctrine:
Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court
provides: "If the decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the
time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be
proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate settled,
in the Court of First Instance in the province in which he resides at
the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country,
the Court of First Instance of any province in which he had estate.
The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of
a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other
courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it
depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of
the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or
proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the original
case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record."
FACTS:
1. Petitioner Virginia G. Fule (illegitimate sister of the
deceased) filed with the CFI of Laguna a petition for letters
of administration alleging that on April 26, 1973, Amado G.
Garcia, a property owner of Calamba, Laguna, died intestate
in the City of Manila, leaving real estate and personal
properties in Calamba, Laguna, and in other places, within
the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court. At the same time,
she moved ex parte for her appointment as special
administratix over the estate. Judge Malvar granted the
motion.
2. Respondent Preciosa alleged that Fule was a creditor of the
estate, and as a mere illegitimate sister of the deceased is
not entitled to succeed from him.
3. MR was filed by Respondent Preciosa B. Garcia, the
surviving spouse of the deceased, contending that:
a. The decedent resided in QC for 3 months before his
death as shown by his death certificate and therefore
have an improper venue.
b. The CFI of Calamba, Laguna lacks jurisdiction over
the petition.
4. CFI denied the motion of Respondent.
5. CA reversed and favored respondent and affirmed making
Respondent Preciosa the administratix upon a bond of
P30,000.
6. Thus, Fule elevated the matter to the SC on appeal by
certiorari.
ISSUES:
a.) Are venue and jurisdiction the same? How can it be
determined in the present case?
b.) What does the word resides in Revised Rules of Court Rule
73 Section 1 Mean?
c.) Who is entitled as special administratix of the estate?
HELD:
a.) NO, jurisdiction is defined as the authority to try,
hear and decide a case base on the merits or the substance
of the facts. It is a substantive aspect of the trial
proceeding. It is granted by law or by the constitution and
cannot be waived or stipulated.
On the other hand, Rule 4 of Rules of Court define
venue as the proper court which has jurisdiction over the
area wherein real property involved or a portion
thereof is situated. Venue is the location of the court with
jurisdiction. It is more on convenience purposes. Its more
on procedural aspect of the case. In some cases it may be
waived or stipulated by the parties.
Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of
Court provides: If the decedent is an inhabitant of
the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a
citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters
of administration granted, and his estate settled, in
the Court of First Instance in the province in which
he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an
inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First
Instance of any province in which he had estate.
b.) Resides should be viewed or understood in its popular
 sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation
of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies
physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In this
popular sense, the term means merely residence, that is,
personal residence, not legal residence or domicile.
Residence simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant
in a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in
that place and also an intention to make it ones domicile.
No particular length of time of residence is required though;
however, the residence must be more than temporary.

c.) In the present case, SC ruled that the last place of

residence of the deceased should be the venue of the
court. Amado G. Garcia was in Quezon City, and not at
Calamba, Laguna base on his death certificate. A death
certificate is admissible to prove the residence of the
decedent at the time of his death.

The conclusion becomes imperative that the venue for

Virginia C. Fules petition for letters of administration was
improperly laid in the Court of First Instance of Calamba,
Laguna. Therefore Preciosa B. Garcia was granted as a special
administratix.

Notes:

With particular regard to letters of administration, Section 2,

Rule 79 of the Revised Rules of Court demands that the petition
therefor should affirmatively show the existence of jurisdiction to
make the appointment sought, and should allege all the necessary
facts, such as death, the name and last residence of the decedent,
the existence, and situs if need be, of assets, intestacy, where this
is relied upon, and the right of the person who seeks
administration, as next of kin, creditor, or otherwise, to be
appointed.

The fact of death of the intestate and his last residence within
the country are foundation facts upon which all subsequent
proceedings in the administration of the estate rest, and that if the
intestate was not an inhabitant of the state at the time of his death,
and left no assets in the state, no jurisdiction is conferred on the
court to grant letters of administration.

13) EMILIA FIGURACION-GERILLA, Petitioner, plaintiffvs.
*
CAROLINA VDA. DE FIGURACION, ELENA FIGURACION-
ANCHETA,* HILARIA A. FIGURACION, FELIPA FIGURACION-
MANUEL, QUINTIN FIGURACION and MARY FIGURACION-
GINEZ, Respondents, defendants ( AUTHOR: VICO BONDOC)
Facts:
Spouses Leandro and respondent Carolina Figuracion (now
both deceased) had 6 children: petitioner Emilia Figuracion-Gerilla
and respondents Elena Figuracion-Ancheta (now deceased), Hilaria
Figuracion, Felipa Figuracion-Manuel, Quintin Figuracion and Mary
Figuracion-Ginez.
When Leandro died in 1958, he left 2 parcels of land located in
Urdaneta, Pangasinan: (1) Lot 2299 consisting of 7,547 sqm
and (2) Lot 705 with an area of 2,900 sqm. Leandro had inherited
both lots from his deceased parents.
What gave rise to the complaint for partition was a dispute
between petitioner Emilia Figuracion-Gerilla and her sister,
respondent Mary, over the eastern half of Lot 707 (different from
Lot 2299 & 705) with an area of 3,164 sq. m.
Lot 707 belonged to Eulalio Adviento. When Adviento died, his 2
daughters, Agripina Adviento (his daughter by his 1st wife) and
respondent Carolina Figuracion (his daughter by his 2nd wife),
succeeded him to it. Agripina executed a quitclaim in favor of
petitioner Emilia Figuracion-Gerilla over the 1/2 eastern portion of
Lot 707. However, before her half-sisters death, respondent
Carolina adjudicated unto herself the entire Lot 707 which she later
sold to respondents Felipa and Hilaria.
Subsequently, petitioner Emilia Figuracion-Gerilla filed a complaint
for partition, annulment of documents, and reconveyance against
respondents, praying for: (1) the partition of Lots 2299 and 705; (2)
the nullification of the affidavit of self-adjudication by respondent
Carolina over Lot 707, the deed of absolute sale in favor of
respondents Felipa and Hilaria and (3) a declaration that petitioner
Emilia Figuracion-Gerilla was the owner of of Lot 707
Respondents (Carolina [mother], Elena, Hilaria, Felipa, Quintin, &
Mary) claims that Leandros estate should first undergo settlement
proceedings before partition could take place.
RTC rendered judgment nullifying Carolinas affidavit of self-
adjudication and deed of absolute sale of Lot 707 but it dismissed
the complaint for partition over Lot 2299 and Lot 705 on the
ground that there should be first a settlement proceedings.
Upon appeal, CA affirmed the dismissal of the complaint for
partition over Lot 2299 and Lot 705. But reversing the decision
with respect to the nullification of the self-adjudication and the
deed of sale over Lot 707. Upholding the validity of the affidavit of
self-adjudication and deed of sale as to Carolinas share, it
instead partitioned Lot 707.
Issue: WON there is a need to a prior settlement of
Leandros intestate estate (an accounting of the income of Lots
2299 and 705, the payment of expenses, liabilities and taxes, plus
compliance with other legal requirements, etc.) before the
properties can be partitioned
Ruling: Yes.
In this case, respondents wanted petitioner to share in the
expenses incurred for the care of their parents before she could get
her part of the estate while petitioner apparently wanted her gross
share, without contributing to the expenses.
 SC said that there are 2 ways by which partition can take
place under Rule 69: by agreement under Section 2 and through
commissioners when such agreement cannot be reached, under
Sections 3 to 6.
However, neither method specifies a procedure for determining
expenses chargeable to the decedents estate such as funeral
expenses, inheritance taxes and similar expenses.
Therefore, where there remains an issue as to the expenses
chargeable to the estate, partition is inappropriate. Here, as found
the CA there are certain expenses" including those related to her
fathers final illness and burial that have not been settled. Thus, the
heirs (petitioner and respondents) have to submit their fathers
estate to settlement because the determination of these expenses
cannot be done in an action for partition.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Court of
Appeals decision and resolution are AFFIRMED in so far as
the issue of the partition of Lots 2299 and 705 is concerned.
*NB: Just focus of Lot 2299 and Lot 705 on the topic of
settlement proceeding; lot 707 is just an additional info, if in case
atty. will ask if there are other lots involve in this case.
14) Arbolario vs. CA, Colinco, et al[G.R. No. 129163. April
22, 2003]TOPIC: Proper Venue AUTHOR: Miguel M. Consing
PONENTE: Panganiban, J.
NOTES:Essentially, the petitioners are trying to claim that they are
legitimate half-siblings of Purificacion Albolario.The 2 other
Petitioners (Spouses Salhay) claim that they own a portion of the
disputed lot because Purificacion sold it to them. They were not
able to show proof of the sale.
CASE LAW/DOCTRINE:
Questions as to the determination of the heirs of a decedent,
the proof of filiation, and the determination of the estate of a
decedent and claims thereto should be brought up before the
proper probate court or in special proceedings instituted for
the purpose. Such issues cannot be adjudicated in an ordinary civil
action for the recovery of ownership and possession.
FACTS:
The subject Lot was originally owned by spouses Anselmo Baloyo
and Macaria Lirazan. They had 5 children, (1) Agueda, (2) Catalina,
(3) Eduardo, (4) Gaudencia, and (5) Julian, (Baloyo Siblings) all are
deceased.
Agueda had 2 children: Antonio and Irene. Antonio predeceased his
3 daughters. Irene and her 3 nieces are the Respondents (The
Colincos).
Catalina married Juan Arbolario, they had one child, Purificacion
Arbolario. Juan Arbolario cohabited with another woman, Francisca
Malvas, and had 5 children (the Arbolarios). These 5 children and 2
others are the Petitioners.
In 1987, the Respondents, believing that they were the surviving
heirs of the late spouses Anselmo Baloyo and Macaria Lirazan,
executed a Declaration of Heirship and Partition Agreement,
wherein they adjudicated among themselves their ideal
proportionate shares in the subject lot. They also filed a case
against the Salhay Spouses for recovery of possession of the part of
the lot that the latter occupied.
Subsequently, the Petitioners filed a case for cancellation of title
against the Respondents. They argued that the Partition Agreement
executed by the Respondents was defective and thus voidable as
they (Arbolarios) were excluded therein. The Arbolarios claim that
they succeeded intestate to the inheritance of their alleged half-
sister, Purificacion Arbolario; and, as forced heirs, they should be
included in the distribution of the lot.
Trial Court: Ruled in Favor of the Arbolarios. The lower court held
that the Arbolarios were the brothers and the sisters of the
deceased Purificacion Arbolario, while the Colincos were her
cousins and nieces. Hence, Pursuant to Article 1009 of the Civil
Code, the Colincos could not inherit from her, because she had half-
brothers and half-sisters.
CA: Reversed and ruled in favor of the Colincos. It rejected the
contention of petitioners that the cohabitation of their father with
their natural mother, Francisca Malvas, was by virtue of a valid
marriage. There was no proof that Arbolarios natural mother and
Juan Arbolario were lawfully married. In fact, the Arbolarios had all
been born before the death of Catalina Baloyo, and no proof was
introduced that the marriage between Juan and Catalina had
lawfully ended. Thus, the Arbolarios are illegitimate half-siblings of
Purificacion. Illegitimate children are barred by Article 992 of the
Civil Code from inheriting intestate from the legitimate children and
relatives of their father or mother.
ISSUE(S) & HELD/RATIO:
Do the Arbolarios have a right to the partition of the
subject lot?
No. The Arbolarios were unable to establish any right to partition,
because they had failed to establish that they were legitimate half-
brothers and half-sisters of the deceased Purificacion. There is no
solid basis for the argument of petitioners that Juan Arbolarios
marriage to Francisca Malvas was valid, supposedly because
Catalina Baloyo was already dead when they were born. t does not
follow that just because his first wife has died, a man is already
conclusively married to the woman who bore his children. A
marriage certificate or other generally accepted proof is necessary
to establish the marriage as an undisputable fact
Questions as to the determination of the heirs of a decedent, the
proof of filiation, and the determination of the estate of a decedent
and claims thereto should be brought up before the proper probate
court or in special proceedings instituted for the purpose. Such
issues cannot be adjudicated in an ordinary civil action for the
recovery of ownership and possession.
15) Felix Azuela vs. CA G.R. No. 122880, 12 April 2006
AUTHOR: Coquia
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE: Articles 805 and 806 of the Civil
Code
FACTS:
The case stems from a petition for probate fied on 10 April 1984
with the RTC Manila. This was filed by Felix Azuela who sought to
admit to probate the notarial will of Eugenia E. Igsolo, which was
notarized on 10 June 1981. Petitioner is the son of the cousin of the
decedent.
On the face of the will, the three named witnesses to the will
affixed their signatures on the left-hand margin of both pages of
the will, but not at the bottom of the attestation clause. The will
only named two heirs, namely: petitioner and Igsolo. The petition
was opposed by Geralda Castillo who was the counsel and
representative for the 12 legitimate heirs of the decedent. The
purpose of the petition by petitioner was due to the fact that a case
for forcible entry has been filed against him of the subject property
in the will. The RTC admitted the will to probate. RTC held that the
liberalization and interepretation of the law on the formal requisites
of a will with the end view of giving the testator more freedom in
expressing his last wishes, the probate was allowed. The Court also
noted that the defects were not serious in nature. The CA reversed
the trial court ruling and disallowed the probate. CA held that the
attestation clause failed to state the number of pages used in the
will, thus rendering the will void and undeserving of probate.
ISSUE(S): WON the failure of the witnesses to sign the attestation
clause constitutes a fatal flaw as to render a will invalid.
HELD: YES.
RATIO:
The solution to this case call for the application of Articles 805 and
806 of the Civil Code. There are more defects. As admitted by the
petitioners the attestation clause fails to state the number of pages
of the will. There was an incomplete attempt to comply with this
requisite, a space having been allotted for the insertion of the
number of pages in the attestation clause.
SC cited: Uy Coque v. Navas Sioca among the defects of the will
in question was the failure of the attestation clause to state the
number of pages contained in the will. The purpose of requiring the
number of sheets to be stated in the attestation clause is obvious;
the document might easily be so prepared that the removal of a
sheet would completely change the testamentary dispositions of
the will and in the absence of a statement of the total number of
sheets such removal might be effected by taking out the sheet and
changing the numbers at the top of the following pages.
In Caneda vs. CA, JBL Reyes discusses Art. 809. The rule must be
limited to disregarding those defects that can be supplied by an
examination of the will itself: whether all the pages are
consecutively numbered; signatures appear in every page; whether
the subscribing witnesses are three or the will was notarized. ... But
the total number of pages and whether all persons required to sign
did so in the presence of each other must substantially appear in
the attestation clause, being the only check against perjury in the
probate proceedings.
Caneda suggested: It may thus be stated that the rule, as it now
stands, is that omission which can be supplied by an examination
of the will itself, without the need of resorting to extrinsic evidence
of the will itself, will not be fatal and, correspondingly, would not
obstruct the allowance to probate of the will being assailed.
16) Alaban v. CA & Provido Author/Digested by: V.D.
Doctrine: A special proceeding is defined as a remedy by which a
party seeks to establish a status, a right or a particular fact.
Facts:
1. In November 2000, respondent Francisco Provido filed a petition
for the probate of the Last Will and Testament of the late
Soledad Provido Elevencionado, who died on 26 October 2000
in Janiuay, Iloilo.
2. Respondent alleged that he was the heir of the decedent and
the executor of her will.
3. In May 2001, RTC Br. 68, in P.D. Monfort North, Dumangas, Iloilo
allowed the probate of the will of the decedent and directing
the issuance of letters testamentary to respondent.
4. More than four months later petitioners filed a motion for the
reopening of the probate proceedings.
1. Filed an opposition to the allowance of the will of the
decedent, as well as the issuance of letters
testamentary to respondent, claiming that they are the
intestate heirs of the decedent.
2. Claimed RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the petition
due to non-payment of the correct docket fees, defective
publication, and lack of notice to the other heirs.
3. Alleged that the will could not have been probated for
the following reasons:
1. Signature of the decedent was forged.
2. Will was not executed in accordance with law,
that is, the witnesses failed to sign below the
attestation clause.
3. Decedent lacked testamentary capacity to
 execute and publish a will.
4. Will was executed by force and under duress and
improper pressure.
5. Decedent had no intention to make a will at the
time of affixing of her signature.
6. Decedent did not know the properties to be
disposed of, having included in the will properties
which no longer belonged to her.
5. Petitioners prayed that the letters testamentary issued to
respondent be withdrawn and the estate of the decedent
disposed of under intestate succession.
6. RTC denied petitioners motion for being unmeritoriousIt also
held that petitioners were deemed notified of the hearing by
publication and that the deficiency in the payment of docket
fees is not a ground for the outright dismissal of the petition.
7. Petitioners filed a petition with an application for preliminary
injunction with the CA seeking to annul RTC decision and order.
They claimed that they held several conferences to discuss
the matter of dividing the estate of the decedent, with
respondent agreeing to a one-sixth (1/6) portion as his
share.
Petitioners allegedly drafted a compromise agreement to
implement the division of the estate.
Claimed respondent refused to sign and return the same.
Petitioners opined that respondent feigned interest in
participating in the compromise agreement so that they
would not suspect his intention to secure the probate of
the will.
Claimed they only learned of the probate proceeding later.
8. CA dismissed the petition for no showing that petitioners failed
to avail of or resort to the ordinary remedies of new trial,
appeal, petition for relief from judgment, or other appropriate
remedies through no fault of their own. CA also held that
petitioners allegations against the RTC were baseless.
9. Hence, case was brought before the Supreme Court.
Issue: W/N CA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction when it dismissed their petition
Held: The petition is devoid of merit.
Ratio:
1. According to the Rules, notice is required to be personally given
to known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator.
2. A perusal of the will shows that respondent was instituted as
the sole heir of the decedent. Petitioners, as nephews and
nieces of the decedent, are neither compulsory nor testate
heirs who are entitled to be notified of the probate proceedings
under the Rules. Respondent had no legal obligation to mention
petitioners in the petition for probate, or to personally notify
them of the same.
3. Besides, assuming petitioners are entitled to be so notified, the
purported infirmity is cured by the publication of the notice.
After all, personal notice upon the heirs is a matter of
procedural convenience and not a jurisdictional requisite.
4. The non-inclusion of petitioners names in the petition and the
alleged failure to personally notify them of the proceedings do
not constitute extrinsic fraud. Petitioners were not denied their
day in court, as they were not prevented from participating in
the proceedings and presenting their case before the probate
court.
5. Issue of forum-shopping against petitioners: Forum-shopping
consists of filing multiple suits in different courts, either
simultaneously or successively, involving the same parties, to
ask the courts to rule on the same or related causes and/or to
grant the same or substantially same reliefs, on the supposition
that one or the other court would make a favorable disposition.
6. Parties in the instant case, as well as in the appealed case
before the CA, are the same. Both cases deal with the existence
and validity of the alleged will of the decedent, with petitioners
anchoring their cause on the state of intestacy.
7. In the probate proceedings, petitioners position has always
been that the decedent left no will and if she did, the will does
not comply with the requisites of a valid will. Indeed, that
position is the bedrock of their present petition. Of course,
respondent maintains the contrary stance. On the other hand,
in the petition for letters of administration, petitioner Flores
prayed for her appointment as administratrix of the estate on
the theory that the decedent died intestate. The petition was
dismissed on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, and it is this
order of dismissal which is the subject of review. Clearly, there
is forum-shopping.
8. Moreover, petitioners failed to inform the Court of the said
pending case in their certification against forum- shopping.
Even in the petition for annulment of judgment, petitioners
failed to inform the CA of the pendency of their appeal in the
CA, even though the notice of appeal was filed way before the
petition for annulment of judgment was instituted.
17) Fleumer vs HiX

Trixcie Magsino
18) Ancheta v. Guersey-Dalaygon (2006)

FACTS:

1) Spouses Audrey ONeill and W. Richard Guersey were

American citizens who have resided in the Philippines for 30
years. They have an adopted daughter, Kyle Guersey Hill.
2) In 1979, Audrey died, leaving a will. In it, she bequeathed
her entire estate to Richard, who was also designated as
executor.
3) The will was admitted to probate before the Orphans Court
of Baltimore, Maryland, U.S.A, which named James N. Phillips
as executor due to Richards renunciation of his
appointment. The court also named Atty. Alonzo
Q. Ancheta (petitioner).
4) 2 years later, Richard married Candelaria Guersey-
Dalaygon (respondent) with whom he has two children,
namely, Kimberly and Kevin.
5) The following year, Audreys will was also admitted to
probate by CFI Rizal in Special Proceeding No. 9625
6) Atty Ancehta as administrator of Audreys estate, filed an
inventory and appraisal of the following properties:
 a. Audreys conjugal share in real estate with
improvements located at 28 Pili Avenue, Forbes Park,
Makati, Metro Manila, valued at P764,865.00 (Makati
property);
b. a current account in Audreys name with a cash
balance of P12,417.97; and
c. 64,444 shares of stock in A/G Interiors, Inc.
worth P64,444.00.
7) After 2 years, Richard died, leaving a will, wherein he
bequeathed his entire estate to his 2nd wife Candelaria
(respondent), save for his rights and interests over the A/G
Interiors, Inc. shares, which he left to Kyle.
8) The will was also admitted to probate by the Orphans Court
of Ann Arundel, Maryland, U.S.A, and designated Atty.
William Quasha as executor.
9) Richards will was then submitted for probate before the RTC
Makati, docketed as Special Proceeding No. M-888. Atty.
Quasha was appointed as ancillary administrator.
10) Ancehta filed in Special Proceeding No. 9625, a motion
to declare Richard and Kyle as heirs of Audrey.
a. a project of partition of Audreys estate, with Richard
being apportioned the undivided interest in the
Makati property, 48.333 shares in A/G Interiors, Inc.,
and P9,313.48 from the Citibank current account;
and Kyle, the undivided interest in the Makati
property, 16,111 shares in A/G Interiors, Inc.,
and P3,104.49 in cash.
b. TC granted and Register of Deeds of makati issued
TCT in the names of Estate of Richard and Kyle.
11) Meanwhile, the Atty. Quasha, in Special Proceeding No. M-
888 (Richards will) also filed a project of partition
wherein 2/5 of Richards undivided interest in the Makati
property was allocated to 2nd wife Candelara,
3
while /5 thereof were allocated to Richards three children.
12) 2nd wife Cadelaria opposed on the ground that under the
law of the State of Maryland, a legacy passes to the
legatee the entire interest of the testator in the
property subject of the legacy.
a. Since Richard left his entire estate to Candelaria,
except for his rights and interests over the A/G
Interiors, Inc, shares, then his entire undivided
interest in the Makati property should be given to
her.
b. Atty Ancheta willfully breached his fiduciary duty
when he disregarded the laws of the State
of Maryland on the distribution of Audreys estate in
accordance with her will
c. As ancillary administrator of Aubreys estate
amounted to extrinsic fraud. He was duty-bound to
follow the express terms of Aubreys will, and his
denial of knowledge of the laws of Maryland cannot
stand because petitioner is a senior partner in a
prestigious law firm and it was his duty to know the
relevant laws.
d. TC disapproved the project of partition.
13) Atty. Ancheta - contended that he acted in good faith in
submitting the project of partition before the trial court in
Special Proceeding No. 9625.
a. he had no knowledge of the State of Marylands laws
on testate and intestate succession.
b. he believed that it is to the best interests of the
surviving children that Philippine law be applied as
they would receive their just shares.
c. orders sought to be annulled are already final and
executory, and cannot be set aside
14) Cadelaria stated that she was not able to file any opposition
to the project of partition because she was not a party
thereto and she learned of the provision of Aubreys will
bequeathing entirely her estate to Richard only after Atty.
Ancheta filed a project of partition in Special Proceeding No.
M-888 for the settlement of Richards estate.
ISSUE:
Whether the decree of disribution of estate is final? Yes, but in
this case it is subject to exception.
Whether there is extrinsic fraud commited by Atty. Ancheta? Yes!
Extrinsic fraud is alleged is that the fraudulent scheme of
the prevailing litigant prevented a party from having his
day in court. Atty Anchetas failure to proficiently manage
the distribution of Audreys estate according to the terms of
her will and as dictated by the applicable law amounted to
extrinsic fraud.
Which law would apply in distribution of Audreys will? Being a
foreign national, the intrinsic validity of Audreys will,
especially with regard as to who are her heirs, is governed
by her national law, i.e., the law of the State of Maryland,
as provided in Article 16 of the Civil Code.
RULING:
GENERAL RULE: A decree of distribution of the estate of a deceased
person vests the title to the land of the estate in the distributees,
which, if erroneous may be corrected by a timely appeal. Once it
becomes final, its binding effect is like any other judgment in rem
EXCEPTION: a final decree of distribution of the estate may
be set aside for lack of jurisdiction or fraud
o in Ramon v. Ortuzar, the Court ruled that a party
interested in a probate proceeding may have a final
liquidation set aside when he is left out by reason of
circumstances beyond his control or through mistake
or inadvertence not imputable to negligence.
An annulment of judgment filed under B.P. 129 may be based on
the ground that a judgment is void for want of jurisdiction or that
the judgment was obtained by extrinsic fraud.
For fraud to become a basis for annulment of judgment, it has to be
extrinsic or actual, and must be brought within four years from the
discovery of the fraud.
In this case, Atty Anchetas failure to follow the terms of Audreys
will, despite the latters declaration of good faith, amounted to
extrinsic fraud.
Under Article 16 of the Civil Code, it is the national law of the
decedent (State of Maryland) that is applicable, hence, petitioner
should have distributed Aubreys estate in accordance with the
terms of her will.
CA found that petitioner was prompted to distribute Audreys estate
in accordance with Philippine laws in order to equally benefit the
adopted daughter Kyle.
2nd wife Candelaria justified her lack of immediate action by saying
that she had no opportunity to question petitioners acts since she
was not a party to Special Proceeding No. 9625, and it was only
after Atty. Ancheta filed the project of partition in Special
Proceeding No. M-888, reducing her inheritance in the estate of
Richard that she was prompted to seek another counsel to protect
her interest
It should be pointed out that the prescriptive period for annulment
of judgment based on extrinsic fraud commences to run from
the discovery of the fraud or fraudulent act/s. Respondents
knowledge of the terms of Audreys will is immaterial in this case
since it is not the fraud complained of. Rather, it is petitioners
failure to introduce in evidence the pertinent law of the State
of Maryland that is the fraudulent act, or in this case, omission,
alleged to have been committed against respondent, and therefore,
the four-year period should be counted from the time of
respondents discovery thereof.
The overriding consideration when extrinsic fraud is alleged
is that the fraudulent scheme of the prevailing litigant
prevented a party from having his day in court.
o Atty Anchetas failure to proficiently manage the
distribution of Audreys estate according to the terms
of her will and as dictated by the applicable law
amounted to extrinsic fraud.
o He is required to exercise reasonable diligence and
act in entire good faith in the performance of that
trust. Although he is not a guarantor or insurer of the
safety of the estate nor is he expected to be
infallible, yet the same degree of prudence, care and
judgment which a person of a fair average capacity
and ability exercises in similar transactions of his
own, serves as the standard by which his conduct is
to be judged
o While foreign laws do not prove themselves in
our jurisdiction and our courts are not
authorized to take judicial notice of them;
however, Atty. Ancheta, as ancillary
administrator of Audreys estate, was duty-
bound to introduce in evidence the pertinent
law of the State of Maryland.
o He is a senior partner in a prestigious law firm, with a
big legal staff and a large library. He had all the legal
resources to determine the applicable law.

NOTES:
There is extrinsic fraud within the meaning of Sec. 9 par. (2), of
B.P. Blg. 129, where it is one the effect of which prevents a party
from hearing a trial, or real contest, or from presenting all of his
case to the court, or where it operates upon matters, not pertaining
to the judgment itself, but to the manner in which it was procured
so that there is not a fair submission of the controversy.
Art. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the
law of the country where it is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary succession,
both with respect to the order of succession and
to the amount of successional rights and to the
intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions,
shall be regulated by the national law of the
person whose succession is under
consideration, whatever may be the nature of
the property and regardless of the country
wherein said property may be found.
Theres no lefitime in foreign laws.
o Honorable as it seems, petitioners motive in
equitably distributing Audreys estate cannot prevail
over Audreys and Richards wishes. As stated in Bellis
v. Bellis:
o x x x whatever public policy or good customs may
be involved in our system of legitimes, Congress has
not intended to extend the same to the succession of
foreign nationals. For it has specifically chosen to
leave, inter alia, the amount of successional rights, to
the decedent's national Law. Specific provisions must
prevail over general ones