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PSYCHOMEDIA --> ENGLISH HOME PAGE JEP --> HOME PAGE --> Number 25
J E P - Number 25 - 2007/2
The Virtual Ego and the Cyborg
Andr Nusselder
Summary:
By combining the terms 'cybernetics' and 'organism' NASA scientist Manfred Clynes coined in 1960 the word
'cyborg'. Whereas this initially referred to a human being whose bodily functions were aided or controlled by
technological devices, nowadays the term has acquired a more general meaning and describes the dependence
of human beings on technology, so that we can think that all who enter cyberspace become cyborgs because
they depend on machines for their online life (Jordan, 1999). The question of space is pivotal: how do we
inhabit virtual spaces? In this paper I use the theory of Lacan to address the question of space. For Lacan this
question is a profound psychological issue: we (psychically) exist in space, and this existence is not without
physical attachment. The function of the ego and the body in the opening up of space should shed some light on
bodily involvement in (cyber) space. From there the question of the cyborg, and the opportunities and risks of
becoming one, should become apparent.
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(Lacan, 1977, 27). Space reflects all sorts of figures of ourselves, and it makes us question whether cyberspace
is not a whole realm full of technological mirrors.
We can perceive a branch and see a stick in it. Pierre Lvy considers the fact that man "sees double" as the
basis of technology. The exchange between ourselves and the real entities that we perceive, virtualizes the real
by doubling it. (Lvy, 1998, 116-7). Lvy stresses the concurrence of man's capacity for creating technological
artifacts and his capacity for creating a second world: no technology without imagination. Imagination is
constitutive of (technological) reality itself. From a Lacanian perspective one might come to similar
conclusions, for Lacan holds that even our sense of personal identity comes about via a doubling of the real.
The "me" is not present in an immature form from birth onwards, only having to reach full maturity, as a tree is
the mature form of the core that was already present in the seed. Lacan follows Freud's basic notion that the
ego is something that must be developed ("Das Ich muss entwickelt werden").
According to Lacan, imagination is a medium through which even we ourselves always exist as a virtual double.
He formulates this constitutive relationship between the organism and its double for the first time in his famous
theory of the mirror stage. Its pivotal notion concerns the identification with the specular image as furnishing
the self with a virtual unity.
The entire dialectic which I gave you as an example under the name of the mirror stage is based on the relation
between, on the one hand, a certain level of tendencies which are experienced let us say, for the moment, at a
certain point of life as disconnected, discordant, in pieces and theres always something of that that remains
and on the other hand, a unity with which it is merged and paired. It is in this unity that the subject knows
himself for the first times as a unity, but as an alienated, virtual unity. (Lacan, 1988a, 50)
The mirror stage is the paradigmatic structure of the imaginary. All identifications with images establish a sense
of unity, mastery or autonomy that is not there in the real. As constitutive elements of our personal identity,
these illusions permeate our reality with virtuality. We recognize ourselves in a complete form in the mirror
image, or reflection: "The human being only sees his form materialised, whole, the mirage of himself, outside of
himself" (S.1, 140). We can gain consciousness of ourselves in all sorts of things in which we can recognize
ourselves: works of art, of philosophy, manual works, consumer goods, instruments, machines, displays :
they give a concrete form to, they design, our desire.
Likewise, we can gain self-identity in products of digital technologies. The computer screen as well functions as
a mirror. For Rob Shields the image-circuits of digital culture have become the mirrors in which to look for an
identity (Shields, 1997). Technological images can provide a sense of personal identity because we can find
(images of) ourselves in them. We identify with the image on the screen as such a mirror. The computer is a
medium for man, to use the words of Lacan, "to impress his image in reality": we find self-images in it and (try
to) shape the world accordingly.
The point to be remembered here is that consciousness is a matter of surface-appearances. In presenting the
outside of ourselves, we make (up) our identity and become conscious of ourselves (self-conscious,
self-confident as with make-up or even self-assured). Make-up and fashion are the most obvious examples
of this intricacy of personal identity and surface-presence. In a broader context this allows for the interpretation
of design as the skin of culture (De Kerckhove, 1997).
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surface of the body. It may thus be regarded as a mental projection of the surface of the body. (Freud, 1923,
25-6). Lacan's theory of the mirror stage upholds this Freudian notion of an ego coming into being via
identification with the mental image of its body or bodily sensations.
The imaginary function constitutes a psychical reality perceived as objective ("I see myself as" a constitutive
difference or distance between the original I and its reflected figures). But this objective space (of
self-representation) cannot do without the libidinal, narcissistic investment in images that differ from the
unreflected I (at the bodily level). When we regard fantasy as equal to the imaginary function, as is the case for
the early Lacan where the narcissistic matrix of the mirror stage gives Lacan's first paradigm of fantasy (cf.
Miller, 1999, 10; Ribettes, 1984, 189) then it has both a subjective and an objective status (without being either
completely subjective or objective): it is objective-subjective. Fantasy as what is necessary for time-space
distanciation, opens up the objective space of the world we live in, but simultaneously introduces a subjective
(bodily) aspect to it. Therefore there is no objective space of self-representation.
The word "space" is derived from the Latin word spatium, meaning "race-track," or generally "distance,"
"interval," "terrain" (Torretti, 1998, 59). A difference or distance between the real and the imaginary is
necessary for the coherent appearance of reality. One way to conceive the real (not: reality) is as a chaotic
multiplicity of immediate sense impressions or bodily feelings that needs synthetization (in imaginary space) in
order to make sense. The Lacanian understanding of space as a modus of the imaginary is very similar to Kant's.
In Lacanian theory, space as equivalent to distance or difference also implies a (psychological) distanciation
from the original symbiotic unity (mother-child" in order to have space for one's own identity; one must
withdraw from the real of a primitive jouissance. An empty space or distanciation (the emptiness of the desiring
subject) is therefore necessary for the sound functioning of a human being.
Since the mirror stage is the paradigmatic structure of the imaginary, all forms that we give to ourselves express
a binding or unification of libidinal energies. From a psychoanalytical perspective such knots of libido are the
nuts and bolts of man's reality. The decisive notion hitching Lacans theory of identity firmly to its Freudian
origins concerns the images that produce consciousness as thoroughly invested by libido. In his seminar on the
formations of the unconscious (1957-58) Lacan states that the image has that property of being a captivating
signal that isolates itself in reality, that attracts and captures a certain libido of the subject, a certain instinct,
due to which a certain number of identifying marks, of psychoanalytical points in the world, permit the living
being to organize his behavior (Lacan, 1998, 225; my translation).
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Fascination is absolutely essential to the phenomenon of the constitution of the ego. The uncoordinated,
incoherent diversity of the primitive fragmentation gains its unity in so far as it is fascinated. Reflection is also
fascination, jamming. (Lacan, 1988a, 50)
The tricky thing about fascination is that it lures us. As Lacan's theory of the mirror image clarifies, fascination
implies an (unconscious) absorption in something (a virtual image) that the subject itself is not (in the real). The
object of desire is not our own in fascination but actually the object of desire of the other, although the desire
appears to be our own desire (we want to be like the fascinating other, we want what he wants). In fascination
we identify with something that we are not: alienation. In his psychoanalytic approach to the (film) screen,
semiotist Christian Metz reveals that in order for fascination to occur the images on the screen must appear as
the expression of the desire of the spectator (cf. Sarup, 1992, 153). Since Lacan unravels desire as the desire of
the other, the lure is an inevitable aspect of human reality (fantasy as a constitutive aspect of reality). We never
get directly to the real; the real is always fantasmatically mediated.
In immersive Virtual Reality (VR) the computer synthesizes the diverse sense-stimuli of the body of the user
into a coherent self-image of the user. As it generates a self-image that we not only look at but also actually live
in, it is one of the most fascinating media experiences available: we act through that image; we step inside the
computer-generated avatar. Hence it is also the most extreme example of how the computer can take over the
synthesizing role of the human subject. As media scientist Ken Hillis points out, the impression that Virtual
Reality offers an experience of unmediated sensation, called "direct perception" by Virtual Reality designers, is
false." According to Hillis Virtual Reality is in fact a highly mediated series of conceptions or ideas, of military,
commercial, scientific interests along with those of the software designers who interpret these conceptions and
write the programs (Hillis, 1999, 69-70).
Too much fascination may make us forget the composition (compositing) of the object that attracts us. So, it
remains a matter of not taking the fascinating fantasy image for reality itself. Hence Ken Hillis reproaches Jaron
Lanier's notion of post-symbolic communication: a house in virtual reality is not a representation of a house but
is actually a house. Thinking in this vein falls into the trap off assuming that virtual reality can realize our
nostalgic desire and get to the true form of the real (thus leaving all the troubles of the real behind). Such
utopian thinking, according to Hillis, may take root during exploitation to justify social inequality. What we
must not forget is that "direct perception" is not reality itself but still a framing of reality. "Lanier himself has
forgotten the screen, if not the frame" (Hillis, 1999, 193). When we forget this framing, the screen turns into a
mirror.
A full absorption in the world of ideal images provided by the media makes the creative process of
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subjectivation disappear, and we risk losing ourselves. That is to say that alienation, which is a constitutive
dimension, becomes total because we no longer recognize the tension between the ideal image (that we are not)
and the real that escapes it: plastic surgery disasters as the excess of make-up. When fascination dissolves this
tension, creative disclosure turns into enclosure. The image must remain a promise.
2. Cyberspace, cyberbodies
Technology helps to fill, to bridge, to overcome the insufficiency emerging from absence. Every form of
technology is teletechnology and serves to overcome spatial and temporal distance. However, this victory over
distance and time is only a phenomenological aspect of the (tele-) media. The real effect of the media lies in
overcoming the mental disturbances (fears, control mechanisms, castration complexes, etc.) caused by distance
and time, by all forms of absence, leave, separation, disappearance, interruption, withdrawal or loss. By
overcoming or shutting off the negative horizon of absence, the technical media become technologies of care
and presence. By visualizing the absent, making it symbolically present, the media also transform the damaging
consequences of absence into pleasant ones. (Weibel, 1992, 75)
Psychologist, systems analyst and philosopher Raymond Barglow stresses the defensive functions of the
computer: it compensates for our dependency and vulnerability by objectificying our surroundings, thus
rendering the world relatively predictable and manipulable and emotionally safe (Barglow, 1994, p. 128). And
Turkle considers the promise of self-control a crucial aspect of man's attraction to computers: it offers an
environment for a new level of control and mastery and thus becomes a key player in this kind of drama
(Turkle, 1995, p. 274). Others stress that the functioning of fantasmatic images is actually the basic motivation
of science (cf. Bergoffen, 1995, p.575), and of technology with the promises of mastery, power, pleasure,
plenty, and self-actualization (cf. Markley, 1996, p. 73).
Media have the power to hypnotize us and to make us forget our own deficiencies: they numb the senses that
cannot cope with all the stimuli. Or, more broadly, they numb the awareness of our own inadequacies and
defects because of the fascinating image they depict of us: according to Richard Veryard we repress technology
itself because we do not want to see how alike we have become to our machines, that our ideas and perceptions
are not our own (Veryard, 2000). From a Lacanian perspective, the numbing of our senses is not necessarily a
malicious process. For we exist (as subjects of desire) in a tension between the immediacy of sensations and its
objectification in the ego: The ego really is an object. The ego is precisely what the immediacy of sensation
is in tension with (Lacan, 1988a, p.49-50). For Lacan a (genetic) physiological deficiency is the root cause of
the objectification of the ego: the prematurity of human birth and the defenselessness of the newborn infant. In
a structural sense this is a disruption of mans "natural" relation to the outside world (Lacan, 1977, p.4). An
inner tension between inadequacy and anticipation characterizes mans imaginary relation to the outside world.
Imaginary forms supplement the real and function as a window upon man himself and his world, which is not
far from the conception of man as a cyborg.
Cyborg technologies materialize this window in technological artifacts that try to restore, normalize, reconfigure
or enhance the human being, the four types of cyborg technologies categorized by Gray, Mentor & Figueroa-
Sarriera in their capital work on the cyborg (1995, p.3). To give some examples: we supplement our bodily
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functions with artificial organs and limbs, glasses and pacemakers; almost everyone of us is reprogrammed
(immunized) to resist disease, and psychopharmacological drugs are generally used to feel or behave better.
"Narcosis as (Second) Nature," to paraphrase McLuhan. As human beings trying to restore, normalize,
reconfigure and enhance our physical and psychical inadequacies by way of a screen of constitutive and
idealizing images, we ("cyborgs") exist in the order of promise.
Though we are cyborgs always supplementing our vulnerable identity, compensation does not lie on the road of
illusions taking us away from our true self." The promises of an ideal reality held forth by science and
technology belong to human reality itself. Actually, these promises sustain (psychologically) the whole
enterprise and lead man towards new discoveries.
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experience a virtual community as just another way of socializing becauseas in normal realitywe can
project our sense of identity on it. Avatars can materialize or visualize the sense of self. Avatars are only the
most obvious examples of how we recognize ourselves in the technological mirror, for all sorts of virtual
environments, agents and informational systems can function as alter egos (cf. Vasseleu, 2002, pp.86-88).
Because we invest ourselves in virtual environments as alter egos, being in a virtual world is not some sort of
disembodied presence (as in the conception: "in cyberspace the mind leaves the body"). It actually has a
material, embodied foundation.
I conceive this material cause of presence, in accord with Freudian theory, as the sensations that occur at the
surface of the body. Their mental projection is the image of the body that we call the ego.
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Media Laboratory, shares these conclusions. In her essay on computers and emotions, she holds that computers
can recognize and evoke emotions, yet not "have" them (Picard, 1997). Affective computing is an interesting
area for the topic of "machinic emotionality" or cyborg emotions. For instance in the development of "Affective
Avatars," information about the users' physiology is registered (by a full-face mask) and represented in the
expressive graphical interface of the avatar, which greatly improves the possibilities of physical and emotional
presence. Affective avatars elucidate emotional presence as a matter of representation.
The imaginary as a doubling of reality has strong impacts as a luring dimension. When we question the
difference between man and computer, we should not seek the decisive criteria at the level of emotions and
feelings. For beings of communication and representation like us, emotions are not the real, substantial criteria.
The interaction with a simulated or machinic other also evokes emotional presence: we feel emotions and
attribute emotions to the machine. Emotions are therefore rather like performances, mimetic operations.
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out of the pivotal role of the body image in the experience of our self. For instance the extent to which the fear
of death, the absolute Master, presupposed in consciousness by a whole philosophical tradition from Hegel
onwards, is psychologically subordinate to the narcissistic fear of damage to ones own body (Lacan, 1977,
p.28). We fear the invasion or violation of our proper (bodily) domain because that may cause what we try most
to keep at a (narcissistic) distance: anxiety.
The myth of Narcissus illustrates that the will to be similar to the image and to eliminate the tension caused by
the 'real self' can lead to self-destruction: Narcissus drowns. Lacan elaborates this aggressive trait of narcissism
into the notion of "narcissistic suicidal aggression" (Lacan, 1966, p.174, p.187). In it, the subject tries to resolve
the aggressive tension caused by the discrepancy between its (limited) self and its (ideal) image by directing the
aggression against the (real) being that does not correspond to the image. Similar aggression is an ever-present
risk among the possibilities of the cyborg. According to Robins and Levidow this duplicity of narcissistic
identification defines the paranoid rationality of the cyborg the duplicity of both omnipotent control and the
fear of being affected, attacked or injured: "The cyborg self phantasizes about controlling the world, freezing
historical forces, and, if necessary, even destroying them in rage; it contains its anxiety in the name of
maintaining rational control" (Robins & Levidow, 1995, 119).
The technological interface with reality functions as a screen towards the real as an object of anxiety, as the
disturbing limitations of our bodily unity. In The Culture of Narcissism (1979) historian and social critic
Christopher Lasch teaches that pathological or secondary narcissism has more to do with self-hatred than with
self-love: it functions as a defense against aggressive impulses and anxiety. The ego, as the result of the
projection of bodily sensations into a mental self-image, can evolve into a pathological entity trying to enclose
itself in its image. It can cut off the ties with everything (the real) that poses a limit to its narcissism and that
calls for an awareness that not everything is possible. Technologies function as such an extension or expansion
of the ego, enlarging the psychological distance to the real (other). So the self that emerges from the
identification with screen-images (the hyper-rational self of RET, the self of online communication, the self of
the cyborg soldier ) can be extremely harsh: controlling the affect, flaming and aggressive acting out, killing
without the shock of direct confrontation.
Conclusion
The ego's habitation of the virtual (subjective) space opened up by the mirror image is complicated and tense.
Virtual space, the duplication of the self and the distance it presupposes, on the one hand is a necessary
condition for reflection and autonomy. On the other hand, the ego might go as far as to annihilate this distance,
driven by the will to converge with its image. Normally, the ego is a necessary condition for the exploration of
space: it opens up space by seeing ourselves reflected in other, virtual spaces. The imaginary object (the ideal
form) that we seek is not simply out there in our natural environment but reflected in different kinds of virtual
space (the mirror, art, the shopping mall, cyberspace ). So, our 'self-portrait' moves us (and it legitimizes
actions: man as an astronaut for the exploration of outer space; man as a multiple personality for the
exploration of cyberspace). Because I see myself as (beautiful, desirable, explorative, multiple etc) I define my
sense of self and my actions. It is the virtual image that sustains desire, and I get anxious when I lose this image,
or depressed when it is negative ("I am nothing, nobody wants me ").
This exploration of space can nevertheless transform into a domination of space. Lacan diagnoses science and
technology as guided by such imaginary desires. This imaginary conquest of space can also seize upon man in
the digital era (cf. the cyborg soldier). Virtual space then replaces real space: someone's life in cyberspace is no
longer an exploration but a compensation. When life in cyberspace becomes such a hallucination (cyberspace
itself as a consensual hallucination), there is no longer (enough) distance between the self and its image, and no
space for (a symbolical, ethical, regulating, non-narcisstic) desire. Cyberspace needs a free subject of desire,
one not wrapped up in it.
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