Epistemology

Epistemology ( i /pstmldi/; from Greek ignate that branch of philosophy which aims to discover
, epistm, meaning 'knowledge', and , the meaning of knowledge, and called it the 'true begin-
logos, meaning 'logical discourse') is the branch of ning' of philosophy. The word is equivalent to the concept
philosophy concerned with the theory of knowledge.[1] Wissenschaftslehre, which was used by German philoso-
phers Johann Fichte and Bernard Bolzano for dierent
Epistemology studies the nature of knowledge, justica-
tion, and the rationality of belief. Much of the debate in projects before it was taken up again by Husserl. French
epistemology centers on four areas: (1) the philosophical philosophers then gave the term pistmologie a narrower
analysis of the nature of knowledge and how it relates to meaning as 'theory of knowledge [thorie de la connais-
such concepts as truth, belief, and justication,[2][3] (2) sance].' E.g., mile Meyerson opened his Identity and
various problems of skepticism, (3) the sources and scope Reality, written in 1908, with the remark that the word 'is
of knowledge and justied belief, and (4) the criteria for becoming current' as equivalent to 'the philosophy of the
knowledge and justication. sciences.'[7]

The term 'Epistemology' was rst used by Scottish

philosopher James Frederick Ferrier in 1854.[lower-alpha 1]
However, according to Brett Warren, King James VI
3 Knowledge
of Scotland had previously personied this philosophical
concept as the character Epistemon in 1591.[5] In mathematics, it is known that 2 + 2 = 4, but there is
also knowing how to add two numbers, and knowing a
person (e.g., oneself), place (e.g., ones hometown), thing
(e.g., cars), or activity (e.g., addition). Some philosophers
1 Epistemon think there is an important distinction between knowing
that, knowing how, and acquaintance-knowledge,
Main article: Daemonologie with epistemology being primarily concerned with the
rst of these.[8]
In a philosophical dialogue, King James VI of Scotland While these distinctions are not explicit in English, they
penned the character Epistemon as the personication of a are dened explicitly in other languages (N.B. some lan-
philosophical concept to debate on arguments of whether guages related to English have been said to retain these
the ancient religious perceptions of witchcraft should be verbs, e.g. Scots: wit and "ken"). In French, Por-
punished in a politically fueled Christian society. The ar- tuguese, Spanish and Dutch to know (a person) is trans-
guments King James poses, through the character Episte- lated using connatre, conhecer,, conocer, and kennen re-
mon, are based on ideas of theological reasoning regard- spectively, whereas to know (how to do something) is
ing societys belief, as his opponent Philomathes takes a translated using savoir, saber, weten. Modern Greek has
philosophical stance on societys legal aspects but seeks to the verbs (gnorzo) and (ksro). Italian
obtain greater knowledge from Epistemon, whose name has the verbs conoscere and sapere and the nouns for
is Greek for scientist. This philosophical approach sig- knowledge are conoscenza and sapienza. German has the
nied a Philomath seeking to obtain greater knowledge verbs wissen and kennen. Wissen implies knowing a fact,
through epistemology with the use of theology. The dia- kennen implies knowing in the sense of being acquainted
logue was used by King James to educate society on var- with and having a working knowledge of; there is also a
ious concepts including the history and etymology of the noun derived from kennen, namely Erkennen, which has
subjects debated.[6] been said to imply knowledge in the form of recognition
or acknowledgment. The verb itself implies a process:
you have to go from one state to another, from a state
2 Etymology of not-erkennen" to a state of true erkennen. This verb
seems to be the most appropriate in terms of describing
The word epistemology is derived from the ancient Greek the episteme in one of the modern European languages,
epistm meaning knowledge and the sux -logy, hence the German name "Erkenntnistheorie. The theo-
meaning a logical "discourse" to (derived from the retical interpretation and signicance of these linguistic
Greek word logos meaning discourse). J.F. Ferrier issues remains controversial.
coined epistemology on the model of 'ontology', to des- In his paper On Denoting and his later book Problems of

1
2 3 KNOWLEDGE
Philosophy Bertrand Russell stressed the distinction be-
tween "knowledge by description" and "knowledge by ac-
quaintance". Gilbert Ryle is also credited with stress-
ing the distinction between knowing how and knowing
that in The Concept of Mind. In Personal Knowledge,
Michael Polanyi argues for the epistemological relevance
of knowledge how and knowledge that; using the exam-
ple of the act of balance involved in riding a bicycle, he
suggests that the theoretical knowledge of the physics in-
volved in maintaining a state of balance cannot substi-
tute for the practical knowledge of how to ride, and that
it is important to understand how both are established
and grounded. This position is essentially Ryles, who
argued that a failure to acknowledge the distinction be-
tween knowledge that and knowledge how leads to innite
regress.
In recent times, epistemologists including (Sosa, Greco,
Kvanvig, Zagzebski) and Duncan Pritchard have argued
that epistemology should evaluate peoples properties
(i.e., intellectual virtues) and not just the properties of
propositions or of propositional mental attitudes.
3.1 Belief
Main article: Belief
In common speech, a statement of belief is typically an 3.4 Gettier problem
expression of faith and/or trust in a person, power or other
entity while it includes such traditional views, episte- Main article: Gettier problem
mology is also concerned with what we believe. This in- Edmund Gettier is best known for a short paper entitled
cludes 'the' truth, and everything else we accept as 'true'
for ourselves from a cognitive point of view.
3.2 Truth
Main article: Truth
Whether someones belief is true is not a prerequisite for
(its) belief. On the other hand, if something is actually
known, then it categorically cannot be false. For example,
if a person believes that a bridge is safe enough to support
him, and attempts to cross it, but the bridge then collapses
under his weight, it could be said that he believed that the
bridge was safe but that his belief was mistaken. It would
not be accurate to say that he knew that the bridge was
safe, because plainly it was not. By contrast, if the bridge
actually supported his weight, then he might say that he
had believed that the bridge was safe, whereas now, after
proving it to himself (by crossing it), he knows it was safe.
Epistemologists argue over whether belief is the proper
truth-bearer. Some would rather describe knowledge as
a system of justied true propositions, and others as a
system of justied true sentences. Plato, in his Gorgias,
argues that belief is the most commonly invoked truth-
bearer.[9]
See also: Criteria of truth
3.3 Justication
In the Theaetetus, Socrates considers a number of theo-
ries as to what knowledge is, the last being that knowl-
edge is true belief with an account (meaning explained
or dened in some way). According to the theory that
knowledge is justied true belief, in order to know that
a given proposition is true, one must not only believe the
relevant true proposition, but one must also have a good
reason for doing so. One implication of this would be that
no one would gain knowledge just by believing something
that happened to be true. For example, an ill person with
no medical training, but with a generally optimistic atti-
tude, might believe that he will recover from his illness
quickly. Nevertheless, even if this belief turned out to be
true, the patient would not have known that he would get
well since his belief lacked justication.
The denition of knowledge as justied true belief was
widely accepted until the 1960s. At this time, a paper
written by the American philosopher Edmund Gettier
provoked major widespread discussion. (See theories of
justication for other views on the idea.)
Propositions
Poorly
justied
true beliefs
Truths Beliefs
Knowledge
Euler diagram representing a denition of knowledge.
'Is Justied True Belief Knowledge?' published in 1963,
which called into question the theory of knowledge that
had been dominant among philosophers for thousands of
years.[10] This in turn called into question the actual value
of philosophy if such an obvious and easy counterexample
to a major theory could exist without anyone noticing it
for thousands of years. In a few pages, Gettier argued that
there are situations in which ones belief may be justied
and true, yet fail to count as knowledge. That is, Gettier
contended that while justied belief in a true proposition
is necessary for that proposition to be known, it is not
3.4 Gettier problem 3

sucient. As in the diagram, a true proposition can be tains that there should be no overriding or defeating truths
believed by an individual (purple region) but still not fall for the reasons that justify ones belief. For example, sup-
within the knowledge category (yellow region). pose that person S believes he saw Tom Grabit steal a
According to Gettier, there are certain circumstances in book from the library and uses this to justify the claim
which one does not have knowledge, even when all of the that Tom Grabit stole a book from the library. A pos-
above conditions are met. Gettier proposed two thought sible defeater or overriding proposition for such a claim
experiments, which have come to be known as Gettier could be a true proposition like, Tom Grabits identical
cases, as counterexamples to the classical account of twin Sam is currently in the same town as Tom. When
no defeaters of ones justication exist, a subject would
knowledge. One of the cases involves two men, Smith
and Jones, who are awaiting the results of their appli- be epistemologically justied.
cations for the same job. Each man has ten coins in The Indian philosopher B. K. Matilal has drawn on the
his pocket. Smith has excellent reasons to believe that Navya-Nyya fallibilism tradition to respond to the Get-
Jones will get the job and, furthermore, knows that Jones tier problem. Nyaya theory distinguishes between know
has ten coins in his pocket (he recently counted them). p and know that one knows p these are dierent events,
From this Smith infers, the man who will get the job has with dierent causal conditions. The second level is a
ten coins in his pocket. However, Smith is unaware that sort of implicit inference that usually follows immedi-
he also has ten coins in his own pocket. Furthermore, ately the episode of knowing p (knowledge simpliciter).
Smith, not Jones, is going to get the job. While Smith The Gettier case is examined by referring to a view of
has strong evidence to believe that Jones will get the job, Gangesha Upadhyaya (late 12th century), who takes any
he is wrong. Smith has a justied true belief that the man true belief to be knowledge; thus a true belief acquired
who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket; however, through a wrong route may just be regarded as knowl-
according to Gettier, Smith does not know that the man edge simpliciter on this view. The question of justica-
who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket, because tion arises only at the second level, when one considers the
Smiths belief is "...true by virtue of the number of coins knowledgehood of the acquired belief. Initially, there is
in Joness pocket, while Smith does not know how many lack of uncertainty, so it becomes a true belief. But at
coins are in Smiths pocket, and bases his belief...on a the very next moment, when the hearer is about to em-
count of the coins in Joness pocket, whom he falsely be- bark upon the venture of knowing whether he knows p,
lieves to be the man who will get the job. (see[10] p. 122.) doubts may arise. If, in some Gettier-like cases, I am
These cases fail to be knowledge because the subjects be- wrong in my inference about the knowledgehood of the
lief is justied, but only happens to be true by virtue of given occurrent belief (for the evidence may be pseudo-
luck. In other words, he made the correct choice (in this evidence), then I am mistaken about the truth of my belief
case predicting an outcome) for the wrong reasons. This and this is in accordance with Nyaya fallibilism: not all
example is similar to those often given when discussing knowledge-claims can be sustained.[12]
belief and truth, wherein a persons belief of what will
happen can coincidentally be correct without his or her
having the actual knowledge to base it on. Reliabilism Main article: Reliabilism

3.4.1 Responses to Gettier Reliabilism has been a signicant line of response to

the Gettier problem among philosophers, originating with
The responses to Gettier have been varied. Usually, they work by Alvin Goldman in the 1960s. According to
have involved substantial attempts to provide a denition reliabilism, a belief is justied (or otherwise supported
of knowledge dierent from the classical one, either by in such a way as to count towards knowledge) only if
recasting knowledge as justied true belief with some ad- it is produced by processes that typically yield a su-
ditional fourth condition, or proposing a completely new ciently high ratio of true to false beliefs. In other words,
set of conditions, disregarding the classical ones entirely. this theory states that a true belief counts as knowledge
only if it is produced by a reliable belief-forming pro-
cess. Examples of reliable processes include: standard
Infallibilism, indefeasibility In one response to Get- perceptual processes, remembering, good reasoning, and
tier, the American philosopher Richard Kirkham has ar- introspection.[13]
gued that the only denition of knowledge that could Reliabilism has been challenged by Gettier cases. An-
ever be immune to all counterexamples is the infallibilist other argument that challenges reliabilism, like the Get-
one.[11] To qualify as an item of knowledge, goes the the- tier cases (although it was not presented in the same short
ory, a belief must not only be true and justied, the jus- article as the Gettier cases), is the case of Henry and the
tication of the belief must necessitate its truth. In other
barn faades. In the thought experiment, a man, Henry,
words, the justication for the belief must be infallible. is driving along and sees a number of buildings that re-
Yet another possible candidate for the fourth condition of semble barns. Based on his perception of one of these, he
knowledge is indefeasibility. Defeasibility theory main- concludes that he has just seen barns. While he has seen
4 3 KNOWLEDGE

one, and the perception he based his belief that the one 3.5 Externalism and internalism
he saw was of a real barn, all the other barn-like buildings
he saw were faades. Theoretically, Henry does not know
that he has seen a barn, despite both his belief that he has Main article: Internalism and externalism
seen one being true and his belief being formed on the
basis of a reliable process (i.e. his vision), since he only
acquired his true belief by accident.[14] A central debate about the nature of justication is a
debate between epistemological externalists on the one
hand, and epistemological internalists on the other.
Other responses Robert Nozick has oered the fol-
Externalists hold that factors deemed external, mean-
lowing denition of knowledge: S knows that P if and
ing outside of the psychological states of those who gain
only if:
knowledge, can be conditions of justication. For exam-
ple, an externalist response to the Gettier problem is to
P;
say that, in order for a justied true belief to count as
S believes that P; knowledge, there must be a link or dependency between
the belief and the state of the external world. Usually
if P were false, S would not believe that P; this is understood to be a causal link. Such causation, to
if P is true, S will believe that P.[15] the extent that it is outside the mind, would count as an
external, knowledge-yielding condition. Internalists, on
Nozick argues that the third of these conditions serves to the other hand, assert that all knowledge-yielding condi-
address cases of the sort described by Gettier. Nozick tions are within the psychological states of those who gain
further claims this condition addresses a case of the sort knowledge.
described by D. M. Armstrong:[16] A father believes his Though unfamiliar with the internalist/externalist debate
daughter innocent of committing a particular crime, both himself, many point to Ren Descartes as an early ex-
because of faith in his baby girl and (now) because he ample of the internalist path to justication. He wrote
has seen presented in the courtroom a conclusive demon- that, because the only method by which we perceive the
stration of his daughters innocence. His belief via the external world is through our senses, and that, because
method of the courtroom satises the four subjunctive the senses are not infallible, we should not consider our
conditions, but his faith-based belief does not. If his concept of knowledge to be infallible. The only way
daughter were guilty, he would still believe her innocent, to nd anything that could be described as indubitably
on the basis of faith in his daughter; this would violate the true, he advocates, would be to see things clearly and
third condition. distinctly.[18] He argued that if there is an omnipotent,
The British philosopher Simon Blackburn has criticized good being who made the world, then its reasonable to
this formulation by suggesting that we do not want to ac- believe that people are made with the ability to know.
cept as knowledge beliefs, which, while they track the However, this does not mean that mans ability to know
truth (as Nozicks account requires), are not held for ap- is perfect. God gave man the ability to know, but not
propriate reasons. He says that we do not want to award omniscience. Descartes said that man must use his ca-
the title of knowing something to someone who is only pacities for knowledge correctly and carefully through
[19]
meeting the conditions through a defect, aw, or fail- methodological doubt. The dictum Cogito ergo sum
ure, compared with someone else who is not meeting the (I think, therefore I am) is also commonly associated with
conditions.[17] In addition to this, externalist accounts of Descartes theory, because in his own methodological
knowledge, such as Nozicks, are often forced to reject doubt, doubting everything he previously knew in order
closure in cases where it is intuitively valid. to start from a blank slate, the rst thing that he could not
logically bring himself to doubt was his own existence: I
Timothy Williamson has advanced a theory of knowl- do not exist would be a contradiction in terms; the act
edge according to which knowledge is not justied true of saying that one does not exist assumes that someone
belief plus some extra condition(s), but primary. In his must be making the statement in the rst place. Though
book Knowledge and its Limits, Williamson argues that Descartes could doubt his senses, his body and the world
the concept of knowledge cannot be broken down into a around him, he could not deny his own existence, be-
set of other concepts through analysisinstead, it is sui cause he was able to doubt and must exist in order to
generis. Thus, though knowledge requires justication, do so. Even if some evil genius were to be deceiving
truth, and belief, the word knowledge can't be, accord- him, he would have to exist in order to be deceived. This
ing to Williamsons theory, accurately regarded as simply one sure point provided him with what he would call his
shorthand for justied true belief. Archimedean point, in order to further develop his foun-
Alvin Goldman writes in his Causal Theory of Knowing dation for knowledge. Simply put, Descartes epistemo-
that in order for knowledge to truly exist there must be logical justication depended upon his indubitable belief
a causal chain between the proposition and the belief of in his own existence and his clear and distinct knowledge
that proposition. of God.[20]
 5

3.6 Value problem edge should resist counterexamples and allow an expla-
nation of the value of knowledge over mere true belief.
We generally assume that knowledge is more valuable Should a theory [26]
of knowledge fail to do so, it would prove
than mere true belief. If so, what is the explanation? A inadequate.
formulation of the value problem in epistemology rst oc- One of the more inuential responses to the problem is
curs in Plato's Meno. Socrates points out to Meno that a that knowledge is not particularly valuable and is not what
man who knew the way to Larissa could lead others there ought to be the main focus of epistemology. Instead, epis-
correctly. But so, too, could a man who had true beliefs temologists ought to focus on other mental states, such as
about how to get there, even if he had not gone there or understanding.[27] Advocates of virtue epistemology have
had any knowledge of Larissa. Socrates says that it seems argued that the value of knowledge comes from an inter-
that both knowledge and true opinion can guide action. nal relationship between the knower and the mental state
Meno then wonders why knowledge is valued more than of believing.[22]
true belief, and why knowledge and true belief are dier-
ent. Socrates responds that knowledge is more valuable
than mere true belief because it is tethered, or justied.
Justication, or working out the reason for a true belief,
4 Acquiring knowledge
locks down true belief.[21]
The problem is to identify what (if anything) makes
4.1 A priori and a posteriori knowledge
knowledge more valuable than mere true belief, or that
Main article: A priori and a posteriori
makes knowledge more valuable than a more mini-
mal conjunction of its components, such as justica-
tion, safety, sensitivity, statistical likelihood, and anti- The nature of this distinction has been disputed by various
Gettier conditions, on a particular analysis of knowl- philosophers; however, the terms may be roughly dened
edge that conceives of knowledge as divided into com- as follows:
ponents (to which knowledge-rst epistemological the-
ories, which posit knowledge as fundamental, are no- A priori knowledge is knowledge that is known inde-
table exceptions).[22] The value problem reemerged in the pendently of experience (that is, it is non-empirical,
philosophical literature on epistemology in the twenty- or arrived at beforehand, usually by reason). It will
rst century following the rise of virtue epistemology in henceforth be acquired through anything that is in-
the 1980s, partly because of the obvious link to the con- dependent from experience.
cept of value in ethics.[23]
The value problem has been presented as an argument A posteriori knowledge is knowledge that is known
against epistemic reliabilism by philosophers including by experience (that is, it is empirical, or arrived at
Linda Zagzebski, Wayne Riggs and Richard Swinburne. afterward).
Zagzebski analogizes the value of knowledge to the value
of espresso produced by an espresso maker: The liquid A priori knowledge is a way of gaining knowledge with-
in this cup is not improved by the fact that it comes from out the need of experience. In Bruce Russells article A
a reliable espresso maker. If the espresso tastes good, Priori Justication and Knowledge[28] he says that it is
it makes no dierence if it comes from an unreliable knowledge based on a priori justication, (1) which re-
machine.[24] For Zagzebski, the value of knowledge de- lies on intuition and the nature of these intuitions. A pri-
ates to the value of mere true belief. She assumes that ori knowledge is often contrasted with posteriori knowl-
reliability in itself has no value or disvalue, but Goldman edge, which is knowledge gained by experience. A way
and Olsson disagree. They point out that Zagzebskis con- to look at the dierence between the two is through an
clusion rests on the assumption of veritism: all that mat- example. Bruce Russell gives two propositions in which
ters is the acquisition of true belief.[25] To the contrary, the reader decides which one he believes more. Option
they argue that a reliable process for acquiring a true be- A: All crows are birds. Option B: All crows are black. If
lief adds value to the mere true belief by making it more you believe option A, then you are a priori justied in be-
likely that future beliefs of a similar kind will be true. By lieving it because you don't have to see a crow to know its
analogy, having a reliable espresso maker that produced a bird. If you believe in option B, then you are posteriori
a good cup of espresso would be more valuable than hav- justied to believe it because you have seen many crows
ing an unreliable one that luckily produced a good cup therefore knowing they are black. He goes on to say that
because the reliable one would more likely produce good it doesn't matter if the statement is true or not, only that
future cups compared to the unreliable one. if you believe in one or the other that matters.
The value problem is important to assessing the ade- The idea of a priori knowledge is that it is based on in-
quacy of theories of knowledge that conceive of knowl- tuition or rational insights. Laurence BonJour says in his
edge as consisting of true belief and other components. article The Structure of Empirical Knowledge,[29] that
According to Kvanvig, an adequate account of knowl- a rational insight is an immediate, non-inferential grasp,
6 4 ACQUIRING KNOWLEDGE

apprehension or 'seeing' that some proposition is neces- 4.3.2 Empiricism

sarily true. (3) Going back to the crow example, by Lau-
rence BonJours denition the reason you would believe In philosophy, empiricism is generally a theory of knowl-
in option A is because you have an immediate knowledge edge focusing on the role of experience, especially ex-
that a crow is a bird, without ever experiencing one. perience based on perceptual observations by the senses.
Evolutionary psychology takes a novel approach to the Certain forms treat all knowledge as empirical, while
problem. It says that there is an innate predisposition for some regard disciplines such as mathematics and logic as
certain types of learning. Only small parts of the brain exceptions.
resemble a tabula rasa; this is true even for human beings. There are many variants of empiricism, positivism,
The remainder is more like an exposed negative waiting realism and common sense being among the most com-
to be dipped into a developer uid[30] monly expounded. But central to all empiricist episte-
mologies is the notion of the epistemologically privileged
status of sense data.

4.2 Analyticsynthetic distinction 4.3.3 Idealism

Main article: Analyticsynthetic distinction Many idealists believe that knowledge is primarily (at
least in some areas) acquired by a priori processes or is
innatefor example, in the form of concepts not derived
Immanuel Kant, in his Critique of Pure Reason, drew
from experience. The relevant theoretical processes of-
a distinction between analytic and synthetic propo-
ten go by the name "intuition".[33] The relevant theoretical
sitions. He contended that some propositions are such
concepts may purportedly be part of the structure of the
that we can know them to be true just by understand-
human mind (as in Kant's theory of transcendental ide-
ing their meaning. For example, consider, My fathers
alism), or they may be said to exist independently of the
brother is my uncle. We can know it to be true solely by
mind (as in Platos theory of Forms).
virtue of our understanding what its terms mean. Philoso-
phers call such propositions analytic. Synthetic proposi-
tions, on the other hand, have distinct subjects and pred- 4.3.4 Rationalism
icates. An example would be, My fathers brother has
black hair. Kant stated that all mathematical and scien-
Main article: Rationalism
tic statements are synthetic a priori propositions because
they are necessarily true but our knowledge about the at-
tributes of the mathematical or physical subjects we canBy contrast with empiricism and idealism, which centres
only get by logical inference. around the epistemologically privileged status of sense
data (empirical) and the primacy of Reason (theoretical)
The American philosopher W. V. O. Quine, in his Two
respectively, modern rationalism adds a third 'system of
Dogmas of Empiricism, famously challenged the distinc-
thinking', (as Gaston Bachelard has termed these areas)
tion, arguing that the two have a blurry boundary. Some
and holds that all three are of equal importance: The em-
contemporary philosophers have oered more sustain-
[31] pirical, the theoretical and the abstract. For Bachelard,
able accounts of the distinction.
rationalism makes equal reference to all three systems of
thinking.

4.3 Branches or schools of thought 4.3.5 Constructivism

Constructivism is a view in philosophy according to

4.3.1 Historical
The historical study of philosophical epistemology is the
historical study of eorts to gain philosophical under-
standing or knowledge of the nature and scope of human
knowledge.[32] Since eorts to get that kind of under-
standing have a history, the questions philosophical epis-
temology asks today about human knowledge are not nec-
essarily the same as they once were.[32] But that does not
mean that philosophical epistemology is itself a historical
subject, or that it pursues only or even primarily historical
understanding.[32]
which all knowledge is a compilation of human-made
constructions,[34] not the neutral discovery of an objec-
tive truth.[35] Whereas objectivism is concerned with the
object of our knowledge, constructivism emphasises
how we construct knowledge.[36] Constructivism pro-
poses new denitions for knowledge and truth that form
a new paradigm, based on inter-subjectivity instead of the
classical objectivity, and on viability instead of truth. Pi-
agetian constructivism, however, believes in objectivity
constructs can be validated through experimentation. The
constructivist point of view is pragmatic;[37] as Vico said:
The norm of the truth is to have made it.
 7

4.4 Regress problem The chief criticism of foundationalism is that if a belief

is not supported by other beliefs, accepting it may be ar-
Main article: Regress argument bitrary or unjustied.[39]

The regress problem is the problem of providing a com-

Coherentism Another response to the regress problem
plete logical foundation for human knowledge. The tra-
is coherentism, which is the rejection of the assump-
ditional way of supporting a rational argument is to ap-
tion that the regress proceeds according to a pattern of
peal to other rational arguments, typically using chains
linear justication. To avoid the charge of circularity,
of reason and rules of logic. A classic example that goes
coherentists hold that an individual belief is justied cir-
back to Aristotle is deducing that Socrates is mortal. We
cularly by the way it ts together (coheres) with the rest
have a logical rule that says All humans are mortal and
of the belief system of which it is a part. This theory
an assertion that Socrates is human and we deduce that
has the advantage of avoiding the innite regress without
Socrates is mortal. In this example how do we know that
claiming special, possibly arbitrary status for some partic-
Socrates is human? Presumably we apply other rules such
ular class of beliefs. Yet, since a system can be coherent
as: All born from human females are human. Which then
while also being wrong, coherentists face the diculty
leaves open the question how do we know that all born
of ensuring that the whole system corresponds to reality.
from humans are human? This is the regress problem:
Additionally, most logicians agree that any argument that
how can we eventually terminate a logical argument with
is circular is trivially valid. That is, to be illuminating, ar-
some statement(s) that do not require further justication
guments must be linear with conclusions that follow from
but can still be considered rational and justied?
stated premises.
As John Pollock stated:
However, Warburton writes in 'Thinking from A to Z,'
Circular arguments are not invalid; in other words, from
... to justify a belief one must appeal to a a logical point of view there is nothing intrinsically wrong
further justied belief. This means that one of with them. However, they are, when viciously circular,
two things can be the case. Either there are spectacularly uninformative. (Warburton 1996).
some beliefs that we can be justied for hold-
ing, without being able to justify them on the
basis of any other belief, or else for each justi- Foundherentism A position known as
ed belief there is an innite regress of (poten- "foundherentism", advanced by Susan Haack, is
tial) justication [the nebula theory]. On this meant to be a unication of foundationalism and co-
theory there is no rock bottom of justication. herentism. One component of this theory is what is
Justication just meanders in and out through called the analogy of the crossword puzzle. Whereas,
our network of beliefs, stopping nowhere.[38] for example, innitists regard the regress of reasons as
shaped like a single line, Susan Haack has argued that
it is more like a crossword puzzle, with multiple lines
The apparent impossibility of completing an innite
mutually supporting each other.[40]
chain of reasoning is thought by some to support
skepticism. It is also the impetus for Descartes famous
dictum: I think therefore I am. Descartes was looking for
Innitism An alternative resolution to the regress
some logical statement that could be true without appeal
problem is known as "innitism". Innitists take the in-
to other statements.
nite series to be merely potential, in the sense that an
individual may have indenitely many reasons available
4.4.1 Response to the regress problem to them, without having consciously thought through all
of these reasons when the need arises. This position is
Many epistemologists studying justication have at- motivated in part by the desire to avoid what is seen as
tempted to argue for various types of chains of reasoning the arbitrariness and circularity of its chief competitors,
that can escape the regress problem. foundationalism and coherentism.

Foundationalism Foundationalists respond to the 5 Indian pramana

regress problem by asserting that certain foundations
or basic beliefs support other beliefs but do not them-
selves require justication from other beliefs. These Main article: Pramana
beliefs might be justied because they are self-evident,
infallible, or derive from reliable cognitive mechanisms. Indian philosophical schools such as the Hindu Nyaya,
Perception, memory, and a priori intuition are often and Carvaka, and later, the Jain and Buddhist philo-
considered to be possible examples of basic beliefs. sophical schools, developed an epistemological tradition
8 7 SEE ALSO

which is termed pramana independently of the West- dhist Madhyamika school has been seen as taking up a
ern philosophical tradition. Pramana can be translated as form of skepticism. Descartes' most famous inquiry into
instrument of knowledge and refers to various means mind and body also began as an exercise in skepticism.
or sources of knowledge which were held to be reliable Descartes began by questioning the validity of all knowl-
by Indian philosophers. Each school of Indian philoso- edge and looking for some fact that was irrefutable. In so
phy had their own theories about which pramanas were doing, he came to his famous dictum: I think therefore I
valid means to knowledge and which was unreliable (and am.
why).[41] In the Indian traditions, the most widely dis- Foundationalism and the other responses to the regress
cussed pramanas are: Pratyaka (perception), Anuma
problem are essentially defenses against skepticism. Sim-
(inference), Upama (comparison and analogy), Arth- ilarly, the pragmatism of William James can be viewed
patti (postulation, derivation from circumstances), Anu-
as a coherentist defense against skepticism. James dis-
palabdi (non-perception, negative/cognitive proof) and carded conventional philosophical views of truth and de-
abda (word, testimony of past or present reliable ex-
ned truth to be based on how well a concept works in
perts). While the Nyaya school (beginning with the a specic context rather than objective rational criteria.
Nyya Stras of Gotama, 2nd century CE) were a propo-
The philosophy of Logical Positivism and the work of
nent of realism and supported four pramanas (perception, philosophers such as Kuhn and Popper can be viewed as
inference, comparison/analogy and testimony), the Bud- skepticism applied to what can truly be considered scien-
dhist epistemologists (Dignaga and Dharmakirti) gener- tic knowledge.[50]
ally accepted only perception and inference.
The theory of knowledge of the Buddha in the early
Buddhist texts has been interpreted as a form of prag-
matism as well as a form of correspondence theory.[42]
7 See also
Likewise, the Buddhist philosopher Dharmakirti has
been interpreted both as holding a form of pragma- For a topical guide to this subject, see Outline of
tism or correspondence theory for his view that what epistemology.
is true is what has eective power (arthakriya).[43][44]
The Buddhist Madhyamika schools theory of emptiness
(shunyata) meanwhile has been interpreted as a form of Epistemological rupture
philosophical skepticism.[45]
Epistemic democracy
The main Jain contribution to epistemology has
been their theory of many sided-ness or multi- Feminist epistemology
perspectivism (Anekantavada) which says that since the
world is multifaceted, any single viewpoint is limited Gdels incompleteness theorems
(naya a partial standpoint).[46] This has been inter-
preted as a kind of pluralism or perspectivism.[47][48] Gnosiology
According to Jain epistemology, none of the pramanas
gives absolute or perfect knowledge since they are each Methodology
limited points of view.
Methods of obtaining knowledge
The Carvaka school of materialists only accepted the
pramana of perception and hence were one of the Monopolies of knowledge
rst empiricists.[49] There was also another school of
philosophical skepticism, the Ajana. Nology

Participatory epistemology
6 Skepticism Philosophy of space and time

Main article: Philosophical skepticism Reformed epistemology

Scientic method
Skepticism is a position that questions the validity of
some or all of human knowledge. Skepticism does not Self-evidence
refer to any one specic school of philosophy, rather it is
a thread that runs through many philosophical discussions Semiotics
of epistemology. The rst well known Greek sceptic was
Socrates who claimed that his only knowledge was that Sociology of knowledge
he knew nothing with certainty. In Indian philosophy,
Sanjaya Belatthiputta was a famous skeptic and the Bud- Uncertainty principle

8 Notes
[1] J. F. Ferrier (1854) Institutes of Metaphysic: The Theory
of Knowing and Being, p. 46.[4]
9 References
[1] Porter, Noah, ed. (1913). Epistemology. Websters Re-
vised Unabridged Dictionary. G & C. Merriam Co. p.
501. Archived from the original on 15 October 2013. Re-
trieved 29 January 2014. E*pis`te*mol"o*gy (?), n. [Gr.
knowledge + -logy.] The theory or science of the method
or grounds of knowledge.
[2] Steup, Matthias. Zalta, Edward N., ed. Epistemology.
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2014 ed.).
[3] Borchert, Donald M., ed. (1967). Epistemology.
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[4] Encyclopdia Britannica Online, 2007
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[7] Suchting, Wal. Epistemology. Historical Materialism.
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[9] Gorgias. Project Gutenberg. 5 October 2008. Retrieved
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[10] Gettier, Edmund (1963). Is Justied True Belief Knowl-
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JSTOR 3326922.
[11] Richard L. Kirkham (1984). Does the Gettier Problem
Rest on a Mistake?" (PDF). Mind. 93 (372): 501513.
doi:10.1093/mind/XCIII.372.501.
[12] Bimal Krishna Matilal (1986). Perception: An essay on
Classical Indian Theories of Knowledge. Oxford India
2002. ISBN 0-19-824625-0. The Gettier problem is dealt
with in Chapter 4, Knowledge as a mental episode. The
thread continues in the next chapter Knowing that one
knows. It is also discussed in Matilals Word and the World
p. 71-72.
[13] Goldman, Alvin I. (1979). Reliabilism: What Is Justi-
ed Belief?". In Pappas, G. S. (ed.). Justication and
Knowledge. Dordrecht, Holland: Reidel. p. 11. ISBN
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[14] Goldman, Alan H. (December 1976). Appearing as Irre-
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[15] Robert Nozick (1981). Philosophical Explanations.
Harvard University Press. ISBN 0-674-66448-
5.Philosophical Explanations Chapter 3 Knowledge and
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[16] D. M. Armstrong (1973). Belief, Truth and Knowledge.
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[18] Descartes, Rene (1985). The Philosophical Writings of
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[19] Descartes, Rene (1985). Philosophical Writings of Rene
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[20] Descartes, Rene (1985). The Philosophical Writings of
Rene Descartes. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-
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[21] Plato (2002). Five Dialogues. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett
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[23] Pritchard, Duncan (April 2007). Recent Work on Epis-
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[24] Zagzebski, Linda. The Search for the Source of Epis-
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[26] Kvanvig, Jonathan (2003). The Value of Knowledge and
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0521037860.
[27] Kvanvig, Jonathan (2003). The Value of Knowledge and
the Pursuit of Understanding. Cambridge, UK; New York:
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[28] Russell, Bruce, A Priori Justication and Knowledge,
The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2014
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stanford.edu/archives/sum2014/entries/apriori/>.
[29] BonJour, Laurence, 1985, The Structure of Empirical
Knowledge, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
[30] Wilson, E. O., Sociobiology: The New Synthesis. Cam-
bridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard
University Press. 1975
[31] Russell, G.: Truth in Virtue of Meaning: A Defence of
the Analytic/Synthetic Distinction. Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press. 2008
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[32] Stroud, Barry (2011). The History of Epistemology.
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9337-4.
[33] Markie, Peter. Rationalism vs. Empiricism. The Stan-
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Retrieved 17 July 2012.
[34] Raskin, J. D. (2002). Constructivism in psychology: Per-
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[37] For an example, see Weber, Eric Thomas. 2010. Rawls,
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[38] John L. Pollock (1975). Knowledge and Justication.
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0-691-07203-5. p. 26.
[39] Foundational Theories of Epistemic Justication.
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
[40] Haack, Susan (1993). Evidence and Inquiry: Towards Re-
construction in Epistemology. Wiley-Blackwell. ISBN 0-
631-19679-X.
[41] James Lochtefeld, Pramana in The Illustrated Encyclo-
pedia of Hinduism, Vol. 2: N-Z, Rosen Publishing. ISBN
0-8239-2287-1, pages 520521
[42] Jayatilleke, K. N.; Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge,
p. 356
[43] Cabezn, Jos I., 2000, Truth in Buddhist Theology, in
R. Jackson and J. Makransky, (eds.), Buddhist Theology,
Critical Reections by Contemporary Buddhist Scholars.
London: Curzon, 136154.
[44] Tom Tillemans (2011), Dharmakirti, Stanford Encyclo-
pedia of Philosophy
[45] Arnold, Dan; Buddhists, Brahmins, and Belief: Episte-
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[46] Grin, David Ray (2005) p. 145
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[48] D. Long, Jeery; Jainism: An Introduction 125.
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12 11 EXTERNAL LINKS

Contextualism in Epistemology. Internet Encyclo-
pedia of Philosophy.
Epistemic Circularity. Internet Encyclopedia of
Philosophy.
Epistemic Justication. Internet Encyclopedia of
Philosophy.
The London Philosophy Study Guide oers many
suggestions on what to read, depending on the stu-
dents familiarity with the subject: Epistemology &
Methodology
Epistemology at PhilPapers
Knowledge-How at Philpapers

Epistemology of Perception. Internet Encyclope- Epistemology at the Indiana Philosophy Ontology

dia of Philosophy.
Ethnoepistemology. Internet Encyclopedia of Phi-
losophy.
Evolutionary Epistemology. Internet Encyclope-
dia of Philosophy.
Fallibilism. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Feminist Epistemology. Internet Encyclopedia of
Philosophy.
Innitism in Epistemology. Internet Encyclopedia
of Philosophy.
Internalism and Externalism in Epistemology.
Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Moral Epistemology. Internet Encyclopedia of
Philosophy.
Project
What Is Epistemology? a brief introduction to the
topic by Keith DeRose.
Justied True Belief and Critical Rationalism by
Mathew Toll
Epistemology Introduction, Part 1 and Part 2 by Paul
Newall at the Galilean Library.
Teaching Theory of Knowledge (1986) Marjorie
Clay (ed.), an electronic publication from The
Council for Philosophical Studies.
An Introduction to Epistemology by Paul Newall,
aimed at beginners.
A short lm about epistemology, for beginners on
YouTube

Naturalistic Epistemology. Internet Encyclopedia

of Philosophy.

Moral Epistemology. Internet Encyclopedia of

Philosophy.

Virtue Epistemology. Internet Encyclopedia of

Philosophy.

Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy articles

Epistemology by Matthias Steup.

Bayesian Epistemology by William Talbott.

Evolutionary Epistemology by Michael Bradie &

William Harms.

Feminist Epistemology and Philosophy of Science

by Elizabeth Anderson.

Naturalized Epistemology by Richard Feldman.

Social Epistemology by Alvin Goldman.

Virtue Epistemology by John Greco.

Knowledge How by Jeremy Fantl.

Other links
 13

12 Text and image sources, contributors, and licenses

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Carbonaro, Joewski, Katalaveno, Zanarh, Icheesehead, Mikael Hggstrm, Lbeaumont, Tparameter, The Transhumanist (AWB), Jeremy-
dyoung, Aphilosopher, EnglishGoethe, Kansas Bear, LeighvsOptimvsMaximvs, Heyitspeter, Bhepburn, Nincubus99x, Dhaluza, JoshRee-
ves2, Treisijs, Inwind, Squids and Chips, Glossologist, Barnham, TreasuryTag, Macedonian, Joe cono, Gepstein, TXiKiBoT, Max Werner,
Steve Newport, Bruce I. Kodish, Abdullais4u, Actipolak, Cuddlyable3, MaveenOlam, Davwillev, JonathanDLehman, Syncrosh, Moe h43,
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Symane, Editator, Newbyguesses, SieBot, Ivan tambuk, Smobri, Tiddly Tom, Malcolmxl5, Winchelsea, Arpose, Viskonsas, Jrk500,
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Clepock, R00m c, Explicit, JustinBlank, Granite07, EPadmirateur, Martarius, Peterlum, ClueBot, Thedosmann, SummerWithMorons,
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tist, Knop92, Citation bot, Groundling, Quebec99, Xqbot, Tasudrty, GaroGarabedyan, Zr6374, Spotxer, Yiba, Omnipaedista, F W Ni-
etzsche, Aaron Kauppi, Walter.sena, QFlux, BoomerAB, Chjoaygame, Hugetim, Nagualdesign, Robynthehode, FrescoBot, Sebastic21,
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14 12 TEXT AND IMAGE SOURCES, CONTRIBUTORS, AND LICENSES

dertakhellambam, James Disambiguation-Smith, Prof. Squirrel, Cyberbot II, JYBot, Platopete, Lawyerrick, Dexbot, Fionalyn, Inayity,
Cerabot~enwiki, Proper Stranger, Frosty, Corinne, Me, Myself, and I are Here, Gabby Merger, Epicgenius, Gladtobeherenow, CsDix,
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