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Topic: Evidence; Falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus (False in one, False in all)
Title: Northwest Airline v. Chiong G.R. no. 155550, January 31, 2008
Ponente: Nachura, J.
Facts: In the course of a civil proceeding, Northwest, filed a separate criminal complaint for False
Testimony against Chiong based on the latters testimony that he did not leave the Philippines
after April 1, 1989 contrary to the notations in his seaman service record book that he had left
the country on April 17, 1989, and returned on October 5 of the same year. The RTC favored
Chiong by the evidence that Chiong passed through the PCG counter on April 1, 1989, and that
his passport was accordingly stamped, obviously for purposes of his departure on that day.
Issue: Is the falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus applicable?
Ruling: No.
Analysis: The legal maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus, cited by Northwest, is not a positive
rule of law and is not strictly applied in this jurisdiction. Before this maxim can be applied, the
witness must be shown to have willfully falsified the truth on one or more material points. The
principle presupposes the existence of a positive testimony on a material point contrary to
subsequent declarations in the testimony. However, the records show that Chiongs testimony
did not contain inconsistencies on what occurred on April 1, 1989. Yet, Northwest never even
attempted to explain or impugn the evidence that Chiong passed through the PCG counter on
April 1, 1989, and that his passport was accordingly stamped, obviously for purposes of his
departure on that day.

ALVAREZ vs. RAMIREZ


FACTS:
Respondent Susan Ramirez was the complaining witness in a criminal case or arson pending
before the RTC. The accused was petitioner Maximo Alvarez, stranged husband of Esperanza
Alvarez, sister of respondent. On June 21, 1999, Esperanza Alvarez was called to the witness
stand as the first witness against petitioner, her husband. Petitioner filed a motion to disqualify
Esperanza from testifying against him pursuant to Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court on
marital disqualification.
Respondent filed an opposition to the motion. Pending resolution of the motion, the trial court
directed the prosecution to proceed with the presentation of the other witnesses. On September
2, 1999, the trial court issued the questioned Order disqualifying Esperanza Alvarez from further
testifying and deleting her testimony from the records. The prosecution filed a motion for
reconsideration but was denied in the other assailed Order dated October 19, 1999. This
prompted respondent to file with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari with application for
preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order. On May 31, 2000, the Appellate Court
rendered a Decision nullifying and setting aside the assailed Orders issued by the trial court.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether or not Esperanza can testify over the objection of her estranged husband on
the ground of marital privilege.
HELD:
Yes, Esperanza may testify over the objection of her husband. The disqualification of a witness by
reason of marriage under Sec. 22, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court has its exceptions as
where the marital relations are so strained that there is no more harmony to be preserved. The
acts of the petitioner stamp out all major aspects of marital life. On the other hand, the State has
an interest in punishing the guilty and exonerating the innocent, and must have the right to offer
the testimony of Esperanza over the objection of her husband.

Zulueta vs. Court of Appeals, 253 SCRA 699 (1996)

The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable, except upon lawful order
of the court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise as prescribed by law. Any
evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceeding section, shall inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding.
FACTS:
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Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private respondent Alfredo Martin. On March 26,
1962, petitioner entered the clinic of her husband, a doctor of medicine, and in the presence of
her mother, a driver and private respondent's secretary, forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet
of her husband's clinic and took 157 documents consisting of private respondents between Dr.
Martin and his alleged paramours, greeting cards, cancelled check, diaries, Dr. Martin's passport,
and photographs. The documents and papers were seized for use in evidence in a case for legal
separation and for disqualification from the practice of medicine which petitioner had filed
against her husband.
ISSUE: Whether or not the papers and other materials obtained from forcible entrusion and from
unlawful means are admissible as evidence in court regarding marital separation and
disqualification from medical practice.
HELD:
Indeed the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence. The
constitutional injuction declaring "the privacy of communication and correspondence to be
inviolable" is no less applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her
husband's infedility) who is the party against whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced.
The only exception to the prohibition in the constitution is if there is a "lawful order from the
court or which public safety or order require otherwise, as prescribed by law." Any violation of
this provision renders the evidence obtained inadmissible "for any purpose in any proceeding."
The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify anyone of them in breaking the
drawers and cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital
infedility. A person, by contracting marriage, does not shed her/his integrity or her/his right to
privacy as an individual and the constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her.
The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it
privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of
the affected spouse while the marriage subsists. Neither may be examined without the consent
of the other as to any communication received in confidence by one from the other during the
marriage, save for specified exceptions. But one thing is freedom of communication; quite
another is a compulsion for each one to share what one knows with the other. And this has
nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that each owes to the other.

Mercado vs Vitriolo
Facts: Rosa Mercado is seeking for the disbarment of Atty. Julito Vitriolo as he allegedly
maliciously filed a criminal case for falsification of public documents against her thereby violating
the attoyrney client privilege. It appears that Vitriolo filed a case against complainant as she
apparently made false entries in the certificate of live birth of her children. More specifically she
allegedly indicated that she is married to a certain Ferdinand Fernandez when in fact her real
husband is Ruben Mercado. Mercado claims that by filing the complaint the attorney client
privilege has been violated. Mercado filed a case for Vitriolos disbarment.
Issue: Whether or not the respondent violated the rule on privileged communication between
attorney-client when he filed the criminal case for falsification
Held: No. The evidence on record fails to substantiate complainants allegations. Complainant did
not even specify the alleged communication disclosed by the respondents. All her claims were
couched in general terms and lacked specificity. Indeed the complaint failed to attend the
hearings at the IBP. Without any testimony from the complainant as to the specific confidential
information allegedly divulged by respondent without her consent, it would be difficult if not
impossible to determine if there was any violation of the rule on privileged communication. Such
information is a crucial link in establishing a breach of the rule on privileged communication
between attorney and client. It is not enough to merely assert the attorney client privilege. The
burden of proving that the privilege applies is placed upon the party asserting the privilege.

ALMONTE VS VASQUEZ
G.R. No. 93567, May 23 1995
FACTS:
Ombudsman Vasquez required Rogado and Rivera of Economic Intelligence and Investigation
Bureau (EIIB) to produce all documents relating to Personal Service Funds yr. 1988 and all
evidence for the whole plantilla of EIIB for 1988. The subpoena duces tecum was issued in
connection with the investigation of funds representing savings from unfilled positions in the EIIB
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which were legally disbursed. Almonte and Perez denied the anomalous activities that circulate
around the EIIB office. They moved to quash the subpoena duces tecum. They claim privilege of
an agency of the Government.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an Ombudsman can oblige the petitioners by virtue of subpoena duces tecum to
provide documents relating to personal service and salary vouchers of EIIB employers.
RULING:
Yes. A government privilege against disclosure is recognized with respect to state secrets bearing
on military, diplomatic and similar matters. This privilege is based upon public interest of such
paramount importance as in and of itself transcending the individual interests of a private
citizen, even though, as a consequence thereof, the plaintiff cannot enforce his legal rights.
In the case at bar, there is no claim that military or diplomatic secrets will be disclosed by the
production of records pertaining to the personnel of the EIIB. EIIB's function is the gathering and
evaluation of intelligence reports and information regarding "illegal activities affecting the
national economy, such as, but not limited to, economic sabotage, smuggling, tax evasion, dollar
salting." Consequently while in cases which involve state secrets it may be sufficient to
determine the circumstances of the case that there is reasonable danger that compulsion of the
evidence will expose military matters without compelling production, no similar excuse can be
made for privilege resting on other considerations.
Right to Information, access to public documents

CHAVEZ vs PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT


Facts:
-Petitioner Francisco I Chavez (in his capacity as taxpayer, citizen and a former government
official) initiated this original action seeking
(1) to prohibit and enjoin respondents [PCGG and its chairman] from privately entering into,
perfecting and/or executing any agreement with the heirs of the late President Ferdinand E.
Marcos . . . relating to and concerning the properties and assets of Ferdinand Marcos located in
the Philippines and/or abroad including the so-called Marcos gold hoard"; and
(2) to compel respondent[s] to make public all negotiations and agreement, be they ongoing or
perfected, and all documents related to or relating to such negotiations and agreement between
the PCGG and the Marcos heirs."
-Chavez is the same person initiated the prosecution of the Marcoses and their cronies who
committed unmitigated plunder of the public treasury and the systematic subjugation of the
country's economy; he says that what impelled him to bring this action were several news
reports 2 bannered in a number of broadsheets sometime in September 1997. These news items
referred to (1) the alleged discovery of billions of dollars of Marcos assets deposited in various
coded accounts in Swiss banks; and (2) the reported execution of a compromise, between the
government (through PCGG) and the Marcos heirs, on how to split or share these assets.
-PETITIONER DEMANDS that respondents make public any and all negotiations and agreements
pertaining to PCGG's task of recovering the Marcoses' ill-gotten wealth. He claims that any
compromise on the alleged billions of ill-gotten wealth involves an issue of "paramount public
interest," since it has a "debilitating effect on the country's economy" that would be greatly
prejudicial to the national interest of the Filipino people. Hence, the people in general have a
right to know the transactions or deals being contrived and effected by the government.
-RESPONDENT ANSWERS that they do not deny forging a compromise agreement with the
Marcos heirs. They claim, though, that petitioner's action is premature, because there is no
showing that he has asked the PCGG to disclose the negotiations and the Agreements. And even
if he has, PCGG may not yet be compelled to make any disclosure, since the proposed terms and
conditions of the Agreements have not become effective and binding.
-PETITIONER INVOKES
Sec. 7 [Article III]. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be
recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts,
transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy
development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.
Sec. 28 [Article II]. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and
implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest.
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-RESPONDENT ANSWERS that the above constitutional provisions refer to completed and
operative official acts, not to those still being considered.
Issue: Whether or not the Court could require the PCGG to disclose to the public the details of
any agreement, perfected or not, with the Marcoses.
Ruling: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The General and Supplemental Agreement dated
December 28, 1993, which PCGG and the Marcos heirs entered into are hereby declared NULL
AND VOID for being contrary to law and the Constitution. Respondent PCGG, its officers and all
government functionaries and officials who are or may be directly ot indirectly involved in the
recovery of the alleged ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses and their associates are DIRECTED to
disclose to the public the terms of any proposed compromise settlment, as well as the final
agreement, relating to such alleged ill-gotten wealth, in accordance with the discussions
embodied in this Decision. No pronouncement as to cost.
RD:
- The "information" and the "transactions" referred to in the subject provisions of the Constitution
have as yet no defined scope and extent. There are no specific laws prescribing the exact
limitations within which the right may be exercised or the correlative state duty may be obliged.
However, the following are some of the recognized restrictions:
(1) national security matters and intelligence information
- there is a governmental privilege against public disclosure with respect to state secrets
regarding military, diplomatic and other national security matters. 24 But where there is no need
to protect such state secrets, the privilege may not be invoked to withhold documents and other
information, 25 provided that they are examined "in strict confidence" and given "scrupulous
protection."
(2) trade secrets and banking transactions
-trade or industrial secrets (pursuant to the Intellectual Property Code 27 and other related laws)
as well as banking transactions (pursuant to the Secrecy of Bank Deposits Act 28) are also
exempted from compulsory disclosure
(3) criminal matters
- Also excluded are classified law enforcement matters, such as those relating to the
apprehension, the prosecution and the detention of criminals, which courts neither may nor
inquire into prior to such arrest, detention and prosecution. Efforts at effective law enforcement
would be seriously jeopardized by free public access to, for example, police information
regarding rescue operations, the whereabouts of fugitives, or leads on covert criminal activities.
(4) other confidential information.
- The Ethical Standards Act 31 further prohibits public officials and employees from using or
divulging "confidential or classified information officially known to them by reason of their office
and not made available to the public." Other acknowledged limitations to information access
include diplomatic correspondence, closed door Cabinet meetings and executive sessions of
either house of Congress, as well as the internal deliberations of the Supreme Court.
- In Valmonte v. Belmonte Jr., the Court emphasized that the information sought must be
"matters of public concern," access to which may be limited by law. Similarly, the state policy of
full public disclosure extends only to "transactions involving public interest" and may also be
"subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law."
- As to the meanings of the terms "public interest" and "public concern," the Court, in Legaspi v.
Civil Service Commission, elucidated: In determining whether or not a particular information is
of public concern there is no rigid test which can be applied. Public concern" like "public
interest" is a term that eludes exact definition. Both terms embrace a broad spectrum of subjects
which the public may want to know, either because these directly affect their lives, or simply
because such matters naturally arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen. In the final analysis, it
is for the courts to determine on a case by case basis whether the matter at issue is of interest or
importance, as it relates to or affects the public.
-As to whether or not the above cited constitutional provisions guarantee access to information
regarding ongoing negotiations or proposals prior to the final agreement, this same clarification
was sought and clearly addressed by the constitutional commissioners during their deliberations,
MR. SUAREZ. And when we say "transactions" which should be distinguished from contracts,
agreements, or treaties or whatever, does the Gentleman refer to the steps leading to the
consummation of the contract, or does he refer to the contract itself?
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MR. OPLE. The "transactions" used here, I suppose, is generic and, therefore, it can cover both
steps leading to a contract, and already a consummated contract, Mr. Presiding Officer.
MR. SUAREZ. This contemplates inclusion of negotiations leading to the consummation of the
transaction?
MR. OPLE. Yes, subject to reasonable safeguards on the national interest.
- Considering the intent of the Constitution, the Court believes that it is incumbent upon the
PCGG and its officers, as well as other government representatives, to disclose sufficient public
information on any proposed settlement they have decided to take up with the ostensible owners
and holders of ill-gotten wealth. Such information, though, must pertain to definite propositions
of the government, not necessarily to intra-agency or inter-agency recommendations or
communications during the stage when common assertions are still in the process of being
formulated or are in the "exploratory" stage. There is a need, of course, to observe the same
restrictions on disclosure of information in general, as discussed above such as on matters
involving national security, diplomatic or foreign relations, intelligence and other classified
information.

CHAVEZ vs PEA, (G.R. No. 133250, November 11, 2003)

FACTS:
This petition asked the Court to legitimize a government contract that conveyed to a private
entity 157.84 hectares of reclaimed public lands along Roxas Boulevard in Metro Manila at the
negotiated price of P1,200 per square meter. However, published reports place the market price
of land near that area at that time at a high of P90,000 per square meter. The difference in price
is a staggering P140.16 billion, equivalent to the budget of the entire Judiciary for seventeen
years and more than three times the Marcos Swiss deposits that this Court forfeited in favor of
the government.
Public Estates Authority (PEA), under the JVA, obligated itself to convey title and possession over
the Property, consisting of approximately One Million Five Hundred Seventy Eight Thousand Four
Hundred Forty One (1,578,441) Square Meters for a total consideration of One Billion Eight
Hundred Ninety Four Million One Hundred Twenty Nine Thousand Two Hundred
(P1,894,129,200.00) Pesos, or a price of One Thousand Two Hundred (P1,200.00) Pesos per
square meter.

ISSUE:
Whether or not stipulations in the Amended JVA for the transfer to AMARI of lands, reclaimed or
to be reclaimed on portions of Manila Bay, violate the Constitution?

RULING:
Submerged lands, like the waters (sea or bay) above them, are part of the States inalienable
natural resources. Submerged lands are property of public dominion, absolutely inalienable and
outside the commerce of man. This is also true with respect to foreshore lands. Any sale of
submerged or foreshore lands is void being contrary to the Constitution as it violates Section 2,
Article XII. In the instant case, the bulk of the lands subject of the Amended JVA are still
submerged lands even to this very day, and therefore inalienable and outside the commerce of
man. Of the 750 hectares subject of the Amended JVA, 592.15 hectares or 78% of the total area
are still submerged, permanently under the waters of Manila Bay. Under the Amended JVA, the
PEA conveyed to Amari the submerged lands even before their actual reclamation, although the
documentation of the deed of transfer and issuance of the certificates of title would be made
only after actual reclamation. This Resolution does not prejudice any innocent third party
purchaser of the reclaimed lands covered by the Amended JVA. Neither the PEA nor Amari has
sold any portion of the reclaimed lands to third parties. Title to the reclaimed lands remains with
the PEA. As held in the 9 July 2002 Decision, the Amended JVA "violates glaringly Sections 2 and
3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution."

Senate vs. Ermita , April 20, 2006


FACTS:
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This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition proffer that the President has abused power by
issuing E.O. 464 Ensuring Observance of the Principles of Separation of Powers, Adherence to
the Rule on Executive Privilege and Respect for the Rights of Public Officials Appearing in
Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Legislation Under the Constitution, and for Other Purposes.
Petitioners pray for its declaration as null and void for being unconstitutional.
In the exercise of its legislative power, the Senate of the Philippines, through its various Senate
Committees, conducts inquiries or investigations in aid of legislation which call for, inter alia, the
attendance of officials and employees of the executive department, bureaus, and offices
including those employed in Government Owned and Controlled Corporations, the Armed Forces
of the Philippines (AFP), and the Philippine National Police (PNP).
The Committee of the Senate issued invitations to various officials of the Executive Department
for them to appear as resource speakers in a public hearing on the railway project, others on the
issues of massive election fraud in the Philippine elections, wire tapping, and the role of military
in the so-called Gloriagate Scandal. Said officials were not able to attend due to lack of consent
from the President as provided by E.O. 464, Section 3 which requires all the public officials
enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before
either house of Congress.

ISSUE:
Is Section 3 of E.O. 464, which requires all the public officials, enumerated in Section 2(b) to
secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either house of Congress, valid and
constitutional?

RULING:
No. The enumeration in Section 2 (b) of E.O. 464 is broad and is covered by the executive
privilege. The doctrine of executive privilege is premised on the fact that certain information
must, as a matter of necessity, be kept confidential in pursuit of the public interest. The privilege
being, by definition, an exemption from the obligation to disclose information, in this case to
Congress, the necessity must be of such high degree as to outweigh the public interest in
enforcing that obligation in a particular case.
Congress undoubtedly has a right to information from the executive branch whenever it is sought
in aid of legislation. If the executive branch withholds such information on the ground that it is
privileged, it must so assert it and state the reason therefor and why it must be respected.
The infirm provisions of E.O. 464, however, allow the executive branch to evade congressional
requests for information without need of clearly asserting a right to do so and/or proffering its
reasons therefor. By the mere expedient of invoking said provisions, the power of Congress to
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is frustrated.

THERESITA, JUAN, ASUNCION, PATROCINIA, RICARDO, and GLORIA, all surnamed DIMAGUILA vs.
JOSE and SONIA A. MONTEIRO
G.R. No. 201011
January 27, 2014

Facts:
On July 5, 1993, respondent spouses, Jose and Sonia Monteiro, along with Jose, Gerasmo, Elisa
and Clarita Nobleza filed a Complaint for Partition and Damages before the RTC against the
Dimaguilas, together with the Borlazas, alleging that the parties were co-owners and prayed for
the partition of a residential house and lot in Laguna covered by Tax Declaration No. 1453. The
Monteiros anchored their claim on a Deed of Sale executed in their favor by the heirs of Pedro
Dimaguila.
The Dimaguilas argued that there was no co-ownership at all since the property had long been
partitioned to Perfecto and Vitaliano Dimaguila, with Perfecto becoming owner of the southern
half and Vitaliano owning the northern half. The defendants claim that they are Vitalianos heirs
and further averred that the Monteiros claim to the property is null for they were not heirs of
either Perfecto or Vitaliano.
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Petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari before the CA assailing the RTCs orders which denied
several of their motions and the proceedings were suspended while such petition was pending.
The CA upheld the RTCs orders and, upon resumption of the proceedings, the spouses Monteiro
filed their Motion for Leave to Amend and/or Admit Amended Complaint which was granted by
the RTC.
The Monteiros admitted in the amended complaint the defendants allegation of a partition and
aver that a third of Perfectos share was sold to them through a Bilihan; and that, upon their
attempt to take possession of that portion, they found that the Dimaguilas were occupying it.
The Dimaguilas, in their answer to the amended complaint now contravened their original
answer that the subject property was actually divided into northern and southern halves,
replacing it with a division into two and share and share alike. This resulted to an admission of
a co-ownership, contrary to their original position. According to the Dimaguilas, the Bilihan also
violated Article 1485 of the Civil Code for not specifying the metes and bounds of the property
sold and that, even if it was specified, the sale was still void since a co-owner can only sell his
undivided share in the property.
The RTC ruled in favor of Spouses Monteiro after perusing evidence aliunde of a cadastral map of
Liliw, Laguna and a corresponding list of claimant as to show that the property had indeed been
partitioned into southern and northern portions. The RTC concluded that the Dimaguilas were
stopped from denying this partition and the Bilihan document was regular and authentic absent
any evidence to the contrary.
The Dimaguilas appealed their case to the CA which affirmed the trial courts decision. A motion
for reconsideration was subsequently filed by the petitioners but it was denied, hence, this
appeal under Rule 45.
Issues:
1) Whether there was a partition of the subject property; and
2) Whether the 1/3 portion of the southern half of the subject property was sold to the
respondent spouses.
Ruling:
The petition is DENIED. Both aforementioned issues are answered in the affirmative.
The Supreme Court points out that to determine whether there was a partition and a sale of the
1/3 portion of the property requires an evaluation of the evidence. This entails a question of fact
which is beyond the ambit of Rule 45 upon which this petition is based. On this ground alone, the
petition could be denied. However, the Supreme Court delved into the concepts of evidence to
put the case to rest.
Preponderance of evidence; definition
Spouses Monteiro, as plaintiffs in the original case, had the burden of proof to establish their
case by a preponderance of evidence, which is the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate
evidence on either side, synonymous with the term greater weight of the evidence.
Preponderance of evidence is evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief
than that which is offered in opposition thereto.

Admissions; contradiction
Section 4 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court provides that an admission made by a party in the
course of the proceedings in the same case does not require proof, and may be contradicted only
by showing that it was made through palpable mistake. The petitioners argue that such
admission was the palpable mistake of their former counsel in his rush to file the answer, a copy
of which was not provided to them. This contention is unacceptable. It is a purely self-serving
claim unsupported by any iota of evidence. Bare allegations, unsubstantiated by evidence, are
not equivalent to proof.
Admissions; rendered conclusive through estoppels
Article 1431 of the Civil Code provides that through estoppel, an admission is rendered
conclusive upon the person making it, and cannot be denied or disproved as against the person
relying thereon. The respondent spouses had clearly relied on the petitioners admission and so
amended their original complaint for partition to one for recovery of possession of a portion of
the subject property. Thus, the petitioners are now estopped from denying or attempting to prove
that there was no partition of the property. Considering that an admission does not require proof,
the admission of the petitioners would actually be sufficient to prove the partition even without
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the documents presented by the respondent spouses. If anything, the additional evidence they
presented only served to corroborate the petitioners admission.

Best Evidence Rule


Section 3(d) of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that when the subject of inquiry is
the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document
itself, except when the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded
in a public office. Section 7 of the same Rule provides that when the original of a document is in
the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office, its contents may be proved by a
certified copy issued by the public officer in custody thereof. Section 24 of Rule 132 provides that
the record of public documents may be evidenced by a copy attested by the officer having the
legal custody or the record.
Hearsay Rule
Section 44 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court similarly provides that entries in official
records are an exception to the rule. The rule provides that entries in official records made in the
performance of the duty of a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance
of a duty specially enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. The
necessity of this rule consists in the inconvenience and difficulty of requiring the officials
attendance as a witness to testify to the innumerable transactions in the course of his duty. The
documents trustworthiness consists in the presumption of regularity of the performance of
official duty. Cadastral maps are the output of cadastral surveys. The DENR is the department
tasked to execute, supervise and manage the conduct of cadastral surveys. It is, therefore, clear
that the cadastral map and the corresponding list of claimants qualify as entries in official
records as they were prepared by the DENR, as mandated by law. As such, they are exceptions to
the hearsay rule and are prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein.
In the morning of June 29, 2004 Amalia was told by her mother to look for her sister Alice. Alice
was an 18 years old girl with the mind of a 5 year old. Amalia looked for Alice all over the
neighborhood until she neared the house of Romy Fallones. As she approached the house of
Fallones, she heard a familiar cry:

Tama na! Tama na!

It was Alices voice. Immediately, she ran up to Fallones door and knocked repeatedly until
Fallones opened the door.

Behind Fallones she saw Alice. Alice said:

Amalia, may napkin na binigay si Romy o.

Alice grabbed her sister who had a bloodied shorts. They went to the barangay office where Alice
was able to positively identify Fallones as the person who sexually abused her.

A rape case was filed against Fallones. During trial, Alice died. Amalia testified on what she heard
during the incident. Eventually, Fallones was convicted of rape.

On appeal, Fallones argued that the testimony of Amalia on what she heard was hearsay for she
only heard the cry of Alice but did not see the act of rape.

ISSUE: Whether or not the testimony of Amalia is admissible despite being hearsay.

HELD: Yes. It is exempted from the hearsay rule under the principle of Res Gestae.
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Res gestae refers to statements made by the participants or the victims of, or the spectators to,
a crime immediately before, during, or after its commission. These statements are a spontaneous
reaction or utterance inspired by the excitement of the occasion, without any opportunity for the
declarant to fabricate a false statement. An important consideration is whether there intervened,
between the occurrence and the statement, any circumstance calculated to divert the mind and
thus restore the mental balance of the declarant; and afford an opportunity for deliberation.

For spontaneous statements to be admitted in evidence, the following must concur:

1) the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence;

2) the statements were made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and

3) the statements concerned the occurrence in question and its immediately attending
circumstances.

In this case, the utterances of Alice Tama na! Tama na! were made during a startling event
(when Fallones was penetrating her). When Fallones opened the door upon Amalias incessant
knocking, Alice came out from behind him, uttering Amalia, may napkin na binigay si Romy o.
The admissibility of Alices spontaneous statements rests on the valid assumption that they were
spoken under circumstances where there had been no chance to contrive. It is difficult to lie in an
excited state and the impulsiveness of the expression is a guaranty of trustworthiness.
G.R. No. 187023: November 17, 2010

EVANGELINE D. IMANI, Petitioner v. METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST COMPANY, Respondent

Nachura, J.:

FACTS:

Imani signed a Continuing Suretyship Agreement in favour of Metrobank with 6 other co-sureties
binding themselves to pay whatever indebtedness C.P. Dazo Tannery, Inc. (CPDTI) incurs, but not
exceeding 6 Million php. CPDTI incurred an indebtednessaround 164,000 php to which it
defaulted in paying Metrobank. This prompted Metrobank to file a collection suit against CPDTI
and its sureties. Metrobank won, and the sheriff levied a property owned by Imani and filed to
consolidate the title to its name.

Imani opposed, stating that it is part of her conjugal property. The RTC ruled in favour of Imani,
reasoning that the loan proceeds never redounded to the benefit of the family of Imani. RTC
annulled the sale and levy. Metrobank appealed, and the CA reversed the decision of the RTC.

Thus, petitioner appeals to the Supreme Court.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the CA erred in reversing the decision of the RTC.

2. Whether the property was subject to execution, it being a road right of way under PD 1529.

HELD:
10

No.

Civil Law: Conjugal Property

All property of the marriage is presumed to be conjugal. However, for this presumption to apply,
the party who invokes it must first prove that the property was acquired during the
marriage.Proof of acquisition during the coverture is a conditionsine qua nonto the operation of
the presumption in favor of the conjugal partnership.Thus, the time when the property was
acquired is material.

As aptly ruled by the CA, the fact that the land was registered in the name ofEvangelina Dazo-
Imani married to Sina Imaniis no proof that the property was acquired during the spouses
coverture. Acquisition of title and registration thereof are two different acts. It is well settled that
registration does not confer title but merely confirms one already existing. Indubitably, petitioner
utterly failed to substantiate her claim that the property belongs to the conjugal
partnership.Thus, it cannot be rightfully said that the CA reversed the RTC ruling without valid
basis

Remedial Law: Appeals

The argument regarding the road right of way must be rejected because it was raised for the first
time in this petition.In the trial court and the CA, petitioners arguments zeroed in on the alleged
conjugal nature of the property.It is well settled that issues raised for the first time on appeal and
not raised in the proceedings in the lower court are barred by estoppel. Points of law, theories,
issues, and arguments not brought to the attention of the trial court ought not to be considered
by a reviewing court, as these cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.To consider the
alleged facts and arguments raised belatedly would amount to trampling on the basic principles
of fair play, justice, and due process.

Denied.