General McChrystal & General Abizaid Gave

Contradictory Testimony at Congressional Hearings

Note on References:

DoD IG Report, refers to the Dept. of Defense Inspector General Report 3-26-07

Jones 15-6, refers to CPL Tillman AR 15-6 Investigation, BG Gary M. Jones 12-28-04

HOC 8-01-07, refers to House Oversight & Govt. Reform Committee Hearing 8-01-07

SASC 6-02-09, refers to the Senate Armed Services Committee Confirmation Hearing

“The operational chain of command for CPL Tillman’s unit … was: (DoD IG, p.12)

1. Headquarters, Operations Team [LTC Bailey, Major Hodne?]

2. Headquarters, 75th Ranger Regiment [COL Nixon]
3. Headquarters, Joint Task Force [GEN McChrystal]
4. CENTCOM [GEN Abizaid]

...

April 22, 2004:

CPL Pat Tillman is killed in action in Afghanistan. (p.70, DoD IG Report, Appendix B:
Chronology)

“The Joint Task Force [McChrystal’s] Chief of Staff COL [?] approved transmission of the
casualty report of CPL Tillman’s death at about 10:30 PM local time, April 22, 2004.” (p.43,
DoD IG Report, Appendix B: Chronology)

...
April 23, 2004:
LTC [Bailey] … and CSM [Birch] … tell COL [Nixon] … that he suspects fratricide and that an
investigation was initiated. (p.70, DoD IG Report, Appendix B: Chronology):

LTC BAILEY: “Sir, within three or four hours [on April 23rd] of being out here on the
ground by the incident, I went back and I told [COL Nixon] that I was certain that we
had killed him. I mean, there was some doubt and we needed to do the 15-6. So, from
that time forward, I never doubted whether or not we had killed Pat Tillman. In fact, I
think just about everybody around knew that.” [Jones 15-6. Section Z, p 52-53)

COL NIXON: “The night after or probably the day after the actual incident [I learned
of possibility of fratricide]. … I think on the day of the 23rd I got some indication that
there might have been some fratricide.” … “Sir, I believe it was on the [23rd?] 24th [that I
directed Bailey to conduct an initial 15-6]” (Jones 15-6, Section AM, p. 2)

COL Nixon calls MG McChrystal to inform him of CPL Tillman’s death. (p.70, DoD IG Report,
Appendix B: Chronology)

Note: COL Nixon is told of suspected fratricide by LTC Bailey and yet doesn’t tell MG
McChrystal?

...

MG McChrystal … while meeting with GEN Abizaid … tells him that Tillman was killed in
action. (p.71, DoD IG Report, Appendix B: Chronology):

ABIZAID: “I believe about the 23rd, GEN McChrystal called me and told me that
Corporal Tillman had been killed in combat, and that the circumstances surrounding his
death were heroic. I called the Chairman and discussed that with the Chairman.” (p. 23,
HOC 8-01-07)

ABIZAID: “When General McChrystal called on or about 23 April he did not mention
any possibility of friendly fire. He told me that Corporal Tillman had been killed in a fire
fight in Afghanistan.” (1-15-08 Abizaid written response to Congressman Waxman)

“On interview with us, GEN Abizaid testified that MG McChrystal informed him of CPL
Tillman’s death while they were in Qatar for a meeting at the time CPL Tillman was
killed. GEN Abizaid said that the action resulted in other casualties, but he received no
details and did not know friendly fire was suspected.” (DoD IG, p.24)

...
 MCCHRYSTAL: “Corporal Tillman was killed on the 22nd of April … I arrived back
into Afghanistan from a meeting in Qatar with General Abizaid on about the 23rd, and I
was informed, at that point, that they suspected that friendly fire might have been the
cause of death, and that they had initiated what we call a 15-6, or an investigation of
that.” (p.17 SASC, 6-02-09)

MCCHRYSTAL: “I was in Qatar when I was told [that possibly fratricide], about a day
or two after the incident. [23rd or 24th] No more than three days later [25th]. [Nixon]
told me that they suspected fratricide at that time – no later than 25 April. He gave me a
brief overview of the situation and told me that based on what he had heard, he believed
there was a potential for fratricide and was investigating it. I told him that I concurred
with him that an initial 15-6 investigation was appropriate.” (Jones 15-6, Section AP)

...

Note on Contradictory Testimony:

General Abizaid said General McChrystal informed him of Tillman’s death while they were in a
meeting in Qatar. McChrystal called on April 23rd and said Tillman was killed in combat and his
death was heroic (or “no details”?) McChrystal did not mention the possibility of friendly fire.

General McChrystal said he was in Qatar (or “arrived back … from a meeting in Qatar with
GEN Abizaid”?) when he was told by COL Nixon on April 23rd of possible fratricide (During IG
interview Nixon and/or McChrystal said that McChrystal was just told of “death” on 23rd.)

The testimony doesn’t match up! Nixon says he only told McChrystal that Tillman was KIA ,
but McChrystal says Nixon told him about fratricide. Abizaid says that McChrystal only told
him about KIA on the 23rd, yet McChrystal says he had been told of fratricide by Nixon. Are
we to believe that McChrystal didn’t tell Abizaid of fratricide, then waited six days to send
Abizaid a P4 instead of just picking up the phone?

And McChrystal contradicts himself about whether he was in Qatar or back in Afghanistan when
he heard the news of fratricide.

April 24, 2004:

CPL Tillman’s Platoon returns to the battalion Forward Operation Base. (p.71, DoD IG Report,
Appendix B: Chronology)
 LTC BAILEY: “Sir, within three or four hours of being out here on the ground by the
incident, I went back and I told [COL Nixon] that I was certain that we had killed
him[April 23rd]. … In fact, I think just about everybody around knew that.

And certainly, by the next day [24th] when we did the investigations, I confirmed it. …
So, after [CPT Scott] did his first five interviews, he came back to me and said, “Sir, I’m
certain. I’m sure.” And then I called [COL Nixon]. … I think it was the 24th. [Jones 15-
5. Section Z, p 52-53)

Note: LTC Bailey told COL Nixon of confirmed fratricide on the 24th. … Next in the chain of
command was MG McChrystal, followed by GEN Abiziad. I think it’s reasonable to assume
word of confirmed fratricide was passed on by phone rapidly up to SEC Rumsfeld and the White
House.

COL NIXON: “…I believed it was my responsibility to tell the family once I had the
facts involved with that. …And it took a considerable time to get truth or the best level of
truth that we could get out of that investigation.” (Jones 15-6, Section AM, p. 9 -10)

NOTE: “Considerable time” being two days! Scott “was certain. I’m sure” on the 24th! This
fratricide confirmation was passed up to Nixon, and presumably up the chain of command to
McChrystal, Abizaid, Meyers, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, White House!

All the Army’s talk of “potential” fratricide taking five weeks to figure out for sure was complete
BS! McChrystal knew of confirmed fratricide long before he wrote the Silver Star and P4
memo.

April 25, 2004:

No later than April 25th, Nixon tells McChrystal that fratricide is suspected and an investigation
initiated. (p.71, DoD IG Report, Appendix B: Chronology)

Platoon AAR (After Action Review) conducted.

April 28, 2004:

MG McChrystal, Commander Joint Task Force, approves the Silver Star citation. (p.72, DoD IG
Report, Appendix B: Chronology)
April 29, 2004:
Silver Star approved by Acting Secretary of the Army Brownlee (p.72, DoD IG Report,
Appendix B: Chronology)

CPT Scott’s 15-6 Final Report submitted to COL Nixon.

COL Nixon creates written appointment of CPT Scott to conduct a 15-6 investigation.

MG McChrystal sends a “Personal For’ (P4) message to GEN Abizaid, GEN Brown, and LTG
Kensinger telling them friendly fire would be the likely outcome of the pending investigation and
recommends they warn the President to avoid embarrassment in their possible speeches (p.72,
DoD IG Report, Appendix B: Chronology)

.Note: Was McChrystal’s & Nixon’s original intent to assert that they had just discovered the
potential for fratricide on the 29th? They “disappeared” Scott’s 4-29 Final Report 15-6, then
gave Scott a written appointment to start the 15-6 on the 29th. They could pretend that they had
just discovered the potential fratricide on the 29th, after they had forwarded the Silver Star
recommendation. The P4 memo was just to provide themselves with a written CYA document;
everyone above them already knew about confirmed fratricide.

May 3, 2004:
CPL Tillman memorial service is held in San Jose, CA (p.72, DoD IG Report, Appendix B:
Chronology)

May 28, 2004:

GEN Abiziad, Commander CENTCOM, approves the completed legal investigation.

General ABIZAID: “Congressman, on the 28th I approved the report that came from General
McChrystal’s command as being definite proof of friendly fire (p.214, HOC 8-01-07).