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CriminalProcedureandthe
MassachusettsConstitution

ROBERTJ.CORDY

ABSTRACT

Professor Robert F. Williamss new book The Law of American State


Constitutions charts trends of state constitutional interpretation and
provides an extraordinary study of the importance of state constitutions.
One concept discussed by Williams has been termed New Judicial
Federalism (NJF), which describes the application of different state
constitutional rights than those provided by the Federal Constitution (in
statecourts).Decisionsinthefieldofcriminalprocedurehaveledthemove
downthepathofNJFparticularlyinMassachusetts.Infact,duetoNJFin
thisfield,itnowvergesonineffectivenessforanattorneyinacriminalcase
nottoseekreliefandprotectionforherclientundertheprovisionsofboth
theFederalandthestateconstitutions.Asthedistancebetweentherights
and protections afforded persons under Article 12 and 14 of the
MassachusettsDeclarationofRightsandundertheFourth,Fifth,andSixth
Amendments grows, it is important to understand this divergence and
keep abreast of this jurisprudence to adequately represent clients. This
Articleisintendedtoexpandonthesesubjectsandupdatethecatalogueof
jurisprudence in which NJF has had an impact on criminal procedure in
Massachusetts.



Hon.RobertJ.Cordy,AssociateJusticeoftheMassachusettsSupremeJudicialCourt.J.D.,
HarvardLawSchool;A.B.,DartmouthCollege.

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INTRODUCTION

I
n his newly published book The Law of American State Constitutions,
Professor Robert F. Williams has produced an extraordinary study of
the function and importance of state constitutions.1 Among the many
strands and trends of state constitutional interpretation explored in the
book, Professor Williamshas chartedand given context to what has been
termedtheNewJudicialFederalism(NJF).Thistermdescribesthefact
that State judges in numerous cases have interpreted their State
constitutional rights provisions to provide more protection than the
nationalminimumstandardguaranteedbythefederalconstitution.2Legal
scholarsdatethebeginningofthisphenomenontothe1970s.3Althoughno
longer a new development, Professor Williams documents its entrance
onto the national jurisprudential stage and the explosion of interest in
therightscontainedinstateconstitutionsthatfollowed.4
Tohighlightboththecontroversysurroundingitandtheimportanceof
state supreme courts and their recent rediscovery of state constitutional
law,5 Williams points to the samesex marriage case decided by the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) in 2003, Goodridge v.
Department of Public Health,6 describing it as perhaps the most broadly
influential state court decision... in recent memory.7 In that case, the
Court essentially struck down state laws that limited marriage to
heterosexual couples based on the equal protection and due process
guaranteesoftheMassachusettsConstitution.8Whilethereisnodoubtas
tothesignificanceoftheGoodridgecaseanditscontributiontothenational
debateonthemeaningofsuchguaranteesforgayandlesbianindividuals
(presentinmanystateconstitutions),thefocusofthisArticleisonanother
categorycriminal procedureof NJF developmentsthat have had major
implications for the practice of criminal law and have significantly
impactedthedaytodaylivesofMassachusettsjudges,citizens,andpolice.
Thefieldofcriminalprocedurehasbeendenotedasthedrivingforce
behind the NJF.9 The establishment of parallel rights and protections in
this fieldfederal and statecontinues to accelerate and expand. When I

1SeeROBERTF.WILLIAMS,THELAWOFAMERICANSTATECONSTITUTIONS(2009).

2Id.at114(emphasisomitted).

3Id.at113.

4Id.at8,113.

5Id.at5.

6798N.E.2d941(Mass.2003).

7WILLIAMS,supranote1,at283.

8Goodridge,798N.E.2dat953,969.

9WILLIAMS,supranote1,at125.
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2011 Criminal Procedure and the Massachusetts Constitution 817

attendedaMassachusettslawschoolintheearly1970s,Idonotrecallever
being directed to the Massachusetts Constitution on a point of criminal
procedure. In the four years that followed my graduation, as a public
defender in Massachusetts, I do not recall relying on the Massachusetts
Constitutioninsupportofanyargumentregardingtherightsofmyclients
(ortheirviolation).AlthoughvigorousinouruseoftheU.S.Constitution
and the array of Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendment rights then so
recentlyappliedtothestatesbytheU.S.SupremeCourt,theDeclarationof
Rights of the Massachusetts Constitution was hardly a footnote in our
briefs.10Thathaschangeddramatically.Today,itvergesonineffectiveness
foranattorneyinacriminalcasenottoseekreliefandprotectionforhisor
herclientundertheprovisionsofbothconstitutions.11
One of the early calls to arms that spurred the NJF forward into the
fieldofcriminalprocedurecamefromJusticeWilliamBrennan,inthewake
of what appeared to be the beginning of the retreat of the Burger Court
fromthefederalconstitutionalizationofstatecriminalprocedure,begunin
earnestbytheWarrenCourtofthe1960s.12In1977,JusticeBrennanwrote:
[S]tate courts cannot rest when they have afforded their citizens
the full protections of the federal Constitution. State
constitutions, too, are a font of individual liberties, their
protections often extending beyond those required by the
Supreme Courts interpretation of federal law. The legal
revolutionwhichhasbroughtfederallawtotheforemustnotbe
allowedtoinhibittheindependentprotectiveforceofstatelaw
for without it, the full realization of our liberties cannot be

10See,e.g.,Commonwealthv.Upton,476N.E.2d548,55556(Mass.1985)([TheSJC]never

affordedmoresubstantiveprotectiontocriminaldefendantsunderart.14oftheDeclaration
ofRightsthanprevailsundertheConstitutionoftheUnitedStates....).
11SeeRobertJ.Cordy,APracticalViewfromtheAppellateBench,BOSTONB.J.,Jan.Feb.2002,

at8,9(Theforensichistoryofjurisprudencein this courtwouldrevealmanylawyerswho


ignoredtheMassachusettsConstitutionbelow,onlytofindoutthathaditbeenraiseditmight
havemadeallthedifference.).
12See,e.g.,Bentonv.Maryland,395U.S.784,794(1969)(incorporatingthedoublejeopardy

prohibitionthroughtheFourteenthAmendment);Washingtonv.Texas,388U.S.14,23(1967)
(holding that petitioner was denied his right to compulsory process for obtaining
witnesses); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966) (affirming all criminal defendants
rightsundertheFifthAmendmenttoprotectionfromselfincrimination);Pointerv.Texas,380
U.S. 400, 405 (1965) (To deprive an accused of the right to crossexamine the witnesses
against him is a denial of the Fourteenth Amendments guarantee of due process of law.);
Malloyv.Hogan,378U.S.1,6(1964)([T]heFifthAmendmentsexceptionfromcompulsory
selfincriminationisalsoprotectedbytheFourteenthAmendmentagainstabridgementbythe
States.); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963) (providing a right to counsel to all
indigent defendants); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 657 (1961) (holding that the exclusionary
ruleisanessentialpartofboththeFourthandFourteenthAmendments).
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guaranteed....13

What followed reverberated in state supreme courts around the


country.TheSJCmayhaverespondedtoBrennansclarioncallinthecase
of District Attorney for the Suffolk District v. Watson.14 In that case, the SJC
struck down the states death penalty as violative of the Massachusetts
constitutional prohibition against the infliction of cruel or unusual
punishments.15 Citing extensively from Justice Brennans concurring
opinion in Furman v. Georgia,16 the Court concluded that although the
Massachusetts death penalty statute would likely meet the federal
constitutional requirements,17 it did not withstand scrutiny under the
nearlyidenticallanguageoftheMassachusettsConstitution.18
The coming emergence of the NJF into the field of Massachusetts
criminal procedure, however, was plainly apparent in a Fourth
Amendment case that followed, involving whether probable cause had
been demonstrated in an affidavit supporting the issuance of a search
warrant.19 In Commonwealth v. Upton (Upton I), the SJC concluded that a
searchwasunreasonableandinviolationoftheFourthAmendmenttothe
U.S. Constitution, because the affidavit, which was based on the
disclosures of an unnamed informant, did not satisfy the twopronged
AguilarSpinelli20 standard for determining probable cause.21 That is, the
basis of the informants knowledge (prong 1) and the underlying
circumstances from which the affiant concluded that the informant was
reliable(prong2)werenotadequatelysetoutintheaffidavit,norwerethe
other corroborating allegations contained therein sufficient to support a
findingofprobablecauseintheabsenceofoneortheother.Inreachingits
conclusion,theSJCconsideredthethenrecentlydecidedcaseofIllinoisv.

13WilliamJ.Brennan,Jr.,StateConstitutionsandtheProtectionofIndividualRights,90HARV.

L. REV.489,491(1977).JusticeGreaneyoftheSJCagreed,stating: Thenatureoffederalism
requiresthat[s]tate[s]upreme[c]ourtsand[s]tate[c]onstitutionsbestrongandindependent
repositories of authority in order to protect the rights of their citizens. Commonwealth v.
Gonsalves,711N.E.2d108,115(Mass.1999).
14411N.E.2d1274(Mass.1980).

15Id.at1275.ForabriefhistoryofdeathpenaltydecisionsinMassachusetts,seeOpinionof

the Justices, 364 N.E.2d 184, 185 (Mass. 1977); Commonwealth v. ONeal, 339 N.E.2d 676, 679
(Mass. 1975). See also Alan Rogers, The Death Penalty and Reversible Error in Massachusetts, 6
PIERCEL.REV.515,529(2008).
16408U.S.238(1972).

17Seeid.at23940.

18Id.at128485.

19SeeCommonwealthv.Upton(UptonI),458N.E.2d717,719(Mass.1983).

20See Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 41819 (1969); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108,

11415(1964).
21UptonI,458N.E.2dat72023.
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2011 Criminal Procedure and the Massachusetts Constitution 819

Gates,22 in which the U.S. Supreme Court had suggested a more flexible
viewofthestandardtobeappliedtoinformationsuppliedbyaninformant
but determined that the Supreme Court had not abandoned the Aguilar
Spinelli twoprong standard for an unacceptably shapeless and
permissive23totalityofthecircumstancestest.24TheSJCwentontonote
that:
IfwehavecorrectlyconstruedthesignificanceofIllinoisv.Gates,
the Fourth Amendment standards for determining probable
causetoissueasearchwarranthavenotbeenmadesomuchless
clear and so relaxed as to compel us to try our hand at a
definitionofstandardsunderart.14[oftheDeclarationofRights
oftheMassachusettsConstitution,theMassachusettsanalogueto
thatamendment].25

TheSupremeCourtrespondedsoonthereafterinapercuriamopinion,
Massachusettsv.Upton(UptonII),26underscoringthatithadindeedadopted
a new, totality of the circumstances test for purposes of satisfying the
Fourth Amendments requirement of probable cause in Gates.27
Consequently,itreversedthejudgmentoftheSJCandremandedthecase
for further proceedings in light of its holding.28 Justices Brennan and
Marshall dissented, and Justice Stevens concurred but lamented the fact
that the SJC had not first decided whether the warrant was valid under
Massachusettslaw.29
On remand, the SJC proceeded as it suggested it might in Upton I,

22462U.S.213(1983).

23UptonI,458N.E.2dat724.

24Id.at721.

25Id.Article14oftheDeclarationofRightsoftheMassachusettsConstitutionprovidesin

relevantpartthat:
Everysubjecthasarighttobesecurefromallunreasonablesearches,and
seizures,ofhisperson,hishouses,hispapers,andallhispossessions.All
warrants,therefore,arecontrarytothisright,ifthecauseorfoundationof
thembenotpreviouslysupportedbyoathoraffirmation....
MASS.CONST.art.XIV,pt.1.
TheFourthAmendmenttotheU.S.Constitutionprovides:
Therightofthepeopletobesecureintheirpersons,houses,papersand
effects,againstunreasonablesearchesandseizures,shallnotbeviolated,
andnowarrantsshallissuebutuponprobablecause,supportedbyoath
oraffirmation....
U.S.CONST.amend.IV.
26466U.S.727(1984)(percuriam).

27Id.at732.

28Id.at735.

29Id.(Stevens,J.,concurring).
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concluding that Article 14 provided more substantive protection[s] to


criminal defendants than [did] the Fourth Amendment, and rejected the
totalityofthecircumstancestestforprobablecauseaslackinginprecision
andtoofluidandflexibleinitsapplication.30Indoingso,theSJCnotedthat
theDeclarationofRightsoftheMassachusettsConstitutionprecededand
was independent of the U.S. Constitution, and adopted the principles
developedundertheAguilarSpinellicaseasamoreappropriatestructure
forprobablecauseinquiriesunderart.14.31
SincethedecisioninUptonII,theSJChasneverlookedback,andthe
distancebetweentherightsandprotectionsofpersonsfromunreasonable
searches and seizures under Article 14 and the Fourth Amendment has
grown.Inaddition,theNJFcontagionhasspreadbroadlyacrossthefield
of criminal procedure, creating daylight between other rights and
protections proclaimed in the two constitutions including: the right to
counsel; the right of confrontation; the right to the production of
exculpatory evidence; and the privilege against selfincrimination. This
divergence has affected many things, from how routine traffic stops are
conducted32 to the consequences of refusing to take a breathalyzer test;33
and from the right of an individual detained at a police station to be
informed of a lawyers attempts to contact him34 to the increased privacy

30Commonwealthv.Upton(UptonIII),476N.E.2d548,556(Mass.1985).

31Id.at55556.

32Compare Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 111 n.6 (1977) (holding that under the

FourthAmendment,onceamotorvehiclehasbeenlawfullydetainedforatrafficviolation,
the police officers may order the driver to get out of the vehicle without violating [the
Constitution]),withCommonwealthv.Gonsalves,711N.E.2d108,112(Mass.1999)(holding
thatunderArticle14,apoliceofficerengagedinaroutinetrafficstopmusthaveareasonable
beliefthattheofficerssafety,orthesafetyofothers,isindangerbeforeorderingadriverout
ofamotorvehicle).
33Compare South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 564 (1983) (Refusal to take a blood

alcoholtest,afterapoliceofficerhaslawfullyrequestedit,isnotanactcoercedbytheofficer,
andthusisnotprotectedbytheprivilegeagainstselfincrimination),withCommonwealthv.
Lydon, 597 N.E.2d 36, 3940 (Mass. 1992) (holding that under Article 12, evidence of a
defendantsrefusaltotakeabreathalyzertestshouldnotbeadmittedagainsthimbecauseit
violatesthedefendantsprivilegeagainstselfincrimination),andOpinionoftheJusticestothe
Senate,591N.E.2d1073,1078(Mass.1992)(notingthatitissimplywrongunderArticle12
to allow a defendants failure or refusal to submit to a breathalyzer test to be admissible
againsthimincourt).
34Compare Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 424 (1986) (holding that the Fifth Amendment

and Miranda do not require law enforcement officers to relay to a suspect involved in a
custodial interrogation his attorneys efforts to contact him), with Commonwealth v.
Mavredakis, 725 N.E.2d 169, 178 (Mass. 2000) (noting that Article 12 provides for a higher
standardofprotectionrelatingtothelawenforcementofficersdutytoinformthesuspectof
hisattorneyseffortstocontacthimthanisprovidedundertheFifthAmendmentandMoran).
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rightsthatMassachusettsresidentshaveintheirhomes.35
TheremainderofthisArticleisintendedtoexpandonthesesubjects,
and to update the catalogue of jurisprudence in which NJF has had an
impactoncriminalprocedureinMassachusetts.36

I. ProtectionsAgainstUnreasonableSearchesandSeizures:TheFourth
AmendmentandArticle14

Pointing to the abuses of privacy and personal security to which the


colonists of Massachusetts had been subjected and to the portions of the
MassachusettsConstitutionof1780adoptedtoguardagainstthoseabuses
in the future,37 the SJC has repeatedly concluded that Article 14s
protections against unreasonable searches and seizures are broader and
more restrictive of police power than those of the Fourth Amendment.38

35See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Blood, 507 N.E.2d 1029, 1036 (Mass. 1987) ([A] distinction

liesinthedisparitybetweenthesenseofsecuritywhichisfeltamongtrustedfriendsandthe
feelings of hostility encountered among competitors or combatants. The sense of security is
essentialtolibertyofthought,speech,andassociation.).
36This is far from a new subject matter. The increasing divide between the two courts in

interpreting parallel provisions of their respective constitutions has been the subject of
periodicarticlesfromwhichthisArticleisdrawnandonwhichithopefullybuilds.See,e.g.,
JosephA.Grasso,Jr.,JohnAdamsMadeMeDoIt:JudicialFederalism,JudicialChauvinism,and
Article14oftheMassachusettsDeclarationofRights,77MISS. L.J.315,315(2007)(discussingthe
MassachusettsSJCsmethodologyforinterpretingArticle14oftheMassachusettsDeclaration
of Rights as compared to the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution); Roderick L.
Ireland,HowWeDoItinMassachusetts:AnOverviewofHowtheMassachusettsSupremeJudicial
Court Has Interpreted Its State Constitution to Address Contemporary Legal Issues, 38 VAL. U. L.
REV. 405, 406 (2004) (discussing how federalist principles inform the analytical methods
employed by the Massachusetts SJC to interpret the state constitution); Brownlow M. Speer,
ChiefJusticeWilkinsandtheCriminalLaw,84MASS. L. REV.125,126(1999)(examiningChief
Justice Wilkinss pathbreaking criminal opinions applying state constitutional and common
lawrulings,whicheitherdivergefrom,orareindependentof,federalconstitutionalrulingsof
theU.S.SupremeCourt);HerbertP.Wilkins,TheStateConstitutionMatters,BOSTONB.J.Nov.
Dec.2000,at4,4.
37See Commonwealth v. Blood, 507 N.E.2d 1029, 1035 (Mass. 1987); Commonwealth v.

Cundriff,415N.E.2d172,176(Mass.1980).
38See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 722 N.E.2d 429, 435 (Mass. 2000) (holding that

drug interdiction roadblocks without probable cause or reasonable suspicion violate Article
14);Commonwealthv.Stoute,665N.E.2d93,97(Mass.1996)(holdingthatapersonisseized
underArticle14onceapoliceofficerhasinitiatedpursuitofthepersonwithobviousintentof
requiringhimtosubmittoquestioning);Commonwealthv.Lyons,564N.E.2d390,392(Mass.
1990) (holding that Article 14 forbids use of the federal totality of the circumstances test for
evaluatingwhetherreasonablesuspicionexiststojustifyanautomobilestop);Commonwealth
v.Upton,476N.E.2d548,556(Mass.1985)([Article]14providesmoresubstantiveprotection
to criminal defendants than does the Fourth Amendment in the determination of probable
cause.).
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These differences have manifested themselves in many discrete areas of


theiroverlappingjurisprudence.

A. PrivacyintheHome

In Commonwealth v. Blood, the SJC concluded that warrantless and


electronic surveillance by means of one partys consent, occurring in a
private home, while beyond the protective reach of the Fourth
Amendment, was prohibited (in the absence of exigent circumstances) by
Article14,whichwasintendednotmerelytoprotectthecitizenfromthe
breaking of his doors and the rummaging of his drawers but also in his
beliefs,thoughts,emotions,andtheexpressionofthesametoothersinhis
home.39Inrequiringthatawarrantbeobtained,eventhoughnotrequired
by the Massachusetts wiretapping statute,40 the SJC underscored the
peculiarlyseveredangertothelibertiesofthepersonposedbyelectronic
surveillance and concluded that it was objectively reasonable to expect
that conversational interchange in a private home will not be invaded
surreptitiously by warrantless electronic transmission or recording, even
inthefaceoftheriskthatapartytothatinterchangemightlaterrevealit.41
Indoingso,itfirmlyrejectedtheFourthAmendmentreasoningoftheU.S.
Supreme Court in United States v. Caceres42 that there is no difference
betweenspeakingtosomeonewhomightlaterwritedownwhathasbeen
saidandtestifytohismemoryofitscontents,andspeakingtoanagentof
thegovernmentrecordingortransmittingeverywordspoken.43

B. ProtectionsontheRoad

In Commonwealth v.Gonsalves, the SJC concluded that neither a driver


stopped for a routine motor vehicle violation nor his passenger could be
compelledtoexitthevehicleunlessthepolicehadareasonablebeliefthat
theofficerssafety,orthesafetyofothers,[was]indanger;44thatis,unless
therewasanobjectivelyreasonablebasis(specificandarticulablefacts)to
justifytheorderbeyondthestopitself.45Thecourtsconclusionwasrooted
in the view that Article 14 guarantees greater protections to drivers and
occupantsofmotorvehiclesthantheFourthAmendmentandthatcitizens
stoppedforaroutinetrafficviolationhaveareasonableexpectationthata

39Blood,507N.E.2dat1034(quotingBoydv.UnitedStates,116U.S.616,630(1886)).

40MASS.GEN.LAWSch.272,99(2008).

41Blood,507N.E.2dat1034.

42440U.S.741,75051(1979)(citingUnitedStatesv.White,401U.S.745,751(1971)).

43Id.at751;seealsoBlood,507N.E.2dat1036.

44711N.E.2d108,112(Mass.1999).

45Id.
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police officer will get the governments business done quickly, so those
detainedcangoontheirway.46Initsdecision,theSJCdeclinedtofollow
the U.S. Supreme Courts Fourth Amendment jurisprudence to the
contraryinPennsylvaniav.MimmsandMarylandv.Wilson.47

C. SearchWarrants

InCommonwealthv.Macias,48theSJCreiteratedthatinordertodispense
with the knock and announce requirement for the execution of search
warrants,policeofficersmusthaveprobablecausetobelievethat,inthe
particular circumstances, evidence will be destroyed or the safety of the
officers jeopardized.49 In holding firm to this requirement, the court
declined to follow the U.S. Supreme Courts ruling in Richards v.
Wisconsin,50 which reduced the comparable Fourth Amendment
requirement to one of reasonable suspicion that knocking and
announcing the presence of police would be dangerous or futile.51 In
rejecting the U.S. Supreme Courts position, the SJC relied on the
requirements of Massachusetts common law, rather than Article 14. This
sameroute(eitherapplyingoradoptingnewcommonlawprinciples)has
been used by the SJC on a number of occasions where it has declined to
followtheU.S.SupremeCourtininterpretingtherequirementsoftheU.S.
Constitution.52

46Seeid.at112,115.

47See Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 410 (1997) (holding that police may order a

passengeroutofalawfullystoppedvehicle);Pennsylvaniav.Mimms,434U.S.106,122(1977)
(holdingthatpolicemayorderadriveroutoflawfullystoppedvehiclefortrafficviolations).
48711N.E.2d130(Mass.1999).

49See,Commonwealthv.Jimenez,780N.E.2d2,56(Mass.2002)([F]ailureofthepoliceto

knockandannouncetheirpresencemaybejustifiedincircumstanceswhere...asubstantial
portionoftheevidencesoughtmightbedestroyedorsecretedispresent.);Macias,711N.E.2d
at13233.
50520U.S.385(1997).

51Id. at 394. The U.S. Supreme Court subsequently went further in Hudson v. Michigan,

declining to apply the exclusionary rule to evidence seized after an entry that concededly
violatedtheknockandannounceruleithadalreadymodifiedinRichards.547U.S.586,58994
(2006).
52See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Hyatt, 647 N.E.2d 1168, 117274 (Mass. 1995) (limiting the

presumption of vindictiveness on an increase in sentence imposed after appeal to


resentencingbythesamejudgeandrejectingTexasv.McCullough,475U.S.134,14041(1986));
Commonwealthv. Tucceri, 589 N.E.2d 1216, 122324 (Mass. 1992) (holding that a new trial
may be granted on the basis of prosecutorial nondisclosure of exculpatory evidence only
whereageneraldefenserequestforsuchevidencewasmadeandadoptingthecommonlaw
standardthatanewtrialisonlyappropriatewherethereisasubstantialriskthatthejury
would have reached a different conclusion if the evidence had been admitted at trial and
rejectingthestandardforgrantinganewtrialannouncedinUnitedStatesv.Agurs,427U.S.97,
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In Commonwealth v. Balicki, the SJC confirmed that the application of


theinadvertencerequirementtotheplainviewexceptiontothewarrant
requirement was required by Article 14 because it protect[s] the
possessory interests conferred on our citizens by the Massachusetts
Constitution and lends credibility to the [plain view] doctrine by
ensuringthatonlyevidencewhichthepolicedidnotanticipateorknowto
be at the locus of a search will be seized without a warrant.53 The SJC
found it necessary to resort to Article 14 after the U.S. Supreme Court
decided,inHortonv.California,toabandontheinadvertencerequirementof
the plain view exception as a necessary condition to a warrantless plain
viewseizureundertheFourthAmendment.54

D. InvestigativeStopsandSeizuresofthePerson

In Commonwealth v. Stoute,55 the SJC declined to adopt the Fourth


Amendment standard for a seizure that the U.S. Supreme Court
articulated in California v. Hodari D.56 Instead, the SJC concluded that the
standardithadconsistentlyapplieduntilthattime,whichpreviouslyhad
been established as the Fourth Amendment standard in United States v.
Mendenhall,57 was the standard required by Article 14.58 In applying this
standardtothepolicepursuitofthedefendant,theStoutecourtheld:
[That] a pursuit, which, objectively considered, indicates to a
personthathewouldnotbefreetoleavethearea(ortoremain
there)withoutfirstrespondingtoapoliceofficersinquiry,isthe
functional equivalent of a seizure, in the sense that the person
being pursued is plainly the object of an official assertion of
authority, which does not intend to be denied, and which

112(1976));Commonwealthv.Buiel,463N.E.2d1172,117274(Mass.1984)(assumingthata
defendant has a right under common law to decline a jury instruction on his right not to
testifyanddecliningtofollowLakesidev.Oregon,435U.S.333,34041(1978)(holdingthatthe
giving of that instruction over defendants objection does not violate Fifth or Fourteenth
Amendments)).
53762N.E.2d290,298(Mass.2002)(quotingCommonwealthv.DAmour,704N.E.2d1166,

1173(1999)).
54See496U.S.128,141(1990).

55665N.E.2d93(Mass.1996).

56Id.at9597;seeCaliforniav.HodariD.,499U.S.621,62627(1991)(holdingthataperson

hasbeenseizedforFourthAmendmentpurposesonlywhentherehasbeenanapplicationof
physicalforcetohispersonorshowofauthoritytowhichhehasyielded).
57446U.S. 544, 545 (1980) (A person has been seized . . . if, in view of all the
circumstancessurroundingtheincident,areasonablepersonwouldhavebelievedthathewas
notfreetoleave.).
58Stoute,665N.E.2dat9597.
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2011 Criminal Procedure and the Massachusetts Constitution 825

infringesconsiderablyonthepersonsfreedomofaction.59

This result plainly would not have been reached had the newly crafted
FourthAmendmentstandardinHodariD.beenapplied.60
In Commonwealth v. Lyons, a case involving the constitutionality of an
investigative stop of an automobile, the SJC concluded under Article 14
thatsuchastopmustbesupportedbyreasonablesuspicion.61Thatis,the
police action must be based on specific, articulable facts and reasonable
inferencestherefromsupporting,inthiscase,areasonablesuspicionthat
theoccupantsofthemotorvehiclehavecommitted,arecommittingorare
about to commit a crime.62 Where the stop was based on an informants
tip,thecourtheldthattheevaluationofthetipsindiciaofreliabilitywill
be focused on the informants reliability and his or her basis of
knowledge,supplementedbyindependentpolicecorroborationthatmay
make up for deficiencies in those factors.63 In reaching its conclusion that
the reasonable suspicion test applied to an investigatory stop, the SJC
rejected the less rigorous totality of the circumstances standard the U.S.
SupremeCourthadadoptedinAlabamav.White,64acaseinvolvingsimilar
circumstances.65

E. AutomaticStanding

InCommonwealthv.Amendola,theSJCexplicitlyadoptedtheautomatic
standing rule under Article 14, thereby ensuring that a person charged
withacrime,inwhichpossessionoftheevidenceseizedduringasearchis
an essential element of guilt, has standing to contest the legality of the

59Id.at97.

60Recently, in Commonwealth v. Franklin, the SJC affirmed its rejection of the Hodari D.

standard as well as its view that a seizure for [Article 14] purposes may be effectuated by
policeconductthatfallsshortof...physicaldetention.926N.E.2d199,203(Mass.2010).
61564N.E.2d390,392(Mass.1990).
62Id.at392(quotingCommonwealthv.Wren,462N.E.2d344,345(Mass.1984)).
63Id.

64496U.S.325,332(1990).

65TheSJChasalsoincreasinglyelectedtodecidesearchandseizurecasessolelyonArticle

14 grounds, declining to opine on whether the Fourth Amendment would or would not
provide the same level of protections provided by the Massachusetts Constitution. See, e.g.,
Commonwealthv. Connolly, 913 N.E.2d 356, 362, 369 (Mass. 2009) (holding that Article 14
requiresasearchwarranttoeffectuatetheinitialinstallationofaGPStrackingdevicewhere
installationrequiredaccesstotheenginecompartmentofthevehicleanduseofthevehicles
electricalsystemandcouldrunindefinitely);Commonwealthv.Lyles,905N.E.2d1106,1110
11(Mass.2009)(holdingthatretentionofthedefendantsidentificationdocumentduringhis
initial encounter with police officers on a public sidewalk in order to check for outstanding
warrants without reasonable suspicion of criminal activity constituted an unlawful seizure
underArticle14).
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searchandseizureofthatevidence.66Theneedforconsideringwhetherto
adopttheautomaticstandingrulewasprecipitatedbytheabandonmentof
thatrulebytheU.S.SupremeCourtinUnitedStatesv.Salvucci,infavorofa
rulerequiringthatadefendantshowthatgovernmentofficialsviolatedhis
legitimateexpectationofprivacyinordertoestablishsuchstanding.67

F. DeterminationofProbableCauseforWarrantlessArrests

InJenkinsv.ChiefJusticeoftheDistrictCourtDepartment,theSJCdecided
that [Article 14] embodies the common law guarantee that a warrantless
arrest must be followed by a judicial determination of probable cause no
later than reasonably necessary to process the arrest and to reach a
magistrate.68Itfurtherheldthatintheusualcircumstance,nomorethan
atwentyfourhourtimeperiodshouldbenecessary,andthepolicemust
bear the burden of demonstrating that an extraordinary circumstance
caused[any]delaybeyondthattimeperiod.69Inreachingthisconclusion,
thecourtdeclinedtofollowCountyofRiversidev.McLaughlin,inwhichthe
majority of the U.S. Supreme Court held that a judicial determination of
probable cause for a warrantless arrest would be prompt within the
requirementoftheFourthAmendmentifheldwithinfortyeighthoursof
arrest.70Instead,theSJCelectedtofollowtheadmonitionofJusticeScalias
dissent, to the effect that twentyfour hours was the outside limit that
should be tolerated under the Constitution, absent extraordinary
circumstances,forwhichtheburdenlayonthepolice.71

II. ThePrivilegeAgainstSelfIncrimination:TheFifthAmendmentand
Article1272

A. EvidenceofRefusal

InOpinionoftheJusticestotheSenate,theSJCconcludedthataproposed
statute, which would have permitted a drivers refusal to submit to a
breathalyzer test to be admitted into evidence in a criminal proceeding,

66550N.E.2d121,12526(Mass.1990).

67See448U.S.83,95(1980).

68619N.E.2d324,332(Mass.1993).

69Id.at335.

70500U.S.44,56(1991).

71Id.at70(Scalia,J.,dissenting).

72In relevant part, the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides: No person

shall be . . . compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself. U.S. CONST.
amend V. In slightly different words, Article 12 to the Declaration of Rights of the
MassachusettsConstitutionprovides:Nosubjectshallbe...compelledtoaccuse,orfurnish
evidenceagainsthimself.MASS.CONST.pt.1,art.12.
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2011 Criminal Procedure and the Massachusetts Constitution 827

would violate Article 12.73 First, the refusal is testimonialit is offered as


theequivalentofthepersonsstatementthat,Ihavehadsomuchtodrink
thatIknoworatleastsuspectthatIamunabletopassthetest.74Second,
the refusal is compelled insofar as the person is forced by the police to
choose between two inculpatory alternatives: take the test and perhaps
produce potentially incriminating real evidence; refuse and have adverse
testimonialevidenceusedagainsthimattrial.75
In reaching its conclusion, the SJC considered and rejected the
reasoningoftheU.S.SupremeCourtinSouthDakotav.Neville.76TheNeville
Court held that statutes that permit the introduction in evidence of the
refusaltotakeabloodalcoholtestdonotcompel,butonlyencourage,the
takingofthetestand,therefore,donotrunafouloftheFifthAmendment
privilegeagainstcompelledselfincrimination.77
TheSJChasapplieditsanalysisofthecompelledtestimonialnatureof
refusal evidence to exclude other similar forms of evidence offered to
establishthedefendantsconsciousnessofguilt.78

73591N.E.2d1073,1073,1078(Mass.1992).

74Id.at1077.

75Id.at1078.

76459U.S.553(1983).

77Id.at564.

78See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Conkey, 714 N.E.2d 343, 34748 (Mass. 1999) (holding that

admission of evidence that the defendant did not appear at the police station to be
fingerprinted violated his [Article 12] rights); Commonwealth v. McGrail, 647 N.E.2d 712,
71415 (Mass. 1995) (holding that evidence of defendants refusal to take field sobriety test
should not have been admitted since its use violated the defendants privilege against self
incrimination secured by [Article 12]); Commonwealth v. Lydon, 597 N.E.2d 36, 40 (Mass.
1992) (holding that defendants refusal to submit to hand swabbing for evidence of
gunpowder residue should not have been admitted since its use violated the defendants
privilegeagainstselfincriminationsecuredby[Article12]).TheSJChasrecognizedadistinct
difference between the refusal of a police request that the defendant provide potentially
incriminatingevidenceandtherefusaltoproduceevidencethatisthesubjectofawarrantor
a court order. The admission of refusals in the latter category does not violate Article 12
because the defendant does not face the choice that was integral to the SJCs decision in
OpinionoftheJusticestotheSenate.Thatis,[t]hechoice...toproduceincriminatingevidence
orbepunishedwithaninferenceofguiltinrefusalisabsentwhenadefendantsdecisionto
cooperate is foreclosed by order of a judge. Commonwealth v. Bly, 862 N.E.2d 341, 361
(Mass.2007)(holdingthatdefendantsrefusaltoprovidecourtorderedhairsampleproperly
admittedinevidence);seealsoCommonwealthv.Delaney,814N.E.2d346,35051(Mass.2004)
(holdingthatwhenacourtorderstheproductionofphysicalevidencenothingiscompelling
thesuspecttosayanything,norisheplacedinacatch22situationidentifiedinOpinionofthe
JusticestotheSenate).Beingcompelledtoproducephysicalevidence,ortosubmittoatestfor
physical evidence, is not a form of compulsion violative of either the Fifth Amendment or
Article12.OpinionoftheJusticestotheSenate,591Mass.at1077.
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B. Immunity

The protection against compelled selfincrimination afforded by the


FifthAmendmentandArticle12can,ofcourse,besupplantedbyagrantof
immunity. The minimum scope of the immunity sufficient to satisfy the
protectionsaffordedbythesetwoparallelprovisionshasbeenthesubject
of decisions by both the U.S. Supreme Court and the SJC. Until 1972, the
jurisprudence of both courts was essentially the same: only a grant of
transactionalimmunitywascoextensivewiththeprivilege.79
This common view changed when the U.S. Supreme Court decided
Kastigarv.UnitedStates.80Inthatcase,theCourtconcludedthatthefederal
immunity statute enacted in 1970, which proscribed only the use of the
compelled testimony (and evidence derived therefrom) in subsequent
criminal proceedings (use immunity), satisfied the requirements of the
FifthAmendmentandwasasufficientbasisonwhichtestimonycouldbe
compelled.81Thereafter,relyingonthedifferencesbetweenthelanguageof
the provisions in the two constitutions and its interpretation of Article 12
extendingbackmorethan100years,theSJCagainrejecteduseimmunity
as inadequate and affirmed that only a grant of transactional immunity
would be sufficient to supplement the protections afforded individuals
underArticle12.82

III. MirandaandtheRighttoCounsel:TheFifthAmendmentand
Article12

A. Mirandav.Arizona

InMirandav.Arizona,theU.S.SupremeCourtfirstrecognizedthatin
the context of custodial interrogations undertaken prior to the
commencement of formal criminal proceedings, the right to counsel was
necessarytosafeguardtheFifthAmendmentprotectionagainstcompelled
selfincrimination.83Subsequently,thatrightwasfullyincorporatedbythe

79SeeInreEmerysCase,107Mass.172,185(1871)(statingthatnoonecanberequiredto

forego his privilege under Article 12 of the Massachusetts Constitution so long as he


remainsliabletoprosecutioncriminallyforanymattersorcausesinrespecttowhichheshall
beexamined,or towhichhistestimonyshallrelate);seealsoCounselman v.Hitchcock,142
U.S.547,58586(1892)(holdingthatinorderforastatutoryenactmentcompellingtestimony
tobevalid[it] mustaffordabsoluteimmunityagainst futureprosecutionforthe offenseto
whichthequestionrelates).
80406U.S.441(1972).

81Id.at462.

82AttyGen.v.Colleton,444N.E.2d915,921(Mass.1982).

83384U.S.436,471,47879(1966).
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2011 Criminal Procedure and the Massachusetts Constitution 829

SJC as a measure necessary to ensure that same protection under Article


12.84
Similarly, the SJC has followed the U.S. Supreme Court in requiring
that the warnings set out in the Miranda decision be administered as a
necessary prerequisite under Article 12 (as it is under the Fifth
Amendment) to the admission in evidence in a subsequent criminal
proceeding of any statement obtained during the course of a custodial
interrogation. The two courts have come to differ, however, on the
consequencesofbelatedlyrenderedwarnings.
In Oregon v. Elstad, the U.S. Supreme Court announced a new rule of
federal constitutional law by rejecting the presumption that an admission
obtained prior to the provision of the warnings tainted any subsequent
admissionmadebytheaccusedandthatthetaintcouldnotbedissipated
solely by giving the warnings.85 In its place, the Court concluded that,
absent deliberately coercive or improper tactics in obtaining the initial
statement[s],thesubsequentadministrationofMirandawarningsshould
suffice to remove the conditions that precluded admission of the earlier
statement.86TheSJCrejectedtheElstadCourtsholdinginCommonwealth
v. Smith as inadequate under Article 12, concluding that the wiser
course...istopresumethatastatementmadefollowingtheviolationofa
suspectsMirandarightsistaintedand...require[s]theprosecutionshow
more than the belated administration of Miranda warnings in order to
dispelthattaint.87
In addition, in Commonwealth v. Martin, the SJC concluded that the
failure to administer Miranda warnings to a suspect in custody requires
suppressionnotonlyofanystatementssubsequentlyobtainedbutalsoof
any physical evidence derived from the unwarned statements.88 In
reachingthisconclusion,theSJCrejectedacontraryconstructionafforded
to the Fifth Amendment in United States v. Patane,89 holding that the
shrinkingprotectionsaffordedbytheSupremeCourttothefederalright

84See, e.g., Commonwealth v. McGann, 477 N.E.2d 1075, 1078 (Mass. App. Ct. 1985)

(discussingtherighttocounselaffordedbytheSixthAmendmenttotheU.S.Constitutionand
byArticle12oftheMassachusettsConstitution).
85470U.S.298,318(1985).

86Id.at314.

87593N.E.2d1288,129596(Mass.1992)(Thispresumptionsupportsoneofthepurposes

of the bright line Miranda rule: to avoid factbound inquiries into the voluntariness of
confessions, where police officers are generally more credible witnesses than criminal
defendants.).
88827N.E.2d198,200(Mass.2005).

89542 U.S. 630, 631 (2004) (holding that the selfincrimination clause is not implicated by

theintroductionattrialofphysicalevidenceresultingfromunwarnedstatementssolongas
theywerenottheproductofcoercion).
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against selfincrimination were no longer adequate to safeguard the


protectionsaffordedMassachusettscitizensbyArticle12.90

B. WaiveroftheRighttoCounsel

TheSJChasbeenparticularlyintentonensuringthatasuspectbefully
informedbythepoliceofanattorneysefforttorenderlegalassistanceto
him,asaprerequisitetoavalidwaiverofhisrighttoconsultwithcounsel
duringthecourseofacustodialinterrogation.91Suchinformation,thecourt
hasruled,isnecessarytoactualizetheotherwiseabstractrighttocounsel
provided in the Miranda warnings and is critical to the consideration of
whetherthesuspectsdecisiontowaivetherighthasbeenknowinglyand
intelligently made.92 The U.S. Supreme Court, on the other hand,
articulatedaverydifferentviewinMoranv.Burbine,holdingthatsolong
as the suspect understands his right to counsel and does not request
counsel, [e]vents occurring outside of a suspects presence and entirely
unknowntohim...havenobearingonthecapacitytocomprehendand
knowingly relinquish a constitutional right.93 In rejecting this reasoning,
theSJCtooknoteofthevigorousdissentbythefourJusticesintheMoran
case and agreed with their essential proposition that the right to counsel
shouldnotbetreatedasanobstacletojusticebutratherasarightcentralto
itsfairadministration.94
TowhatextenttheSJCwillinsistthatpoliceinformasuspectnotonly
of an attorneys efforts to render assistance, but also of the essence of the
advice the attorney wishes to convey to the suspect in his absence, is a
question not yet definitively answered. However, in a recent decision, a
threejudge majority concluded that it was insufficient for the police to
have conveyed only that an attorney had been appointed for the suspect
and that he could stop the questioning to consult with that attorney if he
wished, where the attorney had contacted the police and told them not
onlythathehadbeenappointedbutthathewasonhiswaytothestation,
thathewantedtospeaktohisclient(thesuspect),andthathealsowanted
hisclientto betoldnottotalktothe policeuntilhearrived.95Twoofthe
five Justices deciding the case dissented from so much of the majority
opinionassuggestedthatthepolicewererequiredtoconveynotonlythe
attorneysavailabilitybutalsohisadvice.96

90Martin,827N.E.2dat20405.

91Commonwealthv.Mavredakis,725N.E.2d169,176(Mass.2000).

92Id.

93475U.S.412,413(1986).

94Mavredakis,725N.E.2dat179.

95Commonwealthv.McNulty,937N.E.2d16,2334,2728(Mass.2010).

96Id.at3738(Gants,J.,dissenting).
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2011 Criminal Procedure and the Massachusetts Constitution 831

IV. TheSixthAmendmentandArticle12

A. FaceOff:TheRightofConfrontation97

Although the SJC has repeatedly held that the SixthAmendment and
Article 12 are coextensive when it comes to the use of hearsay evidence,
thereisatleastonerespectinwhichtheconfrontationguaranteesofeach
havebeeninterpreteddifferently.InapairofcasesdecidedbytheSJCin
the 1990s, Commonwealth v. Johnson and Commonwealth v. Amirault, the
CourtdeclaredthatthetextualdifferencesbetweentheSixthAmendment
(therighttoconfrontthewitnesses)andArticle12(therighttomeetthe
witnessesfacetoface)hadsubstantivesignificance.98Specifically,theSJC
concludedthatspecialseatingarrangementsattrialsthatkepttheaccused
fromseeingthefacesofthewitnesses(childreninthesecases)againsthim,
violated Article 12, and that the right to crossexamine witnesses under
oathandtheabilityofthejurytoobservethewitnessessdemeanorwere
incidental to the indispensable right under Article 12 to confront the
witnessesfacetoface.99InAmirault,theSJCrecognizedthattheopposite
conclusion had been reached by the U.S. Supreme Court in its
interpretationoftheSixthAmendmentinMarylandv.Craig.100Inrejecting
the Supreme Courts approach to the cognate right of confrontation in
Article12,theSJCnoted:
Perhaps the Court in Craig was justified in treating the Sixth
Amendment as stating a set of general desiderata that might be
servedinavarietyofwaysandadjustedtothecircumstancesof
the particular caseparticularly so where the rule would be
imposed on the several States with their various constitutional
texts and traditions. But we are not free to treat art. 12 in the
same way.... [when it] speaks to us with such unmistakable
insistence.101

97TheSixthAmendmenttotheU.S.Constitutionprovidesinrelevantpart:Inallcriminal

prosecutions,theaccusedshallenjoytheright...tobeconfrontedwiththewitnessesagainst
him.U.S.CONST.amend.VI.Article12oftheMassachusettsDeclarationofRightsprovides:
[E]very subject shall have a right . . . to meet the witnesses against him face to face . . . .
Mass.CONST.art.XII.
98See Commonwealth v. Amirault, 667 N.E.2d 652, 662 (Mass. 1997); Commonwealth v.

Johnson,631N.E.2d1002,100607(Mass.1994).
99SeeAmirault,677N.E.2dat662;Johnson,631N.E.2dat1006.

100497U.S.836,849,85253(1990)(upholdingthetestimonyofchildwitnessesviaoneway

closed circuit television, concluding that Sixth Amendment did not guarantee absolute right
tofacetofacemeetingwithwitnesses);seealsoAmirault,677N.E.2dat66162.
101Amirault,677N.E.2dat66162.
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B. EffectiveAssistanceofCounsel

Both Article 12 and the Sixth Amendment guarantee the accused the
right to be represented by counsel who performs at least to a certain
minimum level of competency.102 To establish that counsel has been
ineffective within the meaning of those guarantees, a defendant must
ordinarily demonstrate that he was actually prejudiced by a sub par
performance of his counsel.103 However, when counsels professional
shortcomings derive from a conflict between the interests of counsel and
that of his client, the requirements of proving actual prejudice have been
heldtodiffer.UnderArticle12,theSJChasconcludedthatonceanactual
conflict of interest (rather than a potential conflict) has been established,
the defendant does not bear the difficult burden of proving that this
conflicthadanadverseimpactontherepresentationhehasreceived.104In
contrast,theU.S.SupremeCourtheldinCuylerv.Sullivan,thattheburden
ofdemonstratingbothanactualconflictandanadverseeffectremainson
thedefendant.105

CONCLUSION

As the U.S. Supreme Court continues along a path of closely divided


opinions on the meaning and application of the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth
Amendments to the myriad factual situations confronting state court
criminal judges, it is likely that the trend toward NJF, so evident in the
dozensofcasesnotedinthisbriefArticle,willcontinue.106Defensecounsel

102See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 68788 (1984); Commonwealth v. Saferian,

315N.E.2d878,884(Mass.1974);seealsoU.S.CONST.amend.VI;MASS.CONST.art.XII.
103See, e.g., Saferian, 315 N.E.2d at 883 (holding that the defendant must demonstrate that

counsels inadequacy deprived him of an otherwise available, substantial ground of


defence).
104Commonwealth v. Perkins, 883 N.E.2d 230, 246 n.14 (Mass. 2008); Commonwealth v.

Martinez, 681 N.E.2d 818, 823 (Mass. 1997); Commonwealth v. Rainwater, 681 N.E.2d 1218,
1227(Mass.1997);Commonwealthv.Shraiar,489N.E.2d689,692n.3(Mass.1986).
105440U.S.335,34850(1980).InLockhardv.Fretwell,506U.S.364(1983),theU.S.Supreme

CourtconcludedthattoestablishprejudiceunderStricklandv.Washington,adefendantmust
demonstratethatcounselserrorsweresoseriousastodeprivehimofatrialwhoseresultis
unfairorunreliable,notmerelythattheoutcomewouldlikelyhavebeendifferent.Following
Lockhart,theSJCdecidedCommonwealthv.Urena,417Mass.692(1994),inwhichitdescribed
Lockhartasnewlyexplicatingthefederalstandard,andemphasiz[ing]thatthisCourtwill
be the arbiter of the standard for effective assistance of counsel under the Declaration of
RightsandwillnotbeboundbyFederalprecedentwhendecidingthatissue.Id.at696.
106See most recently Montejo v. Louisiana, 129 S. Ct. 2079, 208889 (2009), in which a five

Justice majority of the Supreme Court reversed Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625 (1986). In
Jackson, the Supreme Court had applied the principles of Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477
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2011 Criminal Procedure and the Massachusetts Constitution 833

has become more adept at looking to the Massachusetts Constitution for


the protections and explication of the rights of their clients, and the
jurisprudence on the subject has accordingly increased in its depth and
breadth.WhethertheSJCreliesontextualdifferencesorhistoricalcontext
in justifying its differing interpretations of the analogous rights and
protections afforded in our constitutions, turns to the common law, or
decidesmattersundertheDeclarationofRightswithoutopiningonwhat
the U.S. Constitution does or does not provide, its divergence is one the
court is not likely to abandon. Where the U.S. Constitution sets a floor
below which no state can go, the expectations with respect to liberty and
privacyofthosewhoauthoredtheMassachusettsConstitutionandofthe
communitythatconstitutiongovernstodayrequiremore.

(1981), in holding that, [i]f police initiate interrogation after the defendants assertion at
arraignmentorasimilarproceeding,ofhisrighttocounsel,anywaiverofdefendantsrightto
counselforthatpoliceinterrogationisinvalid.Jackson,475U.S.at636.

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