Documente Academic
Documente Profesional
Documente Cultură
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at
http://about.jstor.org/terms
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted
digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about
JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
University of Hawai'i Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Korean
Studies
This content downloaded from 190.192.144.57 on Wed, 13 Jul 2016 12:54:55 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
Comparative Colonial Response:
Korea and Taiwan
Dennis L. McNamara
This content downloaded from 190.192.144.57 on Wed, 13 Jul 2016 12:54:55 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
COMPARATIVE COLONIAL RESPONSE 55
This content downloaded from 190.192.144.57 on Wed, 13 Jul 2016 12:54:55 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
56 MCNAMARA
This content downloaded from 190.192.144.57 on Wed, 13 Jul 2016 12:54:55 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
COMPARATIVE COLONIAL RESPONSE 57
Chinese mainland. There was little expansion in the production and export
of rice and sugar between 1860 and 1895,7 though exports of tea to the
United States and Europe grew significantly.8 It is important to note here
that Japan's role in Taiwan's foreign trade at the time was minimal.9 Apart
from foreign trade, there had been little economic growth on the islands
prior to annexation. The harbors and Keelung-Hsinchu Railroad were in
disrepair and post and telegraph services inadequate. The islands lacked
both stable financial organs and a reliable currency system. Plagues and
disease were frequent due to poor hygiene and a lack of sanitation facilities
in the tropical climate. This situation of economic underdevelopment
through 1895 made even modest accomplishments under the Japanese
administration appear significant.
In contrast, indigenous reform programs, together with the gradual
economic penetration of the Korean peninsula by the Japanese for the
twenty years prior to the Protectorate of 1905, encouraged development
of a market economy and a growing foreign trade in grains while Korea
was still independent. Grain cultivation was intensified, a marketing and
transport system developed, and the trade in rice and soybeans expanded.
There was also greater attention given to economic infrastructures than
in Taiwan prior to its annexation. The Seoul-Inch'n and Seoul-Pusan
railroads were in operation before 1905. The volume of Japanese shipping
traffic in the ports of Inch'n, Pusan, and Mokp'o had increased remark
ably prior to annexation. The use from 1902 of Daiichi Bank notes as
a yen currency symbolized the growing reliance of the peninsula upon
Japanese banking facilities even before the Protectorate. And finally,
disease and epidemics were less severe in the continental climate of Korea
than in tropical Taiwan. Such economic accomplishments in Korea prior
to 1905 dulled the glamor of development under the Japanese through
1919.
The administrations in Korea and Taiwan pursued similar "agri
culture first" policies through 1919, together with investment in support
ing infrastructures such as harbors and railroads. Cadastral surveys were
undertaken to ascertain land ownership in both colonies. Initial surveys
were completed by 1903 in Taiwan, and government bonds exchanged for
hereditary land rights beginning in 1905. The Cadastral Survey in Korea
was completed in 1918, after eight years of surveys, decisions, and ap
peals.10 There was no similar program in Korea of government bonds
being exchanged for land rights. The surveys in both colonies spurred re
sentment at the outset, for the historical complexity of ownership rights
was not easily resolved by interviews and reviews of land registers. But
two differences were apparent in the land survey projects in these colonies.
First, former hereditary landowners in Taiwan who reinvested capital
from government bonds in business and industry were already benefitting
by 1919 from growth in the Taiwanese economy. In Korea the advantages
This content downloaded from 190.192.144.57 on Wed, 13 Jul 2016 12:54:55 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
58 MCNAMARA
of clear title for purposes of industrial reinvestment would not have been
apparent until textile and other light manufacturing projects had begun
in the mid-1920s or later. Secondly, the relatively rapid completion of the
land survey in Taiwan, as against the extended Korean project, indicates
the greater size of Korea and complexity of landownership rights. Reforms
and adjustments in the relatively more complex Korean economy would
take more time.
Grain production and export were expanded in both colonies
through 1919. The annual rice crop in Taiwan increased from 4,354,000
koku (Korean: sk) in 1905 to 4,842,000 koku in 1920.11 The annual average
rice crop in Korea grew from 11,816,000 koku between 1911 and 1914,
to 13,694,000 koku between 1915 and 1919.12 Rice exports represented 16
percent of the Taiwanese rice crop in 1915 and 13 percent in 1920. Korean
exports of rice represented an annual average of 10 percent of the total
rice harvest between 1910 and 1914 and 16 percent between 1915 and
1919. Koreans also exported soybeans and other grains, while Taiwan's
other major export item was sugar. The production and export of Taiwan
ese sugar grew remarkably in the early colonial period, with a growth in
average annual production of better than 300 percent in the first two de
cades of the twentieth century.13 There was no comparable development
of a cash crop in early colonial Korea. Clearly the effect of the adminis
tration's economic policies was more dramatic in Taiwan than in Korea.
The colonial administration in Taiwan quickly organized communi
cation networks as a basis for development. A three-hundred mile rail
road system was in place by 1905 and soon expanded, together with
development of a network of feeder lines for the light pushcars [daisha].
The ports of Keelung in the north and Kaohsiung in the south were
connected by rail in 1908.14 By 1920 there were some 398 miles of public
railways in Taiwan.15 This system enabled the Taiwanese to move large
quantities of agricultural and forestry products, as well as light manu
factured goods, with efficiency and speed. The main railway lines in Korea,
completed prior to annexation, had likewise facilitated marketing of
agricultural and light manufacturing goods. Military priorities later
prompted extension of the Korean line to Siniju in the north and to the
naval port of Masan in the south.
Differences in railroad construction exemplified the differences in
administrative priorities in the two colonies, and consequently the differ
ences in the effects of colonial control experienced by the two populations.
While the earlier Seoul-Pusan and Seoul-Inch'n lines served the greater
Korean population, military railroads in the sparsely populated areas of
northern Korea were of little economic benefit to the majority of Koreans.
Yet railroads in Taiwan were dramatic examples of development benefit
ting the wider population.
This content downloaded from 190.192.144.57 on Wed, 13 Jul 2016 12:54:55 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
COMPARATIVE COLONIAL RESPONSE 59
This content downloaded from 190.192.144.57 on Wed, 13 Jul 2016 12:54:55 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
60 MCNAMARA
This content downloaded from 190.192.144.57 on Wed, 13 Jul 2016 12:54:55 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
COMPARATIVE COLONIAL RESPONSE 61
The theory of the assimilation policy is that the Koreans should first become
Japanized, after which political rights will become theirs as a matter of course.
In the execution of this policy, the government plays the part of an undemocratic
and despotic organization.20
This content downloaded from 190.192.144.57 on Wed, 13 Jul 2016 12:54:55 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
62 MCNAMARA
This content downloaded from 190.192.144.57 on Wed, 13 Jul 2016 12:54:55 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
COMPARATIVE COLONIAL RESPONSE 63
This content downloaded from 190.192.144.57 on Wed, 13 Jul 2016 12:54:55 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
64 MCNAMARA
This content downloaded from 190.192.144.57 on Wed, 13 Jul 2016 12:54:55 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
COMPARATIVE COLONIAL RESPONSE 65
Conclusion
This content downloaded from 190.192.144.57 on Wed, 13 Jul 2016 12:54:55 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
66 MCNAMARA
1919. At the same time, resentment over alien control and especially over
economic discrimination between Japanese residents and Koreans fueled
anti-Japanese sentiments. The Japanese served as enemy, a negative stimu
lus for ethnic identity. Structures of political and economic dependence
thus served to limit ethnic autonomy, but ironically also encouraged
Korean efforts to sustain whatever autonomy was possible.
Although the structures of colonial dependence limited ethnic auton
omy, the earlier heritage of independence in turn affected the very im
plementation of those structures. For instance, the heritage of political
autonomy affected Japanese political penetration and annexation of
Korea. Korea was annexed through treaty agreement between two nom
inally sovereign states. The legacy of sociocultural autonomy likewise
strongly affected colonial efforts to establish structures of cultural depen
dence. A network of Korean private schools was already in place prior to
annexation, affecting colonial educational policies on the peninsula. The
variety, organization, and strength of indigenous religious groups in Korea
also hampered administration efforts to promote pro-Japanese sentiments
among the wider population. Thus while structures of political and eco
nomic dependence in some ways limited development of a modern Korean
indigenous identity, the legacy of independence itself conditioned the shape
and effects of these same structures.
Limited ethnic autonomy, based on linguistic and racial ties as well
as on a long tradition of domestic autonomy, was a critical factor in pat
terns of Korean reaction to Japanese colonial control. Aspirations for re
covery of such autonomy inspired the literati leadership in the Righteous
Armies. Enlightenment activists came to focus their hopes on cultural in
dependence as providing a link with Korea's past and as a path towards
modern political and cultural sovereignty.
Our comparison suggests not only the relative strength of the
Korean ethnic autonomy in contrast to the situation in Taiwan, but also
the substance of such an identity. Korean elites developed ideologies in
these years supportive of such autonomy. They emphasized symbols of
autonomy such as the monarchy; Korea's language, territory, and re
sources; and a Korean civilization. These elites also enjoyed structural sup
port in their efforts to sustain a native identity. For instance, there were
domestic networks for information sharing, with a network of socie
ties, shrines, and rural schools that was especially strong in the south.
Enlightenment intellectuals were active in private schools, particularly in
Christian schools throughout the country. There were also groups of
Korean intellectuals in exile in China and elsewhere, devoting their careers
to active support of Korean autonomy. Religious organizations such as
the Presbyterian and Methodist churches and members of the Church of
the Heavenly Way provided an independent network supportive of efforts
to preserve an indigenous Korean identity.
This content downloaded from 190.192.144.57 on Wed, 13 Jul 2016 12:54:55 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
COMPARATIVE COLONIAL RESPONSE 67
This study of Japan's two leading colonies sheds light on the pres
ence and strength of structural bases for a limited ethnic autonomy in
Korea through 1919. Such bases were strong enough to sustain an indig
enous racial identity despite establishment of the political and economic
structures of colonial dependence.
NOTES
This content downloaded from 190.192.144.57 on Wed, 13 Jul 2016 12:54:55 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
68 MCNAMARA
13. Ho, Economic Development, p. 357, Table A 43. See also Ramon H. Myers and
Adrienne Ching, "Agricultural Development in Taiwan under Japanese Colonial Rule,"
Journal of Asian Studies 23, no. 4 (1964), pp. 555-570.
14. Ho, Economic Development, p. 28.
15. Ibid., p. 35. The figure cited is 637 kilometers.
16. Lee Yong-hee, "The Spiritual Aspect of Korea-Japan Relations: A Historical
Review of Complications Arising from the Consciousness of Peripheral Culture," Social Sci
ence Journal (Seoul) 3 (1975), pp. 20-45; Koh Byung-ik, "The Attitude of Koreans Toward
Japan," in Listening to Korea, ed. Marshall R. Pihl (New York: Praeger, 1965), pp. 43-52;
Hatada Takeshi, "Kindai ni okeru Chsenjin no Nihonkan" (Koreans' view of Japan in the
modern period), Shis 520 (October 1967), pp. 59-73.
17. See Edward I-te Chen, "Japanese Colonialism in Korea and Formosa: A Com
parison of the Systems of Political Control."
18. Ho described the ho-kd or pao-chia system as "a mutual responsibility scheme for
holding both the village and family responsible for the conduct of their members;" Economic
Development, p. 11, fn. 12. See also Ching-chih Chen, "Police and Community Control
Systems in the Empire," in Myers and Peattie, The Japanese Colonial Empire, pp. 213-239.
19. Japanese resid nts represented 4.5 percent of the total population in Taiwan in
1920, but only two perce-it of the population in Korea. See Ho, Economic Development, p.
312, Table A 10; Government-General of Chosen, Chosen in Pictures (Keijo: Government
General, 1921), Table 1.
20. "The Problems of Japanese Administration in Korea," Pacific Affairs, 11, no.
2 (June 1938), pp. 198-206.
21. Kajimura Hideki, "Shokuminchi to Nihonjin: zai Chosen Nihonjin shi no Ket
suraku" (The Japanese in colonial lands: omissions in the history of Japanese residents in
Korea), in Nihon seikalsu bunkashi, vol. 8, ed. Miyagawa Torao (Tokyo: Kawa Shutsu
Shb Shinsha, 1974), pp. 79-92.
22. There were about 318,000 Christians in Korea in 1919, or about 2 percent of the
population. See Arthur Judson Brown, The Mastery of the Far East (New York: Scribner's,
1919). p. 514. See also Spencer J. Palmer, Korea and Christianity: The Problem of Identifica
tion with Tradition (Seoul: Hollym, 1967); George L. Paik, The History of Protestant Missions
in Korea, 1832-1910 (P'yngyang: Union Christian College, 1920).
23. There were some 37,000 Christians among the 3,600,000 Taiwanese in 1924,
about 1 percent of the population. See George H. Kerr, Formosa: Licensed Revolution and
the Home Rule Movement, 1895-1945 (Honolulu, University of Hawaii Press, 1974), p. 134.
24. E. Patricia Tsurumi, Colonial Education in Taiwan, 1895-1945 (Cambridge, Mas
sachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1977), Table C.l, p. 246; see also her comparative
study, "Colonial Education in Korea and Taiwan," in Myers and Peattie, The Japanese
Colonial Empire, pp. 275-311.
25. O Ch'n-sk, Han'guk sinkyoyuksa (A New History of Korean Education)
(Seoul: Hyundae Kyoyukpsa, 1964), p. 253.
26. Harry Jerome Lamley, "The Taiwan Literati and Early Japanese Rule, 1895
1915," Ph. D. dissertation. University of Washington, 1964, pp. 210-282.
27. The term is used by Peter Worsley in The Third World (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1964), p. 64. The term suggests a basis of pre-colonial ties of race, language
and religion.
28. Edward I-te Chen, "Formosan Political Movements under Japanese Colonial
Rule, 1914-1937," Journal of Asian Studies 31, no. 3 (May 1972), p. 479. For a review of
Taiwan resistance groups in the 1920s, see E. Patricia Tsurumi, "Mental Captivity and Re
sistance: Lessons from Taiwanese Anti-Colonialism," Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars
12, no. 2 (April-June 1980), pp. 2-13.
29. The text of the student declaration can be found in Sin Sk-ho, "Samil undong
chngae" (The unfolding of the March First Movement), in Samil undong osip nyn
kinymjip, ed. Dong-A Ilbo (Seoul: Dong-A Ilbosa, 1963), pp. 160-162. For a study of the
students' role in the movement, see Kim Sng-sik, "Han'guk haksaeng undong i sasangjk
pagyng" (The ideological background of the Korean student movement), Asea Yn'gu 12,
no. 1 (March 1969), pp. 3-21.
This content downloaded from 190.192.144.57 on Wed, 13 Jul 2016 12:54:55 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms