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Moral Relativism:
Lifting Ourselves Up By Our Own Coat Collars
only would you look at me like I was a fool, I would be speaking a fallacy. It would
be quite apparent that the sentence just uttered from my lips would be a self-
defeating thought. By its very existence it refutes its own reality. I obviously
general. Relativism is the concept that all truth is relative to some structure of
would say, “there are no absolute truths.” The reason that this would be a self-
truth is false, and some absolutes do, in truth, exist, or all truth is indeed relative
which would make the statement that “all truth is relative” a relative statement but
absolute or false. So why believe it? You shouldn‟t. If it is still not clear that this
concept is false, consider the fact of 1+1=2 or, “I think therefore I am.” Although
this basic form of relativism is clearly false, other forms are not so easily diffused.
Religious relativism is a bit more persistent, although I think again provably false.
firm standing of the set. This manner of relativism of course is moral relativism.
Moral relativism states all moral actions (or amoral actions), from lying to
helping a little old lady across the street are derived, prescribed, and practiced
within a cultural framework. This means that in America we have moral norms
and aberrations that vary from those of Japan, the Congo or the Australian
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Aborigines. This, says the moral relativist, is due to the varying cultural
developments within the assorted societies. It seems to me that the main, if not
the only basis, for moral relativism is the mere fact that each society has its own
moral code. This does not seem to be a very solid foundation for a moral system
achievable path that will lead to the outlet. Any other path taken will lead to an
insurmountable obstacle. Let us also assume that this maze will take more than a
lifetime to finish, even if the voyager chooses the one correct path. This assures
that only the person watching the test, with full knowledge of the maze and of its
paths, will know if the traveler chose the correct path from the onset or not. Does
the mere variety of choices from the commencement mean that no choice will be
a correct one? No, the fact that there is a multitude of choices does not mean
Before I move on I would like to point out the falsehood that so many
people come up against when discussing moral differences. This deception is the
idea that there is a gigantic gap in the moral structures of the different cultures
from around the world from all times. Christian Apologist and scholar C.S. Lewis
writes:
If a man will go into a library and spend a few days with the
Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics he will soon discover the
massive unanimity of the practical reason of man. From the
Babylonian Hymn to Samos, from the Laws of Manu, the Book of
the Dead, the Analects, the Stoics, the Platonists, from Australian
aborigines and Redskins, he will collect the same triumphantly
monotonous denunciations of oppression, murder, treachery and
falsehood, the same injunctions of kindness to the aged, the young
and the weak, almsgiving and impartiality and honesty. He may be
a little surprised (I certainly was) to find that precepts of mercy are
more frequent than precepts of justice; but he will no longer doubt
that there is such a thing as the Law of Nature. (Lewis 106)
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With that said, let us proceed as if it hadn‟t because many will, for some
reason or another, not believe it. Let us continue with the notion that major
differences do exist, because that is the general platform from which moral
relativist chose to debate from. And even from there, I believe that their theory
couple of truthful points. In general, our moral framework is based on the culture
that we are brought up in. We start thirty paces into the maze. And unlike the
maze, no single framework has it completely accurate, and I would argue that in
not mean, like I have said before, that moral truth or truths do not exist or cannot
be found. I argue that just as we see some people as being amoral within our
own code, some moral frameworks are simply amoral within the absolute moral
law. I will attempt to show that if moral relativism were the only viable choice, we
would lose all right to judge others of their obviously egregious actions. (If you
disagree that I can call them wrong then consider the torture, rape, and murder of
babies for fun or simply Nazi Germany and wonder if you could stand by the
concept that no one can call an action completely immoral.) Moral relativism
fights against our intuition and our common sense. We have an innate duty to
justice and mercy yet within moral relativism, justice falls to the wayside. C.S.
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Two points I would like to extract from this assertion by Lewis are these;
first, it is key to notice where Lewis states “whether we obey it or no.” This means
murderers, and men like Dahmer and Bin Laden, as extremely immoral. We
recognize that they do not comply with the moral measuring rod that Lewis spoke
of. But does their disobedience to those morals mean that they are not objective
but subjective to culture? People break the speed limit every day. Does that give
us the right to look a policeman in the eye and tell them that we shouldn‟t get the
ticket she is writing because that law is subjective? So is it not possible that there
are moral laws that we simply break in the same way that we break our own
legalities?
The second point I would like to discuss is Lewis‟ final statement about the
measuring rod. Unless the moral code is somewhere external to us, meaning not
invented by man, then we are indeed left with the conclusion of moral relativism.
If we do not have an external moral law, then the moral standard was undeniably
derived from men and therefore who is to say which men were correct in their
moral assessments? The moral code must be external to humankind. Lewis later
…he does not fully realize that those who create conscience cannot
be subject to the conscience themselves… If „good‟ means only the
local ideology, how can those who invent the local ideology be
guided by any idea of good themselves? The very idea of freedom
presupposes some objective moral law which overarches rulers
and ruled alike. (Lewis p111)
must be false. First, he states that if moral relativism were true then we would be
unable to make moral assessments like, “Mother Teresa was better than Adolph
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(Geisler/Hoffman p19) And the inclination inside all of us is that Mother Teresa is
actually morally less corrupt than Hitler was, and that this is not only true in our
own framework but in all frameworks. We would have no reason to see one
Secondly, Beckwith says that if the relativist is going to claim that moral
conduct is individually based, then they will face another judicial impossibility.
guaranteed that Dahmer had a very different outlook on cannibalism then did his
neighbor who was his victim. Needless to say, there is obviously a conflict of
Finally, Beckwith states that if the relativist maintains that morals are
qualified by their culture, then they will arrive full force into three more
saying,
The second quandary observed if morals are culturally based, is that there
subculture‟s norms) we ought to decide from. What is a cultural norm but the
moral code from some dominating subculture? But each subculture can be
reduced down further to the majority in the subculture and then further and
further until we come back to individual moral codes. Think of it this way. We
have a “national” moral framework. However, this is only the common ground
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frameworks are again only the major agreements between the proponents of that
systems, which I have already been proven inconsistent with moral relativism.
moral progress. It would be utterly impossible to say that one culture was even
changing for better or for worse without some standard to measure it by. “Yet
who can reasonably deny that the abolition of slavery in the United States was an
we have become more morally enlightened and even sometimes say we have
become more civilized or less savage than our earlier counterparts. This is
impossible without moral progress. Lewis also writes about moral progress in his
As a side note, Beckwith also adds that if morals are relative to culture,
then those who we consider to be great moral leaders such as Jesus, Gandhi
and Martin Luther King Jr. are nothing more than advocators of their own
individual moralities, and therefore are bandits raiding the territory of our own
its own absolute. What that means is that it would claim that we ought to be
moral within our own moral structures. But is that not a moral absolute? It
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norms of his or her own moral communities (Geisler/Hoffman p22). This is a
universal “ought to” that is to be prescribed to all people of all places at all times.
In essence it states, “Doing what is right within your moral code is the right thing
find one absolute moral, then moral relativism must be false. And let us even say
that the relativist says that even this universal is just as relative as the next. Then
what? We are not even proper in doing what is moral in our own moral
framework? If this were true, then we creep nearer and nearer to moral nihilism.
So why is this idea, that moral norms are somehow united with some
mass cultural dictate about how we ought to act, such a popular mode of
thought? I believe it is derived from two dominant rationales. The first, as I have
culture to culture. I will explore this in more detail presently. The second of these,
I believe, is the push for tolerance across cultural boundaries. Now tolerance on
its own is not an evil or harmful notion. In fact, it is quite admirable. However, I
will argue that within moral relativism, the very tolerance that it seeks to promote,
With that said, let me now address in more depth the idea of variety or
moral norms as a proof for a relative moral system. As I have stated before with
the maze illustration, the mere variety of choice does not negate the possibility
that there is one moral code to which all moral codes ought to measure up to. Let
us for now think of moral A as some moral proposition that is consistent and
believed to be true in the general populous of the United States. If someone were
to break moral A we would not say that it was because they had a different moral
somehow acting immoral in regards to A. Often the moral relativist will even say
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that the person who commits A simply has a different moral code about it.
However, contrary to that allegation, the accused most likely knows, with the
exception of the ignorant or the deranged, that they did undeniably break the
between imperfect sight and blindness,” (Lewis p108). Someone can be immoral
within a moral construct, without creating a new moral system. Within moral
relativism, the culture has no right to judge my moral actions since I can claim
sanctuary in my framework. But we, more often than not, observe the contrary.
Even within our own individual moral laws, we recognize that we do indeed make
immoral decisions and commit unscrupulous acts. Without some moral standard,
we would feel no guilt or remorse over our actions because we would be acting
out from our own morality. But indeed, we often feel such feelings. We feel bad
when we lie to friends. We often feel guilt for our wrong actions. It is possible that
whole moral frameworks are off, is it not? How often have we not felt guilt for an
action until years after when we recognized its grievance? We are not always
We also find that the variety of moral programs works against moral
relativism instead of for it. Consider the basic claim of the relativist in regards to
disagreement about morality: “the fact that there is disagreement means that
there are no absolute truths about morality.” But I say to this relativist, I believe
there are moral absolutes. Has not my simple disagreement with him then made
his own position untrue? After all, his position is that disagreement eradicates
Arkes states,
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“My disagreement establishes that the proposition [i.e.,
disagreement means there is no truth] does not enjoy universal
assent, and by the very terms of it the proposition, that should be
quite sufficient to determine its own invalidity,” (Geisler/Hoffman
p19).
false, that leaves us neither here nor there. We must then either have moral
absolutes or else all morality is invalid! What a world that would be! We would
have no reason whatsoever to teach our children that lying, stealing, murder and
The second reason to endorse moral relativism was for the promotion of
moral tolerance and the elimination of ethnocentrism. After all, who are we to
judge another culture? However, what we actually find is that relativism is only
refuting and it destroys, as I have briefly hinted at before, any right to justice for
wrong doings.
To start with, to assume that tolerance is a chief goal of the moral truth
„better‟ than being intolerant. I would not argue with this proposition but I also
states that if you do not agree with the relativistic claims (not his claims of which
morals are true, but his overall claim that morality is relative) then you are wrong,
“excludes your belief from the realm of legitimate options” so it is then exclusive,
(Geisler/Hoffman p 25). And finally since only those thinkers who believe that
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morality is relative will be allowed into the “correct thinking” party, it is also
individual standpoint, I would not be able to rationally justify saying one action is
my children a bedtime story before tucking them in at night. Nazi Germany was
just as right in committing genocide of over six million Jews as I am in feeding the
hungry at the local soup kitchen. After all, who would I be to judge one moral
platform according to my own? This should raise the hair on your back. It is clear
to us, and I would suspect to all moral frameworks, that the slaughter of six
million people, innocent or not, is much more wrong, if not even in the slightest
degree, than loving our children. I‟m sure the officers in charge of the gas
chambers would have much rather been at home with their children than
slaughtering these people in their camps, even if they did approve of their own
evaluate the right and wrong doings of others in our subcultures, super cultures,
belief system what ought we to do with the blatant and blaring contradictions that
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Conversely, would praise still be appropriately given to those who do „right‟ and
promotion for those who do „good‟? Moral relativism is not only self-defeating,
removes praise. It has nothing solid to stand on and no reason, even by its own
precepts, to accept it. C.S. Lewis ends his essay with this thought, and since it is
befitting I will end mine with it as well. He states that even while the relativist
assumes no morals are absolute, they, in their daily life, seek leaders of good
morals, trustworthy friends and faithful wives. Lewis records, “But give me a man
who will do a day‟s work for a day‟s pay, who will refuse bribes, who will not
make up his facts and who has learned to do his job,” (Lewis p112). And I
resonate that. As for the moral relativist, let him try to live his philosophy and see
how quickly, though unwittingly, he falls back into the habits of the absolutist.
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