ATTY. RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO, petitioner, vs.
IBP COMMISSION ON he be exonerated from all the charges against him and that the Court
BAR DISCIPLINE and ATTY. ISMAEL G. KHAN, JR.
This administrative complaint arose from a paid advertisement that
appeared in the July 5, 2000 issue of the newspaper, Philippine Daily
Inquirer, which reads: ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE Specialist 532-
4333/521-2667.[1]
Ms. Ma. Theresa B. Espeleta, a staff member of the Public
Information Office of the Supreme Court, called up the published
telephone number and pretended to be an interested party.She spoke
to Mrs. Simbillo, who claimed that her husband, Atty. Rizalino Simbillo,
was an expert in handling annulment cases and can guarantee a
court decree within four to six months, provided the case will not
involve separation of property or custody of children. Mrs. Simbillo
also said that her husband charges a fee of P48,000.00, half of which
is payable at the time of filing of the case and the other half after a
decision thereon has been rendered.
Further research by the Office of the Court Administrator and the
Public Information Office revealed that similar advertisements were
published in the August 2 and 6, 2000 issues of theManila Bulletin and
August 5, 2000 issue of The Philippine Star.[2]
On September 1, 2000, Atty. Ismael G. Khan, Jr., in his capacity as
Assistant Court Administrator and Chief of the Public Information
Office, filed an administrative complaint against Atty. Rizalino T.
Simbillo for improper advertising and solicitation of his legal services,
in violation of Rule 2.03 and Rule 3.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court.[3]
In his answer, respondent admitted the acts imputed to him, but
argued that advertising and solicitation per se are not prohibited acts;
that the time has come to change our views about the prohibition on
advertising and solicitation; that the interest of the public is not served
by the absolute prohibition on lawyer advertising; that the Court can
lift the ban on lawyer advertising; and that the rationale behind the
decades-old prohibition should be abandoned. Thus, he prayed that
promulgate a ruling that advertisement of legal services offered by a
lawyer is not contrary to law, public policy and public order as long as
it is dignified.[4]
The case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for
investigation, report and recommendation.[5] On June 29, 2002, the
IBP Commission on Bar Discipline passed Resolution No. XV-2002-
306,[6] finding respondent guilty of violation of Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of
the Rules of Court, and suspended him from the practice of law for
one (1) year with the warning that a repetition of similar acts would be
dealt with more severely. The IBP Resolution was noted by this Court
on November 11, 2002.[7]
In the meantime, respondent filed an Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration,[8] which was denied by the IBP in Resolution No.
XV-2002-606 dated October 19, 2002[9]
Hence, the instant petition for certiorari, which was docketed as G.R.
No. 157053 entitled, Atty. Rizalino T. Simbillo, Petitioner versus IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline, Atty. Ismael G. Khan, Jr., Asst. Court
Administrator and Chief, Public Information Office, Respondents. This
petition was consolidated with A.C. No. 5299 per the Courts
Resolution dated March 4, 2003.
In a Resolution dated March 26, 2003, the parties were required to
manifest whether or not they were willing to submit the case for
resolution on the basis of the pleadings.[10]Complainant filed his
Manifestation on April 25, 2003, stating that he is not submitting any
additional pleading or evidence and is submitting the case for its early
resolution on the basis of pleadings and records
thereof. [11] Respondent, on the other hand, filed a Supplemental
Memorandum on June 20, 2003.
We agree with the IBPs Resolutions Nos. XV-2002-306 and XV-2002-
606.
Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility read:
Rule 2.03. A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed
primarily to solicit legal business.
Rule 3.01. A lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false,
fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair
statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal services.
Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court states:
SEC. 27. Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court,
grounds therefor. A member of the bar may be disbarred or
suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any
deceit, malpractice or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly
immoral conduct or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to
take before the admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience
appearing as attorney for a party without authority to do so.
It has been repeatedly stressed that the practice of law is not a
business.[12] It is a profession in which duty to public service, not
money, is the primary consideration. Lawyering is not primarily meant
to be a money-making venture, and law advocacy is not a capital that
necessarily yields profits.[13] The gaining of a livelihood should be a
secondary consideration.[14] The duty to public service and to the
administration of justice should be the primary consideration of
lawyers, who must subordinate their personal interests or what they
owe to themselves.[15]The following elements distinguish the legal
profession from a business:
1. A duty of public service, of which the emolument is a by-product,
and in which one may attain the highest eminence without making
much money;
2. A relation as an officer of the court to the administration of justice
involving thorough sincerity, integrity and reliability;
3. A relation to clients in the highest degree of fiduciary;
4. A relation to colleagues at the bar characterized by candor,
fairness, and unwillingness to resort to current business methods of
advertising and encroachment on their practice, or dealing directly
with their clients.[16]
There is no question that respondent committed the acts complained
of. He himself admits that he caused the publication of the
advertisements. While he professes repentance and begs for the
Courts indulgence, his contrition rings hollow considering the fact that
he advertised his legal services again after he pleaded for
compassion and after claiming that he had no intention to violate the
rules. Eight months after filing his answer, he again advertised his
legal services in the August 14, 2001 issue of the Buy & Sell Free Ads
Newspaper.[17] Ten months later, he caused the same advertisement
to be published in the October 5, 2001 issue of Buy & Sell.[18] Such
acts of respondent are a deliberate and contemptuous affront on the
Courts authority.
What adds to the gravity of respondents acts is that in advertising
himself as a self-styled Annulment of Marriage Specialist, he wittingly
or unwittingly erodes and undermines not only the stability but also
the sanctity of an institution still considered sacrosanct despite the
contemporary climate of permissiveness in our society. Indeed, in
assuring prospective clients that an annulment may be obtained in
four to six months from the time of the filing of the case,[19] he in fact
encourages people, who might have otherwise been disinclined and
would have refrained from dissolving their marriage bonds, to do so.
Nonetheless, the solicitation of legal business is not altogether
proscribed. However, for solicitation to be proper, it must be
compatible with the dignity of the legal profession. If it is made in a
modest and decorous manner, it would bring no injury to the lawyer
and to the bar.[20] Thus, the use of simple signs stating the name or
names of the lawyers, the office and residence address and fields of
practice, as well as advertisement in legal periodicals bearing the
same brief data, are permissible. Even the use of calling cards is now
acceptable.[21]Publication in reputable law lists, in a manner
consistent with the standards of conduct imposed by the canon, of
brief biographical and informative data is likewise allowable. As
explicitly stated in Ulep v. Legal Clinic, Inc.:[22]
Such data must not be misleading and may include only a statement
of the lawyers name and the names of his professional associates;
addresses, telephone numbers, cable addresses; branches of law
practiced; date and place of birth and admission to the bar; schools
attended with dates of graduation, degrees and other educational
distinctions; public or quasi-public offices; posts of honor; legal
authorships; legal teaching positions; membership and offices in bar
associations and committees thereof, in legal and scientific societies
and legal fraternities; the fact of listings in other reputable law lists; the
names and addresses of references; and, with their written consent,
the names of clients regularly represented.
The law list must be a reputable law list published primarily for that
purpose; it cannot be a mere supplemental feature of a paper,
magazine, trade journal or periodical which is published principally for
other purposes. For that reason, a lawyer may not properly publish his
brief biographical and informative data in a daily paper, magazine,
trade journal or society program. Nor may a lawyer permit his name to
be published in a law list the conduct, management, or contents of
which are calculated or likely to deceive or injure the public or the bar,
or to lower dignity or standing of the profession.
The use of an ordinary simple professional card is also permitted. The
card may contain only a statement of his name, the name of the law
firm which he is connected with, address, telephone number and
special branch of law practiced. The publication of a simple
announcement of the opening of a law firm or of changes in the
partnership, associates, firm name or office address, being for the
convenience of the profession, is not objectionable. He may likewise
have his name listed in a telephone directory but not under a
designation of special branch of law. (emphasis and italics supplied)
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent RIZALINO T.
SIMBILLO is found GUILTY of violation of Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of the
Rules of Court. He is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for ONE
(1) YEAR effective upon receipt of this Resolution. He is likewise
STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar offense
will be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this Resolution be entered in his record as attorney and
be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all courts in the
country for their information and guidance.
Pepsi Cola vs Court of Appeals
Facts:
The case is a petition for review and certiorari by the petitioner upon
the denial by the lower and appellate court on their motion for
reconsideration for the postponement of the hearing due to
unavailability of their witnesses and for declaring that the petitioner
waived its right to present evidence in support to its defense. The
case began from the civil action filed by private respondents who won
from the Pepsi Number Fever Promotion" sponsored by petitioner
Pepsi Cola Products Philippines, Inc., wherein numerous holders of
the supposedly winning "349" crowns were not honored and paid by
petitioner due to an alleged mistake in the security codes in the
crowns. While the private respondents are finished presenting their
evidence, the petitioner continues to file a motion for postponement
due to unavailability of witnesses. The schedule for presentation of
evidence began on May 28, 1993 and with frequent postponement,
the court issued a warning to the petitioners counsel that the
scheduled hearing on January 20, 1995 shall be intransferrable in
character. Notwithstanding said warning, petitioner moved for
postponement again which motion was denied by the court for
unreasonable delay on the case. The court of appeals affirmed the
said decision hence this petition for certiorari.
ISSUE: WON the court erred in denying the petitioners motion for
reconsideration.
RULING: The court held that the petitioner was given ample time to
prepare for their witnesses causing the trial to take up to 2 years due
to their motion for postponement and reminded the counsel of the
petitioner that they have the duty to give proper administration of
justice without any delay and dismissed the petition for lack of merit.
LOTHAR SCHULZ, complainant, vs. ATTY. MARCELO G. FLORES,
respondent.
Atty. Flores knew too little of the provisions and application of PD No.
1508 which mandates that all disputes, except those specifically cited
(the dispute between Lothar Schulz and Wilson Ong not included),
between and among residents of the same city or municipality should
be brought first under the system of barangay conciliation before
recourse to the court can be allowed. Because of respondents
transgressions, his client was haled to court as part-defendant.
Respondent also refused to return petitioners money in spite of his
meager service.
Held: GUILTY of negligence and incompetence. SUSPENDED for (6)
months. RETURN the money of complainant with interest. STERNLY
WARNED that a commission of the same or similar act in the future
will be dealt with more severely.
The breach of respondents sworn duty as a lawyer and of the ethical
standards he was strictly to honor and observe has been sufficiently
established. Respondent has fallen short of the competence and
diligence required of every member of the Bar.
CANON 17. A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS
CLIENT AND HE SHALL BE MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND
CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.
CANON 18. A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH
COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE
Rule 18.03 A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him
and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.
Respondent erred in not returning complainants money despite
demands after his failure to file the case and his devious act of
compelling complainant to sign a document stating that he has no
financial obligation to complainant in exchange of the return of
complainants papers. This conduct violated the following Canon:
CANON 15. A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE CANDOR, FAIRNESS,
AND LOYALTY IN ALL HIS DEALINGS AND TRANSACTIONS WITH
HIS CLIENT.
Rule 16.03. A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of client
when due or upon demand.
The failure of an attorney to return the clients money upon demand
gives rise to the presumption that he has misappropriated it for his
own use to the prejudice and violation of the trust reposed in him by
the client. It is not only a gross violation of the general morality as well
as of professional ethics; it also impairs public confidence in the legal
profession and deserves punishment. In short, it is settled that the
unjustified withholding of money belonging to his client, as in this
case, warrants the imposition of disciplinary action.
A lawyer must conduct himself, especially in his dealings with his
clients, with integrity in a manner that is beyond reproach. His
relationship with his clients should be characterized by the highest
degree of good faith and fairness.
Vda. De Mijares v Justice Villaluz A.C. No. 4431 6.19.97
FACTS: Complainant files a disbarment case against the respondent
on grounds of bigamy after contracting a marriage with another
woman several months after their marriage. Respondent contends
theirs was a sham marriage in an effort to protect the complainant
from the administrative case on immorality to be charged against her
by her legal researcher and that during their marriage his marriage
with his first wife was subsisting since the declaration of its annulment acts of dishonesty, falsification and conduct unbecoming a member of
was not yet final and executory pending publication of the decision. the Bar.
The administrative case was referred to Associate Justice Purisima of
CA for investigation who recommended suspension of the respondent
for 2 years with a warning that similar future misconduct shall be dealt ISSUE: Whether or not respondent lawyer is guilty of gross
with more severely. misconduct and violation of Rules 1.01 and 7.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
ISSUE: WON respondent be disbarred.

RULING: Yes. The mere admission of the respondent of contracting

the marriage with the complainant while knowingly his first marriage HELD: YES.
subsists and then married another woman after said marriage with
complainant is a gross misconduct. His claim that he married
complainant to protect her from the administrative charge against her Respondent lawyer violated Rules 1.01 and 7.03 of the Code
is unfounded since one cannot correct a wrong by doing another of Professional Responsibility for he seriously transgressed by his
wrongful act. Finding the respondent morally unfit in the practice of malevolent act of filling up the blank checks by indicating amounts
the law profession, the court upheld the recommendation of Justice that had not been agreed upon at all and despite full knowledge that
Purisima. the loan supposed to be secured by the checks had already been
paid. His was a brazen act of falsification of a commercial document,
Olbes vs Deciembre
resorted to for his material gain. Respondent is clearly guilty of
FACTS: serious dishonesty and professional misconduct. He committed an act
indicative of moral depravity not expected from, and highly
Complainants were government employees. Through unbecoming a member of the bar. His propensity for employing deceit
respondent, Lourdes renewed a loan application from Rodela Loans and misrepresentation is reprehensible. His misuse of the filled-up
Inc., in the amount of P10,000.00. She issued and delivered 5 PNB checks that led to the detention of one petitioner is loathsome.
blank checks, which served as collateral for the approved loan as well
as for the future loans. Lourdes paid respondent P14,874.37 intended
to the loan plus surcharges, penalties, and interests, for which the
Diao v Martinez 7 SCRA 745 3.29.63
latter issued a receipt. Notwithstanding the full payment of the loan,
respondent filled up the blank checks entrusted to him by writing on
those checks amounts that had not been agreed upon at all and
FACTS: 2 years after passing the Bar exam, a complaint was filed
deposited the same checks which were dishonored upon presentment
against Diao on false representation of his application to the Bar
because the account is already closed. Thereafter, he filed a criminal
examination that he has the requisite academic qualification. The
case against complainants for estafa and for violation of B.P. 22.
Solicitor General made an investigation and recommended to strike
Thus, complainants filed a verified petition for the disbarment of Atty.
the name of Diao off the rolls of attorney because contrary to the
Deciembre and charged the respondent with willful and deliberate
allegations in his petition for examination in this Court, he had not
completed, before taking up law subjects, the required pre-legal
education prescribed by the Department of Private Education.
I: WON Diao may continue to practice the law profession.
RULING: The court held that his admission to the bar was under the
pretense that he had acquired a pre-legal education, an academic
requirement before one could take the bar exam. Such admission
having been obtained under false pretenses is thereby revoked. The
fact that he hurdled the Bar examinations is immaterial. Passing such
examinations is not the only qualification to become an attorney-at-
law, taking the prescribed courses of legal study in the regular manner
is equally essential. His name thus was stricken out from the Rolls of
Attorneys.
LESLIE UI, complainant, vs. ATTY. IRIS BONIFACIO, respondent.
DECISION
DE LEON, JR., J.:
Before us is an administrative complaint for disbarment against Atty.
Iris Bonifacio for allegedly carrying on an immoral relationship with
Carlos L. Ui, husband of complainant, Leslie Ui.
The relevant facts are:
On January 24, 1971 complainant Leslie Ui married Carlos L. Ui at the
Our Lady of Lourdes Church in Quezon City[1] and as a result of their
marital union, they had four (4) children, namely, Leilani, Lianni,
Lindsay and Carl Cavin, all surnamed Ui. Sometime in December
1987, however, complainant found out that her husband, Carlos Ui,
was carrying on an illicit relationship with respondent Atty. Iris
Bonifacio with whom he begot a daughter sometime in 1986, and that
they had been living together at No. 527 San Carlos Street, Ayala
Alabang Village in Muntinlupa City. Respondent who is a graduate of
the College of Law of the University of the Philippines was admitted to
the Philippine Bar in 1982.
Carlos Ui admitted to complainant his relationship with the
respondent. Complainant then visited respondent at her office in the
later part of June 1988 and introduced herself as the legal wife of
Carlos Ui. Whereupon, respondent admitted to her that she has a
child with Carlos Ui and alleged, however, that everything was over
between her and Carlos Ui. Complainant believed the representations
of respondent and thought things would turn out well from then on and
that the illicit relationship between her husband and respondent would
come to an end.
However, complainant again discovered that the illicit relationship
between her husband and respondent continued, and that sometime
in December 1988, respondent and her husband, Carlos Ui, had a
second child. Complainant then met again with respondent sometime
in March 1989 and pleaded with respondent to discontinue her illicit
relationship with Carlos Ui but to no avail. The illicit relationship
persisted and complainant even came to know later on that
respondent had been employed by her husband in his company.
A complaint for disbarment, docketed as Adm. Case No. 3319, was
then filed on August 11, 1989 by the complainant against respondent
Atty. Iris Bonifacio before the Commission on Bar Discipline of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (hereinafter, Commission) on the
ground of immorality, more particularly, for carrying on an illicit
relationship with the complainants husband, Carlos Ui. In her Answer,
[2] respondent averred that she met Carlos Ui sometime in 1983 and
had known him all along to be a bachelor, with the knowledge,
however, that Carlos Ui had children by a Chinese woman in Amoy,
China, from whom he had long been estranged. She stated that
during one of their trips abroad, Carlos Ui formalized his intention to
marry her and they in fact got married in Hawaii, USA in 1985[3].
Upon their return to Manila, respondent did not live with Carlos Ui.
The latter continued to live with his children in their Greenhills
residence because respondent and Carlos Ui wanted to let the
children gradually to know and accept the fact of his second marriage
before they would live together.[4]
In 1986, respondent left the country and stayed in Honolulu, Hawaii
and she would only return occasionally to the Philippines to update
her law practice and renew legal ties. During one of her trips to Manila
sometime in June 1988, respondent was surprised when she was
confronted by a woman who insisted that she was the lawful wife of
Carlos Ui. Hurt and desolate upon her discovery of the true civil status
of Carlos Ui, respondent then left for Honolulu, Hawaii sometime in
July 1988 and returned only in March 1989 with her two (2) children.
On March 20, 1989, a few days after she reported to work with the law
firm[5] she was connected with, the woman who represented herself
to be the wife of Carlos Ui again came to her office, demanding to
know if Carlos Ui has been communicating with her.
It is respondents contention that her relationship with Carlos Ui is not
illicit because they were married abroad and that after June 1988
when respondent discovered Carlos Uis true civil status, she cut off all
her ties with him. Respondent averred that Carlos Ui never lived with
her in Alabang, and that he resided at 26 Potsdam Street, Greenhills,
San Juan, Metro Manila. It was respondent who lived in Alabang in a
house which belonged to her mother, Rosalinda L. Bonifacio; and that
the said house was built exclusively from her parents funds.[6] By way
of counterclaim, respondent sought moral damages in the amount of
Ten Million Pesos (Php10,000,000.00) against complainant for having
filed the present allegedly malicious and groundless disbarment case
against respondent.
In her Reply[7] dated April 6, 1990, complainant states, among others,
that respondent knew perfectly well that Carlos Ui was married to
complainant and had children with her even at the start of her
relationship with Carlos Ui, and that the reason respondent went
abroad was to give birth to her two (2) children with Carlos Ui.
During the pendency of the proceedings before the Integrated Bar,
complainant also charged her husband, Carlos Ui, and respondent
with the crime of Concubinage before the Office of the Provincial
Fiscal of Rizal, docketed as I.S. No. 89-5247, but the same was
dismissed for insufficiency of evidence to establish probable cause for
the offense charged. The resolution dismissing the criminal complaint
against respondent reads:
Complainants evidence had prima facie established the existence of
the "illicit relationship" between the respondents allegedly discovered
by the complainant in December 1987. The same evidence however
show that respondent Carlos Ui was still living with complainant up to
the latter part of 1988 and/or the early part of 1989.
It would therefore be logical and safe to state that the "relationship" of
respondents started and was discovered by complainant sometime in
1987 when she and respondent Carlos were still living at No. 26
Potsdam Street, Northeast Greenhills, San Juan, MetroManila and
they, admittedly, continued to live together at their conjugal home up
to early (sic) part of 1989 or later 1988, when respondent Carlos left
the same.
From the above, it would not be amiss to conclude that altho (sic) the
relationship, illicit as complainant puts it, had been prima facie
established by complainants evidence, this same evidence had failed
to even prima facie establish the "fact of respondents cohabitation in
the concept of husband and wife at the 527 San Carlos St., Ayala
Alabang house, proof of which is necessary and indispensable to at
least create probable cause for the offense charged. The statement
alone of complainant, worse, a statement only of a conclusion
respecting the fact of cohabitation does not make the complainants
evidence thereto any better/stronger (U.S. vs. Casipong and Mongoy,
20 Phil. 178).
It is worth stating that the evidence submitted by respondents in
support of their respective positions on the matter support and bolster
the foregoing conclusion/recommendation.
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully recommended that the instant
complaint be dismissed for want of evidence to establish probable
cause for the offense charged.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.[8]
Complainant appealed the said Resolution of the Provincial Fiscal of
Rizal to the Secretary of Justice, but the same was dismissed [9] on
the ground of insufficiency of evidence to prove her allegation that
respondent and Carlos Ui lived together as husband and wife at 527
San Carlos Street, Ayala Alabang, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila.
In the proceedings before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline,
complainant filed a Motion to Cite Respondent in Contempt of the
Commission [10] wherein she charged respondent with making false
allegations in her Answer and for submitting a supporting document
which was altered and intercalated. She alleged that in the Answer of
respondent filed before the Integrated Bar, respondent averred,
among others, that she was married to Carlos Ui on October 22, 1985
and attached a Certificate of Marriage to substantiate her averment.
However, the Certificate of Marriage [11] duly certified by the State
Registrar as a true copy of the record on file in the Hawaii State
Department of Health, and duly authenticated by the Philippine
Consulate General in Honolulu, Hawaii, USA revealed that the date of
marriage between Carlos Ui and respondent Atty. Iris Bonifacio was
October 22, 1987, and not October 22, 1985 as claimed by
respondent in her Answer. According to complainant, the reason for
that false allegation was because respondent wanted to impress upon
the said IBP that the birth of her first child by Carlos Ui was within the
wedlock.[12] It is the contention of complainant that such act
constitutes a violation of Articles 183[13] and 184[14] of the Revised
Penal Code, and also contempt of the Commission; and that the act of
respondent in making false allegations in her Answer and submitting
an altered/intercalated document are indicative of her moral perversity
and lack of integrity which make her unworthy to be a member of the
Philippine Bar.
In her Opposition (To Motion To Cite Respondent in Contempt),
[15] respondent averred that she did not have the original copy of the
marriage certificate because the same was in the possession of
Carlos Ui, and that she annexed such copy because she relied in
good faith on what appeared on the copy of the marriage certificate in
her possession.
Respondent filed her Memorandum [16] on February 22, 1995 and
raised the lone issue of whether or not she has conducted herself in
an immoral manner for which she deserves to be barred from the
practice of law. Respondent averred that the complaint should be
dismissed on two (2) grounds, namely:
(i) Respondent conducted herself in a manner consistent with the
requirement of good moral character for the practice of the legal
profession; and
(ii) Complainant failed to prove her allegation that respondent
conducted herself in an immoral manner.[17]
In her defense, respondent contends, among others, that it was she
who was the victim in this case and not Leslie Ui because she did not
know that Carlos Ui was already married, and that upon learning of
this fact, respondent immediately cut-off all her ties with Carlos Ui.
She stated that there was no reason for her to doubt at that time that
the civil status of Carlos Ui was that of a bachelor because he spent
so much time with her, and he was so open in his courtship.[18]
On the issue of the falsified marriage certificate, respondent alleged
that it was highly incredible for her to have knowingly attached such
marriage certificate to her Answer had she known that the same was
altered. Respondent reiterated that there was no compelling reason
for her to make it appear that her marriage to Carlos Ui took place
either in 1985 or 1987, because the fact remains that respondent and
Carlos Ui got married before complainant confronted respondent and
informed the latter of her earlier marriage to Carlos Ui in June 1988.
Further, respondent stated that it was Carlos Ui who testified and
admitted that he was the person responsible for changing the date of
the marriage certificate from 1987 to 1985, and complainant did not
present evidence to rebut the testimony of Carlos Ui on this matter.
Respondent posits that complainants evidence, consisting of the
pictures of respondent with a child, pictures of respondent with Carlos
Ui, a picture of a garage with cars, a picture of a light colored car with
Plate No. PNS 313, a picture of the same car, and portion of the
house and ground, and another picture of the same car bearing Plate
No. PNS 313 and a picture of the house and the garage,[19] does not
prove that she acted in an immoral manner. They have no evidentiary
value according to her. The pictures were taken by a photographer
from a private security agency and who was not presented during the
hearings. Further, the respondent presented the Resolution of the
Provincial Fiscal of Pasig in I.S. Case No. 89-5427 dismissing the
complaint filed by Leslie Ui against respondent for lack of evidence to
establish probable cause for the offense charged [20] and the
dismissal of the appeal by the Department of Justice [21]to bolster her
argument that she was not guilty of any immoral or illegal act because
of her relationship with Carlos Ui. In fine, respondent claims that she
entered the relationship with Carlos Ui in good faith and that her
conduct cannot be considered as willful, flagrant, or shameless, nor
can it suggest moral indifference. She fell in love with Carlos Ui whom
she believed to be single, and, that upon her discovery of his true civil
status, she parted ways with him.
In the Memorandum [22] filed on March 20, 1995 by complainant
Leslie Ui, she prayed for the disbarment of Atty. Iris Bonifacio and
reiterated that respondent committed immorality by having intimate
relations with a married man which resulted in the birth of two (2)
children. Complainant testified that respondents mother, Mrs. Linda
Bonifacio, personally knew complainant and her husband since the
late 1970s because they were clients of the bank where Mrs.
Bonifacio was the Branch Manager.[23] It was thus highly improbable
that respondent, who was living with her parents as of 1986, would
not have been informed by her own mother that Carlos Ui was a
married man. Complainant likewise averred that respondent
committed disrespect towards the Commission for submitting a
photocopy of a document containing an intercalated date.
In her Reply to Complainants Memorandum [24], respondent stated
that complainant miserably failed to show sufficient proof to warrant
her disbarment. Respondent insists that contrary to the allegations of
complainant, there is no showing that respondent had knowledge of
the fact of marriage of Carlos Ui to complainant. The allegation that
her mother knew Carlos Ui to be a married man does not prove that
such information was made known to respondent.
Hearing on the case ensued, after which the Commission on Bar
Discipline submitted its Report and Recommendation, finding that:
In the case at bar, it is alleged that at the time respondent was courted
by Carlos Ui, the latter represented himself to be single. The
Commission does not find said claim too difficult to believe in the light
of contemporary human experience.
Almost always, when a married man courts a single woman, he
represents himself to be single, separated, or without any firm
commitment to another woman. The reason therefor is not hard to
fathom. By their very nature, single women prefer single men.
The records will show that when respondent became aware the (sic)
true civil status of Carlos Ui, she left for the United States (in July of
1988). She broke off all contacts with him. When she returned to the
Philippines in March of 1989, she lived with her brother, Atty. Teodoro
Bonifacio, Jr. Carlos Ui and respondent only talked to each other
because of the children whom he was allowed to visit. At no time did
they live together.
Under the foregoing circumstances, the Commission fails to find any
act on the part of respondent that can be considered as unprincipled
or disgraceful as to be reprehensible to a high degree. To be sure, she
was more of a victim that (sic) anything else and should deserve
compassion rather than condemnation. Without cavil, this sad episode
destroyed her chance of having a normal and happy family life, a
dream cherished by every single girl.
x..........................x..........................x"
Thereafter, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines issued a Notice of Resolution dated December 13, 1997,
the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and
APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of this
Resolution/Decision as Annex "A", and, finding the recommendation
fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and
rules, the complaint for Gross Immorality against Respondent is
DISMISSED for lack of merit. Atty. Iris Bonifacio is REPRIMANDED
for knowingly and willfully attaching to her Answer a falsified
Certificate of Marriage with a stern warning that a repetition of the
same will merit a more severe penalty."
We agree with the findings aforequoted.
The practice of law is a privilege. A bar candidate does not have the
right to enjoy the practice of the legal profession simply by passing the
bar examinations. It is a privilege that can be revoked, subject to the
mandate of due process, once a lawyer violates his oath and the
dictates of legal ethics. The requisites for admission to the practice of
law are:
a. he must be a citizen of the Philippines;
b. a resident thereof;
c. at least twenty-one (21) years of age;
d. a person of good moral character;
e. he must show that no charges against him involving moral
turpitude, are filed or pending in court;
f. possess the required educational qualifications; and
g. pass the bar examinations.[25] (Italics supplied)
Clear from the foregoing is that one of the conditions prior to
admission to the bar is that an applicant must possess good moral
character. More importantly, possession of good moral character must
be continuous as a requirement to the enjoyment of the privilege of
law practice, otherwise, the loss thereof is a ground for the revocation
of such privilege. It has been held -
If good moral character is a sine qua non for admission to the bar,
then the continued possession of good moral character is also a
requisite for retaining membership in the legal profession.
Membership in the bar may be terminated when a lawyer ceases to
have good moral character. (Royong vs. Oblena, 117 Phil. 865).
A lawyer may be disbarred for "grossly immoral conduct, or by reason
of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude". A member of
the bar should have moral integrity in addition to professional probity.
It is difficult to state with precision and to fix an inflexible standard as
to what is "grossly immoral conduct" or to specify the moral
delinquency and obliquity which render a lawyer unworthy of
continuing as a member of the bar. The rule implies that what appears
to be unconventional behavior to the straight-laced may not be the
immoral conduct that warrants disbarment.
Immoral conduct has been defined as "that conduct which is willful,
flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to the
opinion of the good and respectable members of the community." (7
C.J.S. 959).[26]
In the case at bar, it is the claim of respondent Atty. Bonifacio that
when she met Carlos Ui, she knew and believed him to be single.
Respondent fell in love with him and they got married and as a result
of such marriage, she gave birth to two (2) children. Upon her
knowledge of the true civil status of Carlos Ui, she left him.
Simple as the facts of the case may sound, the effects of the
actuations of respondent are not only far from simple, they will have a
rippling effect on how the standard norms of our legal practitioners
should be defined. Perhaps morality in our liberal society today is a far
cry from what it used to be before. This permissiveness
notwithstanding, lawyers, as keepers of public faith, are burdened with
a higher degree of social responsibility and thus must handle their
personal affairs with greater caution. The facts of this case lead us to
believe that perhaps respondent would not have found herself in such
a compromising situation had she exercised prudence and been more
vigilant in finding out more about Carlos Uis personal background
prior to her intimate involvement with him.
Surely, circumstances existed which should have at least aroused
respondents suspicion that something was amiss in her relationship
with Carlos Ui, and moved her to ask probing questions. For instance,
respondent admitted that she knew that Carlos Ui had children with a
woman from Amoy, China, yet it appeared that she never exerted the
slightest effort to find out if Carlos Ui and this woman were indeed
unmarried. Also, despite their marriage in 1987, Carlos Ui never lived
with respondent and their first child, a circumstance that is simply
incomprehensible considering respondents allegation that Carlos Ui
was very open in courting her.
All these taken together leads to the inescapable conclusion that
respondent was imprudent in managing her personal affairs. However,
the fact remains that her relationship with Carlos Ui, clothed as it was
with what respondent believed was a valid marriage, cannot be
considered immoral. For immorality connotes conduct that shows
indifference to the moral norms of society and the opinion of good and
respectable members of the community.[27] Moreover, for such
conduct to warrant disciplinary action, the same must be "grossly
immoral," that is, it must be so corrupt and false as to constitute a
criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high
degree.[28]
We have held that "a member of the Bar and officer of the court is not
only required to refrain from adulterous relationships x x x but must
also so behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating
the belief that he is flouting those moral standards."[29] Respondents
act of immediately distancing herself from Carlos Ui upon discovering
his true civil status belies just that alleged moral indifference and
proves that she had no intention of flaunting the law and the high
moral standard of the legal profession. Complainants bare assertions
to the contrary deserve no credit. After all, the burden of proof rests
upon the complainant, and the Court will exercise its disciplinary
powers only if she establishes her case by clear, convincing and
satisfactory evidence.[30] This, herein complainant miserably failed to
do.
On the matter of the falsified Certificate of Marriage attached by
respondent to her Answer, we find improbable to believe the averment
of respondent that she merely relied on the photocopy of the Marriage
Certificate which was provided her by Carlos Ui. For an event as
significant as a marriage ceremony, any normal bride would verily
recall the date and year of her marriage. It is difficult to fathom how a
bride, especially a lawyer as in the case at bar, can forget the year
when she got married. Simply stated, it is contrary to human
experience and highly improbable.
Furthermore, any prudent lawyer would verify the information
contained in an attachment to her pleading, especially so when she
has personal knowledge of the facts and circumstances contained
therein. In attaching such Marriage Certificate with an intercalated
date, the defense of good faith of respondent on that point cannot 2. Falsifying his Daily Time Records;
stand. 3. Issuing unauthorized orders; and
4. Continuously engaging in private practice even after the filing of
It is the bounden duty of lawyers to adhere unwaveringly to the case against him for engaging in private practice.
highest standards of morality. The legal profession exacts from its
members nothing less. Lawyers are called upon to safeguard the RULING: The court held on the following:
integrity of the Bar, free from misdeeds and acts constitutive of 1. CHR Resolution No. (III) A2002-133 authorizes CHR lawyers to
malpractice. Their exalted positions as officers of the court demand no engage in private practice (adopting the Civil Service Commission
less than the highest degree of morality. Resolution) subject to some conditions with indispensable
requirement to secure approval from the CHR. In the absence of such
WHEREFORE, the complaint for disbarment against respondent Atty.
approval, the respondent is not allowed in private practice and proved
Iris L. Bonifacio, for alleged immorality, is hereby DISMISSED.
to have falsified his attendance in the DTR while appearing in court at
However, respondent is hereby REPRIMANDED for attaching to her the same time without approved leave of absence.
Answer a photocopy of her Marriage Certificate, with an altered or 2. The respondent has been notarizing even before the CHR
intercalated date thereof, with a STERN WARNING that a more authorized his practice as a notary public.
severe sanction will be imposed on her for any repetition of the same 3. The authority granted with the CHR in their function is merely to
or similar offense in the future. investigate all forms of human rights violation. They cannot try and
decide cases.
Yumol vs Atty. Ferrer, Sr. A.C. No. 6585 April 21, 2005 With the above constituting grounds for suspension of lawyers stated
in Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, the court ruled to modify
the suspension of 1 year as sufficient sanction.
Facts: The petitioner, OIC of the Commission on Human Rights, files
a disbarment case against respondent, Attorney IV said commission Re: Application of A.M. Hernandez July 27, 1993
on ground for grave misconduct. The respondent was found to have
issued 2 orders awarding custody of a child to a complainant in the FACTS: Hernandez is a Filipino citizen who have a degree of Juris
Commission, ordered a bank to reinstate the bank account of the said Doctor from Columbia Law School in New York and passed the bar
complainant, engaging in private practice, notarizing public examinations in the same City in 1990. He is currently taking bar
documents, and attending court hearings while filling up his DTR at subjects in Ateneo Law School and taking a 5 month bar review
the Commission as present at the same time. The case was referred course there. He now asks the court to allow him to take the bar exam
to the IBP and the investigating commissioner recommended in the Phils.
suspension for 2 years which was modified by the IBP Board to 6
months. ISSUE: WON the S.C. may allow him to take the bar exam in the
Phils.
ISSUE: WON respondent has committed gross misconduct arising
from the following alleged acts: RULING: Yes, he may be allowed to take the bar because there were
1. Engaging in the private practice of his profession while being a some instances in the past where a Filipino studied law in a foreign
government employee; law school and were allowed to take the bar in the Philippines.
However, the court held this time that in the following year, applicants
for the Bar must study in a local law school in the Phils. And must
present certifications required by Section 5 and 6 of Rule 138 to be
able to take the bar. Such certification however is not issued to foreign
law school graduates therefore anyone who wants to take the bar in
the country should study in any of the law schools in the Phils. to be
able to take the bar exam.
FLORA NARIDO, complainant,
vs.
ATTORNEY JAIME S. LINSANGAN, respondent.
RESOLUTION
FERNANDO, J:
The spectacle presented by two members of the bar engaged in
bickering and recrimination is far from edifying, although it is
understandable, if not justifiable, that at times zeal in the defense of
ones client may be carried to the point of undue skepticism and doubt
as to the motives of opposing counsel. Some such reflection is
induced by these two administrative cases wherein respondents
Jaime S. Linsangan and Rufino B. Risma, who represented adverse
parties in a workmens compensation case, did mutually hurl
accusation at each other. The charge against respondent Linsangan
filed by a certain Flora Narido is that he violated the attorneys oath by
submitting a perjured statement. When required to answer, not only
did he deny the complaint but he would also hold respondent Risma
accountable for having instigated his client, the complainant, Flora
Narido, to file a false and malicious complaint resulting in what
respondent Linsangan called embarrassment, humiliation and
defamation of a brother in a profession.
On September 9, 1971, this Court referred the above administrative
cases to the Solicitor General for investigation, report and
recommendation. Such report and recommendation was submitted on
May 31 of this year.
1. Insofar as the first case against respondent Jaime S. Linsangan is
concerned, the report contains the following: In support of her
complaint filed with this Honorable Court, complainant Narido heavily
relies on the refusal of respondent Linsangan to withdraw despite
warning the affidavit of Milagros M. Vergel de Dios . . ., which affidavit
Narido claims to be perjured. . . Mrs. Narido and Atty. Risma
threatened Atty. Linsangan with disbarment should he insist in offering
the affidavit of Mrs. Vergel de Dios. 1 Nonetheless, such affidavit
was filed. It was found as a fact that there was nothing improper in
presenting such affidavit, its alleged falsity not being proven. Even if it
were otherwise, still there was no showing of respondent having
violated his attorneys oath for submitting a perjured affidavit. Thus the
report continues: With respect to the other allegations in the affidavit,
suffice it to say that there is no evidence showing Atty. Linsangans
awareness of the falsity thereof, assuming arguendo that they are
indeed false. As testified by Atty. Linsangan he has no intention
whatsoever of misleading any court or judicial body, or of violating his
attorneys oath. 2
2. As for the charge against Attorney Risma, the report stated the
following: This administrative complaint stemmed from the belief of
Atty. Linsangan that Atty. Risma by virtue of his financial interest in
the Award, instigated the filing of Administrative Case No. 944 in
order to accomplish a short cut in winning a case even by intimidation
or unfounded threats, by depriving a party of due process and at the
expense, embarrassment, humiliation, and defamation of his
undersigned brother-respondent. . . . It seems unkind to allude evil
motive to Atty. Risma. It is perhaps more apt to state that Atty. Rismas
missionary zeal to fight for the rights of his clients triggered him into
filing Administrative Case No. 944. We should admire Atty. Rismas
dedication in championing the cause of the poor. Mrs. Narido, his
client, is a destitute woman. She needed every centavo of the award.
To her, any delay in the payment thereof meant grave injustice; it
meant deprivation and starvation. Faced with the dilemma of his
client, Atty. Risma had to rise to the challenge. In view of this, it is
more in keeping with Christian precepts to say that it must have been
the plight of Mrs. Narido rather than his alleged financial interest that
compelled Atty. Risma to advise his client to file the case against Atty.
Linsangan. . . . There being no direct evidence to show the alleged
bad faith of Atty. Risma in advising his client to file Administrative
Case No. 944 against Atty. Linsangan, the benefit of the doubt should
be resolved in favor of Atty. Risma. Consequently, the charge of
instigating the filing of disbarment proceedings against a brother
attorney with improper motives and without just ground necessarily
fails. 3
3. From the above, it was the recommendation that on such charges,
both respondents should be exculpated. It being shown in the
investigation, however, although it was not one of the charges in the
counter-complaint filed against him that respondent Risma would seek
to collect fifteen per cent of the recovery obtained by his client,
contrary to the explicit provision in the Workmens Compensation Act
allowing only a maximum of ten per cent and that only where the case
is appealed, there was likewise a recommendation for admonition or
reprimand. The aptness of such a penalty was predicated on the fact
that respondent Risma had not received a single centavo from the
client. Moreover, it was clear such contract for attorneys fees would
not be enforced. In the meanwhile, he had been serving his poverty-
stricken client faithfully and well, even advancing some of the
necessary expenses. What was recommended commends itself for
acceptance.
4. This further observation is not amiss. The two respondents would
be well-advised to heed these words from Justice Laurel, announced
in Javier v. Cornejo: 4 It should be observed, in this connection, that
mutual bickerings and unjustifiable recriminations, between brother
attorneys detract from the dignity of the legal profession and will not
receive any sympathy from this court. 5
5. One last word. The report submitted by the Solicitor General is
characterized by thoroughness and diligence, but its quality would
have been improved had there been on the part of the Solicitor
concerned a more adequate grasp of notable opinions of this Court on
legal ethics from Justice Malcolm on, thus obviating the need for
reliance on secondary authorities, both Philippine and American.
WHEREFORE, the complaint in Administrative Case No. 944 against
respondent Jaime S. Linsangan is dismissed for lack of merit.
Respondent Rufino B. Risma in Administrative Case No. 1025 is
exculpated from the charge of having instigated the filing of an
unfounded suit. He is, however, admonished to exercise greater care
in ascertaining how much under our law he could recover by way of
attorneys fees. The contract entered into between him and his client
as to his being entitled to fifteen per cent of the award granted her in a
workmens compensation suit is declared to be of no force and effect,
the penalty imposed being that of admonition merely only because he
had made no effort to collect on the same and had even advanced
expenses for a poor client. Let a copy of this resolution be spread on
the records of both respondents.