Case Digest: National Artist Almario v.

Executive
Secretary
G.R. No. 189028 : July 16, 2013

NATIONAL ARTIST FOR LITERATURE VIRGILIO ALMARIO, NATIONAL ARTIST FOR

LITERATURE BIENVENIDO LUMBERA, NATIONAL ARTIST FOR VISUAL ARTS
(PAINTING) BENEDICTO CABRERA, NATIONAL ARTIST FOR VISUAL ARTS
(SCULPTURE) NAPOLEON ABUEVA, NATIONAL ARTIST FOR VISUAL ARTS
(PAINTING AND SCULPTURE) ARTURO LUZ, NATIONAL ARTIST FOR PRODUCTION
DESIGN SALVADOR BERNAL, UNIVERSITY PROFESSOR EMERITUS GEMINO ABAD,
DEAN MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN (UP COLLEGE OF LAW), DEAN DANILO SILVESTRE
(UP COLLEGE OF ARCHITECTURE), DEAN ROLAND TOLENTINO (UP COLLEGE OF
MASS COMMUNICATION), PROF. JOSE DALISAY, DR. ANTON JUAN, DR.
ALEXANDER CORTEZ, DR. JOSE NEIL GARCIA, DR. PEDRO JUN CRUZ REYES,
PROF. JOSE CLAUDIO GUERRERO, PROF. MICHAEL M. COROZA, PROF. GERARD
LICO, PROF. VERNE DE LA PENA, PROF. MARIAN ABUAN, PROF. THEODORE O. TE,
DR. CRISTINA PANTOJA-HIDALGO, PROF. JOSE WENDELL CAPILI, PROF. SIR
ANRIAL TIATCO, PROF. NICOLO DEL CASTILLO, PROF. HORACIO DUMANLIG, PROF.
DANTON REMOTO, PROF. PRISCELINA PATAJOLEGASTO, PROF. BELEN
CALINGACION, PROF. AMIEL Y. LEONARDIA, PROF. VIM NADERA, PROF. MARILYN
CANTA, PROF. CECILIA DELA PAZ, ROF. CHARLSON ONG, PROF. CLOD MARLON
YAMBAO, PROF. KENNETH JAMANDRE, PROF. JETHRO JOAQUIN, ATTY. F.D.
NICOLAS B. PICHAY, ATTY. ROSE BEATRIX ANGELES, MR. FERNANDO JOSEF, MS.
SUSAN S. LARA, MR. ALFRED YUSON, MS. JING PANGANIBAN MENDOZA, MR.
ROMULO BAQUIRAN, JR., MR. CARLJOE JAVIER, MS. REBECCA T. ANONUEVO, MR.
JP ANTHONY D. CUNADA, MS. LEAH NAVARRO, MR. MARK MEILLY, MR. VERGEL O.
SANTOS, MR. GIL OLEA MENDOZA, MR. EDGAR C. SAMAR, MS. CHRISTINE
BELLEN, MR. ANGELO R. LACUESTA, MS. ANNA MARIA KATIGBAKLA CUESTA, MR.
LEX LEDESMA, MS. KELLY PERIQUET, MS. CARLA PACIS, MR. J. ALBERT GAMBOA,
MR. CESAR EVANGELISTA BUENDIA, MR. PAOLO ALCAZAREN, MR. ALWYN C.
JAVIER, MR. RAYMOND MAGNO GARLITOS, MS. GANG BADOY, MR. LESLIE
BOCOBO, MS. FRANCES BRETANA, MS. JUDITH TORRES, MS. JANNETTE PINZON,
MS. JUNE POTICAR-DALISAY, MS. CAMILLE DE LA ROSA, MR. JAMES LADIORAY,
MR. RENATO CONSTANTINO, JR., and CONCERNED ARTISTS OF THE PHILIPPINES
(CAP), Petitioners, v. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, THE CULTURAL CENTER OF THE
PHILIPPINES, THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON CULTURE AND THE ARTS, MS.
CECILE GUIDOTE-ALVAREZ, MR. CARLO MAGNO JOSE CAPARAS,MR. JOSE
MORENO, MR. FRANCISCO MANOSA, AND ALL PERSONS, PUBLIC AND PRIVATE,
ACTING UNDER THEIR INSTRUCTIONS, DIRECTION, CONTROL AND SUPERVISION
IN RELATION TO THE CONFERMENT OF THE ORDER OF THE NATIONAL ARTIST
AND THE RELEASE OF FUNDS IN RELATION TO THE CONFERMENT OF THE
HONORS AND PRIVILEGES OF THE ORDER OF NATIONAL ARTISTS ON
RESPONDENTS GUIDOTE-ALVAREZ, CAPARAS, MORENO AND MANOSA,
Respondents.
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

FACTS:

On April 27, 1972, former President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Proclamation No.
1001and, upon recommendation of the Board of Trustees of the Cultural Center of the
Philippines (CCP), created the category of Award and Decoration of National Artist to be
awarded to Filipinos who have made distinct contributions to arts and letters. In the same
issuance, Fernando Amorsolo was declared as the first National Artist.

On April 3, 1992, Republic Act No. 7356, otherwise known as the Law Creating the National
Commission for Culture and the Arts, was signed into law. It established the National
Commission for Culture and the Arts (NCCA) and gave it an extensive mandate over the
development, promotion and preservation of the Filipino national culture and arts and the
Filipino cultural heritage.

CCP Board of Trustees and the NCCA have been mandated by law to promote, develop
and protect the Philippine national culture and the arts, and authorized to give awards to
deserving Filipino artists, the two bodies decided to team up and jointly administer the
National Artists Award.

On April 3, 2009, the First Deliberation Panel met. A total of 87 nominees were considered
during the deliberation and a preliminary shortlist of 32 names was compiled.

On April 23, 2009, the Second Deliberation Panel shortlisted 13 out of the 32 names in the
preliminary shortlist.On May 6, 2009, the final deliberation was conducted by the 30-
member Final Deliberation Panel comprised of the CCP Board of Trustees and the NCCA
Board of Commissioners and the living National Artists.From the 13 names in the second
shortlist, a final list of four names was agreed upon namely: Manuel Conde, Ramon Santos,
Lazaro Francisco and Federico Aguilar-Alcuaz.

CCP and NCCA submitted this recommendation to the President. According to respondents,
the aforementioned letter was referred by the Office of the President to the Committee on
Honors. Meanwhile, the Office of the President allegedly received nominations from various
sectors, cultural groups and individuals strongly endorsing private respondents Cecile
Guidote-Alvarez, Carlo Magno Jose Caparas, Francisco Masa and Jose Moreno. The
Committee on Honors purportedly processed these nominations and invited resource
persons to validate the qualifications and credentials of the nominees.

Acting on this recommendation, Proclamation No. 1823 declaring Manuel Conde a National
Artist was issued on June 30, 2009. Subsequently, on July 6, 2009, Proclamation Nos. 1824
to 1829 were issued declaring Lazaro Francisco, Federico AguilarAlcuaz and private
respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Masa and Moreno, respectively, as National Artists.
This was subsequently announced to the public by then Executive Secretary Eduardo
Ermita on July 29, 2009.

Convinced that, by law, it is the exclusive province of the NCCA Board of Commissioners
and the CCP Board of Trustees to select those who will be conferred the Order of National
Artists and to set the standard for entry into that select group, petitioners instituted this
petition for prohibition, certiorari and injunction (with prayer for restraining order) praying
that the Order of National Artists be conferred on Dr. Santos and that the conferment of the
Order of National Artists on respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Masa and Moreno be
enjoined and declared to have been rendered in grave abuse of discretion.

All of the petitioners claim that former President Macapagal-Arroyo gravely abused her
discretion in disregarding the results of the rigorous screening and selection process for the
Order of National Artists and in substituting her own choice for those of the Deliberation
Panels. According to petitioners, the Presidents discretion to name National Artists is not
absolute but limited. In particular, her discretion on the matter cannot be exercised in the
absence of or against the recommendation of the NCCA and the CCP.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion committed by former President
Arroyo

HELD: Yes.

Political Law- Legal Standing

The parties who assail the constitutionality or legality of a statute or an official act must have
a direct and personal interest. They must show not only that the law or any governmental
act is invalid, but also that they sustained or are in immediate danger of sustaining some
direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that they suffer thereby in some
indefinite way.

In this case, the petitioning National Artists will be denied some right or privilege to which
they are entitled as members of the Order of National Artists as a result of the conferment of
the award on respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Masa and Moreno. In particular, they
will be denied the privilege of exclusive membership in the Order of National Artists.

Political Law- equal protection

It should be recalled too that respondent Guidote-Alvarez was disqualified to be nominated

for being the Executive Director of the NCCA at that time while respondents Masa and
Caparas did not make it to the preliminary shortlist and respondent Moreno was not
included in the second shortlist. Yet, the four of them were treated differently and
considered favorably when they were exempted from the rigorous screening process of the
NCCA and the CCP and conferred the Order of National Artists.

The special treatment accorded to respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Masa and

Moreno fails to pass rational scrutiny.No real and substantial distinction between
respondents and petitioner Abad has been shown that would justify deviating from the laws,
guidelines and established procedures, and placing respondents in an exceptional position.
The undue classification was not germane to the purpose of the law. Instead, it contradicted
the law and well-established guidelines, rules and regulations meant to carry the law into
effect. While petitioner Abad cannot claim entitlement to the Order of National Artists, he is
entitled to be given an equal opportunity to vie for that honor. In view of the foregoing, there
was a violation of petitioner Abads right to equal protection, an interest that is substantial
enough to confer him standing in this case.
Political Law- Limits of the Presidents Discretion

The "power to recommend" includes the power to give "advice, exhortation or indorsement,
which is essentially persuasive in character, not binding upon the party to whom it is made."

Thus, in the matter of the conferment of the Order of National Artists, the President may or
may not adopt the recommendation or advice of the NCCA and the CCP Boards. In other
words, the advice of the NCCA and the CCP is subject to the Presidents discretion.

Nevertheless, the Presidents discretion on the matter is not totally unfettered, nor the role of
the NCCA and the CCP Boards meaningless. The Presidents power must be exercised in
accordance with existing laws. Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution prescribes faithful
execution of the laws by the President

The Presidents discretion in the conferment of the Order of National Artists should be
exercised in accordance with the duty to faithfully execute the relevant laws. The faithful
execution clause is best construed as an obligation imposed on the President, not a
separate grant of power.

In this connection, the powers granted to the NCCA and the CCP Boards in connection with
the conferment of the Order of National Artists by executive issuances were institutionalized
by two laws, namely, Presidential Decree No. 208 dated June 7, 1973 and Republic Act No.
7356. In particular, Proclamation No. 1144 dated May 15, 1973 constituted the CCP Board
as the National Artists Awards Committee and tasked it to "administer the conferment of the
category of National Artist" upon deserving Filipino artists with the mandate to "draft the
rules to guide its deliberations in the choice of National Artists".

By virtue of their respective statutory mandates in connection with the conferment of the
National Artist Award, the NCCA and the CCP decided to work together and jointly
administer the National Artist Award. They reviewed the guidelines for the nomination,
selection and administration of the National Artist Award. An administrative regulation
adopted pursuant to law has the force and effect of law. Thus, the rules, guidelines and
policies regarding the Order of National Artists jointly issued by the CCP Board of Trustees
and the NCCA pursuant to their respective statutory mandates have the force and effect of
law. Until set aside, they are binding upon executive and administrative agencies,including
the President himself/herself as chief executor of laws.

In view of the various stages of deliberation in the selection process and as a consequence
of his/her duty to faithfully enforce the relevant laws, the discretion of the President in the
matter of the Order of National Artists is confined to the names submitted to him/her by the
NCCA and the CCP Boards. This means that the President could not have considered
conferment of the Order of National Artists on any person not considered and
recommended by the NCCA and the CCP Boards. That is the proper import of the provision
of Executive Order No. 435, s. 2005, that the NCCA and the CCP "shall advise the
President on the conferment of the Order of National Artists." Applying this to the instant
case, the former President could not have properly considered respondents Guidote-
Alvarez, Caparas, Masa and Moreno, as their names were not recommended by the NCCA
and the CCP Boards. Otherwise, not only will the stringent selection and meticulous
screening process be rendered futile, the respective mandates of the NCCA and the CCP
Board of Trustees under relevant laws to administer the conferment of Order of National
Artists, draft the rules and regulations to guide its deliberations, formulate and implement
policies and plans, and undertake any and all necessary measures in that regard will also
become meaningless.

Proclamation Nos. 1826 to 1829 dated July 6, 2009 proclaiming respondents Cecile
Guidote-Alvarez, Carlo Magno Jose Caparas, Francisco Masa, and Jose Moreno,
respectively, as National Artists are declared INVALID and SET ASIDE for having been
issued with grave abuse of discretion.

Almario vs Alba case digest (Consti-1 case)

Amendment to the Constitution
As provided for in Batas Pambansa Blg. 643, the Filipino electorate will go to the polls on January 27,
1984 to either approve or reject amendments to the Constitution proposed by Resolution Nos. 104, 105,
110, 111, 112, and 113 of the Batasang Pambansa. The proposed amendments are embodied in four (4)
separate questions to be answered by simple YES or NO answers. Petitioners herein seek to enjoin the
submission on January 27, 1984 of Question Nos. 3 (grant as an additional mode of acquiring lands
belonging to the public domain) and 4 (the undertaking by the government of a land reform program and a
social reform program), which cover Resolution Nos. 105 and 113, to the people for ratification or
rejection on the ground that there has been no fair and proper submission following the doctrine laid down
in Tolentino v. COMELEC. The petitioners do not seek to prohibit the holding of the plebiscite but only ask
for more time for the people to study the meaning and implications of Resolution Nos. 105 and 113 until
the nature and effect of the proposals are fairly and properly submitted to the electorate.

ISSUE: Whether or not Questions 3 and 4 can be presented to the people on a later date.

HELD: The necessity, expediency, and wisdom of the proposed amendments are beyond the power of
the courts to adjudicate. Precisely, whether or not "grant" of public land and "urban land reform" are
unwise or improvident or whether or not the proposed amendments are unnecessary is a matter which
only the people can decide. The questions are presented for their determination. Assuming that a member
or some members of this Court may find undesirable any additional mode of disposing of public land or an
urban land reform program, the remedy is to vote "NO" in the plebiscite but not to substitute his or their
aversion to the proposed amendments by denying to the millions of voters an opportunity to express their
own likes or dislikes. The issue before us has nothing to do with the wisdom of the proposed
amendments, their desirability, or the danger of the power being abused. The issue is whether or not the
voters are aware of the wisdom, the desirability, or the dangers of abuse. The petitioners have failed to
make out a case that the average voter does not know the meaning of "grant" of public land or of "urban
land reform."

TOPIC: POWERS OF THE EXECUTIVE

LOUIS "BAROK" C. BIRAOGO, petitioner, v.
THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION OF 2010,
respondent.

G.R No. 192935. December 7, 2010

REP. EDCEL C. LAGMAN, REP. RODOLFO B.

ALBANO, RR., REP. SIMEON A. DATUMANONG, and
REP. ORLANDO B. FUA, SR., petitioner, v.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY AND MANAGEMENT
SECRETARY FLORENCIO B. ABAD, respondent.

G.R. No. 193036. December 7, 2010

MENDOZA, J.:

FACT:
E.O No. 1 establishing the Philippine Truth Commission (PTC) of
2010 was signed by President Aquino. The said PTC is a mere branch
formed under the Office of the President tasked to investigate
reports of graft and corruption committed by third-level public
officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and
accessories during the previous administration and submit their
findings and recommendations to the President, Congress and the
Ombudsman. However, PTC is not a quasi-judicial body, it cannot
adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle or render awards in disputes
between parties. Its job is to investigate, collect and asses
evidences gathered and make recommendations. It has subpoena powers
but it has no power to cite people in contempt or even arrest. It
cannot determine for such facts if probable cause exist as to
warrant the filing of an information in our courts of law.

Petitioners contends the Constitutionality of the E.O. on the

grounds that.
 It violates separation of powers as it arrogates the power of
Congress to create a public office and appropriate funds for its
operation;
The provisions of Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of the
Administrative Code of 1987 cannot legitimize E.O. No. 1 because
the delegated authority of the President to structurally reorganize
the Office of the President to achieve economy, simplicity, and
efficiency does not include the power to create an entirely new
office was inexistent like the Truth Commission;
The E.O illegally amended the Constitution when it made the
Truth Commission and vesting it the power duplicating and even
exceeding those of the Office of the Ombudsman and the DOJ.
It violates the equal protection clause

ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT the said E.O is unconstitutional.

RULING:
Yes, E.O No. 1 should be struck down as it is violative of the
equal protection clause. The Chief Executives power to create the
Ad hoc Investigating Committee cannot be doubted. Having been
constitutionally granted full control of the Executive Department,
to which respondents belong, the President has the obligation to
ensure that all executive officials and employees faithfully comply
with the law. With AO 298 as mandate, the legality of the
investigation is sustained. Such validity is not affected by the
fact that the investigating team and the PCAGC had the same
composition, or that the former used the offices and facilities of
the latter in conducting the inquiry.

OUIS BAROK C. BIRAGAO V. THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION OF 2010

G.R. No. 192935 & 193036, December 7, 2010
Mendoza, J.

FACTS:
At the dawn of administration, the President Benigno Simeon Aquino III, on July 30, 2010, signed
Executive Order No. 1 establishing the Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 (PTC). Barely a month
after the issuance of Executive order No. 1, the petitioners asked the Court to declare it unconstitutional
and to enjoin the PTC from performing its functions.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 violates the principle of separation of powers bu usurping the
powers of Congress to create and to appropriate funds for public offices, agencies and commissions.

HELD:

No. The creation of the PTC finds justification under Section 17, Article VII of the constitution, imposing
upon the President the duty to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed.

As correctly pointed out by the respondents, the allocation of power in the three principal branches of
government is a grant of all powers inherent them. The presidents power to conduct investigations to aid
him in ensuring the faithful execution of laws-in this case, fundamental laws on public accountability and
transparency- is inherent in the presidents powers as the Chief Executive. That the authority of the
President to conduct investigations and to create bodies to execute this power is not explicitly mentioned
in the constitution or in statutes does not mean that he is bereft of such authority.

Although the 1987 Constitution imposes limitations on the exercise of specific powers of the President, it
maintains intact what is traditionally considered as within the scope of executive power. Corollarily, the
powers of the President cannot be said to be limited only to the specific powers enumerated in the
constitution. In other words, executive power is more than the sum of specific powers so enumerated. It
has been advanced that whatever power inherent in the government that is neither legislative nor judicial
has to be executive.

The Chief Executives power to create the Ad hoc Investigating Committee cannot be doubted. Having
been constitutionally granted full control of the Executive Department, to which respondents belong, the
President has the obligation to ensure that all executive officials and employees faithfully comply with the
law.

Enrique Garcia vs
Executive Secretary (1992)
November 16, 2011
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ADVERTISEMENTS

211 SCRA 219 Political Law Congress Authorizing the President to Tax

In November 1990, President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order No. 438 which
imposed, in addition to any other duties, taxes and charges imposed by law on all articles
imported into the Philippines, an additional duty of 5% ad valorem tax. This additional duty
was imposed across the board on all imported articles, including crude oil and other oil
products imported into the Philippines. In 1991, EO 443 increased the additional duty to 9%.
In the same year, EO 475 was passed reinstating the previous 5% duty except that crude oil
and other oil products continued to be taxed at 9%. Enrique Garcia, a representative from
Bataan, avers that EO 475 and 478 are unconstitutional for they violate Section 24 of Article
VI of the Constitution which provides:

All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of
local application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of
Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments.

He contends that since the Constitution vests the authority to enact revenue bills in
Congress, the President may not assume such power by issuing Executive Orders Nos. 475
and 478 which are in the nature of revenue-generating measures.
ISSUE: Whether or not EO 475 and 478 are constitutional.

HELD: Under Section 24, Article VI of the Constitution, the enactment of appropriation,
revenue and tariff bills, like all other bills is, of course, within the province of the Legislative
rather than the Executive Department. It does not follow, however, that therefore Executive
Orders Nos. 475 and 478, assuming they may be characterized as revenue measures, are
prohibited to be exercised by the President, that they must be enacted instead by the
Congress of the Philippines.

Section 28(2) of Article VI of the Constitution provides as follows:

(2) The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits, and
subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export
quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of
the national development program of the Government.

There is thus explicit constitutional permission to Congress to authorize the President

subject to such limitations and restrictions as [Congress] may impose to fix within specific
limits tariff rates . . . and other duties or imposts . . . . In this case, it is the Tariff and
Customs Code which authorized the President ot issue the said EOs.

Garcia vs Executive
Secretary GR No 101273
03 July 1992

11 WednesdayMAR 2015

POSTED BY RACHEL CHAN IN CASE DIGESTS, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I

 LEAVE A COMMENT

Facts: Executive Order no 475 imposed an additional duty of 9% on crude oil and oil
products while Executive Order 478 imposed a special duty on crude oil and oil products.
Petitioners claimed that both EOs are unconstitutional because all revenue measures must
originate from the House of Representatives and the Tariff and Customs Code authorized the
president to increase the tariff duties only to protect local industries but not to raise
additional revenue for the government.

Issue: Whether or not the tariff rates imposed are valid?

Decision: Petition dismissed for lack of merit. The assailed Executive Orders are valid.
Congress may by law authorize the president to fit tariff rates and other duties within
specified limits. The issuance of these EOs authorized by Sections 104 and 401 of the Tariff
and Customs Code. There is nothing in the law that suggests that the authority may only be
exercised to protect local industries. Custom duties may be designated to achieve more than
one policy objective the protection of local industries and to raise revenue for the

government.

RUBEN DEL CASTILLO v. PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 185128, 30 January 2012,
THIRD DIVISION (Peralta, J.)
Having been established that the assistance of the barangay tanods was sought by the
police authorities who effected the searched warrant, the same barangay tanods
therefore acted as agents of persons in authority.

FACTS:

Police Officers headed by SPO3 Bienvenido Masnayon went to serve a search warrant from the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) to Petitioner Ruben Del Castillo in search of illegal drugs. Upon arrival, somebody
shouted raid which prompted the police officers to immediately disembark from the jeep they were riding
and go directly to Del Castillos house and cordoned it off. Police men found nothing incriminating in Del
Castillos residence, but one of the barangay tanods was able to confiscate from the hut several articles
including four (4) plastic packs of methamphetamine hydrochloride, or shabu.

An Information was filed before RTC against Del Castillo, charging him with violation of Section 16, Article
III of R.A. 6425 (The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972). During the arraignment, Del Castillo pleaded not
guilty. The RTC found Del Castillo guilty beyond reasonable of the charge against him in the information.
The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the decision.

Del Castillo appealed his case to the CA, insisting that there was a violation of his constitutional guaranty
against unreasonable searches and seizure. On the contrary, the Office of the Solicitor General argued
that the constitutional guaranty against unreasonable searches and seizure is applicable only against
government authorities. Hence, assuming that the items seized were found in another place not
designated in the search warrant, the same items should still be admissible as evidence because the one
who discovered them was a barangay tanod who is a private individual.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there was a violation of Del Castillos right against unreasonable searches and seizure

HELD:

Petition GRANTED.

It must be remembered that the warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched and
persons or things to be seized in order for it to be valid. A designation or description that points out the
place to be searched to the exclusion of all others, and on inquiry unerringly leads the peace officers to it,
satisfies the constitutional requirement of definiteness.

In the present case, the search warrant specifically designates or describes the residence of the petitioner
as the place to be searched. Incidentally, the items were seized by a barangay tanod in a nipa hut, 20
meters away from the residence of the Del Castillo. The confiscated items, having been found in a place
other than the one described in the search warrant, can be considered as fruits of an invalid warrantless
search, the presentation of which as an evidence is a violation of Del Castillos constitutional guaranty
against unreasonable searches and seizure.

The OSG argued that, assuming that the items seized were found in another place not designated in the
search warrant, the same items should still be admissible as evidence because the one who discovered
them was a barangay tanod who is a private individual, the constitutional guaranty against unreasonable
searches and seizure being applicable only against government authorities. The contention is devoid of
merit. It was testified to during trial by the police officers who effected the search warrant that they asked
the assistance of the barangay tanods. Having been established that the assistance of the barangay
tanods was sought by the police authorities who effected the search warrant, the same barangay tanods
therefore acted as agents of persons in authority. Article 152 of the Revised Penal Code defines persons
in authority and agents of persons in authority as any person directly vested with jurisdiction, whether as
an individual or as a member of some court or governmental corporation, board or commission, shall be
deemed a person in authority. A barangay captain and a barangay chairman shall also be deemed a
person in authority. A person who, by direct provision of law or by election or by appointment by
competent authority, is charged with the maintenance of public order and the protection and security of life
and property, such as barrio councilman, barrio policeman and barangay leader, and any person who
comes to the aid of persons in authority, shall be deemed an agent of a person in authority.

The Local Government Code also contains a provision which describes the function of a barangay tanod
as an agent of persons in authority. Section 388 of the Local Government Code reads: For purposes of
the Revised Penal Code, the punong barangay, sangguniang barangay members, and members of the
lupong tagapamayapa in each barangay shall be deemed as persons in authority in their jurisdictions,
while other barangay officials and members who may be designated by law or ordinance and charged
with the maintenance of public order, protection and security of life and property, or the maintenance of a
desirable and balanced environment, and any barangay member who comes to the aid of persons in
authority, shall be deemed agents of persons in authority.

By virtue of the above provisions, the police officers, as well as the barangay tanods were acting as
agents of a person in authority during the conduct of the search. Thus, the search conducted was
unreasonable and the confiscated items are inadmissible in evidence.

Socorro Ramirez vs. CA and Garcia [G.R. No.

93833. September 28, 1995]
15AUG
Ponente: KAPUNAN, J.

FACTS:

Petitioner made a secret recording of the conversation that was part of a civil case filed in the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City alleging that the private respondent, Ester S. Garcia, vexed, insulted and
humiliated her in a hostile and furious mood and in a manner offensive to petitioners dignity and
personality, contrary to morals, good customs and public policy.. Private respondent filed a criminal case
before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City for violation of Republic Act 4200, entitled An Act to prohibit
and penalize wire tapping and other related violations of private communication, and other purposes.
Petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the Information. The trial court granted the said motion. The private
respondent filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with the Supreme Court, which referred the case to
the Court of Appeals in a Resolution. Respondent Court of Appeals promulgated its decision declaring the
trial courts order as null and void, after subsequently denied the motion for reconsideration by the
petitioner.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the applicable provision of Republic Act 4200 does not apply to the taping of a private
conversation by one of the parties to the conversation.

HELD:

NO. Petition denied. Costs against petitioner.

RATIO:

Legislative intent is determined principally from the language of the statute.

The unambiguity of the express words of the provision, taken together with the above-quoted
deliberations from the Congressional Record, therefore plainly supports the view held by the respondent
court that the provision seeks to penalize even those privy to the private communications. Where the law
makes no distinctions, one does not distinguish.

[P]etitioners contention that the phrase private communication in Section 1 of R.A. 4200 does not
include private conversations narrows the ordinary meaning of the word communication to a point of
absurdity.

Navarro vs. Court of Appeals, 313 SCRA 153

(1999)
FACTS:
Two local media men, Stanley Jalbuena, Enrique Lingan, in Lucena City wnet to the police station to
report alledged indecent show in one of the night establishment shows in the City. At the station, a heated
confrontation followed between victim Lingan and accused policeman Navarro who was then having
drinks outside the headquarters, lead to a fisticuffs. The victim was hit with the handle of the
accused's gun below the left eyebrow, followed by a fist blow, resulted the victim to fell and died under
treatment. The exchange of words was recorded on tape, specifically the frantic exclamations made by
Navarro after the altercation that it was the victim who provoked the fight. During the trial, Jalbuena, the
other media man , testified. Presented in evidence to confirm his testimony was a voice recording he had
made of the heated discussion at the police station between the accused police officer Navarro and the
deceased, Lingan, which was taken without the knowledge of the two.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the voice recording is admissible in evidence in view of RA 4200, which prohibits
wire tapping.

2. Whether the mitigating circumstances of sufficient provocation or threat on the part of the offended
party and lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong may be appreciated in favor of the accused.

HELD:
1. The answer is affirmative, the tape is admissible in view of RA 4200, which prohibits wire
tapping. Jalbuena's testimony is confirmed by the voice recording he had made.

The law prohibits the overhearing, intercepting, or recording of private communications (Ramirez v
Cpourt of Appeals, 248 SCRA 590 [1995]). Snce the exchange between petitioner Navarro and Lingan
was not private, its tape recording is not prohibited.

2. The remarks of Lingan, which immediately preceded the acts of the accused, constituted sufficient
provocation. Provocation is said to be any unjust or improper conduct of the offended party capable of
exciting, annoying or irritating someone. The provocation must be sufficient and must immediately
precede the act; and in order to be sufficient, it must be adequate to excite a person to commit the wrong,
which must be accordingly proportionate in gravity. The mitigating circumstance of lack of intention to
commit so grave a wrong must also be considered. The exclamations made by Navarro after the scuffle
that it was Lingan who provoked him showed that he had no intent to kill the latter.

Posted by Ariel Lopez at 6:42 PM

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Navarro vs Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 121087)

Facts:
 Petitioner Navarro and Lingan had a heated altercation. As Lingan was about to
turn away, petitioner Navarro hit him with the handle of his pistol above the left
eyebrow. Lingan fell on the floor, blood flowing down his face. He tried to get up, but
petitioner Navarro gave him a fist blow on the forehead which floored him.

Capt. Coronado, the station commander, called petitioner Navarro to his office,
while a policeman took Lingan to the Quezon Memorial Hospital. The station manager
of DWTI, Boy Casaada, arrived and, learning that Lingan had been taken to the
hospital, proceeded there. But Lingan died from his injuries.

Issue:

Whether or not there is an intention to kill on the part of the accused?

Decision:

The remarks of Lingan, which immediately preceded the act of petitioner,

constituted sufficient provocation. In People v. Macaso, we appreciated this mitigating
circumstance in favor of the accused, a policeman, who shot a motorist after the latter
had repeatedly taunted him with defiant words. Hence, this mitigating circumstance
should be considered in favor of petitioner Navarro.
Furthermore, the mitigating circumstance that the offender had no intention to commit
so grave a wrong as that committed should also be appreciated in favor of
petitioner. The frantic exclamations of petitioner Navarro after the scuffle, that it was
Lingan who provoked him shows that he had no intent to kill the latter. Thus, this
mitigating circumstance should be taken into account in determining the penalty that
should be imposed on petitioner Navarro.

The allowance of this mitigating circumstance is consistent with the rule that
criminal liability shall be incurred by any person committing a felony although the
wrongful act done be different from that which he intended. In People v. Castro, the
mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong as that committed
was appreciated in favor of the accused while finding him guilty of homicide.
Pollo vs. Constantino-David Digest
G.R. No. 181881: October 18, 2011

BRICCIO "Ricky" A. POLLO, Petitioner, v. CHAIRPERSON KARINA CONSTANTINO-

DAVID, DIRECTOR IV RACQUEL DE GUZMAN BUENSALIDA, DIRECTOR IVLYDIA A.
CASTILLO, DIRECTOR III ENGELBERT ANTHONY D. UNITE AND THE CIVIL SERVICE
COMMISSION, Respondents.

FACTS:

Petitioner is a former Supervising Personnel Specialist of the CSC Regional Office No. IV
and also the Officer-in-Charge of the Public Assistance and Liaison Division (PALD) under
the"Mamamayan Muna Hindi Mamaya Na" program of the CSC.

An unsigned letter-complaint addressed to respondent CSC Chairperson

Karina Constantino-David marked "Confidential" was sent through a courier service. Acting
upon the letter-complaint,Chairperson David immediately formed a team of four personnel
with background in information technology (IT), and issued a memo directing them to
conduct an investigation and specifically "to back up all the files in the computers found in
the Mamamayan Muna (PALD) and Legal divisions."

The backing-up of all files in the hard disk of computers at the PALD and Legal Services
Division (LSD) was witnessed by several employees, together with Directors Castillo and
Unite who closely monitored said activity. At around 6:00 p.m., Director Unite sent text
messages to petitioner and the head of LSD, who were both out of the office at the time,
informing them of the ongoing copying of computer files in their divisions upon orders of the
CSC Chair.Petitioner replied also thru text message that he was leaving the matter to
Director Unite and that he will just get a lawyer.

The contents of the diskettes were examined by the CSCs Office for Legal Affairs (OLA).It
was found that most of the files in the 17 diskettes containing files copied from the computer
assigned to and being used by the petitioner, numbering about 40 to 42 documents, were
draft pleadings or lettersin connection with administrative cases in the CSC and other
tribunals. On the basis of this finding, Chairperson David issued the Show-Cause
Order requiring the petitioner, who had gone on extended leave, to submit his explanation
or counter-affidavit within five days from notice.

Petitioner filed his Comment, denying that he is the person referred to in the anonymous
letter-complaint which had no attachments to it, because he is not a lawyer and neither is he
"lawyering" for people with cases in the CSC.He accused CSC officials of conducting a
"fishing expedition" when they unlawfully copied and printed personal files in his computer,
and subsequently asking him to submit his comment which violated his right against self-
incrimination.He asserted that he had protested the unlawful taking of his computer done
while he was on leave, that the files in his computer were his personal files and those of his
sister, relatives, friends and some associates and that he is not authorizing their sealing,
copying, duplicating and printing as these would violate his constitutional right to privacy
and protection against self-incrimination and warrantless search and seizure.

He pointed out that though government property, the temporary use and ownership of the
computer issued under a Memorandum of Receipt (MR) is ceded to the employee who may
exercise all attributes of ownership, including its use for personal purposes.

As to the anonymous letter, petitioner argued that it is not actionable as it failed to comply
with the requirements of a formal complaint under the Uniform Rules on Administrative
Cases in the Civil Service (URACC).In view of the illegal search, the files/documents copied
from his computer without his consent is thus inadmissible as evidence, being "fruits of a
poisonous tree."

The CSC then issued Resolution No. 070382 finding prima facie case against the petitioner
and charging him with Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, Conduct Prejudicial to the Best
Interest of the Service and Violation of R.A. No. 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees).

Petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion (For Reconsideration, to Dismiss and/or to Defer)

assailing the formal charge as without basis having proceeded from an illegal search which
is beyond the authority of the CSC Chairman, such power pertaining solely to the court. The
CSC denied the omnibus motion and resolved to treat the said motion as petitioners
answer.

Due to non-existent jurisprudence, the CSC thus turned to relevant rulings of the United
States Supreme Court, and cited the leading case ofOConnor v. Ortegaas authority for the
view that government agencies, in their capacity as employers, rather than law enforcers,
could validly conduct search and seizure in the governmental workplace without meeting
the "probable cause" or warrant requirement for search and seizure.Another ruling cited by
the CSC is the more recent case ofUnited States v. Mark L. Simonswhich declared that the
federal agencys computer use policy foreclosed any inference of reasonable expectation of
privacy on the part of its employees.

On appeal, the CA dismissed the petition for certiorari after finding no grave abuse of
discretion committed by respondents CSC officials.The CA held that: (1) petitioner was not
charged on the basis of the anonymous letter but from the initiative of the CSC after a fact-
finding investigation was conducted and the results thereof yielded aprima faciecase
against him; (2) it could not be said that in ordering the back-up of files in petitioners
computer and later confiscating the same, Chairperson David had encroached on the
authority of a judge in view of the CSC computer policy declaring the computers as
government property and that employee-users thereof have no reasonable expectation of
privacy in anything they create, store, send, or receive on the computer system; and (3)
there is nothing contemptuous in CSCs act of proceeding with the formal investigation as
there was no restraining order or injunction issued by the CA.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner is entitled to avail the right to privacy over his computer
and electronic files as a government employee.

HELD:

Petitioner failed to prove that he had an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy either in
his office or government-issued computer which contained his personal files.Petitioner did
not allege that he had a separate enclosed office which he did not share with anyone, or
that his office was always locked and not open to other employees or visitors.Neither did he
allege that he used passwords or adopted any means to prevent other employees from
accessing his computer files.On the contrary, he submits that being in the public assistance
office of the CSC-ROIV, he normally would have visitors in his office like friends, associates
and even unknown people, whom he even allowed to use his computer which to him
seemed a trivial request.

The court made an analysis on the landmark case of OConnor v. Ortega and United States
v. Simmons, laying the principle of balancing the right to privacy by an employee against
searches made by the employer, who in this case is also the government. According to the
Court, OConnor emphasized that "a probable cause requirement for searches of the type at
issue here would impose intolerable burdens on public employers.The delay in correcting
the employee misconduct caused by the need for probable cause rather than reasonable
suspicion will be translated into tangible and often irreparable damage to the agencys
work,and ultimately to the public interest."

Care must therefore be made in ensuring that a standard of reasonableness. There must be
reasonable grounds present before the exception may be applied such as suspecting that
the search will turn up evidence that the employee is guilty of work-related misconduct, or
that the search is necessary for a noninvestigatory work-related purpose such as to retrieve
a needed file is.

The CSC in this case had implemented a policy that put its employees on notice that they
have no expectation of privacy inanythingthey create, store, send or receive on the office
computers, and that the CSC may monitor the use of the computer resources using both
automated or by human means.An Office Memorandum No. 10, S. 2002 "Computer Use
Policy (CUP)" explicitly provided for such. This implied therefore, that on-the-spot
inspections may be done to ensure that the computer resources were used only for such
legitimate business purposes.

The search of petitioners computer files was conducted in connection with investigation of
work-related misconduct prompted by an anonymous letter-complaint addressed to
Chairperson David regarding anomalies in the CSC-ROIV where the head of the
Mamamayan Muna Hindi Mamaya Na division is supposedly "lawyering" for individuals with
pending cases in the CSC. A search by a government employer of an employees office is
justified at inception when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that it will turn up
evidence that the employee is guilty of work-related misconduct.
Remedial Law: This case must also be contrasted from Anonymous Letter-Complaint
against Atty. Miguel Morales, Clerk of Court, Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila (571 SCRA
361) because the latter involves the inspection of a personal computer from which a
government employee may expect reasonable privacy with his communications. Petitioners
computer is government property and the use of which the CSC has absolute right to
regulate and monitor. Therefore, any evidence found on petitioners computer is admissible
against him.

FACTS:

Petitioners Jose Jesus M. Disini, Jr., Rowena S. Disini, Lianne Ivy P. Medina, Janette Toral and Ernesto Sonido, Jr.,
as taxpayers, file a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the
petitioners seek to 1) nullify Sections 4(c)(4), 6, 7, 12 and 19 of RA 10175, otherwise known as the Cybercrime
Prevention Act of 2012 for violating the fundamental rights protected under the Constitution; and 2) prohibit the
Respondents, singly and collectively, from enforcing the afore-mentioned provisions of the Cybercrime Act.

Named as Respondents are the Secretary of Justice, the Secretary of the Interior and Local Government, the
Executive Director of the Information Communications Technology Office, the Chief of the Philippine National
Police, and the Director of the National Bureau of Investigation.

ISSUES/GROUNDS:

1. Sections 4(c)(4), 6, 7, 12 and 19 of The Cybercrime Act violate the petitioners constitutionally protected
rights to freedom of expression, due process, equal protection, privacy of communications, as well as the
Constitutional sanctions against double jeopardy, undue delegation of legislative authority and the right
against unreasonable searches and seizure;

o Sections 6 and 7 of the Cybercrime Act more than doubles the liability for imprisonment for any
violation of existing penal laws are in violation of the petitioners right against Double Jeopardy;

o Section 12 of the Cybercrime Act, which permits the NBI and the PNP with due cause to
engage in real time collection of traffic data without the benefit of the intervention of a judge,
violates the Petitioners Constitutionally-protected right to be free from unreasonable searches
and seizure as well as the right to the privacy of communications;

o Section 19 of the Cybercrime Act, which authorizes the Respondent Secretary of DOJ to block
or restrict access to any content upon a prima facie finding that the same violates the law,
contains an undue delegation of legislative authority, infringes upon the judicial power of the
judiciary, and violates the Petitioners Constitutionally-protected right to due process and
freedom of expression; and

o Section 4(c)(4) defines libel as a cybercrime and in relation to Section 6 of the law increased
the penalty from 6 months to 4 years and 2 months to the greater period of 6 years to 10 years,
infringes upon the right to freedom of expression and also restricts the freedom of the press.
Under Section 12, a prima facie finding by the Secretary of DOJ can trigger an order directed at
service providers to block access to the said material without the benefit of a trial or a
conviction. Thus, RA 10175 infringes upon the right to freedom of expression and also restricts
 the freedom of the press. The increased penalties, plus the ease by which allegedly libelous
materials can be removed from access, work together as a chilling effect upon protected
speech.

2. No other plain, speedy, or adequate remedy in the court of law, and that this Petition is therefore
cognizable by the SCs judicial power under Article VIII, Section 1 par. 2 of the Constitution and pursuant
to Rule 65, Sec. 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended.

ARGUMENTS/DISCUSSIONS:

1. The Cybercrime Act Violates Free Speech:

o imposes heavier penalties for online libel than paper-based libel; single act of online libel will
result in two convictions penalized separately under the RP and the Cybercrime Act;

o online libel under the Cybercrime Act will ensure the imprisonment of the accused and for a
much longer period. Such changes will result in a chilling effect upon the freedom of speech;

o with the passage of the Cybercrime Act, Senator Vicente Sotto IIIs earlier threat to criminally
prosecute all bloggers and internet users who were critical of his alleged plagiarism of online
materials for use in his speech against the Reproductive Health Bill became real; threat of
criminal prosecution under RA 10175 will work to preclude people such as Petitioners from
posting social commentaries online, thus creating a chilling effect upon the freedom of
expression;

o gives the DOJ Secretary blanket authority to restrain and block access to content whether
authored by private citizens or the organized press sans any hearing of any kind but merely upon
a mere prima facie showing that a particular Internet article constitutes online libel;

o respondents must demonstrate how the Cybercrime Act will fare under strict scrutiny

2. Sections 6 and 7 of the Cybercrime Act violate the Double Jeopardy and Equal Protection Clauses of the
Constitution:

o Persons who commit crimes using information and communication technologies (ICTs) face the
possibility of being imprisoned more than double the imprisonment laid down in the RPC or
special law, simply by the passage of the Cybercrime Act;

o the cybercrimes defined and punished under Section 6 of the Act are absolutely identical to the
crimes defined in the RPC and special laws which raises the possibility that an accused will be
punished twice for the same offense in violation of the Constitution;

o Congress created a class of offenders who commit crimes by, through or with the use of ICTs
in violation of the equal protection clause

3. The Real Time Collection of Traffic Date Violate the Right to Privacy and the Right Against Unreasonable
Searches and Seizure:

o No compelling state interest that justifies real time collection of data; the authority vested on
the Philippine National Police and the National Bureau of Investigation to collect data is not
bounded by any reasonable standard except due cause which presumably, the PNP and NBI will
determine for itself;

o While the privacy of suspected terrorists, through the Human Security Act, are protected by
the intervention of the Court of Appeals before surveillance operations are conducted, the
privacy of all citizens may be infringed without judicial participation in the Cybercrime Act;
 o Neither the PNP nor the NBI is required to justify the incursion into the right to privacy;

o No limits imposed upon the PNP or the NBI since they can lawfully collect traffic data at all times
without interruption;

o No stated justification for this warrant-free unlimited incursion into the privacy of citizens

4. The Respondent DOJ Secretarys Take Down Authority under Section 19 of the Cybercrime Act violates Due
Process and is an Undue Delegation of Legislative Authority

o The DOJ Secretarys overwhelming powers to order the restriction or blocking of access to
certain content upon a mere prima facie finding without any need for a judicial determination is
in clear violation of petitioners Constitutionally protected right to due process;

o The Cybercrime Act contemplates that the respondent DOJ Secretary will be judge, jury and
executioner of all cybercrime-related complaints;

o To consider that all penal provisions in all specials laws are cybercrimes under Section 6, it
follows that:

1. Complaints filed by intellectual property rights owners may be acted upon the
Respondent DOJ Secretary to block access to websites and content upon a mere prima
facie showing of an infringement;

2. Foreign sites (e.g. Amazon.com) offering goods on retail to Philippine citizens may be
blocked for violating the Retail Trade Law;

3. Foreign service providers such as Skype may be blocked from offering voice services
without securing a license from the National Telecommunications Communication;

4. YouTube video may be blocked for presumably violating the IP Code.

o The Cybercrime Act fails the two tests laid down by the Court in Abakada Guro Party List v.
Purisima (GR No. 166715) to determine the validity of delegation of legislative power: (1) the
completeness test and (2) the sufficient standard test

1. Nowhere in the Cybercrime Acts declaration of policy does it lay down the legislative
policy with respect to the blocking of content. No limits upon the takedown power of
the respondent DOJ Secretary;

2. Prima facie standard is not enough to prevent the DOJ Secretary from exercising infinite
discretion and becoming the supreme authority in the Philippine Internet landscape.

PRAYER:

1. Declare null and void, for being unconstitutional, Sections 4(c)(4), 6, 7, 12 and 19 of RA 10175;

2. Prohibit all Respondents from implementing Sections 4(c)(4), 6, 7, 12 and 19 of RA 10175;

3. Issue a TRO enjoining the Respondents from implementing Sections 4

JOSE JESUS M. DISINI, JR., ET AL. v. THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, ET
AL., G.R. No. 203335, FEBRUARY 18, 2014
Constitutional law; Unsolicited commercial communications, also known as spam is entitled to
protection under freedom of expression. To prohibit the transmission of unsolicited ads would deny a
person the right to read his emails, even unsolicited commercial ads addressed to him. Commercial
speech is a separate category of speech which is not accorded the same level of protection as that
given to other constitutionally guaranteed forms of expression but is nonetheless entitled to
protection. The State cannot rob him of this right without violating the constitutionally guaranteed
freedom of expression. Unsolicited advertisements are legitimate forms of expression.
Criminal law; Cyberlibel under Section 4(c)(4) of the Cybercrime Law is constitutional. The Court
agrees with the Solicitor General that libel is not a constitutionally protected speech and that the
government has an obligation to protect private individuals from defamation. Indeed, cyberlibel is
actually not a new crime since Article 353, in relation to Article 355 of the Penal Code, already
punishes it. In effect, Section 4(c)(4) above merely affirms that online defamation constitutes similar
means for committing libel. But the Courts acquiescence goes only insofar as the cybercrime law
penalizes the author of the libelous statement or article. Cyberlibel brings with it certain intricacies,
unheard of when the Penal Code provisions on libel were enacted. The culture associated with
internet media is distinct from that of print.
Criminal law; Section 5 of the Cybercrime Law that punishes aiding or abetting libel on the
cyberspace is a nullity. The terms aiding or abetting constitute broad sweep that generates chilling
effect on those who express themselves through cyberspace posts, comments, and other messages.
Its vagueness raises apprehension on the part of internet users because of its obvious chilling effect
on the freedom of expression, especially since the crime of aiding or abetting ensnares all the actors
in the cyberspace front in a fuzzy way. What is more, as the petitioners point out, formal crimes such
as libel are not punishable unless consummated. In the absence of legislation tracing the interaction
of netizens and their level of responsibility such as in other countries, Section 5, in relation to Section
4(c)(4) on Libel, Section 4(c)(3) on Unsolicited Commercial Communications, and Section 4(c)(2) on
Child Pornography, cannot stand scrutiny.