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CriminalProcedureandthe
MassachusettsConstitution
ROBERTJ.CORDY
ABSTRACT
Hon.RobertJ.Cordy,AssociateJusticeoftheMassachusettsSupremeJudicialCourt.J.D.,
HarvardLawSchool;A.B.,DartmouthCollege.
815
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INTRODUCTION
I
n his newly published book The Law of American State Constitutions,
Professor Robert F. Williams has produced an extraordinary study of
the function and importance of state constitutions.1 Among the many
strands and trends of state constitutional interpretation explored in the
book, Professor Williamshas chartedand given context to what has been
termedtheNewJudicialFederalism(NJF).Thistermdescribesthefact
that State judges in numerous cases have interpreted their State
constitutional rights provisions to provide more protection than the
nationalminimumstandardguaranteedbythefederalconstitution.2Legal
scholarsdatethebeginningofthisphenomenontothe1970s.3Althoughno
longer a new development, Professor Williams documents its entrance
onto the national jurisprudential stage and the explosion of interest in
therightscontainedinstateconstitutionsthatfollowed.4
Tohighlightboththecontroversysurroundingitandtheimportanceof
state supreme courts and their recent rediscovery of state constitutional
law,5 Williams points to the samesex marriage case decided by the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) in 2003, Goodridge v.
Department of Public Health,6 describing it as perhaps the most broadly
influential state court decision... in recent memory.7 In that case, the
Court essentially struck down state laws that limited marriage to
heterosexual couples based on the equal protection and due process
guaranteesoftheMassachusettsConstitution.8Whilethereisnodoubtas
tothesignificanceoftheGoodridgecaseanditscontributiontothenational
debateonthemeaningofsuchguaranteesforgayandlesbianindividuals
(presentinmanystateconstitutions),thefocusofthisArticleisonanother
categorycriminal procedureof NJF developmentsthat have had major
implications for the practice of criminal law and have significantly
impactedthedaytodaylivesofMassachusettsjudges,citizens,andpolice.
Thefieldofcriminalprocedurehasbeendenotedasthedrivingforce
behind the NJF.9 The establishment of parallel rights and protections in
this fieldfederal and statecontinues to accelerate and expand. When I
1SeeROBERTF.WILLIAMS,THELAWOFAMERICANSTATECONSTITUTIONS(2009).
2Id.at114(emphasisomitted).
3Id.at113.
4Id.at8,113.
5Id.at5.
6798N.E.2d941(Mass.2003).
7WILLIAMS,supranote1,at283.
8Goodridge,798N.E.2dat953,969.
9WILLIAMS,supranote1,at125.
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attendedaMassachusettslawschoolintheearly1970s,Idonotrecallever
being directed to the Massachusetts Constitution on a point of criminal
procedure. In the four years that followed my graduation, as a public
defender in Massachusetts, I do not recall relying on the Massachusetts
Constitutioninsupportofanyargumentregardingtherightsofmyclients
(ortheirviolation).AlthoughvigorousinouruseoftheU.S.Constitution
and the array of Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendment rights then so
recentlyappliedtothestatesbytheU.S.SupremeCourt,theDeclarationof
Rights of the Massachusetts Constitution was hardly a footnote in our
briefs.10Thathaschangeddramatically.Today,itvergesonineffectiveness
foranattorneyinacriminalcasenottoseekreliefandprotectionforhisor
herclientundertheprovisionsofbothconstitutions.11
One of the early calls to arms that spurred the NJF forward into the
fieldofcriminalprocedurecamefromJusticeWilliamBrennan,inthewake
of what appeared to be the beginning of the retreat of the Burger Court
fromthefederalconstitutionalizationofstatecriminalprocedure,begunin
earnestbytheWarrenCourtofthe1960s.12In1977,JusticeBrennanwrote:
[S]tate courts cannot rest when they have afforded their citizens
the full protections of the federal Constitution. State
constitutions, too, are a font of individual liberties, their
protections often extending beyond those required by the
Supreme Courts interpretation of federal law. The legal
revolutionwhichhasbroughtfederallawtotheforemustnotbe
allowedtoinhibittheindependentprotectiveforceofstatelaw
for without it, the full realization of our liberties cannot be
10See,e.g.,Commonwealthv.Upton,476N.E.2d548,55556(Mass.1985)([TheSJC]never
affordedmoresubstantiveprotectiontocriminaldefendantsunderart.14oftheDeclaration
ofRightsthanprevailsundertheConstitutionoftheUnitedStates....).
11SeeRobertJ.Cordy,APracticalViewfromtheAppellateBench,BOSTONB.J.,Jan.Feb.2002,
prohibitionthroughtheFourteenthAmendment);Washingtonv.Texas,388U.S.14,23(1967)
(holding that petitioner was denied his right to compulsory process for obtaining
witnesses); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966) (affirming all criminal defendants
rightsundertheFifthAmendmenttoprotectionfromselfincrimination);Pointerv.Texas,380
U.S. 400, 405 (1965) (To deprive an accused of the right to crossexamine the witnesses
against him is a denial of the Fourteenth Amendments guarantee of due process of law.);
Malloyv.Hogan,378U.S.1,6(1964)([T]heFifthAmendmentsexceptionfromcompulsory
selfincriminationisalsoprotectedbytheFourteenthAmendmentagainstabridgementbythe
States.); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963) (providing a right to counsel to all
indigent defendants); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 657 (1961) (holding that the exclusionary
ruleisanessentialpartofboththeFourthandFourteenthAmendments).
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guaranteed....13
13WilliamJ.Brennan,Jr.,StateConstitutionsandtheProtectionofIndividualRights,90HARV.
L. REV.489,491(1977).JusticeGreaneyoftheSJCagreed,stating: Thenatureoffederalism
requiresthat[s]tate[s]upreme[c]ourtsand[s]tate[c]onstitutionsbestrongandindependent
repositories of authority in order to protect the rights of their citizens. Commonwealth v.
Gonsalves,711N.E.2d108,115(Mass.1999).
14411N.E.2d1274(Mass.1980).
15Id.at1275.ForabriefhistoryofdeathpenaltydecisionsinMassachusetts,seeOpinionof
the Justices, 364 N.E.2d 184, 185 (Mass. 1977); Commonwealth v. ONeal, 339 N.E.2d 676, 679
(Mass. 1975). See also Alan Rogers, The Death Penalty and Reversible Error in Massachusetts, 6
PIERCEL.REV.515,529(2008).
16408U.S.238(1972).
17Seeid.at23940.
18Id.at128485.
19SeeCommonwealthv.Upton(UptonI),458N.E.2d717,719(Mass.1983).
20See Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 41819 (1969); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108,
11415(1964).
21UptonI,458N.E.2dat72023.
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Gates,22 in which the U.S. Supreme Court had suggested a more flexible
viewofthestandardtobeappliedtoinformationsuppliedbyaninformant
but determined that the Supreme Court had not abandoned the Aguilar
Spinelli twoprong standard for an unacceptably shapeless and
permissive23totalityofthecircumstancestest.24TheSJCwentontonote
that:
IfwehavecorrectlyconstruedthesignificanceofIllinoisv.Gates,
the Fourth Amendment standards for determining probable
causetoissueasearchwarranthavenotbeenmadesomuchless
clear and so relaxed as to compel us to try our hand at a
definitionofstandardsunderart.14[oftheDeclarationofRights
oftheMassachusettsConstitution,theMassachusettsanalogueto
thatamendment].25
TheSupremeCourtrespondedsoonthereafterinapercuriamopinion,
Massachusettsv.Upton(UptonII),26underscoringthatithadindeedadopted
a new, totality of the circumstances test for purposes of satisfying the
Fourth Amendments requirement of probable cause in Gates.27
Consequently,itreversedthejudgmentoftheSJCandremandedthecase
for further proceedings in light of its holding.28 Justices Brennan and
Marshall dissented, and Justice Stevens concurred but lamented the fact
that the SJC had not first decided whether the warrant was valid under
Massachusettslaw.29
On remand, the SJC proceeded as it suggested it might in Upton I,
22462U.S.213(1983).
23UptonI,458N.E.2dat724.
24Id.at721.
25Id.Article14oftheDeclarationofRightsoftheMassachusettsConstitutionprovidesin
relevantpartthat:
Everysubjecthasarighttobesecurefromallunreasonablesearches,and
seizures,ofhisperson,hishouses,hispapers,andallhispossessions.All
warrants,therefore,arecontrarytothisright,ifthecauseorfoundationof
thembenotpreviouslysupportedbyoathoraffirmation....
MASS.CONST.art.XIV,pt.1.
TheFourthAmendmenttotheU.S.Constitutionprovides:
Therightofthepeopletobesecureintheirpersons,houses,papersand
effects,againstunreasonablesearchesandseizures,shallnotbeviolated,
andnowarrantsshallissuebutuponprobablecause,supportedbyoath
oraffirmation....
U.S.CONST.amend.IV.
26466U.S.727(1984)(percuriam).
27Id.at732.
28Id.at735.
29Id.(Stevens,J.,concurring).
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30Commonwealthv.Upton(UptonIII),476N.E.2d548,556(Mass.1985).
31Id.at55556.
32Compare Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 111 n.6 (1977) (holding that under the
FourthAmendment,onceamotorvehiclehasbeenlawfullydetainedforatrafficviolation,
the police officers may order the driver to get out of the vehicle without violating [the
Constitution]),withCommonwealthv.Gonsalves,711N.E.2d108,112(Mass.1999)(holding
thatunderArticle14,apoliceofficerengagedinaroutinetrafficstopmusthaveareasonable
beliefthattheofficerssafety,orthesafetyofothers,isindangerbeforeorderingadriverout
ofamotorvehicle).
33Compare South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 564 (1983) (Refusal to take a blood
alcoholtest,afterapoliceofficerhaslawfullyrequestedit,isnotanactcoercedbytheofficer,
andthusisnotprotectedbytheprivilegeagainstselfincrimination),withCommonwealthv.
Lydon, 597 N.E.2d 36, 3940 (Mass. 1992) (holding that under Article 12, evidence of a
defendantsrefusaltotakeabreathalyzertestshouldnotbeadmittedagainsthimbecauseit
violatesthedefendantsprivilegeagainstselfincrimination),andOpinionoftheJusticestothe
Senate,591N.E.2d1073,1078(Mass.1992)(notingthatitissimplywrongunderArticle12
to allow a defendants failure or refusal to submit to a breathalyzer test to be admissible
againsthimincourt).
34Compare Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 424 (1986) (holding that the Fifth Amendment
and Miranda do not require law enforcement officers to relay to a suspect involved in a
custodial interrogation his attorneys efforts to contact him), with Commonwealth v.
Mavredakis, 725 N.E.2d 169, 178 (Mass. 2000) (noting that Article 12 provides for a higher
standardofprotectionrelatingtothelawenforcementofficersdutytoinformthesuspectof
hisattorneyseffortstocontacthimthanisprovidedundertheFifthAmendmentandMoran).
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rightsthatMassachusettsresidentshaveintheirhomes.35
TheremainderofthisArticleisintendedtoexpandonthesesubjects,
and to update the catalogue of jurisprudence in which NJF has had an
impactoncriminalprocedureinMassachusetts.36
I. ProtectionsAgainstUnreasonableSearchesandSeizures:TheFourth
AmendmentandArticle14
35See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Blood, 507 N.E.2d 1029, 1036 (Mass. 1987) ([A] distinction
liesinthedisparitybetweenthesenseofsecuritywhichisfeltamongtrustedfriendsandthe
feelings of hostility encountered among competitors or combatants. The sense of security is
essentialtolibertyofthought,speech,andassociation.).
36This is far from a new subject matter. The increasing divide between the two courts in
interpreting parallel provisions of their respective constitutions has been the subject of
periodicarticlesfromwhichthisArticleisdrawnandonwhichithopefullybuilds.See,e.g.,
JosephA.Grasso,Jr.,JohnAdamsMadeMeDoIt:JudicialFederalism,JudicialChauvinism,and
Article14oftheMassachusettsDeclarationofRights,77MISS. L.J.315,315(2007)(discussingthe
MassachusettsSJCsmethodologyforinterpretingArticle14oftheMassachusettsDeclaration
of Rights as compared to the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution); Roderick L.
Ireland,HowWeDoItinMassachusetts:AnOverviewofHowtheMassachusettsSupremeJudicial
Court Has Interpreted Its State Constitution to Address Contemporary Legal Issues, 38 VAL. U. L.
REV. 405, 406 (2004) (discussing how federalist principles inform the analytical methods
employed by the Massachusetts SJC to interpret the state constitution); Brownlow M. Speer,
ChiefJusticeWilkinsandtheCriminalLaw,84MASS. L. REV.125,126(1999)(examiningChief
Justice Wilkinss pathbreaking criminal opinions applying state constitutional and common
lawrulings,whicheitherdivergefrom,orareindependentof,federalconstitutionalrulingsof
theU.S.SupremeCourt);HerbertP.Wilkins,TheStateConstitutionMatters,BOSTONB.J.Nov.
Dec.2000,at4,4.
37See Commonwealth v. Blood, 507 N.E.2d 1029, 1035 (Mass. 1987); Commonwealth v.
Cundriff,415N.E.2d172,176(Mass.1980).
38See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 722 N.E.2d 429, 435 (Mass. 2000) (holding that
drug interdiction roadblocks without probable cause or reasonable suspicion violate Article
14);Commonwealthv.Stoute,665N.E.2d93,97(Mass.1996)(holdingthatapersonisseized
underArticle14onceapoliceofficerhasinitiatedpursuitofthepersonwithobviousintentof
requiringhimtosubmittoquestioning);Commonwealthv.Lyons,564N.E.2d390,392(Mass.
1990) (holding that Article 14 forbids use of the federal totality of the circumstances test for
evaluatingwhetherreasonablesuspicionexiststojustifyanautomobilestop);Commonwealth
v.Upton,476N.E.2d548,556(Mass.1985)([Article]14providesmoresubstantiveprotection
to criminal defendants than does the Fourth Amendment in the determination of probable
cause.).
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A. PrivacyintheHome
B. ProtectionsontheRoad
39Blood,507N.E.2dat1034(quotingBoydv.UnitedStates,116U.S.616,630(1886)).
40MASS.GEN.LAWSch.272,99(2008).
41Blood,507N.E.2dat1034.
42440U.S.741,75051(1979)(citingUnitedStatesv.White,401U.S.745,751(1971)).
43Id.at751;seealsoBlood,507N.E.2dat1036.
44711N.E.2d108,112(Mass.1999).
45Id.
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police officer will get the governments business done quickly, so those
detainedcangoontheirway.46Initsdecision,theSJCdeclinedtofollow
the U.S. Supreme Courts Fourth Amendment jurisprudence to the
contraryinPennsylvaniav.MimmsandMarylandv.Wilson.47
C. SearchWarrants
InCommonwealthv.Macias,48theSJCreiteratedthatinordertodispense
with the knock and announce requirement for the execution of search
warrants,policeofficersmusthaveprobablecausetobelievethat,inthe
particular circumstances, evidence will be destroyed or the safety of the
officers jeopardized.49 In holding firm to this requirement, the court
declined to follow the U.S. Supreme Courts ruling in Richards v.
Wisconsin,50 which reduced the comparable Fourth Amendment
requirement to one of reasonable suspicion that knocking and
announcing the presence of police would be dangerous or futile.51 In
rejecting the U.S. Supreme Courts position, the SJC relied on the
requirements of Massachusetts common law, rather than Article 14. This
sameroute(eitherapplyingoradoptingnewcommonlawprinciples)has
been used by the SJC on a number of occasions where it has declined to
followtheU.S.SupremeCourtininterpretingtherequirementsoftheU.S.
Constitution.52
46Seeid.at112,115.
47See Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 410 (1997) (holding that police may order a
passengeroutofalawfullystoppedvehicle);Pennsylvaniav.Mimms,434U.S.106,122(1977)
(holdingthatpolicemayorderadriveroutoflawfullystoppedvehiclefortrafficviolations).
48711N.E.2d130(Mass.1999).
49See,Commonwealthv.Jimenez,780N.E.2d2,56(Mass.2002)([F]ailureofthepoliceto
knockandannouncetheirpresencemaybejustifiedincircumstanceswhere...asubstantial
portionoftheevidencesoughtmightbedestroyedorsecretedispresent.);Macias,711N.E.2d
at13233.
50520U.S.385(1997).
51Id. at 394. The U.S. Supreme Court subsequently went further in Hudson v. Michigan,
declining to apply the exclusionary rule to evidence seized after an entry that concededly
violatedtheknockandannounceruleithadalreadymodifiedinRichards.547U.S.586,58994
(2006).
52See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Hyatt, 647 N.E.2d 1168, 117274 (Mass. 1995) (limiting the
D. InvestigativeStopsandSeizuresofthePerson
112(1976));Commonwealthv.Buiel,463N.E.2d1172,117274(Mass.1984)(assumingthata
defendant has a right under common law to decline a jury instruction on his right not to
testifyanddecliningtofollowLakesidev.Oregon,435U.S.333,34041(1978)(holdingthatthe
giving of that instruction over defendants objection does not violate Fifth or Fourteenth
Amendments)).
53762N.E.2d290,298(Mass.2002)(quotingCommonwealthv.DAmour,704N.E.2d1166,
1173(1999)).
54See496U.S.128,141(1990).
55665N.E.2d93(Mass.1996).
56Id.at9597;seeCaliforniav.HodariD.,499U.S.621,62627(1991)(holdingthataperson
hasbeenseizedforFourthAmendmentpurposesonlywhentherehasbeenanapplicationof
physicalforcetohispersonorshowofauthoritytowhichhehasyielded).
57446U.S. 544, 545 (1980) (A person has been seized . . . if, in view of all the
circumstancessurroundingtheincident,areasonablepersonwouldhavebelievedthathewas
notfreetoleave.).
58Stoute,665N.E.2dat9597.
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infringesconsiderablyonthepersonsfreedomofaction.59
This result plainly would not have been reached had the newly crafted
FourthAmendmentstandardinHodariD.beenapplied.60
In Commonwealth v. Lyons, a case involving the constitutionality of an
investigative stop of an automobile, the SJC concluded under Article 14
thatsuchastopmustbesupportedbyreasonablesuspicion.61Thatis,the
police action must be based on specific, articulable facts and reasonable
inferencestherefromsupporting,inthiscase,areasonablesuspicionthat
theoccupantsofthemotorvehiclehavecommitted,arecommittingorare
about to commit a crime.62 Where the stop was based on an informants
tip,thecourtheldthattheevaluationofthetipsindiciaofreliabilitywill
be focused on the informants reliability and his or her basis of
knowledge,supplementedbyindependentpolicecorroborationthatmay
make up for deficiencies in those factors.63 In reaching its conclusion that
the reasonable suspicion test applied to an investigatory stop, the SJC
rejected the less rigorous totality of the circumstances standard the U.S.
SupremeCourthadadoptedinAlabamav.White,64acaseinvolvingsimilar
circumstances.65
E. AutomaticStanding
InCommonwealthv.Amendola,theSJCexplicitlyadoptedtheautomatic
standing rule under Article 14, thereby ensuring that a person charged
withacrime,inwhichpossessionoftheevidenceseizedduringasearchis
an essential element of guilt, has standing to contest the legality of the
59Id.at97.
60Recently, in Commonwealth v. Franklin, the SJC affirmed its rejection of the Hodari D.
standard as well as its view that a seizure for [Article 14] purposes may be effectuated by
policeconductthatfallsshortof...physicaldetention.926N.E.2d199,203(Mass.2010).
61564N.E.2d390,392(Mass.1990).
62Id.at392(quotingCommonwealthv.Wren,462N.E.2d344,345(Mass.1984)).
63Id.
64496U.S.325,332(1990).
65TheSJChasalsoincreasinglyelectedtodecidesearchandseizurecasessolelyonArticle
14 grounds, declining to opine on whether the Fourth Amendment would or would not
provide the same level of protections provided by the Massachusetts Constitution. See, e.g.,
Commonwealthv. Connolly, 913 N.E.2d 356, 362, 369 (Mass. 2009) (holding that Article 14
requiresasearchwarranttoeffectuatetheinitialinstallationofaGPStrackingdevicewhere
installationrequiredaccesstotheenginecompartmentofthevehicleanduseofthevehicles
electricalsystemandcouldrunindefinitely);Commonwealthv.Lyles,905N.E.2d1106,1110
11(Mass.2009)(holdingthatretentionofthedefendantsidentificationdocumentduringhis
initial encounter with police officers on a public sidewalk in order to check for outstanding
warrants without reasonable suspicion of criminal activity constituted an unlawful seizure
underArticle14).
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searchandseizureofthatevidence.66Theneedforconsideringwhetherto
adopttheautomaticstandingrulewasprecipitatedbytheabandonmentof
thatrulebytheU.S.SupremeCourtinUnitedStatesv.Salvucci,infavorofa
rulerequiringthatadefendantshowthatgovernmentofficialsviolatedhis
legitimateexpectationofprivacyinordertoestablishsuchstanding.67
F. DeterminationofProbableCauseforWarrantlessArrests
InJenkinsv.ChiefJusticeoftheDistrictCourtDepartment,theSJCdecided
that [Article 14] embodies the common law guarantee that a warrantless
arrest must be followed by a judicial determination of probable cause no
later than reasonably necessary to process the arrest and to reach a
magistrate.68Itfurtherheldthatintheusualcircumstance,nomorethan
atwentyfourhourtimeperiodshouldbenecessary,andthepolicemust
bear the burden of demonstrating that an extraordinary circumstance
caused[any]delaybeyondthattimeperiod.69Inreachingthisconclusion,
thecourtdeclinedtofollowCountyofRiversidev.McLaughlin,inwhichthe
majority of the U.S. Supreme Court held that a judicial determination of
probable cause for a warrantless arrest would be prompt within the
requirementoftheFourthAmendmentifheldwithinfortyeighthoursof
arrest.70Instead,theSJCelectedtofollowtheadmonitionofJusticeScalias
dissent, to the effect that twentyfour hours was the outside limit that
should be tolerated under the Constitution, absent extraordinary
circumstances,forwhichtheburdenlayonthepolice.71
II. ThePrivilegeAgainstSelfIncrimination:TheFifthAmendmentand
Article1272
A. EvidenceofRefusal
InOpinionoftheJusticestotheSenate,theSJCconcludedthataproposed
statute, which would have permitted a drivers refusal to submit to a
breathalyzer test to be admitted into evidence in a criminal proceeding,
66550N.E.2d121,12526(Mass.1990).
67See448U.S.83,95(1980).
68619N.E.2d324,332(Mass.1993).
69Id.at335.
70500U.S.44,56(1991).
71Id.at70(Scalia,J.,dissenting).
72In relevant part, the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides: No person
shall be . . . compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself. U.S. CONST.
amend V. In slightly different words, Article 12 to the Declaration of Rights of the
MassachusettsConstitutionprovides:Nosubjectshallbe...compelledtoaccuse,orfurnish
evidenceagainsthimself.MASS.CONST.pt.1,art.12.
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73591N.E.2d1073,1073,1078(Mass.1992).
74Id.at1077.
75Id.at1078.
76459U.S.553(1983).
77Id.at564.
78See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Conkey, 714 N.E.2d 343, 34748 (Mass. 1999) (holding that
admission of evidence that the defendant did not appear at the police station to be
fingerprinted violated his [Article 12] rights); Commonwealth v. McGrail, 647 N.E.2d 712,
71415 (Mass. 1995) (holding that evidence of defendants refusal to take field sobriety test
should not have been admitted since its use violated the defendants privilege against self
incrimination secured by [Article 12]); Commonwealth v. Lydon, 597 N.E.2d 36, 40 (Mass.
1992) (holding that defendants refusal to submit to hand swabbing for evidence of
gunpowder residue should not have been admitted since its use violated the defendants
privilegeagainstselfincriminationsecuredby[Article12]).TheSJChasrecognizedadistinct
difference between the refusal of a police request that the defendant provide potentially
incriminatingevidenceandtherefusaltoproduceevidencethatisthesubjectofawarrantor
a court order. The admission of refusals in the latter category does not violate Article 12
because the defendant does not face the choice that was integral to the SJCs decision in
OpinionoftheJusticestotheSenate.Thatis,[t]hechoice...toproduceincriminatingevidence
orbepunishedwithaninferenceofguiltinrefusalisabsentwhenadefendantsdecisionto
cooperate is foreclosed by order of a judge. Commonwealth v. Bly, 862 N.E.2d 341, 361
(Mass.2007)(holdingthatdefendantsrefusaltoprovidecourtorderedhairsampleproperly
admittedinevidence);seealsoCommonwealthv.Delaney,814N.E.2d346,35051(Mass.2004)
(holdingthatwhenacourtorderstheproductionofphysicalevidencenothingiscompelling
thesuspecttosayanything,norisheplacedinacatch22situationidentifiedinOpinionofthe
JusticestotheSenate).Beingcompelledtoproducephysicalevidence,ortosubmittoatestfor
physical evidence, is not a form of compulsion violative of either the Fifth Amendment or
Article12.OpinionoftheJusticestotheSenate,591Mass.at1077.
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B. Immunity
III. MirandaandtheRighttoCounsel:TheFifthAmendmentand
Article12
A. Mirandav.Arizona
InMirandav.Arizona,theU.S.SupremeCourtfirstrecognizedthatin
the context of custodial interrogations undertaken prior to the
commencement of formal criminal proceedings, the right to counsel was
necessarytosafeguardtheFifthAmendmentprotectionagainstcompelled
selfincrimination.83Subsequently,thatrightwasfullyincorporatedbythe
79SeeInreEmerysCase,107Mass.172,185(1871)(statingthatnoonecanberequiredto
81Id.at462.
82AttyGen.v.Colleton,444N.E.2d915,921(Mass.1982).
83384U.S.436,471,47879(1966).
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84See, e.g., Commonwealth v. McGann, 477 N.E.2d 1075, 1078 (Mass. App. Ct. 1985)
(discussingtherighttocounselaffordedbytheSixthAmendmenttotheU.S.Constitutionand
byArticle12oftheMassachusettsConstitution).
85470U.S.298,318(1985).
86Id.at314.
87593N.E.2d1288,129596(Mass.1992)(Thispresumptionsupportsoneofthepurposes
of the bright line Miranda rule: to avoid factbound inquiries into the voluntariness of
confessions, where police officers are generally more credible witnesses than criminal
defendants.).
88827N.E.2d198,200(Mass.2005).
89542 U.S. 630, 631 (2004) (holding that the selfincrimination clause is not implicated by
theintroductionattrialofphysicalevidenceresultingfromunwarnedstatementssolongas
theywerenottheproductofcoercion).
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B. WaiveroftheRighttoCounsel
TheSJChasbeenparticularlyintentonensuringthatasuspectbefully
informedbythepoliceofanattorneysefforttorenderlegalassistanceto
him,asaprerequisitetoavalidwaiverofhisrighttoconsultwithcounsel
duringthecourseofacustodialinterrogation.91Suchinformation,thecourt
hasruled,isnecessarytoactualizetheotherwiseabstractrighttocounsel
provided in the Miranda warnings and is critical to the consideration of
whetherthesuspectsdecisiontowaivetherighthasbeenknowinglyand
intelligently made.92 The U.S. Supreme Court, on the other hand,
articulatedaverydifferentviewinMoranv.Burbine,holdingthatsolong
as the suspect understands his right to counsel and does not request
counsel, [e]vents occurring outside of a suspects presence and entirely
unknowntohim...havenobearingonthecapacitytocomprehendand
knowingly relinquish a constitutional right.93 In rejecting this reasoning,
theSJCtooknoteofthevigorousdissentbythefourJusticesintheMoran
case and agreed with their essential proposition that the right to counsel
shouldnotbetreatedasanobstacletojusticebutratherasarightcentralto
itsfairadministration.94
TowhatextenttheSJCwillinsistthatpoliceinformasuspectnotonly
of an attorneys efforts to render assistance, but also of the essence of the
advice the attorney wishes to convey to the suspect in his absence, is a
question not yet definitively answered. However, in a recent decision, a
threejudge majority concluded that it was insufficient for the police to
have conveyed only that an attorney had been appointed for the suspect
and that he could stop the questioning to consult with that attorney if he
wished, where the attorney had contacted the police and told them not
onlythathehadbeenappointedbutthathewasonhiswaytothestation,
thathewantedtospeaktohisclient(thesuspect),andthathealsowanted
hisclientto betoldnottotalktothe policeuntilhearrived.95Twoofthe
five Justices deciding the case dissented from so much of the majority
opinionassuggestedthatthepolicewererequiredtoconveynotonlythe
attorneysavailabilitybutalsohisadvice.96
90Martin,827N.E.2dat20405.
91Commonwealthv.Mavredakis,725N.E.2d169,176(Mass.2000).
92Id.
93475U.S.412,413(1986).
94Mavredakis,725N.E.2dat179.
95Commonwealthv.McNulty,937N.E.2d16,2334,2728(Mass.2010).
96Id.at3738(Gants,J.,dissenting).
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IV. TheSixthAmendmentandArticle12
A. FaceOff:TheRightofConfrontation97
Although the SJC has repeatedly held that the SixthAmendment and
Article 12 are coextensive when it comes to the use of hearsay evidence,
thereisatleastonerespectinwhichtheconfrontationguaranteesofeach
havebeeninterpreteddifferently.InapairofcasesdecidedbytheSJCin
the 1990s, Commonwealth v. Johnson and Commonwealth v. Amirault, the
CourtdeclaredthatthetextualdifferencesbetweentheSixthAmendment
(therighttoconfrontthewitnesses)andArticle12(therighttomeetthe
witnessesfacetoface)hadsubstantivesignificance.98Specifically,theSJC
concludedthatspecialseatingarrangementsattrialsthatkepttheaccused
fromseeingthefacesofthewitnesses(childreninthesecases)againsthim,
violated Article 12, and that the right to crossexamine witnesses under
oathandtheabilityofthejurytoobservethewitnessessdemeanorwere
incidental to the indispensable right under Article 12 to confront the
witnessesfacetoface.99InAmirault,theSJCrecognizedthattheopposite
conclusion had been reached by the U.S. Supreme Court in its
interpretationoftheSixthAmendmentinMarylandv.Craig.100Inrejecting
the Supreme Courts approach to the cognate right of confrontation in
Article12,theSJCnoted:
Perhaps the Court in Craig was justified in treating the Sixth
Amendment as stating a set of general desiderata that might be
servedinavarietyofwaysandadjustedtothecircumstancesof
the particular caseparticularly so where the rule would be
imposed on the several States with their various constitutional
texts and traditions. But we are not free to treat art. 12 in the
same way.... [when it] speaks to us with such unmistakable
insistence.101
97TheSixthAmendmenttotheU.S.Constitutionprovidesinrelevantpart:Inallcriminal
prosecutions,theaccusedshallenjoytheright...tobeconfrontedwiththewitnessesagainst
him.U.S.CONST.amend.VI.Article12oftheMassachusettsDeclarationofRightsprovides:
[E]very subject shall have a right . . . to meet the witnesses against him face to face . . . .
Mass.CONST.art.XII.
98See Commonwealth v. Amirault, 667 N.E.2d 652, 662 (Mass. 1997); Commonwealth v.
Johnson,631N.E.2d1002,100607(Mass.1994).
99SeeAmirault,677N.E.2dat662;Johnson,631N.E.2dat1006.
100497U.S.836,849,85253(1990)(upholdingthetestimonyofchildwitnessesviaoneway
closed circuit television, concluding that Sixth Amendment did not guarantee absolute right
tofacetofacemeetingwithwitnesses);seealsoAmirault,677N.E.2dat66162.
101Amirault,677N.E.2dat66162.
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B. EffectiveAssistanceofCounsel
Both Article 12 and the Sixth Amendment guarantee the accused the
right to be represented by counsel who performs at least to a certain
minimum level of competency.102 To establish that counsel has been
ineffective within the meaning of those guarantees, a defendant must
ordinarily demonstrate that he was actually prejudiced by a sub par
performance of his counsel.103 However, when counsels professional
shortcomings derive from a conflict between the interests of counsel and
that of his client, the requirements of proving actual prejudice have been
heldtodiffer.UnderArticle12,theSJChasconcludedthatonceanactual
conflict of interest (rather than a potential conflict) has been established,
the defendant does not bear the difficult burden of proving that this
conflicthadanadverseimpactontherepresentationhehasreceived.104In
contrast,theU.S.SupremeCourtheldinCuylerv.Sullivan,thattheburden
ofdemonstratingbothanactualconflictandanadverseeffectremainson
thedefendant.105
CONCLUSION
102See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 68788 (1984); Commonwealth v. Saferian,
315N.E.2d878,884(Mass.1974);seealsoU.S.CONST.amend.VI;MASS.CONST.art.XII.
103See, e.g., Saferian, 315 N.E.2d at 883 (holding that the defendant must demonstrate that
Martinez, 681 N.E.2d 818, 823 (Mass. 1997); Commonwealth v. Rainwater, 681 N.E.2d 1218,
1227(Mass.1997);Commonwealthv.Shraiar,489N.E.2d689,692n.3(Mass.1986).
105440U.S.335,34850(1980).InLockhardv.Fretwell,506U.S.364(1983),theU.S.Supreme
CourtconcludedthattoestablishprejudiceunderStricklandv.Washington,adefendantmust
demonstratethatcounselserrorsweresoseriousastodeprivehimofatrialwhoseresultis
unfairorunreliable,notmerelythattheoutcomewouldlikelyhavebeendifferent.Following
Lockhart,theSJCdecidedCommonwealthv.Urena,417Mass.692(1994),inwhichitdescribed
Lockhartasnewlyexplicatingthefederalstandard,andemphasiz[ing]thatthisCourtwill
be the arbiter of the standard for effective assistance of counsel under the Declaration of
RightsandwillnotbeboundbyFederalprecedentwhendecidingthatissue.Id.at696.
106See most recently Montejo v. Louisiana, 129 S. Ct. 2079, 208889 (2009), in which a five
Justice majority of the Supreme Court reversed Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625 (1986). In
Jackson, the Supreme Court had applied the principles of Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477
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(1981), in holding that, [i]f police initiate interrogation after the defendants assertion at
arraignmentorasimilarproceeding,ofhisrighttocounsel,anywaiverofdefendantsrightto
counselforthatpoliceinterrogationisinvalid.Jackson,475U.S.at636.