might have done himself if no proceedings in insolvency had been
G.R. No. L-7817. October 31, 1956.]
ALFREDO M. VELAYO vs. SHELL COMPANY OF THE
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, LTD
Prior to 1948, Commercial Airlines (CALI) owed P170k (abt. $79k) to
Shell Company. CAL offered its C-54 plane as payment to Shell
Company (the plane was in California) but Shell at that time declined
as it thought CALI had sufficient money to pay its debt. In 1948
however, CALI was going bankrupt so it called upon an informal
meeting of its creditors. In that meeting, the creditors agreed to
appoint representatives to a working committee that would
determine the order of preference as to how each creditor should be
paid. They also agreed not to file suit against CALI but CALI did
reserve that it will file insolvency proceedings should its assets be
not enough to pay them up. Shell Company was represented by a
certain Fitzgerald to the three man working committee. Later, the
working committee convened to discuss how CALIs asset should be
divided amongst the creditors but while such was pending,
Fitzgerald sent a telegraph message to Shell USA advising the latter
that Shell Philippines is assigning its credit to Shell USA in the
amount of $79k, thereby effectively collecting almost all if not the
entire indebtedness of CALI to Shell Philippines. Shell USA got wind
of the fact that CALI has a C-54 plane is California and so Shell USA
petitioned before a California court to have the plane be the subject
of a writ of attachment which was granted.
Meanwhile, the stockholders of CALI were unaware of the
assignment of credit made by Shell Philippines to Shell USA and
they went on to approve the sale of CALIs asset to the Philippine
Airlines. In September 1948, the other creditors learned of the
assignment made by Shell. This prompted these other creditors to
file their own complaint of attachment against CALIs assets. CALI
then filed for insolvency proceedings to protect its assets in the
Philippines from being attached. Alfredo Velayos appointment as
CALIs assignee was approved in lieu of the insolvency proceeding.
In order for him to recover the C-54 plane in California, it filed for a
writ of injunction against Shell Philippines in order for the latter to
restrain Shell USA from proceeding with the attachment and in the
alternative that judgment be awarded in favor of CALI for damages
double the amount of the C-54 plane. The C-54 plane was not
recovered. Shell Company argued it is not liable for damages
because there is nothing in the law which prohibits a company from
assigning its credit, it being a common practice.
ISSUE: Whether or not Shell is liable for damages considering that it
did not violate any law.
HELD: Yes. The basis of such liability, in the absence of law, is
Article 21 of the Civil Code which states: Art. 21. Any person who
willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary
to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter
for the damage.
We may agree with the trial judge, that the assignment of
Defendants credit for a valuable consideration is not violative of the
provisions of sections 32 and 70 of the Insolvency Law (Public Act
No. 1956), because the assignment was made since August 9, 1948,
the original complaint in the United States was filed on August 12,
1948, and the writ of attachment issued on this same date, while
CALI filed its petition for insolvency on October 7, 1948. At his Honor
correctly states, said Sections 32 and 70 only contemplate acts and
transactions occuring within 30 days prior to the commencement of
the proceedings in insolvency and, consequently, all other acts
outside of the 30-day period cannot possibly be considered as
coming within the orbit of the operation. In addition to this, We may
add that Article 70 of the Insolvency Law refers to acts of the debtor
(in this case the insolvent CALI) and not of the creditor, the Shell
Company of the P. I. Ltd. But section 70 does not constitute the only
provisions of the law pertinent to the matter. The Insolvency Law
also provides the following:
SEC. 33. The assignee shall have the right to recover all the
estate, debt and effects of said insolvent. If at the time of the
commencement of the proceedings in insolvency, an action is
pending in the name of the debtor, for the recovery of a debt or other
thing might or ought to pass to the assignee by the assignment, the
assignee shall be allowed to prosecute the action, in like manner
and with life effect as if it had been originally commenced by him. If
there are any rights of action in favor of the insolvency for damages,
on any account, for which an action is not pending the assignee shall
have the right to prosecute the same with effect as the insolvent
Torts Human Relations Torts
instituted cralaw .
It must not be forgotten that in accordance with the spirit of the
Insolvency Law and with the provisions of Chapter V thereof which
deal with the powers and duties of a receiver, the assignee
represents the insolvent as well as the creditors in voluntary and
involuntary proceedings. From the foregoing, We see that Plaintiff,
as Assignee of the Insolvent CALI, had personality and authority to
institute this case for damages, and the only question that remains
determination is whether the payment of damages sought to be
recovered from Defendant may be ordered under the Law and the
evidence of record.
IF ANY PERSON, before the assignment is made, having notice of
the commencement of the proceedings in insolvency, or having
reason to believe that insolvency proceedings are about to be
commenced, embezzles or disposes of any money, goods, chattels,
or effects of the insolvent, he is chargeable therewith, and liable to
an action by the assignee for double the value of the property sought
to be embezzled or disposed of, to be received for the benefit of the
insolvent estate.
The writer of this decision does not entertain any doubt that the
Defendant taking advantage of his knowledge that insolvency
proceedings were to be instituted by CALI if the creditors did not
come to an understanding as to the manner of distribution of the
insolvent asset among them, and believing it most probable that they
would not arrive at such understanding as it was really the case
schemed and effected the transfer of its sister corporation in the
United States, where CALIs plane C-54 was by that swift and
unsuspected operation efficaciously disposed of said insolvents
property depriving the latter and the Assignee that was latter
appointed, of the opportunity to recover said plane. In addition to the
aforementioned Section 37, Chapter 2 of the PRELIMINARY TITLE
of the Civil Code, dealing on Human Relations, provides the
following:
Art 19. Any person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the
performances of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due
and observe honesty and good faith.
It maybe said that this article only contains a mere declarations of
principles and while such statement may be is essentially correct,
yet We find that such declaration is implemented by Article 21 and
sequence of the same Chapter which prescribe the following:
Art. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a
manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy
shall compensate the latter for the damage.
The Code Commission commenting on this article, says the
following:
Thus at one stroke, the legislator, if the forgoing rule is approved (as
it was approved), would vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that
untold numbers of moral wrongs which is impossible for human
foresight to provide for specifically in the statutes.
But, it may be asked, would this proposed article obliterate the
boundary line between morality and law? The answer is that, in the
last analysis, every good law draws its breath of life from morals,
from those principles which are written with words of fire in the
conscience of man. If this premises is admitted, then the proposed
rule is a prudent earnest of justice in the face of the impossibility of
enumerating, one by one, all wrongs which cause damages. When it
is reflected that while codes of law and statutes have changed from
age to age, the conscience of man has remained fixed to its ancient
moorings, one cannot but feel that it is safe and salutary to
transmute, as far as may be, moral norms into legal rules, thus
imparting to every legal system that enduring quality which ought to
be one of its superlative attributes.
Furthermore, there is no belief of more baneful consequence upon
the social order than that a person may with impunity cause damage
to his fellow-men so long as he does not break any law of the State,
though he may be defying the most sacred postulates of morality.
What is more, the victim loses faith in the ability of the government to
afford him protection or relief.
A provision similar to the one under consideration is embodied in
article 826 of the German Civil Code.
1

The same observations may be made concerning injurious acts that
are contrary to public policy but are not forbidden by statute. There
are countless acts of such character, but have not been foreseen by
the lawmakers. Among these are many business practices that are
unfair or oppressive, and certain acts of landholders and employers
affecting their tenants and employees which contravene the public
policy of social justice.
Another rule is expressed in Article 24 which compels the return of a
thing acquired without just or legal grounds. This provision
embodies the doctrine that no person should unjustly enrich himself
at the expense of another, which has been one of the mainstays of
every legal system for centuries. It is most needful that this ancient
principles be clearly and specifically consecrated in the proposed
Civil Code to the end that in cases not foreseen by the lawmaker, no
one may unjustly benefit himself to the prejudice of another. The
German Civil Code has a similar provision (art. 812). (Report of the
Code Commission on the Proposed Civil Code of the Philippines, p.
40- 41).
From the Civil Code Annotated by Ambrosio Padilla, Vol. I, p. 51,
1956 edition, We also copy the following:
A moral wrong or injury, even if it does not constitute a violation of a
statute law, should be compensated by damages. Moral damages
(Art. 2217) may be recovered (Art. 2219). In Article 20, the liability for
damages arises from a willful or negligent act contrary to law. In this
article, the act is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy.
Now, if Article 23 of the Civil Code goes as far as to provide that:
Even if an act or event causing damage to anothers property was
not due to the fault or negligence of the Defendant, the latter shall be
liable for indemnity if through the act or event he was benefited.
with mere much more reason the Defendant should be liable for
indemnity for acts it committed in bad faith and with betrayal of
confidence.
It may be argued that the aforequoted provisions of the Civil Code
only came into effect on August 30, 1950, and that they cannot be
applicable to acts that took place in 1948, prior to its effectivity. But
Article 2252 of the Civil Code, though providing that:
Changes made and new provisions and rules laid down by this
Code which may be prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in
accordance with the old legislation, shall have no retroactive effect.
implies that when the new provisions of the Code does nor prejudice
or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the old
legislation and it cannot be alleged that in the case at bar
Defendant had any vested or acquired right to betray the confidence
of the insolvent CALI or of its creditors said new provisions, like
those on Human Relations, can be given retroactive effect.
Moreover, Article 2253 of the Civil Code further provides:
But if a right should be declared for the first time in this Code, it
shall be effective at once, even though the act or event which may
give rise thereto may have been done or may have occurred under
the prior legislation, provided said new right does not prejudice or
impair any vested or acquired right, of the same origin.
and according to Article 2254, no vested or acquired right can arise
from acts or omissions which are against the law or which infringe
upon the right of others.
In case of Juan Castro vs. Acro Taxicab Company, (82 Phil., 359; 47
Off. Gaz., [5] 2023), one of the question at issue was whether or not
the provisions of the New Civil Code of the Philippines on moral
damages should be applied to an act of negligence which occurred
before the effectivity of said code, and this Court, through Mr. Justice
Briones, sustaining the affirmative proposition and citing decisions of
the Supreme Court of Spain of February 14, 1941, and November
14, 1934, as well as the comment of Mr. Castan, Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court of Spain, about the revolutionary tendency of
Spanish jurisprudence, said the following:
We conclude, therefore, reaffirming the doctrine laid down in the
case of Lilius (59 J. F. 800) in the sense that indemnity lies for moral
and patrimonial damages which include physical and pain sufferings.
With this (doctrine), We effect in this jurisdiction a real symbiosis 1 of
Torts Human Relations Torts
the Spanish and American Laws and, at the same time, We act in
consonance with the spirit and progressive march of time
(translation)
The writer of this decision does not see any reason for not applying
the provisions of Section 37 of the Insolvency Law to the case at bar,
specially if We take into consideration that the term any person
used therein cannot be limited to the officers or employee of the
insolvent, as no such limitation exist in the wording of the section
(See also Sec. 38 of the same Act), and that, as stated before, the
Defendant schemed and affected the transfer of its credits (from
which it could derive practically nothing) to its sister corporation in
the United States where CALIs plane C-54 was then situated,
succeeding by such swift and unsuspected operation in disposing of
said insolvents property by removing it from the possession and
ownership of the insolvent. However, some members of this Court
entertain doubt as to the applicability of said section 37 because in
their opinion what Defendant in reality disposed of was its own credit
and not the insolvents property, although this was practically the
effect and result of the scheme. Having in mind this objection and
that the provisions of Article 37 making the person coming within its
purview liable for double the value of the property sought to be
disposed of constitute a sort of penal clause which shall be strictly
construed, and considering further that the same result may be
obtained, by applying only the provisions of the Civil Code, the writer
of this decision yields to the objection aforementioned.
Articles 2229, 2232, 2234, 2142, and 2143 of the Civil Code read as
follows:
Art. 2229. Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed, by way
of example or correction for the public good, in addition to the moral,
temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages.
Art. 2232. In contracts quasi-contracts, the Court may award
exemplary damages if the Defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent,
reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner.
Art. 2234. While the amount of the exemplary damages need not
be proved, the Plaintiff must show that he is entitled to moral,
temperate, or compensatory damages before the court may consider
the question of whether or not exemplary damages should be
awarded. In case liquidated damages should be upon, although no
proof of loss is necessary in order that such liquidated damages be
recovered, nevertheless, before the court may consider the question
of granting exemplary in addition to the liquidated damages, the
Plaintiff must show that he would be entitled to moral, temperate or
compensatory damages were it not for the stipulation for liquidated
damages.
Art. 2142. Certain lawful, voluntary and unilateral acts give rise to
the juridical relation of quasi-contract to the end that no one shall be
unjustly enriched or benefited at the expense of another.
Art, 2143. The provisions for quasi-contracts in this Chapter do not
exclude other quasi-contracts which may come within the purview of
the preceding article.
In accordance with these quoted provisions of the Civil Code, We
hold Defendant liable to pay to the Plaintiff, for the benefit of the
insolvent CALI and its creditors, as compensatory damages a sum
equivalent to the value of the plane at the time aforementioned and
another equal sum as exemplary damages.
There is no clear proof in the record about the real value of CALIs
plane C-54 at the time when Defendants credit was assigned to its
sister corporation in the United States.
Judgment
Wherefore, and on the strength of the foregoing considerations, the
decision appealed from is reversed and Defendant-Appellee-, Shell
Company of the Philippine Islands, Ltd., is hereby sentenced to pay
to Plaintiff-Appellant, as Assignee of the insolvent CALI, damages in
a sum double the amount of the value of the insolvents airplane C-
54 at the time Defendants credit against the CALI was assigned to
its sister corporation in the United States, which value shall be
determined in the corresponding incident in the lower court after this
decision becomes final. Costs are taxed against Defendant-
Appellee. It is SO ORDERED.
2
RESOLUTION - July 30, 1957
That Appellee Shell is not liable for exemplary damages in this case
and that Plaintiff-Appellant has no cause of action against
Defendant-Appellee, for he is not the real party in interest, are
matters fully discussed in Our decision and We find no sensible
reason for disturbing the conclusions We reached therein.
As to the fifth question raised by counsel for Appellee in the course
of his oral argument at the hearing in the City of Baguio of his
motion, i.e., that Plaintiffs right of action was based and prosecuted
in the lower court under the provisions of the Insolvency Law and he
is, therefore, stopped from pursuing on appeal another theory under
which he might be entitled to damages in consonance with the
provisions of the new Civil Code, We may invoke the decision in the
case of Dimaliwat vs. Asuncion, 59 Phil., 396, 401.
Vicente Dimaliwat contends that Esperanza Dimaliwat has no right
to claim the ownership of the property in question to the exclusion of
the children of the third marriage, under the foregoing provisions of
the Civil Code, because the case was not tried on that theory in the
lower court. We find no merit in that contention. The decision cited
are not in point. Articles 968 and 969 of the Civil Code are rules of
substantive law, and if they are applicable to the facts of this case
they must be given effect.
The same thing can be said in the case at bar. Articles 19, 21, 2229,
2232, 2234, 2142 and 2143 of the new Civil Code are rules of
substantive law, and if they are applicable to the facts of this case,
which We hold they do, they must be made operative and given
effect in this litigation.
xxx xxx xxx
It maybe seen from the foregoing that the above mentioned grounds
on which the motion for reconsideration of the Defendant Shell
stand, are not well taken. However, and despite this finding, We
insist to delve in the question of whether the exemplary damages
imposed in this Court upon Defendant Appellee, which the latters
counsel contends to be inequitable and unfair, may be modified.
It will be remembered that this case was looked into from the point of
view of the provisions of Section 37 of the Insolvency Law, which
reads as follows:
SEC. 37. IF ANY PERSON, before the assignment is made, having
notice of the commencement of the proceedings in insolvency, or
having reason to believe that insolvency proceedings are about to be
commenced, embezzles or disposses of any of the money, goods,
chattels, or effects of the insolvent, he is chargeable therewith, and
liable to an action by the assignee for double the value of the
property sought to be embezzled or disposed of, to be received for
the benefit of the insolvent estate.
The writer of the decision was then and still is of the opinion that the
provisions of this section were applicable to the case, and
accordingly, that Defendant Shell was liable in this action instituted
by the Assignee for double the value of the property disposed of, to
be received for the benefit of the Insolvent estate. However, some of
the members of this Court, for the reasons already stated in the
decision, entertained some doubt as to the applicability of said
Section 37, and yielding to their objections the writer of the decision
turned his eyes to the provisions of the new Civil Code, inasmuch as
the same result could be achieved. In the case at bar, it cannot be
denied that:
Defendant taking advantage of his knowledge that insolvency
proceedings were to be instituted by CALI if the creditors did not
come to an understanding as to the manner of distribution of the
insolvent assets among them, and believing as most probable that
they would not arrive at such understanding, as it was really the
case- schemed and effected the transfer of its credit to its sister
corporation in the United States where CALIs plane C-54 was and
by this swift and unsuspected operation efficaciously disposed of
said insolvents property depriving the latter and the Assignee that
was later appointed, of the opportunity to recover said plane.
These acts of Defendant Shell come squarely within the sanction
prescribed by Congress by similar acts and no reflection can be
reasonably cast on Us if in the measure of the exemplary damages
that were to be imposed upon Defendant-Appellee, We were
influenced by the provisions of Section 37 of the Insolvency Law. In
Torts Human Relations Torts
this connection it is to be noted that, according to the Civil Code,
exemplary or corrective damages are imposed by way of example or
correction for the public good, in addition of the moral, temperate,
liquidated or compensatory damages Art. 2229, and that the amount
of the exemplary damages need not be proved (Art. 2234), for it is
left to the sound discretion of the Court.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, a majority of this Court was of the
belief that the value of CALIs plane C-54, at the time when
Defendants credit was assigned to its sister corporation in the
United States, might result quite high, and that exemplary damages
should not be left to speculation but properly determined by a certain
and fixed amount. So they voted for the reconsideration of the
decision with regard to the amount of exemplary damages which this
Court fixed at P25,000.00.
______________________________________________________
G.R. No. 81262 August 25, 1989
GLOBE MACKAY CABLE AND RADIO CORP., and HERBERT C.
HENDRY, petitioners, vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and RESTITUTO M.
TOBIAS, respondents.
The main issue in this case is whether or not petitioners are liable for
damages to private respondent.
Petitioners contend that they could not be made liable for damages
in the lawful exercise of their right to dismiss private respondent.
On the other hand, private respondent contends that because of
petitioners' abusive manner in dismissing him as well as for the
inhuman treatment he got from them, the Petitioners must indemnify
him for the damage that he had suffered.
One of the more notable innovations of the New Civil Code is the
codification of "some basic principles that are to be observed for the
rightful relationship between human beings and for the stability of the
social order." [REPORT ON THE CODE COMMISSION ON THE
PROPOSED CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, p. 39]. The
framers of the Code, seeking to remedy the defect of the old Code
which merely stated the effects of the law, but failed to draw out its
spirit, incorporated certain fundamental precepts which were
"designed to indicate certain norms that spring from the fountain of
good conscience" and which were also meant to serve as "guides for
human conduct [that] should run as golden threads through society,
to the end that law may approach its supreme ideal, which is the
sway and dominance of justice" (Id.) Foremost among these
principles is that pronounced in Article 19 which provides: Art. 19.
Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due,
and observe honesty and good faith.
This article, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the
principle of abuse of rights, sets certain standards which must be
observed not only in the exercise of one's rights but also in the
performance of one's duties. These standards are the following: to
act with justice; to give everyone his due; and to observe honesty
and good faith. The law, therefore, recognizes a primordial limitation
on all rights; that in their exercise, the norms of human conduct set
forth in Article 19 must be observed. A right, though by itself legal
because recognized or granted by law as such, may nevertheless
become the source of some illegality. When a right is exercised in a
manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined in Article
19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby
committed for which the wrongdoer must be held responsible. But
while Article 19 lays down a rule of conduct for the government of
human relations and for the maintenance of social order, it does not
provide a remedy for its violation. Generally, an action for damages
under either Article 20 or Article 21 would be proper.
Article 20, which pertains to damage arising from a violation of law,
provides that: Art. 20. Every person who contrary to law, wilfully or
negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for
the same.
However, in the case at bar, petitioners claim that they did not violate
any provision of law since they were merely exercising their legal
3
right to dismiss private respondent. This does not, however, leave
private respondent with no relief because Article 21 of the Civil Code
provides that: Art. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury
to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or
public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
This article, adopted to remedy the "countless gaps in the statutes,
which leave so many victims of moral wrongs helpless, even though
they have actually suffered material and moral injury" [Id.] should
"vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that untold number of moral
wrongs which it is impossible for human foresight to provide for
specifically in the statutes."
In determining whether or not the principle of abuse of rights may be
invoked, there is no rigid test which can be applied. While the Court
has not hesitated to apply Article 19 whether the legal and factual
circumstances called for its applicationthe question of whether or not
the principle of abuse of rights has been violated resulting in
damages under Article 20 or Article 21 or other applicable provision
of law, depends on the circumstances of each case. And in the
instant case, the Court, after examining the record and considering
certain significant circumstances, finds that all petitioners have
indeed abused the right that they invoke, causing damage to private
respondent and for which the latter must now be indemnified.
The trial court made a finding that notwithstanding the fact that it was
private respondent Tobias who reported the possible existence of
anomalous transactions, petitioner Hendry "showed belligerence and
told plaintiff (private respondent herein) that he was the number one
suspect and to take a one week vacation leave, not to communicate
with the office, to leave his table drawers open, and to leave his keys
to said defendant (petitioner Hendry)" [RTC Decision, p. 2; Rollo, p.
232]. This, petitioners do not dispute. But regardless of whether or
not it was private respondent Tobias who reported the anomalies to
petitioners, the latter's reaction towards the former upon uncovering
the anomalies was less than civil. An employer who harbors
suspicions that an employee has committed dishonesty might be
justified in taking the appropriate action such as ordering an
investigation and directing the employee to go on a leave. Firmness
and the resolve to uncover the truth would also be expected from
such employer. But the high-handed treatment accorded Tobias by
petitioners was certainly uncalled for. And this reprehensible attitude
of petitioners was to continue when private respondent returned to
work on November 20, 1972 after his one week forced leave. Upon
reporting for work, Tobias was confronted by Hendry who said.
"Tobby, you are the crook and swindler in this company."
Considering that the first report made by the police investigators was
submitted only on December 10, 1972 [See Exh. A] the statement
made by petitioner Hendry was baseless. The imputation of guilt
without basis and the pattern of harassment during the investigations
of Tobias transgress the standards of human conduct set forth in
Article 19 of the Civil Code. The Court has already ruled that the
right of the employer to dismiss an employee should not be confused
with the manner in which the right is exercised and the effects
flowing therefrom. If the dismissal is done abusively, then the
employer is liable for damages to the employee [Quisaba v. Sta.
Ines-Melale Veneer and Plywood Inc., G.R. No. L-38088, August 30,
1974, 58 SCRA 771; See also Philippine Refining Co., Inc. v. Garcia,
G.R. No. L-21871, September 27,1966, 18 SCRA 107] Under the
circumstances of the instant case, the petitioners clearly failed to
exercise in a legitimate manner their right to dismiss Tobias, giving
the latter the right to recover damages under Article 19 in relation to
Article 21 of the Civil Code.
But petitioners were not content with just dismissing Tobias. Several
other tortious acts were committed by petitioners against Tobias after
the latter's termination from work. Towards the latter part of January,
1973, after the filing of the first of six criminal complaints against
Tobias, the latter talked to Hendry to protest the actions taken
against him. In response, Hendry cut short Tobias' protestations by
telling him to just confess or else the company would file a hundred
more cases against him until he landed in jail. Hendry added that,
"You Filipinos cannot be trusted." The threat unmasked petitioner's
bad faith in the various actions taken against Tobias. On the other
hand, the scornful remark about Filipinos as well as Hendry's earlier
statements about Tobias being a "crook" and "swindler" are clear
violations of 'Tobias' personal dignity [See Article 26, Civil Code].
The next tortious act committed by petitioners was the writing of a
letter to RETELCO sometime in October 1974, stating that Tobias
Torts Human Relations Torts
had been dismissed by GLOBE MACKAY due to dishonesty.
Because of the letter, Tobias failed to gain employment with
RETELCO and as a result of which, Tobias remained unemployed
for a longer period of time. For this further damage suffered by
Tobias, petitioners must likewise be held liable for damages
consistent with Article 2176 of the Civil Code. Finally, there is the
matter of the filing by petitioners of six criminal complaints against
Tobias.
While sound principles of justice and public policy dictate that
persons shall have free resort to the courts for redress of wrongs
and vindication of their rights, the right to institute criminal
prosecutions can not be exercised maliciously and in bad faith. To
constitute malicious prosecution, there must be proof that the
prosecution was prompted by a design to vex and humiliate a person
and that it was initiated deliberately by the defendant knowing that
the charges were false and groundless. Concededly, the filing of a
suit by itself, does not render a person liable for malicious
prosecution. The mere dismissal by the fiscal of the criminal
complaint is not a ground for an award of damages for malicious
prosecution if there is no competent evidence to show that the
complainant had acted in bad faith
In the instant case, however, the trial court made a finding that
petitioners acted in bad faith in filing the criminal complaints against
Tobias. In addition to the observations made by the trial court, the
Court finds it significant that the criminal complaints were filed during
the pendency of the illegal dismissal case filed by Tobias against
petitioners.
Petitioners next contend that the award of damages was excessive.
In the complaint filed against petitioners, Tobias prayed for the
following: one hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) as actual
damages; fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) as exemplary
damages; eight hundred thousand pesos (P800,000.00) as moral
damages; fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) as attorney's fees; and
costs. The trial court, after making a computation of the damages
incurred by Tobias [See RTC Decision, pp. 7-8; Rollo, pp. 154-1551,
awarded him the following: eighty thousand pesos (P80,000.00) as
actual damages; two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00) as
moral damages; twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) as exemplary
damages; thirty thousand pesos (P30,000.00) as attorney's fees;
and, costs. It must be underscored that petitioners have been guilty
of committing several actionable tortious acts, i.e., the abusive
manner in which they dismissed Tobias from work including the
baseless imputation of guilt and the harassment during the
investigations; the defamatory language heaped on Tobias as well
as the scornful remark on Filipinos; the poison letter sent to
RETELCO which resulted in Tobias' loss of possible employment;
and, the malicious filing of the criminal complaints. Considering the
extent of the damage wrought on Tobias, the Court finds that,
contrary to petitioners' contention, the amount of damages awarded
to Tobias was reasonable under the circumstances.
Yet, petitioners still insist that the award of damages was improper,
invoking the principle of damnum absque injuria. It is argued that
"[t]he only probable actual damage that plaintiff (private respondent
herein) could have suffered was a direct result of his having been
dismissed from his employment, which was a valid and legal act of
the defendants-appellants (petitioners herein).
According to the principle of damnum absque injuria, damage or loss
which does not constitute a violation of a legal right or amount to a
legal wrong is not actionable. This principle finds no application in
this case. It bears repeating that even granting that petitioners might
have had the right to dismiss Tobias from work, the abusive manner
in which that right was exercised amounted to a legal wrong for
which petitioners must now be held liable. Moreover, the damage
incurred by Tobias was not only in connection with the abusive
manner in which he was dismissed but was also the result of several
other quasi-delictual acts committed by petitioners.
Petitioners next question the award of moral damages. However, the
Court has already ruled in Wassmer v. Velez, G.R. No. L-20089,
December 26, 1964, 12 SCRA 648, 653, that [p]er express provision
of Article 2219 (10) of the New Civil Code, moral damages are
recoverable in the cases mentioned in Article 21 of said Code."
Hence, the Court of Appeals committed no error in awarding moral
damages to Tobias.
4
Lastly, the award of exemplary damages is impugned by petitioners.
Although Article 2231 of the Civil Code provides that "[i]n quasi-
delicts, exemplary damages may be granted if the defendant acted
with gross negligence," the Court, in Zulueta v. Pan American World
Airways, Inc., G.R. No. L- 28589, January 8, 1973, 49 SCRA 1, ruled
that if gross negligence warrants the award of exemplary damages,
with more reason is its imposition justified when the act performed is
deliberate, malicious and tainted with bad faith. As in
the Zulueta case, the nature of the wrongful acts shown to have
been committed by petitioners against Tobias is sufficient basis for
the award of exemplary damages to the latter.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED and the decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 09055 is AFFIRMED. SO
ORDERED.
G.R. No. 88694 January 11, 1993
ALBENSON ENTERPRISES CORP., JESSE YAP, AND BENJAMIN
MENDIONA, petitioners, vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS AND EUGENIO S.
BALTAO, respondents.
In September, October, and November 1980, petitioner Albenson
Enterprises Corporation (Albenson for short) delivered to
Guaranteed Industries, Inc. (Guaranteed for short) located at 3267 V.
Mapa Street, Sta. Mesa, Manila, the mild steel plates which the latter
ordered. As part payment thereof, Albenson was given Pacific
Banking Corporation Check No. 136361 in the amount of P2,575.00
and drawn against the account of E.L. Woodworks (Rollo, p. 148).
When presented for payment, the check was dishonored for the
reason "Account Closed."
Because of the alleged unjust filing of a criminal case against him for
allegedly issuing a check which bounced in violation of Batas
Pambansa Bilang 22 for a measly amount of P2,575.00, respondent
Baltao filed before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a
complaint for damages against herein petitioners Albenson
Enterprises, Jesse Yap, its owner, and Benjamin Mendiona, its
employee.
Petitioners contend that the civil case filed in the lower court was
one for malicious prosecution. Citing the case of Madera vs.
Lopez (102 SCRA 700 [1981]), they assert that the absence of
malice on their part absolves them from any liability for malicious
prosecution. Private respondent, on the other hand, anchored his
complaint for Damages on Articles 19, 20, and 21 ** of the Civil
Code.
Article 19, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the
principle of abuse of rights, sets certain standards which may be
observed not only in the exercise of one's rights but also in the
performance of one's duties. These standards are the following: to
act with justice; to give everyone his due; and to observe honesty
and good faith. The law, therefore, recognizes the primordial
limitation on all rights: that in their exercise, the norms of human
conduct set forth in Article 19 must be observed. A right, though by
itself legal because recognized or granted by law as such, may
nevertheless become the source of some illegality. When a right is
exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms
enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal
wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be held
responsible. Although the requirements of each provision is different,
these three (3) articles are all related to each other. As the eminent
Civilist Senator Arturo Tolentino puts it: "With this article (Article 21),
combined with articles 19 and 20, the scope of our law on civil
wrongs has been very greatly broadened; it has become much more
supple and adaptable than the Anglo-American law on torts. It is now
difficult to conceive of any malevolent exercise of a right which could
not be checked by the application of these articles" (Tolentino, 1 Civil
Code of the Philippines 72).
There is however, no hard and fast rule which can be applied to
determine whether or not the principle of abuse of rights may be
invoked. The question of whether or not the principle of abuse of
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rights has been violated, resulting in damages under Articles 20 and
21 or other applicable provision of law, depends on the
circumstances of each case. (Globe Mackay Cable and Radio
Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 176 SCRA 778 [1989]).
The elements of an abuse of right under Article 19 are the following:
(1) There is a legal right or duty; (2) which is exercised in bad faith;
(3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another. Article 20
speaks of the general sanction for all other provisions of law which
do not especially provide for their own sanction (Tolentino, supra, p.
71). Thus, anyone who, whether willfully or negligently, in the
exercise of his legal right or duty, causes damage to another, shall
indemnify his victim for injuries suffered thereby. Article 21 deals with
acts contra bonus mores, and has the following elements: 1) There
is an act which is legal; 2) but which is contrary to morals, good
custom, public order, or public policy; 3) and it is done with intent to
injure.
Thus, under any of these three (3) provisions of law, an act which
causes injury to another may be made the basis for an award of
damages.
There is a common element under Articles 19 and 21, and that is,
the act must be intentional. However, Article 20 does not distinguish:
the act may be done either "willfully", or "negligently". The trial court
as well as the respondent appellate court mistakenly lumped these
three (3) articles together, and cited the same as the bases for the
award of damages in the civil complaint filed against petitioners,
thus:
With the foregoing legal provisions (Articles 19, 20, and 21) in focus,
there is not much difficulty in ascertaining the means by which
appellants' first assigned error should be resolved, given the
admitted fact that when there was an attempt to collect the amount
of P2,575.00, the defendants were explicitly warned that plaintiff
Eugenio S. Baltao is not the Eugenio Baltao defendants had been
dealing with (supra, p. 5). When the defendants nevertheless
insisted and persisted in filing a case a criminal case no less
against plaintiff, said defendants ran afoul of the legal provisions
(Articles 19, 20, and 21 of the Civil Code) cited by the lower court
and heretofore quoted (supra).
Defendants, not having been paid the amount of P2,575.00, certainly
had the right to complain. But that right is limited by certain
constraints. Beyond that limit is the area of excess, of abuse of
rights.
Assuming, arguendo, that all the three (3) articles, together and not
independently of each one, could be validly made the bases for an
award of damages based on the principle of "abuse of right", under
the circumstances, We see no cogent reason for such an award of
damages to be made in favor of private respondent.
Certainly, petitioners could not be said to have violated the
aforestated principle of abuse of right. What prompted petitioners to
file the case for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 against
private respondent was their failure to collect the amount of
P2,575.00 due on a bounced check which they honestly believed
was issued to them by private respondent. Petitioners had
conducted inquiries regarding the origin of the check, and yielded
the following results: from the records of the Securities and
Exchange Commission, it was discovered that the President of
Guaranteed (the recipient of the unpaid mild steel plates), was one
"Eugenio S. Baltao"; an inquiry with the Ministry of Trade and
Industry revealed that E.L. Woodworks, against whose account the
check was drawn, was registered in the name of one "Eugenio
Baltao"; verification with the drawee bank, the Pacific Banking
Corporation, revealed that the signature appearing on the check
belonged to one "Eugenio Baltao".
The criminal complaint filed against private respondent after the
latter refused to make good the amount of the bouncing check
despite demand was a sincere attempt on the part of petitioners to
find the best possible means by which they could collect the sum of
money due them. A person who has not been paid an obligation
owed to him will naturally seek ways to compel the debtor to pay
him. It was normal for petitioners to find means to make the issuer of
the check pay the amount thereof. In the absence of a wrongful act
5
or omission or of fraud or bad faith, moral damages cannot be
awarded and that the adverse result of an action does not per
se make the action wrongful and subject the actor to the payment of
damages, for the law could not have meant to impose a penalty on
the right to litigate (Rubio vs. Court of Appeals, 141 SCRA 488
[1986]).
In the case at bar, private respondent does not deny that the mild
steel plates were ordered by and delivered to Guaranteed at Baltao
building and as part payment thereof, the bouncing check was
issued by one Eugenio Baltao. Neither had private respondent
conveyed to petitioner that there are two Eugenio Baltaos
conducting business in the same building he and his son Eugenio
Baltao III. Considering that Guaranteed, which received the goods in
payment of which the bouncing check was issued is owned by
respondent, petitioner acted in good faith and probable cause in
filing the complaint before the provincial fiscal.
To constitute malicious prosecution, there must be proof that the
prosecution was prompted by a sinister design to vex and humiliate
a person, and that it was initiated deliberately by the defendant
knowing that his charges were false and groundless. Concededly,
the mere act of submitting a case to the authorities for prosecution
does not make one liable for malicious prosecution. (Manila Gas
Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 100 SCRA 602 [1980]). Still,
private respondent argues that liability under Articles 19, 20, and 21
of the Civil Code is so encompassing that it likewise includes liability
for damages for malicious prosecution under Article 2219 (8). True, a
civil action for damages for malicious prosecution is allowed under
the New Civil Code, more specifically Articles 19, 20, 26, 29, 32, 33,
35, and 2219 (8) thereof. In order that such a case can prosper,
however, the following three (3) elements must be present, to wit: (1)
The fact of the prosecution and the further fact that the defendant
was himself the prosecutor, and that the action was finally
terminated with an acquittal; (2) That in bringing the action, the
prosecutor acted without probable cause; (3) The prosecutor was
actuated or impelled by legal malice (Lao vs. Court of Appeals, 199
SCRA 58, [1991]).
Thus, a party injured by the filing of a court case against him, even if
he is later on absolved, may file a case for damages grounded either
on the principle of abuse of rights, or on malicious prosecution. As
earlier stated, a complaint for damages based on malicious
prosecution will prosper only if the three (3) elements aforecited are
shown to exist. In the case at bar, the second and third elements
were not shown to exist. It is well-settled that one cannot be held
liable for maliciously instituting a prosecution where one has acted
with probable cause. "Probable cause is the existence of such facts
and circumstances as would excite the belief, in a reasonable mind,
acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the
person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted.
In other words, a suit will lie only in cases where a legal prosecution
has been carried on without probable cause. The reason for this rule
is that it would be a very great discouragement to public justice, if
prosecutors, who had tolerable ground of suspicion, were liable to be
sued at law when their indictment miscarried" (Que vs. Intermediate
Appellate Court, 169 SCRA 137 [1989]).
The presence of probable cause signifies, as a legal consequence,
the absence of malice. In the instant case, it is evident that
petitioners were not motivated by malicious intent or by sinister
design to unduly harass private respondent, but only by a well-
founded anxiety to protect their rights when they filed the criminal
complaint against private respondent.
To constitute malicious prosecution, there must be proof that the
prosecution was prompted by a sinister design to vex and humiliate
a person, that it was initiated deliberately by the defendant knowing
that his charges were false and groundless. Concededly, the mere
act of submitting a case to the authorities for prosecution does not
make one liable for malicious prosecution. Proof and motive that the
institution of the action was prompted by a sinister design to vex and
humiliate a person must be clearly and preponderantly established
to entitle the victims to damages (Ibid.).
In the case at bar, there is no proof of a sinister design on the part of
petitioners to vex or humiliate private respondent by instituting the
criminal case against him. While petitioners may have been
negligent to some extent in determining the liability of private
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respondent for the dishonored check, the same is not so gross or
reckless as to amount to bad faith warranting an award of damages.
The root of the controversy in this case is founded on a case of
mistaken identity. It is possible that with a more assiduous
investigation, petitioners would have eventually discovered that
private respondent Eugenio S. Baltao is not the "Eugenio Baltao"
responsible for the dishonored check. However, the record shows
that petitioners did exert considerable effort in order to determine the
liability of private respondent. Their investigation pointed to private
respondent as the "Eugenio Baltao" who issued and signed the
dishonored check as the president of the debtor-corporation
Guaranteed Enterprises. Their error in proceeding against the wrong
individual was obviously in the nature of an innocent mistake, and
cannot be characterized as having been committed in bad faith. This
error could have been discovered if respondent had submitted his
counter-affidavit before investigating fiscal Sumaway and was
immediately rectified by Provincial Fiscal Mauro Castro upon
discovery thereof, i.e., during the reinvestigation resulting in the
dismissal of the complaint.
Furthermore, the adverse result of an action does not per se make
the act wrongful and subject the actor to the payment of moral
damages. The law could not have meant to impose a penalty on the
right to litigate, such right is so precious that moral damages may not
be charged on those who may even exercise it erroneously. And an
adverse decision does not ipso facto justify the award of attorney's
fees to the winning party (Garcia vs. Gonzales, 183 SCRA 72
[1990]).
Thus, an award of damages and attorney's fees is unwarranted
where the action was filed in good faith. If damage results from a
person's exercising his legal rights, it is damnum absque
injuria (Ilocos Norte Electric Company vs. Court of Appeals, 179
SCRA 5 [1989]).
Coming now to the claim of private respondent for actual or
compensatory damages, the records show that the same was based
solely on his allegations without proof to substantiate the same. He
did not present proof of the cost of the medical treatment which he
claimed to have undergone as a result of the nervous breakdown he
suffered, nor did he present proof of the actual loss to his business
caused by the unjust litigation against him. In determining actual
damages, the court cannot rely on speculation, conjectures or
guesswork as to the amount. Without the actual proof of loss, the
award of actual damages becomes erroneous (Guilatco vs. City of
Dagupan, 171 SCRA 382 [1989]).
Actual and compensatory damages are those recoverable because
of pecuniary loss in business, trade, property, profession, job or
occupation and the same must be proved, otherwise, if the proof
is flimsy and unsubstantiated, no damages will be given (Rubio vs.
Court of Appeals, 141 SCRA 488 [1986]). For these reasons, it was
gravely erroneous for respondent court to have affirmed the award of
actual damages in favor of private respondent in the absence of
proof thereof.
Where there is no evidence of the other party having acted in
wanton, fraudulent or reckless, or oppressive manner, neither may
exemplary damages be awarded (Dee Hua Liong Electrical
Equipment Corporation vs. Reyes, 145 SCRA 488 [1986]).
As to the award of attorney's fees, it is well-settled that the same is
the exception rather than the general rule. Needless to say, the
award of attorney's fees must be disallowed where the award of
exemplary damages is eliminated (Article 2208, Civil Code; Agustin
vs. Court of Appeals, 186 SCRA 375 [1990]). Moreover, in view of
the fact that there was no malicious prosecution against private
respondent, attorney's fees cannot be awarded him on that ground.
In the final analysis, there is no proof or showing that petitioners
acted maliciously or in bad faith in the filing of the case against
private respondent. Consequently, in the absence of proof of fraud
and bad faith committed by petitioners, they cannot be held liable for
damages (Escritor, Jr. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 155 SCRA
577 [1987]). No damages can be awarded in the instant case,
whether based on the principle of abuse of rights, or for malicious
prosecution. The questioned judgment in the instant case attests to
6
the propensity of trial judges to award damages without basis. Lower
courts are hereby cautioned anew against awarding unconscionable
sums as damages without bases therefor.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the decision of the
Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. C.V. No. 14948 dated May 13, 1989, is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Costs against respondent
Baltao.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 140420. February 15 , 2001]
SERGIO AMONOY, petitioner, vs. Spouses JOSE GUTIERREZ
and ANGELA FORNILDA, respondents.
Damnum absque injuria. Under this principle, the legitimate exercise
of a persons rights, even if it causes loss to another, does not
automatically result in an actionable injury. The law does not
prescribe a remedy for the loss. This principle does not, however,
apply when there is an abuse of a persons right, or when the
exercise of this right is suspended or extinguished pursuant to a
court order. Indeed, in the availment of ones rights, one must act
with justice, give others their due, and observe honesty and good
faith.
THE FACTS
The appellate court narrated the factual antecedents of this case as
follows:
This case had its roots in Special Proceedings No. 3103 of Branch I
of the CFI of Pasig, Rizal, for the settlement of the estate of the
deceased Julio Cantolos.
Because his attorneys fees thus secured by the two lots were not
paid, on 21 January 1970 Amonoy filed for their foreclosure. The
said lots were foreclosed and on 23 March 1973 the auction sale
was held where Amonoy was the highest bidder at P23,760.00. On 2
May 1973 his bid was judicially confirmed. A deficiency was claimed
and to satisfy it another execution sale was conducted, and again
the highest bidder was Amonoy at P12,137.50. Included in those
sold was the lot on which the Gutierrez spouses had their house.
A civil case was filed, but by the time the Supreme Court
promulgated the above-mentioned Decision, respondents house had
already been destroyed, supposedly in accordance with a Writ of
Demolition ordered by the lower court.
Thus, a Complaint for damages in connection with the destruction of
their house was filed by respondents against petitioner before the
RTC on December 15, 1989.
THE ISSUE
Whether or not the Court of Appeals was correct in deciding that the
petitioner [was] liable to the respondents for damages[8]
THE COURTS RULING
The Petition has no merit.
Well-settled is the maxim that damage resulting from the legitimate
exercise of a persons rights is a loss without injury -- damnum
absque injuria -- for which the law gives no remedy.[9] In other words,
one who merely exercises ones rights does no actionable injury and
cannot be held liable for damages.
Petitioner invokes this legal precept in arguing that he is not liable for
the demolition of respondents house. He maintains that he was
merely acting in accordance with the Writ of Demolition ordered by
the RTC.
We reject this submission. Damnum absque injuria finds no
application to this case.
True, petitioner commenced the demolition of respondents house on
May 30, 1986 under the authority of a Writ of Demolition issued by
the RTC.But the records show that a Temporary Restraining Order
(TRO), enjoining the demolition of respondents house, was issued
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by the Supreme Court on June 2, 1986. The CA also found, based
on the Certificate of Service of the Supreme Court process server,
that a copy of the TRO was served on petitioner himself on June 4,
1986.
Petitioner, however, did not heed the TRO of this Court. We agree
with the CA that he unlawfully pursued the demolition of respondents
house well until the middle of 1987. This is clear from Respondent
Angela Gutierrezs testimony.
The foregoing disproves the claim of petitioner that the demolition,
which allegedly commenced only on May 30, 1986, was completed
the following day. It likewise belies his allegation that the demolitions
had already ceased when he received notice of the TRO.
Although the acts of petitioner may have been legally justified at the
outset, their continuation after the issuance of the TRO amounted to
an insidious abuse of his right. Indubitably, his actions were tainted
with bad faith. Had he not insisted on completing the demolition,
respondents would not have suffered the loss that engendered the
suit before the RTC. Verily, his acts constituted not only an abuse of
a right, but an invalid exercise of a right that had been
suspended when he received the TRO from this Court on June 4,
1986. By then, he was no longer entitled to proceed with the
demolition.
A commentator on this topic explains:
The exercise of a right ends when the right disappears, and it
disappears when it is abused, especially to the prejudice of
others. The mask of a right without the spirit of justice which gives it
life, is repugnant to the modern concept of social law. It cannot be
said that a person exercises a right when he unnecessarily
prejudices another x x x. Over and above the specific precepts of
positive law are the supreme norms of justice x x x; and he who
violates them violates the law. For this reason, it is not permissible to
abuse our rights to prejudice others.[12]
Likewise, in Albenson Enterprises Corp. v. CA,[13] the Court
discussed the concept of abuse of rights as follows:
Article 19, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the
principle of abuse of rights, sets certain standards which may be
observed not only in the exercise of ones rights but also in the
performance of ones duties. These standards are the following: to
act with justice; to give everyone his due; and to observe honesty
and good faith. The law, therefore, recognizes the primordial
limitation on all rights: that in their exercise, the norms of human
conduct set forth in Article 19 must be observed. A right, though by
itself legal because recognized or granted by law as such, may
nevertheless become the source of some illegality. When a right is
exercised in a manner which does not conform with norms enshrined
in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is
thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be held
responsible x x x.
Clearly then, the demolition of respondents house by petitioner,
despite his receipt of the TRO, was not only an abuse but also an
unlawful exercise of such right. In insisting on his alleged right, he
wantonly violated this Courts Order and wittingly caused the
destruction of respondents house.
Obviously, petitioner cannot invoke damnum absque injuria, a
principle premised on the valid exercise of a right.[14] Anything less or
beyond such exercise will not give rise to the legal protection that the
principle accords. And when damage or prejudice to another is
occasioned thereby,liability cannot be obscured, much less abated.
In the ultimate analysis, petitioners liability is premised on the
obligation to repair or to make whole the damage caused to another
by reason of ones act or omission, whether done intentionally or
negligently and whether or not punishable by law.[15]
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the appealed
Decision AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 132344 February 17, 2000
UNIVERSITY OF THE EAST, petitioner, vs.
ROMEO A. JADER, respondent.
7
May an educational institution be held liable for damages for
misleading a student into believing that the latter had satisfied all the
requirements for graduation when such is not the case?
Respondent sued petitioner for damages alleging that he suffered
moral shock, mental anguish, serious anxiety, besmirched
reputation, wounded feelings and sleepless nights when he was not
able to take the 1988 bar examinations arising from the latter's
negligence. He prayed for an award of moral and exemplary
damages, unrealized income, attorney's fees, and costs of suit.
In its answer with counterclaim, petitioner denied liability arguing
mainly that it never led respondent to believe that he completed the
requirements for a Bachelor of Laws degree when his name was
included in the tentative list of graduating students.
Petitioner UE elevated the case to this Court on a petition for review
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, arguing that it has no liability to
respondent Romeo A. Jader, considering that the proximate and
immediate cause of the alleged damages incurred by the latter arose
out of his own negligence in not verifying from the professor
concerned the result of his removal exam.
The petition lacks merit.
When a student is enrolled in any educational or learning institution,
a contract of education is entered into between said institution and
the student. The professors, teachers or instructors hired by the
school are considered merely as agents and administrators tasked
to perform the school's commitment under the contract. Since the
contracting parties are the school and the student, the latter is not
duty-bound to deal with the former's agents, such as the professors
with respect to the status or result of his grades, although nothing
prevents either professors or students from sharing with each other
such information. The Court takes judicial notice of the traditional
practice in educational institutions wherein the professor directly
furnishes his/her students their grades. It is the contractual obligation
of the school to timely inform and furnish sufficient notice and
information to each and every student as to whether he or she had
already complied with all the requirements for the conferment of a
degree or whether they would be included among those who will
graduate. Although commencement exercises are but a formal
ceremony, it nonetheless is not an ordinary occasion, since such
ceremony is the educational institution's way of announcing to the
whole world that the students included in the list of those who will be
conferred a degree during the baccalaureate ceremony have
satisfied all the requirements for such degree. Prior or subsequent to
the ceremony, the school has the obligation to promptly inform the
student of any problem involving the latter's grades and performance
and also most importantly, of the procedures for remedying the
same.
Petitioner, in belatedly informing respondent of the result of the
removal examination, particularly at a time when he had already
commenced preparing for the bar exams, cannot be said to have
acted in good faith. Absence of good faith must be sufficiently
established for a successful prosecution by the aggrieved party in a
suit for abuse of right under Article 19 of the Civil Code. Good faith
connotes an honest intention to abstain from taking undue
advantage of another, even though the forms and technicalities of
the law, together with the absence of all information or belief of facts,
would render the transaction unconscientious.5 It is the school that
has access to those information and it is only the school that can
compel its professors to act and comply with its rules, regulations
and policies with respect to the computation and the prompt
submission of grades. Students do not exercise control, much less
influence, over the way an educational institution should run its
affairs, particularly in disciplining its professors and teachers and
ensuring their compliance with the school's rules and orders. Being
the party that hired them, it is the school that exercises general
supervision and exclusive control over the professors with respect to
the submission of reports involving the students' standing. Exclusive
control means that no other person or entity had any control over the
instrumentality which caused the damage or injury.6
The college dean is the senior officer responsible for the operation of
an academic program, enforcement of rules and regulations, and the
supervision of faculty and student services.7 He must see to it that
his own professors and teachers, regardless of their status or
Torts Human Relations Torts
position outside of the university, must comply with the rules set by
the latter. The negligent act of a professor who fails to observe the
rules of the school, for instance by not promptly submitting a
student's grade, is not only imputable to the professor but is an act
of the school, being his employer.
Considering further, that the institution of learning involved herein is
a university which is engaged in legal education, it should have
practiced what it inculcates in its students, more specifically the
principle of good dealings enshrined in Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil
Code which states:
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due,
and observe honesty and good faith.
Art. 20. Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently
causes damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the same.
Art. 19 was intended to expand the concept of torts by granting
adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which
is impossible for human foresight to provide specifically in statutory
law.8 In civilized society, men must be able to assume that others will
do them no intended injury that others will commit no internal
aggressions upon them; that their fellowmen, when they act
affirmatively will do so with due care which the ordinary
understanding and moral sense of the community exacts and that
those with whom they deal in the general course of society will act in
good faith. The ultimate thing in the theory of liability is justifiable
reliance under conditions of civilized society.9 Schools and
professors cannot just take students for granted and be indifferent to
them, for without the latter, the former are useless.
Educational institutions are duty-bound to inform the students of their
academic status and not wait for the latter to inquire from the former.
The conscious indifference of a person to the rights or welfare of the
person/persons who may be affected by his act or omission can
support a claim for damages.10 Want of care to the conscious
disregard of civil obligations coupled with a conscious knowledge of
the cause naturally calculated to produce them would make the
erring party liable.11 Petitioner ought to have known that time was of
the essence in the performance of its obligation to inform respondent
of his grade. It cannot feign ignorance that respondent will not
prepare himself for the bar exams since that is precisely the
immediate concern after graduation of an LL.B. graduate. It failed to
act seasonably. Petitioner cannot just give out its student's grades at
any time because a student has to comply with certain deadlines set
by the Supreme Court on the submission of requirements for taking
the bar. Petitioner's liability arose from its failure to promptly inform
respondent of the result of an examination and in misleading the
latter into believing that he had satisfied all requirements for the
course. Worth quoting is the following disquisition of the respondent
court:
It is apparent from the testimony of Dean Tiongson that defendant-
appellee University had been informed during the deliberation that
the professor in Practice Court I gave plaintiff-appellant a failing
grade. Yet, defendant-appellee still did not inform plaintiff-appellant
of his failure to complete the requirements for the degree nor did
they remove his name from the tentative list of candidates for
graduation. Worse, defendant-appellee university, despite the
knowledge that plaintiff-appellant failed in Practice Court
I, again included plaintiff-appellant's name in the "tentative list of
candidates for graduation which was prepared after the deliberation
and which became the basis for the commencement rites program.
Dean Tiongson reasons out that plaintiff-appellant's name was
allowed to remain in the tentative list of candidates for graduation in
the hope that the latter would still be able to remedy the situation in
the remaining few days before graduation day. Dean Tiongson,
however, did not explain how plaintiff appellant Jader could have
done something to complete his deficiency if defendant-appellee
university did not exert any effort to inform plaintiff-appellant of his
failing grade in Practice Court I.12
Petitioner cannot pass on its blame to the professors to justify its
own negligence that led to the delayed relay of information to
respondent. When one of two innocent parties must suffer, he
through whose agency the loss occurred must bear it. 13 The modern
tendency is to grant indemnity for damages in cases where there is
8
abuse of right, even when the act is not illicit. 14 If mere fault or
negligence in one's acts can make him liable for damages for injury
caused thereby, with more reason should abuse or bad faith make
him liable. A person should be protected only when he acts in the
legitimate exercise of his right, that is, when he acts with prudence
and in good faith, but not when he acts with negligence or abuse.15
However, while petitioner was guilty of negligence and thus liable to
respondent for the latter's actual damages, we hold that respondent
should not have been awarded moral damages. We do not agree
with the Court of Appeals' findings that respondent suffered shock,
trauma and pain when he was informed that he could not graduate
and will not be allowed to take the bar examinations. At the very
least, it behooved on respondent to verify for himself whether he has
completed all necessary requirements to be eligible for the bar
examinations. As a senior law student, respondent should have been
responsible enough to ensure that all his affairs, specifically those
pertaining to his academic achievement, are in order. Given these
considerations, we fail to see how respondent could have suffered
untold embarrassment in attending the graduation rites, enrolling in
the bar review classes and not being able to take the bar exams. If
respondent was indeed humiliated by his failure to take the bar, he
brought this upon himself by not verifying if he has satisfied all the
requirements including his school records, before preparing himself
for the bar examination. Certainly, taking the bar examinations does
not only entail a mental preparation on the subjects thereof; there
are also prerequisites of documentation and submission of
requirements which the prospective examinee must meet.
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Petitioner is ORDERED to PAY
respondent the sum of Thirty-five Thousand Four Hundred Seventy
Pesos (P35,470.00), with legal interest of 6% per annum computed
from the date of filing of the complaint until fully paid; the amount of
Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) as attorney's fees; and the costs
of the suit. The award of moral damages is DELEIED.1wphi1.nt
SO ORDERED.
[G. R. No. 126486. February 9, 1998]
BARONS MARKETING CORP., petitioner, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS and PHELPS DODGE PHILS., INC. respondents.
The instant petition raises two issues: (1) whether or not private
respondent is guilty of abuse of right; and (2) whether or not private
respondent is entitled to interest and attorneys fees.
The facts are undisputed:
On August 31, 1973, plaintiff [Phelps Dodge, Philippines, Inc. private
respondent herein] appointed defendant [petitioner Barons
Marketing, Corporation] as one of its dealers of electrical wires and
cables effective September 1, 1973 (Exh. A). As such dealer,
defendant was given by plaintiff 60 days credit for its purchases of
plaintiffs electrical products. This credit term was to be reckoned
from the date of delivery by plaintiff of its products to defendant.
Private respondent Phelps Dodge Phils., Inc. filed a complaint before
the Pasig Regional Trial Court against petitioner Barons Marketing
Corporation for the recovery of P3,802,478.20 representing the
value of the wires and cables the former had delivered to the latter,
including interest. Phelps Dodge likewise prayed that it be awarded
attorneys fees at the rate of 25% of the amount demanded,
exemplary damages amounting to at least P100,000.00, the
expenses of litigation and the costs of suit.
Petitioner, in its answer, admitted purchasing the wires and cables
from private respondent but disputed the amount claimed by the
latter. Petitioner likewise interposed a counterclaim against private
respondent, alleging that it suffered injury to its reputation due to
Phelps Dodges acts. Such acts were purportedly calculated to
humiliate petitioner and constituted an abuse of rights.
Petitioner Barons Marketing is now before this Court alleging that
respondent court erred when it held (1) private respondent Phelps
Dodge not guilty of creditors abuse, and (2) petitioner liable to
private respondent for interest and attorneys fees.
I purpose of prejudicing and injuring the petitioner.[10]
Torts Human Relations Torts
Petitioner does not deny private respondents rights to institute
an action for collection and to claim full payment. Indeed, petitioners
right to file an action for collection is beyond cavil. [5] Likewise, private
respondents right to reject petitioners offer to pay in installments is
guaranteed by Article 1248 of the Civil Code which states:
ART. 1248. Unless there is an express stipulation to that effect, the
creditor cannot be compelled partially to receive the prestations in
which the obligation consists. Neither may the debtor be required to
make partial payments.
However, when the debt is in part liquidated and in part unliquidated,
the creditor may demand and the debtor may effect the payment of
the former without waiting for the liquidation of the latter.
Under this provision, the prestation , i.e., the object of the obligation,
must be performed in one act, not in parts.
Tolentino concedes that the right has its limitations:
Partial Prestations. Since the creditor cannot be compelled to
accept partial performance, unless otherwise stipulated, the creditor
who refuses to accept partial prestations does not incur in delay
or mora accipiendi, except when there is abuse of right or if good
faith requires acceptance.[6]
Indeed, the law, as set forth in Article 19 of the Civil Code, prescribes
a primordial limitation on all rights by setting certain standards that
must be observed in the exercise thereof .[7] Thus:
ART. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due,
and observe honesty and good faith.
Petitioner now invokes Article 19 and Article 21[8] of the Civil
Code, claiming that private respondent abused its rights when it
rejected petitioners offer of settlement and subsequently filed the
action for collection considering:
xxx that the relationship between the parties started in 1973
spanning more than 13 years before the complaint was filed, that the
petitioner had been a good and reliable dealer enjoying a good credit
standing during the period before it became delinquent in 1987, that
the relationship between the parties had been a fruitful one
especially for the private respondent, that the petitioner exerted its
outmost efforts to settle its obligations and avoid a suit, that the
petitioner did not evade in the payment of its obligation to the private
respondent, and that the petitioner was just asking a small
concession that it be allowed to liquidate its obligation to eight (8)
monthly installments of P500,000.00 plus 1% interest per month on
the balance which proposal was supported by post-dated checks.[9]
Expounding on its theory, petitioner states:
In the ordinary course of events, a suit for collection of a sum of
money filed in court is done for the primary purpose of collecting a
debt or obligation. If there is an offer by the debtor to pay its debt or
obligation supported by post-dated checks and with provision for
interests, the normal response of a creditor would be to accept the
offer of compromise and not file the suit for collection. It is of
common knowledge that proceedings in our courts would normally
take years before an action is finally settled. It is always wiser and
more prudent to accept an offer of payment in installment rather than
file an action in court to compel the debtor to settle his obligation in
full in a single payment.
xxx.
xxx. Why then did private respondent elect to file a suit for collection
rather than accept petitioners offer of settlement, supported by post-
dated checks, by paying monthly installments of P500,000.00 plus
1% per month commencing on October 15, 1987 until full payment?
The answer is obvious. The action of private respondent in filling a
suit for collection was an abuse of right and exercised for the sole
9
 Petitioner prays that the Court order private respondent to pay
petitioner moral and exemplary damages, attorneys fees, as well as
the costs of suit. It likewise asks that it be allowed to liquidate its
obligation to private respondent, without interests, in eight equal
monthly installments.
Petitioners theory is untenable.
Both parties agree that to constitute an abuse of rights under
Article 19 the defendant must act with bad faith or intent to prejudice
the plaintiff. They cite the following comments of Tolentino as their
authority:
Test of Abuse of Right. Modern jurisprudence does not permit acts
which, although not unlawful, are anti-social. There is undoubtedly
an abuse of right when it is exercised for the only purpose of
prejudicing or injuring another. When the objective of the actor is
illegitimate, the illicit act cannot be concealed under the guise of
exercising a right. The principle does not permit acts which, without
utility or legitimate purpose cause damage to another, because they
violate the concept of social solidarity which considers law as
rational and just. Hence, every abnormal exercise of a right, contrary
to its socio-economic purpose, is an abuse that will give rise to
liability. The exercise of a right must be in accordance with the
purpose for which it was established, and must not be excessive or
unduly harsh; there must be no intention to injure
another. Ultimately, however, and in practice, courts, in the sound
exercise of their discretion, will have to determine all the facts and
circumstances when the exercise of a right is unjust, or when there
has been an abuse of right.[11]
The question, therefore, is whether private respondent
intended to prejudice or injure petitioner when it rejected petitioners
offer and filed the action for collection.
We hold in the negative. It is an elementary rule in this
jurisdiction that good faith is presumed and that the burden of
proving bad faith rests upon the party alleging the same. [12] In the
case at bar, petitioner has failed to prove bad faith on the part of
private respondent. Petitioners allegation that private respondent
was motivated by a desire to terminate its agency relationship with
petitioner so that private respondent itself may deal directly with
Meralco is simply not supported by the evidence. At most, such
supposition is merely speculative.
Moreover, we find that private respondent was driven by very
legitimate reasons for rejecting petitioners offer and instituting the
action for collection before the trial court. As pointed out by private
respondent, the corporation had its own cash position to protect in
order for it to pay its own obligations. This is not such a lame and
poor rationalization as petitioner purports it to be. For if private
respondent were to be required to accept petitioners offer, there
would be no reason for the latter to reject similar offers from its other
debtors. Clearly, this would be inimical to the interests of any
enterprise, especially a profit-oriented one like private respondent. It
is plain to see that what we have here is a mere exercise of rights,
not an abuse thereof. Under these circumstances, we do not deem
private respondent to have acted in a manner contrary to morals,
good customs or public policy as to violate the provisions of Article
21 of the Civil Code.
Consequently, petitioners prayer for moral and exemplary
damages must thus be rejected. Petitioners claim for moral damages
is anchored on Article 2219 (10) of the Civil Code which states:
ART. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and
analogous cases:
(10) Acts and actions referred to in articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30,
32, 34, and 35.
Having ruled that private respondents acts did not transgress the
provisions of Article 21, petitioner cannot be entitled to moral
damages or, for that matter, exemplary damages. While the amount
of exemplary damages need not be proved, petitioner must show
that he is entitled to moral, temperate or compensatory damages
before the court may consider the question of whether or
not exemplary damages should be awarded.[13] As we have observed
above, petitioner has failed to discharge this burden.
Torts Human Relations Torts
It may not be amiss to state that petitioners contract with
private respondent has the force of law between them. [14] Petitioner
is thus bound to fulfill what has been expressly stipulated therein.
[15]
In the absence of any abuse of right, private respondent cannot
be allowed to perform its obligation under such contract in
parts. Otherwise, private respondents right under Article 1248 will be
negated, the sanctity of its contract with petitioner defiled. The
principle of autonomy of contracts[16] must be respected.
II
Under said contract, petitioner is liable to private respondent
for the unpaid balance of its purchases from private respondent plus
12% interest. Private respondents sales invoices expressly provide
that:
xxx. Interest at 12% per annum will be charged on all overdue
account plus 25% on said amount for attorneys fees and
collection. xxx.[17]
It may also be noted that the above stipulation, insofar as it
provides for the payment of 25% on said amount for attorneys fees
and collection (sic), constitutes what is known as a penal clause.
[18]
Petitioner is thus obliged to pay such penalty in addition to the
12% annual interest, there being an express stipulation to that effect.
Petitioner nevertheless urges this Court to reduce the
attorneys fees for being grossly excessive, considering the nature of
the case which is a mere action for collection of a sum of money. It
may be pointed out however that the above penalty is supposed to
answer not only for attorneys fees but for collection fees as
well. Moreover:
x x x the attorneys fees here provided is not, strictly speaking, the
attorneys fees recoverable as between attorney and client spoken of
and regulated by the Rules of Court. Rather, the attorneys fees here
are in the nature of liquidated damages and the stipulation therefor is
aptly called a penal clause. It has been said that so long as such
stipulation does not contravene law, morals, or public order, it is
strictly binding upon defendant. The attorneys fees so provided are
awarded in favor of the litigant, not his counsel. It is the litigant, not
counsel, who is the judgment creditor entitled to enforce the
judgment by execution.[19]
Nonetheless, courts are empowered to reduce such penalty if
the same is iniquitous or unconscionable. Article 1229 of the Civil
Code states thus:
ART. 1229. The judge shall equitably reduce the penalty when the
principal obligation has been partly or irregularly complied with by
the debtor. Even if there has been no performance, the penalty may
also be reduced by the courts if it is iniquitous or unconscionable.
(Underscoring supplied.)
The sentiments of the law are echoed in Article 2227 of the
same Code:
ART. 2227. Liquidated damages, whether intended as an indemnity
or a penalty, shall be equitably reduced if they are iniquitous or
unconscionable.
It is true that we have upheld the reasonableness of penalties
in the form of attorneys fees consisting of twenty-five percent (25%)
of the principal debt plus interest. [20] In the case at bar, however, the
interest alone runs to some four and a half million pesos (P4.5M),
even exceeding the principal debt amounting to almost four million
pesos (P4.0M). Twenty five percent (25%) of the principal and
interest amounts to roughly two million pesos (P2M). In real terms,
therefore, the attorneys fees and collection fees are manifestly
exorbitant.Accordingly, we reduce the same to ten percent (10%) of
the principal.
Private respondent, however, argues that petitioner failed to
question the award of attorneys fees on appeal before respondent
court and raised the issue only in its motion for
reconsideration. Consequently, petitioner should be deemed to have
waived its right to question such award.
10
 Private respondents attempts to dissuade us from reducing
the penalty are futile. The Court is clothed with ample authority to
review matters, even if they are not assigned as errors in their
appeal, if it finds that their consideration is necessary in arriving at a
just decision of the case.[21]
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby
MODIFIED in that the attorneys and collection fees are reduced
to ten percent (10%) of the principal but is AFFIRMED in all other
respects.
G.R. No. 160959 April 3, 2007
ANTONIO DIAZ, Petitioner, vs.
DAVAO LIGHT AND POWER CO., INC., MANUEL M. ORIG and
ELISEO R. BRAGANZA, JR., Respondents.
Antonio G. Diaz was the president of Diaz and Co., Inc. He was also
vice-president of Diaz Realty Inc. which, in turn, owned the Doa
Segunda Hotel,3 formerly known as the Davao Imperial Hotel
(Imperial Hotel Building). On July 25, 1983, DLPC sent a Notice of
Disconnection10 to Diaz and Co., Inc. informing it that, as of June 13,
1983, the hotels unpaid electric consumption bill amounted
to P190,111.02.
On January 7, 1987, Diaz filed an application for preliminary
injunction in Sp. Civil Case No. 18,288 35 to enjoin DLPC from
disconnecting the electric connections to Meter No. 84738 under
Account No. 091-12643. On March 12, 1987, the RTC in Sp. Civil
Case No. 18,288, denied the motion for issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction39 filed by Diaz. He moved for a
reconsideration, which was, however, denied in the Order 40 dated
August 20, 1987. DLPC then removed its single-phase meter on
November 20, 1987, which rendered almost half of the building
without power.41 That same day, Diaz went to the DLPC building and
threw stones at it, breaking four glass windows in the process. 42 He
then bought his own electric meter, Meter No. 86673509, 43 had it
calibrated by the Board of Energy, and unilaterally replaced Meter
No. 84738. The electricity in the building was then restored.44
On June 10, 1992, DLPC instituted a civil action for
Damages,87 before the RTC, Cebu City, against Diaz for defamatory
and libelous remarks and for abuse of rights. The plaintiff alleged
that Diaz, motivated by malice and ill-will, had taken it upon himself
to find fault in DLPCs acts and oppose all its application with the
BOE, using the media to assault its good name by circulating or
publishing libelous and false statements in the newspapers. The
case was docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-11843.
DLPC further alleged that Diaz published and disseminated a
handbill claiming that there was something irregular and anomalous
regarding the Energy Regulation Boards approval of the appraisal of
the properties and equipment of DLPC, because of which the
customers of DLPC could expect a P5.00 per kilowatt charge in the
future. Diaz allegedly gave identical interviews with the Mindanao
Daily Mirror and the Ang Peryodiko Dabaw reiterating what he said
in the handbill.88 In addition, Diaz, in an interview with the Peoples
Daily Forum, claimed that the National Power Corporation sold two
(2) generating sets to DLPC for only P1.00 each.89
Consequently, DLPC suffered besmirched reputation and public
humiliation, and damage to its business standing.
The issues raised in the present action can be summarized as
follows: (1) whether or not the compromise agreement entered into
between DLPC and Diaz barred the former from instituting further
actions involving electric Meter No. 84736 or 86673509; (2) whether
or not DLPC acted in bad faith in instituting the criminal cases
against Diaz; and (3) whether or not Diaz is entitled to damages.
The petition is without merit.
Petitioner insists that the compromise agreement as well as the
decision of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 14909 already settled the
controversies between them; yet, DLPC instituted the theft case
against Diaz, and worse, instituted another action for violation of P.D.
401, as amended by B.P. Blg. 876. Thus, the only conclusion that
Torts Human Relations Torts
can be inferred from the acts of DLPC is that they were designed to
harass, embarrass, prejudice, and ruin him. He further avers that the
compromise agreement in Civil Case No. CEB-1049 completely
erased litigious matters that could necessarily arise out of either
Electric Meter No. 84736 or 86673509.107 Moreover, Diaz asserts
that the evidence he presented is sufficient to prove the damages he
suffered by reason of the malicious institution of the criminal cases.
We do not agree.
Article 2028 of the Civil Code defines a compromise as a contract
whereby the parties, by making reciprocal concessions, avoid
litigation or put an end to one already commenced. The purpose of
compromise is to settle the claims of the parties and bar all future
disputes and controversies. However, criminal liability is not affected
by compromise for it is a public offense which must be prosecuted
and punished by the Government on its own motion, though
complete reparation should have been made of the damages
suffered by the offended party. A criminal case is committed against
the People, and the offended party may not waive or extinguish the
criminal liability that the law imposes for the commission of the
offense.108 Moreover, a compromise is not one of the grounds
prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for the extinction of criminal
liability.109
As can be inferred from the compromise agreement, Diaz and DLPC
merely agreed to (1) reduce the latters total claims to
only P385,000.00; (2) for DLPC to waive its counterclaims against
Diaz; and (3) upon receipt of the amount, for DLPC to immediately
install the necessary electric service to the building. The parties
likewise agreed to the dismissal of Sp. Civil Case No. 18,288 for
being moot and academic. Nowhere in said agreement did the
parties agree that DLPC was barred from instituting any further
action involving electric Meter No. 84736 or 86673509.
We find that petitioner is not entitled to damages under Articles 19,
20, and 21 and Articles 2217 and 2219(8) of the New Civil Code.
The elements of abuse of rights are the following: (a) the existence
of a legal right or duty; (b) which is exercised in bad faith; and (c) for
the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.115 Thus, malice or
bad faith is at the core of the above provisions. 116 Good faith refers to
the state of the mind which is manifested by the acts of the individual
concerned. It consists of the intention to abstain from taking an
unconscionable and unscrupulous advantage of another.117 Good
faith is presumed and he who alleges bad faith has the duty to prove
the same.118 Bad faith, on the other hand, does not simply connote
bad judgment to simple negligence, dishonest purpose or some
moral obloquy and conscious doing of a wrong, a breach of known
duty due to some motives or interest or ill-will that partakes of the
nature of fraud. Malice connotes ill-will or spite and speaks not in
response to duty. It implies an intention to do ulterior and
unjustifiable harm. Malice is bad faith or bad motive. 119
The evidence presented by respondents negates malice or bad faith.
Petitioner himself alleged in his complaint that he unilaterally
installed Meter No. 86673509 to replace Meter No. 84738 after it
was removed by DLPC. No less than this Court, in G.R. No. 85445,
admonished petitioner and reminded him that connections of
electrical service and installations of electric meters should always
be upon mutual contract of the parties, and that payments for
electrical consumption should also be made promptly whenever
due.120 Based on these established facts, petitioner has not shown
that the acts of respondent were done with the sole intent of
prejudicing and injuring him.
Petitioner may have suffered damages as a result of the filing of the
complaints. However, there is a material distinction between
damages and injury. Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right;
damage is the loss, hurt or harm which results from the injury; and
damages are the recompense or compensation awarded for the
damage suffered. Thus, there can be damage without injury in those
instances in which the loss or harm was not the result of a violation
of a legal duty. In such cases, the consequences must be borne by
the injured person alone; the law affords no remedy for damages
resulting from an act which does not amount to a legal injury or
wrong. These situations are often called damnum absque
injuria.121 Whatever damages Diaz may have suffered would have to
11
be borne by him alone since it was his acts which led to the filing of
the complaints against him.
On the other hand, malicious prosecution has been defined as an
action for damages brought by or against whom a criminal
prosecution, civil suit or other legal proceeding has been instituted
maliciously and without probable cause, after the termination of such
prosecution, suit, or other proceeding in favor of the defendant
therein.122 It is an established rule that in order for malicious
prosecution to prosper, the following requisites must be proven by
petitioner: (1) the fact of prosecution and the further fact that the
defendant (respondent) was himself the prosecutor, and that the
action finally terminated with an acquittal; (2) that in bringing the
action, the prosecutor acted without probable cause; and (3) that the
prosecutor was actuated or impelled by legal malice, that is, by
improper or sinister motive.123 The foregoing are necessary to
preserve a persons right to litigate which may be emasculated by
the undue filing of malicious prosecution cases.124 From the
foregoing requirements, it can be inferred that malice and want of
probable cause must both be clearly established to justify an award
of damages based on malicious prosecution.125
The Court notes that respondents initiated two separate criminal
actions, one for theft of electricity, Inv. Sheet No. 593 July/1988, and
the other, for Violation of P.D. 401, as amended by B.P. Blg. 876, I.S.
No. 92-4590. It must be stressed that theft of electricity is a felony
defined and penalized under the Revised Penal Code, while
Violation of P.D. 401, as amended by B.P. Blg. 876, is an offense
punished by a special law. What generally makes the former a felony
is criminal intent (dolo) or negligence (culpa); what makes the latter
a crime is the special law enacting it. 126In addition, the elements of
the two (2) offenses are different from one another. In theft, the
elements are: (1) intent to gain; (2) unlawful taking; (3) personal
property belonging to another; (4) and absence of violence or
intimidation against persons or force upon things. 127 On the other
hand, the crime of Violation of P.D. 401, as amended by B.P. Blg.
876, is mala prohibita. The criminal act is not inherently immoral but
becomes punishable only because the law says it is forbidden. With
these crimes, the sole issue is whether the law has been violated.
Criminal intent is not necessary.128
While the institution of separate criminal actions under the provisions
of P.D. 401, as amended by B.P. Blg. 876, and under the provisions
of the Revised Penal Code on theft may refer to identical acts
committed by petitioner, the prosecution thereof cannot be limited to
one offense because a single criminal act may give rise to a
multiplicity of offenses; and where there is variance or difference
between the elements of an offense in one law and another law, as
in the case at bar, there will be no double jeopardy because what the
rule on double jeopardy prohibits refers to identity of elements in the
two (2) offenses. Otherwise stated, prosecution for the same act is
not prohibited; what is forbidden is prosecution for the same
offense.129 Hence, no fault could be attributed to respondent DLPC
when it instituted the two separate actions.
As earlier stated, a claim for damages based on malicious
prosecution will prosper only if the three elements aforecited are
shown to exist. We find that none of the requisites are attendant
here.
First. Although respondent DLPC initiated before the prosecutors
office Inv. Sheet No. 593 July/1988 for theft of electricity, and I.S. No.
92-4590 for Violation of P.D. 401, as amended by B.P. Blg. 876, no
information was ever filed in court. The cases were eventually
dropped or dismissed before they could be filed in court. Ultimately,
both actions could not end in an acquittal.
Second. It cannot be concluded that respondent DLPC acted without
probable cause when it instituted the actions. The events which led
to the filing of the complaints are undisputed, and respondent DLPC
cannot be faulted for filing them. In the early case of Buchanan v.
Esteban,130 this Court had already stressed that "one cannot be held
liable in damages for maliciously instituting a prosecution where he
acted with probable cause." As Justice Moreland explained in that
case:
Probable cause is the existence of such facts and circumstances as
would excite the belief, in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts
within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was
Torts Human Relations Torts
guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted. The general rule is
well settled that one cannot be held liable in damages for maliciously
instituting a prosecution where he acted with probable cause. In
other words, a suit will lie only in cases where a legal prosecution
has been carried on without probable cause. And the reason for the
rule as stated by Blackstone, is that it would be a very great
discouragement to public justice if prosecutors, who had a tolerable
ground of suspicion, were liable to be sued at law when their
indictments miscarried.
Thus, the element of malice and the absence of probable cause
must be proved.131 There must be proof that the prosecution was
prompted by a sinister design to vex and humiliate a person, and
that it was initiated deliberately knowing that the charge was false
and baseless to entitle the victims to damages.132 The two elements
must simultaneously exist; otherwise, the presence of probable
cause signifies, as a legal consequence, the absence of malice.133 In
the instant case, it is evident that respondent DLPC was not
motivated by malicious intent or by a sinister design to unduly harass
petitioner, but only by a well-founded anxiety to protect its rights.
Respondent DLPC cannot therefore be faulted in availing of the
remedies provided for by law.
In a free society, controversies are heard and settled under the rule
of law in the forum of the courts of justice. It is one of the virtues of
our system of government that a person who feels aggrieved does
not have to take the law into his or her hands or resort to the use of
force for the vindication of injury. The courts are there to hear and
act on the complaint. The right to litigate is an escape valve to
relieve the pressures of personal disagreements that might
otherwise explode in physical confrontation. It is necessary not only
for upholding ones claims when they are unjustly denied but also for
the maintenance of peace, if not goodwill, among incipient
antagonists. Without the right to litigate, conflicting claims cannot be
examined and resolved in accordance with one of the primary
purposes of government, which is to provide for a just and orderly
society.134 Hence, the mere act of submitting a case to the authorities
for prosecution does not render a person liable for malicious
prosecution should he or she be unsuccessful, for the law could not
have meant to impose a penalty on the right to litigate.135
IN LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED. The
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 68709 is
AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.
PANTALEON VS AMERICAN EXPRESS (G.R. No. 174269)
BRION, J.:
FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS
The established antecedents of the case are narrated below.
AMEX is a resident foreign corporation engaged in the business of
providing credit services through the operation of a charge card
system. Pantaleon has been an AMEX cardholder since 1980.[3]
In October 1991, Pantaleon, together with his wife (Julialinda),
daughter (Regina), and son (Adrian Roberto), went on a guided
European tour. To have enough time for take a guided city tour
of Amsterdam before their departure scheduled on that day, the tour
group planned to leave Coster by 9:30 a.m. at the latest.
While at Coster, Mrs. Pantaleon decided to purchase
some diamond pieces worth a total of US$13,826.00. Pantaleon
presented his American Express credit card to the sales clerk to pay
for this purchase. In all, it took AMEX a total of 78 minutes to
approve Pantaleons purchase and to transmit the approval to
the jewelry store.[7]
After the trip to Europe, the Pantaleon family proceeded to
the United States. Again, Pantaleon experienced delay in securing
approval for purchases using his American Express credit card on
two separate occasions
Upon return to Manila, Pantaleon sent AMEX a letter demanding an
apology for the humiliation and inconvenience he and his family
experienced due to the delays in obtaining approval for his credit
card purchases. AMEX responded by explaining that the delay in
12
Amsterdam was due to the amount involved the charged purchase
of US$13,826.00 deviated from Pantaleons established charge
purchase pattern.
OUR RULING
Nature of Credit Card Transactions
Simply put, every credit card transaction involves three
contracts, namely: (a) the sales contract between the credit card
holder and the merchant or the business establishment which
accepted the credit card; (b) the loan agreement between the credit
card issuer and the credit card holder; and lastly, (c) the promise to
pay between the credit card issuer and the merchant or business
establishment.[16]
AMEX acted with good faith
Thus far, we have already established that: (a) AMEX had
neither a contractual nor a legal obligation to act upon Pantaleons
purchases within a specific period of time; and (b) AMEX has a right
to review a cardholders credit card history. Our recognition of
these entitlements, however, does not give AMEX an unlimited
right to put off action on cardholders purchase requests for
indefinite periods of time. In acting on cardholders purchase
requests, AMEX must take care not to abuse its rights and cause
injury to its clients and/or third persons. We cite in this regard Article
19, in conjunction with Article 21, of the Civil Code.
Article 19 pervades the entire legal system and ensures
that a person suffering damage in the course of anothers exercise of
right or performance of duty, should find himself without relief. [36] It
sets the standard for the conduct of all persons, whether artificial or
natural, and requires that everyone, in the exercise of rights and the
performance of obligations, must: (a) act with justice, (b) give
everyone his due, and (c) observe honesty and good faith. It is not
because a person invokes his rights that he can do anything, even to
the prejudice and disadvantage of another.[37]
While Article 19 enumerates the standards of conduct,
Article 21 provides the remedy for the person injured by the willful
act, an action for damages. We explained how these two provisions
correlate with each other in GF Equity, Inc. v. Valenzona:[38]
[Article 19], known to contain what is commonly
referred to as the principle of abuse of rights, sets certain
standards which must be observed not only in the exercise of
one's rights but also in the performance of one's duties. These
standards are the following: to act with justice; to give everyone
his due; and to observe honesty and good faith. The law,
therefore, recognizes a primordial limitation on all rights; that in
their exercise, the norms of human conduct set forth in Article
19 must be observed. A right, though by itself legal because
recognized or granted by law as such, may nevertheless
become the source of some illegality. When a right is
exercised in a manner which does not conform with the
norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to
another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the
wrongdoer must be held responsible. But while Article 19
lays down a rule of conduct for the government of human
relations and for the maintenance of social order, it does not
provide a remedy for its violation. Generally, an action for
damages under either Article 20 or Article 21 would be proper.
In the context of a credit card relationship, although there is neither a
contractual stipulation nor a specific law requiring the credit card
issuer to act on the credit card holders offer within a definite period
of time, these principles provide the standard by which to judge
AMEXs actions.
According to Pantaleon, even if AMEX did have a right to review his
charge purchases, it abused this right when it unreasonably delayed
the processing of the Coster charge purchase, as well as his
purchase requests at the Richard Metz Golf Studio and Kids
Unlimited Store; AMEX should have known that its failure to act
immediately on charge referrals would entail inconvenience and
result in humiliation, embarrassment, anxiety and distress to its
cardholders who would be required to wait before closing their
transactions.[39]
Torts Human Relations Torts
It is an elementary rule in our jurisdiction that good faith is
presumed and that the burden of proving bad faith rests upon the
party alleging it.[40] Although it took AMEX some time before it
approved Pantaleons three charge requests, we find no evidence to
suggest that it acted with deliberate intent to cause Pantaleon any
loss or injury, or acted in a manner that was contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy. We give credence to AMEXs claim that its
review procedure was done to ensure Pantaleons own protection as
a cardholder and to prevent the possibility that the credit card was
being fraudulently used by a third person.
Pantaleon countered that this review procedure is primarily
intended to protect AMEXs interests, to make sure that the
cardholder making the purchase has enough means to pay for the
credit extended. Even if this were the case, however, we do not find
any taint of bad faith in such motive. It is but natural for AMEX to
want to ensure that it will extend credit only to people who will have
sufficient means to pay for their purchases. AMEX, after all, is
running a business, not a charity, and it would simply be ludicrous to
suggest that it would not want to earn profit for its services. Thus, so
long as AMEX exercises its rights, performs its obligations, and
generally acts with good faith, with no intent to cause harm, even if it
may occasionally inconvenience others, it cannot be held liable for
damages.
We also cannot turn a blind eye to the circumstances
surrounding the Coster transaction which, in our opinion, justified the
wait. As Edgardo Jaurigue clarified, the reason why Pantaleon had
to wait for AMEXs approval was because he had to go over
Pantaleons credit card history for the past twelve months. [43] It would
certainly be unjust for us to penalize AMEX for merely exercising its
right to review Pantaleons credit history meticulously.
Finally, we said in Garciano v. Court of Appeals that the
right to recover [moral damages] under Article 21 is based on equity,
and he who comes to court to demand equity, must come with clean
hands. Article 21 should be construed as granting the right to
recover damages to injured persons who are not themselves at fault.
[44]
As will be discussed below, Pantaleon is not a blameless party in
all this.
Pantaleons action was the proximate cause for his injury
Pantaleon mainly anchors his claim for moral and
exemplary damages on the embarrassment and humiliation that he
felt when the European tour group had to wait for him and his wife
for approximately 35 minutes, and eventually had to cancel
the Amsterdam city tour. After thoroughly reviewing the records of
this case, we have come to the conclusion that Pantaleon is the
proximate cause for this embarrassment and humiliation.
As borne by the records, Pantaleon knew even before
entering Coster that the tour group would have to leave the store
by 9:30 a.m. to have enough time to take the city tour
of Amsterdam before they left the country. After 9:30 a.m.,
Pantaleons son, who had boarded the bus ahead of his family,
returned to the store to inform his family that they were the only ones
not on the bus and that the entire tour group was waiting for them.
Significantly, Pantaleon tried to cancel the sale at 9:40
a.m. because he did not want to cause any inconvenience to the
tour group. However, when Costers sale manager asked him to
wait a few more minutes for the credit card approval, he agreed,
despite the knowledge that he had already caused a 10-minute
delay and that the city tour could not start without him.
In Nikko Hotel Manila Garden v. Reyes,[45] we ruled that a
person who knowingly and voluntarily exposes himself to danger
cannot claim damages for the resulting injury: The doctrine of volenti
non fit injuria (to which a person assents is not esteemed in law as
injury) refers to self-inflicted injury or to the consent to injury which
precludes the recovery of damages by one who has knowingly and
voluntarily exposed himself to danger, even if he is not negligent in
doing so.
This doctrine, in our view, is wholly applicable to this
case. Pantaleon himself testified that the most basic rule when
travelling in a tour group is that you must never be a cause of any
delay because the schedule is very strict.[46] When Pantaleon made
up his mind to push through with his purchase, he must have known
that the group would become annoyed and irritated with him. This
was the natural, foreseeable consequence of his decision to make
them all wait.
13

We do not discount the fact that Pantaleon and his family
did feel humiliated and embarrassed when they had to wait for
AMEX to approve the Coster purchase in Amsterdam. We have to
acknowledge, however, that Pantaleon was not a helpless victim in
this scenario at any time, he could have cancelled the sale so that
the group could go on with the city tour. But he did not.
More importantly, AMEX did not violate any legal duty to
Pantaleon under the circumstances under the principle of damnum
absque injuria, or damages without legal wrong, loss without injury.
[47]
Pantaleon is not entitled to damages
Because AMEX neither breached its contract with
Pantaleon, nor acted with culpable delay or the willful intent to cause
harm, we find the award of moral damages to Pantaleon
unwarranted.
Similarly, we find no basis to award exemplary damages.
In contracts, exemplary damages can only be awarded if a
defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or
malevolent manner.[49] The plaintiff must also show that he is entitled
to moral, temperate, or compensatory damages before the court
may consider the question of whether or not exemplary damages
should be awarded.[50]
As previously discussed, it took AMEX some time to
approve Pantaleons purchase requests because it had legitimate
concerns on the amount being charged; no malicious intent was ever
established here. In the absence of any other damages, the award of
exemplary damages clearly lacks legal basis.
Neither do we find any basis for the award of attorneys
fees and costs of litigation. No premium should be placed on the
right to litigate and not every winning party is entitled to an automatic
grant of attorney's fees.[51] To be entitled to attorneys fees and
litigation costs, a party must show that he falls under one of the
instances enumerated in Article 2208 of the Civil Code.[52]This,
Pantaleon failed to do. Since we eliminated the award of moral and
exemplary damages, so must we delete the award for attorney's fees
and litigation expenses.
Lastly, although we affirm the result of the CA decision, we do so for
the reasons stated in this Resolution and not for those found in the
CA decision.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we SET
ASIDE our May 8, 2009 Decision and GRANT the present motion for
reconsideration. The Court of Appeals Decision dated August 18,
2006 is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 168512 March 20, 2007
ORLANDO D. GARCIA, JR., doing business under the name and
style COMMUNITY DIAGNOSTIC CENTER and BU
CASTRO,1 Petitioners, vs.
RANIDA D. SALVADOR and RAMON SALVADOR, Respondents.
When Ranida submitted the test result to Dr. Sto. Domingo, the
Company physician, the latter apprised her that the findings
indicated that she is suffering from Hepatitis B, a liver disease. Thus,
based on the medical report6submitted by Sto. Domingo, the
Company terminated Ranidas employment for failing the physical
examination.
When Ranida informed her father, Ramon, about her ailment, the
latter suffered a heart attack and was confined at the Bataan Doctors
Hospital. During Ramons confinement, Ranida underwent another
HBs Ag test at the said hospital and the result indicated that she is
non-reactive. She informed Sto. Domingo of this development but
was told that the test conducted by CDC was more reliable because
it used the Micro-Elisa Method. Thus, Ranida went back to CDC for
confirmatory testing, and this time, the Anti-HBs test conducted on
her indicated a "Negative" result. Ranida also underwent another
Torts Human Relations Torts
HBs Ag test at the Bataan Doctors Hospital using the Micro-Elisa
Method. The result indicated that she was non-reactive.10
On July 25, 1994, Ranida and Ramon filed a complaint13 for
damages against petitioner Garcia and a purportedly unknown
pathologist of CDC, claiming that, by reason of the erroneous
interpretation of the results of Ranidas examination, she lost her job
and suffered serious mental anxiety, trauma and sleepless nights,
while Ramon was hospitalized and lost business opportunities.
On September 26, 1994, respondents amended their complaint by
naming Castro as the "unknown pathologist."
Garcia denied the allegations of gross negligence and incompetence
and reiterated the scientific explanation for the "false positive" result
of the first HBs Ag test in his December 7, 1993 letter to the
respondents.15
For his part, Castro claimed that as pathologist, he rarely went to
CDC and only when a case was referred to him; that he did not
examine Ranida; and that the test results bore only his rubber-stamp
signature.
The main issue for resolution is whether the Court of Appeals, in
reversing the decision of the trial court, correctly found petitioner
liable for damages to the respondents for issuing an incorrect
HBsAG test result.
Garcia maintains he is not negligent, thus not liable for damages,
because he followed the appropriate laboratory measures and
procedures as dictated by his training and experience; and that he
did everything within his professional competence to arrive at an
objective, impartial and impersonal result.
At the outset, we note that the issues raised are factual in nature.
Whether a person is negligent or not is a question of fact which we
cannot pass upon in a petition for review on certiorari which is limited
to reviewing errors of law
Negligence is the failure to observe for the protection of the interest
of another person that degree of care, precaution and vigilance
which the circumstances justly demand,20 whereby such other
person suffers injury. For health care providers, the test of the
existence of negligence is: did the health care provider either fail to
do something which a reasonably prudent health care provider
would have done, or that he or she did something that a reasonably
prudent health care provider would not have done; and that failure or
action caused injury to the patient;21 if yes, then he is guilty of
negligence.
Thus, the elements of an actionable conduct are: 1) duty, 2) breach,
3) injury, and 4) proximate causation.
All the elements are present in the case at bar.
Owners and operators of clinical laboratories have the duty to
comply with statutes, as well as rules and regulations, purposely
promulgated to protect and promote the health of the people by
preventing the operation of substandard, improperly managed and
inadequately supported clinical laboratories and by improving the
quality of performance of clinical laboratory examinations.22 Their
business is impressed with public interest, as such, high standards
of performance are expected from them.
In fine, violation of a statutory duty is negligence. Where the law
imposes upon a person the duty to do something, his omission or
non-performance will render him liable to whoever may be injured
thereby.
From the laws and rules, it is clear that a clinical laboratory must be
administered, directed and supervised by a licensed physician
authorized by the Secretary of Health, like a pathologist who is
specially trained in methods of laboratory medicine; that the medical
technologist must be under the supervision of the pathologist or a
licensed physician; and that the results of any examination may be
14
released only to the requesting physician or his authorized
representative upon the direction of the laboratory pathologist.
These rules are intended for the protection of the public by
preventing performance of substandard clinical examinations by
laboratories whose personnel are not properly supervised. The
public demands no less than an effective and efficient performance
of clinical laboratory examinations through compliance with the
quality standards set by laws and regulations.
We find that petitioner Garcia failed to comply with these standards.
First, CDC is not administered, directed and supervised by a
licensed physician as required by law, but by Ma. Ruby C. Calderon,
a licensed Medical Technologist. Second, Garcia conducted the
HBsAG test of respondent Ranida without the supervision of
defendant-appellee Castro, who admitted that he does not know,
and has never known or met, the plaintiff-patient even up to this time
nor has he personally examined the plaintiff-patient. Last, the
disputed HBsAG test result was released to respondent Ranida
without the authorization of defendant-appellee Castro.29
Garcia may not have intended to cause the consequences which
followed after the release of the HBsAG test result. However, his
failure to comply with the laws and rules promulgated and issued for
the protection of public safety and interest is failure to observe that
care which a reasonably prudent health care provider would
observe. Thus, his act or omission constitutes a breach of duty.
Indubitably, Ranida suffered injury as a direct consequence of
Garcias failure to comply with the mandate of the laws and rules
aforequoted. She was terminated from the service for failing the
physical examination; suffered anxiety because of the diagnosis; and
was compelled to undergo several more tests. All these could have
been avoided had the proper safeguards been scrupulously followed
in conducting the clinical examination and releasing the clinical
report.
Article 20 of the New Civil Code provides:
Art. 20. Every person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently
causes damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the same.
The foregoing provision provides the legal basis for the award of
damages to a party who suffers damage whenever one commits an
act in violation of some legal provision. 30 This was incorporated by
the Code Commission to provide relief to a person who suffers
damage because another has violated some legal provision.31
We find the Court of Appeals award of moral damages reasonable
under the circumstances bearing in mind the mental trauma suffered
by respondent Ranida who thought she was afflicted by Hepatitis B,
making her "unfit or unsafe for any type of employment." 32 Having
established her right to moral damages, we see no reason to disturb
the award of exemplary damages and attorneys fees. Exemplary
damages are imposed, by way of example or correction for the
public good, in addition to moral, temperate, liquidated or
compensatory damages,33 and attorneys fees may be recovered
when, as in the instant case, exemplary damages are awarded.34
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-14628 September 30, 1960
FRANCISCO HERMOSISIMA, petitioner, vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., respondents.
On October 4, 1954, Soledad Cagigas, hereinafter referred to as
complaint, filed with said of her child, Chris Hermosisima, as natural
child and moral damages for alleged breach of promise. Petitioner
admitted the paternity of child and expressed willingness to support
the latter, but denied having ever promised to marry the complainant.
Upon her motion, said court ordered petitioner, on October 27, 1954,
to pay, by way of alimony pendente lite, P50.00 a month, which was,
on February 16, 1955, reduced to P30.00 a month.
Torts Human Relations Torts
On appeal taken by petitioner, the Court of Appeals affirmed this
decision, except as to the actual and compensatory damages and
the moral damages, which were increased to P5,614.25 and
P7,000.00, respectively.
The main issue before us is whether moral damages are
recoverable, under our laws, for breach of promise to marry. The
pertinent facts are:
Complainant Soledad Cagigas, was born in July 1917. Since 1950,
Soledad then a teacher in the Sibonga Provincial High School in
Cebu, and petitioner, who was almost ten (10) years younger than
she, used to go around together and were regarded as engaged,
although he had made no promise of marriage prior thereto. In 1951,
she gave up teaching and became a life insurance underwriter in the
City of Cebu, where intimacy developed among her and the
petitioner, since one evening in 1953, when after coming from the
movies, they had sexual intercourse in his cabin on board M/V
"Escao," to which he was then attached as apprentice pilot. In
February 1954, Soledad advised petitioner that she was in the family
way, whereupon he promised to marry her. Their child, Chris
Hermosisima, was born on June 17, 1954, in a private maternity and
clinic. However, subsequently, or on July 24, 1954, defendant
married one Romanita Perez. Hence, the present action, which was
commenced on or about October 4, 1954.
Referring now to the issue above referred to, it will be noted that the
Civil Code of Spain permitted the recovery of damages for breach to
marry.
Inasmuch as these articles were never in force in the Philippines,
this Court ruled in De Jesus vs. Syquia (58 Phil., 866), that "the
action for breach of promises to marry has no standing in the civil
law, apart from the right to recover money or property advanced . . .
upon the faith of such promise". The Code Commission charged with
the drafting of the Proposed Civil Code of the Philippines deem it
best, however, to change the law thereon.
That breach of promise to marry is not actionable has been definitely
decide in the case of De Jesus vs. Syquia, 58 Phil., 866. The history
of breach of promise suit in the United States and in England has
shown that no other action lends itself more readily to abuse by
designing women and unscrupulous men. It is this experience which
has led to the abolition of the rights of action in the so-called Balm
suit in many of the American States.
Apart from the fact that the general tenor of said Article 2219,
particularly the paragraphs preceding and those following the one
cited by the Court of Appeals, and the language used in said
paragraph strongly indicates that the "seduction" therein
contemplated is the crime punished as such in Article as such in
Article 337 and 338 of the Revised Penal Code, which admittedly
does not exist in the present case, we find ourselves unable to say
that petitioner is morally guilty of seduction, not only because he is
approximately ten (10) years younger than the complainant who
around thirty-six (36) years of age, and as highly enlightened as a
former high school teacher and a life insurance agent are supposed
to be when she became intimate with petitioner, then a mere
apprentice pilot, but, also, because, the court of first instance found
that, complainant "surrendered herself" to petitioner because,
"overwhelmed by her love" for him, she "wanted to bind" "by having
a fruit of their engagement even before they had the benefit of
clergy."
The court of first instance sentenced petitioner to pay the following:
(1) a monthly pension of P30.00 for the support of the child: (2)
P4,500, representing the income that complainant had allegedly
failed to earn during her pregnancy and shortly after the birth of the
child, as actual and compensation damages; (3) P5,000, as moral
damages; and (4) P500.00, as attorney's fees. The Court of Appeals
added to the second item the sum of P1,114.25 consisting of
P144.20, for hospitalization and medical attendance, in connection
with the parturiation, and the balance representing expenses
incurred to support the child and increased the moral damages to
P7,000.00.
With the elimination of this award for damages, the decision of the
Court of Appeals is hereby affirmed, therefore, in all other respects,
15
without special pronouncement as to cost in this instance. It is so
ordered.
G.R. No. L-20089 December 26, 1964
BEATRIZ P. WASSMER, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
FRANCISCO X. VELEZ, defendant-appellant.
The facts that culminated in this case started with dreams and
hopes, followed by appropriate planning and serious endeavors, but
terminated in frustration and, what is worse, complete public
humiliation.
Francisco X. Velez and Beatriz P. Wassmer, following their mutual
promise of love, decided to get married and set September 4, 1954
as the big day. On September 2, 1954 Velez left this note for his
bride-to-be:
Dear Bet
Will have to postpone wedding My mother opposes it. Am leaving
on the Convair today.Please do not ask too many people about the
reason why That would only create a scandal. Paquing
But the next day, September 3, he sent her the following telegram:
NOTHING CHANGED REST ASSURED RETURNING VERY SOON
APOLOGIZE MAMA PAPA LOVE. PAKING
Thereafter Velez did not appear nor was he heard from again.
Sued by Beatriz for damages, Velez filed no answer and was
declared in default. Plaintiff adduced evidence before the clerk of
court as commissioner, and on April 29, 1955, judgment was
rendered ordering defendant to pay plaintiff P2,000.00 as actual
damages; P25,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages; P2,500.00
as attorney's fees; and the costs.
In support of his "motion for new trial and reconsideration,"
defendant asserts that the judgment is contrary to law. The reason
given is that "there is no provision of the Civil Code authorizing" an
action for breach of promise to marry. Indeed, our ruling
in Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals (L-14628, Sept. 30, 1960), as
reiterated in Estopa vs. Biansay (L-14733, Sept. 30, 1960), is that
"mere breach of a promise to marry" is not an actionable wrong. We
pointed out that Congress deliberately eliminated from the draft of
the new Civil Code the provisions that would have it so.
It must not be overlooked, however, that the extent to which acts not
contrary to law may be perpetrated with impunity, is not limitless for
Article 21 of said Code provides that "any person who wilfully causes
loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage."
The record reveals that on August 23, 1954 plaintiff and defendant
applied for a license to contract marriage, which was subsequently
issued (Exhs. A, A-1). Their wedding was set for September 4, 1954.
Invitations were printed and distributed to relatives, friends and
acquaintances (Tsn., 5; Exh. C). The bride-to-be's trousseau, party
dresses and other apparel for the important occasion were
purchased (Tsn., 7-8). Dresses for the maid of honor and the flower
girl were prepared. A matrimonial bed, with accessories, was bought.
Bridal showers were given and gifts received (Tsn., 6; Exh. E). And
then, with but two days before the wedding, defendant, who was
then 28 years old,: simply left a note for plaintiff stating: "Will have to
postpone wedding My mother opposes it ... " He enplaned to his
home city in Mindanao, and the next day, the day before the
wedding, he wired plaintiff: "Nothing changed rest assured returning
soon." But he never returned and was never heard from again.
Surely this is not a case of mere breach of promise to marry. As
stated, mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong.
But to formally set a wedding and go through all the above-described
preparation and publicity, only to walk out of it when the matrimony is
about to be solemnized, is quite different. This is palpably and
Torts Human Relations Torts
unjustifiably contrary to good customs for which defendant must be
held answerable in damages in accordance with Article 21 aforesaid.
Defendant urges in his afore-stated petition that the damages
awarded were excessive. No question is raised as to the award of
actual damages. What defendant would really assert hereunder is
that the award of moral and exemplary damages, in the amount of
P25,000.00, should be totally eliminated.
Per express provision of Article 2219 (10) of the New Civil Code,
moral damages are recoverable in the cases mentioned in Article 21
of said Code. As to exemplary damages, defendant contends that
the same could not be adjudged against him because under Article
2232 of the New Civil Code the condition precedent is that "the
defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or
malevolent manner." The argument is devoid of merit as under the
above-narrated circumstances of this case defendant clearly acted in
a "wanton ... , reckless [and] oppressive manner." This Court's
opinion, however, is that considering the particular circumstances of
this case, P15,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages is deemed
to be a reasonable award.
G.R. No. L-18630 December 17, 1966
APOLONIO TANJANCO, petitioner, vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ARACELI SANTOS, respondents.
The essential allegations of the complaint are to the effect that, from
December, 1957, the defendant (appellee herein), Apolonio
Tanjanco, courted the plaintiff, Araceli Santos, both being of adult
age; that "defendant expressed and professed his undying love and
affection for plaintiff who also in due time reciprocated the tender
feelings"; that in consideration of defendant's promise of marriage
plaintiff consented and acceded to defendant's pleas for carnal
knowledge; that regularly until December 1959, through his
protestations of love and promises of marriage, defendant
succeeded in having carnal access to plaintiff, as a result of which
the latter conceived a child; that due to her pregnant condition, to
avoid embarrassment and social humiliation, plaintiff had to resign
her job as secretary in IBM Philippines, Inc., where she was
receiving P230.00 a month; that thereby plaintiff became unable to
support herself and her baby; that due to defendant's refusal to
marry plaintiff, as promised, the latter suffered mental anguish,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, and social
humiliation. The prayer was for a decree compelling the defendant to
recognize the unborn child that plaintiff was bearing; to pay her not
less than P430.00 a month for her support and that of her baby, plus
P100,000.00 in moral and exemplary damages, plus P10,000.00
attorney's fees.
Upon defendant's motion to dismiss, the court of first instance
dismissed the complaint for failure to state a cause of action. The
Court of Appeals, therefore, entered judgment setting aside the
dismissal and directing the court of origin to proceed with the case.
Defendant, in turn, appealed to this Court, pleading that actions for
breach of a promise to marry are not permissible in this jurisdiction,
and invoking the rulings of this Court in Estopa vs. Piansay, L-
14733, September 30, 1960; Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals, L-
14628, January 29, 1962; and De Jesus vs. SyQuia, 58 Phil. 886.
We find this appeal meritorious.
In holding that the complaint stated a cause of action for damages,
under Article 21 above mentioned, the Court of Appeals relied upon
and quoted from the memorandum submitted by the Code
Commission to the Legislature in 1949 to support the original draft of
the Civil Code. Referring to Article 23 of the draft (now Article 21 of
the Code), the Commission stated:
But the Code Commission has gone farther than the sphere of
wrongs defined or determined by positive law. Fully sensible that
there are countless gaps in the statutes, which leave so many
victims of moral wrongs helpless, even though they have actually
suffered material and moral injury, the Commission has deemed it
16
 necessary, in the interest of justice, to incorporate in the proposed
Civil Code the following rule:
"ART. 23. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another
in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public
policy shall compensate the latter for the damage."
An example will illustrate the purview of the foregoing norm: "A"
seduces the nineteen-year old daughter of "X". A promise of
marriage either has not been made, or can not be proved. The girl
becomes pregnant. Under the present laws, there is no crime, as
the girl is above eighteen years of age. Neither can any civil action
for breach of promise of marriage be filed. Therefore, though the
grievous moral wrong has been committed, and though the girl
and her family have suffered incalculable moral damage, she and
her parents cannot bring any action for damages. But under the
proposed article, she and her parents would have such a right of
action.
The Court of Appeals seems to have overlooked that the example
set forth in the Code Commission's memorandum refers to a tort
upon a minor who has been seduced. The essential feature is
seduction, that in law is more than mere sexual intercourse, or a
breach of a promise of marriage; it connotes essentially the idea of
deceit, enticement, superior power or abuse of confidence on the
part of the seducer to which the woman has yielded (U.S. vs.
Buenaventura, 27 Phil. 121; U.S. vs. Arlante, 9 Phil. 595).
It has been ruled in the Buenaventura case (supra) that
To constitute seduction there must in all cases be some sufficient
promise or inducement and the woman must yield because of the
promise or other inducement. If she consents merely from carnal
lust and the intercourse is from mutual desire, there is no
seduction (43 Cent. Dig. tit. Seduction, par. 56). She must be
induced to depart from the path of virtue by the use of some
species of arts, persuasions and wiles, which are calculated to
have and do have that effect, and which result in her ultimately
submitting her person to the sexual embraces of her seducer (27
Phil. 123).
And in American Jurisprudence we find:
On the other hand, in an action by the woman, the enticement,
persuasion or deception is the essence of the injury; and a mere
proof of intercourse is insufficient to warrant a recover.
Accordingly it is not seduction where the willingness arises out of
sexual desire or curiosity of the female, and the defendant merely
affords her the needed opportunity for the commission of the act.
It has been emphasized that to allow a recovery in all such cases
would tend to the demoralization of the female sex, and would be
a reward for unchastity by which a class of adventuresses would
be swift to profit." (47 Am. Jur. 662)
Bearing these principles in mind, let us examine the complaint.
Over and above the partisan allegations, the facts stand out that for
one whole year, from 1958 to 1959, the plaintiff-appellee, a woman
of adult age, maintained intimate sexual relations with appellant, with
repeated acts of intercourse. Such conduct is incompatible with the
idea of seduction. Plainly there is here voluntariness and mutual
passion; for had the appellant been deceived, had she surrendered
exclusively because of the deceit, artful persuasions and wiles of the
defendant, she would not have again yielded to his embraces, much
less for one year, without exacting early fulfillment of the alleged
promises of marriage, and would have cut chart all sexual relations
upon finding that defendant did not intend to fulfill his promises.
Hence, we conclude that no case is made under Article 21 of the
Civil Code, and no other cause of action being alleged, no error was
committed by the Court of First Instance in dismissing the complaint.
Of course, the dismissal must be understood as without prejudice to
whatever actions may correspond to the child of the plaintiff against
the defendant-appellant, if any. On that point, this Court makes no
pronouncement, since the child's own rights are not here involved.
Torts Human Relations Torts
FOR THE FOREGOING REASONS, the decision of the Court of
Appeals is reversed, and that of the Court of First Instance is
affirmed. No costs.
G.R. No. 97336 February 19, 1993
GASHEM SHOOKAT BAKSH, petitioner, vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and MARILOU T.
GONZALES, respondents.
On 27 October 1987, private respondent, without the assistance of
counsel, filed with the aforesaid trial court a complaint 2 for damages
against the petitioner for the alleged violation of their agreement to
get married. She alleges in said complaint that: she is twenty-two
(22) years old, single, Filipino and a pretty lass of good moral
character and reputation duly respected in her community; petitioner,
on the other hand, is an Iranian citizen residing at the Lozano
Apartments, Guilig, Dagupan City, and is an exchange student
taking a medical course at the Lyceum Northwestern Colleges in
Dagupan City; before 20 August 1987, the latter courted and
proposed to marry her; she accepted his love on the condition that
they would get married; they therefore agreed to get married after
the end of the school semester, which was in October of that year;
petitioner then visited the private respondent's parents in Baaga,
Bugallon, Pangasinan to secure their approval to the marriage;
sometime in 20 August 1987, the petitioner forced her to live with
him in the Lozano Apartments; she was a virgin before she began
living with him; a week before the filing of the complaint, petitioner's
attitude towards her started to change; he maltreated and threatened
to kill her; as a result of such maltreatment, she sustained injuries;
during a confrontation with a representative of the barangay captain
of Guilig a day before the filing of the complaint, petitioner
repudiated their marriage agreement and asked her not to live with
him anymore and; the petitioner is already married to someone living
in Bacolod City. Private respondent then prayed for judgment
ordering the petitioner to pay her damages in the amount of not less
than P45,000.00, reimbursement for actual expenses amounting to
P600.00, attorney's fees and costs, and granting her such other
relief and remedies as may be just and equitable. The complaint was
docketed as Civil Case No. 16503.
After trial on the merits, the lower court, applying Article 21 of the
Civil Code, rendered on 16 October 1989 a decision 5 favoring the
private respondent. The petitioner was thus ordered to pay the latter
damages and attorney's fees.
The decision is anchored on the trial court's findings and conclusions
that (a) petitioner and private respondent were lovers, (b) private
respondent is not a woman of loose morals or questionable virtue
who readily submits to sexual advances, (c) petitioner, through
machinations, deceit and false pretenses, promised to marry private
respondent, d) because of his persuasive promise to marry her, she
allowed herself to be deflowered by him, (e) by reason of that
deceitful promise, private respondent and her parents in
accordance with Filipino customs and traditions made some
preparations for the wedding that was to be held at the end of
October 1987 by looking for pigs and chickens, inviting friends and
relatives and contracting sponsors, (f) petitioner did not fulfill his
promise to marry her and (g) such acts of the petitioner, who is a
foreigner and who has abused Philippine hospitality, have offended
our sense of morality, good customs, culture and traditions. The trial
court gave full credit to the private respondent's testimony
because, inter alia, she would not have had the temerity and
courage to come to court and expose her honor and reputation to
public scrutiny and ridicule if her claim was false. 7
Petitioner appealed the trial court's decision to the respondent Court
of Appeals which docketed the case as CA-G.R. CV No. 24256. On
18 February 1991, respondent Court promulgated the challenged
decision 10 affirming in toto the trial court's ruling of 16 October 1989.
Unfazed by his second defeat, petitioner filed the instant petition on
26 March 1991; he raises therein the single issue of whether or not
Article 21 of the Civil Code applies to the case at bar. 13
It is petitioner's thesis that said Article 21 is not applicable because
he had not committed any moral wrong or injury or violated any good
custom or public policy; he has not professed love or proposed
17
marriage to the private respondent; and he has never maltreated
her. He criticizes the trial court for liberally invoking Filipino customs,
traditions and culture, and ignoring the fact that since he is a
foreigner, he is not conversant with such Filipino customs, traditions
and culture. As an Iranian Moslem, he is not familiar with Catholic
and Christian ways. He stresses that even if he had made a promise
to marry, the subsequent failure to fulfill the same is excusable or
tolerable because of his Moslem upbringing; he then alludes to the
Muslim Code which purportedly allows a Muslim to take four (4)
wives and concludes that on the basis thereof, the trial court erred in
ruling that he does not posses good moral character. Moreover, his
controversial "common law life" is now his legal wife as their
marriage had been solemnized in civil ceremonies in the Iranian
Embassy. As to his unlawful cohabitation with the private
respondent, petitioner claims that even if responsibility could be
pinned on him for the live-in relationship, the private respondent
should also be faulted for consenting to an illicit arrangement.
Finally, petitioner asseverates that even if it was to be
assumed arguendo that he had professed his love to the private
respondent and had also promised to marry her, such acts would not
be actionable in view of the special circumstances of the case. The
mere breach of promise is not actionable. 14
The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an
actionable wrong. 17 Congress deliberately eliminated from the draft
of the New Civil Code the provisions that would have made it so.
This notwithstanding, the said Code contains a provision, Article 21,
which is designed to expand the concept of torts or quasi-delict in
this jurisdiction by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold
number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to
specifically enumerate and punish in the statute books. 20
As the Code Commission itself stated in its Report:
But the Code Commission had gone farther than the sphere of
wrongs defined or determined by positive law. Fully sensible
that there are countless gaps in the statutes, which leave so
many victims of moral wrongs helpless, even though they have
actually suffered material and moral injury, the Commission has
deemed it necessary, in the interest of justice, to incorporate in
the proposed Civil Code the following rule:
Art. 23. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another
in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public
policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
An example will illustrate the purview of the foregoing norm: "A"
seduces the nineteen-year old daughter of "X". A promise of
marriage either has not been made, or can not be proved. The
girl becomes pregnant. Under the present laws, there is no
crime, as the girl is above nineteen years of age. Neither can
any civil action for breach of promise of marriage be filed.
Therefore, though the grievous moral wrong has been
committed, and though the girl and family have suffered
incalculable moral damage, she and her parents cannot bring
action for damages. But under the proposed article, she and
her parents would have such a right of action.
Thus at one stroke, the legislator, if the forgoing rule is
approved, would vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that
untold number of moral wrongs which it is impossible for human
foresight to provide for specifically in the statutes. 21
Article 2176 of the Civil Code, which defines a quasi-delict thus:
Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there
being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage
done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-
delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
is limited to negligent acts or omissions and excludes the notion
of willfulness or intent. Quasi-delict, known in Spanish legal
treatises as culpa aquiliana, is a civil law concept while torts is
an Anglo-American or common law concept. Torts is much
broader than culpa aquiliana because it includes not only
Torts Human Relations Torts
negligence, but international criminal acts as well such as
assault and battery, false imprisonment and deceit. In the
general scheme of the Philippine legal system envisioned by
the Commission responsible for drafting the New Civil Code,
intentional and malicious acts, with certain exceptions, are to be
governed by the Revised Penal Code while negligent acts or
omissions are to be covered by Article 2176 of the Civil
Code. 22 In between these opposite spectrums are injurious
acts which, in the absence of Article 21, would have been
beyond redress. Thus, Article 21 fills that vacuum. It is even
postulated that together with Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil
Code, Article 21 has greatly broadened the scope of the law on
civil wrongs; it has become much more supple and adaptable
than the Anglo-American law on torts. 23
In the light of the above laudable purpose of Article 21, We are of the
opinion, and so hold, that where a man's promise to marry is in fact
the proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman and
his representation to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the
proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him in a sexual
congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of marrying her
and that the promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive device
to entice or inveigle her to accept him and to obtain her consent to
the sexual act, could justify the award of damages pursuant to Article
21 not because of such promise to marry but because of the fraud
and deceit behind it and the willful injury to her honor and reputation
which followed thereafter. It is essential, however, that such injury
should have been committed in a manner contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy.
In the instant case, respondent Court found that it was the
petitioner's "fraudulent and deceptive protestations of love for and
promise to marry plaintiff that made her surrender her virtue and
womanhood to him and to live with him on the honest and sincere
belief that he would keep said promise, and it was likewise these
fraud and deception on appellant's part that made plaintiff's parents
agree to their daughter's living-in with him preparatory to their
supposed marriage." 24 In short, the private respondent surrendered
her virginity, the cherished possession of every single Filipina, not
because of lust but because of moral seduction the kind
illustrated by the Code Commission in its example earlier adverted
to. The petitioner could not be held liable for criminal seduction
punished under either Article 337 or Article 338 of the Revised Penal
Code because the private respondent was above eighteen (18)
years of age at the time of the seduction.
Prior decisions of this Court clearly suggest that Article 21 may be
applied in a breach of promise to marry where the woman is a victim
of moral seduction. Thus, in Hermosisima vs. Court of
Appeals, 25 this Court denied recovery of damages to the woman
because:
. . . we find ourselves unable to say that petitioner
is morally guilty of seduction, not only because he is
approximately ten (10) years younger than the complainant
who was around thirty-six (36) years of age, and as highly
enlightened as a former high school teacher and a life
insurance agent are supposed to be when she became
intimate with petitioner, then a mere apprentice pilot, but, also,
because the court of first instance found that, complainant
"surrendered herself" to petitioner because, "overwhelmed by
her love" for him, she "wanted to bind" him by having a fruit of
their engagement even before they had the benefit of clergy.
In Tanjanco vs. Court of Appeals, 26 while this Court likewise hinted
at possible recovery if there had been moral seduction, recovery was
eventually denied because We were not convinced that such
seduction existed. The following enlightening disquisition and
conclusion were made in the said case:
The Court of Appeals seem to have overlooked that the
example set forth in the Code Commission's memorandum
refers to a tort upon a minor who had been seduced. The
essential feature is seduction, that in law is more than mere
sexual intercourse, or a breach of a promise of marriage; it
connotes essentially the idea of deceit, enticement, superior
power or abuse of confidence on the part of the seducer to
which the woman has yielded (U.S. vs. Buenaventura, 27 Phil.
121; U.S. vs. Arlante, 9 Phil. 595).
18
 It has been ruled in the Buenaventura case (supra) that
To constitute seduction there must in all cases be some
sufficient promise or inducement and the woman must yield
because of the promise or other inducement. If she consents
merely from carnal lust and the intercourse is from mutual
desire, there is no seduction (43 Cent. Dig. tit. Seduction, par.
56) She must be induced to depart from the path of virtue by
the use of some species of arts, persuasions and wiles, which
are calculated to have and do have that effect, and which result
in her person to ultimately submitting her person to the sexual
embraces of her seducer (27 Phil. 123).
And in American Jurisprudence we find:
On the other hand, in an action by the woman, the enticement,
persuasion or deception is the essence of the injury; and a
mere proof of intercourse is insufficient to warrant a recovery.
Accordingly it is not seduction where the willingness arises out
of sexual desire of curiosity of the female, and the defendant
merely affords her the needed opportunity for the commission
of the act. It has been emphasized that to allow a recovery in all
such cases would tend to the demoralization of the female sex,
and would be a reward for unchastity by which a class of
adventuresses would be swift to profit. (47 Am. Jur. 662)
xxx xxx xxx
Over and above the partisan allegations, the fact stand out that
for one whole year, from 1958 to 1959, the plaintiff-appellee, a
woman of adult age, maintain intimate sexual relations with
appellant, with repeated acts of intercourse. Such conduct is
incompatible with the idea of seduction. Plainly there is here
voluntariness and mutual passion; for had the appellant been
deceived, had she surrendered exclusively because of the
deceit, artful persuasions and wiles of the defendant, she would
not have again yielded to his embraces, much less for one
year, without exacting early fulfillment of the alleged promises
of marriage, and would have cut short all sexual relations upon
finding that defendant did not intend to fulfill his defendant did
not intend to fulfill his promise. Hence, we conclude that no
case is made under article 21 of the Civil Code, and no other
cause of action being alleged, no error was committed by the
Court of First Instance in dismissing the complaint. 27
In his annotations on the Civil Code, 28 Associate Justice Edgardo L.
Paras, who recently retired from this Court, opined that in a breach
of promise to marry where there had been carnal knowledge, moral
damages may be recovered:
. . . if there be criminal or moral seduction, but
not if the intercourse was due to mutual lust.
(Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals,
L-14628, Sept. 30, 1960; Estopa vs. Piansay,
Jr., L-14733, Sept. 30, 1960; Batarra vs.
Marcos, 7 Phil. 56 (sic); Beatriz Galang vs.
Court of Appeals, et al., L-17248, Jan. 29,
1962). (In other words, if the CAUSE be the
promise to marry, and the EFFECT be the
carnal knowledge, there is a chance that there
was criminal or moral seduction, hence recovery
of moral damages will prosper. If it be the other
way around, there can be no recovery of moral
damages, because here mutual lust has
intervened). . . .
together with "ACTUAL damages, should there be any,
such as the expenses for the wedding presentations (See
Domalagon v. Bolifer, 33 Phil. 471).
29
Senator Arturo M. Tolentino is also of the same persuasion:
It is submitted that the rule in Batarra vs. Marcos, 30 still
subsists, notwithstanding the incorporation of the present
article 31 in the Code. The example given by the Code
Commission is correct, if there was seduction, not necessarily
Torts Human Relations Torts
in the legal sense, but in the vulgar sense of deception. But
when the sexual act is accomplished without any deceit or
qualifying circumstance of abuse of authority or influence, but
the woman, already of age, has knowingly given herself to a
man, it cannot be said that there is an injury which can be the
basis for indemnity.
But so long as there is fraud, which is characterized by
willfulness (sic), the action lies. The court, however, must weigh
the degree of fraud, if it is sufficient to deceive the woman
under the circumstances, because an act which would deceive
a girl sixteen years of age may not constitute deceit as to an
experienced woman thirty years of age. But so long as there is
a wrongful act and a resulting injury, there should be civil
liability, even if the act is not punishable under the criminal law
and there should have been an acquittal or dismissal of the
criminal case for that reason.
We are unable to agree with the petitioner's alternative proposition to
the effect that granting, for argument's sake, that he did promise to
marry the private respondent, the latter is nevertheless also at fault.
According to him, both parties are in pari delicto; hence, pursuant to
Article 1412(1) of the Civil Code and the doctrine laid down
in Batarra vs. Marcos, 32 the private respondent cannot recover
damages from the petitioner. The latter even goes as far as stating
that if the private respondent had "sustained any injury or damage in
their relationship, it is primarily because of her own doing, 33 for:
. . . She is also interested in the petitioner as the latter will
become a doctor sooner or later. Take notice that she is a
plain high school graduate and a mere employee . . .
(Annex "C") or a waitress (TSN, p. 51, January 25, 1988)
in a luncheonette and without doubt, is in need of a man
who can give her economic security. Her family is in dire
need of financial assistance. (TSN, pp. 51-53, May 18,
1988). And this predicament prompted her to accept a
proposition that may have been offered by the petitioner. 34
These statements reveal the true character and motive of the
petitioner. It is clear that he harbors a condescending, if not
sarcastic, regard for the private respondent on account of the latter's
ignoble birth, inferior educational background, poverty and, as
perceived by him, dishonorable employment. Obviously then, from
the very beginning, he was not at all moved by good faith and an
honest motive. Marrying with a woman so circumstances could not
have even remotely occurred to him. Thus, his profession of love
and promise to marry were empty words directly intended to fool,
dupe, entice, beguile and deceive the poor woman into believing that
indeed, he loved her and would want her to be his life's partner. His
was nothing but pure lust which he wanted satisfied by a Filipina
who honestly believed that by accepting his proffer of love and
proposal of marriage, she would be able to enjoy a life of ease and
security. Petitioner clearly violated the Filipino's concept of morality
and brazenly defied the traditional respect Filipinos have for their
women. It can even be said that the petitioner committed such
deplorable acts in blatant disregard of Article 19 of the Civil Code
which directs every person to act with justice, give everyone his due
and observe honesty and good faith in the exercise of his rights and
in the performance of his obligations.
No foreigner must be allowed to make a mockery of our laws,
customs and traditions.
The pari delicto rule does not apply in this case for while indeed, the
private respondent may not have been impelled by the purest of
intentions, she eventually submitted to the petitioner in sexual
congress not out of lust, but because of moral seduction. In fact, it is
apparent that she had qualms of conscience about the entire
episode for as soon as she found out that the petitioner was not
going to marry her after all, she left him. She is not, therefore, in pari
delicto with the petitioner. Pari delicto means "in equal fault; in a
similar offense or crime; equal in guilt or in legal fault." 35At most, it
could be conceded that she is merely in delicto.
Equity often interferes for the relief of the less
guilty of the parties, where his transgression has
been brought about by the imposition of undue
influence of the party on whom the burden of the
original wrong principally rests, or where his
19
 consent to the transaction was itself procured
by
fraud. 36
In Mangayao vs. Lasud, 37 We declared:
Appellants likewise stress that both parties
being at fault, there should be no action by one
against the other (Art. 1412, New Civil Code).
This rule, however, has been interpreted as
applicable only where the fault on both sides is,
more or less, equivalent. It does not apply
where one party is literate or intelligent and the
other one is not. (c.f. Bough vs. Cantiveros, 40
Phil. 209).
We should stress, however, that while We find for the private
respondent, let it not be said that this Court condones the deplorable
behavior of her parents in letting her and the petitioner stay together
in the same room in their house after giving approval to their
marriage. It is the solemn duty of parents to protect the honor of their
daughters and infuse upon them the higher values of morality and
dignity.
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the challenged decision,
the instant petition is hereby DENIED, with costs against the
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-17396 May 30, 1962
CECILIO PE, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants, vs. ALFONSO
PE, defendant-appellee.
There is no doubt that the claim of plaintiffs for damages is based on
the fact that defendant, being a married man, carried on a love affair
with Lolita Pe thereby causing plaintiffs injury in a manner contrary to
morals, good customs and public policy. But in spite of the fact that
plaintiffs have clearly established that in illicit affair was carried on
between defendant and Lolita which caused great damage to the
name and reputation of plaintiffs who are her parents, brothers and
sisters, the trial court considered their complaint not actionable for
the reason that they failed to prove that defendant deliberately and in
bad faith tried to win Lolita's affection. Thus, the trial court said: "In
the absence of proof on this point, the court may not presume that it
was the defendant who deliberately induced such relationship. We
cannot be unmindful of the uncertainties and sometimes inexplicable
mysteries of the human emotions. It is a possibility that the
defendant and Lolita simply fell in love with each other, not only
without any desire on their part, but also against their better
judgment and in full consciousness of what it will bring to both of
them. This is specially so with respect to Lolita, being an unmarried
woman, falling in love with defendant who is a married man."
We disagree with this view. The circumstances under which
defendant tried to win Lolita's affection cannot lead, to any other
conclusion than that it was he who, thru an ingenious scheme or
trickery, seduced the latter to the extent of making her fall in love
with him. This is shown by the fact that defendant frequented the
house of Lolita on the pretext that he wanted her to teach him how to
pray the rosary. Because of the frequency of his visits to the latter's
family who was allowed free access because he was a collateral
relative and was considered as a member of her family, the two
eventually fell in love with each other and conducted clandestine
love affairs not only in Gasan but also in Boac where Lolita used to
teach in a barrio school. When the rumors about their illicit affairs
reached the knowledge of her parents, defendant was forbidden
from going to their house and even from seeing Lolita. Plaintiffs even
filed deportation proceedings against defendant who is a Chinese
national. Nevertheless, defendant continued his love affairs with
Lolita until she disappeared from the parental home. Indeed, no
other conclusion can be drawn from this chain of events than that
defendant not only deliberately, but through a clever strategy,
succeeded in winning the affection and love of Lolita to the extent of
having illicit relations with her. The wrong he has caused her and her
family is indeed immeasurable considering the fact that he is a
married man. Verily, he has committed an injury to Lolita's family in a
Torts Human Relations Torts
manner contrary to morals, good customs and public policy as
contemplated in Article 21 of the new Civil Code.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is reversed. Defendant is
hereby sentenced to pay the plaintiffs the sum of P5,000.00 as
damages and P2,000.00 as attorney's fees and expenses of
litigations. Costs against appellee.
G.R. No. L-66865 January 13, 1989
MAGTANGGOL QUE, petitioner, vs.
THE HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and
NICOLAS, respondents.
In 1975, Antonio Nicolas ordered from Magtanggol Que canvass
strollers, and Nicolas issued to Que 5 post-dated checks with a total
face value of P7,600.00. Nicolas ordered a "stop payment" because
of defects in the articles sold which Que had not corrected, so Que
was unable to encash the checks.
Que filed a complaint for estafa against Nicolas. The charge was
dismissed for lack of merit, as the investigating fiscal held that it was
an accounting matter, which did not necessarily involve deceit on
Nicolas part of Nicolas.
In 1976, Nicolas filed his own complaint for damages against Que for
malicious prosecution. Que averred that Nicolas had maliciously filed
the complaint in Bulacan although he was a resident of Caloocan
City, and Nicolas was indebted to him in any case, and that it was he
[Que] who suffered damages due to the unwarranted suit.
Judge Puno held in favor of Nicolas, finding that Que acted
maliciously in filing the estafa charge and in alleging that Nicolas
issued the dishonored checks with deceit. Ques MfR was denied. A
2nd MfR was filed, and Que averred the mere dismissal of the
charge in the fiscal's office was not a ground for damages nor did it
constitute an actionable wrong. The trial court reversed the original
decision, so Que won.
Nicolas contended that the amended decision was null and void for
several technical reasons. IAC reinstated the original decision of
Judge Punoso Nicolas won.
QUE NOT GUILTY OF MALICIOUS PROSECUTION
To constitute malicious prosecution, there must be proof that the
prosecution was prompted by a sinister design to vex and humiliate
a person that it was initiated deliberately by the defendant knowing
that his charges were false and groundless. The mere act of
submitting a case to the authorities for prosecution does not make
one liable for malicious prosecution.
One cannot be held liable in damages for maliciously instituting a
prosecution where he acted with probable cause. The presence of
probable cause signifies as a legal consequence the absence of
malice. If the charge, although false, was made with an honest belief
in its truth and justice, and there were reasonable grounds on which
such a belief could be founded, the accusation could not be held to
have been false in the legal sense. [Buchanan v. Esteban]
Proof and motive that the prosecution or institution of the action was
prompted by a sinister design to vex and humiliate a person and to
cast dishonor and disgrace must be clearly and preponderantly
established to entitle the victims to damages and other rights
granted by law. Otherwise, there would always be a civil action for
damages after the prosecution's failure to prove its cause. The
adverse result of an action does not per se make the act wrongful
and subject the actor to the payment of moral damages. The law
could not have meant to impose a penalty on the right to litigate;
such right is so precious that moral damages may not be charged on
those who may exercise it erroneously.
Considering that the checks could not be encashed and the
supposedly defective goods had not been returned, Que had reason
to believe that Nicolas intended to deceive him. Que was not
motivated by ill feeling but only by an anxiety to protect his rights.
20
Even if the fiscal found that no deceit was involved and that Ques
claim was unfounded, the mistaken charge was not malicious.
The mere dismissal of the criminal complaint by the fiscal's office did
not create a cause of action. What was inquired into was WON there
was a prima facie showing of estafa. Nowhere in the fiscal's
investigation report is there any statement imputing malice to Que.
SC finds Ques claim of harassment more plausible. However,
inasmuch as good faith is presumed, absent sufficient rebuttable
evidence, neither of them is guilty of malice. SC denied both parties
their respective claims for damages. Each of them must bear the
financial consequences of ones own acts, including the litigation
expenses.
[G.R. No. 107019. March 20, 1997]
FRANKLIN M. DRILON, AURELIO C. TRAMPE, GREGORIO A.
ARIZALA, CESAR M. SOLIS and FERDINAND R.
ABESAMIS, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON.
GEORGE C. MACLI-ING, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of
Branch 100 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, and
HOMOBONO ADAZA, respondents.
DECISION
HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:
In a letter-complaint to then Secretary of Justice Franklin
Drilon[1] dated March 20, 1990, General Renato de Villa, [2] who was
then the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines,
requested the Department of Justice to order the investigation of
several individuals named therein, including herein private
respondent Homobono Adaza, for their alleged participation in the
failed December 1989 coup detat. The letter-complaint was based
on the affidavit of Brigadier General Alejandro Galido, Captain
Oscarlito Mapalo, Colonel Juan Mamorno, Colonel Hernani Figueroa
and Major Eduardo Sebastian.
Gen. de Villas letter-complaint with its annexes was referred
for preliminary inquiry to the Special Composite Team of Prosecutors
created pursuant to Department of Justice Order No. 5 dated
January 10, 1990. Petitioner then Assistant Chief State Prosecutor
Aurelio Trampe,[3] the Team Leader, finding sufficient basis to
continue the inquiry, issued a subpoena to the individuals named in
the letter-complaint, Adaza included, and assigned the case for
preliminary investigation to a panel of investigators composed of
prosecutors George Arizala, as Chairman, and Ferdinand Abesamis
and Cesar Solis as members. The case was docketed as I.S. No.
DOJ-SC-90-013.
On April 17, 1990, the panel released its findings, thru a
Resolution, which reads:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, we find and so hold that there is
probable cause to hold herein respondents for trial for the crime of
REBELLION WITH MURDER AND FRUSTRATED MURDER. Hence
we respectfully recommend the filing of the corresponding
information against them in court.[4]
The above Resolution became the basis for the filing of an
Information,[5] dated April 18, 1990, charging private respondent with
the crime of rebellion with murder and frustrated murder before the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, with no recommendation as to
bail.[6]
Feeling aggrieved by the institution of these proceedings
against him, private respondent Adaza filed a complaint for
damages,[7]dated July 11, 1990, before Branch 100 of the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City. In his complaint, Adaza charged
petitioners with engaging in a deliberate, willful and malicious
experimentation by filing against him a charge of rebellion
complexed with murder and frustrated murder when petitioners,
according to Adaza, were fully aware of the non-existence of such
crime in the statute books.
On October 15, 1990, petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss
Adazas complaint on the ground that said complaint states no
Torts Human Relations Torts
actionable wrong constituting a valid cause of action against
petitioners.
The petition has merit.
In his Comment,[14] dated March 23, 1993, respondent Adaza
maintains that his claim before the trial court was merely a suit for
damages based on tort by reason of petitioners various
malfeasance, misfeasance and nonfeasance in office, as well as for
violation by the petitioners of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No. 3019,
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. It was
not a suit for malicious prosecution.
Private respondent is taking us for a ride. A cursory perusal of
the complaint filed by Adaza before respondent Judge George Macli-
ing reveals that it is one for malicious prosecution against the
petitioners for the latters filing of the charge against him of rebellion
with murder and frustrated murder.
The term malicious prosecution has been defined in various
ways. In American jurisdiction, it is defined as:
One begun in malice without probable cause to believe the charges
can be sustained (Eustace v. Dechter, 28 Cal. App. 2d. 706,83 P. 2d.
525). Instituted with intention of injuring defendant and without
probable cause, and which terminates in favor of the person
prosecuted. For this injury an action on the case lies, called the
action of malicious prosecution (Hicks v. Brantley, 29 S.E. 459, 102
Ga. 264; Eggett v. Allen, 96 N.W. 803, 119 Wis. 625).[16]
In Philippine jurisdiction, it has been defined as:
An action for damages brought by one against whom a criminal
prosecution, civil suit, or other legal proceeding has been instituted
maliciously and without probable cause, after the termination of such
prosecution, suit, or other proceeding in favor of the defendant
therein. The gist of the action is the putting of legal process in force,
regularly, for the mere purpose of vexation or injury (Cabasaan v.
Anota, 14169-R, November 19, 1956).[17]
The statutory basis for a civil action for damages for malicious
prosecution are found in the provisions of the New Civil Code on
Human Relations and on damages particularly Articles 19, 20, 21,
26, 29, 32, 33, 35, 2217 and 2219 (8). [18] To constitute malicious
prosecution, however, there must be proof that the prosecution was
prompted by a sinister design to vex and humiliate a person, and
that it was initiated deliberately by the defendant knowing that his
charges were false and groundless. Concededly, the mere act of
submitting a case to the authorities for prosecution does not make
one liable for malicious prosecution.[19] Thus, in order for a malicious
prosecution suit to prosper, the plaintiff must prove three (3)
elements: (1) the fact of the prosecution and the further fact that the
defendant was himself the prosecutor and that the action finally
terminated with an acquittal; (2) that in bringing the action, the
prosecutor acted without probable cause; and (3) that the prosecutor
was actuated or impelled by legal malice, that is by improper or
sinister motive.[20] All these requisites must concur.
Judging from the face of the complaint itself filed by Adaza
against the herein petitioners, none of the foregoing requisites have
been alleged therein, thus rendering the complaint dismissible on the
ground of failure to state a cause of action under Section 1 (g), Rule
16 of the Revised Rules of Court.
The complaint likewise does not make any allegation that the
prosecution acted without probable cause in filing the criminal
information dated April 18, 1990 for rebellion with murder and
frustrated murder. Elementarily defined, probable cause is the
existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief,
in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the
prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which
he was prosecuted. It is well-settled that one cannot be held liable
for maliciously instituting a prosecution where one has acted with
probable cause. Elsewise stated, a suit for malicious prosecution will
lie only in cases where a legal prosecution has been carried on
without probable cause. The reason for this rule is that it would be a
very great discouragement to public justice, if prosecutors, who had
tolerable ground of suspicion, were liable to be sued at law when
their indictment miscarried.[22]
In the case under consideration, the decision of the Special
Team of Prosecutors to file the information for rebellion with murder
21
and frustrated murder against respondent Adaza, among others,
cannot be dismissed as the mere product of whim or caprice on the
part of the prosecutors who conducted the preliminary
investigation. Said decision was fully justified in an eighteen (18)-
page Resolution dated April 17, 1990.[23] While it is true that the
petitioners were fully aware of the prevailing jurisprudence
enunciated in People v. Hernandez, [24] which proscribes the
complexing of murder and other common crimes with rebellion,
petitioners were of the honest conviction that the Hernandez Case
can be differentiated from the present case.
A doubtful or difficult question of law may become the basis of
good faith and, in this regard, the law always accords to public
officials the presumption of good faith and regularity in the
performance of official duties.[31] Any person who seeks to establish
otherwise has the burden of proving bad faith or ill-motive. Here,
since the petitioners were of the honest conviction that there was
probable cause to hold respondent Adaza for trial for the crime of
rebellion with murder and frustrated murder, and since Adaza
himself, through counsel, did not allege in his complaint lack of
probable cause, we find that the petitioners cannot be held liable for
malicious prosecution. Needless to say, probable cause was not
wanting in the institution of Criminal Case No. Q-90-11855 against
Adaza.
As to the requirement that the prosecutor must be impelled by
malice in bringing the unfounded action, suffice it to state that the
presence of probable cause signifies, as a legal consequence, the
absence of malice.[32] At the risk of being repetitious, it is evident in
this case that petitioners were not motivated by malicious intent or
by a sinister design to unduly harass private respondent, but only by
a well-founded belief that respondent Adaza can be held for trial for
the crime alleged in the information.
All told, the complaint, dated July 11, 1990, filed by Adaza
before Branch 100 of the Regional Trial Court against the petitioners
does not allege facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action for
malicious prosecution. Lack of cause of action, as a ground for a
motion to dismiss under Section 1 (g), Rule 16 of the Revised Rules
of Court, must appear on the face of the complaint itself, meaning
that it must be determined from the allegations of the complaint and
from none other.[33] The infirmity of the complaint in this regard is only
too obvious to have escaped respondent judges
attention. Paragraph 14 of the complaint which states:
xxxxxxxxx
14. The malicious prosecution, nay persecution, of plaintiff for a non-
existent crime had severely injured and besmirched plaintiffs name
and reputation and forever stigmatized his stature as a public figure,
thereby causing him extreme physical suffering, serious anxiety,
mental anguish, moral shock and social humiliation.[34]
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions of
respondent Court of Appeals dated January 31, 1992 and
September 2, 1992 affirming the February 8, 1991 and May 14, 1991
Orders of respondent Judge George C. Macli-ing are all hereby
NULLIFIED AND SET ASIDE. Respondent Judge is DIRECTED to
take no further action on Civil Case No. Q-90-6073 except to
DISMISS the same.
SO ORDERED.
`G.R. No. 132659 February 12, 2007
CONRADO MAGBANUA and ROSEMARIE MAGBANUA-
TABORADA, the latter assisted by her husband ARTEMIO
TABORADA,Petitioners, vs.
PILAR S. JUNSAY, asssisted by her husband VICENTE JUNSAY,
IBARRA LOPEZ, and JUANITO JACELA, Respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
For our resolution is the issue of whether petitioners are entitled to
damages for malicious prosecution. However, before we could
resolve said issue, we should first determine whether the filing of a
criminal case for Robbery against petitioner Rosemarie constituted
malicious prosecution.
Torts Human Relations Torts
It is petitioners submission that the prosecution of petitioner
Rosemarie was founded upon baseless accusations.34Petitioners
posit that the charges were based on false affidavits and false police
reports, without which the criminal case against petitioner Rosemarie
would not have been filed.35 Petitioners further decry the
maltreatment which petitioner Rosemarie allegedly suffered from the
hands of respondents. According to petitioners, Rosemarie was
maltreated to extract a confession from her, and to make her admit
to a crime she did not commit. They reasoned that petitioner
Rosemarie, who was then a minor, an uneducated farm girl, and a
stranger in Bacolod City, was subjected to torture and inhumane
treatment.36 Petitioners contend further that respondent Pilar
employed her privileged status in the society as a medical doctor;
and her co-respondents Ibarra and Juanito utilized their positions as
members of the Bacolod City Police to secure an admission from
petitioner Rosemarie.37
In this jurisdiction, the term "malicious prosecution" has been defined
as "an action for damages brought by one against whom a criminal
prosecution, civil suit, or other legal proceeding has been instituted
maliciously and without probable cause, after the termination of such
prosecution, suit, or other proceeding in favor of the defendant
therein."38 While generally associated with unfounded criminal
actions, the term has been expanded to include unfounded civil suits
instituted just to vex and humiliate the defendant despite the
absence of a cause of action or probable cause.39
This Court, in Drilon v. Court of Appeals,40 elucidated, viz:
The term malicious prosecution has been defined in various ways. In
American jurisdiction, it is defined as:
"One begun in malice without probable cause to believe the charges
can be sustained (Eustace v. Dechter, 28 Cal. App. 2d. 706, 83 P.
2d. 525). Instituted with intention of injuring defendant and without
probable cause, and which terminates in favor of the person
prosecuted. For this injury an action on the case lies, called the
action of malicious prosecution (Hicks v. Brantley, 29 S.E. 459, 102
Ga. 264; Eggett v. Allen, 96 N.W. 803, 119 Wis. 625)."
In Philippine jurisdiction, it has been defined as:
"An action for damages brought by one against whom a criminal
prosecution, civil suit, or other legal proceeding has been instituted
maliciously and without probable cause, after the termination of such
prosecution, suit, or other proceeding in favor of the defendant
therein. The gist of the action is the putting of legal process in force,
regularly, for the mere purpose of vexation or injury (Cabasaan v.
Anota, 14169-R, November 19, 1956)."
The statutory basis for a civil action for damages for malicious
prosecution are found in the provisions of the New Civil Code on
Human Relations and on damages particularly Articles 19, 20, 21,
26, 29, 32, 33, 35, 2217 and 2219 (8). To constitute malicious
prosecution, however, there must be proof that the prosecution was
prompted by a sinister design to vex and humiliate a person, and
that it was initiated deliberately by the defendant knowing that his
charges were false and groundless. Concededly, the mere act of
submitting a case to the authorities for prosecution does not make
one liable for malicious prosecution.
This Court has drawn the four elements that must be shown to
concur to recover damages for malicious prosecution. Therefore, for
a malicious prosecution suit to prosper, the plaintiff must prove the
following: (1) the prosecution did occur, and the defendant was
himself the prosecutor or that he instigated its commencement; (2)
the criminal action finally ended with an acquittal; (3) in bringing the
action, the prosecutor acted without probable cause; and (4) the
prosecution was impelled by legal malice -- an improper or a sinister
motive.41 The gravamen of malicious prosecution is not the filing of a
complaint based on the wrong provision of law, but the deliberate
initiation of an action with the knowledge that the charges were false
and groundless.42
We shall proceed to determine whether in the prosecution of
petitioner Rosemarie for the crime of Robbery, all four elements
were in attendance.
22
It is not disputed that the first and second elements are present.
The prosecution of petitioner Rosemarie for the crime of robbery did
occur, and respondents Pilar, Ibarra and Juanito instigated its
commencement. On 20 December 1985, the RTC, Branch XLI,
Bacolod City, rendered a Decision acquitting Rosemarie Magbanua
on the ground of insufficiency of evidence.
On the question of probable cause, this Court has ruled that for
purposes of malicious prosecution, "probable cause" means "such
facts and circumstances as would excite the belief, in a reasonable
mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that
the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was
prosecuted."43 It is merely based on opinion and reasonable
belief.44 Thus, a finding of probable cause does not require an
inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a
conviction.45
Anent the question of whether the prosecutor acted without probable
cause in bringing the action against petitioner Rosemarie, we find no
reason to depart from the conclusions reached by the RTC and the
Court of Appeals. The filing of Criminal Case No. 28 for Robbery was
not without probable cause.
Indeed, during the investigation petitioner Rosemarie admitted her
participation in the commission of the incident complained of. The
investigation report, which prompted the filing of the Information for
Robbery against petitioner Rosemarie showed that she admitted to
receiving instruction from her co-accused Ernesto Fernandez and a
certain Gudo to leave the barrel belt of the kitchen door
unlocked,46 so her co-accused can gain entry to the house of
respondent Pilar.1avvphi1.net Moreover, she admitted that after her
co-accused had taken the pieces of jewelry owned by respondent
Pilar, they gave her a necklace which she kept in a shoulder bag.
During the investigation, she was shown the said necklace, and she
positively identified the same to be the necklace her co-accused had
given her.47On the basis of the said admission, the Office of the
Prosecutor found basis and probable cause to file the appropriate
Information with the RTC against petitioner Rosemarie and her co-
accused Ernesto Fernandez and a certain Gudo. The inadmissibility
of the aforesaid admission on the ground that the same was
extracted under duress was an evidentiary matter, which does not
detract from the fact that based on petitioner Rosemaries
admission, there was reason for the respondents to believe that the
suit was not unfounded, and that the crime was committed.
Finally, in an action to recover damages based on malicious
prosecution, it must be established that the prosecution was
impelled by legal malice. There is necessity of proof that the suit was
so patently malicious as to warrant the award of damages under
Articles 19 to 21,48 of the Civil Code, or that the suit was grounded
on malice or bad faith.49 Moreover, it is a doctrine well-entrenched in
jurisprudence that the mere act of submitting a case to the
authorities for prosecution does not make one liable for malicious
prosecution, for the law would not have meant to impose a penalty
on the right to litigate.50 1awphi1.net
Applying the rule to the case at bar, we affirm the findings of the RTC
and the Court of Appeals that there was no proof of a sinister design
on the part of the respondents to vex or humiliate petitioner
Rosemarie by instituting the criminal case against her and her co-
accused. Respondent Pilar who was robbed of her valuable
belongings can only be expected to bring the matter to the
authorities. There can be no evil motive that should be attributed to
one, who, as victim of a crime institutes the necessary legal
proceedings. At the risk of redundancy, we stress that the
proscription against the imposition of penalty on the right to litigate
must not be violated. Mere filing of a suit does not render a person
liable for malicious prosecution should he be unsuccessful, for the
law could not have meant to impose a penalty on the right to
litigate.51 There was no other explanation or motive as to why
respondents would institute baseless prosecution of petitioner
Rosemarie. No evidence was shown that there was bad blood
between respondent Pilar and petitioner Rosemarie prior to the
supposed robbery.
We also do not find the actuations of respondents Ibarra and Juanito
to be impelled by legal malice. Their commencement of the action
against petitioner Rosemarie and her co-accused was pursuant to
Torts Human Relations Torts
their duties as police officers. The same was made subsequent to
the report of respondent Pilar of the commission of the crime, and
the investigation on the person of petitioner Rosemarie. Even then,
mistakes committed by a public officer are not actionable absent any
clear showing that they were motivated by malice or gross
negligence amounting to bad faith,52 which was not established in
the case at bar.
Moreover, as was clear from the outset, the instant case is a suit
seeking damages for malicious prosecution, and not for the
violations and maltreatment that respondents allegedly committed
against petitioner Rosemarie in extracting the admission from her. At
any rate, the RTC had ruled that the instant case is not an action on
the injuries allegedly suffered by petitioner Rosemarie, but rather for
malicious prosecution. Otherwise, an action seeking damages for
her injuries should have been deemed prescribed.53
WHEREFORE, the Appeal is DENIED. The Decision, dated 26
January 1998, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51750,
which affirmed in toto the Decision, dated 25 July 1995, of the RTC,
Branch 51, Bacolod City, in Civil Case No. 4361, is AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-48250 December 28, 1979
GRAND UNION SUPERMARKET, INC. and NELIA SANTOS
FANDINO, petitioners, vs.
JOSE J. ESPINO JR., and THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents.
"Upon the evidence, and from the findings of the lower court, it
appears that in the morning of August 22, 1970, plaintiff Jose J.
Espino. Jr., a civil engineer and an executive of Procter and Gamble
Philippines, Inc., and his wife and their two daughters went to shop
at the defendants' South Supermarket in Makati. While his wife was
shopping at the groceries section, plaintiff browsed around the other
parts of the market. Finding a cylindrical "rat tail" file which he
needed in his hobby and had been wanting to buy, plaintiff picked up
that item from one of the shelves. He held it in his hand thinking that
it might be lost, because of its tiny size, if he put it in his wife's
grocery cart. In the course of their shopping, plaintiff and his wife
saw the maid of plaintiff's aunt. While talking to this maid, plaintiff
stuck the file into the front breast pocket of his shirt with a good part
of the merchandise exposed.
"At the check-out counter, the plaintiff paid for his wife's purchases
which amounted to P77.00, but he forgot to pay for the file. As he
was leaving by the exit of the supermarket on his way to his car,
carrying two bags of groceries and accompanied by his wife and two
daughter, plaintiff was approached by a uniformed guard of the
supermarket who said: "Excuse me, Mr., I think you have something
in your pocket which you have not paid for." (p. 5, tsn, Aug. 13,
1971), pointing to his left front breast pocket. Suddenly reminded of
the file, plaintiff apologized thus: "I am sorry," and he turned back
toward the cashier to pay for the file. But the guard stopped him and
led him instead toward the rear of the supermarket. The plaintiff
protested but the guard was firm saying: "No, Mr., please come with
me. It is the procedure of the supermarket to bring people that we
apprehend to the back of the supermarket" (p. 8, Ibid). The time was
between 9 and 10 o'clock. A crowd of customers on their way into
the supermarket saw the plaintiff being stopped and led by a
uniformed guard toward the rear of the supermarket. Plaintiff
acquiesced and signaled to his wife and daughters to wait.
"The guard who had accosted plaintiff took him back inside the
supermarket in the company of his wife. Plaintiff and his wife were
directed across the main entrance to the shopping area, down the
line of check-out counters, to a desk beside the first checkout
counter. To the woman seated at the desk, who turned out to be
defendant Nelia Santos-Fandino, the guard presented the incident
report and the file, Exhibit B. Defendant Fandino read the report and
addressing the guard remarked: "Ano, nakaw na naman ito" (p. 22,
Id.).
23
"Extracting a P5.00 bill from his pocket, plaintiff told Fandino that he Relesed by Mrs. Fandino after paying the item," Exhibit A-4 which
was paying for the file whose cost was P3.85. Fandino reached over says opposite the stenciled words Remarks Noted: Grd. Ebreo
and took the P5.00 bill from plaintiff with these words: "We are fining requested Grd. Paunil to apprehend subject shoplifter," established
you P5.00. That is your the fine." Plaintiff was shocked. He and his the opinion, judgment or thinking of the management of petitioner's
wife objected vigorously that he was not a common criminal, and supermarket upon private respondent's act of picking up the file. ln
they wanted to get back the P5.00. But Fandino told them that the plain words, private respondent was regarded and pronounced a
money would be given as an incentive to the guards who apprehend shoplifter and had committed "shoplifting."
pilferers. People were milling around them and staring at the plaintiff.
Plaintiff gave up the discussion. He drew a P50.00 bill and took back
We also affirm the Court of Appeals' finding that petitioner Nelia
the file. Fandino directed him to the nearest check-out counter where
Santos Fandino, after reading the incident report, remarked the
he had to fall in line. The people who heard the exchange of words
following: "Ano, nakaw na naman ito". Such a remark made in the
between Fandino and plaintiff continued to stare at him. At the trial,
presence of private respondent and with reference to the incident
plaintiff expressed his embarrassment and humiliation thus: " I felt as
report with its entries, was offensive to private respondent's dignity
though I wanted to disappear into a hole on the ground" (p. 34, Id.).
and defamatory to his character and honesty. When Espino
After paying for the file, plaintiff and his wife walked as fast as they
explained that he was going to pay the file but simply forgot to do so,
could out of the supermarket. His first impulse was to go back to the
Fandino doubted the explanation. saying: "That is all what they say,
supermarket that night to throw rocks at its glass windows. But
the people whom we caught not paying for the goods say... they all
reason prevailed over passion and he thought that justice should
intended to pay for the things that are found to them." Private
take its due course.
respondent objected and said that he was a regular customer of the
Supermarket.
Private respondent's complaint filed on October 8, 1970 is founded
on Article 21 in relation to Article 2219 of the New Civil Code and
The admission of Fandino that she required private respondent to
prays for moral damages, exemplary damages, attorney s fees and
pay a fine of P5.00 and did in fact take the P5.00 bill of private
'expenses of litigation, costs of the suit and the return of the P5.00
respondent tendered by the latter to pay for the file, as a fine which
fine. After trial, the Court of First Instance of Pasig, Rizal, Branch XIX
would be given as an incentive to the guards who apprehend
dismissed the complaint, Interposing the appeal to the Court of
pilferers clearly proved that Fandino branded private respondent as
Appeals, the latter reversed and set aside the appealed judgment,
a thief which was not right nor justified.
granting and damages as earlier stated.

The testimony of the guard that management instructed them to

We agree with the holding of the respondent appellate court that "the
bring the suspected customers to the public area for the people to
evidence sustains the court's finding that the plaintiff had absolutely
see those kind of customers in order that they may be embarassed
no intention to steal the file." The totality of the facts and
(p. 26, tsn, Sept. 30, 1971); that management wanted "the
circumstances as found by the Court of Appeals unerringly points to
customers to be embarrassed in public so that they will not repeat
the conclusion that private respondent did not intend to steal the file
the stealing again" (p. 2, tsn, Dec. 10, 1971); that the management
and that is act of picking up the file from the open shelf was not
asked the guards "to bring these customers to different cashiers in
criminal nor done with malice or criminal intent for on the contrary,
order that they will know that they are pilferers" (p. 2, Ibid.) may
he took the item with the intention of buying and paying for it.
indicate the manner or pattern whereby a confirmed or self-
confessed shoplifter is treated by the Supermarket management but
This Court needs only to stress the following undisputed facts which in the case at bar, there is no showing that such procedure was
strongly and convincingly uphold the conclusion that private taken in the case of the private respondent who denied strongly and
respondent was not "shoplifting. Considering further the personal vehemently the charge of shoplifting.
circumstances of the private respondent. his education, position and
character showing that he is a graduate Mechanical Engineer from
Nonetheless, the false accusation charged against the private
U.P. Class 1950, employed as an executive of Proctor & Gamble
respondent after detaining and interrogating him by the uniformed
Phils., Inc., a corporate manager incharge of motoring and
guards and the mode and manner in which he was subjected,
warehousing therein; honorably discharged from the Philippine Army
shouting at him, imposing upon him a fine, threatening to call the
in 1946; a Philippine government pensionado of the United States
police and in the presence and hearing of many people at the
for six months; member of the Philippine veterans Legion; author of
Supermarket which brought and caused him humiliation and
articles published in the Manila Sunday Times and Philippines Free
embarrassment, sufficiently rendered the petitioners liable for
Press; member of the Knights of Columbus, Council No. 3713; son
damages under Articles 19 and 21 in relation to Article 2219 of the
of the late Jose Maria Espino, retired Minister, Department of
Civil Code. We rule that under the facts of the case at bar,
Foreign Affairs at the Philippine Embassy Washington, We are fully
petitioners wilfully caused loss or injury to private respondent in a
convinced, as the trial and appellate courts were, that private
manner that was contrary to morals, good customs or public policy. It
respondent did not intend to steal the article costing P3.85. Nothing
is against morals, good customs and public policy to humiliate,
in the records intimates or hints whatsoever that private respondent
embarrass and degrade the dignity of a person. Everyone must
has had any police record of any sort much less suspicion of stealing
respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his
or shoplifting.
neighbors and other persons (Article 26, Civil Code). And one must
act with justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty and
We do not lay down here any hard-and-fast rule as to what act or good faith (Article 19, Civil Code).
combination of acts constitute the crime of shoplifting for it must be
stressed that each case must be considered and adjudged on a
Private respondent is entitled to damages but We hold that the
case-to-case basis and that in the determination of whether a person
award of Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00) for moral
suspected of shoplifting has in truth and in fact committed the same,
damages and Twenty-Five Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00, for
all the attendant facts and circumstances should be considered in
exemplary damages is unconscionable and excessive.
their entirety and not from any single fact or circumstance from
which to impute the stigma of shoplifting on any person suspected
and apprehended therefor. While no proof of pecuniary loss is necessary in order that moral,
nominal, temperate, liquidated or exemplary damages may be
adjudicated, the assessment of such damages, except liquidated
We likewise concur with the Court of Appeals that "(u)pon the facts
ones, is left to the discretion of the court, according to the
and under the law, plaintiff has clearly made the cause of action for
circumstances of each case (Art. 2216, New Civil Code). In the case
damages against the defendants. Defendants wilfully caused loss or
at bar, there is no question that the whole incident that befell
injury to plaintiff in a manner that was contrary to morals, good
respondent had arisen in such a manner that was created unwittingly
customs or public policy, making them amenable to damages under
by his own act of forgetting to pay for the file. It was his
Articles 19 and 21 in relation to Article 2219 of the Civil Code." 2
forgetfullness in checking out the item and paying for it that started
the chain of events which led to his embarassment and humiliation
That private respondent was falsely accused of shoplifting is evident. thereby causing him mental anguish, wounded feelings and serious
The Incident Report (Exhibit A) with the entries thereon under Exhibit anxiety. Yet, private respondent's act of omission contributed to the
A-1 which says opposite the stenciled word SUBJECT: "Shoplifting," occurrence of his injury or loss and such contributory negligence is a
Exhibit A-3 which says opposite the stenciled words Action Taken: factor which may reduce the damages that private respondent may
Torts Human Relations Torts 24
recover (Art. 2214, New Civil Code). Moreover, that many people
were present and they saw and heard the ensuing interrogation and
altercation appears to be simply a matter of coincidence in a
supermarket which is a public place and the crowd of onlookers,
hearers or bystanders was not deliberately sought or called by
management to witness private respondent's predicament. We do
not believe that private respondent was intentionally paraded in
order to humiliate or embarrass him because petitioner's business
depended for its success and patronage the good will of the buying
public which can only be preserved and promoted by good public
relations.
As succinctly expressed by Mr. Justice J. B. L. Reyes in his
concurring and dissenting opinion in Pangasinan Transportation
Company, Inc, vs. Legaspi, 12 SCRA 598, the purpose of moral
damages is essentially indemnity or reparation, both punishment or
correction. Moral damages are emphatically not intended to enrich a
complainant at the expense of a defendant; they are awarded only to
enable the injured party to obtain means, diversion or amusements
that will serve to alleviate the moral suffering he has undergone, by
reason of the defendant's culpable action. In other words, the award
of moral damages is aimed at a restoration, within the limits of the
possible, of the spiritual status quo ante and, it must be
proportionate to the suffering inflicted.
In Our considered estimation and assessment, moral damages in
the amount of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) is reasonable and
just to award to private respondent.
The grant of Twenty-Five Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00) as
exemplary damages is unjustified. Exemplary or corrective damages
are imposed by way of example or correction for the public good, in
addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory
damages (Art. 2229, New Civil Code). Exemplary damages cannot
be recovered as a matter of right; the court will decide whether or not
they could be adjudicated (Art. 2223, New Civil Code). Considering
that exemplary damages are awarded for wanton acts, that they are
penal in character granted not by way of compensation but as a
punishment to the offender and as a warning to others as a sort of
deterrent, We hold that the facts and circumstances of the case at
bar do not warrant the grant of exemplary damages.
Petitioners acted in good faith in trying to protect and recover their
property, a right which the law accords to them. Under Article 429,
New Civil Code, the owner or lawful possessor of a thing has a right
to exclude any person from the enjoyment and disposal thereof and
for this purpose, he may use such force as may be reasonably
necessary to repel or prevent an actual or threatened unlawful
physical invasion or usurpation of his property. And since a person
who acts in the fulfillment of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right
or office exempts him from civil or criminal liability, petitioner may not
be punished by imposing exemplary damages against him. We
agree that petitioners acted upon probable cause in stopping and
investigating private respondent for taking the file without paying for
it, hence, the imposition of exemplary damages as a warning to
others by way of a deterrent is without legal basis. We, therefore,
eliminate the grant of exemplary damages to the private respondent.
In the light of the reduction of the damages, We hereby likewise
reduce the original award of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) as
attorney's fees to Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000.00).
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the judgment of the
Court of Appeals is hereby modified. Petitioners are hereby ordered
to pay, jointly and severally, to private respondent moral damages in
the sum of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) and the amount of
Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000.00) as and for attorney's fees; and
further, to return the P5.00 fine to private respondent. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 151866. September 9, 2004]
SOLEDAD CARPIO, petitioner, vs. LEONORA A.
VALMONTE, respondent.
DECISION
Torts Human Relations Torts
TINGA, J.:
Respondent Leonora Valmonte is a wedding
coordinator. Michelle del Rosario and Jon Sierra engaged her
services for their church wedding on 10 October 1996. At about 4:30
p.m. on that day, Valmonte went to the Manila Hotel where the bride
and her family were billeted. When she arrived at Suite 326-A,
several persons were already there including the bride, the brides
parents and relatives, the make-up artist and his assistant, the
official photographers, and the fashion designer. Among those
present was petitioner Soledad Carpio, an aunt of the bride who was
preparing to dress up for the occasion.
After reporting to the bride, Valmonte went out of the suite
carrying the items needed for the wedding rites and the gifts from the
principal sponsors. She proceeded to the Maynila Restaurant where
the reception was to be held. She paid the suppliers, gave the meal
allowance to the band, and went back to the suite. Upon entering the
suite, Valmonte noticed the people staring at her. It was at this
juncture that petitioner allegedly uttered the following words to
Valmonte: Ikaw lang ang lumabas ng kwarto, nasaan ang dala mong
bag? Saan ka pumunta? Ikaw lang and lumabas ng kwarto, ikaw
ang kumuha. Petitioner then ordered one of the ladies to search
Valmontes bag. It turned out that after Valmonte left the room to
attend to her duties, petitioner discovered that the pieces of jewelry
which she placed inside the comfort room in a paper bag were
lost. The jewelry pieces consist of two (2) diamond rings, one (1) set
of diamond earrings, bracelet and necklace with a total value of
about one million pesos. The hotel security was called in to help in
the search. The bags and personal belongings of all the people
inside the room were searched. Valmonte was allegedly bodily
searched, interrogated and trailed by a security guard throughout the
evening. Later, police officers arrived and interviewed all persons
who had access to the suite and fingerprinted them including
Valmonte. During all the time Valmonte was being interrogated by
the police officers, petitioner kept on saying the words Siya lang ang
lumabas ng kwarto. Valmontes car which was parked at the hotel
premises was also searched but the search yielded nothing.
A few days after the incident, petitioner received a letter from
Valmonte demanding a formal letter of apology which she wanted to
be circulated to the newlyweds relatives and guests to redeem her
smeared reputation as a result of petitioners imputations against her.
Petitioner did not respond to the letter. Thus, on 20 February 1997,
Valmonte filed a suit for damages against her before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 268. In her complaint,
Valmonte prayed that petitioner be ordered to pay actual, moral and
exemplary damages, as well as attorneys fees.
Responding to the complaint, petitioner denied having uttered
words or done any act to confront or single out Valmonte during the
investigation and claimed that everything that transpired after the
theft incident was purely a police matter in which she had no
participation. Petitioner prayed for the dismissal of the complaint and
for the court to adjudge Valmonte liable on her counterclaim.
The trial court rendered its Decision on 21 August 2000,
dismissing Valmontes complaint for damages. It ruled that when
petitioner sought investigation for the loss of her jewelry, she was
merely exercising her right and if damage results from a person
exercising his legal right, it is damnum absque injuria. It added that
no proof was presented by Valmonte to show that petitioner acted
maliciously and in bad faith in pointing to her as the culprit. The court
said that Valmonte failed to show that she suffered serious anxiety,
moral shock, social humiliation, or that her reputation was
besmirched due to petitioners wrongful act.
Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals alleging that the
trial court erred in finding that petitioner did not slander her good
name and reputation and in disregarding the evidence she
presented.
The Court of Appeals ruled differently. It opined that Valmonte
has clearly established that she was singled out by petitioner as the
one responsible for the loss of her jewelry. It cited the testimony of
Serena Manding, corroborating Valmontes claim that petitioner
confronted her and uttered words to the effect that she was the only
one who went out of the room and that she was the one who took
the jewelry.
Hence, this petition.
25
 Contrary to the trial courts finding, we find sufficient evidence
on record tending to prove that petitioners imputations against
respondent was made with malice and in bad faith.
Petitioners testimony was shorn of substance and consists
mainly of denials. She claimed not to have uttered the words
imputing the crime of theft to respondent or to have mentioned the
latters name to the authorities as the one responsible for the loss of
her jewelry. Well-settled is the rule that denials, if unsubstantiated by
clear and convincing evidence, are negative and self-serving which
merit no weight in law and cannot be given greater evidentiary value
over the testimony of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative
matters.[6]
Respondent, however, has successfully refuted petitioners
testimony. Quite credibly, she has narrated in great detail her
distressing experience on that fateful day. She testified as to how
rudely she was treated by petitioner right after she returned to the
room. Petitioner immediately confronted her and uttered the
words Ikaw lang ang lumabas ng kwarto. Nasaan ang dala mong
bag? Saan ka pumunta?Ikaw ang kumuha. Thereafter, her body was
searched including her bag and her car. Worse, during the reception,
she was once more asked by the hotel security to go to the ladies
room and she was again bodily searched.[7]
Serea Manding, a make-up artist, corroborated respondents
testimony. She testified that petitioner confronted respondent in the
presence of all the people inside the suite accusing her of being the
only one who went out of the comfort room before the loss of the
jewelry. Manding added that respondent was embarrassed because
everybody else in the room thought she was a thief.[8]
Significantly, petitioners counsel elected not to pursue her cross-
examination of the witness on this point following her terse and firm
declaration that she remembered petitioners exact defamatory words
in answer to the counsels question.[10]
Jaime Papio, Security Supervisor at Manila Hotel, likewise
contradicted petitioners allegation that she did not suspect or
mention the name of respondent as her suspect in the loss of the
jewelry.[11]
To warrant recovery of damages, there must be both a right of
action, for a wrong inflicted by the defendant, and the damage
resulting therefrom to the plaintiff. Wrong without damage, or
damage without wrong, does not constitute a cause of action.[12]
In the sphere of our law on human relations, the victim of a
wrongful act or omission, whether done willfully or negligently, is not
left without any remedy or recourse to obtain relief for the damage or
injury he sustained. Incorporated into our civil law are not only
principles of equity but also universal moral precepts which are
designed to indicate certain norms that spring from the fountain of
good conscience and which are meant to serve as guides for human
conduct.[13] First of these fundamental precepts is the principle
commonly known as abuse of rights under Article 19 of the Civil
Code. It provides that Every person must, in the exercise of his
rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give
everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith. To find the
existence of an abuse of right, the following elements must be
present: (1) there is a legal right or duty; (2) which is exercised in
bad faith; (3) for the sole intent or prejudicing or injuring another.
[14]
When a right is exercised in a manner which discards these
norms resulting in damage to another, a legal wrong is committed for
which the actor can be held accountable. [15] One is not allowed to
exercise his right in a manner which would cause unnecessary
prejudice to another or if he would thereby offend morals or good
customs. Thus, a person should be protected only when he acts in
the legitimate exercise of his right, that is when he acts with
prudence and good faith; but not when he acts with negligence or
abuse.[16]
Complementing the principle of abuse of rights are the
provisions of Articles 20 and 21 of the Civil Code which read, thus:
Art. 20. Every person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently
causes damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the same.
Art. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a
manner that is contrary to morals or good customs or public policy
shall compensate the latter for the damage.
Torts Human Relations Torts
The foregoing rules provide the legal bedrock for the award of
damages to a party who suffers damage whenever one commits an
act in violation of some legal provision, or an act which though not
constituting a transgression of positive law, nevertheless violates
certain rudimentary rights of the party aggrieved.
In the case at bar, petitioners verbal reproach against
respondent was certainly uncalled for considering that by her own
account nobody knew that she brought such kind and amount of
jewelry inside the paper bag. [17] This being the case, she had no right
to attack respondent with her innuendos which were not merely
inquisitive but outrightly accusatory. By openly accusing respondent
as the only person who went out of the room before the loss of the
jewelry in the presence of all the guests therein, and ordering that
she be immediately bodily searched, petitioner virtually branded
respondent as the thief. True, petitioner had the right to ascertain the
identity of the malefactor, but to malign respondent without an iota of
proof that she was the one who actually stole the jewelry is an act
which, by any standard or principle of law is impermissible. Petitioner
had willfully caused injury to respondent in a manner which is
contrary to morals and good customs. Her firmness and resolve to
find her missing jewelry cannot justify her acts toward
respondent. She did not act with justice and good faith for
apparently, she had no other purpose in mind but to prejudice
respondent. Certainly, petitioner transgressed the provisions of
Article 19 in relation to Article 21 for which she should be held
accountable.
Owing to the rule that great weight and even finality is given to
factual conclusions of the Court of Appeals which affirm those of the
trial court,[18] we sustain the findings of the trial court and the
appellate court that respondents claim for actual damages has not
been substantiated with satisfactory evidence during the trial and
must therefore be denied. To be recoverable, actual damages must
be duly proved with reasonable degree of certainty and the courts
cannot rely on speculation, conjecture or guesswork.[19]
Respondent, however, is clearly entitled to an award of moral
damages. Moral damages may be awarded whenever the
defendants wrongful act or omission is the proximate cause of the
plaintiffs physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social
humiliation, and similar injury[20] in the cases specified or
analogous to those provided in Article 2219 of the Civil Code.
[21]
Though no proof of pecuniary loss is necessary in order that
moral damages may be adjudicated, courts are mandated to take
into account all the circumstances obtaining in the case and assess
damages according to their discretion.[22] Worthy of note is that moral
damages are not awarded to penalize the defendant,[23] or to enrich a
complainant, but to enable the latter to obtain means, diversions or
amusements that will serve to alleviate the moral suffering he has
undergone, by reason of defendants culpable action. In any case,
award of moral damages must be proportionate to the sufferings
inflicted.[24]
Based on the foregoing jurisprudential pronouncements, we
rule that the appellate court did not err in awarding moral
damages.Considering respondents social standing, and the fact that
her profession is based primarily on trust reposed in her by her
clients, the seriousness of the imputations made by petitioner has
greatly tarnished her reputation and will in one way or the other,
affect her future dealings with her clients, the award of P100,000.00
as moral damages appears to be a fair and reasonable assessment
of respondents damages.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is DENIED. Costs against
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-38088 August 30, 1974
JOVITO N. QUISABA, petitioner, vs.
STA. INES-MELALE VENEER & PLYWOOD, INC., et
al., respondents.
In this special civil action for certiorari, 1 the sole issue of law posed
for resolution is whether a complaint for moral damages, exemplary
damages, termination pay and attorney's fees, arising from an
employer's constructive dismissal of an employee, is exclusively
cognizable by the regular courts of justice or by the National Labor
Relations Commission created by Presidential Decree No. 21,
promulgated on October 14, 1972. 2
26
Although the acts complained of seemingly appear to constitute
"matters involving employee-employer relations" as Quisaba's
dismissal was the severance of a pre-existing employee-employer
relation, his complaint is grounded not on his dismissal per se as in
fact he does not ask for reinstatement or backwages, but on
the manner of his dismissal and the consequent effects of such
dismissal.
Civil law consists of that "mass of precepts that determine or
regulate the relations ... that exist between members of a society for
the protection of private interests. 3
The "right" of the respondents to dismiss Quisaba should not be
confused with the manner in which the right was exercised and the
effects flowing therefrom. If the dismissal was done anti-socially or
oppressively, as the complaint alleges, then the respondents violated
article 1701 of the Civil Code which prohibits acts of oppression by
either capital or labor against the other, and article 21, which makes
a person liable for damages if he wilfully causes loss or injury to
another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or
public policy, the sanction for which, by way of moral damages, is
provided in article 2219, no. 10. 4
Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and
analogous cages:
xxx xxx xxx
(10) Acts and actions referred to in articles 21, ....
The case at bar is intrinsically concerned with a civil (not a labor)
dispute; 5 it has to do with an alleged violation of Quisaba's rights as
a member of society, and does not involve an existing employee-
employer relation within the meaning of section 2(1) of Presidential
Decree No. 21. The complaint is thus properly and exclusively
cognizable by the regular courts of justice, not by the National Labor
Relations Commission.
ACCORDINGLY, the order of September 18, 1973 is set aside, and
this case is hereby ordered remanded to the court a quo for further
proceedings in accordance with law. Costs against the private
respondents.
G.R. No. L-46061 November 14, 1984
ST. LOUIS REALTY CORPORATION, petitioner, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and CONRADO J. ARAMIL, respondents.
AQUINO, J.:
This case is about the recovery of damages for a wrongful
advertisement in the Sunday Times where Saint Louis Realty
Corporation misrepresented that the house of Doctor Conrado J.
Aramil belonged to Arcadio S. Arcadio.
St. Louis Realty caused to be published with the permission of
Arcadio S. Arcadio (but without permission of Doctor Aramil) in the
issue of the Sunday Times of December 15, 1968 an advertisement
with the heading "WHERE THE HEART IS.
The same advertisement appeared in the Sunday Times dated
January 5, 1969. Doctor Aramil a neuropsychiatrist and a member of
the faculty of the U. E. Ramon Magsaysay Memorial Hospital,
noticed the mistake. On that same date, he wrote St. Louis Realty
the following letter of protest:
Dear Sirs:
This is anent to your advertisements appearing in the
December 15, 1968 and January 5, 1969 issues of the Sunday
Times which boldly depicted my house at the above-mentioned
address and implying that it belonged to another person. I am
not aware of any permission or authority on my part for the use
of my house for such publicity.
Torts Human Relations Torts
This unauthorized use of my house for your promotional gain
and much more the apparent distortions therein are I believe
not only transgression to my private property but also
damaging to my prestige in the medical profession I have had
invited in several occasions numerous medical colleagues,
medical students and friends to my house and after reading
your December 15 advertisement some of them have uttered
some remarks purporting doubts as to my professional and
personal integrity. Such sly remarks although in light vein as "it
looks like your house," "how much are you renting from the
Arcadios?", " like your wife portrayed in the papers as
belonging to another husband," etc., have resulted in no little
mental anguish on my part.
I have referred this matter to the Legal Panel of the Philippine
Medical Association and their final advice is pending upon my
submission of supporting ownership papers.
I will therefore be constrained to pursue court action against
your corporation unless you could satisfactorily explain this
matter within a week upon receipt of this letter.
Judge Jose M. Leuterio observed that St. Louis Realty should
have immediately published a rectification and apology. He found
that as a result of St. Louis Realty's mistake, magnified by its utter
lack of sincerity, Doctor Aramil suffered mental anguish and his
income was reduced by about P1,000 to P1,500 a month. Moreover,
there was violation of Aramil's right to privacy (Art. 26, Civil Code).
The trial court awarded Aramil P8,000 as actual damages, P20,000
as moral damages and P2,000 as attorney's fees. St. Louis Realty
appealed to the Court of Appeals.
The Appellate Court affirmed that judgment, with Acting Presiding
Justice Magno S. Gatmaitan as ponente, and Justices Sixto A.
Domondon and Samuel F. Reyes concurring.
The Appellate Court reasoned out that St. Louis Realty committed an
actionable quasi-delict under articles 21 and 26 of the Civil Code
because the questioned advertisements pictured a beautiful house
which did not belong to Arcadio but to Doctor Aramil who, naturally,
was annoyed by that contretemps.
In this appeal, St. Louis Realty contends that the Appellate Court
ignored certain facts and resorted to surmises and conjectures. This
contention is unwarranted. The Appellate Court adopted the facts
found by the trial court. Those factual findings are binding on this
Court.
St. Louis Realty also contends that the decision is contrary to law
and that the case was decided in a way not in conformity with the
rulings of this Court. It argues that the case is not covered by article
26 which provides that "every person shall respect the dignity,
personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other
persons". "Prying into the privacy of another's residence" and
"meddling with or disturbing the private life or family relations of
another" and "similar acts", "though they may not constitute a
criminal offense, shall produce a cause of action for damages,
prevention and other relief".
The damages fixed by Judge Leuterio are sanctioned by Articles
2200, 2208 and 2219 of the Civil Code. Article 2219 allows moral
damages for acts and actions mentioned in Article 26. As lengthily
explained by Justice Gatmaitan, the acts and omissions of the firm
fan under Article 26.
St. Louis Realty's employee was grossly negligent in mixing up the
Aramil and Arcadio residences in a widely circulated publication like
the Sunday Times. To suit its purpose, it never made any written
apology and explanation of the mix-up. It just contented itself with a
cavalier "rectification ".
Persons, who know the residence of Doctor Aramil, were confused
by the distorted, lingering impression that he was renting his
residence from Arcadio or that Arcadio had leased it from him. Either
way, his private life was mistakenly and unnecessarily exposed. He
suffered diminution of income and mental anguish.
27
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Appellate Court is affirmed.
Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 179799 September 11, 2009
ZENAIDA R. GREGORIO, Petitioner, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, SANSIO PHILIPPINES, INC., and EMMA J.
DATUIN, Respondents.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
This is a petition1 for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
assailing the Decision 2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated January
31, 2007 and its Resolution 3 dated September 12, 2007 in CA-G.R.
SP No. 63602, entitled "Sansio Philippines, Inc., et al. v. Hon.
Romulo SG. Villanueva, et al."
The case arose from the filing of an Affidavit of Complaint 4 for
violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang (B.P. Blg.) 22 (Bouncing Checks
Law) by respondent Emma J. Datuin (Datuin), as Officer-in-Charge
of the Accounts Receivables Department, and upon authority of
petitioner Sansio Philippines, Inc. (Sansio), against petitioner
Zenaida R. Gregorio (Gregorio) and one Vito Belarmino, as
proprietors of Alvi Marketing, allegedly for delivering insufficiently
funded bank checks as payment for the numerous appliances
bought by Alvi Marketing from Sansio.
As the address stated in the complaint was incorrect, Gregorio was
unable to controvert the charges against her. Consequently, she was
indicted for three (3) counts of violation of B.P. Blg. 22, docketed as
Criminal Case Nos. 236544, 236545, and 236546, before the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 3, Manila.
The MeTC issued a warrant5 for her arrest, and it was served upon
her by the armed operatives of the Public Assistance and Reaction
Against Crime (PARAC) of the Department of Interior and Local
Government (DILG) on October 17, 1997, Friday, at around 9:30
a.m. in Quezon City while she was visiting her husband and their two
(2) daughters at their city residence. Gregorio was brought to the
PARAC-DILG Office where she was subjected to fingerprinting and
mug shots, and was detained. She was released in the afternoon of
the same day when her husband posted a bond for her temporary
liberty.
On December 5, 1997, Gregorio filed before the MeTC a Motion 6 for
Deferment of Arraignment and Reinvestigation, alleging that she
could not have issued the bounced checks, since she did not even
have a checking account with the bank on which the checks were
drawn, as certified by the branch manager of the Philippine National
Bank, Sorsogon Branch. She also alleged that her signature was
patently and radically different from the signatures appearing on the
bounced checks.
The MeTC granted the Motion and a reinvestigation was conducted.
In the course of the reinvestigation, Datuin submitted an Affidavit of
Desistance7 dated August 18, 1998, stating, among others, that
Gregorio was not one of the signatories of the bounced checks
subject of prosecution.
Subsequently, the assistant city prosecutor filed a Motion to
Dismiss8 dated November 12, 1998 with respect to Criminal Case
Nos. 236544-46. The MeTC granted the motion and ordered the B.P.
Blg. 22 cases dismissed.9
On August 18, 2000, Gregorio filed a complaint 10 for damages
against Sansio and Datuin before the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 12, Ligao, Albay.
The core issue to be resolved, as culled from the factual
circumstances of this case, is whether the complaint, a civil suit filed
by Gregorio, is based on quasi-delict or malicious prosecution.
Torts Human Relations Torts
It is the position of Sansio and Datuin that the complaint for
damages filed by Gregorio before the RTC was for malicious
prosecution, but it failed to allege the elements thereof, such that it
was aptly dismissed on appeal by the CA on the ground of lack of
cause of action. In their comment, citing Albenson Enterprise
Corporation v. Court of Appeals,20 they posit that Article 26 of the
Civil Code, cited by Gregorio as one of the bases for her complaint,
and Articles 19, 20, and 21 of the same Code, mentioned by the
RTC as bases for sustaining the complaint, are the very same
provisions upon which malicious prosecution is grounded. And in
order to further buttress their position that Gregorios complaint was
indeed one for malicious prosecution, they even pointed out the fact
that Gregorio prayed for moral damages, which may be awarded
only in case of malicious prosecution or, if the case is for quasi-
delict, only if physical injury results therefrom.
We disagree.
A perusal of the allegations of Gregorios complaint for damages
readily shows that she filed a civil suit against Sansio and Datuin for
filing against her criminal charges for violation of B.P. Blg. 22; that
respondents did not exercise diligent efforts to ascertain the true
identity of the person who delivered to them insufficiently funded
checks as payment for the various appliances purchased; and that
respondents never gave her the opportunity to controvert the
charges against her, because they stated an incorrect address in the
criminal complaint. Gregorio claimed damages for the
embarrassment and humiliation she suffered when she was
suddenly arrested at her city residence in Quezon City while visiting
her family. She was, at the time of her arrest, a respected Kagawad
in Oas, Albay. Gregorio anchored her civil complaint on Articles
26,21 2176,22 and 218023 of the Civil Code. Noticeably, despite
alleging either fault or negligence on the part of Sansio and Datuin,
Gregorio never imputed to them any bad faith in her complaint.
Basic is the legal principle that the nature of an action is determined
by the material averments in the complaint and the character of the
relief sought.24 Undeniably, Gregorios civil complaint, read in its
entirety, is a complaint based on quasi-delict under Article 2176, in
relation to Article 26 of the Civil Code, rather than on malicious
prosecution.
In every tort case filed under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, the
plaintiff has to prove by a preponderance of evidence: (1) the
damages suffered by him; (2) the fault or negligence of the
defendant or some other person to whose act he must respond; (3)
the connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence
and the damages incurred; and (4) that there must be no preexisting
contractual relation between the parties.25
On the other hand, Article 26 of the Civil Code grants a cause of
action for damages, prevention, and other relief in cases of breach,
though not necessarily constituting a criminal offense, of the
following rights: (1) right to personal dignity; (2) right to personal
security; (3) right to family relations; (4) right to social intercourse; (5)
right to privacy; and (6) right to peace of mind.26
A scrutiny of Gregorios civil complaint reveals that the averments
thereof, taken together, fulfill the elements of Article 2176, in relation
to Article 26 of the Civil Code. It appears that Gregorios rights to
personal dignity, personal security, privacy, and peace of mind were
infringed by Sansio and Datuin when they failed to exercise the
requisite diligence in determining the identity of the person they
should rightfully accuse of tendering insufficiently funded checks.
This fault was compounded when they failed to ascertain the correct
address of petitioner, thus depriving her of the opportunity to
controvert the charges, because she was not given proper notice.
Because she was not able to refute the charges against her,
petitioner was falsely indicted for three (3) counts of violation of B.P.
Blg. 22. Although she was never found at No. 76 Pearanda St.,
Legaspi City, the office address of Alvi Marketing as stated in the
criminal complaint, Gregorio was conveniently arrested by armed
operatives of the PARAC-DILG at her city residence at 78 K-2 St.,
Kamuning, Quezon City, while visiting her family. She suffered
embarrassment and humiliation over her sudden arrest and
detention and she had to spend time, effort, and money to clear her
tarnished name and reputation, considering that she had held
several honorable positions in different organizations and offices in
the public service, particularly her being a Kagawad in Oas, Albay at
28
the time of her arrest. There exists no contractual relation between
Gregorio and Sansio. On the other hand, Gregorio is prosecuting
Sansio, under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, for its vicarious liability,
as employer, arising from the act or omission of its employee Datuin.
These allegations, assuming them to be true, sufficiently constituted
a cause of action against Sansio and Datuin. Thus, the RTC was
correct when it denied respondents motion to dismiss.
Sansio and Datuin are in error when they insist that Gregorios
complaint is based on malicious prosecution. In an action to recover
damages for malicious prosecution, it must be alleged and
established that Sansio and Datuin were impelled by legal malice or
bad faith in deliberately initiating an action against Gregorio, knowing
that the charges were false and groundless, intending to vex and
humiliate her.27 As previously mentioned, Gregorio did not allege this
in her complaint. Moreover, the fact that she prayed for moral
damages did not change the nature of her action based on quasi-
delict. She might have acted on the mistaken notion that she was
entitled to moral damages, considering that she suffered physical
suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched
reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, and social humiliation on
account of her indictment and her sudden arrest.
Verily, Gregorio was only acting within her right when she instituted
against Sansio and Datuin an action she perceived to be proper,
given the factual antecedents of the case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated
January 31, 2007 and the Resolution dated September 12, 2007 are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Costs against respondents.
SO ORDERED.
SPOUSES LUIGI M. GUANIO and ANNA HERNANDEZ-GUANIO,
vs. MAKATI SHANGRI-LA HOTEL and RESORT, INC.,
For their wedding reception on July 28, 2001, spouses Luigi M.
Guanio and Anna Hernandez-Guanio (petitioners) booked at the
Shangri-la Hotel Makati (the hotel).
A day before the event or on July 27, 2001, the parties finalized and
forged their contract.[1]
Petitioners claim that during the reception, respondents
representatives, Catering Director Bea Marquez and Sales Manager
Tessa Alvarez, did not show up despite their assurance that they
would; their guests complained of the delay in the service of the
dinner; certain items listed in the published menu were unavailable;
the hotels waiters were rude and unapologetic when confronted
about the delay; and despite Alvarezs promise that there would be
no charge for the extension of the reception beyond 12:00 midnight,
they were billed and paid P8,000 per hour for the three-hour
extension of the event up to 4:00 A.M. the next day.
Petitioners further claim that they brought wine and liquor in
accordance with their open bar arrangement, but these were not
served to the guests who were forced to pay for their drinks.
Petitioners thus sent a letter-complaint to the Makati Shangri-la Hotel
and Resort, Inc. (respondent) and received an apologetic reply from
Krister Svensson, the hotels Executive Assistant Manager in charge
of Food and Beverage. They nevertheless filed a complaint for
breach of contract and damages before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Makati City.
By Decision of August 17, 2006, Branch 148 of the Makati RTC
rendered judgment in favor of petitioners, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment
is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and
against the defendant ordering the defendants
to pay the plaintiff the following:
1) The amount of P350,000.00 by
way of actual damages;
Torts Human Relations Torts
2) The amount of P250,000.00 for
and as moral damages;
3) The amount of P100,000.00 as
exemplary damages;
4) The amount of P100,000.00 for
and as attorneys fees.
With costs against the defendant.
SO ORDERED.[3]
On appeal, the Court of Appeals, by Decision of July 27, 2009,
[6]
reversed the trial courts decision, it holding that the proximate
cause of petitioners injury was an unexpected increase in their
guests.
Petitioners motion for reconsideration having been denied by
Resolution of November 18, 2009, the present petition for review
was filed.
The Court finds that since petitioners complaint arose from a
contract, the doctrine of proximate cause finds no application to it:
The doctrine of proximate cause is applicable only
in actions for quasi-delicts, not in actions
involving breach of contract. x x x The doctrine is a device
for imputing liability to a person where there is no relation
between him and another party. In such a case, the
obligation is created by law itself. But, where there is a
pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, it is
the parties themselves who create the obligation, and the
function of the law is merely to regulate the relation thus
created.[8] (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
What applies in the present case is Article 1170 of the Civil Code
which reads:
Art. 1170. Those who in the performance of their
obligations are guilty of fraud, negligence or delay, and
those who in any manner contravene the tenor thereof,
are liable for damages.
RCPI v. Verchez, et al. [9] enlightens:
In culpa contractual x x x the mere
proof of the existence of the contract and the
failure of its compliance justify, prima facie, a
corresponding right of relief. The law,
recognizing the obligatory force of contracts, will
not permit a party to be set free from liability for
any kind of misperformance of the contractual
undertaking or a contravention of the tenor
thereof. A breach upon the contract confers
upon the injured party a valid cause for
recovering that which may have been lost or
suffered. The remedy serves to preserve the
interests of the promissee that may include
his expectation interest, which is his interest in
having the benefit of his bargain by being put in
as good a position as he would have been in
had the contract been performed, or
his reliance interest, which is his interest in
being reimbursed for loss caused by reliance on
the contract by being put in as good a position
as he would have been in had the contract not
been made; or his restitution interest, which is
his interest in having restored to him any benefit
that he has conferred on the other party.
Indeed, agreements can accomplish little, either
for their makers or for society, unless they are
made the basis for action. The effect of every
infraction is to create a new duty, that is, to
make RECOMPENSE to the one who has been
injured by the failure of another to observe his
contractual obligation unless he can show
extenuating circumstances, like proof of his
exercise of due diligence x x x or of
the attendance of fortuitous event, to
excuse him from his ensuing liability. (emphasis
29
 and underscoring in the original; capitalization
supplied)

The pertinent provisions of the Banquet and

Meeting Services Contract between the parties read:

4.3 The ENGAGER shall be billed in

accordance with the prescribed rate for the
minimum guaranteed number of persons
contracted for, regardless of under attendance
or non-appearance of the expected number of
guests, except where the ENGAGER cancels
the Function in accordance with its Letter of
Confirmation with the HOTEL. Should the
attendance exceed the minimum guaranteed
attendance, the ENGAGER shall also be billed
at the actual rate per cover in excess of the
minimum guaranteed attendance.

xxxx

4.5. The ENGAGER must inform the

HOTEL at least forty eight (48) hours before the
scheduled date and time of the Function of any
change in the minimum guaranteed covers. In
the absence of such notice, paragraph 4.3 shall
apply in the event of under attendance. In case
the actual number of attendees exceed the
minimum guaranteed number by ten percent
(10%), the HOTEL shall not in any way be
held liable for any damage or
inconvenience which may be caused
thereby. The ENGAGER shall also undertake
to advise the guests of the situation and take
positive steps to remedy the same.
[10]
(emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied)

Breach of contract is defined as the failure without legal

reason to comply with the terms of a contract. It is also defined as
the [f]ailure, without legal excuse, to perform any promise which
forms the whole or part of the contract.[11]

The appellate court, and even the trial court, observed that
petitioners were remiss in their obligation to inform respondent of the
change in the expected number of guests. The observation is
reflected in the records of the case. Petitioners failure to discharge
such obligation thus excused, as the above-quoted paragraph 4.5 of
the parties contract provide, respondent from liability for any damage
or inconvenience occasioned thereby.

As for petitioners claim that respondent departed from

its verbal agreement with petitioners, the same fails, given that the
written contract which the parties entered into the day before the
event, being the law between them.

In the present petition, under considerations of equity, the

Court deems it just to award the amount of P50,000.00 by way of
nominal damages to petitioners, for the discomfiture that they were
subjected to during to the event.[15] The Court recognizes that every
person is entitled to respect of his dignity, personality, privacy and
peace of mind.[16] Respondents lack of prudence is an affront to this
right.

WHEREFORE, the Court of Appeals Decision dated July

27, 2009 is PARTIALLY REVERSED. Respondent is, in light of the
foregoing discussion, ORDERED to pay the amount of P50,000.00
to petitioners by way of nominal damages.

SO ORDERED.

Torts Human Relations Torts 30