Documente Academic
Documente Profesional
Documente Cultură
Ma n u fact ur ed i n t h e U n i t ed St at es of A m er i ca
Fi r st ed i t i on , 1982
Pa t h f i n der P ress
410 W est St r eet
New Y o r k , N Y 100 14
Contents
Introduction 7
The Historic Program of the FSLN 13
Nicaragua: Zero Hour
By, Carlos Fonseca A m ad or 23
Nothing %il l Hold Back Our Struggle for Liberation
B y Dani el Ortega 43
Nicaragua — The Strategy of Victory
Ir..ter vi ew wi t h H u mberto O rtega
O n H u m a n Ri g ht s i n N i car agu a
By T omas Borg e 85
The Role of Religion in the New Nicaragua 105
Nicaragua's Economy and the Fight Against Imperialism
By J ai me Wheelock 113
The Second Anniversary of the Sandinista Revolution
By Tomas Borge 127
An Appeal for Justice and Peace
By Daniel Ortega 141
Index 155
H ON D U R A S
EL
SAI V A D OR
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N I CA RA GU A
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Cari bbean
Lake Sea
Rjyas N i c a ra gu a
Pacifi c Ocean
COSTA R I CA
PANAM
In tr odu ction
running water and only one house in ten had a decent roof. Half the
s ick received no medical care at all .
Inequitable distribution of the land meant that many went hungry .
Half of all the farmland was owned by less than 2 percent of the land
o wn ers, w h i l e th e poorest 50 percent of t h e f ar m er s h el d less t han 4
percent of the land. For these farmers, the average annual income in
1972 was only $35.
These t er r i ble condi t i ons led t o w idespread opposi t ion t o t he di ct a
torship and a continual struggle against the regime and its North
Am er i can back er s.
Out of this tradition of struggle, the FSLN was born. Carlos Fonseca
Am ador , T omas B or ge, an d Si l v i o M ay or ga , veter an s of t h e st udent
struggle of the 1950s, joined with others including a veteran of Sandi
no's army, Colonel Santos Ldpez, in July 1961, taking their inspiration
both from Sandino's struggle and from the successful Cuban revolu
tion of 1959.
The struggle the FSLN began then, with a guerilla front along the
n or t h er n bor der, was to last u n t i l t he in su r rect i on. It took m any d i f e r
ent forms. The Sandinistas worked clandestinely and, when possible,
legally; they worked in the mountains and in the cities; in the villages
and in the factories. Many were arrested, tortured, and ki lled. But
they persevered. They won the respect, confidence, and loyalty of al
m ost t h e en t i r e popul at i on, so t ha t w hen t h e in su r rect ion f i n a l l y t r i
um phed t hey coul d t r u l y be descr ibed as t h e l eg i t i m at e r epresent a
tives of the Nicaraguan people.
I m m edi at ely after the over t h r ow of Somoza, the FSL N began to i m
plement it s program for Nicaragua's reconstruction, and t his won
t hem even br oader suppor t f r om t h e w or k er s an d peasants. For t h e
fi rst t i m e, a gover nm en t responsive to the needs of the oppressed w as
in power.
T he revolutionar y government launched a l iteracy campaign to
teach t h e people how to read and w r i t e. It con fi scated t he propert y of
Somoza and his closest collaborators, bringing about 25 percent of the
cultivable land under government control. It nationalized the banks
and sought to use their resources to rebuild the devastation caused by
Somoza's N a t i onal Gu ar d . I t encour aged w or k er s to for m u n i ons and
enforced workers' rights, such as the eight-hour day, paid vacations,
and social security protection. I t helped organize workers in many
plants into production committees and took additional steps to in
crease w or k er s' pa r t i cip at ion i n p l a n n i n g pr odu ct ion an d m an ag i ng
f act or ies. I t i n t er vened t h r oug h n a t i on al izat i on s against ca pi t a l i st s
10 Sandinistas Speak
Bruce Marcus
April 1982
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The Historic Program of the FSLN
13
14 Sa n d in is tas Speak
I . A r ev olu ti on ar y gov er n m e n t
II . T h e ag r a r i an r e v o lut io n
pate in the process of production due to age (children, old people), med
i cal condition, or other reasons beyond their control .
2. St rict enforcement of the eight-hour work day.
3. The income of the workers (wages and other benefits) must be
suAi ci en t t o sati sf y t h ei r da i l y needs.
4. Respect for the dignity of the worker, prohibiting and punish
i n g u nj ust t r eat m en t of w or k er s i n t he cour se of th ei r l abor .
5. Abolition of unjustified firings.
6. Obligation to pay wages in the period required by law.
7. Right of all workers to periodic vacations.
B. It will eliminate the scourge of unemployment.
C. It wil l extend the scope of the social security system to all the
wor k er s and pu b l i c em pl oyees i n t h e cou nt r y . Th e scope w i l l i n cl ude
c overage for i l l ness, phy sical i n capaci t y , and r et i r em en t .
D. It will provide free medical assistance to the entire population. It
w ill set up clinics and hospitals throughout the national territiory .
E. I t wil l undertake massive campaigns to eradicate endemic ill
nesses and pr ev en t epidem ics.
F . I t w i l l ca r r y ou t u r ban r efor m , w hich w i l l p r ov ide each f a m i l y
with adequate shelter. It will put an end to profiteering speculation in
ur ban l and (subdi vi si ons, ur ban const ru ct i on, r en ta l hou si ng) t hat ex
p l oi ts the need t hat w or k i n g fam i l ies in the ci t ies have for an adequ at e
roof over t h ei r heads i n order t o l i v e.
G . I t w i l l i n i t i at e and expand the const ru ct ion of adequ ate housi n g
for the peasant population.
H . I t w i l l r educe the ch ar ges for w at er , l i gh t , sew ers, ur ban beau t i
fication; it wil l apply programs to extend all these services to the en
t i r e u r ban and r u r a l popu l at i on .
I. I t w i l l encour age pa r t i ci pat ion i n sport s of al l t y pes and catego
ri es.
J. I t w i l l el i m i n ate the h u m i l i at ion of begging by pu t t i ng the above
men t i oned m easures i nto pract ice.
V. Administrative honesty
The Sandinista people's revolution will root out administrative gov
er n m en t a l cor r u pt i on , and w i l l est ab l ish st r ict ad m i n i st r a t i ve hones
ty.
A. I t w il l abolish the criminal vice industry (prostitution, gam
b l i ng, drug use, etc.l w hich t he pr i v i leged sect or of the N at i onal Gua r d
a nd the foreign parasites exploit .
B. It will establish strict control over the collection of taxes to pre
The Historic Program of the FSL1V 1 9
v en t gov er n m en t f un ct i on ar ies fr om pr of i t i ng , pu t t i n g an en d t o t h e
nor m al pr act ice of th e presen t r eg i me's offi cial agencies.
C . I t w i l l end t h e ar bi t r ar y acti ons of t h e m ember s of t he GN , w h o
plunder the population through the subterfuge of local taxes.
D . I t w i l l put an end to t he sit u at ion w h er ei n m i l i t ar y com m ander s
appropriate the budget that is supposed to go to take care of common
pr i soners, and i t w i l l est ab lish cent er s designed to reh ab i l i t at e t hese
wr on gdoer s.
E. It will abolish the smuggling that is practiced on a large scale by
th e gan g of pol i t i ci ans, of fi cers, an d for ei gn er s w ho are th e r egim e's
accomplices.
F. It will severely punish persons who engage in crimes against ad
mi n i st r a t i ve honest y (embezzlemen t , sm uggl i ng, t rafl i ck i n g i n vices,
etc.i, usin g gr eatest sever it y w hen i t i n v olves eleme nts a cti ve in t h e
r ev ol u t i on ar y m ov em en t .
VI I . Emancipation of women
The Sandinista people's revolution will abolish the odious discrimi
nation that women have been subjected to compared to men; it will es
tablish economic, political, and cultural equality between woman and
m an .
A. I t will pay special attention to the mother and child.
B. I t w i l l e l i m i n at e pr ost i t u t io n an d ot her socia l v ices, t h r ough
20 Sa n d i n is tas Spe ak
X I I I . V en e r a t io n of ou r m a r t y r s
Th e e co n o m i c s it u a t i o n
23
24 Sandin istas Speak
~1 hect ar e = 2 .4 7 acr es
N i ca r ag ua: Z ero H ou r 25
try was being led. Having received guarantees that his life would be
r espected, San di no decided to t ak e par t i n t a l k s in order t o dispel t h e
slander ous ch ar ge t ha t he was not i n t erested i n peace.
1 936. Somoza ousts the const i t u t ional president of t he count r y, w i t h
t he appr oval of t he U .S. gover n m en t .
1 947. Somoza ousts the constitutional president of the country ,
a gai n w i t h t h e appr ova l of t he U .S. gover n m en t .
1 960. The U .S. fl eet i n t he Car i bbean Sea is mobi l ized to pr otect t h e
g over nm ent s of Gu at em al a and N icar agua, w hich ar e facing gr ow i n g
p opu lar discont en t .
1968. It has been asserted that Somoza's agents took par t i n the
overthrow of the government of Arnulfo Arias,* who despite his sub
missiveness, apparently didn't fully satisfy all the demands of the U.S.
g ov er nm en t .
*Earl Browder (1891-1973( headed the Communist Party USA 1930-45. Af
ter the Nazi invasion of the USSR in June 1941 his name became identified
wit h the policy (actually dictated by Stal in) of supporting capitalist govern
men ts t hat w er e at w ar w i t h N azi Ger m a n y . I n L a t i n A m er ica t h is mean t su p
porting governments that had Washington's support, and subordinating the
w or k er s' st r u ggles to t h em .
32 Sa n d in is tas Speak
object i ve, i t 's necessar y t o expl ai n t ha t t h i s ver y gr ave error was not
the result of simple bad faith by the leaders. We must look at the fac
t ors t hat br ou gh t i t abou t .
The Marxist leadership did not possess the necessary clarity in the
face of the Conserv at i ve sect or's contr ol over the an t i -Somozaist oppo
si t i on . It could not di st i n g u ish between t he j u st ice of the an t i-Somoza
i st opposi t ion an d t he m an euv ers of t he Conserv at i v e sect or .
Once Somoza had used the pseudo-M a r xist sector for his ow n bene
f i t , h e u n l eashed r epression aga inst t h e w or k er s' m ov em ent , w h i ch ,
due to t he comfor t abl e cond i t ions i n w hich it wa s born, did not k n o w
how to defend it self w i t h t h e necessary r evol u t i on ar y f i r m ness.
P ar al lel to t h is, the capi t a l ist sector of t he opposi t i on (Conserv a t i v e
Par t y , L i b er a l opposit ion g r oup i ng ) car r ied ou t a l l k i nds of com pr o
m i ses w it h t he Somoza regi m e .
p l ace, the FSL N leader ship did not f u l l y u nder st and t h is to be no mor e
t h a n a par t i a l ph en om en on , i nasm uch as t he di rect ion of th e r evol u
t i on ar y m ov em en t w as fu ndam ent al l y t ow ar d pr ogr ess and i n t r an si
t ion toward maturity .
It was correct in that period to pass over to rebuilding the insurrec
ti ona l or ga ni zat ion an d accu m u l a t i n g new f orces w i t h w h ich t o r e
l aunch the armed st r u ggle, but t h is goal n at u r al ly dem anded an u n i n
t er r u pted m ai n t en ance of a series of insu r rect i on al -t ype t asks: accum
u l a t i n g m at er ial resources, tr a i n i ng combat an t s, car r y i n g out cert ai n
ar med act i ons appropr i at e to t he st r at egic defensive st age, et c.
T h i s devi a t ion i n tact ics was also expressed i n the ideology t hat t h e
Sandi ni st a Fr ont adopt ed. A l t h ough i t r aised the banner of an t i -i m pe
r i a lism and the em an cipat ion of the expl oited classes, the Fr on t vaci l
lated in putt ing forward a clearly Marxist-Leninist ideology. The atti
t u de t ha t t h e t r adi t i ona l M a r xi st -L en i n i st sector had m ai n t a ined i n
t h e N i car aguan people's st r u ggl e con t r i b ut ed t o t h i s vaci l l at i on . A s
has been stated, this sector in practice has openly played the game of
t h e Somozaist cl i que. T h i s fact or , t ogether w i t h t h e ideological back
wardness prevailing in the revolutionary sector of the country, led to
vaci l l at ion i n adopt in g an ideology t hat on the n at i onal level was root
ed i n com pr om i se. I t can be said t h at at t h at t i m e th er e was a lack of
c lea r u n der st an di n g t ha t i t w as on l y a quest ion of t i m e befor e t h e
youth and people of Nicaragua would begin to distinguish between the
false Marxists and the true Marxists.
C onsequent l y , i n t h e year s 1964 an d 1965, pr act i ca ll y al l t h e em
p hasis w as pu t on open w or k , w h ich i n cl uded legal w or k am on g t h e
m asses. Cl andest ine t asks w ere car r i ed out , above al l i n t he coun t r y
side, but the main emphasis of the work during that time was legal.
Real it y sh owed t h a t l ega l w or k ca r r ied ou t i n t h at m a nner di d not
s erve t o accu m u l at e forces and t hat t h e pr ogress achieved w as m i n i
mal. Neither can it be overlooked that the legal work through the now
d isappeared Repu bl ican M ob i l i zat ion gr oup, t h e st uden t m ov em en t ,
and peasan t m ov em en t suff ered from lack of disci pl i ne, audaci ty , an d
organization.
One m ust also concl ude t hat r ev ol u t i on ar y w or k (w h et her i t be pub
l ic, legal, or cl andest i n e), cannot be adv anced in an acceler ated way i f
the armed r ev ol u t i on ar y force is lack i ng. It was the lack of such a force
th a t det er m i ned t he ext r em e l i m i t a t i ons of the legal w or k car r ied out
in the years 1964-65.
Ou r exper ience sh ow s t ha t t h e a r med r evol u t i onar y f orce (u r ban
and r u r al) is the motor force of the revol ut i on ar y m ovem ent in N i car a
gua. The armed struggle is the only thing that can inspire the revolu
36 Sa n d i ni stew Spe ak
m en t i n a nei ghbor ing coun t r y , w hich had prov ided di st ance from t h e
enemy's observation; rather it was preparation of an armed movement
i n m o u n t a i n s s i t u a t e d i n t h e v e r y c e n t e r o f t h e co u n t r y .
An ex t r em el y i mpor t an t factor t hat h i ndered t he success of the Pan
casan m ovem ent w as the mi st ak en m ethod used to get t he peasants t o
par t i cipat e i n t he st r u ggle. The for m used was to recr u i t a n u m ber of
pe a s a n t s t o b ec o m e p a r t o f t h e r e g u l a r c o l u m n . T h i s m e a n s t h a t t h e se
p easant s w er e compl et el y m i xed i n w i t h t h e w or k i n g-class an d st u
d ent fi g h t ers, i.e., combat a nt s w it h an u r ban back gr ou n d .
T h e m i l i t a n t s w h o cam e fr o m u r ba n ar eas gener al l y possessed a
hi gher r ev ol ut ion ar y consciousness t han t he peasants as a whole, w ho
became demor al ized w hen faced w it h t he f i rst di ff i cu l t ies t hat we r an
up aga in st : scarcit y of su pp l ies, cer t ai n slow m ar ches, and t h e fi r st
r u m or s of t h e presence of enem y soldi er s on nearby r oad». T his obl i
g ated t h e leader shi p t o sen d back t h e m aj or it y of t h e peasant s, al
th oug h t h er e w er e h onor abl e except i on s of peasant s w h o fi r m l y r e
f used to be. let go and who are an exam ple of the combat ive possibi l i t y
o f t h is sect or .
In add i t i on , i n t he f irst st age of the r evol u t i on ar y wa r t h at w as be
gi n n i ng , w e di d not f i n d a w ay t o incorpor at e t h e peasant s i n t hose
areas some days di st an t , w i t h w hom contact had pr ev iously been es
t a b l ished t h r ough organ i zing them in t he st r u ggle for l and and for ot h
e r demands. Some of the peasants who tempor ar i ly j oi ned the guer r i l
las had been m oved from t h ei r ar eas to t he encam pm ent s.
W hen t h e br eak -u p of t h e Pancasa n gu er r i l l a m ov em en t h a d a l
r eady t ak en p l ace, i t became k n ow n t h a t once som e of t h e peasant s
who had deserted t he guer r i l l as ar r ived back i n t h ei r ow n areas, they
t ook par t i n a r m ed assau lt s on local gover n m en t post s or r u r a l com
mer cia l est ab l i sh ment s, as w el l a s execut ion s o f k n ow i i i n for m er s.
Th i s i ndicates t hat to a large extent, some of t he peasants who had be
c ome dem or al ized w en t t h r ough t hat cr i sis because they w er e not or
g a nized i n t he most appr op r i at e m a nn er . I t m eans t hat t hey pr obabl v
should h ave been i r r egu lar r at her t h an r egu la r guerr! llas. T his expe
r i ence leads us t o t h i n k ab ou t t h e possib i l it y of or gan i zi ng i r r egu l a r
gu er r i l las par a l lel i o the regu l ars. We should not fai l to point out t h at
w e ca n no w ev al u at e t h e i m por t ance of w or k a m on g t h e peasan t s
m uch bet t er , t h a n k s t o ou r ow n exper ience. We don't on l y base ou r
selves on t h e exper i ences of ot her L a t i n A m er ica n gu er r i l l a m ove
ment s.
An ot he r aspect t h a t m u s t h e h i g h l i gh te d w a s t h < i n .uffi cient
n um ber of cadres t o han dle al l t h e t ask s t ha t t h e pr epar a t ion of t h e
wor k dem anded, not only in t he cit y and t he cou n t r y side, hut even oui.—
88 Sa n d in is tas Spe ak
side of the country. For too long the leadership of the Sandinista Front
t ol er ated sect ar i a n i sm , w h ich st ood i n t h e way of pr om ot i n g a su Ai
cient quantity of new cadres coming from politically advanced work
i ng-class back gr ou nds an d f r om t h e u n i v er sit y sect or . F ever ish at
t em pt s w er e made to achi eve excessivel y bi g goal s in stead of al w ay s
mak in g pr ogress in car r y i n g ou t su i t able, ev er yday ta sk s.
Th e in su r recf,ionar y w or k w as not r el ated t o t h e gener a l people' s
st r u ggle — especial ly t he peasant, st udent, wor k i ng-class st r u ggles. It
w as good t hat t he F ront. put i ts pr i nci pal em phasis on i n su r rect iona r y
wor k , bu t i t w a s a n er ror t o ab andon ot her r ev ol u t i on ar y f or m s of
s t r u gg le. Sect ar ian ta ct ics wei ghed heav il y and t hese det er m ined t h e
c ourse of' act i v i t y i n t h e pr epar at ion for t h e m ov em en t i n t h e m ou n
tains.
Th e inel iv i du a l i st ic bad h ab it s t ha t leader shi p com r ades often di s
pl ayed was the factor t h at h elped hold back t h e i n i t i a t i ves that coul d
have resolved m an y pr obl ems; on differen t occasions i nd i v i d ual pr ob
lem s w er e m i xed w i t h pol i t i ca l pr obl eins. T h i s ma y h av e decisiv el y
cont r i buted to depr i v i ng cert ai n i n i t i a t i ves of the seriousness that w as
d ue t h em .
In r egar d to placing cadres in ch arge of v ar i ous tasks, i t w as a m i s
take to be confiden t t hat com r ades who had not exper ienced the pr i v a
ti on s of' guer r i l l a l if'e would be able t o w or k am on g t he masses — for
e xam pl e, am ong the st udent m asses. For some years now, our or gan i
z ation h as been conscious ol' the ba l last t hat t h e N i car ag ua n r evol u
t i on ;ir y m ovem en t car r ies as a result of the stance of the capi t a l i st par
ti es, w hich for m any y ears usurped the leader ship of the an t i-Somoza
ist opposit i on . I l ow ev er , at t h e t i m e w hen t h e gu er r i l l a base was es
t abl i shed i n t h e m oun t a i ns, t h er e w as in su Ai ci en t t h ou ght. given t o
t he fact t hat due to t he prevai l i ng cond i t i ons t he tasks requ i red by t h e
wor k i n t h e ci t ies coul d nof, be at t ended t o by m i l i t a nt s who di d not
possess the necessary f i r m ness and discip l i ne. In view of t hi s, the com
rades in i h» forefront of ur ban resist ance wor k could count on the pr ac
t ical col labor a t ion of a v er y r educed n u m ber of m i l i t an t s. Th e si t u a
t ion of the ur ban resi st ance became morc acute due to the sect ar i an al
t i t ude of those charged w it h t h is responsi bi l i t y .
Or ga nized mass wor k i st udent , peasant, w or k er ) was par alyzed. On
th e one hand, i h ere w er e not enough cadres to h andle t hi s w or k , and
on t he ot h er , t here was an underest i m at ion of the i mpor t ance t h is ac
t i v it y could play in t he developmen t of the arm ed st r uggle. T h is weak
n ess led t o t h e sit.uai ion w h er e w he n t h e deat h of com r ades i n t h e
mou nt ai ns and i n fhe ci t ies was recorded, th ere was not consisten t sol
Nicaragua: Zero Hour 3 9
side, including the zones where a guerrilla base is not organized, lives
the abject poverty that the peasants suffer and feels their desire to
st r u ggle.
A phenomenon that has been seen in this country since the Panca
skn m ov em en t i s t h e gr ow t h of t h e San di ni st a N a t i ona l L i b er at i on
Front's political authorit y over th e broad sectors of the popular
m asses. Today t h e Sandi n i st a F r on t ca n cl a i m , an d has obt ain ed , a
much greater degree of cooperation from the population than in the
past. It must also be said that if we do not get greater cooperation than
we act u all y are r ecei v i n g, i t is because we lack cadres who are compe
tent in asking for this type of help, and also because the cadres now ac
tive are not functioning systematically enough.
Simultaneously, new methods are being found so that we can gain
the practical collaboration of new sectors of the population in the clan
destine conditions under which we function (a smal l countr y wi th
s m al l ci t ies). T h is has led us to not depend exclu siv el y on the old m i l
itants and collaborators (a large proportion of whom are "jaded").
Furthermore, we have reestablished squads that are prepared to act
in the cities, and they have carried out some actions.
We now have plans to undertake actions in harmony with the period
o f reestabl i sh m en t we are now goi ng t hr ou gh .
The Sandinista National Liberation Front believes that at the pres
ent time and for a certain period to come, Nicaragua wil l be going
through a stage in which a radical political force will be developing its
specific ch ar act er i st ics. Consequen t l y , at t he cu r r en t t i m e i t is neces
sary for us to strongly emphasize that our major objective is the social
ist r evol u t i on , a r ev ol u t ion t ha t a i m s t o defeat Y a n kee i mp er i a l i sm
and it s local agents, false oppositionists, and false revolutionaries.
T h i s pr opaganda, w i t h t h e fi r m ba ck i n g of ar m ed act i on , w i l l per m i t
t h e Fr on t t o w i n t h e suppor t of a sector of t h e popular m asses t hat i s
conscious of the profound nature of the struggle we are carrying out .
I n order to outline a strategy for the revolutionary movement, it is
necessary to take into account the strength that the capitalist parties
represent, due to the influence they still wield within the opposition.
One m ust be al er t to the danger t hat t he react i on ar y force in t he oppo
sition to the Somoza regime could climb on the back of the revolution
ary insurrection. The revolutionary movement has a dual goal. On the
one hand, to overthrow the criminal and tr aitorous clique that has
usurped the power for so many years; and on the other, to prevent the
capit a list opposi t ion — of pr oven su bm ission t o Y a n kee i m per i a li sm
— from taking advantage of the situation which the guerrilla struggle
has unleashed, and grabbing power. In the task of barring the way to
Nicaragua: Zero Hour 4 1
by Daniel Ortega
Ou r voices must be heard in H a v a na. Men m ust not lack t he mor al cour age t o
s peak t he t r u t h ab ou t our m i sf or t u n e. They must t el l how t he people of N i car a
gua, w ho a r « v a l i a n t l y f i g h t i n g and suff er i n g, are deter m i ned to m ake any sac
ri f ice. even i n c l u d i n g t he ir o wn e xt e rm i n a t i o n, in order to defend th e ir l i b er ty .
T h e resu lt s i n H a v ana w i l l be nu l l and void if t he ideal of t he Spani sh-speak i n g
p eoples is not cry st al liz«d; if you let us be ;issassin atc d to t he last m an, w« wi l l
h ave the consol at ion of' k n ow in g t h at we car r ied out our d u t y. Our (: ou n t r y an d
Freedom.
A . (; . San d i n o
43
44 Sa n d i n is tas Speak
*Patri re Lumumba, a leader nf the struggle for Congolese liberati on, was the
fi r st pr em ier of the Repu b l ic of t he Congo. H ia gov er n m en t was over t h r ow n by
a m i l i t ar y coup i n vo l v i n g t he (', I A , and he was m u rd ered i n 19 g l .
* L o l i t a L ebron w as on e of f iv e Pu er t o Ri ca n n at i on a l i st s i m p r isoned i n t h e
U.S. in the early 1960s for armed proindependence actions. She and the three
other surviving prisoners were released in 1979.
Nothing Will Hokt Back Our Struggle 4 7
per i a list m an euv ers in Rh odesia, the puppet r egime of M uzor ew a, and
the so-called internal settlement.*
We solidarize ourselves with the frontline countries and condemn
the aggression by South Africa and Rhodesia against them. And we so
li d a rize w i t h t h e r i gh t of t h e people of East T i m or t o self-det er m i n a
t i on .
We support the reunification of K orea and we demand the with
d r aw al of U .S. troops from Sout h K or ea .
Onl y a fe w m on t h s w er e t o pass w hen i n 192 7 Y a n k ee m ar i n es
a gai n l anded on ou r soi l .
Then the fi gure of A u gu sto Cesar Sandi no vigor ously rose up and, at
the head of an army of workers and peasants, sought to militarily de
f eat t he i n t er v en t i onist forces i n an un equal cam pai g n .
San di no embodied t h e desir e for l i bert y of a people w h o w er e sys
tematically subjected to the attack of Yankee intervention and sub
jected t o i m per i a l ist ex pl oi t at ion an d dom i n at i on . The same m a r i n es
w h o m u r dered t h e F i l i p i n o people th ousands of m i les from ou r cou n
tr y , ar r i ved t o soak N i car aguan t er r i t or y i n blood i n t hose days.
This explains the existence of Sandinismo, which on May 4, 1927,
gave rise to w hat San dino called the " w ar of l iber at ors to end the w ar
of t he oppressors."
T he Y a nk ees, who w ere unable to defeat San di no's arm y m i l i t a r i l y ,
who found themselves forced to withdraw in January 1932, again re
s orted t o t r eacher y , u sin g as t h ei r i n st r u m en t a n ar m y an d an ar m y
chief named Anastasio Somoza Garcia, founder of the dynasty. This
army and this army chief were created by the White House strategists
to assassin at e Sandi n o.
They t h ou gh t t h at k i l l i n g San di n o w oul d solv e th e pr obl em . They
d i d not t ak e i nto account t h at Sand ino had i n i t i ated a process of l i b er
a t ion w h i ch , car r ied on by t he Sand i ni st a N at i onal L i b er at ion F r on t ,
was t o w i n on e of it s most i m por t an t vi ct or ies on J u l y 19 , 1979. On
th at day we bot h defeated the cr i m i n al Somozaist N at i onal Gu ar d and
e xpelled t he last Y a n k ee m ar i ne, A nastasio Somoza, from N i car ag u a .
O u r cou n t r y i s a sm al l coun t r y , a poor cou n t r y .
In June 1979, there were forces in the U.S. government that wanted
to propose an invasion of our soil to the seventeenth meeting of repre
sentatives of the Organization of American States. But there were also
seventeen L a t i n A m er ican cou n t r ies t h a t sai d n o t o t h e i m p er i a l i st
proposal.
Here we must make special mention and take recognition of the An
dean Pact countries.
We should mention the names of President Rodrigo Carazo of Costa
Rica; ex-Presiden t C a r los A n dres Perez of V enezuela; President Jose
Lopez Portillo of Mexico; General Omar Torrijos of Panama; and Fidel
C ast r o of Cuba — al l of w hom w er e an d con t i n u e t o be i n sol i d ar i t y
with our struggle, despite the risks that such solidarity implies.
W e should m ake special men t ion of the m i l i t an t soli dar it y t hat L at
i n A m er ican f i gh t er s gave ou r st r u ggle. Th e blood of t hese f i g ht er s
was shed along t h e r oad to vi ct or y . W e can st at e t h at L a t i n A m er i ca
helped to make this victory possible.
We are a sm al l coun t r y t ha t h as w aged wa r i n order t o w i n peace.
An d we suppor t t h e establ i sh m en t of a j ust and last i ng peace t hat ex
tends to al l coun t r ies and regi ons.
We recognize the right of peoples to win their freedom through the
p at h t h at is best for t h em , wh et her a r med or n ot .
We ar e a poor coun t r y t h at w a nt s to t ak e th e eff or t s and resources
now being i n v ested in d efense of t h e re volu t i on a nd i n v est i t i n t r a c
t or s and pl ow s. A n d w e suppor t gener al an d com pl et e disar m am en t ,
under st r ict i n t er n at i onal cont r ol . We are for an end to the ar m s race
and w e sal u t e the SA L T I I accords as an i m por t an t step i n t h is dir ec
ti on . W e dem and respect for t h e t er r i t or i a l i n t egr it y of st ates and r e
n u nci at ion of t he use of force i n i n t er n at i onal r el at i ons. We condem n
the exi st ence of m i l i t ar y bases.
S andi ni sm o is the incar n at ion of the n at i on. The Sand i n i sta N at i on
a l L iber at ion Fr ont , as the gen u i ne vanguar d of th e great people's in
s ur rect ion t h at. defeated t h e di ct at or sh i p, i s now pu sh in g for w ar d a
p rocess of nat i onal reconst r u ct ion whose first measures have been t h e
massive expropr i at ion of t h e property of Somoza and h is civ i l i an a nd
mi l i t ar y accom p lices. So far mo re th an 5 00,000 hecta re s, close to 5 0
percent of t he ent ir e ara ble area of the coun tr y , has been recovered by
the peopl e.
More than 180 industrial and commercial enterprises have passed
into the hands of the people.
M or e t ha n 400 m an sions and h om es have been ex pr opr i ated i n t h e
in t er ests of t he people.
Th e ban k s have been n at i on a lized.
50 Sandin istas Speak
"'ln 1956, the poet Rigoberto Lopez Perez walked into a public affair for So
moza i n t h e cit y of L eon an d sh ot th e di ct ator four ti m e s. Somoza l a ter d ie d
f rom h is w ou nds, and Lopez Pi.rez was k i l l ed on t he spot by t he di ct at or 's body
guards.
N i ca r a gua — S t rategy of Vi ctor y 55
*On July 26, 1953, Fidel Castro led a group of fewer than 200 in an unsuc
cessful attack on the Moncada garrison in Santiago de Cuba. Almost all were
ki l led or c aptu r e d; Castr o was sente nced to fif teen years in pri son for h is part i n
the attack .
mov em ent w as to par t i cip ate. For us it was prefer able t hat such a cas
trated trade union movement not be formed.
S um m i n g up, the big j u m p ahead occu rr ed i n Oct ober 1977 and t h i s
sharpened the crisis. Then came the assassination of Pedro Joaquin
Chamorro, which made the situation even worse, and with the masses
in the cities, in the neighborhoods, everywhere, participating more
and m or e i n t h e upr i si ng, the process became compl et el y i r r ev er si b l e.
After that came the capture of the city of Rivas along with the city of
Granada on February 2, 1978. Present in these actions were several
comrades who were later k i lled in the struggle, such as Commander
Camilo Ortega Saavedra, who led the attack on Granada; the com
mander , guer r i l l a p r iest , and Spanish i nt er n at i on alist Gaspar Gar ci a
Lav i ana; and Pan ch i t o Gu t i er r ez, am on g ot h er s.
Ha rnecker : Wh en d id t h e m asses begin t o jo in t h e i ns ur r ecti o nal
process?
Ortega : The opera ti o ns of October 1 977 gave a big boost t o th e mass
m ovem ent , but i t w asn't u n t i l aft er the asassinat ion of Pedro Joaqu i n
Chamorro that they really came out i n ful l force and made crystal
clear their potential, their determination, and their Sandinista will to
join in the armed struggle.
I would like to make clear that the uprising of the masses as an af
t er m at h t o Ch am or r o's assassi n a t ion was not led ex clu sivel y b y t h e
FSLN .
Ha rneeker : W a s it a s pont a neous acti o n?
Ortega: It w a s a s ponta neous r e acti on o n t h e p art o f t h e m asses
which, in the end, the Sandinista Front began to direct through its ac
ti v i sts and a n um ber of m i l i t ar y u n i t s. It w as not a mass mov em ent re
sponding to a call by the Sandinistas; it was a response to a situation
that nobody had foreseen.
Now t h en , ou r capacit y fo r i n t r odu cin g ou rselves i n t o t h a t mass
m ov em en t w as st i l l l i m i ted at t h e t i me and was aimed at r eaf fi r m i n g
our political and milit ary presence among the masses, but not yet from
a concr ete organic standpoin t because we di dn't h ave the necessary ca
dr es.
In October we began to t ake steps in t hat di recti on: the act i vi st s, t he
mechani sms — and new per m anent for ms of mass organization began
to take shape quickly: the neighborhood committees, the work done in
a nu m ber of fact or ies and i n t h e st udent m ovem en t. F u r t h er m ore, t he
United People's Movement was already beginning to take shape even
before October. This was the result of the Sandinistas' efforts to re
group the revolutionary organizations around their program in order
to fight against Somoza's regime and gradually lead the people in our
Nicaragua — Stnztegy of Victory 6 3
but they needed more milit ary organization, more mass organization .
Th ere was a need for r iper pol i t i cal condi t i ons and th ere was a need for
more agitation, for better means of propaganda, such as a clandestine
radio station.
It was necessary to mobilize the masses for war through the most
elementary forms of organization.
Ha r necker: Yo u b egan t o consider t h e m a t t e r o f t h e r a dio s ta ti o n
th en ?
Ortega: We'd been thinking about i t s ince October but w e hadn' t
been abl e to set i t up . W e had a r adi o set t ha t t h e f i r st. ant i-Somoza
f i g h t ers had used i n 1960, bu t it w as old and we weren't able to pu t i t
i n w or k i n g or der at t ha t t i m e .
H ow ev er , w e m a naged t o fi x i t l ater an d w e pu t i t i n oper at ion i n
those months of 1978. It was heard in Rivas, but very faint ly. By then
we w er e fu l l y aw ar e of th e need for a r adio st at i on , of a w ay t o com
mu n icat e w i t h t h e m asses i n order t o pr epare t hem for t h e in su r r ec
t i on .
But to get back to the idea I was developing. A gradual strengthen
ing of forces was achieved am idst an enor m ous am ount of act i v i t y t h at
in cl uded the execut ion of Gen. Regu aldo Perez V ega, chief of the Gen
e ral St aff of the N a t i onal Gu a r d, the capt u r e of t he palace in A u gu st *
and w i n d i n g u p t h e f i rst st age of t h i s in su r rect i onal m ov em en t t h at
had begun i n October 1977, wit h the nationwide uprising i n Sep
tem ber 1978 .
Ha r neeker: At t h a t t i m e , when you issued a call for th e up ri s in g, did
you think it would be successful?
Ortega: We issued a call for t h e up ri s in g. A seri es of events, of objec
tive conditions, came up all of a sudden that prevented us from being
better pr epar ed. W e coul d not stop t he in su r rect i on . Th e mass move
men t w en t beyon d t h e vangu ar d's capacit y t o t ak e t h e lead. W e cer
ta i n l y could not oppose t hat mass movemen t, stop that av al an che. On
the contrary. we had to put ourselves at the forefront in order to lead it
a nd ch annel i t t o a cer t ai n ex t en t .
I n t h i s sense, t h e v an gu ar d , aw ar e of i t s l i m i t a t i ons, decided t o
adopt the general decision taken by the masses; a general decision
t ha t w as based on t h e ex am pl e of t h e I n d i an s of M on i m bo, w ho, i n
ing the men, training them; without prior training; without previous
victories and setbacks as happened in Nicaragua beginning in October
1977, when t h e masses wer e subj ected to t h e most savage repression
which was, at the same time, a great source of learning; without a flex
ib le, i nt el l i gent , an d m a t ur e policy of a l l i ances on bot h t h e n at i on al
and i nt er n a t i onal l evels th ere would have been no revol u t i on ary vi ct o
ry . Th e vi ct or y w as the cu l m i n a t ion of al l those fact or s.
It al l sounds very si m ple, but you can't i m ag i ne w hat i t cost us to do
it — lt cost us an October, a February, a palace, an insurrection in Sep
tember , al l t h e b at t les afte r Sept em ber i n E l J i caro, E st el i , N u ev a
Gu i n ea. It cost us al l t he eff or t s made i n t he zone of the Pablo Ubeda
C ol um n i n t he m ou n t a i ns, in t he A t l an t ic Coast zone. Th at 's what w e
h ad t o pay for ou r v i ct or y .
Ha rnecker: A b out t h e re ar g ua rd — s ome th i n g t h a t w a s absent i n
m an y L a t i n A m er i can guer r i l l a movem ents — when di d you st ar t or
g an i zing i t ?
Ortega: We alwa ys had a rear g ua rd . The moveme nt h ad di re ct e x
per i ence w it h a rear gu ard dat ing back m any years. Our coun t r y is not
a n i sl and l ik e Cuba, we have to rely on neighbor i ng cou n t r ies, and t h e
r evol u t i on ar y m ov em en t r el ied o n su ppor t f r o m t h e n ei ghbor i n g
movem en ts from the very begi n n i ng. Sandino him sel f w en t to M exico,
to H on du ras — m an y H on du r an s an d Cost a Ri cans j oi ned San di no's
struggle — so we counted on support from Honduras and Costa Rica to
meet some needs of the rear gu ard t hat w ere diffi cu l t to meet i n N i ca
r ag u a .
W e oper ated cl andest i n el y i n Cost a Ri ca an d H on du r as. A n d i n
o rder t o set up th e r ear gu ar d at h i gher lev els i t became necessar y —
along with finding resources and setting up clandestine schools — to
b egi n ar ou si n g — t o begi n ar ou si n g a feel i n g of sol i d ar i t y w i t h ou r
c ause am on g t h e m ai n pr ogressive pol i t i ca l sect or s i n each coun t r y ,
wi t h ou t bein g sect ar i an , and not w i t h t h e left -w i n g sect ors alone, be
cause t ha t w oul d h ave m ean t isol at i n g ou rselves. N obody gave us a
rear gu ar d; we won t h e r i gh t t o h ave one.
T h e al l i ances we achieved t h r ough ou r effor t s were of v i t a l i m por
t ance i n ou r ob t a i n i n g heavy w eapons and sophi st icated equ i pm en t .
Ha rnecker: Co nsideri n g t h a t y o urs w as an a r m ed m o ve me nt, how
did you manage to put i nto practice a broad policy of alliances'? It
woul d seem easier for an elect i on-ori en ted m ov em en t to put i n t o prac
tice a policy of that kind.
Ortega: We succeeded because we earned respect for o urs elves, and
t h i s i s somet h i n g t ha t ot her m ov em ent s h av e not achi ev ed; they ar e
not t ak en ser i ou sl y, they ar e not respected. We won t he r i gh t to estab
¹c a r ag ua — St r a tegy of V i c tory 7 9
led to our gradual spl it, breaking up into the three tendencies that
everybody knows about.
The split coincided with the death in combat of Oscar Turcios and
Ri cardo M or al es, both m embers of the nat i onal leader sh i p. It arose out
of the growth of the Sandinista movement itself, and came at a time
when the very development of the movement called for a radical im
provement in our organization and leadership, a more organized van
guard capable of effectively leading the mass struggle, of charting a
sure path for the armed struggle in Nicaragua. We were aware of this
need, but we were not able to accomplish this, to assimilate the expe
rience of our older comrades — more experienced in party work, in
working with the masses, with more military experience and more ex
perience in dealing with political forces at home and abroad — and to
combine this with the dynamism of the young people who were already
beginning to join the movement in significant numbers.
It was necessary to combine the old with the new and, in practice,
t hi s created clashes. Th e older comrades began t o mi strust t he
y ounger ones, who were beginning t o assume responsibilit y for a
number of tasks, and the young ones, who had no idea how hard the
struggles of the preceding years had been, underrated the older com
rades because the veterans still resorted to primitive methods of work
which the young ones thought should be eliminated.
Ha rnecker: Yo u consider y o urs elf a mo ng t h e ve te ra ns ?
Ortega: W o ul d n't y ou say s o? I w as among t ho se who sta rt e d years
ago.
Harnecker: How do you explain t he implicit d ivision of labor be
tween the three tendencies by virtue of which the Proletarian Tenden
cy worked chiefly w ith the urban masses and the Prolonged People' s
War T endency with the guerri llas in the mountains?
Ortega: I w a nt t o e xp la in t h a t t he d i v i s ion o f l a bor o f w h i ch y ou
speak was not the result of the division into tendencies; it existed be
f ore t he di vi sion of t he fr on t .
L et me expla i n
The leaders of the three tendencies were concerned with the overall
problems of the revolution. What I'm trying to say is that when, at the
time of the split, the comrades working on the different tasks assigned
to them by the FSLN realized that they were unable to come up with
sol u t i ons for t he problems they faced — because of the dr aw backs and
weaknesses I' ve already mentioned — they started to organize them
selves and the work they had mastered on the spot and seek solutions
to the problems they faced according to the structures withi n their
reach . Y ou m ust r em ember t h a t w e w er e w or k i n g am idst br u t a l r e
82 Sandin istas Speak
cal foundation made it possible for us to coordinate our efforts with in
creasing effectiveness and pave the way for our regrouping. I think it
would be more correct to say that we regrouped together rather than
reunited. The three tendencies all had a great desire to become a sin
gle FSLN once again, as shown by the enthusiasm, love, and zeal with
which this unit y is preserved now, and w'e're sure it is irreversible.
Just as Sandinista unity was vital for victory, the unity of all the left
around Sandinismo and of the entire population around the left and
Sandinismo is vital to consolidate the process and achieve our goals.
Ha r necker: W e u n d ers ta nd t h a t w o men p la yed a v e ry i m p ort a nt
role in t he armed st r u ggle i n N i car agua, that i n t he ci t ies they fought
s houlder to shoulder w i t h men and in t he col u m ns they came to const i
tu t e 25 percent of t he force; t hat t h ere w ere sev er al w omen com m and
ers. W hat are your vi ews on t his? Was i t som et h i ng new or was t here a
tradition of women participating in such activities?
Ortega: Th e Sandi n is ta F r o nt w a s heir t o t he t r a di t i on of w o men' s
participation in the struggle, not only in Sandino's time but also in the
past cen t u r y an d even fu r t her ba ck . You al ready k now about t he r ol e
o f w omen d u r i n g Sand i no's st r u ggle, of his com rade, of i n t er n a t i on al
ist com r ades l i k e t he L i a T oro si st er s. Or t h e case of t h e wo men w h o
w er e m u r dered by t h e Y a n k ees i n 19 12. Th er e was a woman from E l
Salvador involved; her name was Lucia Matamoros. She was drawn
and quartered for having fought against the intervention of that time.
T h ere was also Com r ade Concepcion A l d ay, the w ife of the first L iber
a l gu er r i l l a t o fi gh t t h e Y a nk ees i n C h i n andega, w h o was k i l led i n
1926.
Th e F SL N i n h er it ed an d foll owed u p on t h i s par t i cipat i on . Bu t i t' s
i m p or t an t to point out t hat San di n i smo not only developed the par t i ci
pat ion of w omen i n t h e van gu ar d or gani zat ion bu t i n al l sect ors, and
not j ust i n suppor t w or k for key tasks bu t i n key st r at egic tasks. Such
is the case of guerrilla Commander Dora Tellez, better known as Com
m ander 2; guer r i l l a Com m ander M on ica Ba lt odano; and other guer r i l
la commanders such as Leticia Herrera. These three comrades played
a very i mp or t an t r ole, not j ust i n suppor t w or k for t he r ev ol u t i on ar y
s t r u ggl e bu t as pol i t i cal an d m i l i t ar y leaders. I n th e course of th e i n
s ur rect i on, they w er e leaders on t he bat t l efi eld, as in t he case of Dor a
Tel lez {Claudia I, who headed what was called t he Rigobert o Lopez Pe
r ez West er n Fr on t , one of t he most i m por t an t fr ont s of t he w a r .
Sandinismo did not close the doors to women's participation; that
w oul d h av e been a back w a r d , sexist w a y of u nderest i m a t i n g t h em .
Women played a very important role in the insurrection. There were
c ol um n s i n w h ic h al l t h e of ficer s w er e w om en , w omen w h o com
84 Sa n d i n is tas Speak
by Tomtls Borge
85
86 Sandin istas Speak
th e same as the l aw s t ha t ex ist t oday . Now w e see the con t r adi ct i ons
b etween the l aws of the past and the revol u t ion t h at is under w ay . W e
haven't yet had t i me to ch ange the ent i re j u di cial sy st em, but we k now
t h at m uch of i t is obsolete and not i n l i ne w i t h our r ev ol u t i on ar y pr i n
ciples. There was a legal framework under the dictatorship, but Somo
z a just did not pay much attention to it .
T h e abuses com m i t ted u nder Somoza ar e fa m i l i a r t o al l of y o u
even t hough a cr i m i n a l l i k e Somoza does ever y t h i n g possible to hi de
hi s cr i m es. W hen h e was i n pow er , h e was able t o cover u p a lot of
things.
As a m at ter of pr i n ci ple we have not t r ied to h ide any t h i ng, not even
o u r m i st ak es. not even t h e abuses t ha t h ave been com m i t t ed . Bu t i n
the days of the dictatorship, obviously, everything possible was done to
c over up t he w or st aspects of t he r epressi on .
You n ever h a d a ch ance t o t a l k t o t h e peasant s w h o ha d gr ease
spread on t heir gen i t als so that t he dogs would eat t h em. You could not,
t al k to the men w ho were scalped alive w i t h razors and had salt and v i
negar r u bbed i n t o t h ei r w ou nds so they w oul d suffer u n t i l t hey di ed .
Y ou cert a i nl y never h ad a chance t o t al k t o t h e peasant w om en w h o
were raped, as almost 100 percent of t hem w ere in some nor t h er n pr o
vi nces.
Pr obably you don't even k now abou t t h e peasant s who w ere bu r i ed
alive in the mountains. You don't know the incredibly horrible statis
tics on the n um ber of vi ct i m s. You have spoken of the l arge nu mber of
vi ct i ms — we k now th at they n u mbered in t he tens of thousands. M or e
t h a n 100,000 N i car agu ans w er e k i l l ed .
Th i n k about t he fact t h at t h ere wasn't a si n gle fam i l y i n N i car agu a
t h a t escaped t h e r epression , not even t h e fa m i l y of Somoza h i m sel f .
Because Edgar L a ng, a Sandi ni st a m ar t y r an d h ero, was a r el at ive of
Somoza's; m an y m emb er s of Somoza's fam i l y w er e vi ct i m s of r epres
sion .
Repression u nder Somoza w en t so far beyond the n or mal l i m i t s t h at
it t ouched h i s ow n f a m i l y an d t h e f a m i l ies of f r i ends. T h er e wasn' t
even a single Somozaist fa m il y t hat escaped t he repression. That gi ves
you some idea of t he m agn i t ude of r epression under Somoza.
O f course al l t h i s r epression led t o an enor m ous bu i l du p of resen t
ment and hatred in the Nicaraguan population. Everything that has
to do with the National Guard is despised in this country. We made a
big effort t o save some members of the National Guard. We found
them j obs, and i n some cases the wor k ers accepted them out of'a sense
of disci p l i ne. But t hey w ou l dn't t al k to the Gu ardsmen — they t u r n ed
On Human Rights in Nicaragua 8 7
venge, and my revenge is that we are not going to harm a single hair
on your heads. You didn't believe us before, but now we are going to
make you believe us."
That was our philosophy; that was the way we were. But take a min
ute to think about what it meant, what it means to have been in Nica
ragua in those days.
You, M r . President * — just imagine that they murdered your wife,
the way they murdered mine. Imagine if they had brutally murdered
your son or your brother, if they had raped your wife or sister or
daughter — and then you came to power .
This will give you some idea of the moral stature of the leaders of
this revolution, that we have not taken revenge against those who did
u s so much har m .
But we cannot demand the same consciousness from the great mass
of fighters who saw their brothers and sons shot down, whose wives
were raped, whose daughters were raped, whose loved ones were tor
tured, who were themselves victims of tort ure, who lived through the
frightening destruction of the botnbs that fell in their cities and of the
rockets that fell on their houses and killed children and old people.
They cam e t o power w i t h t h e soun d of sh ot s st i l l ri nging in t heir
e ars, st i l l feeli ng the blood recent ly sp i l led and the cr i mes just com m i t
ted .
The logical, natural thing to do was to turn the guns against those
who had lived by the gun. But the immense majority of the National
Guard were not shot; only a tiny m inority of these murderers were
shot . Even we our selves don't k now w ho they w ere. It w as l i k e F t ten
teovej una — e veryo ne was in i t t ogeth e r. **
W hen t he r ev ol u t i on w on , they gave m e a m i l l ion cordobas to st ar t
sett i ng up the M i n i st r y of the I nt er i or . And I sta rt ed spendin g th i s mo
n ey t o set u p a police force an d St at e Secur i t y , w i t h ou t bot h er i n g t o
ask for receipts. I don't k now exact ly w hat happened to th is mone y. If I
h ad to give an exact accounting, they would have to send me to jail .
You cannot have the faintest idea of the situation that existed in Ni
c aragu a at t h a t m om en t . I don't even k now w ho was in ch arge of t h e
La Polvo ra ba r r a cks r i g ht t h en — a nd I d on't t h i n k a nyo ne k n o ws .
People spent one week here an d the next week som eplace else.
A l l r i g h t , i t i s possible t hat i f we w ere to m ak e an i nvest i g at ion w e
might be able to find out who was in charge of La Polvora.
B u t do w e r eal l y h av e th e m oral r i gh t t o pu nish t hose wh o fou gh t
alongside the people against the tyranny, who risked their lives, who
perh aps w er e w ounded, w h o saw t h ei r fa t h er s and br ot h er s and sons
ki lled?
W hat r i gh t do we have to ask now t ha t they be pu ni shed for t h i n gs
t h at h appened at a t i me when t h ere w er e no mechani sms of cont rol i n
t he wh ole coun t r y — w hen th ere exi sted nei t her j u di cial order nor m i l
i t ar y order .
These companeros did not have a very clear idea of what they were
supposed to be doi ng, and some may even h ave t hough t they w ere fol
l ow in g the policy of the revol u t i on ar y gover nm ent. The means of com
mu n i cat ion w e had at ou r di sposal t o let people k now w hat t he poli cy
w as w ere not ver y good, and t h is was also t r ue du r in g t h e w a r .
I t w oul d be ver y d i f fi cul t for us to t rack dow n w ho was responsi bl e
for t h e t h i ngs t hat h appened i n t h e f ir st m on t h s after t he vi ct ory , ex
t r em ely di ffi cu l t .
We would be demagogues and liars if we told you we were going to
punish these companeros, if we told you that we were going to have a
th or ou gh i nvest i gat ion t o find ou t w ho was responsi ble for t he execu
t i ons t hat t ook pl ace i n t h e days aft er t h e vi ct or y .
O n t he other h an d, we have pu n ished a lot of people. W hen we fou n d
out abou t som et h i n g, we pen alized those responsi ble. Bu t we di d not
publicize what we were doing, and I don't even remember the names of
those penalized.
W e depor ted on e f i gh t er , w hose n am e I d on't r em em ber , a Sou t h
Am er i can, wh o I f ound com m i t t i n g abuses. W e i m m edi at el y expell ed
h i m fr om t h e cou n t r y .
We also put in j ail some cornpaneros whom we found committing
a buses. I don't k now i f t hey ar e ou t n ow .
But you don't have any idea of what those first months after the rev
olution were like: there wasn't the slightest bit of control over any
thing.
When we founded the Ministry of the Interior, there were six of us;
and in the whole country there was no police force, no State Security,
no judges, no courts„no Supreme Court, no nothing.
All we had were titles: "You' re the minister of the interior." "You' re
the president of the Supreme Court." There was no infrastructure. We
didn't even have offices. We didn't have files. We had nothing, abso
l u t el y n ot h i n g .
90 Sandin istas Speak
About the only thing we could do then was go around here and there
trying to stop bad things from being done.
When they tried to lynch the prisoners who were in the Red Cross
building, I personally went to see the relatives of our martyrs who
were there ready to take their revenge.
I needed all the powers of persuasion I possessed. I didn't tape record
what I said, but I think it was one of the most eloquent of the few elo
quent speeches I have made in my life.
In any case, I managed to persuade them not to kill the National
Guard. Mr. Ismael Reyes, who is a member of the Red Cross, was
there; he was the one who called me.
There was a large crowd trying to break down the doors to get in and
kill the murderers who were inside. We were able to convince them not
to do it. We were able to convince them by saying that we could not kill
them because we had made this revolution in order to put a stop to kill
ings.
This was perhaps the most persuasive argument. I asked them: "So
why did we make this revolution, if we are going to do the same thing
they used to do? If that's the way it is going to be, we would be better
off not having made the revolution."
We said the same thing to the police, to members of the State Securi
ty, to the companeros in the army: "Don't commit abuses; don't be dis
respectful to anyone; don't hit prisoners." Because often they did hit
prisoners or kill prisoners. We said to them: "If you do such things, then
w hat di d we make this reooLution for t "
It was a battle, a tremendous battle. We asked the Church to help
us. For example, we asked the Church to help us improve prison condi
tions. One time a German clergyman came to this very office and ex
pressed his admiration for the revolution and asked me: "'How can we
help you?"
We told him: We' re going to tell you a secret; we want you to help us
to improve conditions for the prisoners.
We didn't want to say it publicly, because several times when we did
something to improve conditions, word got out. And people didn't like
it.
If you were Nicaraguan and you had suffered all that Nicaraguans
have suffered, you wouldn't be very sympathetic with the idea of doing
something for the prisoners either. When we ask people what we
should do with the prisoners, they say, "Shoot them." If we had gone
along with the will of the people on this, we would have shot them all.
That is why we told this clergyman to help us improve the condi
tions of the prisoners. We told him: "Don't send us aid for our children,
On Human Rights in Nicaragua 9 1
p opul at i on, wh o used to l ive in fear. They w ere alw ays afr ai d of bei n g
ki l l ed , of bein g t h r ow n i n j a i l , of b ein g t or t u r ed , afr ai d t h ei r l a n ds
woul d be st ol en , afr ai d t hey w oul d lose th ei r j obs or be k i ck ed ou t of
s chool. They l i ved i n a st at e of ex t r em e insecu r i t y .
Bu t w h o was responsi ble for t h is insecur i t y? The social gr oups t hat
ru led the coun t r y. Now those who w ere insecure before have recovered
a sense of security; they feel safe for the first time.
B u t t hose w h o befor e caused insecur i t y t o t h e bi g m aj or it y of t h e
p opul at ion now feel insecur e t h emselves — even t h ough t h i s r ev ol u
t i on h as been ex t r em el y fl ex i bl e an d has given every one an opport u
n i t y . T hey feel i nsecur e even t h ough w e h ave ser i ou sl y pr oposed
and t h is is not j ust a tact ical or shor t -t er m t h i ng — that we m ai n t ai n a
m i xed econom y an d pol i t i cal pl u r a li sm .
We mean i t w hen we t al k about pol i t i cal pl u r a l ism and a m ixed eco
n om y . Bu t w h a t h appens i s t ha t a t h ief t h i n k s ev ery on e else i s l i k e
h i m . A nd t hese people t h i n k we are t r i ck i ng th em, when in fact we ar e
going t o gr eat p a i n s t o show t hem t h at w e ar e not l y i n g, t ha t i n fact
they are the ones who hi st or i call y h ave been t he li ar s. They can't con
cede t h e possibi l i t y t h a t t h er e m i gh t be people wh o ar en't l i ar s, an d
th er ef ore they feel n er v ou s.
Ob vi ou sl y t h i s i s a vi cious ci r cle, because t h i s in secur i t y t hey feel
c auses them t o decapi t a l ize t h ei r bu si nesses. Bu t w hen t hey begi n t o
do th at , th ei r w or k ers become aw are of what t hey are doi ng. A nd th en
th e r ev ol u t i on ar y gov er n m en t becomes concerned .
We are not pr epared to allow t hem t o decapi t a l ize thei r bu si nesses.
S uch a lack of confidence is a blow to t h is coun t r y. They are all in debt ,
w h ich is t he best pr oof. Th er e is not a si n gle pr i v ate ent er p r i se in t h i s
c oun t r y w h ich is not i n debt t o th e fi n an cial sy st em .
An d it w ould not even be a r adical st ep, but a si m ple business proce
d u re, for us to say to t h em : "Gen t l em en, ei t her you pay us or you t u r n
o ver y ou r oper at i ons." Bu t t hey ar en't i n a posi t ion t o pay .
So what has the r ev ol u t i on ar y gov er nm ent done? Has it t ak en aw ay
th ei r bu sinesses? No. In fact i t has ext ended t hem m ore loans in order
for t hem to develop t h ei r bu si nesses.
Unf or t u n at el y , w e h av e a back w ar d capi t a list cl ass. I w an t t o be
fr an k w i t h y ou. I t h i n k t h at in the long run a cert ai n segm ent of the so
called pr i v ate sector is going to come to its senses. There are some peo
p l e w h o don't show good sense now bu t m a y som e day com e t o t h ei r
senses. Th er e ar e some who ar e h alf-sensible w ho may become sensi
ble; j ust l i k e t h er e ar e some who alr eady show some common sense in
which this characteristic may become stronger.
W e coul d h ave w iped t hese people out . W e had t h e power t o do i t .
96 Sandin istas Speak
The L iber als* don't dar e to iden t i fy t h em selves, but t h er e are t hose
who are bold enough to suggest that the Liberals should be a political
option in this country. This doesn't worry us.
What kind of influence can these parties have, either historically or
among the masses'? They are doing us a big favor by presenting them
selves as our opposition. We'd rather have them for an opposition than
some modern party with relevant ideas and a possibility of a future.
Bet ter t hem t h a n new sectors that ar en't t a i nt ed w i t h h a v i n g been
Somoza's yes-men, having made deals with Somoza, having been part
of t he reacti on ar y hy st er i a t ha t pr ev ai led i n t h i s cou n t r y . T a i nted by
complicity with the imperialist i nterventions in Nicaragua (with all
du e respect t o ou r h on ored f r i end, th e pr esiden t of t h e com m ission ).
T h i s is the k i n d of opposit ion w e don't h ave to w or r y about . They ar e
th e ones who ar e w or r i ed .
A t a cer t ai n t i m e, they w er e dem an di n g i m m ed i at e elect i ons. W e
said no, and one of the reasons was precisely because we favor political
p l u r al i sm .
If w e had h el d elect i ons si x m on t hs after t h e vi ct or y , or i f w e held
them r i gh t now, those people wou l dn't even get h alf a depu t y. Pol i t i cal
pl u r al ism w oul d di sappear . I f t h er e w er e 100 r epresent a t i ves in con
gress, it would be 100 Sandinistas. And since we do favor political plu
r a l i sm , we w an t t h em t o h ave pol i t i cal r epresent at i on ; we w oul d l i k e
them t o be able t o or gan ize t h emselves i n t o som e t ype of pa r t y t h at
w ould at l east h ave t he possibi l i t y of presen t i n g it sel f as an opt i on .
Besides that, we really didn't have time to spend holding elections
r i gh t t h en . It w oul d h ave meant an expend i t u re of en ergy an d resou r
ces when our main job right then was to get our economy going again,
Bu t elect ions w i l l be held. We have alr eady set the date. That w i l l be
the t i me to have a contest i n t he elect or al ar ena. W hat w on't be up for
d ebate is wh ether or not t h er e is a r evol u t i on i n N i car agu a .
We h av e pu bl i cl y cr i t i cized peopl e i n t h e p r i v at e sect or , bu t t h ey
have cr i t i cized us as well. They dem and the ri ght to at t ack us, but th ey
d on't t h i n k w e h ave a r i gh t t o at tack t h em .
I f they can at tack us, why can't we do the same to t hem? If t hey cal l
us communists, why can*t we call them reactionaries? If they say we' ve
s old ourselves for gold from M oscow, why can't we say t hey are prost i
tu t es who have sold th emselves to i m per i a l i sm' ?
If t hey h ave the same r i ght to express th emselves as we do, and they
at t ack us in La Prensa and over Radio Corpora cion and other sta ti o ns ,
then we can attack them in our media.
* Somoza's pa rt y .
98 Sa n d i n i stas Speak
We don*t have a new system of laws wri tten since the revolution.
This is a very big problem. We still have judges who aren't very hon
est. This is because in order to have honest judges you have to have
honest lawyers. One day we went out with a lamp looking for an hon
est l awyer i n N i car agua. We found j ust one — we found Leonte H er do
cia.
M aybe I am exagger at i n g. M aybe th ere are a n um ber of honest l aw
y ers, but t h e n u mber is not ver y bi g. They w ere t r a ined i n a hor r i b l y
cor r u pt school. The pr oblem w i t h N i car agu a is that cor r u pt ion was so
per vasive that being cor r upt was not considered st r an ge. In fact, it w as
being honest that was considered weird. Anybody who didn't steal was
c onsidered a fool .
I remember people talking about a man who worked in a bank and
di dn't st eal , an d they called hi m a b l i t h er i n g i di ot . I n ot her w or ds, it
w as sor t of a cr i me not to be a cr i m i n al. People acqu i red ver y negat i v e
h ab i t s. We need new gen er at i ons to overcome t h is, t o forge new at t i
tudes.
A lot of lawyers bribe judges. They try to get money from the family
of someone who is arrested. The police don't have very good investiga
t ive techniques, they don't produce evidence in time, so, as a result ,
someone w al ks off scot-free who is obvi ou sl y a ver y danger ous in di v i d
ual. So someone who has raped a three-year-old girl goes free for lack
of adequat e ev idence, especi al l y si nce th er e is a t endency t o consider
cr i mes l i k e t h i s a pr i v ate busi ness.
Eden Pastora caught a man with a gun in his hand attacking some
one. H e took aw ay his gun and ar rested h i m , but t he man w as set fr ee
for lack of proof. There are people who sell narcotics, a crime for which
we have a special h at r ed, and they go free for lack of evidence.
Sometimes there are protests because the people don't want to let
such people go, because they know for a fact the criminals will go out
i n t he street s and com m i t new cr i m es. So somet i mes they t r y to t ak e
mat t er s i nt o th ei r ow n h ands. W e fi nd th e same type of resi st ance on
the par t of t h e chiefs of pol ice i n t h e pr ov inces.
We h ave had cer t ai n problems w i t h t he j u di cial st r u ct u r e, t r y i n g t o
c om e u p w i t h l aw s t ha t ar e st r ict en oug h so t ha t cr i m i n al s w i l l be
locked up and not left to hurt people. But writ ing laws is a difFicult un
dertaking. Changing the judicial structure of a country takes time.
In the case of the Special Tribunals, you shouldn't think we aren' t
concerned about speeding things up. And the way we go about writing
new laws (which are already better than they used to be) is more care
ful every day, in terms of the types of legal solutions to the various
100 Sa n d i n is tas Speak
their relatives have told you about abuses they have suffered. They ex
aggerate of course, although in some cases abuses have been commit
ted, which have been infl ated by the prisoners.
Someone was asking about the abuses we have committed. I have to
say there isn't a pattern of abuse. One day I went to a jail and a woman
prisoner told me she had been undressed and forced to do situps in her
under wear . I asked her t o t el l m e w ho di d i t . The person she accused
denied it, but she insisted.
I must say t h at t he person accused was not a N i car agu an; I t h i n k he
was a Col om bi an . H e was one of t h e r em n an t s of t he " Si mon B ol i v ar
Br i gade." * W e i m m edi at el y deported h i m ; t h i s happened i n t h e f i r st
few m on t h s.
It w as very dif fi cu lt to ar rest people and put them in j a i l. We already
h ad pl enty of pr ison ers to w or r y about w i t h out going ar ound arr est i n g
our ow n people. Besides, if we had put every one who com m i t t ed abuses
in prison, I think we would have had to jail half a million Nicaraguans.
People not only committed abuses. They also stole cars, and looted
abandoned houses. Ther e wasn't a house t ha t w asn't loot ed. Who did
i t? The people did it, our com paneros, the police, members of the ar m y .
I n cr edible t h i ngs w en t on i n t h i s cou n t r y .
I t seemed l i k e t h e most n a t u r a l t h i n g i n t h e w or l d t o gr ab ever y
thing you could in these houses and make off with it. It was like com
m u n a l proper t y .
We lost a lot economically through the looting and destruction of
buildings. This very building was stripped down to the walls. Every
th i n g was t aken — ai r con di t i oners, t oil et s.
The house of the m i l l i on a i re M ont ealegre, out on the hi gh way to the
105
106 Sa n di nistas Spe ak
*The "messengers of the word" were lay Christians who proselytized among
peasants in the early 1970s. They often played a role in organizing opposition
to the Somoza dictatorship in the countryside.
The Role of Religion 107
c apaci t y , i n h is capacit y as a Ch r i st i a n .
7, Some reactionary ideologists have accused the FSLN of trying to
divide the Church. Nothing could be further from the truth or more ill
i n t en t i oned than t h is accusat i on . If th ere are di vi si ons w i t h i n t he rel i
gions, they exist completely independently of the will and activity of
the FSLN .
A st udy of hi st or y sh ows that ar ound big pol i t i cal events mem bers of
th e Cat h oli c ch urch h ave al w ay s t ak en di ff er en t an d even cont r adi c
t or y posi ti ons. M i ssi on ar ies cam e w i t h t h e Spanish col onizers, an d
t hey used the cross to consecr ate the slave labor t hat had been i n i t i at
ed by t he sw or d. Bu t against t hem arose the f i r m ness of B ar t olome de
las Casas, the defender of the Indians.*
I n t he begi n n i n g of t he last cen t ur y m an y p r iests fough t for t he i n
dependence of Cen t r a l A m er i ca, some w it h w eapons i n h and. A nd on
th e ot her ex t r em e t h er e w er e pr iest s wh o defended t h e pr i v i leges of
the crow n i n L at i n A m er ica w it h equal v eh em ence.
After liberation from the colonial yoke, we find the anti-interven
ti onist posi t i ons of M on si gnor Per ei r a y Cast el l 6n , w ho called for de
f ense of t h e n at i on's i n t erests against t h e N or t h A m er i ca n i n vasi on .
D u r i n g t h e Somoza epoch t he fi gu r e of M on si gnor Calderon y Pad i l l a
stands out, at t ack i n g t he Somozas' vice, cor r u pt i on, and abuse of pow
e r against t h e poor .
A n d t oday t h er e i s t he m assive r ev ol u t i on ar y com m i t m en t am on g
revol u t i on ar y Ch r i st i ans.
Earlier we mentioned the participation of many Christians in the
people's revol u t i on ar y st r u gg le. But we must also point out t hat some,
li k e L e6n Pal l ai s and ot h ers, r em ai ned at Somoza's side to the end .
W e sh oul d not f orget t h a t i n t h a t p er iod t h er e w er e pr iest s w h o
pr oudly par aded th ei r m i l i t ar y r a n ks and official posi t i ons — of course
no one demanded that they give up their posts. But we should also not
forget t h at i n con t r ast to these sad exam ples we have t he i m m ense fig
ur e of Gaspa r G ar ci a L . an d so m an y ot he r Sandi n i st a m ar t y r s of
C h r i st i an or i g i n .
T h is sit u at ion cont i nues in t he present st age. A n i m m ense m aj or i t y
of the Christians actively support and participate in the revolution .
Bu t t h er e is also a m i n or i t y t h at m a i n t ai n pol i t i cal posi t i ons opposed
t o t he r evol u t i on .
N at u r a l l y w e San di ni st a s ar e good f r i end s of t h e r evol u t i on ar y
question under discussion, but also and especially to remind the revo
lutionary militants of the FSLN and the Churches of their duties and
responsi bi l i t ies in t he const r u ct ion of our cou nt r y, w hich has been hel d
down by 159 years of pillage, repression, and dependence.
Bu i l d i n g N i car agua's fu t u r e is a hi st or ic chal l enge t hat t r anscends
our borders and inspires other peoples in their struggle for liberation
and to create the new man, and it is a right and a duty of all Nicara
gu ans, regar dless of th ei r r el i gi ous beliefs.
Sandino Yesterday, Sandino Today, Sandino Always!
F r ee H om el an d or D ea t h !
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Nicar agu a's Economy and the
Fi ght Against I mp er i alism
by Jaime Wheelock
113
114 Sa n d in is tas Speak
ness of the peasantry and the humble people to turn them against the
r evol u t i on .
But one thing is certain: here, neither the reactionary hierarchy, the
oligarchy, nor the military dictatorship can guarantee national unit y
a n y l onger . Th er e is u n i t y , but u nder r ev ol u t i on ar y r u le. I t is a u n i t y
rooted in the mass organizations, the organizations of the workers,
p easants, st uden ts, and democr at ic w om en .
I n ot her w or ds, a people's u n i t y w i t h people*s ar med pow er , an d a
gover n m ent pr ogr am all ow i ng for and st i m u l at ing the par t i ci pat ion of
all strata in the national reconstruction of Nicaragua. And all those
f act ors are u n i ted under t he fi r m gu i dance of our v an gu ar d, the San di
n i st a N at i onal L ib er at ion F r on t .
Five years ago that w as a dream, an i l l u si on. But now t h is St ate De
par t m en t ofl i cial r ealizes that w h i le the old t r ad i t i onal pat t er ns h av e
been replaced by r evolutionary patterns, peace, stability , and the
smoot h fun ct i on ing of the economy are m ai n t a i n ed. T h is is a vi ct or y of
t h e rev ol u t i on, t hi s is a vi ct or y of al l the r ev ol u t i on ar ies in t he w or l d .
An d t h at i s even m or e i m por t an t t h an t h e speci ficall y econom i c as
pects.
Our main concern, therefore, is to fully use the nation's productive
forces. A nd we t h i n k t h at u nder a revol u t i on ar y power i t is also possi
ble to in duce the forces of the mi ddle class and even t he bourgeois sec
t or t o j oi n u s , i n t h e sam e w a y a n a g r i cu l t u r a l w or ke r offer s h i s
energy, his sweat, his blood in the task of building the new homeland,
w h ich is w hat t h e peasant s and w or k er s are doi n g .
I n or der t o st r en gt hen t h e cou n t r y 's u n it y w e can benefi t fr om t h e
b ourgeoisie's exper i ence in agr i cu l t u r e, from t h ei r m an agem en t sk i l l s
in industry. The contradictions arising from their participation are
l ess sig n i fi can t t h a n t h e sol u t i on s they pr ov ide for ca r r y i n g on t h e
s tr u ggle against t he com m m on enem y .
The cont r adi ct i ons i nh er ent to social classes are less impor t an t t h an
our m at er ia l ach i ev em ent s i n r econst r u ct in g t h e fou nd at i on s of n a
tional economy, i n the st ruggle for development , i n th e struggle
against backwardness, and indeed in the struggle against economic
d ependence, because the r a ti on al e of t h e econom y i s cent r a l ized i n a
pl an , i n an economic program t h at assi gns a r ole to each social force.
W e ar e not r ef er r i n g t o t ha t old , back w ar d econom y w h er e a b i g
manufacturer could do as he pleased. In the first place, a big manufac
tu r er has to con t r i b ut e to t he fi n an cial sy stem and has to pay a f ixed
interest rate reimbursing the money that was lent to him by the state,
by the people.
120 Sa n d in is tas Speak
r i a l dam age we had suff ered and also because of the shock and t u r m oi l
o u r people suffered, th e geogr aph i cal di st r i b u t ion of t h e popul at i on ,
and other social factors.
Bu t we can say t h at we have pract icall y at t a ined t hat fi g u r e, and i n
some aspects we have surpassed it, especially in agriculture. The em
ployment goal of 95,000 workers was 92 percent fulfilled; in 1980 we
w er e abl e t o cr eat e 82,000 new j obs. W e succeeded i n t h e econom i c
r eact i v at ion of ou r m ai n l i nes of pr oduct i on .
As for coffee, the harvest w il l surpass by 7 percent th e figure
pl anned for 1980. The l owest f i g ur e for cot ton pr odu ct ion i n t h e 1980
pr ogram was sur passed, the h i ghest bein g 170,000 m anzanas plant ed,
t h e lowest , 120,000 m anzan as. We pl anted 140,000 m anzanas, bu t i n
ter ms of yield we w i l l pract ical ly equal the fi gu re that could have been
e xpected from th e 170,000 m anzana goal .
We pl anted m or e t ha n 4 5 percent over t h e f i g ur e pl anned for r i ce
and 20 percent more in tobacco. As for sugarcane, we surpassed the
plan's goal by 25 percent.
W e can say t hat w e recorded t h e most i m p or t an t and bi ggest gr ai n
harvest in our country's history. We had rain, transportation and com
m u n i cat i on s pr obl em s t h a t con sider abl y r educed t h e h a r vest , an d
s t or age problems t hat consider ably cu t pr odu ct i on .
Never t h eless, i n a g r i cu l t u r a l pr odu ct i on , bot h fo r domest i c con
sum pt ion an d expor ts, we can say t hat ou r people m ade a great eff or t
t o react i v ate the economy. The agr i cu l t u r al w or k ers, the st udents w ho
h ar vested cot ton an d coffee, t h e w h ol e people, al l t h e sect or s of ou r
people i n a j oi n t effor t w er e able t o achi eve t he goals set for n at i on al
r econst r u ct ion i n or der t o gi ve N icar agua and t he N icar aguan r ev ol u
tion ou r f i r st m aj or econom ic success.
In du st r i a l r eact i v at ion faced pr oblems, not so much because of lack
of resources, energy, vitality, ability, and administrative capacity, but
m a i n l y because th e Cen t r a l A m er i can Com mon M a r k et u nder w en t a
cr i sis. V i r t u a l l y al l ou r i n du st r i a l pr odu ct ion for expor ts, t hat is, our
most i m por t an t domest ic pr odu ct i on , is or i ented t ow ar d t he Com m on
Ma r k et . E l Sal v ador had m a r k et pr oblem s, as did Cost a Rica, H ondu
ras, and Guat em al a. A nd we h ave not been able to m ar ket some of our
p r oduct s y et .
We think that when the situation in El Salvador is resolved in favor
of the revolutionaries we wil l occupy a more favorable position eco
nomi ca ll y because E l Sal v ador is one of ou r m aj or m a r k et s.
We want to underscore one i nt erest ing aspect — econom ic react i v a
tion got a l i t t le ou t of con t r ol i n t he sphere of ser vices.
I t w as nat u r a l t h a t because of t h e phy sical dest r u ct ion i n ag r i cu l
122 Sa n d i n is tas Speak
t u r e an d i n du st r y , i t w as goin g t o be di ff i cu l t t o reconst r u ct . So t h e
work force, especially small farmers and workers, were reoriented to
w ar d t h e com m er cial sect or . T r ade grew excessivel y , by 140 percen t .
This is a distortion, a trend toward creating too large a tertiary sector
t hat will have negative effects if we do not check it .
Bu t i n gen er al , we can say th at t he 1980 pr ogram w as a success. W e
do not face t h e sam e si t u at ion w e had at t he begi n n i n g, t h at of 1962.
W e ar e al r ead y a t t h e l evel o f 19 78 . T ha t i s r eal l y a r em a r k ab l e
achievement, which gives us hope and encouragement for the coming
year.
Generally speaking, 1981 will likewise be a year of reactivation. We
w i l l pu t st ress on sav i ngs and economic effi ci en cy . Bu t econ om i c eff i
ciency in what sense?
You ca n see clear l y t h a t t h er e ar e new ad m i ni st r at or s an d n ew
w or k ers who lack experi en ce. Wh ere th ere is destr uct ion — let us say ,
in a fact ory — if you gr ant t he adm i n i st r ator 1 m i l l ion cordobas to pr o
d uce 100 u n i ts, real it y w i l l pr ov e under present ph y sical, adm i ni st r a
tive, and organizational conditions that 1 mi llion cordobas in that
pr odu ct ion center w i l l probably pr oduce only seventy un i t s. That is t he
problem we have faced throughout agriculture and industry, although
it seems to have hit us harder in agriculture.
We have dumped lots of money — again and again — into small
production units that never before had had access to it. They were not
a ble to m an age t h ei r resources effi cien t l y , so in st ead of produ cing for
t y u n i t s, they pr oduced tw en t y . T hat is w h y w e are now facing f i n an
c ial pr obl em s, and per h aps some in fl a t i on , since th er e are l arge su m s
of money w i t h no cou nt er par t i n pr odu ct s.
The 1981 program is aimed at solving this problem by using diff'er
ent v a r i ables — assi g n ing cr ed its m ore r at i on al l y , gr an t i ng credits t o
those who can produce efficiently .
S omew hat r om an t i cal ly, at one point we were even t r av el i ng in h el i
c opter s an d g i v i n g ou t cr ed it s t o peasant s w h o l i ved i n v er y r em ot e
areas. The credits virtually fell into their hands from the helicopter .
But who was going to gather that production? By which roads, by
w h ich m eans of t r anspor at i on ?
The fact is that the produce, if there was any, remained there be
cause that money was spent on salt, shoes, and clothing and not on
p r odu ct i on .
Such romantic errors are made in every revolution. They are just
th e count er pr odu ct i ve side of t he generosit y of r evol u t i on i st s.
In agricult ure the problem was more or less the same. Imagine all
Somoza's agricultural enterprises and production centers — some
>>Iicarag ua's Economy and I mp er i a l i sm 1 23
a nd th ere are oth ers t hat owe $20 b i l l i on, or t en, or t hr ee, or four. T h e
time will come when an economy like Nicaragua's will be suffocated
and th ere w i l l be a collapse. A t some poin t t h ere w i l l be a col l apse.
We must all be aware of that. This applies both to the cornpaneros
who are in a posi t ion to launch cam pai gns to fam i l i a r ize pu bl ic opi nion
with the situation, and to those representatives of friendly countries
w h er e per h aps th er e ar e st i l l gr eat sh or tcom i n gs in t er ms of fu l l y u n
der st an di ng the com plex pr obl ems ou r r ev ol u t ion faces.
Th er e ar e t r em endous econom i c resources that coul d be m obi l ized
for the str en gt h en ing of a revol u t i on ar y process l i k e ours, if ev ery on e
were conv inced th at t h i s r evol u t ion has a bear i ng, not onl y locall y or
r egi on a l l y , bu t on t he w h ole w or ld .
T h i s i s a n on goin g r evol u t ion i n a T h i r d W or l d cou n t r y t h a t h a s
been abl e t o ov er t h row i m per i a list pow er , t h a t i s b u i l d i n g n at i on al
u n i t y w i t h a democr at i c an d p l u r a l i st i c or i ent at i on , t ha t i s w or k i n g
m i r acles i n t h e m idst of a ser ies of con t r adi ct i ons, t h a t i s t r y i n g t o
make a contribution to our peoples so as to open to them the road to lib
e r at i on . A l l t h i s ca n m ak e t h e vaci l l at or s i n m an y pl aces pu t conf i
d ence in t he revol u t i on ar ies who are able to lead thei r n at i ons t ow ar d s
r eal independence, social progress, and stability .
An d each and ever y br ot her or sister in each and every cou n t r y must
work t irelessly so that solidarity and material support, economic and
fi n an cial cooper at i on , m i gh t con t r i b ut e t o br eak i n g t h r ough t h e eco
n om ic and f i n an cial bar r i ers that i nt er n a t i onal r eact ion is set t i n g up .
A few days ago they warned us that should the Nicaraguan govern
ment per sist i n al l eged m i l i t ar y aid to the revol u t i on ar y m ov ement of
El Salvador, the $75 million loan from the U.S. government would be
immediately suspended, and that its payment would be immediately
demanded.
They have now paused to review the granting of the remaining $15
mi llion. We are morally and politically ready to resist these aggres
sions.
In an y case, we w i l l set a fr esh ex am ple, an ex am ple for everyone.
Perhaps it will be an example differing from Chile's simply because of
d i spr ov in g t h e n ot ion t h a t t h er e cannot b e a secon d r ev ol u t ion i n
Am er ica or t hat t he revol u t ion can be rev ersed. We t h i n k t h at w hen a
revol u t ion is a r eal one, i t i s i r r ever si ble.
So our example might well be that wherever imperialism seeks to
reverse a revolution in Latin America, it will find a people ready to
fi gh t t o th e last drop of blood for t h ei r i ndependence.
We consider t hese aspects to be reall y i m por t an t . We k now t hat our
essent ial responsib i l i t y i s to w or k for t h e bu i l d i ng of t he N i car agu an
126 Sa n d i n is tas Speak
by Tomas Berge
127
128 Sa n d i n is tas Speck
But they would not have been astonished at the idea of this huge rally,
because they always had faith in the future, an unshakable confidence
i n vi ct or y .
I n J u l y 1961, fel low N i car agu ans, a course w as begu n t h at b r ok e
li k e a stor m i n J u l y 1979. J ul y 1961 is the f ir st g l i m mer of a new idea
that was justified and realized in July 1979.
Bot h d ates fu l f i l l t h e pr om ise Sandi no m ade when he sai d " I swear
b efore our hom el and and before hi st or y t h a t in y sword w i l l defend t h e
nat i onal honor and t hat i t w i l l m ean vi ct or y for t he oppressed."
I n J u l y 1961, th e sw or d of Sa nd in o w a s un sheat hed, an d i n J u l y
1 979 the pr omise about vi ct or y for t he oppressed was k ept .
T h is sw or d is st il l un sh eathed for cu t t i ng off the heads of t he r ev ol u
ti on's enemies.
Twenty years ago, when a group of people returned to Sandino's
road of st r u ggle, they di d not f oresee t h e m ag n i t ude t h e r evol ut ion
w oul d assum e. N o w t h e p resen t g en er at i on s u nder st an d w h at t h i s
p r ocess means, but i t w i l l t ake fu t u re gener a t i ons to compr ehend fu l l y
the h er oism of the fou nders. Fut u re gener at i ons w i l l be the ones to u n
der st an d t he sacr i fi ce, t h e cour age, and t h e st r en gt h of past gener a
tions, and of the current generation of Nicaraguans.
W hen t h e Sandi n i st a N a t i ona l L ib er at ion F r on t w a s fou nded, t h e
exploiting classes represented by the Somoza dynasty had closed off all
possibi l i t y of a peacefu l st r u g gle. The t i m e had come t o t ak e up once
again the rifles of Sandino. Some peop! e had already done it: the proud
ol d w h i t e-bearded R a u dales, D i az , t h e j o u r n a l is t Sot elo , a f a r m er
named Car los Hasl am , and m any ot h er s.
T he F SL N w as, in the last ana ly sis, the com ing toget her of i ndi vidu
al gu er r i l l a fi g ht ers of t hat er a. I t was a union of di ffer en t ideological
a n d pol i t i ca l ideas. I t w as a sy n t hesis, as w e h av e sai d before, of a
wh ol e hi st or y of h er oi c st r u g gles, w h ich began i n t h e colon ial per i od
and broke like light ni ng bolts in the new epoch that opened up in 1821,
which lying historians falsely call independence.
Don't w or r y , we are not goin g to t el l t he hi st ory of N i car agu a here,
not even i n broad ou t l i ne. The hist or y of our people, wh ich is often dis
t or ted or u n k now n, is a her oic one. We j ust w an t to point out t h at J u l y
1 961 was th e begi n n i n g of a defi n i t i v e effor t t o t ak e on not onl y t h e
bloody dictatorship but also to break i n a mi llion pieces the heavy
c hains t hat t ied us to Y a nkee im per i al i sm .
The condit,ions under which t.he FSLN was founded were incredibly
d i ff i cul t an d pa i n f u l . They n ever st opped being di ff i cu l t an d pa i n f u l .
These w er e h a r dsh ip s an d pa i n t h a t ou r w h ol e peopl e w a s goi ng
th r ou gh. What was special about t hose founders, who w ere consider ed
The Second Anniversary 12 9
mistaken and even crazy at the time, was that they had a sense of his
t or y . T ha t t h ey n ever gav e u p i n t h e face of h ardsh ip s an d danger .
That they st arted wit h nothing, wit h no money, no arms, no expe
r i en ce, no reput at i on .
What set them apart was that they had boundless faith in the peo
ple, that they were aggressive, brave, endlessly patient, and absolute
ly sur e they w ou l d w i n i n t h e end. They w er e i n t he f i r st cr op, when
th er e w ere ver y few people doing the pla n t i ng. They accepted the ri sk
of death, when t h ere was no possibi l i t y of act u a l l y seeing the new day
in the immediate future.
T hey m ade the b i r t h of t he v an gu ar d possible, they m ade the b i r t h
of t he San di ni st a N a t i onal L i ber at ion Fr on t possibl e.
A n d ob vi ou sl y w h en w e t al k abou t t h e F SL N , w e ar e not t a l k i n g
about something that is just a political party. We' re not talking simply
about an armed organization. We ar e talking about a hi storic re
s ponse. We are t a l k i n g abou t t h e in di v i si ble real it y of t h e F SL N an d
the Nicaraguan people.
As l ong as t h is people is m i l i t an t and pr oud, as long as t h is people is
made up of heroic workers, as long as the workers and peasants and all
r ev ol u t i on ar ies are r eady t o defend th e n at i onal sov er ei gnt y ar m s i n
hand, as long as t h ere are N icar agu ans who love the l and w h ere they
were born , as long as t h is people exi sts, the FSL N w i l l cont i n ue to ex
ist.
For this reason, all the efforts of those who were born in Nicaragua
but now want to go back to the past, of the bootlickers of the Yankees,
will fail. They will never be able to separate the people from their van
g u ar d .
F or t h e same reason, when t h e masses express th ei r desires — an d
also th ei r di ssat i sfact ions — t he F SL N , w h ich is th ei r h i ghest for m of
or ganizat i on, m akes these desires and dissati sfacti ons its own, m ak es
t hem par t of i t s r evol u t i on ar y act i on .
Th at 's why we say t hat t he measures Daniel f Ortega] announced to
day were not pulled out of a magician's hat, but instead were the result
of you r st r u gg le, the st r u ggle of t he great popu lar m asses.*
Th e m asses pu t f or w ar d t h ei r dem an ds. Th e F SL N processes an d
syn t hesizes t hese dem ands and r et u r n s t hem i n t h e for m of con cr et e
This is the sense in which the revolution has put forward the strat
e gy of a m ixed econom y, so that the gen t l emen of the bu si ness com m u
n i t y can produce, for t h ei r ow n benefi t bu t also to cont r i b ute to r ai si n g
pr oduct ion i n t he coun t r y. Bu t w hat has happened? We have to repeat
w h a t ou r br ot her D a niel has sai d .
There are a few patriotic businessmen who have understood what
t he new r ules of the game ar e, learned the new l aws of pol i t i cal ar i t h
m et i c, an d h av e adopted a n h onest an d con st r u ct i v e a t t i t u de. B u t
th ere are many ot h ers, the unpa t r i ot ic businessm en, who have refused
to pi tch i n w i t h t he tasks of w i p i ng out back w ar dn ess and povert y an d
t a k i n g up t he ch a l l enge ou r econom ic di ffi cu l t i es presen t .
T hey h av e had a h u n dred ye ar s of ch ances, hi st or i cal l y speak i n g .
An d w e h ave to adm i t t hat t hey h av e accom pl ished some t h i n gs, but
a lw ay s t o en r ich t h em selves a t t h e ex pense of t h e w or k ers' sw ea t .
Every drop of proletarian sweat, and sometimes every drop of blood,
w a s t r ansformed t h r oug h t h e bu sinessmen's f am ou s eff i ci ency i n t o
lu x u r i ous wea l t h , al l of i t dest ined for t h ei r st r on g boxes.
Wh a t h av e t hese u n pat r i ot i c el em en t s don e for N i car agua'? They
made it i nto a r u bbish heap, into a l ake of blood, i nto a valley of tear s.
Because they d i dn' t t each t he people t o read and w r i t e. Because they
d id n ot h i n g for t h e hea lt h of t he people. Because they took t h i s coun
tr y , w h ich because of its n at u r a l resources should by r i ght h ave been a
paradise, and kept it backward and miserably poor.
Now the top representatives of this unpatriotic bourgeoisie demand
that we rebuild immediately what it took them a hundred years to de
s tr oy .
Who decapit a l ized the coun t r y? Who assassinated Sand ino and cele
br ated i n an orgy of cham pagne an d blood? Who made fabu l ous deal s
wi t h t h e t y r a n ny? W h o made con t r i b u t i ons u nder t h e t able t o Somo
za's elect ion cam pa i gns? l "The bourgeoisie," t he crow d responds]
Wh o gr abbed up t he peasant s' land and has kept t he w or k er s under
the yoke of oppression?! "The bourgeoisie" I
Wh o cal led ou r w onder fu l l i t eracy cam paign i ndoct r i n a t i on ?
Wh o ch imed i n an d st i l l ch i mes i n w i t h t h e cr ude a n t i com m u n ist
campai gns of Somoza, Pinoch et , St roessn er , and al l t he rest of t he go
r i l l a an i m a l l i f e of L a t i n A m er ica an d t h e C I A ? W h o sl andered t h e
r ev ol u t i on an d w h o abuses t h e mass orga ni zat ions w i t h d i sgu st i ng
epithets? I "The bourgeoisie" l
Who asks for adv ice and t ak es orders from t he represent at i ves of t he
e m p i re, of t he same em p i re t h at t r ied t o ensl ave ou r coun t r y , sow i n g
death, destruction, and humili ation'? [ "The bourgeoisie"1
It w as not you w or k ers and peasants. You w er en't t he ones who de
The Second Annioersary 13 5
With the agrarian reform we feel in our hearts a joy similar to that
wr i t t en about i n the B i ble wh ere it says "Let t he sea and al l t he i nhab
itants contained in the world roar. Let the rivers applaud and be joined
b y t he m ou n t a i ns in cr ies of j oy ," because the love of ju st ice is not on l y
a r ev ol u t i on ar y sen t i m ent , bu t also a sen t i m en t deeply sh ared by t h e
C h r i st i a n people of N icar agu a .
And so we see that in our free Nicaragua there are hundreds of thou
sands of Ch r i st ian r evol u t i on ar ies, men and w omen who today r ej oi ce
o ver t he news of t he sol ut ion t he Cat h olics have ar r ived at w it h the bi
shops. A solution based on dialogue and respect, that recognizes the
p r i n ci pl e of t h e r i gh t of r ev ol u t i on ar y C a t h ol ics t o w or k sh ou lder t o
s houlder w i t h t h ei r people, i n t h e const r u ct ion of a new societ y . I t
gi ves us pleasur e to see the m at u r i t y of t h e Ch ur ch's leader s.
W e w ere say in g bef'ore that t h e er r ors w i l l be recti fi ed bu t t h at t h e
r ev ol ut i on ar y m eth ods w i l l r em a i n . So let us t al k a bi t m ore of our er
rors, but not l i k e in t he confession al, where you receive absolu t ion and
t hen go on si n n i n g .
Let us speak frankly before the people, as a healthy self-criticism, to
correct er r or s, t o rect if y ou r course.
Somet h i n g w e mu st cr i t i cize, an d D an ie l h a s a l r eady m en t i oned
t h is, but we w ant to t al k abou t i t a bit m or e: bureaucr at i sm. We inh er
ited m ore t han dest r u ct i on . We also in her ited t he destr oy er , bur eauc
rat i sm . Pu b l i c fun ct i on ar ies i n t h e past w er e educated w i t h t h e con
ception that their special jobs were only marginal to political deci
sions.
B u t t he pub l ic fun ct i on ar y is not only a speciali st, but t oday must al
so mak e pol i t i cal decisi on s.
U n f or t u n at ely, t h ere are a great m any f u n ct i on a ries that don't t ak e
t h e approach of d ir ect l y resol v i n g pr obl em s by w or k i n g d i rect l y w i t h
you , w it h t h e masses. The st at e appar at us m ust be si m ple, dyn a m i c,
e ffi cien t .
W hen we created t he n at i on a l ized sector of t he econom y , w hen w e
b egan to m ak e hea lt h care, educati on , and cu l t u r e av ai lable to ever y
one, that was when the number of public employees began to increase,
logi cal ly. H ow ev er, I t h i n k t hat we have gone too far. We have not on ly
in cr eased the fun ct i ons of pu bl ic w or k ers, but w e h ave also increased
th e n u mb er , and now the bur eaucracy is gi v i ng b i r t h to m ore bur eau
cracy. A nd w it h m ore and m ore empl oyees and fun ct i on ar i es the sol u
tion gets harder an d h arder . So begins the red tape. Every one in a sea
of red tape, mem or an da, for ms. I t h i n k t h at t he b ur eaucracy grew so
much t hat i t w ou ld h ave done wel l to compete in the basebal l leagues,
because it was t h r ow i ng us al l so many curves, and I t h i n k t hat t he bu
138 Sa n d i n is tas Speak
and other organisms, although fortunately very few, who think t hat
the uniform or the responsibility the revolution has given them puts
them in the category of special citizen who can ignore traffic laws, not
s t an d i n l i n e at, th e m ov ies, giv e or receive recommendat i ons, m ak e
scenes in cl ubs and amusem en t spot s.
These com paneros ei t he r w i l l correct t h ei r beh avior or w i l l f or feit
the right to be known as Sandinistas.
We have spoken of aust er i t y , bu t i n m any in st i t u t i ons so far i t 's j ust
rh et or ic . T h er e ar e i n n u m er abl e a buses, sq u ander i n g o f gasol i n e,
which means squandering our foreign exchange earnings. Of course,
for in st ance, we have the r i ght to have a good t i m e, to have our par t i es.
If w e w ant t o h ave a par t y we h ave it , th er e's no probl em ; bu t i t m u st
be put on w i t h t h e si m p l i ci t y and t h e pr udence our pov er t y dem ands,
the pr udence demanded by our cu r r ent pr oblems and above all our r ev
ol u t i on ar y qu al i t ies.
In our offices we must econom ize on the use of paper, elect r i ci t y, eco
nom ize i n ev er y way possible. I n ever y way possible, except w or k , ef
f or t , an d sacr i fi ce. A u st er it y m u st be for ev er ybody , not j ust for t h e
wor k er s i n t h e fi elds and i n t h e ci t ies, upon w hom t h e w ei gh t of ou r
e conomic di f fi cu l t ies has fallen up to n ow .
W a r t o the deat h , t h en , against bu r eaucracy , free spendi ng , pi l fer
age, corr u p t i on, and abuses. Let us put an end to these ev ils, in order t o
give land to the peasants, to make the revolution, honor the memory of
those who died, to end th ef t , cr i m e, and cor r u p t i on. T h at's what those
gener ous, br ave, an d h u m bl e men w e r ecal l w i t h such pr ofoun d r e
spect t oday gave th ei r l i ves for . A nd how could we fai l to recal l our he
roes'? How could we fai l to recal l t hem on t h is glor i ous occasion? How
can we not sense the et er nal presence of Santos L 6pez, vet er an fi g ht er
of Sandino's army, who, carrying with him the weight of the years,
st i l l had i n h is eyes t he old gleam from t he j u n gles of Segov i a?
How could we fai l to recall the i ndef at i gable F au st i no Ru iz, of whom
i t was once said t hat he never said a word t hat wasn't on the m ar k l i k e
a n ar row i n t he heart'? How could we fai l to recall J or ge N av a r ro, w h o
car r ied a k napsack f u l l of j oy , and a h an dfu l of gr enades'? How cou ld
we fai l to recal l Rigoberto C r uz, Pablo Ubeda, fi rst i n t he bean s of t he
peasants? Fr an cisco Bu i t r ago, a st uden t w ho k new m an y t h i n gs, but
n ever k new fa t i gue or di sm ay? How could we fai l t o recal l, how cou ld
we fail to have a deeply felt remembrance of Germann Pomares, that in
trepid forger of the dawn'? Or Jose Benito Escobar, that worker whose
t r ades were gu npowder and the people? How could we fai l to recall Si l
vio M ay or ga, w ho created a gen t l eness that was al w ays at t he side of
ever y San di n i sta? How could w e fai l t o recal l , w i t h ou r hear t s f ul l of
I40 Sandin istas Speak
by Daniel Ortega
141
142 Sandin is tas Speak
cenaries to invade Zimbabwe, all of this with the support of the pres
ent United States government; at a time when Libya is the victim of
acts of aggression deriving from United States policy which have even
led to two aircraft of the Libyan Air Force being shot down over its own
ter ritorial space in the Gulf of Sidra.
We are the bearers of a specific proposal aimed at contributing to the
cause of peace i n Cen t r al A m er ica at a t i m e w hen t h e gover nm en t of
Isr ael, w it h t he fu l l suppor t of the U n i t ed St ates, is car r y i ng out acts of
terrorism against the Palestinian people, and against the Lebanese
people, murdering hundreds of people, as well as bombing the Tam
m u z nu clear r esearch center i n I r aq .
We are the bearers of a specific proposal aimed at contributing to the
cause of peace in Cen t r al A m er i ca, at a t i me w hen t here is an in crease
in spying flights by United States aircraft in the air space of Demo
c r at i c K or ea an d t h e econom i c block ade an d pol i t ica l an d m i l i t a r y
th r eats against Cuba, and the occupat ion of Gu an t an am o, cont i n ue; at
a time when the people of Grenada are harassed and attacked; at a
t i me when th e i m pl em en t a t ion of t he t r eat ies concer n i ng t he Panam a
Canal Zone, for which Gen. Omar Torrijos fought and died, is placed in
jeopardy; at a time when resolutions of the United Nations concerning
the independence of Namibia are flouted.
We bring a specific proposal aimed at assisting Central America in
its struggle for peace, at a time when the enemies of peace brandish
philosophical concepts to justify thei r war like nature, while at the
s ame t i m e perpet r at i n g acts of aggressi on .
Th at is why t oday we also wish to cont r i b ute to the cause of peace by
condemning the South African regime, expressing our solidarity with
the peoples attacked by that regime, expressing our solidarity with the
patriots of the South West Africa People's Organisation (SWAPO) as
the sole legitimate representatives of Namibia; supporting the front
l ine st ates; expressing our suppor t and solid ar i t y w i t h L i by a and w i t h
the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), the sole representative
of the Palestinian people; with the people and government of Demo
c r at i c K or ea ; w i t h t h e peopl e an d gov er n m en t of Gr enada „. w i t h t h e
c our ageous, un it ed, and st r on g people and gov er n m en t of r evol u t i on
ary Cuba; with the struggle of the Polisario Front; with the resolutions
adopted on August 20, 1981, on the implementation of the Declaration
on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,
wherein the inalienable right of the people of Puerto Rico to self-deter
mination and independence is reaffirmed; with the people and govern
ment of Panama; with the people and government of heroic Vietnam,
while repudiating the policy of punishment, and the threat and use of
Appeal for Justice and Peace 1 4 3
force against that people; with the coastal states of the Indian Ocean
which are continuing their struggle to have that area declared a zone
of peace and to obtain the consequential withdrawal of the different
mi lit ary fleets moving in the area. We also appeal to the fraternal peo
ples and governments of Iran and Iraq to seek a solution in the spirit of
th e N on al i gned m ovem en t, to the di ff er ences or cl ai ms t hat may exi st
between those two st ates.
Fi n a l l y , may w e once agai n ex pr ess ou r sol i dar i t y w i t h t h e peopl e
and government of Cyprus, with the people of Chile, with the people of
U r u g u ay , and w i t h t he her oic people of Gu at em al a. M ay w e also h ai l
as a victory for peace the independence of the people of Belize and its
m ember sh i p i n t h i s or ganizat i on .
We bring a specific proposal aimed at strengthening the worldwide
efforts to ensure peace which Central America is today obliged to
mak e at a t i m e when t hat peace is also t h r eat ened by rest r i ct i ve eco
n om ic measures w h ich m ak e t h ei r f u l l w ei gh t fel t i n t he T h i r d W or l d
coun t r i es, hi st or ica ll y ex pl oi ted by t he developed coun t r i es.
The latest decisions on the subject made public by the government of
th e U n i t ed St ates are clear proof of w hat we h ave just st at ed. The se
cretary of the treasury of the present United States government has
said t hat t he gover nm ent i n t ends to l i m i t loans and credits to develop
i ng cou n t r ies t hr ough t he I nt er n at i onal M on et ar y F und and the I nt er
national Bank for Reconstruction and Development; and President
R eagan h im sel f, at t he an n ual meet i ng of t he I nt er n at i onal M on et ar y
Fu n d an d t h e I n t er n a t i ona l B an k fo r Reconst r u ct ion an d D ev elop
ment, conf i r m ed t hat decisi on, say ing that for t he poor cou n t r ies ther e
the only magic formula is that of the free market, a "magic formula"
which has served only to make our countries poorer.
D espite the effort s made by the Th i rd W or ld cou n t r ies to rest ru ct u r e
th ei r for eign debt an d, by m eans of great sacr i fi ces, to pay t he ser vi c
ing costs, the econom ic horizon is now so bleak t hat i t compels us to se
rious reflection. Unless formulas in keeping with the economic reali
ties of our cou n t r ies are devised, t here w i l l be no way out except to can
cel the ent i re for eign debt and its ser v i cing costs, or the t ime w i l l com e
w hen by com mon agreem en t w e, the poor coun t r i es of the w or ld, w i l l
have t o say t h at w e ar e not goin g to pay , because we cannot pay, be
cause we have nothing to pay with.
We must not forget that in foreign debt servicing alone the develop
ing countries must pay with blood and sweat more than $40 billion a
year , w i t h ou t t h e least possi bi l i t y of f i n d i n g a sol u t ion t o t h ei r eco
nomic problems. On the contrary, the situation is becoming more and
more serious.
144 Sa n d i n is tas Speak
were but a sample and that the United States was ready to give its
suppor t to H on d u r as in a war against N i car agua and to at tack t he peo
ple and the revolutionary government of Nicaragua.
His lack of respect did not stop there. He also attacked the govern
m en t of H on du r as because it pr oclaimed t hat i t w as neu t r a l v is-a-v i s
neighbors like Nicaragua and a guerrilla war such as that in El Salva
d or . H e also at tacked the gover n m ents of M exico and F r ance. A l l t h i s
a ccompanied t h e ar r i v a l i n Pu er t o Cortes on t h e A t l a n t i c Coast of
Hon du ras of t h e U n i ted St ates am ph i bi ous vessel Fo rt S nell in g w i t h
500 marines, three patrol boats, a tugboat, and mil itary materiel .
Th ere also ar r ived at t h e sam e t i m e at San Pedro de Su la, H on d u r as,
tw o observ at ion a ir cr af t of t h e U n i ted St ates A i r F orce com i n g fr om
the Panama Canal Zone.
Wh a t can we cal l al l t h is'?
The U n i ted St ates also t r ies to use Cen t r al A m er ican t er r i t or y — as
i t di d i n t h e 1960s to at t ack C uba — to at tack N i car agua now .
Act s o f ag gression , i n t er ference , pr essure, an d b l ac k m ai l n ever
cease. Respect for t h e sover ei gnt y of ou r cou n t r ies has never been ob
ta ined fr om t h e U n i ted St at es. The expan si on ist t h i n k i n g of t h e last
century , the gunboat treaties, the big-stick policy, have emerged
again.
In t he face of these facts and t hr eats we cannot r em ai n sil ent or i nac
t i ve, because hi st ory j u s t i fies our belief t hat we can be at tacked agai n
an d t h at t h e sover ei gn t y w e won once and for al l by force of ar m s on
J u l y 19 , 1979 , i s i n ser i ou s danger . Peace an d st ab i l i t y i n Cen t r al
A m er ica are seri ou sly endanger ed. Is t his t he k i nd of hi st ory t hat w i l l
repeat it sel f i n Cen t r a l A m er ica?
Our peoples are ready to respond as Sandino did to any attempt at
d i rect or i n d irect aggressi on , ei t her i n N i car agu a or i n E l Sa lv ador .
We al l k now t hat t he t hr eat of i n vasion is directed fi rst an d for emost
against t hose two peoples.
Wi l l t hat i n t er ven t i onist policy con t i n ue to be imposed on the w i l l of
t he people of the U n ited St ates? W i l l the policy of sust ai n i n g, ar m i n g ,
an d defendi n g i n Cen t r al A m er ica such cr i m i n a l r eg imes as t hose of
Ubico, H er n andez, M a r t i nez, and Somoza con t i nu e t o he im posed? It
w ou l d appear so, accor di ng t o t he nost al gi c w or ds of' a r epresent at i v e
of t he U n i t ed St ates w ho, on her passage t hr ough Per u, aff i r med t h at
she would prefer Somoza in power in Nicaragua rather than the Sandi
ni st as.
How far wil l economic aggression, hand in hand with mi litary ag
g ression , against N i car agua go? W i l l t he policy of i n t er v en t i on ism i n
Central America again be imposed with impunity? Wil l the United
Appeal fo r J u stic e and Peace 1 5 1
The Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front and the Revolutionary De
m ocr at i c Fr on t au t h or ize you to convey to t he U n i ted N a t i ons Gen eral A ssem
bly, at its Thirty-Sixth Session and to the peoples of the world, our proposals
c oncerned w i t h possibl e peace t a l k s a imed at sol v i n g t h e cr i sis at pr esen t af
fl i ct i n g ou r cou n t r y . T he fol l ow in g is t he t ex t of ou r pr oposals:
Th e F ar ab u ndo M a r t i N a t i ona l L i ber at ion F r on t an d t he Revol u t i o n ar y D e
m ocr at i c Fr on t ad dr ess the i n t er n a t i on al com m u n i t y an d peoples of t h e w or l d
because they consider t he U n i t ed N a t i ons to be the expression of t he pr i n ciples
of' peace, Justice, an d equ a l it y am on g st ates an d peoples and t h er efor e t he ap
pr op r i at e for u m i n w h ich to expr ess the aspi r a t i ons of the people of E l Salv ador
a n d it s r epresent at iv e or gan izat i ons, I" M L N an d I'"D R .
M ay w e f ir st of al l ex pr ess our gr at i t u de for t he m an y expressions of sol i d ar
ity with the struggle of our people we have received from governments, as well
as from or gani zat i ons and pol i t i cal, social, and r el i gi ous person al i t i es, t h r ou gh
ou t ou r st r u g gle. W e wish most especi al l y t o ex press ou r gr a t i t u de to t he gov
e r n m en t s and peoples of M ex ico an d F r ance for t h ei r sol i d ar i t y , for t hey h a v e
recognized our or ga n izat i ons as represent at i ve pol i t i cal forces. M ay we also ex
p r ess our t h a n k s for t he com m ent s and proposals of most of t he cou n t r ies of t h e
i n t er n a t i onal com m u n i t y i n su ppor t of a pol i t i ca l sol u t i on .
If t oday ou r people, d irected b y t h e F ar ab u ndo M a r t i N a t i ona l L i ber a t i on
F r on t and t he Revol u t i on ar y D emocr at ic Fr on t , are i nv ol ved in ar med st r u gg l e
it is because regimes of oppression and repression have closed the peaceful
c h an nels for ch ange, leav i n g r ecourse to ar med st r u g gle as the sole leg i t i m a t e
a l t er n a t i v e t o t he people i n i t s quest for l i b er at i on ; th at is, t he ex er ci se of t h e
u n i v er sa l an d const i t u t i ona l r i g h t t o resor t t o rebel l ion ag a inst u n l a w fu l an d
b loodt h i r st y au t h o r i t y .
Our war is therefore a just and necessary war to build peace and bring about
eq ua l i t y am on g al l Sal v ador ans.
How ev er, w hat we w an t is peace and to achi eve it we are proposing a pol i t i cal
s ol u t i on , the object iv e of w h ich w ou l d be the end of w ar and t he est ab l i sh m en t
of a new economic and political order that will ensure for all Salvadorans the
enjoyment of their national rights as citizens and a life worthy of human be
ings.
A l l t h i s suppor t s ou r ex pr ess w i l l t o open a d i alogu e w i t h t h e ci v i l i a n an d
mi l i t ar y r epresent a t i ves t o be design ated by t h e j u n t a t h r oug h a pr ocess of
p eace t al k s .
We i n t end to base t hose peace t a l k s, w h ich reaA i r m our com m i t m en t to seek
a rid i m pl em ent a pol i t i cal sol u t i on, on the basis of the fol l ow i ng gen er al pr i n ci
ples:
F i r st, t hey w i l l be car r ied out bet w een delegates appoi nted by t he F ar abu n d o
Marti National Liberation Front and the Revolutionary Democratic Front and
App eal for Ju s tice and Peace 1 M