Spouses Antonio and Clarita Navarro acquired three properties and built their ho

me thereon. The TCTs, however, were registered to Antonio Navarro married to Bel
en Navarro. MBTC caused judicial foreclosurre upon the properties. The propertie
s were sold at a public auction to MBTC to which was issued a certificate of sal
e.
Clarita filed an action for the declaration of nullity of the real estate mortga
ge and the foreclosure sale. She alleges that the properties involved belonged t
o her and Antonio's conjugal partnership property as they were acquried during t
he subsistence of their marriage and that Antonio, with Belen, had secured the r
egistration thereof in their names and mortgaged the same to MBTC without her kn
owledge.
The case was dismissed on motion of MBTC on the ground of laches as it took Clar
ita 11 years to institute the action contesting the mortgage. On appeal, the cas
e was denied by the CA on the same ground. The decision had attained finality wi
thout a motion for reconsideration being filed or an appeal being taken therefro
m.
Several years later, Clarita instituted another action this time for the declara
tion of nullity of the TCTs covering the same properties and for reconveyance an
d damages. It alleges the same material facts as well as the same parties. Accor
dingly, she prayed that at least her one-half conjugal share in the properties b
e reconveyed to her without prejudice to MBTCs rights against Antonio and Belen.
RTC ruled in favor of Clarita saying that the previous case did not constitute
res judicata because a dismissal on laches and failure to implead an indispensab
le party could never be a dismissal on the merits. MBTC raised the matter to the
CA.
In the mean time, the spouses entered into a compromise agreement as Antonio rec
ognized the share of his wife in the properties. Antonio likewise stipulated the
rein that he had not availed of any mortgage loan from MBTC and that it was the
bank manager, Danilo Meneses, who facilitated the manipulation of his account wi
th the bank which led to the constitution of the mortgage and the eventual forec
losure thereof.
CA decided in favor of MBTC saying that the ground of laches should preclude as
the dismissal of the first case had the effect of an adjudication on the merits.
It also pointed out that inasmuch as the two cases presented identical issues a
nd causes of action and prayed for the same relief, the second complaint must li
kewise suffer the effect of laches. Citing Section 3, Rule 17 of the Rules of Co
urt, the CA emphasized Clarita's neglect to prosecute her claim since it took he
r another two years since the dismissal of the first case to file the second. In
conclusion, it held that the trial court indeed gravely abused its discretion w
hen it denied MBTCs motion to dismiss and, accordingly, it ordered the dismissal
of the complaint.
W/N the dismissal of the first case due to laches and no appeal or MR being take
n therefrom should bar the filing of the second case.
Yes. It is an important fundamental principle in our Judicial system that every
litigation must come to an end. Access to the courts is guaranteed. But there mu
st be a limit thereto. Once a litigants rights have been adjudicated in a valid
final judgment of a competent court, he should not be granted an unbridled licen
se to come back for another try. The prevailing party should not be harassed by
subsequent suits. For, if endless litigations were to be encouraged, then unscru
pulous litigants will multiply in number to the detriment of the administration
of justice.
As a ground for the dismissal of a complaint, the doctrine of laches is embraced
 in the broad provision in Section 1 of Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, which enu
merates the various grounds on which a motion to dismiss may be based. Paragraph
(h) thereof states that the fact that the claim or demand set forth in the plai
ntiffs pleading has been paid, waived, abandoned, or otherwise extinguished, may
be raised in a motion to dismiss. The language of the rule, particularly on the
relation of the words abandoned and otherwise extinguished to the phrase claim
or demand set forth in the plaintiffs pleading is broad enough to include within
its ambit the defense of bar by laches.
In this case, the two cases were founded on the same claim and would have called
for the same set of or similar evidence to support them. The dismissal of the f
irst has barred the filing of the second.
Further, Section 5 of Rule 16 provides that "Subject to the right of appeal, an
order granting a motion to dismiss based on paragraphs (f), (h) and (i) of Secti
on 1 hereof shall bar the refiling of the same action or claim."
The Court held that where the complaint is dismissed on the ground that the caus
e of action is barred by a prior judgment or by the statute of limitations; or t
hat the claim or demand set forth in the plaintiffs pleading has been paid, waiv
ed, abandoned, or otherwise extinguished; or that the claim on which the action
is founded is unenforceable under the provisions of the statute of frauds, such
dismissal operates as one with prejudice and which therefore precludes the filin
g of another action based on the same claim. Hence, such dismissal already const
itutes res judicata.
When material facts or questions in issue in a former action were conclusively s
ettled by a judgment rendered therein, such facts or questions constitute res ju
dicata and may not be again litigated in a subsequent action between the same pa
rties or their privies regardless of the form of the latter.