PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS ARTICLE 8 On October 21, 1993, after being married for more than 18 years
ctober 21, 1993, after being married for more than 18 years to petitioner
G.R. No. 166562 March 31, 2009
BENJAMIN G. TING, Petitioner
vs
CARMEN M. VELEZ-TING, Respondent
Ynares-Santiago, J.,Chairperson,
Carpio Morales,* Chico-Nazario, Nachura, and Peralta, JJ.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to set aside the
November 17, 2003 Amended Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA), and its
December 13, 2004 Resolution[2] in CA-G.R. CV No. 59903. The appellate court, in
its assailed decision and resolution, affirmed the January 9, 1998 Decision [3] of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 23, Cebu City, declaring the marriage between
petitioner and respondent null and void ab initio pursuant to Article 36 of the Family
Code.[4]
The facts follows.
Petitioner Benjamin Ting (Benjamin) and respondent Carmen Velez-Ting
(Carmen) first met in 1972 while they were classmates in medical school. [5] They fell
in love, and they were wed on July 26, 1975 in Cebu City when respondent was already
pregnant with their first child.
At first, they resided at Benjamins family home in
Maguikay, Mandaue City.[6] When their second child was born, the couple decided to
move to Carmens family home in Cebu City.[7] In September 1975, Benjamin passed
the medical board examinations [8] and thereafter proceeded to take a residency
program to become a surgeon but shifted to anesthesiology after two years. By 1979,
Benjamin completed the preceptorship program for the said field [9] and, in 1980, he
began working for Velez Hospital, owned by Carmens family, as member of its active
staff,[10] while Carmen worked as the hospitals Treasurer.[11]
The couple begot six (6) children, namely Dennis, born on December 9, 1975;
James Louis, born on August 25, 1977; Agnes Irene, born on April 5, 1981; Charles
Laurence, born on July 21, 1986; Myles Vincent, born on July 19, 1988; and Marie
Corinne, born on June 16, 1991.[12]
and while their youngest child was only two years old, Carmen filed a verified petition
before the RTC of Cebu City praying for the declaration of nullity of their marriage
based on Article 36 of the Family Code. She claimed that Benjamin suffered from
psychological incapacity even at the time of the celebration of their marriage, which,
however, only became manifest thereafter. [13]
In her complaint, Carmen stated that prior to their marriage, she was already
aware that Benjamin used to drink and gamble occasionally with his friends. [14] But
after they were married, petitioner continued to drink regularly and would go home at
about midnight or sometimes in the wee hours of the morning drunk and violent. He
would confront and insult respondent, physically assault her and force her to have sex
with him. There were also instances when Benjamin used his gun and shot the gate of
their house.[15]Because of his drinking habit, Benjamins job as anesthesiologist was
affected to the point that he often had to refuse to answer the call of his fellow doctors
and to pass the task to other anesthesiologists. Some surgeons even stopped calling
him for his services because they perceived petitioner to be unreliable. Respondent
tried to talk to her husband about the latters drinking problem, but Benjamin refused
to acknowledge the same.[16]
Carmen also complained that petitioner deliberately refused to give financial
support to their family and would even get angry at her whenever she asked for money
for their children. Instead of providing support, Benjamin would spend his money on
drinking and gambling and would even buy expensive equipment for his hobby.[17] He
rarely stayed home[18] and even neglected his obligation to his children.[19]
Aside from this, Benjamin also engaged in compulsive gambling. [20] He
would gamble two or three times a week and would borrow from his friends, brothers,
or from loan sharks whenever he had no money. Sometimes, Benjamin would pawn
his wifes own jewelry to finance his gambling.[21] There was also an instance when the
spouses had to sell their family car and even a portion of the lot Benjamin inherited
from his father just to be able to pay off his gambling debts.[22] Benjamin only stopped
going to the casinos in 1986 after he was banned therefrom for having caused trouble,
an act which he said he purposely committed so that he would be banned from the
gambling establishments.[23]
In sum, Carmens allegations of Benjamins psychological incapacity consisted of the
following manifestations:
1. Benjamins alcoholism, which adversely affected his family
relationship and his profession;
2. Benjamins violent nature brought about by his excessive and regular
drinking;
3. His compulsive gambling habit, as a result of which Benjamin found
it necessary to sell the family car twice and the property he inherited
from his father in order to pay off his debts, because he no longer had
money to pay the same; and
 4. Benjamins irresponsibility and immaturity as shown by his failure and
refusal to give regular financial support to his family.[24]
In his answer, Benjamin denied being psychologically incapacitated. He
maintained that he is a respectable person, as his peers would confirm. He said that he
is an active member of social and athletic clubs and would drink and gamble only for
social reasons and for leisure. He also denied being a violent person, except when
provoked by circumstances.[25] As for his alleged failure to support his family
financially, Benjamin claimed that it was Carmen herself who would collect his
professional fees from VelezHospital when he was still serving there as practicing
anesthesiologist.[26] In his testimony, Benjamin also insisted that he gave his family
financial support within his means whenever he could and would only get angry at
respondent for lavishly spending his hard-earned money on unnecessary things.[27] He
also pointed out that it was he who often comforted and took care of their children,
while Carmen played mahjong with her friends twice a week.[28]
During the trial, Carmens testimony regarding Benjamins drinking and
gambling habits and violent behavior was corroborated by Susana Wasawas, who
served as nanny to the spouses children from 1987 to 1992.[29] Wasawas stated that
she personally witnessed instances when Benjamin maltreated Carmen even in front
of their children.[30]
Carmen also presented as witness Dr. Pureza Trinidad-Oate, a
psychiatrist.[31] Instead of the usual personal interview, however, Dr. Oates evaluation
of Benjamin was limited to the transcript of stenographic notes taken during
Benjamins deposition because the latter had already gone to work as an
anesthesiologist in a hospital in South Africa. After reading the transcript of
stenographic notes, Dr. Oate concluded that Benjamins compulsive drinking,
compulsive gambling and physical abuse of respondent are clear indications that
petitioner suffers from a personality disorder.[32]
To refute Dr. Oates opinion, petitioner presented Dr. Renato D. Obra, a
psychiatrist and a consultant at the Department of Psychiatry
in Don Vicente Sotto MemorialMedical Center, as his expert witness.[33] Dr. Obra
evaluated Benjamins psychological behavior based on the transcript of stenographic
notes, as well as the psychiatric evaluation report prepared by Dr. A.J.L. Pentz, a
psychiatrist from the University of Pretoria in South Africa, and his (Dr. Obras)
interview with Benjamins brothers.[34]Contrary to Dr. Oates findings, Dr. Obra
observed that there is nothing wrong with petitioners personality, considering the
latters good relationship with his fellow doctors and his good track record as
anesthesiologist.[35]
On January 9, 1998, the lower court rendered its Decision [36] declaring the
marriage between petitioner and respondent null and void. The RTC gave credence to
Dr. Oates findings and the admissions made by Benjamin in the course of his
deposition, and found him to be psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential obligations of marriage. Specifically, the trial court found Benjamin an
excessive drinker, a compulsive gambler, someone who prefers his extra-curricular
activities to his family, and a person with violent tendencies, which character traits
find root in a personality defect existing even before his marriage to Carmen. The
decretal portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, judgment is
hereby rendered declaring the marriage between plaintiff and
defendant null and void ab initio pursuant to Art. 36 of the Family
Code. x x x
xxxx
SO ORDERED.[37]
Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to the CA. On October 19, 2000, the CA rendered a
Decision[38] reversing the trial courts ruling. It faulted the trial courts finding, stating
that no proof was adduced to support the conclusion that Benjamin was
psychologically incapacitated at the time he married Carmen since Dr. Oates
conclusion was based only on theories and not on established fact, [39] contrary to the
guidelines set forth in Santos v. Court of Appeals[40] and in Rep. of the Phils. v. Court
of Appeals and Molina.[41]
Because of this, Carmen filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing that
the Molina guidelines should not be applied to this case since the Molina decision was
promulgated only on February 13, 1997, or more than five years after she had filed her
petition with the RTC.[42] She claimed that the Molina ruling could not be made to
apply retroactively, as it would run counter to the principle of stare decisis. Initially,
the CA denied the motion for reconsideration for having been filed beyond the
prescribed period. Respondent thereafter filed a manifestation explaining compliance
with the prescriptive period but the same was likewise denied for lack of merit.
Undaunted, respondent filed a petition for certiorari[43] with this Court. In a
Resolution[44] dated March 5, 2003, this Court granted the petition and directed the CA
to resolve Carmens motion for reconsideration.[45] On review, the CA decided to
reconsider its previous ruling. Thus, on November 17, 2003, it issued an Amended
Decision[46] reversing its first ruling and sustaining the trial courts decision. [47]
A motion for reconsideration was filed, this time by Benjamin, but the same was
denied by the CA in its December 13, 2004 Resolution. [48]
Hence, this petition.
For our resolution are the following issues:
 I. Whether the CA violated the rule on stare decisis when
it refused to follow the guidelines set forth under
the Santos and Molina cases;
II. Whether the CA correctly ruled that the requirement of
proof of psychological incapacity for the declaration of
absolute nullity of marriage based on Article 36 of the
Family Code has been liberalized; and
III. Whether the CAs decision declaring the marriage between
petitioner and respondent null and void [is] in accordance
with law and jurisprudence.
We find merit in the petition.
I. On the issue of stare decisis.
The principle of stare decisis enjoins adherence by lower courts to doctrinal
rules established by this Court in its final decisions. It is based on the principle that
once a question of law has been examined and decided, it should be deemed settled
and closed to further argument.[49] Basically, it is a bar to any attempt to relitigate the
same issues,[50] necessary for two simple reasons: economy and stability. In our
jurisdiction, the principle is entrenched in Article 8 of the Civil Code. [51]
This doctrine of adherence to precedents or stare decisis was applied by the
English courts and was later adopted by the United States. Associate Justice (now
Chief Justice) Reynato S. Punos discussion on the historical development of this legal
principle in his dissenting opinion in Lambino v. Commission on Elections[52] is
enlightening:
The latin phrase stare decisis et non quieta movere means
stand by the thing and do not disturb the calm. The doctrine started
with the English Courts. Blackstone observed that at the beginning
of the 18th century, it is an established rule to abide by former
precedents where the same points come again in litigation. As the
rule evolved, early limits to its application were recognized: (1) it
would not be followed if it were plainly unreasonable; (2) where
courts of equal authority developed conflicting decisions; and, (3)
the binding force of the decision was the actual principle or
principles necessary for the decision; not the words or reasoning
used to reach the decision.
The doctrine migrated to the United States. It was
recognized by the framers of the U.S. Constitution. According
to Hamilton, strict rules and precedents are necessary to prevent
arbitrary discretion in the courts. Madison agreed but stressed that x
x x once the precedent ventures into the realm of altering or
repealing the law, it should be rejected. Prof. Consovoy well noted
that Hamilton and Madison disagree about the countervailing policy
considerations that would allow a judge to abandon a precedent. He
added that their ideas reveal a deep internal conflict between the
concreteness required by the rule of law and the flexibility
demanded in error correction. It is this internal conflict that the
Supreme Court has attempted to deal with for over two centuries.
Indeed, two centuries of American case law will confirm
Prof. Consovoy's observation although stare decisis developed its
own life in the United States. Two strains of stare decisishave been
isolated by legal scholars. The first, known as vertical stare
decisis deals with the duty of lower courts to apply the decisions of
the higher courts to cases involving the same facts. The second,
known as horizontal stare decisis requires that high courts must
follow its own precedents. Prof. Consovoy correctly observes that
vertical stare decisis has been viewed as an obligation, while
horizontal stare decisis, has been viewed as a policy, imposing
choice but not a command. Indeed, stare decisis is not one of the
precepts set in stone in our Constitution.
It is also instructive to distinguish the two kinds of
horizontal stare decisis constitutional stare decisis and
statutory stare decisis. Constitutional stare decisis involves
judicial interpretations of the Constitution while statutory stare
decisis involves interpretations of statutes. The distinction is
important for courts enjoy more flexibility in refusing to apply stare
decisisin constitutional litigations. Justice Brandeis' view on the
binding effect of the doctrine in constitutional litigations still holds
sway today. In soothing prose, Brandeis stated: Stare decisis is not .
. . a universal and inexorable command. The rule of stare decisis is
not inflexible. Whether it shall be followed or departed from, is a
question entirely within the discretion of the court, which is again
called upon to consider a question once decided. In the same vein,
the venerable Justice Frankfurter opined: the ultimate touchstone of
constitutionality is the Constitution itself and not what we have said
about it. In contrast, the application of stare decisis on judicial
interpretation of statutes is more inflexible. As Justice Stevens
explains: after a statute has been construed, either by this Court or
by a consistent course of decision by other federal judges and
agencies, it acquires a meaning that should be as clear as if the
judicial gloss had been drafted by the Congress itself. This stance
reflects both respect for Congress' role and the need to preserve the
courts' limited resources.

In general, courts follow the stare decisis rule for an
ensemble of reasons, viz.: (1) it legitimizes judicial institutions; (2)
it promotes judicial economy; and, (3) it allows for predictability.
Contrariwise, courts refuse to be bound by the stare decisis rule
where (1) its application perpetuates illegitimate and
unconstitutional holdings; (2) it cannot accommodate changing
social and political understandings; (3) it leaves the power to
overturn bad constitutional law solely in the hands of Congress; and,
(4) activist judges can dictate the policy for future courts while
judges that respect stare decisis are stuck agreeing with them.
In its 200-year history, the U.S. Supreme Court has refused
to follow the stare decisis rule and reversed its decisions in 192
cases. The most famous of these reversals is Brown v. Board of
Education which junked Plessy v. Ferguson's separate but equal
doctrine. Plessy upheld as constitutional a state law requirement that
races be segregated on public transportation. In Brown, the U.S.
Supreme Court, unanimously held that separate . . . is inherently
unequal. Thus, by freeing itself from the shackles of stare decisis,
the U.S. Supreme Court freed the colored Americans from the
chains of inequality. In the Philippine setting, this Court has likewise
refused to be straitjacketed by the stare decisis rule in order to
promote public welfare. In La Bugal-B'laan Tribal Association, Inc.
v. Ramos, we reversed our original ruling that certain provisions of
the Mining Law are unconstitutional. Similarly, in Secretary of
Justice v. Lantion, we overturned our first ruling and held, on motion
for reconsideration, that a private respondent is bereft of the right to
notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition
process.
An examination of decisions on stare decisis in major
countries will show that courts are agreed on the factors that should
be considered before overturning prior rulings. These are
workability, reliance, intervening developments in the law and
changes in fact. In addition, courts put in the balance the following
determinants: closeness of the voting, age of the prior decision and
its merits.
The leading case in deciding whether a court should follow
the stare decisis rule in constitutional litigations is Planned
Parenthood v. Casey. It established a 4-pronged test. The court
should (1) determine whether the rule has proved to be intolerable
simply in defying practical workability; (2) consider whether the
rule is subject to a kind of reliance that would lend a special hardship
to the consequences of overruling and add inequity to the cost of
repudiation; (3) determine whether related principles of law have so
far developed as to have the old rule no more than a remnant of an
abandoned doctrine; and, (4) find out whether facts have so changed
or come to be seen differently, as to have robbed the old rule of
significant application or justification.[53]
To be forthright, respondents argument that the doctrinal guidelines prescribed
in Santos and Molina should not be applied retroactively for being contrary to the
principle ofstare decisis is no longer new. The same argument was also raised but was
struck down in Pesca v. Pesca,[54] and again in Antonio v. Reyes.[55] In these cases, we
explained that the interpretation or construction of a law by courts constitutes a part of
the law as of the date the statute is enacted. It is only when a prior ruling of this Court
is overruled, and a different view is adopted, that the new doctrine may have to be
applied prospectively in favor of parties who have relied on the old doctrine and have
acted in good faith, in accordance therewith under the familiar rule of lex prospicit,
non respicit.
II. On liberalizing the required proof for the declaration of nullity of marriage under
Article 36.
Now, petitioner wants to know if we have abandoned the Molina doctrine.
We have not.
In Edward Kenneth Ngo Te v. Rowena Ong Gutierrez Yu-Te,[56] we declared
that, in hindsight, it may have been inappropriate for the Court to impose a rigid set of
rules, as the one in Molina, in resolving all cases of psychological incapacity. We said
that instead of serving as a guideline, Molina unintentionally became a straightjacket,
forcing all cases involving psychological incapacity to fit into and be bound by it,
which is not only contrary to the intention of the law but unrealistic as well because,
with respect to psychological incapacity, no case can be considered as on all fours with
another.[57]
By the very nature of cases involving the application of Article 36, it is logical and
understandable to give weight to the expert opinions furnished by psychologists
regarding the psychological temperament of parties in order to determine the root
cause, juridical antecedence, gravity and incurability of the psychological incapacity.
However, such opinions, while highly advisable, are not conditions sine qua non in
granting petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage. [58] At best, courts must treat
such opinions as decisive but not indispensable evidence in determining the merits of
a given case. In fact, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding
of psychological incapacity, then actual medical or psychological examination of the
person concerned need not be resorted to.[59] The trial court, as in any other given case
presented before it, must always base its decision not solely on the expert opinions
furnished by the parties but also on the totality of evidence adduced in the course of
the proceedings.

It was for this reason that we found it necessary to emphasize in Ngo Te that
each case involving the application of Article 36 must be treated distinctly and judged
not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according
to its own attendant facts. Courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis,
guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological
disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.
Far from abandoning Molina, we simply suggested the relaxation of the
stringent requirements set forth therein, cognizant of the explanation given by the
Committee on the Revision of the Rules on the rationale of the Rule on Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC), viz.:
To require the petitioner to allege in the petition the
particular root cause of the psychological incapacity and to attach
thereto the verified written report of an accredited psychologist or
psychiatrist have proved to be too expensive for the parties. They
adversely affect access to justice o poor litigants. It is also a fact that
there are provinces where these experts are not available. Thus, the
Committee deemed it necessary to relax this stringent requirement
enunciated in the Molina Case. The need for the examination of a
party or parties by a psychiatrist or clinical psychologist and the
presentation of psychiatric experts shall now be determined by the
court during the pre-trial conference.[60]
But where, as in this case, the parties had the full opportunity to present professional
and expert opinions of psychiatrists tracing the root cause, gravity and incurability of
a partys alleged psychological incapacity, then such expert opinion should be
presented and, accordingly, be weighed by the court in deciding whether to grant a
petition for nullity of marriage.
III. On petitioners psychological incapacity.
Coming now to the main issue, we find the totality of evidence adduced by
respondent insufficient to prove that petitioner is psychologically unfit to discharge
the duties expected of him as a husband, and more particularly, that he suffered from
such psychological incapacity as of the date of the marriage eighteen (18) years ago.
Accordingly, we reverse the trial courts and the appellate courts rulings declaring the
marriage between petitioner and respondent null and void ab initio.
The intendment of the law has been to confine the application of Article 36
to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. [61] The
psychological illness that must have afflicted a party at the inception of the marriage
should be a malady so grave and permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the
duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond he or she is about to assume.[62]
In this case, respondent failed to prove that petitioners defects were present
at the time of the celebration of their marriage. She merely cited that prior to their
marriage, she already knew that petitioner would occasionally drink and gamble with
his friends; but such statement, by itself, is insufficient to prove any pre-existing
psychological defect on the part of her husband. Neither did the evidence adduced
prove such defects to be incurable.
The evaluation of the two psychiatrists should have been the decisive
evidence in determining whether to declare the marriage between the parties null and
void. Sadly, however, we are not convinced that the opinions provided by these experts
strengthened respondents allegation of psychological incapacity. The two experts
provided diametrically contradicting psychological evaluations: Dr. Oate testified that
petitioners behavior is a positive indication of a personality disorder,[63] while Dr. Obra
maintained that there is nothing wrong with petitioners personality. Moreover, there
appears to be greater weight in Dr. Obras opinion because, aside from analyzing the
transcript of Benjamins deposition similar to what Dr. Oate did, Dr. Obra also took
into consideration the psychological evaluation report furnished by another
psychiatrist in South Africawho personally examined Benjamin, as well as his (Dr.
Obras) personal interview with Benjamins brothers.[64] Logically, therefore, the
balance tilts in favor of Dr. Obras findings.
Lest it be misunderstood, we are not condoning petitioners drinking and
gambling problems, or his violent outbursts against his wife. There is no valid excuse
to justify such a behavior. Petitioner must remember that he owes love, respect, and
fidelity to his spouse as much as the latter owes the same to him. Unfortunately, this
court finds respondents testimony, as well as the totality of evidence presented by the
respondent, to be too inadequate to declare him psychologically unfit pursuant to
Article 36.
It should be remembered that the presumption is always in favor of the
validity of marriage. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio.[65] In this case, the
presumption has not been amply rebutted and must, perforce, prevail.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review
on certiorari is GRANTED. The November 17, 2003 Amended Decision and the
December 13, 2004 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 59903 are
accordingly REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 100776 October 28, 1993
ALBINO S. CO, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Antonio P. Barredo for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for the people.
NARVASA, C.J.:
In connection with an agreement to salvage and refloat asunken vessel and
in payment of his share of the expenses of the salvage operations therein
stipulated petitioner Albino Co delivered to the salvaging firm on September
1, 1983 a check drawn against the Associated Citizens' Bank, postdated
November 30, 1983 in the sum of P361,528.00. 1 The check was deposited on
January 3, 1984. It was dishonored two days later, the tersely-stated reason
given by the bank being: "CLOSED ACCOUNT."
A criminal complaint for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 2 was filed by
the salvage company against Albino Co with the Regional Trial Court of Pasay
City. The case eventuated in Co's conviction of the crime charged, and his
being sentenced to suffer a term of imprisonment of sixty (60) days and to
indemnify the salvage company in the sum of P361,528.00.
Co appealed to the Court of Appeals. There he sought exoneration upon the
theory that it was reversible error for the Regional Trial Court to have relied,
as basis for its verdict of conviction, on the ruling rendered on September 21,
1987 by this Court in Que v. People, 154 SCRA 160 (1987) 3 i.e., that a
check issued merely to guarantee the performance of an obligation is
nevertheless covered by B.P. Blg. 22. This was because at the time of the
issuance of the check on September 1, 1983, some four (4) years prior to the
promulgation of the judgment in Que v. People on September 21, 1987, the
delivery of a "rubber" or "bouncing" check as guarantee for an obligation was
not considered a punishable offense, an official pronouncement made in a
Circular of the Ministry of Justice. That Circular (No. 4), dated December 15,
1981, pertinently provided as follows:
2.3.4. Where issuance of bouncing check is neither estafa nor
violation of B.P. Blg. 22.
Where the check is issued as part of an arrangement to guarantee or
secure the payment of an obligation, whether pre-existing or not, the
drawer is not criminally liable for either estafa or violation of B.P. Blg.
22 (Res. No. 438, s. 1981, Virginia Montano vs. Josefino Galvez,
June 19, 1981; Res. No. 707, s. 1989; Alice Quizon vs. Lydia Calingo,
October 23, 1981, Res. No. 769, s. 1981, Alfredo Guido vs. Miguel
A. Mateo, et. al., November 17, 1981; Res. No. 589, s. 1981, Zenaida
Lazaro vs. Maria Aquino, August 7, 1981).
This administrative circular was subsequently reversed by another issued on
August 8, 1984 (Ministry Circular No. 12) almost one (1) year after Albino
Co had delivered the "bouncing" check to the complainant on September 1,
1983. Said Circular No. 12, after observing inter alia that Circular No. 4 of
December 15, 1981 appeared to have been based on "a misapplication of the
deliberation in the Batasang Pambansa, . . . (or) the explanatory note on the
original bill, i.e. that the intention was not to penalize the issuance of a check
to secure or guarantee the payment of an obligation," as follows: 4
Henceforth, conforming with the rule that an administrative agency
having interpreting authority may reverse its administration
interpretation of a statute, but that its review interpretation applies
only prospectively (Waterbury Savings Bank vs. Danaher, 128 Conn.,
476; 20 a2d 455 (1941), in all cases involving violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 where the check in question is issued after this
date, the claim that the check is issued as a guarantee or part of an
arrangement to secure an obligation collection will no longer be
considered a valid defense.
Co's theory was rejected by the Court of Appeals which affirmed his conviction.
Citing Senarillos v. Hermosisima, 101 Phil. 561, the Appellate Court opined
that the Que doctrine did not amount to the passage of new law but was merely
a construction or interpretation of a pre-existing one, i.e., BP 22, enacted on
April 3, 1979.
From this adverse judgment of the Court of Appeals, Albino Co appealed to
this Court on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. By Resolution
dated September 9, 1991, the Court dismissed his appeal. Co moved for
reconsideration under date of October 2, 1991. The Court required comment
thereon by the Office of the Solicitor General. The latter complied and, in its
comment dated December 13, 1991, extensively argued against the merits of
Albino Co's theory on appeal, which was substantially that proffered by him in
the Court of Appeals. To this comment, Albino Co filed a reply dated February
14, 1992. After deliberating on the parties' arguments and contentions, the
Court resolved, in the interests of justice, to reinstate Albino Co's appeal and
adjudicate the same on its merits.
Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution
shall form a part of the legal system of the Philippines," according to
Article 8 of the Civil Code. "Laws shall have no retroactive effect,
unless the contrary is provided," declares Article 4 of the same Code,
 a declaration that is echoed by Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code:
"Penal laws shall have, a retroactive effect insofar as they favor the
person guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal . . . 5
The principle of prospectivity of statutes, original or amendatory, has been
applied in many cases. These include: Buyco v. PNB, 961 2 SCRA 682 (June
30, 1961), holding that Republic Act No. 1576 which divested the Philippine
National Bank of authority to accept back pay certificates in payment of loans,
does not apply to an offer of payment made before effectivity of the
act; Largado v. Masaganda, et al., 5 SCRA 522 (June 30, 1962), ruling that
RA 2613, s amended by RA 3090 on June, 1961, granting to inferior courts
jurisdiction over guardianship cases, could not be given retroactive effect, in
the absence of a saving clause; Larga v. Ranada, Jr., 64 SCRA 18, to the
effect that Sections 9 and 10 of Executive Order No. 90, amending Section 4
of PD 1752, could have no retroactive application; People v. Que Po Lay, 94
Phil. 640, holding that a person cannot be convicted of violating Circular No.
20 of the Central, when the alleged violation occurred before publication of the
Circular in the Official Gazette; Baltazar v. C.A., 104 SCRA 619, denying
retroactive application to P.D. No. 27 decreeing the emancipation of tenants
from the bondage of the soil, and P.D. No. 316 prohibiting ejectment of tenants
from rice and corn farmholdings, pending the promulgation of rules and
regulations implementing P.D. No. 27; Nilo v. Court of Appeals, 128 SCRA
519, adjudging that RA 6389 whichremoved "personal cultivation" as a ground
for the ejectment of a tenant cannot be given retroactive effect in the absence
of a statutory statement for retroactivity;Tac-An v. CA, 129 SCRA 319, ruling
that the repeal of the old Administrative Code by RA 4252 could not be
accorded retroactive effect; Ballardo v. Borromeo, 161 SCRA 500, holding that
RA 6389 should have only prospective application; (see also Bonifacio v.
Dizon, 177 SCRA 294 and Balatbat v. CA, 205 SCRA 419).
The prospectivity principle has also been made to apply to administrative
rulings and circulars, to wit: ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation v. CTA, Oct.
12, 1981, 108 SCRA 142, holding that a circular or ruling of the Commissioner
of Internal Revenue may not be given retroactive effect adversely to a
taxpayer: Sanchez v.COMELEC, 193 SCRA 317, ruling that Resolution No.
90-0590 of the Commission on Elections, which directed the holding of recall
proceedings, had no retroactive application; Romualdez v. CSC, 197 SCRA
168, where it was ruled that CSC Memorandum Circular No. 29, s. 1989
cannot be given retrospective effect so as to entitle to permanent appointment
an employee whose temporary appointment had expired before the Circular
was issued.
The principle of prospectivity has also been applied to judicial decisions which,
"although in themselves not laws, are nevertheless evidence of what the laws
mean, . . . (this being) the reason whyunder Article 8 of the New Civil Code,
'Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall
form a part of the legal system . . .'"
So did this Court hold, for example, in Peo. v. Jabinal, 55 SCRA 607, 611:
It will be noted that when appellant was appointed Secret Agent by
the Provincial Government in 1962, and Confidential Agent by the
Provincial commander in 1964, the prevailing doctrine on the matter
was that laid down by Us in People v. Macarandang (1959)
and People v. Lucero (1958). 6Our decision in People
v. Mapa, 7 reversing the aforesaid doctrine, came only in 1967. The
sole question in this appeal is: should appellant be acquitted on the
basis of Our rulings in Macarandang and Lucero, or should his
conviction stand in view of the complete reverse of the Macarandang
and Lucero doctrine in Mapa? . . .
Decisions of this Court, although in themselves not laws, are
nevertheless evidence of what the laws mean, and this is the reason
why under Article 8 of the New Civil Code, "Judicial decisions
applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part
of the legal system . . ."The interpretation upon a law by this Court
constitutes, in a way, a part of the law as of the date that law was
originally passed, since this Court's construction merely establishes
the contemporaneous legislative intent that the law thus construed
intends to effectuate. The settled rule supported by numerous
authorities is a restatement of the legal maxim "legis interpretation
legis vim obtinet" the interpretation placed upon the written law by
a competent court has the force of law. The doctrine laid down
in Lucero andMacarandang was part of the jurisprudence, hence, of
the law, of the land, at the time appellant was found in possession of
the firearm in question and where he was arraigned by the trial court.
It is true that the doctrine was overruled in the Mapa case in 1967,
but when a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a different view is
adopted, the new doctrine should be applied prospectively, and
should not apply to parties who had relied on, the old doctrine and
acted on the faith thereof. This is especially true in the construction
and application of criminal laws, where it is necessary that the
punishment of an act be reasonably foreseen for the guidance of
society.
So, too, did the Court rule in Spouses Gauvain and Bernardita Benzonan
v. Court of Appeals, et al. (G.R. No. 97973) and Development Bank of the
Philippines v. Court of Appeals, et al (G.R. No 97998), Jan. 27, 1992, 205
SCRA 515, 527-528: 8
 We sustain the petitioners' position, It is undisputed that the subject
lot was mortgaged to DBP on February 24, 1970. It was acquired by
DBP as the highest bidder at a foreclosure sale on June 18, 1977,
and then sold to the petitioners on September 29, 1979.
At that time, the prevailing jurisprudence interpreting section 119 of
R.A. 141 as amended was that enunciated in Monge and Tupas cited
above. The petitioners Benzonan and respondent Pe and the DBP
are bound by these decisions for pursuant to Article 8 of the Civil
Code "judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the
Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the Philippines."
But while our decisions form part of the law of the land, they are also
subject to Article 4 of the Civil Code which provides that "laws shall
have no retroactive effect unless the contrary is provided." This is
expressed in the familiar legal maxim lex prospicit, non respicit, the
law looks forward not backward. The rationale against retroactivity is
easy to perceive. The retroactive application of a law usually divests
rights that have already become vested or impairs the obligations of
contract and hence, is unconstitutional (Francisco vs. Certeza, 3
SCRA 565 [1061]).
The same consideration underlies our rulings giving only prospective
effect to decisions enunciating new doctrines. Thus, we emphasized
in People v. Jabinal, 55 SCRA 607 [1974]" . . . when a doctrine of this
Court is overruled and a different view is adopted, the new doctrine
should be applied prospectively and should not apply to parties who
had relied on the old doctrine and acted on the faith thereof.
A compelling rationalization of the prospectivity principle of judicial decisions
is well set forth in the oft-cited case of Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter
States Bank, 308 US 371, 374 [1940]. The Chicot doctrine advocates the
imperative necessity to take account of the actual existence of a statute prior
to its nullification, as an operative fact negating acceptance of "a principle of
absolute retroactive invalidity.
9
Thus, in this Court's decision in Taada v. Tuvera, promulgated on April 24,
1985 which declared "that presidential issuances of general application,
which have not been published,shall have no force and effect," and as regards
which declaration some members of the Court appeared "quite apprehensive
about the possible unsettling effect . . . (the) decision might have on acts done
in reliance on the validity of these presidential decrees . . ." the Court said:
. . . . The answer is all too familiar. In similar situation is in the past
this Court, had taken the pragmatic and realistic course set forth
in Chicot County Drainage District vs. Baxter Bank (308 U.S. 371,
374) to wit:
The courts below have proceeded on the theory that the Act of
Congress, having found to be unconstitutional, was not a law; that it
was inoperative, conferring no rights and imposing no duties, and
hence affording no basis for the challenged decree. Norton vs.
Shelby County, 118 US 425, 442; Chicago, I. & L. Ry. Co. v. Hackett,
228 U. S. 559, 566. It is quite clear, however, that such broad
statements as to the effect of a determination of unconstitutionality
must be taken with qualifications. The actual existence of a statute,
prior to such a determination, is an operative fact and may have
consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot
always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the
subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in
various aspects with respect to particular conduct, private and
official. Questions of rights claimed to have become vested, of status,
of prior determinations deemed to have finality and acted upon
accordingly, of public policy in the light of the nature both of the
statute and of its previous application, demand examination. These
questions are among the most difficult of those who have engaged
the attention of courts, state and federal, and it is manifest from
numerous decisions that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of
absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified.
Much earlier, in De Agbayani v. PNB, 38 SCRA 429 concerning the effects
of the invalidation of "Republic Act No. 342, the moratorium legislation, which
continued Executive Order No. 32, issued by the then President Osmea,
suspending the enforcement of payment of all debts and other monetary
obligations payable by war sufferers," and which had been "explicitly held in
Rutter v. Esteban (93 Phil. 68 [1953] 10 . . . (to be) in 1953 'unreasonable and
oppressive, and should not be prolonged a minute longer . . ." the Court
made substantially the same observations, to wit: 11
. . . . The decision now on appeal reflects the orthodox view that an
unconstitutional act, for that matter an executive order or a municipal
ordinance likewise suffering from that infirmity, cannot be the source
of any legal rights or duties. Nor can it justify any official act taken
under it. Its repugnancy to the fundamental law once judicially
declared results in its being to all intents and purposes amere scrap
of paper. . . . It is understandable why it should be so, the Constitution
being supreme and paramount. Any legislative or executive act
contrary to its terms cannot survive.
Such a view has support in logic and possesses the merit of
simplicity. lt may not however be sufficiently realistic. It does not
 admit of doubt that prior to the declaration of nullity such challenged
legislative or executive act must have been in force and had to be
compiled with. This is so as until after the judiciary, in an appropriate
case, declares its invalidity,, it is entitled to obedience and respect.
Parties may have acted under it and may have changed
theirpositions, what could be more fitting than that in a subsequent
litigation regard be had to what has been done while such legislative
or executive act was in operation and presumed to be valid in all
respects. It is now accepted as a doctrine that prior to its being
nullified, its existence is a fact must be reckoned with. This is merely
to reflect awareness that precisely because the judiciary is the
governmental organ which has the final say on whether or not a
legislative or executive measure is valid, a, period of time may have
elapsed before it can exercise the power of judicial review that may
lead to a declaration of nullity. It would be to deprive the law of its
quality of fairness and justice then, if there be no recognition of what
had transpired prior to such adjudication.
In the language of an American Supreme Court decision: 'The actual
existence of a statute, prior to such a determination [of
unconstitutionality], is an operative fact and may have consequences
which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by
a new judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to
invalidity may have to be considered in various aspects, with
respect to particular relations, individual and corporate, and particular
conduct, private and official (Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter
States Bank, 308 US 371, 374 [1940]). This language has been
quoted with approval in a resolution in Araneta v. Hill (93 Phil. 1002
[1953]) and the decision in Manila Motor Co. Inc. v. Flores (99 Phil.
738 [1956]). An even more recent instance is the opinion of Justice
Zaldivar speaking for the Court in Fernandez v. Cuerva and Co. (L-
21114, Nov. 28, 1967, 21 SCRA 1095).
Again, treating of the effect that should be given to its decision
in Olaguer v. Military Commission No 34, 12 declaring invalid
criminal proceedings conducted during the martial law regime against
civilians, which had resulted in the conviction and incarceration of
numerous persons this Court, in Tan vs. Barrios, 190 SCRA 686,
at p. 700, ruled as follows:
In the interest of justice and consistently, we hold that Olaguer should,
in principle, be applied prospectively only to future cases and cases
still ongoing or not yet final when that decision was promulgated.
Hence, there should be no retroactive nullification of final judgments,
whether of conviction or acquittal, rendered by military courts against
civilians before the promulgation of the Olaguer decision. Such final
sentences should not be disturbed by the State. Only in particular
cases where the convicted person or the State shows that there was
serious denial of constitutional rights of the accused, should the nullity
of the sentence be declared and a retrial be ordered based on the
violation of the constitutional rights of the accused and not on the
Olaguer doctrine. If a retrial is no longer possible, the accused should
be released since judgment against him is null on account of the
violation of his constitutional rights and denial of due process.
xxx xxx xxx
The trial of thousands of civilians for common crimes before the
military tribunals and commissions during the ten-year period of
martial rule (1971-1981) which were created under general orders
issued by President Marcos in the exercise of his legislative powers is
an operative fact that may not just be ignored. The belated declaration
in 1987 of the unconstitutionality and invalidity of those proceedings
did not erase the reality of their consequences which occurred long
before our decision in Olaguer was promulgated and which now
prevent us from carrying Olaguer to the limit of its logic. Thus did this
Court rule in Municipality of Malabang v. Benito, 27 SCRA 533, where
the question arose as to whether the nullity of creation of a municipality
by executive order wiped out all the acts of the local government
abolished. 13
It would seem then, that the weight of authority is decidedly in favor of the
proposition that the Court's decision of September 21, 1987 in Que v. People,
154 SCRA 160 (1987) 14 that a check issued merely to guarantee the
performance of an obligation is nevertheless covered by B.P. Blg. 22 should
not be given retrospective effect to the prejudice of the petitioner and other
persons situated, who relied on the official opinion of the Minister of Justice
that such a check did not fall within the scope of B.P. Blg. 22.
Inveighing against this proposition, the Solicitor General invokes U.S. v. Go
Chico, 14 Phil. 128, applying the familiar doctrine that in crimes mala prohibita,
the intent or motive of the offender is inconsequential, the only relevant inquiry
being, "has the law been violated?" The facts in Go Chico are substantially
different from those in the case at bar. In the former, there was no official
issuance by the Secretary of Justice or other government officer construing
the special law violated; 15 and it was there observed, among others, that "the
defense . . . (of) an honest misconstruction of the law under legal
advice" 16 could not be appreciated as a valid defense. In the present case on
the other hand, the defense is that reliance was placed, not on the opinion of
a private lawyer but upon an official pronouncement of no less than the
attorney of the Government, the Secretary of Justice, whose opinions, though
not law, are entitled to great weight and on which reliance may be placed by
private individuals is reflective of the correct interpretation of a constitutional
or statutory provision; this, particularly in the case of penal statutes, by the very
nature and scope of the authority that resides in as regards prosecutions for
their violation. 17 Senarillos vs. Hermosisima, supra, relied upon by the
respondent Court of Appeals, is crucially different in that in said case, as
in U.S. v. Go Chico, supra, no administrative interpretation antedated the
contrary construction placed by the Court on the law invoked.
This is after all a criminal action all doubts in which, pursuant to familiar,
fundamental doctrine, must be resolved in favor of the accused. Everything
considered, the Court sees no compelling reason why the doctrine of mala
prohibita should override the principle of prospectivity, and its clear
implications as herein above set out and discussed, negating criminal liability.
WHEREFORE, the assailed decisions of the Court of Appeals and of the
Regional Trial Court are reversed and set aside, and the criminal prosecution
against the accused-petitioner is DISMISSED, with costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Padilla, Regalado, Nocon and Puno, JJ., concur.
[G.R. No. 136921. April 17, 2001]
LORNA GUILLEN PESCA, petitioner,
vs.
ZOSIMO A. PESCA, respondent.
DECISION
VITUG, J.:
Submitted for review is the decision of the Court of Appeals, promulgated on 27
May 1998, in C.A. G.R. CV. No. 52374, reversing the decision of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Caloocan City, Branch 130, which has declared the marriage between
petitioner and respondent to be null and void ab initio on the ground of psychological
incapacity on the part of respondent.
Petitioner Lorna G. Pesca and respondent Zosimo A. Pesca first met sometime
in 1975 while on board an inter-island vessel bound for Bacolod City. After a
whirlwind courtship, they got married on 03 March 1975. Initially, the young couple
did not live together as petitioner was still a student in college and respondent, a
seaman, had to leave the country on board an ocean-going vessel barely a month after
the marriage. Six months later, the young couple established their residence in Quezon
City until they were able to build their own house in Caloocan City where they finally
resided. It was blissful marriage for the couple during the two months of the year that
they could stay together when respondent was on vacation. The union begot four
children, 19-year old Ruhem, 17-year old Rez, 11-year old Ryan, and 9-year old
Richie.
It started in 1988, petitioner said, when she noticed that respondent surprisingly
showed signs of psychological incapacity to perform his marital covenant. His "true
color" of being an emotionally immature and irresponsible husband became
apparent. He was cruel and violent. He was a habitual drinker, staying with friends
daily from 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon until 1:00 o'clock in the morning.When
cautioned to stop or, to at least, minimize his drinking, respondent would beat, slap
and kick her. At one time, he chased petitioner with a loaded shotgun and threatened
to kill her in the presence of the children. The children themselves were not spared
from physical violence.
Finally, on 19 November 1992, petitioner and her children left the conjugal abode
to live in the house of her sister in Quezon City as they could no longer bear his violent
ways. Two months later, petitioner decided to forgive respondent, and she returned
home to give him a chance to change. But, to her dismay, things did not so turn out as
expected. Indeed, matters became worse.
On the morning of 22 March 1994, about eight oclock, respondent assaulted
petitioner for about half an hour in the presence of the children. She was battered black
and blue. She submitted herself to medical examination at the Quezon City General
Hospital, which diagnosed her injuries as contusions and abrasions. Petitioner filed a
complaint with the barangay authorities, and a case was filed against respondent for
slight physical injuries. He was convicted by the Metropolitan Trial Court of Caloocan
City and sentenced to eleven days of imprisonment.
This time, petitioner and her children left the conjugal home for good and stayed
with her sister. Eventually, they decided to rent an apartment. Petitioner sued
respondent before the Regional Trial Court for the declaration of nullity of their
marriage invoking psychological incapacity. Petitioner likewise sought the custody of
her minor children and prayed for support pendente lite.
Summons, together with a copy of the complaint, was served on respondent on
25 April 1994 by personal service by the sheriff. As respondent failed to file an answer
or to enter his appearance within the reglementary period, the trial court ordered the
city prosecutor to look into a possible collusion between the parties. Prosecutor Rosa
C. Reyes, on 03 August 1994, submitted her report to the effect that she found no
evidence to establish that there was collusion between the parties.
On 11 January 1995, respondent belatedly filed, without leave of court, an
answer, and the same, although filed late, was admitted by the court. In his answer,
respondent admitted the fact of his marriage with petitioner and the birth of their
children. He also confirmed the veracity of Annex "A" of the complaint which listed
the conjugal property. Respondent vehemently denied, however, the allegation that he
was psychologically incapacitated.
 On 15 November 1995, following hearings conducted by it, the trial court
rendered its decision declaring the marriage between petitioner and respondent to be
null and void ab initio on the basis of psychological incapacity on the part of
respondent and ordered the liquidation of the conjugal partnership.
Respondent appealed the above decision to the Court of Appeals, contending that
the trial court erred, particularly, in holding that there was legal basis to declare the
marriage null and void and in denying his motion to reopen the case.
The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court and declared the
marriage between petitioner and respondent valid and subsisting. The appellate court
said:
"Definitely the appellee has not established the following: That the appellant showed
signs of mental incapacity as would cause him to be truly incognitive of the basic
marital covenant, as so provided for in Article 68 of the Family Code; that the
incapacity is grave, has preceded the marriage and is incurable; that his incapacity to
meet his marital responsibility is because of a psychological, not physical illness; that
the root cause of the incapacity has been identified medically or clinically, and has
been proven by an expert; and that the incapacity is permanent and incurable in nature.
The burden of proof to show the nullity of marriage lies in the plaintiff and any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and
against its dissolution and nullity."[1]
Petitioner, in her plea to this Court, would have the decision of the Court of
Appeals reversed on the thesis that the doctrine enunciated in Santos vs. Court of
Appeals,[2] promulgated on 14 January 1995, as well as the guidelines set out in
Republic vs. Court of Appeals and Molina,[3] promulgated on 13 February 1997,
should have no retroactive application and, on the assumption that the Molina ruling
could be applied retroactively, the guidelines therein outlined should be taken to be
merely advisory and not mandatory in nature. In any case, petitioner argues, the
application of the Santos and Molina dictashould warrant only a remand of the case
to the trial court for further proceedings and not its dismissal.
Be that as it may, respondent submits, the appellate court did not err in its assailed
decision for there is absolutely no evidence that has been shown to prove
psychological incapacity on his part as the term has been so defined in Santos.
Indeed, there is no merit in the petition.
The term psychological incapacity, as a ground for the declaration of nullity of a
marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, has been explained by the Court
in Santos and reiterated in Molina. The Court, in Santos, concluded:
"It should be obvious, looking at all the foregoing disquisitions, including, and most
importantly, the deliberations of the Family Code Revision Committee itself, that the
use of the phrase `psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Code has not been
meant to comprehend all such possible cases of psychoses as, likewise mentioned by
some ecclesiastical authorities, extremely low intelligence, immaturity, and like
circumstances (cited in Fr. Artemio Balumad's `Void and Voidable Marriages in the
Family Code and their Parallels in Canon Law, quoting form the Diagnostic Statistical
Manuel of Mental Disorder by the American Psychiatric Association; Edward
Hudson's `Handbook II for Marriage Nullity Cases). Article 36 of the Family Code
cannot be taken and construed independently of, but must stand in conjunction with,
existing precepts in our law on marriage. Thus correlated, `psychological incapacity
should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be
truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed
and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of
the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love,
respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the
intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of `psychological incapacity to
the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This
psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated."
The "doctrine of stare decisis," ordained in Article 8 of the Civil Code, expresses
that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the law shall form part of the legal
system of the Philippines. The rule follows the settled legal maxim legis interpretado
legis vim obtinet that the interpretation placed upon the written law by a competent
court has the force of law.[4] The interpretation or construction placed by the courts
establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent of the law. The latter as so
interpreted and construed would thus constitute a part of that law as of the date the
statute is enacted. It is only when a prior ruling of this Court finds itself later overruled,
and a different view is adopted, that the new doctrine may have to be applied
prospectively in favor of parties who have relied on the old doctrine and have acted in
good faith in accordance therewith[5] under the familiar rule of lex prospicit, non
respicit.
The phrase psychological incapacity, borrowed from Canon law, is an entirely
novel provision in our statute books, and, until the relatively recent enactment of the
Family Code, the concept has escaped jurisprudential attention. It is in Santos when,
for the first time, the Court has given life to the term. Molina, that followed, has
additionally provided procedural guidelines to assist the courts and the parties in trying
cases for annulment of marriages grounded on psychological incapacity. Molina has
strengthened, not overturned, Santos.
At all events, petitioner has utterly failed, both in her allegations in the complaint
and in her evidence, to make out a case of psychological incapacity on the part of
respondent, let alone at the time of solemnization of the contract, so as to warrant a
declaration of nullity of the marriage. Emotional immaturity and irresponsibility,
invoked by her, cannot be equated with psychological incapacity.
 The Court reiterates its reminder that marriage is an inviolable social institution
and the foundation of the family[6] that the State cherishes and protects. While the
Court commisserates with petitioner in her unhappy marital relationship with
respondent, totally terminating that relationship, however, may not necessarily be the
fitting denouement to it. In these cases, the law has not quite given up, neither should
we.
WHEREFORE, the herein petition is DENIED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, (Chairman), Panganiban, Gonzaga-Reyes,