Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-40502 November 29, 1976

VIRGINIA GARCIA FULE, and HONORABLE SEVERO A. MALVAR, Presiding Judge, Court of
First Instance of Laguna, Branch Vl, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, * PRECIOSA B. GARCIA and AGUSTINA B.
GARCIA, respondents.

G.R. No. L-42670 November 29, 1976

VIRGINIA GARCIA FULE, petitioner,

vs.
HONORABLE ERNANI C. PAO, Presiding Judge of Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon
City, Branch XVIII, and PRECIOSA B. GARCIA, respondents.

Francisco Carreon for petitioners.

Augusto G. Gatmaytan for private respondents.

MARTIN, J.:

These two interrelated cases bring to Us the question of what the word "resides" in Section
1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules Of Court, referring to the situs of the settlement of the estate
of deceased persons, means. Additionally, the rule in the appointment of a special
administrator is sought to be reviewed.

On May 2, 1973, Virginia G. Fule filed with the Court of First Instance of Laguna, at Calamba,
presided over by Judge Severo A. Malvar, a petition for letters of administration, docketed as
Sp. Proc. No. 27-C, alleging, inter alia, "that on April 26, 1973, Amado G. Garcia, a property
owner of Calamba, Laguna, died intestate in the City of Manila, leaving real estate and
personal properties in Calamba, Laguna, and in other places, within the jurisdiction of the
Honorable Court." At the same time, she moved
ex parte for her appointment as special administratrix over the estate. On even date, May 2,
1973, Judge Malvar granted the motion.

A motion for reconsideration was filed by Preciosa B. Garcia on May 8, 1973, contending that
the order appointing Virginia G. Fule as special administratrix was issued without
jurisdiction, since no notice of the petition for letters of administration has been served upon
all persons interested in the estate; there has been no delay or cause for delay in the
proceedings for the appointment of a regular administrator as the surviving spouse of Amado
G. Garcia, she should be preferred in the appointment of a special administratrix; and,
Virginia G. Fule is a debtor of the estate of Amado G. Garcia. Preciosa B. Garcia, therefore,
prayed that she be appointed special administratrix of the estate, in lieu of Virginia G. Fule,
and as regular administratrix after due hearing.

While this reconsideration motion was pending resolution before the Court, Preciosa B.
Garcia filed on May 29, 1973 a motion to remove Virginia G. Fule as special administratrix
alleging, besides the jurisdictional ground raised in the motion for reconsideration of May 8,
1973 that her appointment was obtained through erroneous, misleading and/or incomplete
misrepresentations; that Virginia G. Fule has adverse interest against the estate; and that she
has shown herself unsuitable as administratrix and as officer of the court.

In the meantime, the notice of hearing of the petition for letters of administration filed by
Virginia G. Fule with the Court of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna, was published on May
17, 24, and 31, 1973, in the Bayanihan, a weekly publication of general circulation in Southern
Luzon.

On June 6, 1973, Preciosa B. Garcia received a "Supplemental Petition for the Appointment of
Regular Administrator ' filed by Virginia G. Fule. This supplemental petition modified the
original petition in four aspects: (1) the allegation that during the lifetime of the deceased
Amado G. Garcia, he was elected as Constitutional Delegate for the First District of Laguna
and his last place of residence was at Calamba, Laguna; (2) the deletion of the names of
Preciosa B. Garcia and Agustina Garcia as legal heirs of Amado G. Garcia; (3) the allegation
that Carolina Carpio, who was simply listed as heir in the original petition, is the surviving
spouse of Amado G. Garcia and that she has expressly renounced her preferential right to
the administration of the estate in favor of Virginia G. Fule; and (4) that Virginia G. Fule be
appointed as the regular administratrix. The admission of this supplemental petition was
opposed by Preciosa B. Garcia for the reason, among others, that it attempts to confer
jurisdiction on the Court of First Instance of Laguna, of which the court was not possessed at
the beginning because the original petition was deficient.

On July 19, 1973, Preciosa B. Garcia filed an opposition to the original and supplemental
petitions for letters of administration, raising the issues of jurisdiction, venue, lack of interest
of Virginia G. Fule in the estate of Amado G. Garcia, and disqualification of Virginia G Fule as
special administratrix.

An omnibus motion was filed by Virginia G. Fule on August 20, 1973, praying for authority to
take possession of properties of the decedent allegedly in the hands of third persons as well
as to secure cash advances from the Calamba Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing
Association, Inc. Preciosa B. Garcia opposed the motion, calling attention to the limitation
made by Judge Malvar on the power of the special administratrix, viz., "to making an
inventory of the personal and real properties making up the state of the deceased."

However, by July 2, 1973, Judge Malvar and already issued an order, received by Preciosa B.
Garcia only on July 31, 1973, denying the motion of Preciosa B. Garcia to reconsider the
order of May 2, 1973, appointing Virginia G. Fule as special administratrix, and admitting the
supplementation petition of May 18,1973.

On August 31, 1973, Preciosa B. Garcia moved to dismiss the petition, because (1)
jurisdiction over the petition or over the parties in interest has not been acquired by the
court; (2) venue was improperly laid; and (3) Virginia G. Fule is not a party in interest as she
is not entitled to inherit from the deceased Amado G. Garcia.
On September 28, 1973, Preciosa B. Garcia filed a supplemental motion to substitute Virginia
G. Fule as special administratrix, reasoning that the said Virginia G. Fule admitted before
before the court that she is a full-blooded sister of Pablo G. Alcalde, an illegitimate son of
Andrea Alcalde, with whom the deceased Amado G. Garcia has no relation.

Three motions were filed by Preciosa B. Garcia on November 14, 1973, one, to enjoin the
special administratrix from taking possession of properties in the hands of third persons
which have not been determined as belonging to Amado G. Garcia; another, to remove the
special administratrix for acting outside her authority and against the interest of the estate;
and still another, filed in behalf of the minor Agustina B. Garcia, to dismiss the petition for
want of cause of action, jurisdiction, and improper venue.

On November 28, 1973, Judge Malvar resolved the pending omnibus motion of Virgina G.
Fule and the motion to dismiss filed by Preciosa B. Garcia. Resolving the motion to dismiss,
Judge Malvar ruled that the powers of the special administratrix are those provided for in
Section 2, Rule 80 of the Rules of Court, 1 subject only to the previous qualification made by the
court that the administration of the properties subject of the marketing agreement with the
Canlubang Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing Association should remain with the latter; and
that the special administratrix had already been authorized in a previous order of August 20, 1973
to take custody and possession of all papers and certificates of title and personal effects of the
decedent with the Canlubang Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc. Ramon
Mercado, of the Canlubang Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc., was ordered
to deliver to Preciosa B. Garcia all certificates of title in her name without any qualifying words
like "married to Amado Garcia" does not appear. Regarding the motion to dismiss, Judge Malvar
ruled that the issue of jurisdiction had already been resolved in the order of July 2, 1973, denying
Preciosa B. Garcia's motion to reconsider the appointment of Virginia G. Fule and admitting the
supplemental petition, the failure of Virginia G. Fule to allege in her original petition for letters of
administration in the place of residence of the decedent at the time of his death was cured. Judge
Malvar further held that Preciosa B. Garcia had submitted to the jurisdiction of the court and had
waived her objections thereto by praying to be appointed as special and regular administratrix of
the estate.

An omnibus motion was filed by Preciosa B. Garcia on December 27, 1973 to clarify or
reconsider the foregoing order of Judge Malvar, in view of previous court order limiting the
authority of the special administratrix to the making of an inventory. Preciosa B. Garcia also
asked for the resolution of her motion to dismiss the petitions for lack of cause of action, and
also that filed in behalf of Agustina B. Garcia. Resolution of her motions to substitute and
remove the special administratrix was likewise prayed for.

On December 19, 1973, Judge Malvar issued two separate orders, the first, denying Preciosa
B. Garcia's motions to substitute and remove the special administratrix, and the second,
holding that the power allowed the special administratrix enables her to conduct and submit
an inventory of the assets of the estate.

On January 7, 1974, Preciosa B. Garcia moved for reconsideration of the foregoing orders of
November 28, 1973 and December 19, 1973, insofar as they sustained or failed to rule on the
issues raised by her: (a) legal standing (cause of action) of Virginia G. Fule; (b) venue; (c)
jurisdiction; (d) appointment, qualification and removal of special administratrix; and (e)
delivery to the special administratrix of checks and papers and effects in the office of the
Calamba Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc.

On March 27, 1973, Judge Malvar issued the first questioned order denying Preciosa B.
Garcia's motion for reconsideration of January 7, 1974. On July 19, 1974, Judge Malvar
issued the other three questioned orders: one, directing Ramon Mercado, of the Calamba
Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc., to furnish Virginia G. Fule, as special
administratrix, copy of the statement of accounts and final liquidation of sugar pool, as well
as to deliver to her the corresponding amount due the estate; another, directing Preciosa B.
Garcia to deliver to Virginia G. Fule two motor vehicles presumably belonging to the estate;
and another, directing Ramon Mercado to deliver to the court all certificates of title in his
possession in the name of Preciosa B. Garcia, whether qualified with the word "single" or
"married to Amado Garcia."

During the hearing of the various incidents of this case (Sp. Proc. 27-C) before Judge
Malvar, 2 Virginia G. Fule presented the death certificate of Amado G. Garcia showing that his
residence at the time of his death was Quezon City. On her part, Preciosa B. Garcia presented the
residence certificate of the decedent for 1973 showing that three months before his death his
residence was in Quezon City. Virginia G. Fule also testified that Amado G. Garcia was residing in
Calamba, Laguna at the time of his death, and that he was a delegate to the 1971 Constitutional
Convention for the first district of Laguna.

On July 26, 1974, Preciosa B. Garcia and Agustina B. Garcia commenced a special action for
certiorari and/or prohibition and preliminary injunction before the Court of Appeals, docketed
as CA-G.R. No. 03221-SP. primarily to annul the proceedings before Judge Malvar in Sp. Proc.
No. 27-C of the Court of First Instance of Laguna, or, in the alternative, to vacate the
questioned four orders of that court, viz., one dated March 27, 1974, denying their motion for
reconsideration of the order denying their motion to dismiss the criminal and supplemental
petitions on the issue, among others, of jurisdiction, and the three others, all dated July 19,
1974, directing the delivery of certain properties to the special administratrix, Virginia G. Fule,
and to the court.

On January 30, 1975, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment annulling the proceedings
before Judge Severo A. Malvar in Sp. Proc. 27-C of the Court of First Instance of Calamba,
Laguna, for lack of jurisdiction.

Denied of their motion for reconsideration on March 31, 1975, Virginia G. Fule forthwith
elevated the matter to Us on appeal by certiorari. The case was docketed as G.R. No. L-40502.

However, even before Virginia G. Fule could receive the decision of the Court of Appeals,
Preciosa B. Garcia had already filed on February 1, 1975 a petition for letters of
administration before the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch, docketed as
Sp. Proc. No. Q-19738, over the same intestate estate of Amado G. Garcia. On February 10,
1975, Preciosa B. Garcia urgently moved for her appointment as special administratrix of the
estate. Judge Vicente G. Ericta granted the motion and appointed Preciosa B. Garcia as
special administratrix upon a bond of P30,000.00. Preciosa B. Garcia qualified and assumed
the office.

For the first time, on February 14, 1975, Preciosa B. Garcia informed Judge Ericta of the
pendency of Sp. Proc. No. 27-C before Judge Malvar of the Court of First Instance of Laguna,
and the annulment of the proceedings therein by the Court of Appeals on January 30, 1975.
She manifested, however, her willingness to withdraw Sp. Proc. Q-19738 should the decision
of the Court of Appeals annulling the proceedings before the Court of First Instance of
Laguna in Sp. Proc. No. 27-C have not yet become final, it being the subject of a motion for
reconsideration.
On March 10, 1973, Judge Ericta ordered the suspension of the proceedings before his court
until Preciosa B. Garcia inform the court of the final outcome of the case pending before the
Court of Appeals. This notwithstanding, Preciosa B. Garcia filed on December 11, 1975, an
"Urgent Petition for Authority to Pay Estate Obligations."

On December 13, 1975, Virginia G. Fule filed a "Special Appearance to Question Venue and
Jurisdiction" reiterating the grounds stated in the previous special appearance of March 3,
1975, and calling attention that the decision of the Court of Appeals and its resolution
denying the motion for reconsideration had been appealed to this Court; that the parties had
already filed their respective briefs; and that the case is still pending before the Court.

On December 17, 1975, Judge Ernani Cruz Pano, who succeeded Judge Ericta, issued an
order granting Preciosa B. Garcia's "Urgent Petition for Authority to Pay Estate Obligations"
in that the payments were for the benefit of the estate and that there hangs a cloud of doubt
on the validity of the proceedings in Sp. Proc. No. 27-C of the Court of First Instance of
Laguna.

A compliance of this Order was filed by Preciosa B. Garcia on January 12,1976.

On February 4,1974, VIRGINIA G. FULE instituted G.R. No. L-42670, a petition for certiorari
with temporary restraining order, to annul the proceedings in Sp. Proc. No. Q-19738 and to
restrain Judge Ernani Cruz Pao from further acting in the case. A restraining order was
issued on February 9, 1976.

We dismiss the appeal in G.R. No. L-40502 and the petition for certiorari in G.R. No. L-
42670 for the reasons and considerations hereinafter stated.

1. Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court provides: "If the decedent is an inhabitant
of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be
proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First
Instance in the province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant
of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance of any province in which he had estate. The
court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise
jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as
it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not
be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the original case,
or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record." With particular regard to letters of
administration, Section 2, Rule 79 of the Revised Rules of Court demands that the petition
therefor should affirmatively show the existence of jurisdiction to make the appointment
sought, and should allege all the necessary facts, such as death, the name and last
residence of the decedent, the existence, and situs if need be, of assets, intestacy, where this
is relied upon, and the right of the person who seeks administration, as next of kin, creditor,
or otherwise, to be appointed. The fact of death of the intestate and his last residence within
the country are foundation facts upon which all subsequent proceedings in the
administration of the estate rest, and that if the intestate was not an inhabitant of the state at
the time of his death, and left no assets in the state, no jurisdiction is conferred on the court
to grant letters of administration. 3

The aforequoted Section 1, Rule 73 (formerly Rule 75, Section 1), specifically the clause "so
far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of the estate,"
is in reality a matter of venue, as the caption of the Rule indicates: "Settlement of Estate of
Deceased Persons. Venue and Processes. 4 It could not have been intended to define the
jurisdiction over the subject matter, because such legal provision is contained in a law of
procedure dealing merely with procedural matters. Procedure is one thing; jurisdiction over the
subject matter is another. The power or authority of the court over the subject matter "existed and
was fixed before procedure in a given cause began." That power or authority is not altered or
changed by procedure, which simply directs the manner in which the power or authority shall be
fully and justly exercised. There are cases though that if the power is not exercised conformably
with the provisions of the procedural law, purely, the court attempting to exercise it loses the
power to exercise it legally. However, this does not amount to a loss of jurisdiction over the
subject matter. Rather, it means that the court may thereby lose jurisdiction over the person or
that the judgment may thereby be rendered defective for lack of something essential to sustain it.
The appearance of this provision in the procedural law at once raises a strong presumption that it
has nothing to do with the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter. In plain words, it is just
a matter of method, of convenience to the parties. 5

The Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, confers upon Courts of First Instance jurisdiction
over all probate cases independently of the place of residence of the deceased. Because of
the existence of numerous Courts of First Instance in the country, the Rules of Court,
however, purposedly fixes the venue or the place where each case shall be brought. A
fortiori, the place of residence of the deceased in settlement of estates, probate of will, and
issuance of letters of administration does not constitute an element of jurisdiction over the
subject matter. It is merely constitutive of venue. And it is upon this reason that the Revised
Rules of Court properly considers the province where the estate of a deceased person shall
be settled as "venue." 6

2. But, the far-ranging question is this: What does the term "resides" mean? Does it refer to
the actual residence or domicile of the decedent at the time of his death? We lay down the
doctrinal rule that the term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as
distinguished from "legal residence or domicile." This term "resides," like, the terms
"residing" and "residence," is elastic and should be interpreted in the light of the object or
purpose of the statute or rule in which it is employed. 7 In the application of venue statutes and
rules Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature residence rather
than domicile is the significant factor. Even where the statute uses the word "domicile" still it is
construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the technical sense. Some cases make a
distinction between the terms "residence" and "domicile" but as generally used in statutes fixing
venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term "inhabitant." 8 In
other words, "resides" should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the
personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies
physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term means merely
residence, that is, personal residence, not legal residence or domicile. 9 Residence simply
requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily
presence in that place and also an intention to make it one's domicile. 10 No particular length of
time of residence is required though; however, the residence must be more than temporary. 11

3. Divergent claims are maintained by Virginia G. Fule and Preciosa B. Garcia on the
residence of the deceased Amado G. Garcia at the time of his death. In her original petition
for letters of administration before the Court of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna, Virginia G.
Fule measely stated "(t)hat on April 26,1973, Amado G. Garcia, a property owner of Calamba,
Laguna, died intestate in the City of Manila, leaving real estate and personal properties in
Calamba, Laguna, and in other places within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court."
Preciosa B. Garcia assailed the petition for failure to satisfy the jurisdictional requirement
and improper laying of venue. For her, the quoted statement avers no domicile or residence
of the deceased Amado G. Garcia. To say that as "property owner of Calamba, Laguna," he
also resides in Calamba, Laguna, is, according to her, non sequitur. On the contrary, Preciosa
B. Garcia claims that, as appearing in his death certificate presented by Virginia G. Fule
herself before the Calamba court and in other papers, the last residence of Amado G. Garcia
was at 11 Carmel Avenue, Carmel Subdivision, Quezon City. Parenthetically, in her amended
petition, Virginia G. Fule categorically alleged that Amado G. Garcia's "last place of residence
was at Calamba, Laguna."

On this issue, We rule that the last place of residence of the deceased Amado G. Garcia was
at 11 Carmel Avenue, Carmel Subdivision, Quezon City, and not at Calamba, Laguna. A death
certificate is admissible to prove the residence of the decedent at the time of his death. 12 As it
is, the death certificate of Amado G. Garcia, which was presented in evidence by Virginia G. Fule
herself and also by Preciosa B. Garcia, shows that his last place of residence was at 11 Carmel
Avenue, Carmel Subdivision, Quezon City. Aside from this, the deceased's residence certificate
for 1973 obtained three months before his death; the Marketing Agreement and Power of Attorney
dated November 12, 1971 turning over the administration of his two parcels of sugar land to the
Calamba Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc.; the Deed of Donation dated
January 8, 1973, transferring part of his interest in certain parcels of land in Calamba, Laguna to
Agustina B. Garcia; and certificates of titles covering parcels of land in Calamba, Laguna, show in
bold documents that Amado G. Garcia's last place of residence was at Quezon City. Withal, the
conclusion becomes imperative that the venue for Virginia C. Fule's petition for letters of
administration was improperly laid in the Court of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna.
Nevertheless, the long-settled rule is that objection to improper venue is subject to waiver.
Section 4, Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of Court states: "When improper venue is not objected to in
a motion to dismiss, it is deemed waived." In the case before Us the Court of Appeals had reason
to hold that in asking to substitute Virginia G. Fule as special administratrix, Preciosa B. Garcia
did not necessarily waive her objection to the jurisdiction or venue assumed by the Court of First
Instance of Calamba, Laguna, but availed of a mere practical resort to alternative remedy to assert
her rights as surviving spouse, while insisting on the enforcement of the Rule fixing the proper
venue of the proceedings at the last residence of the decedent.

4. Preciosa B. Garcia's challenge to Virginia G. Fule's appointment as special administratrix

is another issue of perplexity. Preciosa B. Garcia claims preference to the appointment as
surviving spouse. Section 1 of Rule 80 provides that "(w)hen there is delay in granting letters
testamentary or of administration by any cause including an appeal from the allowance or
disallowance of a will, the court may appoint a special administrator to take possession and
charge of the estate of the deceased until the questions causing the delay are decided and
executors or administrators appointed. 13 Formerly, the appointment of a special administrator
was only proper when the allowance or disallowance of a will is under appeal. The new Rules,
however, broadened the basis for appointment and such appointment is now allowed when there
is delay in granting letters testamentary or administration by any cause e.g., parties cannot agree
among themselves. 14 Nevertheless, the discretion to appoint a special administrator or not lies in
the probate court. 15That, however, is no authority for the judge to become partial, or to make his
personal likes and dislikes prevail over, or his passions to rule, his judgment. Exercise of that
discretion must be based on reason, equity, justice and legal principle. There is no reason why the
same fundamental and legal principles governing the choice of a regular administrator should not
be taken into account in the appointment of a special administrator. 16 Nothing is wrong for the
judge to consider the order of preference in the appointment of a regular administrator in
appointing a special administrator. After all, the consideration that overrides all others in this
respect is the beneficial interest of the appointee in the estate of the decedent. 17 Under the law,
the widow would have the right of succession over a portion of the exclusive property of the
decedent, besides her share in the conjugal partnership. For such reason, she would have as
such, if not more, interest in administering the entire estate correctly than any other next of kin.
The good or bad administration of a property may affect rather the fruits than the naked
ownership of a property. 18
Virginia G. Fule, however, disputes the status of Preciosa B. Garcia as the widow of the late
Amado G. Garcia. With equal force, Preciosa B. Garcia maintains that Virginia G. Fule has no
relation whatsoever with Amado G. Garcia, or that, she is a mere illegitimate sister of the
latter, incapable of any successional rights. 19 On this point, We rule that Preciosa B. Garcia
is prima facie entitled to the appointment of special administratrix. It needs be emphasized that in
the issuance of such appointment, which is but temporary and subsists only until a regular
administrator is appointed, 20 the appointing court does not determine who are entitled to share in
the estate of the decedent but who is entitled to the administration. The issue of heirship is one to
be determined in the decree of distribution, and the findings of the court on the relationship of the
parties in the administration as to be the basis of distribution. 21 The preference of Preciosa B.
Garcia is with sufficient reason. In a Donation Inter Vivos executed by the deceased Amado G.
Garcia on January 8, 1973 in favor of Agustina B. Garcia, he indicated therein that he is married to
Preciosa B. Garcia. 22 In his certificate of candidacy for the office of Delegate to the Constitutional
Convention for the First District of Laguna filed on September 1, 1970, he wrote therein the name
of Preciosa B. Banaticla as his spouse. 23 Faced with these documents and the presumption that a
man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract
of marriage, Preciosa B. Garcia can be reasonably believed to be the surviving spouse of the late
Amado G. Garcia. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. 24

5. Under these circumstances and the doctrine laid down in Cuenco vs. Court of
Appeals, 25 this Court under its supervisory authority over all inferior courts may properly decree
that venue in the instant case was properly assumed by and transferred to Quezon City and that it
is in the interest of justice and avoidance of needless delay that the Quezon City court's exercise
of jurisdiction over the settlement of the estate of the deceased Amado G. Garcia and the
appointment of special administratrix over the latter's estate be approved and authorized and the
Court of First Instance of Laguna be disauthorized from continuing with the case and instead be
required to transfer all the records thereof to the Court of First Instance of Quezon City for the
continuation of the proceedings.

6. Accordingly, the Order of Judge Ernani Cruz Pano of December 17, 1975, granting the
"Urgent Petition for Authority to Pay Estate Obligations" filed by Preciosa B. Garcia in Sp.
Proc. No. Q-19738, subject matter of G.R. No. L-42670, and ordering the Canlubang Sugar
Estate to deliver to her as special administratrix the sum of P48,874.70 for payment of the
sum of estate obligations is hereby upheld.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petitions of petitioner Virginia Garcia Fule in G.R. No. L-
40502 and in G.R. No. L42670 are hereby denied, with costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 128314 May 29, 2002

RODOLFO V. JAO, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PERICO V. JAO, respondents.

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Rodolfo and Perico Jao were the only sons of the spouses Ignacio Jao Tayag and Andrea V. Jao,
who died intestate in 1988 and 1989, respectively. The decedents left real estate, cash, shares of
stock and other personal properties.

On April 17, 1991, Perico instituted a petition for issuance of letters of administration before the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 99, over the estate of his parents, docketed as Special
Proceedings No. Q-91-8507.1 Pending the appointment of a regular administrator, Perico moved that
he be appointed as special administrator. He alleged that his brother, Rodolfo, was gradually
dissipating the assets of the estate. More particularly, Rodolfo was receiving rentals from real
properties without rendering any accounting, and forcibly opening vaults belonging to their deceased
parents and disposing of the cash and valuables therein.

Rodolfo moved for the dismissal of the petition on the ground of improper venue. 2 He argued that the
deceased spouses did not reside in Quezon City either during their lifetime or at the time of their
deaths. The decedents actual residence was in Angeles City, Pampanga, where his late mother
used to run and operate a bakery. As the health of his parents deteriorated due to old age, they
stayed in Rodolfos residence at 61 Scout Gandia Street, Quezon City, solely for the purpose of
obtaining medical treatment and hospitalization. Rodolfo submitted documentary evidence
previously executed by the decedents, consisting of income tax returns, voters affidavits, statements
of assets and liabilities, real estate tax payments, motor vehicle registration and passports, all
indicating that their permanent residence was in Angeles City, Pampanga. 1wphi1.nt

In his opposition,3 Perico countered that their deceased parents actually resided in Rodolfos house
in Quezon City at the time of their deaths. As a matter of fact, it was conclusively declared in their
death certificates that their last residence before they died was at 61 Scout Gandia Street, Quezon
City.4 Rodolfo himself even supplied the entry appearing on the death certificate of their mother,
Andrea, and affixed his own signature on the said document.
Rodolfo filed a rejoinder, stating that he gave the information regarding the decedents residence on
the death certificates in good faith and through honest mistake. He gave his residence only as
reference, considering that their parents were treated in their late years at the Medical City General
Hospital in Mandaluyong, Metro Manila. Their stay in his house was merely transitory, in the same
way that they were taken at different times for the same purpose to Pericos residence at Legaspi
Towers in Roxas Boulevard. The death certificates could not, therefore, be deemed conclusive
evidence of the decedents residence in light of the other documents showing otherwise. 5

The court required the parties to submit their respective nominees for the position. 6 Both failed to
comply, whereupon the trial court ordered that the petition be archived. 7

Subsequently, Perico moved that the intestate proceedings be revived. 8 After the parties submitted
the names of their respective nominees, the trial court designated Justice Carlos L. Sundiam as
special administrator of the estate of Ignacio Jao Tayag and Andrea Jao. 9

On April 6, 1994, the motion to dismiss filed by petitioner Rodolfo was denied, to wit:

A mere perusal of the death certificates of the spouses issued separately in 1988 and 1989,
respectively, confirm the fact that Quezon City was the last place of residence of the
decedents. Surprisingly, the entries appearing on the death certificate of Andrea V. Jao were
supplied by movant, Rodolfo V. Jao, whose signature appears in said document. Movant,
therefore, cannot disown his own representation by taking an inconsistent position other than
his own admission. xxx xxx xxx.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing consideration, this court DENIES for lack of merit
movants motion to dismiss.

SO ORDERED.10

Rodolfo filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, which was docketed as CA-G.R. SP
No. 35908. On December 11, 1996, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed decision, the
dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, no error, much less any grave abuse of discretion of the court a quo having
been shown, the petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED. The questioned order of the
respondent Judge is affirmed in toto.

SO ORDERED.11

Rodolfos motion for reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals in the assailed resolution
dated February 17, 1997.12 Hence, this petition for review, anchored on the following grounds:

RESPONDENT COURT HAD DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE IN A WAY NOT IN

ACCORD WITH THE LAW AND IS DIRECTLY CONTRADICTORY TO THE APPLICABLE
DECISION ALREADY RENDERED BY THIS HONORABLE COURT.

II
 RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE RULING OF THIS HONORABLE
COURT IN THE CASE OF EUSEBIO VS. EUSEBIO, 100 PHILS. 593, WHICH CLEARLY
INTERPRETED WHAT IS MEANT BY RESIDENCE IN SEC. 1 OF RULE 73 OF THE RULES
OF COURT.

III

RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PHYSICAL PRESENCE IN A PLACE

AT THE TIME OF DEATH IS DETERMINATIVE OF DECEDENTS RESIDENCE RATHER
THAN THE INTENTION OF THE DECEDENTS TO ESTABLISH THEIR PERMANENT
RESIDENCE IN ANOTHER PLACE.

IV

RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN APPLYING BY ANALOGY THE RESIDENCE

CONTEMPLATED IN SEC. 2 OF RULE 4 FOR THE PURPOSE OF SERVING SUMMONS
TO A DEFENDANT IN A PERSONAL ACTION TO THE RESIDENCE CONTEMPLATED IN
SEC. 1 OF RULE 73 FOR THE PURPOSE OF DETERMINING VENUE IN THE
SETTLEMENT OF THE ESTATE OF A DECEASED.

RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN GIVING MORE WEIGHT TO THE ENTRY OF

PETITIONER AND PRIVATE RESPONDENT IN THE RESPECTIVE DEATH CERTIFICATES
OF THE DECEDENTS RATHER THAN THE OVERWHELMING EVIDENCE SHOWING THE
CLEAR INTENTION OF THE DECEDENTS TO ESTABLISH THEIR PERMANENT
RESIDENCE IN ANGELES CITY.

VI

RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN APPLYING THE PRINCIPLE OF ESTOPPEL AS

AGAINST PETITIONER WHICH CAN NOT BE MORE PERSUASIVE THAN THE CLEAR
INTENTION OF THE DECEDENTS THEMSELVES TO ESTABLISH PERMANENT
RESIDENCE IN ANGELES CITY.

VII

RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI

DESPITE THE CLEAR ABUSE OF DISCRETION ON THE PART OF THE TRIAL COURT IN
INSISTING TO TAKE COGNIZANCE OF SP. PROCEEDING NO. Q-91-8507. 13

The main issue before us is: where should the settlement proceedings be had --- in Pampanga,
where the decedents had their permanent residence, or in Quezon City, where they actually stayed
before their demise?

Rule 73, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states:

Where estate of deceased persons be settled. If the decedent is an inhabitant of the

Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved,
or letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance in the
province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign
 country, the Court of First Instance of any province in which he had estate. The court first
taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent shall exercise jurisdiction to
the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on
the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested
in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the
want of jurisdiction appears on the record. (underscoring ours)

Clearly, the estate of an inhabitant of the Philippines shall be settled or letters of administration
granted in the proper court located in the province where the decedent resides at the time of his
death.

Petitioner Rodolfo invokes our ruling in the case of Eusebio v. Eusebio, et al.,14 where we held that
the situs of settlement proceedings shall be the place where the decedent had his permanent
residence or domicile at the time of death. In determining residence at the time of death, the
following factors must be considered, namely, the decedent had: (a) capacity to choose and freedom
of choice; (b) physical presence at the place chosen; and (c) intention to stay therein
permanently.15 While it appears that the decedents in this case chose to be physically present in
Quezon City for medical convenience, petitioner avers that they never adopted Quezon City as their
permanent residence. 1wphi1.nt

The contention lacks merit.

The facts in Eusebio were different from those in the case at bar. The decedent therein, Andres
Eusebio, passed away while in the process of transferring his personal belongings to a house in
Quezon City. He was then suffering from a heart ailment and was advised by his doctor/son to
purchase a Quezon City residence, which was nearer to his doctor. While he was able to acquire a
house in Quezon City, Eusebio died even before he could move therein. In said case, we ruled that
Eusebio retained his domicile --- and hence, residence --- in San Fernando, Pampanga. It cannot be
said that Eusebio changed his residence because, strictly speaking, his physical presence in
Quezon City was just temporary.

In the case at bar, there is substantial proof that the decedents have transferred to petitioners
Quezon City residence. Petitioner failed to sufficiently refute respondents assertion that their elderly
parents stayed in his house for some three to four years before they died in the late 1980s.

Furthermore, the decedents respective death certificates state that they were both residents of
Quezon City at the time of their demise. Significantly, it was petitioner himself who filled up his late
mothers death certificate. To our mind, this unqualifiedly shows that at that time, at least, petitioner
recognized his deceased mothers residence to be Quezon City. Moreover, petitioner failed to
contest the entry in Ignacios death certificate, accomplished a year earlier by respondent.

The recitals in the death certificates, which are admissible in evidence, were thus properly
considered and presumed to be correct by the court a quo. We agree with the appellate courts
observation that since the death certificates were accomplished even before petitioner and
respondent quarreled over their inheritance, they may be relied upon to reflect the true situation at
the time of their parents death.

The death certificates thus prevailed as proofs of the decedents residence at the time of
death, over the numerous documentary evidence presented by petitioner. To be sure, the
documents presented by petitioner pertained not to residence at the time of death, as required by
the Rules of Court, but to permanent residence or domicile. In Garcia-Fule v. Court of
Appeals,16 we held:
 xxx xxx xxx the term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished
from "legal residence or domicile." This term "resides", like the terms "residing" and
"residence", is elastic and should be interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the
statute or rule in which it is employed. In the application of venue statutes and rules
Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature residence rather
than domicile is the significant factor. Even where the statute uses the word "domicile" still it
is construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the technical sense. Some cases
make a distinction between the terms "residence" and "domicile" but as generally used in
statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term
"inhabitant." In other words, "resides" should be viewed or understood in its popular sense,
meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of
abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In this popular sense,
the term means merely residence, that is, personal residence, not legal residence or
domicile. Residence simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while
domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also an intention to make it ones
domicile. No particular length of time of residence is required though; however, the residence
must be more than temporary.17

Both the settlement court and the Court of Appeals found that the decedents have been living with
petitioner at the time of their deaths and for some time prior thereto. We find this conclusion to be
substantiated by the evidence on record. A close perusal of the challenged decision shows that,
contrary to petitioners assertion, the court below considered not only the decedents physical
presence in Quezon City, but also other factors indicating that the decedents stay therein was more
than temporary. In the absence of any substantial showing that the lower courts factual findings
stemmed from an erroneous apprehension of the evidence presented, the same must be held to be
conclusive and binding upon this Court.

Petitioner strains to differentiate between the venue provisions found in Rule 4, Section 2, 18 on
ordinary civil actions, and Rule 73, Section 1, which applies specifically to settlement proceedings.
He argues that while venue in the former understandably refers to actual physical residence for the
purpose of serving summons, it is the permanent residence of the decedent which is significant in
Rule 73, Section 1. Petitioner insists that venue for the settlement of estates can only refer to
permanent residence or domicile because it is the place where the records of the properties are kept
and where most of the decedents properties are located.

Petitioners argument fails to persuade.

It does not necessarily follow that the records of a persons properties are kept in the place where he
permanently resides. Neither can it be presumed that a persons properties can be found mostly in
the place where he establishes his domicile. It may be that he has his domicile in a place different
from that where he keeps his records, or where he maintains extensive personal and business
interests. No generalizations can thus be formulated on the matter, as the question of where to keep
records or retain properties is entirely dependent upon an individuals choice and peculiarities.

At any rate, petitioner is obviously splitting straws when he differentiates between venue in ordinary
civil actions and venue in special proceedings. In Raymond v. Court of Appeals19 and Bejer v. Court
of Appeals,20 we ruled that venue for ordinary civil actions and that for special proceedings have one
and the same meaning. As thus defined, "residence", in the context of venue provisions, means
nothing more than a persons actual residence or place of abode, provided he resides therein with
continuity and consistency.21 All told, the lower court and the Court of Appeals correctly held that
venue for the settlement of the decedents intestate estate was properly laid in the Quezon City
court.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED, and the decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 35908 is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Kapunan, and Austria-Martinez, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-22761 May 31, 1969

ROSE BUSH MALIG and JOE, THOMAS, and JOHN all surnamed BUSH, represented in this
suit by their attorney-in-fact, ROSE BUSH MALIG, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
MARIA SANTOS BUSH, defendant-appellee.

Dewey G. Soriano for plaintiffs-appellants.

Feria, Feria, Lugtu and La'O for defendant-appellee.

MAKALINTAL, J.:

This is an appeal by the plaintiffs from two orders of the Court of First Instance of Manila in Civil
Case No. 51639, the first dismissing the complaint and the second denying the motion to reconsider
the order of dismissal.

On September 19, 1962 the plaintiffs filed the complaint, alleging that they were the acknowledged
natural children and the only heirs in the direct line of the deceased John T. Bush, having been born
of the common-law relationship of their father with Apolonia Perez from 1923 up to August, 1941;
that said John T. Bush and Apolonia Perez, during the conception of the plaintiffs, were not suffering
from any disability to marry each other; that they lived with their alleged father during his lifetime and
were considered and treated by. him as his acknowledge natural children; that said John T. Bush, at
the time of his death, left several real and personal properties; that the defendant, by falsely alleging
that she was the legal wife of the deceased was able to secure her appointment as administratrix of
the estate of the deceased in Testate Proceedings No. 29932 of the Court of First Instance of Manila;
that she submitted to the court for approval a project of partition, purporting to show that the
deceased left a will whereby he bequeathed his estate to three persons, namely: Maria Santos
Bush, Anita S. Bush and Anna Berger; that the defendant then knew that the plaintiffs were the
acknowledged natural children of the deceased; and that they discovered the fraud and
misrepresentation perpetrated by the defendant only in July, 1962. They prayed that the project of
partition be annulled; that the defendant be ordered to submit a complete inventory and accounting
of all the properties left by the deceased and another project of partition adjudicating to the plaintiffs
their legal participation in the said estate and/or in the event that the defendant had disposed of all or
part of the estate, that she be ordered to pay them the market value thereof; and that the defendant
be ordered to pay for the value of the fruits received, damages and attorney's fees.

The defendant moved to dismiss, alleging lack of cause of action, res judicata and statute of
limitations. The plaintiffs opposed and the defendant filed a reply to the opposition. On January 10,
1963 the lower court denied the motion, "it appearing that the grounds upon which said motion is
based are not indubitable." In time, the defendant filed her answer specifically denying all the
material averments of the complaint and invoking laches, res judicata and statute of limitations as
affirmative defenses.

After the issues were joined the case was set for hearing, but on the date thereof the hearing was
postponed upon the defendant's manifestation that she would file a written motion to dismiss. The
motion, when filed, challenged the jurisdiction of the court, stating that since the action was one to
annul a project of partition duly approved by the probate court it was that court alone which could
take cognizance of the case, citing Rule 75, Section 1, of the Rules of Court. On October 31, 1963
the lower court granted the motion and dismissed the complaint, not on the ground relied upon by
the defendant but because the action had prescribed. The plaintiffs moved to reconsider but were
turned down; hence, this appeal.

The procedural question posed by appellants is: May the lower court dismiss an action on a ground
not alleged in the motion to dismiss?

It must be remembered that the first motion to dismiss, alleging lack of cause of action, res
judicata and statute of limitations, was denied because those grounds did not appear to the court to
be indubitable. The second motion reiterated none of those grounds and raised only the question of
jurisdiction. In dismissing the complaint upon a ground not relied upon, the lower court in effect did
so motu proprio, without offering the plaintiffs a chance to argue the point. In fact the court did not
even state in its order why in its opinion the action had prescribed, and why in effect, without any
evidence or new arguments on the question, it reversed its previous ruling that the ground of
prescription was not indubitable.

In Manila Herald Publishing Co., Inc. vs. Ramos, et al., 88 Phil. 94, it was held:

Section 1 of Rule 8 enumerates the grounds upon which an action may be

dismissed, and it specifically ordains that a motion to this end be filed. In the light of
this express requirement we do not believe that the court had power to dismiss the
case without the requisite motion duly presented. The fact that the parties filed
memoranda upon the court's indication or order in which they discussed the
proposition that the action was unnecessary and was improperly brought outside and
independently of the case for libel did not supply the deficiency. Rule 30 of the Rules
of Court provides for the cases in which an action may be dismissed, and the
inclusion of those therein provided excludes any other, under the familiar
maxims, inclusio unius est exclusivo ulterius. The only instance in which, according
to said Rules, the court may dismiss upon the court's own motion an action is, when
the 'plaintiff fails to appear at the time of the trial or to prosecute his action for an
unreasonable length of time or to comply with the Rules or any order of the court.

The foregoing ruling is applicable in this case, because although a motion to dismiss had been
presented defendant the resolution of the court granting the same was based upon a ground not
alleged in said motion. But assuming that the lower court could properly consider the question of
prescription anew, the same still did not appear to be indubitable on the face of the allegations in the
complaint. The defendant cites Article 137 of the Civil Code, which provides that an action for
acknowledgment of natural children may be commenced only during the lifetime of the putative
parents, except in two instances not obtaining in this case, and that the present action was
commenced after the death of the putative father of the plaintiffs. The said provision is not of
indubitable application, since the plaintiffs do not seek acknowledgment but allege as a matter of fact
that they "are the acknowledged natural children and the only heirs in the direct line of the late John
T. Bush." Whether or not this allegation is true will, of course, depend upon the evidence to be
presented at the trial.

The defendant insists in this instance on the jurisdictional ground posed in her motion to dismiss,
citing Rule 75, Section 1, of the Rules of Court formerly in force (now Rule 73, Section 1), which
says:

SECTION 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. If the decedent is an

inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his
will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the
Court of First Instance in the province in which he resides at the time of his death,
and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance of any
province in which he had estate. The court first taking cognizance of the settlement
of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other
courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of
residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a
suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when
the want of jurisdiction appears on the record. lawphi1.et

It will be noted that the foregoing rule fixes jurisdiction for purposes of the special proceeding for the
settlement of the estate of a deceased person, "so far as it depends on the place of residence of the
decedent, or of the location of his estate." The matter really concerns venue, as the caption of Rule
cited indicates, and in order to preclude different courts which may properly assume jurisdiction from
doing so, the Rule specifies that "the court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a
decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts."

In the final analysis this action is not necessarily one to annul the partition already made and
approved by the probate court, and to reopen the estate proceeding so that a new partition may be
made, but for recovery by the plaintiffs of the portion of their alleged inheritance of which, through
fraud, they have been deprived.

Without prejudice to whatever defenses may be available to the defendant, this Court believes that
the plaintiffs' cause should not be foreclosed without a hearing on the merits.

WHEREFORE, the orders appealed from are set aside and the case remanded for further
proceedings. Costs against the defendant-appellee in this instance.

Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Fernando and Capistrano, JJ., concur.
Teehankee and Barredo, JJ., took no part.
Concepcion, C.J., and Castro, J., are on leave.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-31174 May 30, 1972

MANUEL Y. MACIAS, petitioner-appellant,

vs.
UY KIM, ANDRES CO, NEMESIO G. CO, NICASIO G. CO, MANUEL SOSANTONG and
RELIABLE REALTY CORPORATION, defendants-appellees.

Petitioner in his own behalf.

J. Natividad & Associates for respondent.

MAKASIAR, J.:p

Petitioner-appellant Manuel Y. Macias filed on December 2, 1969 a petition for review

by certiorari against respondents Uy Kim, Andres Co, Nemesio Co, Nicasio Co, Manuel Sosantong,
Reliable Realty Corporation, and Branch X of the Manila Court of First Instance, alleging that he filed
on May 5, 1969 a complaint dated April 30, 1969 for the annulment of a deed of
sale, reivindicacion and damages against respondents docketed as Civil Case No. 76412 and
assigned to Branch X of the Manila Court of First Instance presided over by Honorable Jose L.
Moya, wherein he averred:

(1) that he is a beneficiary of the estate of Julian Wolfson pending settlement in

Special Proceedings No. 57405 before Branch VI of the Manila Court of First
Instance and also a beneficiary of the estate of Rosina Marguerite Wolfson pending
settlement in Special Proceedings No. 63866 before Branch VIII of the Manila Court
of First Instance. In Special Proceedings No. 63866, he appealed from the order
dated December 27, 1967 appointing Ricardo Vito Cruz as ancillary administrator to
the Supreme Court, which appeal was docketed as G.R. No. L-29235;

(2) that he has been named as special administrator of the estate of Rosina in
Special Proceedings No. 67302 originally assigned to Branch VI but later transferred
to Branch VIII and consolidated with Special Proceedings No. 63866 but the
Presiding Judge of Branch VIII dismissed said Special Proceedings No. 67302 in an
order dated February 20, 1967, which he also appealed to the Supreme Court and
docketed as G.R. No. L-28054;
 (3) that to protect his interest as such beneficiary in the estates of Rosina and Julian,
he caused a notice of lis pendens to be annotated on Transfer Certificates of Title
Nos. 49877/ T-158, 49878/T-158, 49879/T-158, 49880/T-158, 49881/T-158 all issued
in the name of Rosina covering five adjacent lots in Tondo, Manila;

(4) that in an order dated April 16, 1969 (p. 73, rec. of L-30935), Judge Manuel P.
Barcelona presiding in Special Proceedings No. 63866, authorized respondent
Ricardo Vito Cruz as ancillary administrator of Rosina's estate, upon the latter's
motion, to sell the real properties of the estate for the payment of the estate and
inheritance taxes, realty taxes of the estate and expenses of administration;

(5) that respondent Ricardo Vito Cruz negotiated for the sale of the aforesaid lots
with the Reliable Realty Corporation, which was willing to buy the properties for
P400,000.00 provided the notice of lis pendens annotated on the titles covering said
lots is cancelled;

(6) that upon motion of respondent Vito Cruz, Judge Manuel Barcelona in Special
Proceedings No. 63866 ordered the cancellation of the said notice of lis pendens in
an order dated April 15, 1969 (Schedule "C" of petition, p. 43, rec.);

(7) that respondent Vito Cruz executed a deed of sale over the aforesaid properties
in favor of Reliable Realty Corporation, organized by respondents Uy Kim, Andres
Co, Nicasio Co, Nemesio Co, and Manuel Sosantong, and respondent Judge Manuel
P. Barcelona issued an order dated April 24, 1969 approving the said deed of sale
(Annex "A" and Schedule "B" of petition, pp. 38-47, rec.);

(8) that thereafter T.C.T. Nos. 49877, 49878, 49880, and 49881 were cancelled and
in lieu thereof, T.C.T. Nos. 96471/T-757, 96472/T-757, 96473/T-757 and 96474/T-757
were issued by the Register of Deeds in favor of respondent Reliable Realty
Corporation;

(9) that the aforesaid orders of April 16, 1969 and April 24, 1969 were issued without
due notice to petitioner and without or in excess of the jurisdiction of the Presiding
Judge in Special Proceedings No. 63866 for the reason that he had been divested of
jurisdiction of said proceedings by reason of his appeal therein in G. R. No. L-29235,
(p. 32, rec.);

(10) that on April 30, 1969, he caused the filing of a notice of adverse claim on the
properties covered by T.C.T. Nos. 96471, 96472, 96473 and 96474 (p. 34, rec.); and

(11) that he spent at least P10,000.00 in his efforts to protect and defend his
hereditary interests in the estate of Rosina;

and prays for judgment (a) declaring the deed of sale over the aforementioned lots as null and void,
(b) directing the cancellation of the transfer certificates of titles issued in the name of Reliable Realty
Corporation, (c) declaring that the aforesaid five lots as his distributive share in the estate of Rosina
as well as directing the register of deeds of Manila to issue in his name new transfer certificates of
title, and (d) sentencing private respondents jointly and severally to pay him P10,000.00 as actual
damages, P100,000.00 as moral damages, P20,000.00 as exemplary damages, and P50,000.00 as
attorney's fees plus legal interests on all said values.
Private respondents Reliable Realty Corporation, Uy Kim, Nemesio Co, Andres Co, Nicasio Co and
Manuel Sosantong filed a motion to dismiss (Appendix "B", pp. 44-50, rec.) appellant Macias'
complaint in Branch X of the Manila Court of First Instance on the grounds that the court has no
jurisdiction over the nature and subject matter of the suit; that the complaint states no cause of
action; that there is another action of the same nature pending in court; that plaintiff has no legal
capacity to prosecute the present suit; and alleging specifically that:

(1) Branch X of the Manila Court of First Instance has no jurisdiction over the case
since the subject matter involved properly belongs exclusively to and is within the
competence of Branch VIII and Branch IV before which courts Special Proceedings
Nos. 63866 and 57405 are pending and petitioner's alleged claim of beneficiary
interest in the estate of Julian and Rosina depends on a recognition thereof by the
probate court in said Special Proceedings Nos. 63866 and 57405;

(2) that upon the face of the complaint, the same does not contain a cause of action;
because Branch X, which is coordinate with Branch VIII of the Manila Court of First
Instance, under the existing jurisprudence has no authority to annul the questioned
orders issued by Branch VIII, aside from the fact that he appealed to the Supreme
Court from the order of the Presiding Judge of Branch VIII dismissing Special
Proceedings No. 67302 which was then pending before Branch IV and subsequently
transferred to Branch VIII (L-28054), from the order denying Macias' claim of
beneficiary interest in Rosina's estate and appointing respondent Vito Cruz as
ancillary administrator of the estate of Rosina in the same Special Proceedings No.
63866 (L-29235; Annex "A", pp. 51-60, rec.) as well as from the order of the
Presiding Judge of Branch IV also denying Macias' petition for relief from the order
approving the partial distribution of the estate of Julian and denying his motion for the
removal of Vito Cruz as administrator and appointment of herein appellant in his
place (L-28947; Annex "B", pp. 61-65, rec.);

(3) that petitioner Manuel Macias is not a real party in interest; because he is not the
beneficiary, nor legatee nor creditor, much less an heir, of Rosina. He bases his
alleged interest in the estate of Julian who died intestate on June 15, 1964 solely on
the latter's memorandum to his sister Rosina wherein he hoped that his sister Rosina
will, after his estate is settled, give at her convenience to petitioner Manuel Macias
the sum of P500.00; to Faustino A. Reis and Severino Baron the amount of P10
000.00 each; and to Dominador M. Milan and Vicente D. Recto P1,000.00 each. The
said memorandum is not a will. Unfortunately, Rosina died on September 14, 1965
without being able to comply with the memorandum of her brother Julian. Since
petitioner has not been declared an heir or legatee of Julian in Special Proceedings
No. 57405 nor of Rosina in Special Proceedings No. 63866, he has no legal standing
to file the present action. The aforesaid motion to dismiss was followed by
supplement alleging that since the buyer, the Reliable Corporation, has a distinct
personality from those of its incorporators, there is no cause of action against private
respondent Uy Kim, Nemesis Co, Andres Co, Nicasio Co and Manuel Sosantong, its
incorporators.

Respondent Ricardo Vito Cruz filed a motion for intervention in said Case No. 76412 dated June 4,
1969, reiterating the ground of the motion to dismiss advanced by the other private respondents as
aforestated and emphasizing that this petition for relief from judgment seeks the nullified
classification by the Presiding Judge of Branch X of the order of the Presiding Judge of Branch VIII
in Special Proceedings No. 63866 dated April 15 and April 24, 1969, as admmitted by petitioner's
motion in praying that this Case No. 76412 should not be assigned to Branch IV or Branch VIII as his
petition seeks to nullify the orders of Presiding Judge Manuel Barcelona of Branch VIII in said
Special Proceedings No. 63866 (Annex "B", pp. 96-97, rec.).

Petitioner-appellant filed his opposition dated June 14, 1969 to the motion to dismiss of respondents
Reliable Realty Corporation and its incorporators as well as to the motion for intervention filed by
respondent Vito Cruz.

In an order dated June 30, 1969, Presiding Judge Jose L. Moya of Branch X sustained the motion to
dismiss and forthwith dismissed plaintiff's complaint herein in Civil Case No. 76412 but denied the
prayer of the motion to dismiss for cancellation of the notice of adverse claim, which petitioner-
appellant caused to be annotated on the titles issued in favor of Reliable Realty Corporation, from
which order petitioner-appellant Macias interposed his appeal, and accordingly filed this petition for
review on certiorari.

Herein respondents Reliable Realty Corporation, Uy Kim, Andres Co, Nemesio Co, Nicasio Co and
Manuel Sosantong filed on December 12, 1969 their motion to dismiss the instant petition on the
ground that Branch X of the Manila Court of First Instance has no jurisdiction over plaintiff's
complaint, for the said Branch X is without authority to review the decisions of Branch IV, a
coordinate branch of the Manila Court of First Instance; that petitioner-appellant is not a beneficiary,
heir or creditor of the estate of Julian or Rosina; and that petitioner-appellant had already appealed
the order of Judge Barcelona of Branch VIII authorizing and approving the sale of the lots in favor of
respondent Reliable Realty Corporation respectively dated April 16 and April 24, 1969 (Annex "A"
pp. 94-95, rec.), which appeal is now pending before this Court in L-30935 (pp. 87-97, rec.; pp. 4,
15, appellant's brief; emphasis supplied).

In a manifestation dated and filed on December 19, 1969, respondent Vito Cruz adopted in toto as
his own motion to dismiss and/or answer, the motion to dismiss dated December 12, 1969 filed by
the principal respondents (p. 102, rec.).

Petitioner-appellant filed on December 19, 1969 an opposition dated December 18, 1969 to the
motion to dismiss (pp. 104-108, rec.).

In Our resolution dated January 23, 1970, the motion to dismiss petition for review and certiorari was
denied (p. 123, rec.).

In a manifestation dated February 13, 1970, private respondents Reliable Realty Corporation, Uy
Kim, Nemesio Co, Andres Co, Nicasio Co and Manuel Sosantong adopted as their answer their
motion to dismiss filed on December 12, 1969 (p. 133, rec.).

The appealed order of respondent Judge Jose L. Moya, dated June 30, 1969, reads:

It appearing from the complaint that there is presently pending in Branch VIII of this
Court Special Proceeding No. 63866 for the settlement of the inheritance of the
deceased Rosina Marguerite Wolfson; that the plaintiff claims to be a beneficiary by
hereditary title of her estate; that the sale of the lands forming part thereof which the
plaintiff desires to annul was approved by this Court in Special Proceeding No.
63866; that aside from praying for the annulment of the sale, the plaintiff also seeks a
declaration that the lands sold constitutes his distributive share of Rosina Marguerite
Wolfson's inheritance; and that the plaintiff has appealed to the Supreme Court from
the order approving the sale, and it being settled that the jurisdiction to annul a
judgment or order of a branch of the Court of First Instance is vested exclusively in
the branch which rendered the judgment or issued the order and that any other
 branch, even if it be in the same judicial district, which attempts to do so, exceeds its
jurisdiction (Tuason v. Judge Torres, 21 S.C.R.A. 1169, L-24717, December 4, 1967),
and it being unquestionable that the authority to distribute the inheritance of a
deceased person and determine the persons entitled thereto belongs exclusively to
the court or branch thereof taking cognizance of the proceedings for its settlement
(Branch VIII) in this case; and finally the Supreme Court having already acquired
jurisdiction by reason of the plaintiff's appeal, no subordinate court should attempt to
pass upon the same question submitted to it, the motion to dismiss filed by the
defendant is granted and the complaint is dismissed.

The prayer in the motion to dismiss for the cancellation of the notice of adverse claim
which the plaintiff caused to be annotated on the titles to the lands on account of the
present action is denied as the only question raised by a motion to dismiss is the
sufficiency of the complaint filed in the action. (Appendix "F", p. 78, rec.).

The pretense of herein petitioner-appellant is without merit and the foregoing order appealed from
should be sustained.

Under Section 1 of Rule 73, Rules of Court, "the court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the
estates of the deceased, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts." Pursuant to
this provision, therefore all questions concerning the settlement of the estate of the deceased Rosina
Marguerite Wolfson should be filed before Branch VIII of the Manila Court of First Instance, then
presided over by former Judge, now Justice of the Court of Appeals, Manuel Barcelona, where
Special Proceedings No. 63866 for the settlement of the testate estate of the deceased Rosina
Marguerite Wolfson was filed and is still pending.

This Court stated the rationale of said Section 1 of Rule 73, thus:

... The reason for this provision of the law is obvious. The settlement of the estate of
a deceased person in court constitutes but one proceeding. For the successful
administration of that estate it is necessary that there should be but one responsible
entity, one court, which should have exclusive control of every part of such
administration. To intrust it to two or more courts, each independent of the other,
would result in confusion and delay.

xxx xxx xxx

The provision of section 602, giving one court exclusive jurisdiction of the settlement
of the estate of a deceased person, was not inserted in the law for the benefit of the
parties litigant, but in the public interest for the better administration of justice. For
that reason the parties have no control over it. 1

On the other hand, and for such effects as may be proper, it should be stated herein that
any challenge to the validity of a will, any objection to the authentication thereof, and
every demand or claim which any heir, delegate or party in interest in a testate or
intestate succession may make, must be acted upon and decided within the same special
proceedings, not in a separate action, and the same judge having jurisdiction in the
administration of the estate shall take cognizance of the question raised, inasmuch as
when the day comes he will be called upon to make distribution and adjudication of the
property to the interested parties, ... . 2

This was reiterated in Maningat vs. Castillo, 3 thus:

 ... The main function of a probate court is to settle and liquidate the estates of
deceased persons either summarily or through the process of administration. (See
articles 74 to 91, inclusive, Rules of Court.) In order to settle the estate of a
deceased person it is one of the functions of the probate court to determine who the
heirs are that will receive the net assets of the estate and the amount or proportion of
their respective shares. ...

It is not disputed that the orders sought to be annulled and set aside by herein petitioner-appellant in
his complaint against private respondents which was assigned to Branch X of the Manila Court of
First Instance presided over by Judge Jose L. Moya, were issued by Judge Barcelona presiding over
Branch VIII of the same court.

Even in other cases, it is also a general principle that the branch of the court of first instance that first
acquired jurisdiction over the case retains such jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other branches of
the same court of first instance or judicial district and all other coordinate courts. Thus, in the 1970
case of De Leon vs. Salvador, 4 Mr. Justice Teehankee, speaking for the Court, ruled:

The various branches of a Court of First Instance of a province or city, having as they
have the same or equal authority and exercising as they do concurrent and
coordinate jurisdiction, should not, cannot, and are not permitted to interfere with the
respective cases, much less with their orders or judgments, by means of injunction. 5

In the words of Mr. Justice Fernando, also in behalf of the Court, "any other view would be
subversive of a doctrine that has been steadfastly adhered to, the main purpose of which is to
assure stability and consistency in judicial actuations and to avoid confusion that may otherwise
ensue if courts of coordinate jurisdiction are permitted to interfere with each other's lawful orders. ...
This is to preclude an undesirable situation from arising one, which if permitted, as above pointed
out, would be fraught with undesirable consequences, as already indicated, for the bench, no less
than for the litigants. To such an eventuality, this Court cannot give its sanction. 6

Appellant claims that his action in Civil Case No. 76412 before Branch X of the Manila Court of First
Instance, is not for the annulment of any judgment or order of Branch VIII of said Court and that
nowhere, either in the prayer or in the body of his complaint, does he seek for the annulment of any
order of Branch VIII (p. 8, appellant's brief). This pretension of appellant is belied by paragraph 8 of
his complaint in Civil Case No. 76412 alleging that the order dated April 15, 1969 directing the
register of deeds of Manila to cancel the notice of lis pendens caused to be annotated by the
appellant on the titles covering the five (5) lots and the order dated April 24, 1969 approving the
deed of sale were both issued by the Presiding Judge of Branch VIII in Special Proceedings No.
63866, without due notice to and hearing of appellant; and further belied by paragraph 9 of the same
complaint alleging that the acts of the buyers of the aforesaid five (5) lots in causing the cancellation
of appellant's notice of lis pendens in obtaining the registration of the deed of sale, in procuring the
cancellation of the transfer certificates of titles over the five (5) lots in the name of Rosina, and in
securing new transfer certificates of title in the name of defendant Reliable Realty Corporation, are
all null and void ab initio, because (1) of the pendency of his appeal in G.R. No. L-29235 for said
appeal divested the Presiding Judge of Branch VIII of any jurisdiction in Special Proceedings No.
63866 to sell the properties in question notwithstanding the order of April 24, 1969 approving the
deed of sale, (2) the orders dated April 15, 1969 and April 24, 1969 directing the cancellation of
appellant's notice of lis pendens and approving the deed of sale may not be registered as they have
not become final and will not become final by reason of his appeal in G.R. No. L-29235, and (3) he
was not notified of the petition to sell any portion of Rosina's estate (pars. 8 & 9, Appendix "A", pp.
30-34, rec.). It is patent that by the aforesaid paragraphs 8 and 9 of his complaint in Civil Case No.
76412 before Branch X, appellant impugns the validity of the aforementioned orders of the Presiding
Judge of Branch VIII in Special Proceedings No. 63866.

Furthermore, in his motion to the Honorable Executive Judge of May 5, 1969, appellant averred that
he filed his complaint in Civil Case No. 76412 to nullify and set aside certain orders of Judge Manuel
P. Barcelona of Branch VIII in Special Proceedings No. 63866 over the testate estate of Rosina
Marguerite Wolfson and prayed that said Case No. 76412 should not be assigned to either Branch
VIII or Branch IV (Annex "A", pp. 21-22, appellant's brief). Said motion could not refer to orders of
Judge Manuel P. Barcelona other than the aforecited orders of April 15, 16, and 24, 1969 in Special
Proceedings No. 63866.

This appellant impliedly admits on pp. 3-4 of his reply brief which is further emphasized by his
statement that the only purpose of his motion dated May 5, 1969 was "to keep the action away from
possible prejudgment by the abovementioned branches of the court below (referring to Branch IV
and Branch VIII of the Manila Court of First Instance)."

But even without considering paragraphs 8 and 9 of appellant's complaint and his motion dated May
5, 1969 in Civil Case No. 76412 before Branch X, his prayer in the same complaint for the
nullification or rescission of the deed of sale covering the five lots in question cannot be decreed
without passing upon the validity of the orders of the Presiding Judge of Branch VIII in Special
Proceedings No. 63866 cancelling his notice of lis pendens authorizing the sale and approving the
sale. And, as heretofore stated, under the rules and controlling jurisprudence, the Presiding Judge of
Branch X of the Manila Court of First Instance cannot legally interfere with, nor pass upon the validity
of said orders of the Presiding Judge of Branch VIII, which court, as the probate court, has exclusive
jurisdiction over the estate of the decedent, including the validity of the will, the declaration of heirs,
the disposition of the estate for the payment of its liabilities, and the distribution among the heirs of
the residue thereof.

Appellant's insistence that in Civil Case No. 76412, he seeks to recover his distributive share of the
estate of the decedent Rosina, all the more removes the said case from the jurisdiction of Branch X;
for as heretofore stated, the distribution of the estate is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the probate
court. He must therefore seek his remedy in the same probate court Branch VIII which is
hearing Special Proceedings No. 63866, instead of filing a separate civil case in Branch X.

Moreover, his petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus in G.R. No. L-30935, entitled Macias
vs. University of Michigan, et al., wherein he questions the validity of the aforesaid orders of the
Presiding Judge of Branch VIII in Special Proceedings No. 63866, amply covers the same subject
matter and seeks substantially the same relief as his complaint in Civil Case No. 76412 and the
present petition (see pars. 26, 28, 30-40, and the prayer in this petition, pp. 13-34, rec. of L-30935). .

Appellant himself states that the decision in the three cases he filed with this Court namely, G.R.
Nos. L-29235, L-28947 and L-30935 will answer the question whether he has legal interest in the
estates of Rosina Marguerite Wolfson and Julian A. Wolfson (pp. 21-22, appellant's brief).

The cases he cited, as correctly contended by appellees (Lajom vs. Viola, et al., 73 Phil. 563;
Ramirez vs. Gmur, 42 Phil. 855; Rodriguez vs. Dela Cruz, 8 Phil. 665; and Quion vs. Claridad, L-
48541, January 30, 1943, 2 O.G., No. 6, June, 1943, p. 572, 74 Phil. 100), are not applicable to and
therefore do not govern the instant case, because the actions therein were filed by the preterited heir
or legatee or co-owner long after the intestate or testate or partition proceedings had been closed or
terminated. In the case at bar, Special Proceedings No. 63866 is still pending in the probate court
Branch VIII of the Manila Court of First Instance where appellant should present, as he has in fact
presented, his alleged claim of legal interest in the estate of Rosina Marguerite Wolfson, which
claim, if valid, will certainly entitle him to all notices of all petitions, motions, orders, resolutions,
decisions and processes issued and/or promulgated by said probate court. There is no order by the
said probate court terminating or closing Special Proceedings No. 63866.

However, in the recent case of Guilas vs. Judge of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, et
al., 7 WE reiterated the rule:

... The better practice, however, for the heir who has not received his share, is to
demand his share through a proper motion in the same probate or administration
proceedings, or for re-opening of the probate or administrative proceedings if it had
already been closed, and not through an independent action, which would be tried by
another court or Judge which may thus reverse a decision or order of the probate or
intestate court already final and executed and re-shuffle properties long ago
distributed and disposed of (Ramos vs. Ortuzar, 89 Phil. 730, 741-742; Timbol vs.
Cano, supra; Jingco vs. Daluz, L-5107, April 24, 1953, 92 Phil. 1082; Roman Catholic
vs. Agustines, L-14710, March 29, 1960, 107 Phil. 455, 460-61).

Even in the case of Quion, etc. vs. Claridad, et al., supra, invoked by appellant, WE ruled that the
intestate proceedings, although closed and terminated, can still be reopened within the prescriptive
period upon petition therefor by a preterited heir.

The Court cannot ignore the proclivity or tendency of appellant herein to file several actions covering
the same subject matter or seeking substantially identical relief, which is unduly burdening the
courts. Coming from a neophyte, who is still unsure of himself in the practice of the law, the same
may be regarded with some understanding. But considering appellant's ability and long experience
at the bar, his filing identical suits for the same remedy is reprehensible and should merit rebuke.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby dismissed and the appealed order is hereby affirmed, with
costs against petitioner-appellant. Let this be entered in his personal record.

Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Teehankee, Barredo and Antonio, JJ., concur.

Castro and Fernando, JJ., took no part.

Concepcion, C.J., is on leave.

G.R. No. L-23419 June 27, 1975

INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED GELACIO SEBIAL. BENJAMINA SEBIAL, petitioner-

appellee,
vs.
ROBERTA SEBIAL, JULIANO SEBIAL and HEIRS OF BALBINA SEBIAL, oppositors-appellants.

C. de la Victoria & L. de la Victoria for appellants.

Robustiano D. Dejaresco for appellee.

AQUINO, J.:

Gelacio Sebial died intestate in 1943 in Pinamungajan Cebu. According to the appellants, Gelacio
Sebial, by his first wife Leoncia Manikis, who allegedly died in 1919, begot three children named
Roberta, Balbina and Juliano. By his second wife, Dolores Enad, whom he allegedly married in
1927, he supposedly begot six children named Benjamina, Valentina, Ciriaco, Gregoria, Esperanza
and Luciano.

On June 17, 1960 Benjamina Sebial filed in the Court of First Instance of Cebu a verified petition for
the settlement of Gelacio Sebial's estate. She prayed that she be appointed administratrix thereof
(Spec. Proc. No. 2049-R). Roberta Sebial opposed the petition on the ground that the estate of
Gelacio Sebial had already been partitioned among his children and that, if an administration
proceeding was necessary, she, Roberta Sebial, a resident of Guimbawian, a remote mountain
barrio of Pinamungajan, where the decedent's estate was supposedly located, should be the one
appointed administratrix and not Benjamina Sebial, a housemaid working at Talisay, Cebu which is
about seventy kilometers away from Pinamungajan. In a supplemental opposition the children of the
first marriage contended that the remedy of Benjamina Sebial was an action to rescind the partition.

After hearing, the lower court in its order of January 16, 1961 appointed Benjamina Sebial as
administratrix. It found that the decedent left an estate consisting of lands with an area of twenty-one
hectares, valued at more than six thousand pesos, and that the alleged partition of the decedent's
estate was invalid and ineffective.

Letters of administration were issued to Benjamina Sebial on January 19, 1961. On the same date, a
notice to creditors was issued. The oppositors moved for the reconsideration of the order appointing
Benjamina Sebial as administratrix. They insisted that the decedent's estate had been partitioned on
August 29, 1945, as shown in Exhibits 5, 6, 7 and I, and that the action to rescind the partition had
already prescribed. The lower court denied the motion in its order of February 11, 1961.

The oppositors filed on March 16, 1961 a motion to terminate the administration proceeding on the
grounds that the decedent's estate was valued at less than six thousand pesos and that it had
already been partitioned and, therefore, there was no necessity for the administration proceeding.

On April 27, 1961 Benjamina Sebial filed an inventory and appraisal of the decedent's estate
allegedly consisting of seven unregistered parcels of land, covered by Tax Declarations Nos. 04477,
04478, 04490, 04491, 04492, 04493 and 04500, with a total value of nine thousand pesos, all
located at Barrio Guimbawian, Pinamungajan. The oppositors registered their opposition to the
inventory on the ground that the seven parcels of land enumerated in the inventory no longer formed
part of the decedent's estate.

On May 6, 1961, the administratrix filed a motion to require Lorenzo Rematado, Demetrio Camillo
and the spouses Roberta Sebial and Lazaro Recuelo to deliver to her the parcels of land covered by
Tax Declarations Nos. 04478, 04490,04491 and 04493.

On June 24, 1961 the probate court issued an order suspending action on the pending incidents in
view of the possibility of an amicable settlement. It ordered the parties to prepare a complete list of
the properties belonging to the decedent, with a segregation of the properties belonging to each
marriage. Orders of the same tenor were issued by the lower court on July 8 and October 28, 1961.

On November 11, 1961 the oppositors, Roberta Sebial, Juliano Sebial and the heirs of Balbina
Sebial, submitted their own inventory of the conjugal assets of Gelacio Sebial and Leoncia Manikis,
consisting of two parcels of land acquired in 1912 and 1915. They alleged that the conjugal estate of
Gelacio Sebial and Dolores Enad consisted of only one parcel of land, containing an area of seven
hectares, allegedly purchased with money coming from the conjugal assets of Gelacio Sebial and
Leoncia Manikis. They further alleged that the said seven- hectare land was sold by the children of
the second marriage to Eduardo Cortado (Tax Declaration No. 2591). 1wph1.t

The oppositors claimed that the aforementioned two parcels of land acquired during the first
marriage were partitioned in 1945 among (1) Roberta Sebial, (2) Juliano Sebial, (3) Francisco Sebial
as the representative of the estate of Balbina Sebial and (4) Valentina Sebial as the representative of
the six children of the second marriage, some of whom were minors. They clarified that under that
partition the three children of the first marriage received a three-fourths share while the six children
of second marriage received a one-fourth share (Tax Declaration No. 06500). They also alleged that
Eduardo Cortado, Emilio Sialongo, Lorenzo Rematado and Lazaro Recuelo were the third persons
involved in the transfer of the lands pertaining to the estate of Gelacio Sebial (Tax Declarations Nos.
04493, 06571 and 04471). To the inventory submitted by the oppositors, the administratrix filed an
opposition dated November 18, 1961.

In an order dated November 11, 1961 the lower court inexplicably required the administratrix to
submit another inventory. In compliance with that order she submitted an inventory dated November
17, 1961, wherein she reproduced her inventory dated April 17, 1961 and added two other items,
namely, two houses allegedly valued at P8,000 and the fruits of the properties amounting to P5,000
allegedly received by the children of the first marriage. The oppositor interposed an opposition to the
said inventory.

On November 24, 1961 the oppositors filed a "motion for revision of partition" which was based on
their own inventory dated November 7, 1961.

The lower court in its order of December 11, 1961 approved the second inventory dated November,
7, 1961 because there was allegedly a "prima facie evidence to show that" the seven parcels of land
and two houses listed therein belonged to the decedent's estate. In another order also dated
December 11, 1961 the lower court granted the motion of the administratrix dated May 4, 1961 for
the delivery to her of certain parcels of land and it directed that the heirs of Gelacio Sebial, who are
in possession of the parcels of land covered by Tax Declarations Nos. 04493, 04491, 04490 and
04478, should deliver those properties to the administratrix and should not disturb her in her
possession and administration of the same. The lower court denied the oppositors' motion dated
November 20, 1961 for "revision of partition".
On December 29, 1961 Roberta Sebial moved for the reconsideration of the two orders on the
grounds (1) that the court had no jurisdiction to approve an inventory filed beyond the three-month
period fixed in section 1, Rule 84 of the Rules of Court; (2) that the said inventory is not supported by
any documentary evidence because there is no tax declaration at all in Gelacio Sebial's name; (3)
that the two houses mentioned in the inventory were nonexistent because they were demolished by
the Japanese soldiers in 1943 and the materials thereof were appropriated by the administratrix and
her brothers and sisters; (4) that the valuation of P17,000 indicated in the inventory was fake,
fictitious and fantastic since the total value of the seven parcels of land amounted only to P3,080; (5)
that Gelacio Sebial's estate should be settled summarily because of its small value as provided in
section 2, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court and (6) that an ordinary action is necessary to recover the
lands in the possession of third persons.

The oppositors without awaiting the resolution of their motion for reconsideration filed a notice of
appeal from the two orders both dated December 11, 1961. The notice of appeal was filed "without
prejudice to the motion for reconsideration". Benjamina Sebial opposed the motion for
reconsideration. The lower court in its order of January 18, 1962 denied oppositors' motion for
reconsideration. It approved Roberta Sebial's amended record on appeal. The case was elevated to
the Court of Appeals.

The Court of Appeals in its resolution of July 31, 1964 in CA-G.R. No. 31978.-R certified the case to
this Court because in its opinion the appeal involves only the legal issues of (1) the construction to
be given to section 2, Rule 74 and section 1, Rule 84 (now Rule 83) of the Rules of Court and (2)
whether an ordinary civil action for recovery of property and not an administration proceeding is the
proper remedy, considering oppositors' allegation that the estate of Gelacio Sebial was partitioned in
1945 and that some of his heirs had already sold their respective shares (Per Angeles, Gatmaitan
and Concepcion Jr., JJ.)

The Clerk of Court of the lower court in his letter of January 15, 1963, transmitting the amended
record on appeal, said "there was no presentation of evidence by either parties concerning the two
orders appealed from".

This case involves the conflicting claims of some humble folks from a remote rural area in Cebu
regarding some unregistered farm lands. Because of her poverty Roberta Sebial wanted to appeal in
forma pauperis. Her husband Lazaro Recuelo and her nephew, Candelario Carrillo, in order to justify
the filing of a mimeographed brief, swore that their families subsisted on root crops because they
could not afford to buy corn grit or rice.

Oppositors' contention in their motion for reconsideration (not in their brief) that the probate court
had no jurisdiction to approve the inventory dated November 17, 1961 because the administratrix
filed it after three months from the date of her appointment is not well-taken. The three-month period
prescribed in section 1, Rule 83 (formerly Rule 84) of the Rules of Court is not mandatory. After the
filing of a petition for the issuance of letters of administration and the publication of the notice of
hearing, the proper Court of First Instance acquires jurisdiction over a decedent's estate and retains
that jurisdiction until the proceeding is closed. The fact that an inventory was filed after the three-
month period would not deprive the probate court of jurisdiction to approve it. However, an
administrator's unexplained delay in filing the inventory may be a ground for his removal (Sec. 2,
Rule 82, Rules of Court).

The other contention of the oppositors that inasmuch as the value of the decedent's estate is less
than five thousand pesos and he had no debts, the estate could be settled summarily under section
2, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court or that an administration proceeding was not necessary (the limit of
six thousand pesos was increased to ten thousand pesos in section 2, Rule 74 effective on January
1, 1964) rests on a controversial basis. While in the verified petition for the issuance of letters of
administration, it was alleged that the gross value of the decedent's estate was "not more than five
thousand pesos", in the amended inventory the valuation was P17,000. Indeed, one of the lower
court's omissions was its failure to ascertain by preponderance of evidence the actual value of the
estate, if there was still an estate to be administered. The approval of the amended inventory was
not such a determination.

Anyway, in the present posture of the proceeding, no useful purpose would be served by dismissing
the petition herein and ordering that a new petition for summary settlement be filed. Inasmuch as a
regular administrator had been appointed and a notice to creditors had been issued and no claims
were filed, the probate court could still proceed summarily and expeditiously to terminate the
proceeding. With the cooperation of the lawyers of the parties, it should strive to effect an amicable
settlement of the case (See arts. 222 and 2029, Civil Code).

If the efforts to arrive at an amicable settlement prove fruitless, then the probate court should
ascertain what assets constituted the estate of Gelacio Sebial, what happened to those assets and
whether the children of the second marriage (the petitioner was a child of the second marriage and
the principal oppositor was a child of first marriage) could still have a share, howsoever small, in the
decedent's estate.

The lower court's order of December 11, 1961, approving the amended inventory of November 11,
1961, is not a conclusive determination of what assets constituted the decedent's estate and of the
valuations thereof. Such a determination is only provisional in character and is without prejudice to a
judgment in a separate action on the issue of title or ownership (3 Moran's Comments on the Rules
of Court, 1970 Ed., 448-449). 1wph1.t

The other order dated December 11, 1961 requires the delivery to the administratrix of (1) two
parcels of land covered by Tax Declarations Nos. 04491 and 04493 in the possession of the spouses
Lazaro Recuelo and Roberta Sebial, an oppositor-appellant; (2) the parcel of land covered by Tax
Declaration No. 04490 in the possession of Lorenzo Rematado and (3) the parcel of land described
under Tax Declaration No. 04478 in the possession of Demetrio Camillo (Canillo), a child of the
deceased Balbina Sebial, one of the three children of the first marriage.

We hold that the said order is erroneous and should be set aside because the probate court failed to
receive evidence as to the ownership of the said parcels of land. The general rule is that questions
of title to property cannot be passed upon in a testate or intestate proceeding. However, when the
parties are all heirs of the decedent, it is optional upon them to submit to the probate court the
question of title to property and, when so submitted, the probate court may definitely pass judgment
thereon (3 Moran's Comment's on the Rules of Court, 1970 Ed., pp. 448, 473; Alvarez vs. Espiritu, L-
18833, August 14, 1965, 14 SCRA 892).

Lorenzo Rematado and Lazaro Recuelo are not heirs of the decedent. They are third persons. The
rule is that matters affecting property under administration may be taken cognizance of by the
probate court in the course of the intestate proceedings provided that the interests of third persons
are not prejudiced (Cunanan vs. Amparo, 80 Phil. 227; Ibid, 3 Moran 473).

However, third persons to whom the decedent's assets had been fraudulently conveyed may be
cited to appear in court and be examined under oath as to how they came into the possession of the
decedent's assets (Sec. 6, Rule 87, Rules of Court) but a separate action would be necessary to
recover the said assets (Chanco vs. Madrilejos, 12 Phil. 543; Guanco vs. Philippine National Bank,
54 Phil. 244).
The probate court should receive evidence on the discordant contentions of the parties as to the
assets of decedent's estate, the valuations thereof and the rights of the transferees of some of the
assets. The issue of prescription should also be considered (see p. 84, Record on Appeal).
Generally prescription does not run in favor of a coheir as long as he expressly or impliedly
recognizes the coownership (Art. 494, Civil Code). But from the moment that a coheir claims
1wph1.t

absolute and exclusive ownership of the hereditary properties and denies the others any share
therein, the question involved is no longer one of partition but that of ownership (Bargayo vs.
Camumot, 40 Phil. 857).

At the hearing of the petition for letters of administration some evidence was already introduced on
the assets constituting the estate of Gelacio Sebial. The petitioner testified and presented Exhibits A
to J and X to Y-3. The oppositor also testified and presented Exhibits 2 to 10-A. The stenographic
notes for the said hearing should be transcribed. In addition to that evidence. The probate court
should require the parties to present further proofs on the ownership of the seven parcels of land
and the materials of the two houses enumerated in the amended inventory of November 17, 1961,
on the alleged partition effected in 1945 and on the allegations in oppositors' inventory dated
November 7, 1961.

After receiving evidence, the probate court should decide once and for all whether there are still any
assets of the estate that can be partitioned and, if so, to effect the requisite partition and distribution.
If the estate has no more assets and if a partition had really been made or the action to recover the
lands transferred to third person had prescribed, it should dismiss the intestate proceeding.

WHEREFORE, (a) the probate court's order of December 11, 1961, granting the administratrix's
motion of May 4, 1961 for the delivery to her of certain properties is set aside; (b) its other order of
December 11, 1961 approving the amended inventory should not be considered as a final
adjudication on the ownership of the properties listed in the inventory and (c) this case is remanded
to the lower court for further proceedings in accordance with the guidelines laid down in this
decision. No costs.

SO ORDERED.