Torts Part 2 For Alex Baby

Mariano C.
Mendoza and Elvira Lim vs Spouses Leonora and Gabriel Gomez

Topic: Liability of a registered owner of a vehicle
FACTS: As a result of a vehicular collision resulting from the drivers negligence, respondents suffered
physical injuries and the Isuzu truck sustained extensive damages. Hence, this case for damages.
Respondents argued that although the registered owner of the bus was Lim, the actual owner of the
bus was Cirilo Enriquez (Enriquez), who had the bus attached with Mayamy Transportation Company
(Mayamy Transport) under the socalled "kabit system." Respondents then impleaded both Lim and
Enriquez.
ISSUE: Who is liable? Who is deemed as Mendozas (driver) employer? Is it Enriquez, the actual owner
of the bus or Lim, the registered owner of the bus?
RULING:
The registered owner is deemed the employer of the negligent driver, and is thus vicariously liable
under Article 2176, in relation to Article 2180, of the Civil Code. The registered owner of the motor
vehicle is the employer of the negligent driver, and the actual employer is considered merely as an
agent of such owner. Thus, whether there is an employer-employee relationship between the registered
owner and the driver is irrelevant in determining the liability of the registered owner who the law holds
primarily and directly responsible for any accident, injury or death caused by the operation of the
vehicle in the streets and highways
As such, there can be no other conclusion but to hold Lim vicariously liable with Mendoza.
This does not mean, however, that Lim is left without any recourse against Enriquez and Mendoza.
Under the civil law principle of unjust enrichment, the registered owner of the motor vehicle has a
right to be indemnified by the actual employer of the driver; and under Article 2181 of the Civil Code,
whoever pays for the damage caused by his dependents or employees may recover from the latter
what he has paid or delivered in satisfaction of the claim.
[Supplementary Notes:]
Generally, when an injury is caused by the negligence of a servant or employee, there instantly arises a
presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of the master or employer either in the
selection of the servant or employee (culpa in eligiendo) or in the supervision over him after the
selection (culpa vigilando), or both.
The presumption is juris tantum and not juris et de jure; consequently, it may be rebutted. Accordingly,
the general rule is that if the employer shows to the satisfaction of the court that in the selection and
supervision of his employee he has exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family, the
presumption is overcome and he is relieved of liability.
However, with the enactment of the motor vehicle registration law, the defenses available under Article
2180 of the Civil Code that the employee acts beyond the scope of his assigned task or that it
exercised the due diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage are no longer available
to the registered owner of the motor vehicle, because the motor vehicle registration law, to a certain
extent, modified Article 2180.
(Basically, as long as youre the registered owner of the vehicle, you along with the driver are liable.)
**Caravan Travels and Tours vs Abejar 2016 (UGH DI KO TALAGA MAHANAP )
Filamer Christian Institute vs. IAC| Gutierrez G.R. No. 75112, August 17, 1992 |
FACTS
Funtecha was a working student, being a part-time janitor and a scholar of petitioner Filamer. He
was, in relation to the school, an employee even if he was assigned to clean the school premises
for only two (2) hours in the morning of each school day.
Having a student driver's license, Funtecha requested the school driver, Allan Masa, and was
allowed, to take over the vehicle while the latter was on his way home one late afternoon.
The place where Allan lives is also the house of his father, the school president, Agustin Masa.
Moreover, it is also the house where Funtecha was allowed free board while he was a student of
Filamer Christian Institute.
Allan Masa turned over the vehicle to Funtecha only after driving down a road, negotiating a sharp
dangerous curb, and viewing that the road was clear.
According to Allan's testimony, a fast moving truck with glaring lights nearly hit them so that they
had to swerve to the right to avoid a collision. Upon swerving, they heard a sound as if
something had bumped against the vehicle, but they did not stop to check. Actually, the Pinoy
jeep swerved towards the pedestrian, Potenciano Kapunan who was walking in his lane in the
direction against vehicular traffic, and hit him.
Allan affirmed that Funtecha followed his advise to swerve to the right. At the time of the incident
(6:30 P.M.) in Roxas City, the jeep had only one functioning headlight.
The Court is constrained to conclude that the act of Funtecha in taking over the steering wheel was
one done for and in behalf of his employer for which act the petitioner-school cannot deny any
responsibility by arguing that it was done beyond the scope of his janitorial duties. The clause
"within the scope of their assigned tasks" for purposes of raising the presumption of liability of
an employer, includes any act done by an employee, in furtherance of the interests of the
employer or for the account of the employer at the time of the infliction of the injury or damage.
Driving the vehicle to and from the house of the school president where both Allan and Funtecha
reside is an act in furtherance of the interest of the petitioner-school. Allan's job demands that
he drive home the school jeep so he can use it to fetch students in the morning of the next
school day.
In learning how to drive while taking the vehicle home in the direction of Allan's house, Funtecha
definitely was not having a joy ride. Funtecha was not driving for the purpose of his enjoyment
or for a "frolic of his own" but ultimately, for the service for which the jeep was intended by the
petitioner school.
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS
W/N Filamer is liable as Funtechas employer.
HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI
Yes, Filamer is liable
There is evidence to show that there exists in the present case an extra-contractual obligation
arising from the negligence or reckless imprudence of a person "whose acts or omissions are
imputable, by a legal fiction, to other(s) who are in a position to exercise an absolute or limited
control over (him)."
Funtecha is an employee of petitioner Filamer. He need not have an official appointment for a
driver's position in order that the petitioner may be held responsible for his grossly negligent
act, it being sufficient that the act of driving at the time of the incident was for the benefit of the
petitioner.
Hence, the fact that Funtecha was not the school driver or was not acting within the scope of his
janitorial duties does not relieve the petitioner of the burden of rebutting the presumption juris
tantum that there was negligence on its part either in the selection of a servant or employee, or
in the supervision over him. The petitioner has failed to show proof of its having exercised the
required diligence of a good father of a family over its employees Funtecha and Allan.
An employer is expected to impose upon its employees the necessary discipline called for in the
performance of any act indispensable to the business and beneficial to their employer. In the
present case, the petitioner has not shown that it has set forth such rules and guidelines as
would prohibit any one of its employees from taking control over its vehicles if one is not the
official driver or prohibiting the driver and son of the Filamer president from authorizing another
employee to drive the school vehicle. Furthermore, the petitioner has failed to prove that it had
imposed sanctions or warned its employees against the use of its vehicles by persons other than
the driver.
The actual driver of the school jeep, Allan Masa, was not made a party defendant in the civil case
for damages. As far as the injured pedestrian, plaintiff Potenciano Kapunan, was concerned, it
was Funtecha who was the one driving the vehicle and presumably was one authorized by the
school to drive. For the purpose of recovering damages under the prevailing circumstances, it is
enough that the plaintiff and the private respondent heirs were able to establish the existence of
employer-employee relationship between Funtecha and petitioner Filamer and the fact that
Funtecha was engaged in an act not for an independent purpose of his own but in furtherance of
the business of his employer. A position of responsibility on the part of the petitioner has thus
been satisfactorily demonstrated.
Castilex vs. Vasquez | Kapunan G.R. No. 129329, July 31, 2001 | 362 SCRA 56
FACTS
On 28 August 1988, at around 1:30 to 2:00 in the morning, Romeo So Vasquez, was driving a Honda
motorcycle around Fuente Osmea Rotunda. He was traveling counter-clockwise, (the normal flow of
traffic in a rotunda) but without any protective helmet or goggles. He was also only carrying a Student's
Permit to Drive at the time. Upon the other hand, Benjamin Abad was a production manager of Castilex
Industrial Corporation, registered owner of the Toyota Hi-Lux Pick-up with plate no. GBW-794 which
Abad drove car out of a parking lot. Instead of going around the Osmea rotunda he went against the
flow of the traffic in proceeding to his route to General Maxilom St. or to Belvic St.. The motorcycle of
Vasquez and the pick-up of Abad collided with each other causing severe injuries to Vasquez.
Abad stopped his vehicle and brought Vasquez to the Southern Islands Hospital and later to the Cebu
Doctor's Hospital. On September 5, 1988, Vasquez died at the Cebu Doctor's Hospital. Abad signed an
acknowledgment of Responsible Party
wherein he agreed to pay whatever hospital bills, professional fees and other incidental charges
Vasquez may incur.
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS
W/N Castilex as employer of Abad can be held liable with Abad.
No.
The fifth paragraph of article 2180 states Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their
employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the
former are not engaged in any business or industry.
In order for this paragraph to apply, it must be shown that the employee was acting within the scope of
his assigned tasks. Here it was not sufficiently proven that suchwas the case.
Jurisprudence provides:
o An employee who uses his employer's vehicle in going from his work to a place where he intends to
eat or in returning to work from a meal is not ordinarily acting within the scope of his employment in
the absence of evidence of some special business benefit to the employer. There has to be Evidence
that by using the employer's vehicle to go to and from meals, an employee is
enabled to reduce his time-off and so devote more time to the performance of his duties supports the
finding that an employee is acting within the scope of his employment while so driving the vehicle.
o Traveling to and from the place of work is ordinarily a personal problem or concern of the employee,
and not a part of his services to his employer.
**De Leon Brokerage V Ca Digest 1967 (UGH DI KO TALAGA MAHANAP )
Merrit vs. Government of the Philippine Islands

FACTS
When the plaintiff, riding on a motorcycle, was going toward the western part of Calle Padre
Faura, passing along the west side thereof at a speed of ten to twelve miles an hour, upon crossing Taft
Avenue and when he was ten feet from the southwestern intersection of said streets, the General
Hospital ambulance, upon reaching said avenue, instead of turning toward the south, after passing the
center thereof, so that it would be on the left side of said avenue, as is prescribed by the ordinance and
the Motor Vehicle Act, turned suddenly and unexpectedly and long before reaching the center of the
street, into the right side of Taft Avenue, without having sounded any whistle or horn, by which
movement it struck the plaintiff, who was already six feet from the southwestern point or from the post
place there.
By reason of the resulting collision, the plaintiff was so severely injured that, according to Dr.
Saleeby, who examined him on the very same day that he was taken to the General Hospital, he was
suffering from a depression in the left parietal region, a would in the same place and in the back part of
his head, while blood ISSUEd from his nose and he was entirely unconscious.
As a consequence of the loss the plaintiff suffered in the efficiency of his work as a contractor,
he had to dissolved the partnership he had formed with the engineer. Wilson, because he was
incapacitated from making mathematical calculations on account of the condition of his leg and of his
mental faculties, and he had to give up a contract he had for the construction of the Uy Chaco building.
As the negligence which caused the collision is a tort committed by an agent or employee of the
Government, the inquiry at once arises whether the Government is legally-liable for the damages
resulting therefrom.
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS
W/N the Government is liable?
Paragraph 5 of article 1903 of the Civil Code reads:
The state is liable in this sense when it acts through a special agent, but not when the damage should
have been caused by the official to whom properly it pertained to do the act performed, in which case
the provisions of the preceding article shall be applicable.
The supreme court of Spain in defining the scope of this paragraph said:
That the obligation to indemnify for damages which a third person causes to another by his fault
or negligence is based, as is evidenced by the same Law 3, Title 15, Partida 7, on that the person
obligated, by his own fault or negligence, takes part in the act or omission of the third party who
caused the damage. It follows therefrom that the state, by virtue of such provisions of law, is not
responsible for the damages suffered by private individuals in consequence of acts performed by its
employees in the discharge of the functions pertaining to their office, because neither fault nor even
negligence can be presumed on the part of the state in the organization of branches of public service
and in the appointment of its agents; on the contrary, we must presuppose all foresight humanly
possible on its part in order that each branch of service serves the general weal an that of private
persons interested in its operation. Between these latter and the state, therefore, no relations of a
private nature governed by the civil law can arise except in a case where the state acts as a judicial
person capable of acquiring rights and contracting obligations. (Supreme Court of Spain, January 7,
1898; 83 Jur. Civ., 24.)
It is, therefore, evidence that the State (the Government of the Philippine Islands) is only liable,
according to the above quoted decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain, for the acts of its agents,
officers and employees when they act as special agents within the meaning of paragraph 5 of article
1903, supra, and that the chauffeur of the ambulance of the General Hospital was not such an agent.
Fontanilla vs. Maliaman | Paras G.R. No. L-55963, December 1, 1989|

FACTS
It appears that on August 21, 1976 at about 6:30 P.M., a pickup owned and operated by respondent
National Irrigation Administration, a government agency bearing Plate No. IN-651, then driven officially
by Hugo Garcia, an employee of said agency as its regular driver, bumped a bicycle ridden by Francisco
Fontanilla, son of herein petitioners, and Restituto Deligo, at Maasin, San Jose City along the Maharlika
Highway. As a result of the impact, Francisco Fontanilla and Restituto Deligo were
injured and brought to the San Jose City Emergency Hospital for treatment. Fontanilla was later
transferred to the Cabanatuan Provincial Hospital where he died.
Garcia was then a regular driver of respondent National Irrigation Administration who, at the time of the
accident, was a licensed professional driver and who qualified for employment as such regular driver of
respondent after having passed
the written and oral examinations on traffic rules and maintenance of vehicles given by National
Irrigation Administration authorities.
This petition is an off-shot of the action (Civil Case No. SJC-56) instituted by petitioners-spouses on April
17, 1978 against respondent NIA before the then Court of First Instance of San Jose City, for damages in
connection with the death of their
son resulting from the accident.
The trial court rendered judgment which directed respondent National Irrigation Administration to pay
damages (death benefits) and actual expenses to petitioners
Respondent National Irrigation Administration thus appealed said decision to the Court of Appeals
Instead of filing the required brief in the aforecited Court of Appeals case, petitioners filed the instant
petition with this Court.
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS
W/N the award of moral damages, exemplary damages and attorney's fees is legally proper in a
complaint for damages based on quasi-delict which resulted in the death of the son of herein
petitioners.
Yes.
Art. 2176 thus provides:

Whoever by act omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay
for damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between
theparties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of
Paragraphs 5 and 6 of Art. 21 80 read as follows:
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting
within the scope of their assigned tasks, even the though the former are not engaged in any business
or industry.
The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special agent.; but not when the damage
has been caused by the official to whom the task done properly pertains, in which case what is provide
in Art. 2176 shall be applicable.
The liability of the State has two aspects. namely:

1. Its public or governmental aspects where it is liable for the tortious acts of special
agents only.
2. Its private or business aspects (as when it engages in private enterprises) where it becomes
liable as an ordinary employer. (p. 961, Civil Code of the Philippines; Annotated, Paras; 1986 Ed. ).
In this jurisdiction, the State assumes a limited liability for the damage caused by the tortious acts or
conduct of its special agent.
Under the aforequoted paragrah 6 of Art. 2180, the State has voluntarily assumed liability for acts done
through special agents. The State's agent, if a public official, must not only be specially commissioned
to do a particular task but that such task must be foreign to said official's usual governmental
functions. If the State's agent is not a public official, and is commissioned to perform non-governmental
functions, then the State assumes the role of an ordinary employer and will be held liable as such for its
agent's tort. Where the government commissions a private individual for a special governmental task, it
is acting through a special agent within the meaning of the provision. (Torts and Damages, Sangco, p.
347, 1984 Ed.)
Certain functions and activities, which can be performed only by the government, are more or less
generally agreed to be "governmental" in character, and so the State is immune from tort liability. On
the other hand, a service which might as well be provided by a private corporation, and particularly
when it collects revenues from it, the function is considered a "proprietary" one, as to which there may
be liability for the torts of agents within the scope of their employment.
The National Irrigation Administration is an agency of the government exercising proprietary functions,
by express provision of Rep. Act No. 3601
Indubitably, the NIA is a government corporation with juridical personality and not a mere agency of the
government. Since it is a corporate body performing non-governmental functions, it now becomes liable
for the damage caused by the accident resulting from the tortious act of its driver-employee. In this
particular case, the NIA assumes the responsibility of an ordinary employer and as such, it becomes
answerable for damages. This assumption of liability, however, is predicated upon the existence of
negligence on the part of respondent NIA. The negligence referred to here is the negligence of
supervision.
It should be emphasized that the accident happened along the Maharlika National Road within the city
limits of San Jose City, an urban area. Considering the fact that the victim was thrown 50 meters away
from the point of impact, there is a strong indication that driver Garcia was driving at a high speed. This
is confirmed by the fact that the pick-up suffered substantial and heavy damage as above-described
and the fact that the NIA group was then "in a hurry to reach the campsite as early as possible", as
shown by their not stopping to find out what they bumped as would have been their normal and initial
reaction.
Evidently, there was negligence in the supervision of the driver for the reason that they were
travelling at a high speed within the city limits and yet the supervisor of the group, Ely Salonga, failed
to caution and make the driver observe the proper and allowed speed limit within the city. Under the
situation, such negligence is further aggravated by their desire to reach their destination without even
checking whether or not the vehicle suffered damage from the object it bumped, thus showing
imprudence and reckelessness on the part of both the driver and the supervisor in the group.
Considering the foregoing, respondent NIA is hereby directed to pay herein petitioners-spouses
the amounts of P12,000.00 for the death of Francisco Fontanilla; P3,389.00 for hospitalization and burial
expenses of the aforenamed deceased; P30,000.00 as moral damages; P8,000.00 as exemplary
damages and attorney's fees of 20% of the total award.
Rosete vs. The Auditor General

FACTS: Rosete filed a claim with the Auditor General in the amount of P35,376.00 for damages caused
to the buildings belonging to her which were destroyed by fire that came from the contiguous
warehouses of the Emergency Control Administration due to the negligence of the latter's employee
Jose Frayno, in igniting recklessly his cigarette lighter near a drum of gasoline in said warehouse
contrary to provisions or ordinances of the City of Manila.
Held: There being no showing that whatever negligence may be imputed to the Emergency Control
Administration or its officers, was done by a special agent, because the officers of the Emergency
Control Administration did not act as special agents of the Government within the above-defined
meaning of that word in Article 1903 of the Civil Code in storing gasoline in the warehouse of the ECA,
the government is not responsible for the damages caused through such a negligence.
DISSENT
Paragraph 5 Of article 1903 of the Civil Code distinguishes the special agent from the official with
specific duty or duties to perform. Under the meaning of the paragraph, the word official comprises all
officials and employees of the government who exercise duties of their respective public offices. All
others who are acting by commission of the government belong to the class of special agents, whether
individual or juridical bodies.
The ECA was not a branch or office of the government, such as the legislative bodies, the executive
offices, or the tribunals. It was an agency set up for specific purposes which were not attainable
through the official functions entrust J by law to the government or its branches.
The ECA was one of the groups of special agents created by the government for activities ordinarily
ungovernmental in character, such as the Philippine National Bank, the National Development
Company, the National Coconut Corporation, the National Tobacco Corporation, and many other
government enterprises.
In qualifying the special agent with the adjective "special", the Civil Code aimed at distinguishing it
from the regular or ordinary agent of government, which refers to all officers and employees in the
public service. There cannot be any dispute that all persons in the active service of the government,
regardless of department or branch, are agents of the State or of the people. All of them are properly
designated as servants of the people. Servants are agents.
The Civil Code uses the adjective "special", because its authors could not miss the fact that the official,
mentioned in paragraph 5 of article 1903, is also an agent.
For all the foregoing, the decision of the Auditor General, dated Oct. 3, 1946, denying petitioner's claim
should be set aside, not only because it is not supported by law, but because it is premised on the
totalitarian philosophy of the State's immunity for whatever wrong it may perpetrate.
Republic vs. Palacio

FACTS: Ildefonso Ortiz sued the Handong Irrigation Association and the Irrigation Service Unit for
recovery of possession of a lot, an office or agency under the Department of Public Works and
Communications. For failure to appear and answer the complaint the Irrigation Service unit was
declared in default. On February 16, 1962 the Sheriff of Manila garnished the deposits and trust fund in
the account of the Irrigation Service Unit in the Philippine National Bank in Manila. Republic of the
Philippines moved for the dismissal of the complaint, claiming that ISU has no juridical personality to
sue and be sued. The motion was denied on the ground that while ISU is a mere agency of the Republic,
it is engaged in the private business of selling irrigation pumps and construction materials on an
installment plan.
Held: The fund was set up to finance ISUs project of completing the rehabilitation of irrigation pump
systems. It is a public fund. Its levy would amount to diversion from the purposes originally intended,
and would be a disbursement without any proper appropriation, as required by law.The Irrigation
Service Unit was an office in the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Pump Irrigation
Trust Fund which was garnished was a public fund. The ISU liability thus arose from tort and not from
contract; and it is a well-enriched rule in this jurisdiction, embodied in Article 2180 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines, that the State is liable only for torts caused by its special agents, specially
commissioned to carry out the acts complained of outside of such agent's regular duties (Meritt vs.
Insular Government, supra; Rosete vs.Auditor General, 81 Phil.453). There being no proof that the
making of the tortious inducement was authorized, neither the State nor its funds can be made liable
therefor.
Garnishment declared null and void.
Municipality of San Fernando vs Firme

FACTS: A passenger jeepney, a sand truck and a dump truck of the Municipality of San Fernando, La
Union collided. Due to the impact, several passengers of the jeepney including Laureano Bania Sr.
died. The heirs of Bania filed a complaint for damages against the owner and driver of the jeepney,
who, in turn, filed a Third Party Complaint against the Municipality and its dump truck driver, Alfredo
Bislig. Municipality filed its answer and raised the defense of non-suability of the State. After trial, the
court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs and ordered Municipality and Bislig to pay jointly and severally the
heirs of Bania.
ISSUES:
1. Are municipal corporations suable?
2. Is the Municipality liable for the torts committed by its employee who was then engaged in the
discharge of governmental functions?
HELD:
1. Municipal corporations, like provinces and cities, are agencies of the State when they are engaged in
governmental functions and therefore should enjoy the sovereign immunity from suit. Nevertheless,
they are subject to suit even in the performance of such functions because their charter provided that
they can sue and be sued.
2. Municipal corporations are suable because their charters grant them the competence to sue and be
sued. Nevertheless, they are generally not liable for torts committed by them in the discharge of
governmental functions and can be held answerable only if it can be shown that they were acting in a
proprietary capacity.
In permitting such entities to be sued, the State merely gives the claimant the right to show that the
defendant was not acting in its governmental capacity when the injury was committed or that the case
comes under the exceptions recognized by law. Without such proof, the presumption of regularity subsists,
pursuant to Rule 131 of the Revised Rules of Court.
In this case, the driver of the dump truck of the municipality insists that "he was on his way to the
Naguilian river to get a load of sand and gravel for the repair of San Fernando's municipal streets." In
the absence of any evidence to the contrary, the regularity of the performance of official duty is
presumed. Hence, the driver of the dump truck was performing duties or tasks pertaining to his office.
Decision of the lower court modified. Petitioner municipality was absolved of any liability.
** GSIS v. Labung-Deang, 365 SCRA 341 (UGH DI KO TALAGA MAHANAP last na to sa failures ko for
Torts)
Mercado vs. Court of Appeals | Labrador G.R. No. 87584, May 30, 1960 | 108 Phil. 414
FACTS
Augusto Mercado and Manuel Quisumbing, Jr. are both pupils of the Lourdes Catholic School,
Kanlaon, Quezon City.
A pitogo (an empty nutshell used by children as a piggy bank) belonged to Augusto Mercado
but he lent it to Benedicto Lim and in turn Benedicto lent it to Renato Legaspi.
Renato was not aware that the pitogo belonged to Augusto.
Manuel Quisumbing, Jr. thought it was Benedictos, so when Augusto attempted to get the pitogo
from Renato, Manuel, Jr. told him not to do so because Renato was better at putting the chain
into the holes of the pitogo.
Augusto resented his remark and pushed Manuel, Jr., which started the fight.
After successive blows to Manuel, Jr., Augusto cut him on the right cheek with a piece of razor.
Manuel, Jr. and his father filed a complaint against Ciriaco Mercado, Augustos father.
Petitioner: Since the incident occurred in the school during recess time, through no fault of the father.
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS
W/N the teacher or head of the school should be held responsible instead of the father?
NO. CHILDREN WERE NOT IN THEIR CUSTODY.

Petitioner rests his claim on the last paragraph of Art. 2180 of the Civil Code:
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages
caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody.
That clause contemplates a situation where the pupil lives and boards with the teacher, such that
the control, direction and influence on the pupil supersedes those of the parents.
In these circumstances the control or influence over the conduct and actions of the pupil would pass
from the father and mother to the teacher; and so would the responsibility for the torts of the
pupil.
Such a situation does not appear in the case at bar; the pupils appear to go to school during school
hours and go back to their homes with their parents after school is over.
Manuels dad is not liable for act of his son because the cause of his injury was his sons (Manuel)own
negligence.
Palisoc vs. Brillantes| Teehankee G.R. No. L-29025, October 4, 1971| 41

SCRA 557
FACTS
Deceased Dominador Palisoc and the defendant Virgilio L. Daffon were classmates at the Manila
Technical Institute, and on the afternoon of March 10, 1966, between two and three o'clock, they,
together with another classmate Desiderio Cruz were in
the laboratory room located on the ground floor. Desiderio Cruz and Virgilio L. Daffon were working on
a machine while Dominador Palisoc was merely looking on at them. Daffon made a remark to the effect
that Palisoc was acting like a
foreman. Because of this remark Palisoc slapped slightly Daffon on the face. Daffon, in retaliation, gave
Palisoc a strong flat blow on the face, which was followed by other fist blows on the stomach. Palisoc
retreated apparently to avoid the fist blows, but Daffon followed him and both exchanged blows until
Palisoc stumbled on an engine block which caused him to fall face downward. Palisoc became pale and
fainted. First aid was administered to him but he was not revived, so he was immediately taken to a
hospital. He never regained consciousness; finally he died.
Plaintiffs-appellants as parents of the deceased had filed on May 19, 1966, the action below for
damages. Defendants, per the trial court's decision, are: "Defendant Antonio C. Brillantes, at the time
when the incident which gave rise to his action
occurred was a member of the Board of Directors of the institute; the defendant Teodosio Valenton, the
president thereof; the defendant Santiago M. Quibulue, instructor of the class to which the deceased
belonged; and the defendant Virgilio L.
Daffon, a fellow student of the deceased. At the beginning the Manila Technical Institute was a single
proprietorship, but lately on August 2, 1962, it was duly incorporated."
The trial court found defendant Daffon liable for the quasi delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code
however absolved from liability the three other defendants- officials of the Manila Technical Institute
citing that Article 2180 is not applicable in
the case at hand.
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS

W/N the trial court erred in absolving the defendant-school officials.
YES, DEFENDANTS-SCHOOL OFFICIALS ARE LIABLE UNDER ART. 2180
The lower erred in law in absolving defendants-school officials on the ground that they could be
held liable under Article 2180, Civil Code, only if the student who inflicted the fatal fistblows on his
classmate and victim "lived and boarded with his teacher or the other defendants officials of the
school." As stated above, the phrase used in the cited article "so long as (the students) remain
in their custody" means the protective and supervisory custody that the school and its heads and
teachers exercise over the pupils and students for as long as they are at attendance in the school,
including recess time. There is nothing in the law that requires that for such liability to attach the pupil
or student who commits the tortious act must live and board in the school, as erroneously held by the
lower court, and he dicta in Mercado (as well as in Exconde) on which it relied, must now be deemed to
have been set aside by the present decision.
Defendants Valenton and Quibulue as president and teacher-in-charge of the school must
therefore be held jointly and severally liable for the quasi-delict of their co-defendant Daffon in the
latter having caused the death of his classmate, the
deceased Dominador Palisoc. The unfortunate death resulting from the fight between the protagonists-
students could have been avoided, had said defendants but complied with their duty of providing
adequate supervision over the activities of the students in the school premises to protect their students
from harm, whether at the hands of fellow students or other parties.
At any rate, the law holds them liable unless they relieve themselves of such liability, in compliance
with the last paragraph of Article 2180, Civil Code, by "(proving) that they observed all the diligence of
a good father of a family to prevent damage." In
the light of the factual findings of the lower court's decision, said defendants failed to prove such
exemption from liability.
Amadoras vs. CA
FACTS
Alfredo Amadora is a student of Colegio de San Jose Recoletos. While he was in the schools
auditorium he was shot to death by a classmate in the name of Pablito Daffon. The latter was then
convicted of homicide through reckless imprudence.
The victims parents sued for damages under Art. 2180 against the school, the principal, dean
for boys, the Physics teacher, the accused, his parents and some other students along with their
parents.
Later, the complaint against the other students and their parents were dropped. The Amadoras
contend that the presence of Alfredo was by reason of a Physics experiment, hence the student is still
under custody of the school at the time of the incident.
The school, however, denies liability since his presence was merely to submit the Physics project
and that the semester had already ended.
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS
W/N private respondents are liable
No.
Article 2180 applies to schools whether academic or non-academic. The student is deemed in
the custody of the school as long as he is under the control and influence of the school and is within its
premises, whether the school semester has just begun or has ended.
The liability of the article is by the head superior in-charge to the student and not by the school
who could be liable under respondeat superior. Both have the defense of bonus pater familias. In this
case the evidence did not support who the in-charge teacher was other than the fact he submitted his
Physics report.
And even if the Physics teacher was in fact in charge there is no showing that he was negligent
in the supervision and discipline of the accused. The private respondents properly adduced evidence to
prove they exercised bonus pater familias.
Ylarde v Aquino (163 scra 697) G.R. No. L-33722 (July 29, 1988)
Facts:
June 11 1951: Juanito Chan, son of Chan Lin Po and Remedios Diala, drove and operated a motor
vehicle (a truck) along Rizal Ave Ext, Manila in a reckless and imprudent manner thereby causing to hit
Nicolas Paras, 65 yo, and ran over his head, crushing it, resulting to his instantaneous death; facs
revealed that the truck was registered in the name of Lim Koo.
At the initial stage of the criminal trial, Petitioner, Estanislawa Canlas (widow of Nicolas, representing
also 5 minor children), made a reservation to file a separate civil action.
TC: Juanito is guilty, serve sentence of 1yr-8mos, plus 5K indeminity.
CA: modified, 1yr not less than 4 yrs of imprisonment, indemnity also affirmed.
In the civil action, same facts were alleged. Defendants disclaimed liability by establishing that Juanito
is married and is no longer a minor living in the company of his parents, and that he is also not an
employee of Lim Koo. Thus, Neither Juanitos parents can be made liable under vicarious liability (2180
of the NCC) nor the owner of vehicle be the subsidiary liable under 103 of the RPC.
Civil action: dismissed, since petitioner already tried to execute the indemnity adjudged in the crim
action and Juanito already served subsidiary imprisonment by virtue of his inability to pay indemnity.
Petitioner insists on the liability of parents and truck owner. MR denied, hence this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not under Art. 2176 and 2180, both the teacher and the principal can be held liable for
damages
Held:
As to the principal, he cannot be made responsible for the death of the child Ylarde, he being the head
of an academic school and not a school of arts and trades. In line with the ruling in Amadora vs. Court
of Appeals, under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, it is only the teacher and not the head of an academic
school who should be answerable for torts committed by their students. This Court went on to say that
in a school of arts and trades, it is only the head of the school who can be held liable. Soriano, as
principal, cannot be held liable for the reason that the school he heads is an academic school and not a
school of arts and trades. Besides, as clearly admitted by private respondent Aquino, private
respondent Soriano did not give any instruction regarding the digging.
From the foregoing, it can be easily seen that private respondent Aquino can be held liable under
Article 2180 of the Civil Code as the teacher-in-charge of the children for being negligent in his
supervision over them and his failure to take the necessary precautions to prevent any injury on their
persons. However, petitioners base the alleged liability of private respondent Aquino on Article 2176.
Were there acts and omissions on the part of private respondent Aquino amounting to fault or
negligence which have direct causal relation to the death of his pupil Ylarde? The Court answered in the
affirmative. He is liable for damages.
Clearly, private respondent Aquino acted with fault and gross negligence when he:
(1) failed to avail himself of services of adult manual laborers and instead utilized his pupils aged ten to
eleven to make an excavation near the one-ton concrete stone which he knew to be a very hazardous
task;
(2) required the children to remain inside the pit even after they had finished digging, knowing that the
huge block was lying nearby and could be easily pushed or kicked aside by any pupil who by chance
may go to the perilous area;
(3) ordered them to level the soil around the excavation when it was so apparent that the huge stone
was at the brink of falling; (4) went to a place where he would not be able to check on the children's
safety; and
(5) left the children close to the excavation, an obviously attractive nuisance.
The contention that private respondent Aquino exercised the utmost diligence of a very cautious person
is certainly without cogent basis. A reasonably prudent person would have foreseen that bringing
children to an excavation site, and more so, leaving them there all by themselves, may result in an
accident. An ordinarily careful human being would not assume that a simple warning "not to touch the
stone" is sufficient to cast away all the serious danger that a huge concrete block adjacent to an
excavation would present to the children. Moreover, a teacher who stands in loco parentis to his pupils
would have made sure that the children are protected from all harm in his company
Salvosa vs. IAC| Padilla G.R. No. 70458 October 5, 1988

FACTS
Petitioner Baguio Colleges Foundation (BCF) is an academic institution and an institution of arts and
trade.
Petitioner Benjamin Salvosa is the President and Chairman of the Board of BCF.
The Baguio Colleges Foundation ROTC Unit had Jimmy B. Abon as its duly appointed armorer. As
armorer of the ROTC Unit, Abon received his appointment from the AFP. Not being an employee of the
BCF, he also received his salary and orders from the AFP. Abon was also a commerce student of the BCF.
On 3 March 1977, at around 8:00 p.m., in the parking space of BCF, Abon shot Napoleon Castro a
student of the University of Baguio with an unlicensed firearm which the former took from the armory of
the ROTC Unit of the BCF. As a result, Castro died and Abon was prosecuted for, and convicted of the
crime of Homicide by Military Court.
The heirs of Castro sued for damages. TC sentenced Abon, Salvosa and BCF, jointly and severally liable
to pay the heirs of Castro.
CA affirmed with modification in the amount of damages.
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS
W/N Salvosa and BCF can be held solidarity liable with Abon for damages under Article 218012
of the Civil Code, as a consequence of the tortious act of Abon.
o TC and CA: Yes. Abon was in the protective and supervisory custody of the BCF when he shot Castro
as he must have been attending night classes and therefore that hour in the evening was just about
dismissal time for him or soon thereafter. The time interval is safely within "recess time".

No. Abon cannot be considered to have been "at attendance in the school," or in the custody of BCF,
when he shot Castro. Logically, therefore, Salvosa and BCF cannot under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code be
held solidarity liable with Abon for damages resulting from his acts.
Rationale behind Art. 2180: So long as the student remains in the custody of a teacher, the
latter "stands, to a certain extent, in loco parentis [as to the student] and [is] called upon to exercise
reasonable supervision over the conduct of the [student].
Art. 2180 'so long as (the students) remain in their custody means the protective and
supervisory custody that the school and its heads and teachers exercise over the pupils and students
for as long as they are at attendance in the school, including recess time.
A "recessat attendance in the school," contemplates a situation of temporary adjournment of
school activities where the student still remains within call of his mentor and is not permitted to leave
the school premises, or the area within which the school activity is conducted.
A student not "at attendance in the school" cannot be in "recess" thereat.
The mere fact of being enrolled or being in the premises of a school without more does not
constitute "attending school" or being in the "protective and supervisory custody' of the school, as
contemplated in the law.
Moreover, Abon was supposed to be working in the armory with definite instructions from his
superior, the ROTC Commandant, when he shot Castro.
PSBA v. Court of Appeals | Padilla G.R. No. 84698 February 4, 1992| 205
SCRA 729
FACTS
Carlitos Bautista was a third year commerce student in PSBA. In Aug 30, 1985, he was stabbed
while on the 2nd floor of the school, causing his death. It was established that the assailants were not
students of PSBA.
The parents of Carlitos filed a damage suit against PSBA and its school authorities for the death of their
child.
Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss, alleging that since they are presumably sued under Article 2180 of
the Civil Code, the complaint states no cause of action against them, as jurisprudence on the subject is
to the effect that academic institutions, such as the PSBA, are beyond the ambit of the rule in the afore-
stated article.
RTC dismissed the MTD. CA affirmed. The CA ratiocinated as follows:
Article 2180 (formerly Article 1903) of the Civil Code is an adoption from the old Spanish Civil Code. The
comments of Manresa and learned authorities on its meaning should give way to present day changes.
The law is not fixed and flexible (sic); it must be dynamic. In fact, the greatest value and significance of
law as a rule of conduct in (sic) its flexibility to adopt to changing social conditions and its capacity to
meet the new challenges of progress.Construed in the light of modern day educational system, Article
2180 cannot be construed in its narrow concept as held in the old case of Exconde vs. Capuno and
Mercado vs. Court of Appeals; hence, the RULING in the Palisoc case that it should apply to all kinds of
educational institutions, academic or vocational.At any rate, the law holds the teachers and heads of
the school staff liable unless they relieve themselves of such liability pursuant to the last paragraph of
Article 2180 by "proving that they observed all the diligence to prevent damage." This can only be done
at a trial on the merits of the case.
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS
W/N PSBA and its school authorities are vicariously liable for the death of Carlitos Bautista inside
its premises.
NO, THEY ARE NOT LIABLE.
Article 2180, in conjunction with Article 2176 of the Civil Code, establishes the rule of in loco
parentis. This Court discussed this doctrine in the afore-cited cases of
Exconde, Mendoza, Palisoc and, more recently, in Amadora vs. Court of Appeals. 6 In all such cases, it
had been stressed that the law (Article 2180) plainly provides that the damage should have been
caused or inflicted by pupils or students of he educational institution sought to be held liable for the
acts of its pupils or students while in its custody. However, this material situation does not exist in the
present case for, as earlier indicated, the assailants of Carlitos were not students of the PSBA, for
whose acts the school could be made liable.
Soliman vs. Tuazon | Feliciano G.R. No. 66207, May 18, 1992 | 209 SCRA 47
FACTS
Petitioner Soliman Jr. filed a civil complaint for damages against respondents Republic Central Colleges,
R.L. Security Agency, and Solomon, a security guard at Republic.
The complaint alleges that one morning, while Soliman was in the premises of Republic, as he was still
a regular enrolled student, Solomon with intent to kill attacked and shot him in the abdomen. It is
further alleged that such wound would
have caused his death, were it not for timely medical assistance, and because of this he may not be
able to attend his regular classes and perform his usual work from three to four months.
Republic Colleges filed a motion to dismiss, contending that Soliman had no action against it. It averred
that it should be free from liability because it was not the employer of the security guard. Moreover,
Article 2180 (7th paragraph) did not
apply, since such holds teachers and heads responsible only for damages caused by their pupils and
students/apprentices.
The MTD was granted by the judge. Hence this instant petition.
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS
W/N Republic Central Colleges may be held liable for damages.
REPUBLIC CENTRAL COLLEGES MAY NOT BE HELD LIABLE FOR DAMAGES UNDER ARTICLE 2180 (AS
AN EMPLOYER). HOWEVER, IT
MAY BE LIABLE ON THE BASIS OF AN IMPLIED CONTRACT.
Under Article 2180 of the NCC, employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their
employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the
former are not engaged in any business or industry. Also, teachers or heads of establishments of arts
and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils, their students or apprentices, so long as
they remain in their custody.
There is no basis to hold Republic liable under Article 2180. The employer of security guard
Solomon was R.L. Security Agency Inc. Where the security agency, as here, recruits, hires and assigns
the work of its watchmen or security guards, the agency is the employer of such guards or watchmen.
Liability for illegal or harmful acts committed by the security guards attaches to the employer agency,
and not to the clients or customers of such agency.
The fact that a client company may give instructions or directions to the security guards
assigned to it, does not, by itself, render the client responsible as an employer.
Solomon was neither a pupil nor a student of Republic. Hence, the provision with regard to the liability
of teachers and heads is also not available to make Republic liable for damages.
Nevertheless, Republic may be held liable on the basis of an implied contract between it and Soliman,
because of its obligation to maintain peace and order within the campus premises and to prevent the
breakdown thereof. Should this be the case,
the school may still avoid liability by proving that the breach of its contractual obligation to the
students was not due to its negligence, here statutorily defined to be the omission of that degree of
diligence which is required by the nature of
obligation and corresponding to the circumstances of person, time and place.
Respondent trial judge was in serious error when he supposed that petitioner could have no cause of
action other than one based on Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
Respondent trial judge should not have granted the motion to dismiss but rather should have, in the
interest of justice, allowed petitioner to prove acts constituting breach of an obligation ex contractu or
ex lege on the part of respondent Colleges.
Petition GRANTED. Order REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. Case REMANDED to the court a quo for further
proceedings.
St. Francis High School vs. CA| Paras G.R. No. 82465 February 25, 1991 |
SCRA
FACTS
Ferdinand Castillo, then a freshman student of Section 1-C at the St. Francis High School, wanted to join
a school picnic undertaken by Class I-B and Class I-C at Talaan Beach, Sariaya, Quezon. Ferdinand's
parents, respondents spouses Dr.
Romulo Castillo and Lilia Cadiz Castillo, because of short notice, did not allow their son to join but
merely allowed him to bring food to the teachers for the picnic, with the directive that he should go
back home after doing so. However, because of
persuasion of the teachers, Ferdinand went on with them to the beach.
During the picnic and while the students, including Ferdinand, were in the water, one of the female
teachers was apparently drowning. Some of the students, including Ferdinand, came to her rescue, but
in the process, it was Ferdinand
himself who drowned. His body was recovered but efforts to resuscitate him ashore failed.
Thereupon, the Castillo spouses filed a complaint against the St. Francis High School, represented by
the spouses Fernando Nantes and Rosario Lacandula, Benjamin Illumin (its principal), and the teachers:
Tirso de Chaves, Luisito Vinas, Connie Arquio, Nida Aragones, Yoly Jaro, and Patria Cadiz, for amages
which respondents allegedly incurred from the death of their 13-year old
son, Ferdinand Castillo.
The TC found in favor of the Castillo spouses and against petitioners-teachers Arquio, de Chaves, Vinas,
Aragones, Jaro and Cadiz. On the other hand, the TC dismissed. the case against the St. Francis High
School, Benjamin Illumin and
Aurora Cadorna.
While it is alleged that when defendants Yoly Jaro and Nida Aragones arrived at the picnic site, the
drowning incident had already occurred, such fact does not and cannot excuse them from their liability.
In fact, it could be said that by coming late, they were remiss in their duty to safeguard the students.
Benjamin Illumin had himself not consented to the picnic and in fact he did not join it. Defendant Aurora
Cadorna had then her own class to supervise and in fact she was not amongst those allegedly invited
by defendant Connie Arquio to supervise class I-C to which Ferdinand Castillo belongs.
CA
o St. Francis High School and the school principal, Benjamin Illumin, are liable under Article 2176 taken
together with the 1st, 4th and 5th paragraphs of Article 2180 of the Civil Code
o Under Article 2180, supra, the defendant school and defendant school principal must be found jointly
and severally liable with the defendants- teachers for the damages incurred by the plaintiffs as a result
of the death of Ferdinand. It is the rule that the negligence of the employees in causing the injury or
damage gives rise to a presumption of negligence on the part of the owner and/or manager of the
establishment (in the present case, St. Francis High School and its principal); and while this
presumption is not conclusive, it may be overthrown only by clear and convincing proof that the owner
and/or manager exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and/or
supervision of the employee or
employees causing the injury or damage (in this case, the defendants-teachers). The record does not
disclose such evidence as would serve to overcome the aforesaid presumption and absolve the St.
Francis High School and its principal from liability.
o Whether or not the victim's parents had given such permission to their son was immaterial to the
determination of the existence of liability on the part of the school and school officials for the damage
incurred by the Castillo spouses as a result of the death of their son. What is material to such a
determination is whether or not there was negligence on the part of school
officials vis-a-vis the supervision of the victim's group during the picnic; and, as correctly found by the
trial court, an affirmative reply to this question has been satisfactorily established by the evidence, as
already pointed out.
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS
W/N there was negligence attributable to the school officials which will warrant the award of damages
to the Castillo spouses;
W/N Art. 2180, in relation to Art. 2176 of the New Civil Code is applicable to the case at bar;
W/N the award of exemplary and moral damages is proper under the circumstances surrounding the
case at bar.
Castillos:
The death of their son was due to the failure of the petitioners to exercise the proper diligence of a
good father of the family in preventing their son's drowning
No. There was no negligence attributable to the school officials which will warrant the award of
damages to the Castillo spouses.
The school officials are neither guilty of their own negligence or guilty of the negligence of those under
them. Consequently, they are not liable for damages.
No. Art. 2180, in relation to Art. 2176 of the New Civil Code is not applicable to the case at bar.
Before an employer may be held liable for the negligence of his employee, the act or omission which
caused damage or prejudice must have occurred while an employee was in the performance of his
assigned tasks.
In the case at bar, the teachers/petitioners were not in the actual performance of their assigned tasks.
The incident happened not within the school premises, not on a school day and most importantly while
the teachers and students were holding a purely private affair, a picnic. It is clear from the beginning
that the incident happened while some members of the I-C class of St. Francis High School were having
a picnic at Talaan Beach. This picnic had no permit from the school head or its principal, Benjamin
Illumin because this picnic is not a school sanctioned activity neither is it considered as an extra-
curricular activity.
Mere knowledge by petitioner/principal Illumin of the planning of the picnic by the students and
their teachers does not in any way or in any manner show acquiescence or consent to the holding of
the same.
No. The award of exemplary and moral damages is improper under the circumstances surrounding the
case at bar.
No negligence could be attributable to the petitioners-teachers to warrant the award of damages

to the respondents-spouses.
Petitioners Connie Arquio the class adviser of I-C, the section where Ferdinand belonged, did her
best and exercised diligence of a good father of a family to prevent any untoward incident or damages
to all the students who joined the picnic.
With these FACTS in mind, no moral nor exemplary damages may be awarded in favor of
respondents-spouses. The case at bar does not fall under any of the grounds to grant moral damages.9
Separate Opinion:
Padilla, dissenting:
Although the excursion may not have been attended by the appropriate school authorities, the
presence or stamp of authority of the school nevertheless pervaded by reason of the participation not
of one but of several teachers, the petitioners. As found by the court a quo, the excursion was an
activity "organized by the teachers themselves, for the students and to which the student, NATURALLY,
acceded."
Having known of the forthcoming activity, petitioner Illumin, as school principal, should have
taken appropriate measures to ensure the safety of his students. His silence and negligence in
performing his role as principal head of the school that must be construed as an implied consent to
such activity.
As administrative head (principal) of St. Francis High School, petitioner Illumin acted as the
agent of his principal (the school) or its representatives, the petitioners-spouses Nantes and Lacandula.
Consequently, and as found by the respondent court. Article 2176 in conjunction with Article 2180,
paragraphs (1) and (5) are applicable to the situation. In the application of these provisions, the
negligence of the employee in causing injury or damage gives rise to a presumption of negligence on
the part of the owner and/or manager of the establishment. While this presumption is not conclusive, it
may be overcome only by clear and convincing evidence that the owner and/or manager exercised the
care and diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and/or supervision of the employees
causing the injury or damage. I agree with the respondent court that no proof was presented to absolve
the owner and/or manager, herein petitioners-spouses Nantes and Lacandula, and Illumin. Thus, as
correctly held by the respondent court, they too must be accountable for the death of Ferdinand
Castillo.
St. Marys Academy vs Carpitanos| Pardo G.R. No. 143363 February 6, 2002|
FACTS
The case is about St. Marys liability for damages arising from an accident that resulted in the death
of a student who had joined a campaign to visit the public schools in Dipolog City to solicit
enrollment.
Sherwin Capistranos was part of the campaigning group.
On the day of the incident, Sherwin rode a Mitsubishi Jeep owned by Vicencio Villanueva. It was
driven by James Daniel II then 15 years old and a student of the same school.
James Daniel was driving the car recklessly so it turned turtle.
Actually it was the detachment of the steering that caused it.
Sherwin Capistranos died as a result of the injuries he sustained from the accident.
William Carpitanos and Lucia Carpitanos filed on June 9, 1995 a case claiming damages for their son
Sherwin Carpitanos against James Daniel Sr. and Guada Daniel, the vehicle owner, Vivencio
Villanueva and St. Marys Academy before the RTC of Dipolog City.
St. Marys Academy was ordered to pay the complainants for damages.
In case of the insolvency of St. Marys Academy, James Daniel and Guada Daniel were also ordered
to pay Capistrano. Daniel is only subsidiarily liable. James Daniel was a minor during the
commission of the tort and was under the special parental authority of James Daniel II. He was
adjudged to have subsidiary liability with his parents.
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS
Whether the St. Marys should be liable for damages for the death of Sherwin Capistranos.
Whether the Capistranos are entitled to the award of moral damages.
No to both issues.
Under Article 218 of the Family Code, the following shall have special parental authority over a
minor child while under their supervision, instruction or custody: 1. The school, its administrators and
teachers. 2. the individual, entity or institution engaged in child care. This special parental authority
and responsibility applies to all authorized activities inside or outside the premises of the school, entity
or institution.
Under Article 219 of the Family Code, if the person under custody is a minor, those exercising
special parental authority are principally and solidarily liable for damages caused by the acts or
omissions of the unemancipated minor under their supervision, instruction or custody.
In this case, there was no finding that the act or omission considered negligent was the
proximate cause of the injury caused because the negligence, must have a causal connection to the
accident.
Daniel spouses and Villanueva admitted that the immediate cause of the accident was not the
negligence of the petitioner or the reckless driving of James Daniel II, but the detachment of the
steering wheel guide of the Jeep.
There was no evidence that the petitioner school allowed the minor James Daniel II to drive the
Jeep of respondent Vicencio Villanueva. IT was Ched Villanueva who had custody, control and
possession of the Jeep.
The negligence of petitioner St. Marys Academy was only a remote cause of the accident.
Between the remote cause and the injury, there intervened the negligence of the minors parents or the
detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep.
St. Marys cannot be held liable for moral damages. Though incapable of pecuniary estimation,
moral damages may be recovered if they are the proximate result of the defendants wrongful act or
omission. In this case the cause was not attributable to St. Marys Academy.
ST. JOSEPHS COLLEGE vs. JAYSON MIRANDA

FACTS:
While inside the premises of St. Josephs College, the class where respondent Miranda belonged was
conducting a science experiment about fusion of sulphur powder andiron fillings under the tutelage of
Rosalinda Tabugo, she being the teacher and the employee, while the adviser is Estafania Abdan.
Tabugo left her class while it was doing the experiment without having adequately secured it from any
untoward incident or occurrence. In the middle of the experiment,[Jayson], who was the assistant
leader of one of the class groups, checked the result of the experiment by looking into the test tube
with magnifying glass. The test tube was being held by one of his group mates who moved it close and
towards the eye of [Jayson]. At that instance, thecompound in the test tube spurted out and several
particles of which hit [Jaysons] eye and the different parts of the bodies of some of his group mates. As
a result thereof, [Jaysons] eyes were chemically burned, particularly his left
eye, for which he had to undergo surgery and had to spend for his medication. Upon filing of this case
[in] the lower court, his wound had not completely healed and still had to undergo another surgery.
Upon learning of the incident and because of the need for finances, [Jaysons] mother, who was working
abroad, had to rush back home for which she spent P36,070.00 for her
fares and had to forego her salary from November 23, 1994 to December 26, 1994, in the amount of at
least P40,000.00.
Jason and his parents suffered sleepless nights, mental anguish and wounded feelings as a result of his
injury due to the petitioners fault and failure to exercise the degree of care and diligence incumbent
upon each one of them. Thus, they should be held liable for moral damages.
ISSUE: Whether the petitioners were liable for the accident.
HELD: Yes. As found by both lower courts, proximate cause of the Jasons injury was the concurrent
failure of petitioners to prevent to foreseeable mishap that occurred during the conduct of the science
experiment. Petitioners were negligent by failing to exercise the higher degree of care, caution and
foresight incumbent upon the school, its administrators and teachers. "The defense of due diligence of
a good father of a family raised by [petitioner] St. Joseph College will not exculpate it from liability
because it has been shown that it was guilty of inexcusable laxity in the supervision of its teachers
(despite an apparent rigid screening process for hiring) and in the maintenance of what should have
been a safe and secured environment for conducting dangerous experiments.
[Petitioner] school is still liable for the wrongful acts of the teachers and employees because it had full
information on the nature of dangerous science experiments but did not take affirmative steps to avert
damage and injury to students. The fact that there has never been any accident in the past during the
conduct of science experiments is not a justification to be complacent in just preserving the status quo
and do away with creative foresight to install safety measures to protect the students. Schools should
not simply install safety reminders and distribute safety instructional manuals. More importantly,
schools should provide protective gears and devices to shield students from expected risks and
anticipated dangers.
Worcester v. Ocampo February 27, 1912

FACTS:
Dean Worcester filed an action to recover damages resulting from an alleged libelous publication
against Martin Ocampo, Teodoro M. Kalaw, Lope K. Santos, Fidel A. Reyes, Faustino Aguilar, et al, as the
owners, directors, writers, editors and administrators of the daily newspaper El Renacimiento
(Spanish version) and Muling Pagsilang (tagalong version). Worcester alleged that the defendants
have been maliciously persecuting and attacking him in the newspapers for a long time and they
published an editorial entitled Birds of Prey with the malicious intent of injuring Worcester, both as a
private person and as a government official as the editorial obviously referred to him.
Worcester alleged that he was likened to birds of prey in the following manner: Such are the
characteristics of the
man who is at the same time an eagle who surprises and devours, a vulture who gorges himself on the
dead and putrid meats, an owl who affects a petulant omniscience and a vampire who silently sucks
the blood of the victim until
he leaves it bloodless.
TC:
In favor of Worcester; Defendants jointly and severally liable for the P60k total damages.
ISSUE: WON the defendants individual properties can be made jointly and severally liable for the
damages under the
civil and commercial codes,
HELD:
Yes. TC modified. Damages reduced, Santos absolved. The present action is a tort.
Universal doctrine:
Each joint tortfeasor is not only individually liable for the tort in which he participates, but is also jointly
liable with his tortfeasors. If several persons commit a tort, the plaintiff or person injured, has his
election to sue all or some of the parties jointly, or one of them separately, because the TORT IS IN
ITS NATURE A SEPARATE ACT OF EACH INDIVIDUAL.
It is not necessary that cooperation should be a direct, corporal act- e.g. assault and battery committed
by various persons, under the common law, they are all principals. Under common law, he who aided or
counseled, in any way, the commission of a crime, was as much a principal as he who inflicted or
committed the actual tort.
General Rule:
Joint tortfeasors are all the persons who command, instigate, promote, encourage, advise,
countenance, cooperate in, aid or abet the commission of a tort, or who approve of it after it is done, if
done for their benefit. They are each liable as principals, to the same extent and in the same manner as
if they had performed the wrongful act themselves. Joint tortfeasors are jointly and severally liable for
the tort which they commit. Joint tortfeasors are not liable pro rata. The damages can not be
apportioned among them, except among themselves. They cannot insist upon an apportionment, for
the purpose of each paying an aliquot part.
They are jointly and severally liable for the full amount.
A payment in full of the damage done by one tortfeasor satisfies any claim which might exist against
the others. The release of one of the joint tortfeasors by agreement generally operates to discharge all.
The court however may make findings as to which of the alleged joint tortfeasors are liable and which
are not, even if they are charged jointly and severally.
Metro Manila Transit Corp. (MMTC) vs. CA 223 SCRA 521 June 21, 1993
FACTS: Appellant Nenita Custodio boarded a jeepney driven by defendant Agudo Calebag and owned
by his co-defendant Victorino Lamayo. The jeepney collided with an MMTC bus at the intersection of
DBP Avenue and Honeydew Road. MMTC bus was driven by defendant Godofredo Leonardo. Both
drivers failed to slow down or blow their horns. As a result of said incident, Custodio was thrown out
through the windshield and sustained serious physical injuries. She was sent to the hospital and
regained consciousness only after a week.
Appellant, assisted by her parents, filed a complaint for damages. Defendants denied the material
allegations. MMTC for its part presented Milagros Garbo, its training officer, and Christian Bautista, its
transport supervisor, as two of its witnesses. Garbo testified that the company's bus drivers undergo a
series of training programs, examinations, clearances, interviews and seminars for their selection.
Bautista on the other hand, testified that he ensured the drivers were in proper uniform, briefed in
traffic rules and regulations and fit to drive before the start of duty.
The trial court found both drivers negligent for non-observance of appropriate traffic rules and
regulations and for failure to take the usual precautions when approaching an intersection. It however,
absolved MMTC, stating that it was careful and diligent in selecting its employees and strict and diligent
in supervising them as shown by the evidence. The CA modified the said RULING, holding MMTC
solidarily liable with the other defendants. According to the CA, MMTC failed to substantiate its
allegations that it exercised the diligence of the good father of a family in the selection and supervision
of its employees. It pointed out the fact that Garbo and Bautista failed to present documentary
evidence to support their claims, such as the clearances and test results of Leonardo or the written
guidelines. As such, the testimonies fall short of the required evidentiary quantum.
ISSUE: Whether or not the evidence of MMTC is sufficient to show that it exercised the diligence of a
good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its employees.
Held: No. The SC agrees with the RULING of the CA.
In civil cases, the degree of evidence required of a party in order to support his claim is preponderance
of evidence, or that evidence adduced by one party which is more conclusive and credible than that of
the other party. It is, therefore, incumbent on the plaintiff who is claiming a right to prove his case.
Corollary, defendant must likewise prove its own allegation to buttress its claim that it is not liable. In
fine, the party, whether plaintiff or defendant, who asserts the affirmative of the ISSUE has the burden
of presenting at the trial such amount of evidence required by law to obtain a favorable judgment. In
the case at bar, petitioner's attempt to prove it diligentissimi patris familias in the selection and
supervision of employees must fail as it was unable to buttress the same with any other evidence,
object or documentary, which might obviate the apparent biased nature of the testimony. MMTC only
gave oral testimonies as its evidence, no documentary proof was submitted upon request to further
bolster its defense. The mere formulation of various company policies on saftey without showing that
they were being complied with is not sufficient to exempt petitioner from liability arising from
negligence of its employees.
The SC does not find the evidence presented by petitioner sufficiently convincing to prove the diligence
of a good father of a family. Hence, applying Art. 2180 in relation to Art. 2176, petitioner is held
solidarily liable with the other defendants.
Ruks Konsult vs. Adworld Sign GR No. 204866, January 21, 2015
FACTS:
Adworld filed for damages against Transworld when Transworlds billboard structure collapsed and
crashed against Adworlds billboard structure, which was misaligned and its foundation impaired.
In its Answer with Counterclaim, Transworld averred that the collapse of its billboard structure was due
to extraordinarily strong winds that occurred instantly and unexpectedly, and maintained that the
damage caused to Adworlds billboard structure was hardly noticeable. Transworld likewise filed a Third-
Party Complaint against Ruks, the company which built the collapsed billboard structure in the formers
favor. It was alleged therein that the structure constructed by Ruks had a weak and poor foundation not
suited for billboards, thus, prone to collapse, and as such, Ruks should ultimately be held liable for the
damages caused to Adworlds billboard structure.
ISSUE:
Whether Ruks was solidarily liable with Transworld for the damages in Adworlds billboard
HELD:
Yes.
Jurisprudence defines negligence as the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by
those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing of
something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do. It is the failure to observe for the
protection of the interest of another person that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the
circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury.
In this case, the CA correctly affirmed the RTCs finding that Transworlds initial construction of its
billboards lower structure without the proper foundation, and that of Rukss finishing its upper structure
and just merely assuming that Transworld would reinforce the weak foundation are the two (2)
successive acts which were the direct and proximate cause of the damages sustained by Adworld.
Worse, both Transworld and Ruks were fully aware that the foundation for the formers billboard was
weak; yet, neither of them took any positive step to reinforce the same. They merely relied on each
others word that repairs would be done to such foundation, but none was done at all. Clearly, the
foregoing circumstances show that both Transworld and Ruks are guilty of negligence in the
construction of the formers billboard, and perforce, should be held liable for its collapse and the
resulting damage to Adworlds billboard structure.
As joint tortfeasors, therefore, they are solidarily liable to Adworld. Verily, "[j]oint tortfeasors are those
who command, instigate, promote, encourage, advise, countenance, cooperate in, aid or abet the
commission of a tort, or approve of it after it is done, if done for their benefit. They are also referred to
as those who act together in committing wrong or whose acts, if independent of each other, unite in
causing a single injury. Under Article 2194 of the Civil Code, joint tortfeasors are solidarily liable for the
resulting damage. In other words, joint tortfeasors are each liable as principals, to the same extent and
in the same manner as if they had performed the wrongful act themselves." The Courts
pronouncement in People v. Velasco is instructive on this matter, to wit:
Where several causes producing an injury are concurrent and each is an efficient cause without which
the injury would not have happened, the injury may be attributed to all or any of the causes and
recovery may be had against any or all of the responsible persons although under the circumstances of
the case, it may appear that one of them was more culpable, and that the duty owed by them to the
injured person was not same. No actor's negligence ceases to be a proximate cause merely because it
does not exceed the negligence of other actors. Each wrongdoer is responsible for the entire result and
is liable as though his acts were the sole cause of the injury.
There is no contribution between joint [tortfeasors] whose liability is solidary since both of them are
liable for the total damage. Where the concurrent or successive negligent acts or omissions of two or
more persons, although acting independently, are in combination the direct and proximate cause of a
single injury to a third person, it is impossible to determine in what proportion each contributed to the
injury and either of them is responsible for the whole injury.
Vestil vs. IAC G.R. No. 74431 (November 6, 1989)

FACTS:
On July 29, 1975, Theness Tan Uy was bitten by a dog while she was playing with a child of Purita and
Agustin Vestil in the house of the late Vicente Miranda, the father of Purita. Thenese was rushed to the
Hospital, where she was treated for "multipte lacerated wounds on the forehead" and administered an
anti-rabies vaccine. She was discharged after nine days but was readmitted a week later due to
"vomiting of saliva." On August 15, 1975, the child died. The cause of death was certified as broncho-
pneumonia.Theness developed hydrophobia, a symptom of rabies, as a result of the dog bites, and
asphyxia broncho-pneumonia, a complication of rabies, which ultimately caused her death.
The Uys sued for damages, alleging that the Vestils were liable as the possessors of the dog that bit
and eventually killed their daughter. The Uys claim that the Vestils are liable for the death of Theness,
since they own the dog that bit her. While the Vestils contend that the dog belonged to the deceased
Vicente Miranda, and that it was a tame animal, and that in any case no one had witnessed it bite
Theness.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Vestils are liable for the damage caused by the dog.
HELD:
ART. 2183 states The possessor of an animal or whoever may make use of the same is responsible for
the damage which it may cause, although it may escape or be lost. This responsibility shall cease only
in case the damage should come from force majeure or from the fault of the person who has suffered
damage.
The obligation imposed by Article 2183 of the Civil Code is not based on the negligence or on the
presumed lack of vigilance of the possessor or user of the animal causing the damage. It is based on
natural equity and on the principle of social interest that he who possesses animals for his utility,
pleasure or service must answer for the damage which such animal may cause.
While it is true that she is not really the owner of the house, which was still part of Vicente Miranda's
estate, there is no doubt that she and her husband were its possessors at the time of the incident in
question. The Vestils contention that they could not be expected to exercise remote control of the dog
is not acceptable. In fact, Article 2183 of the Civil Code holds the possessor liable even if the animal
should "escape or be lost" and so be removed from his control. And it does not matter either that the
dog was tame and was merely provoked by the child into biting her. The law does not speak only of
vicious animals but covers even tame ones as long as they cause injury. As for the belated allegations
that Theness provoked the dog, the Vestils forget that the deceased was only three years old at the
time she was attacked and can hardly be faulted for whatever she might have done to the animal.
There is evidence showing that Theness and her family regularly went to the house of the Vestils once
or twice a week. The Court finds that the link between the dog bites and the certified cause of death
has been satisfactorily established. The obligation imposed by Article 2183 of the Civil Code is not
based on the negligence or on the presumed lack of vigilance of the possessor or user of the animal
causing the damage. It is based on natural equity and on the principle of social interest that he who
possesses animals for his utility, pleasure or service must answer for the damage which such animal
may cause.
J. H. Chapman vs. James M. Underwood 27 Phil 374 (March 28, 1914)

FACTS: J.H. Chapman visited a man by the name of Creveling, in front of whose house the accident
occurred. Chapman wanted to board a certain "San Marcelino" single-track street-car coming from
Santa Ana and bound for Manila. Being told by Creveling that the car was approaching, he hurriedly,
passed from the gate of Crevelings home into the street for the purpose of signaling and boarding the
car. The car was a closed one, the entrance being from the front or the rear platform. Chapman
attempted to board the front platform but, seeing that he could not reach it without extra exertion,
stopped beside the car, facing toward the rear platform, and waited for it to come within reach for him
to board. While in this position, he was struck from behind and run over by Underwoods automobile.
Immediately prior to the incident, Underwoods automobile, which was being driven by his chauffeur,
followed behind a street car from Manila bound to Santa Ana (Opposite direction of the San Marcelino
street-car that Chapman wanted to board). Just before reaching the scene of the accident, the street
car being followed by Underwood took the switched off the main line to the left. Thereupon,
Underwoods automobile no longer followed that street-car nor went to the left, but either kept straight
ahead on the main street-car track or a bit to the right. The street-car which the Chapman intended to
board was on the main line and bound in an opposite direction. When the front of the "San Marcelino"
car (the one which plaintiff attempted to board) was almost in front of Underwoods automobile, the
latters driver suddenly went to the right striking and running over Chapman. The trial court rendered
decision in favor of the defendant.
ISSUE: Is defendant liable in the case at bar?
Held: A careful examination of the record leads to the conclusion that the Underwoods driver was
guilty of negligence in running upon and over the plaintiff. He was passing an incoming car upon the
wrong side. The plaintiff, out to board the car, was not obliged to observe whether a car was coming
upon him from his left hand. He had only to guard against those coming from the right. He knew that,
according to the law of the road, no automobile or other vehicle coming from his left should pass upon
his side of the car. He needed only to watch for cars coming from his right, as they were the only ones
under the law permitted to pass upon that side of the street car.
Underwood, however, is not responsible for the negligence of his driver, under the FACTS and
circumstances of this case. As stated in the case of Johnson vs. David (5 Phil. Rep., 663), the driver
does not fall within the list of persons in article 1903 of the Civil Code for whose acts the defendant
would be responsible. The owner of an automobile who permits his chauffeur to drive up to Escolta, for
example, at a speed of 60 miles an hour, without any effort to stop him, although he has had a
reasonable opportunity to do so, becomes himself responsible, both criminally and civilly, for the results
produced by the acts of his chauffeur. On the other hand, if the driver, by a sudden act of negligence,
and without the owner having a reasonable opportunity to prevent the acts or its continuance, injures a
person or violates the criminal law, the owner of the automobile, although present therein at the time
the act was committed, is not responsible, either civilly or criminally, therefor. The act complained of
must be continued in the presence of the owner for such a length a time that the owner, by his
acquiescence, makes his driver's act his own.
In this case, it DOES NOT appear that, from the time the automobile took the wrong side of the road to
the commission of the injury, sufficient time intervened to give the defendant an opportunity to correct
the act of his driver. Instead, it appears that the interval between the turning out to meet and pass the
street car and the happening of the accident was so small as not to be sufficient to charge defendant
with the negligence of the driver.
Caedo vs. Yu Khe Thai G.R. No. L-20392 December 18, 1968
FACTS: On March 24, 1958 on Highway 54 (now E. de los Santos Avenue) in the vicinity of San Lorenzo
Village, Marcial Caedo was driving his Mercury car. With them in the car were Mrs. Caedo and three
daughters. Coming from the opposite direction was the Cadillac of Yu Khe Thai, with his driver Rafael
Bernardo at the wheel, taking the owner from his Paraaque home to Wack Wack for his regular round
of golf. The two cars were traveling at fairly moderate speeds, their headlights were mutually
noticeable from a distance. Ahead of the Cadillac, going in the same direction, was a caretella owned
by Pedro Bautista. The carretela was towing another horse by means of a short rope coiled around the
rig's vertical post on the right side and held at the other end by Pedro's son, Julian Bautista.
Bernardo tried to overtake the carretela, instead of slowing down or stopping behind the carretela until
the lane was clear. Its rear bumper caught the wheel of the carretela and wrenched it loose, and the car
skidded to the other lane. Caedo tried to avoid the collision at the last moment by going farther to the
right, but was unsuccessful.
Caedo and his family members were injured. They filed a suit for recovery of damages from the
defendants. The CFI Rizal rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants, Yu
Khe Thai and Rafael Bernardo.
ISSUE:Is Yu Khe Thai, as owner of the Cadillac, solidarily liable with the driver?
HELD: No. The applicable law is Article 2184 of the Civil Code:
ART. 2184. In motor vehicle mishaps, the owner is solidarily liable with his driver, if the former, who was
in the vehicle, could have, by the use of due diligence, prevented the misfortune. It is disputably
presumed that a driver was negligent, if he had been found guilty of reckless driving or violating traffic
regulations at least twice within the next preceding two months.
Under the foregoing provision, if the causative factor was the driver's negligence, the owner of the
vehicle who was present is likewise held liable if he could have prevented the mishap by the exercise of
due diligence.
The basis of the master's liability in civil law is not respondent superior but rather the relationship of
paterfamilias. The theory is that ultimately the negligence of the servant, if known to the master and
susceptible of timely correction by him, reflects his own negligence if he fails to correct it in order to
prevent injury or damage.
In the present case the defendants' evidence is that Rafael Bernardo had been Yu Khe Thai's driver
since 1937, and before that had been employed by Yutivo Sons Hardware Co. in the same capacity for
over ten years. During that time he had no record of violation of traffic laws and regulations. No
negligence for having employed him at all may be imputed to his master.
The time element was such that there was no reasonable opportunity for Yu Khe Thai to assess the risks
involved and warn the driver accordingly.
The law does not require that a person must possess a certain measure of skill or proficiency either in
the mechanics of driving or in the observance of traffic rules before he may own a motor vehicle. The
test of his intelligence, within the meaning of Article 2184, is his omission to do that which the evidence
of his own senses tells him he should do in order to avoid the accident. And as far as perception is
concerned, absent a minimum level imposed by law, a maneuver that appears to be fraught with
danger to one passenger may appear to be entirely safe and commonplace to another. Were the law to
require a uniform standard of perceptiveness, employment of professional drivers by car owners who,
by their very inadequacies, have real need of drivers' services, would be effectively proscribed.
PCI LEASING AND FINANCE, INC., v UCPB GENERAL INSURANCE CO., INC. G.R.
No. 162267 (July 4, 2008)
FACTS:
A Mitsubishi Lancer car owned by UCPB, insured with UCPB General Insurance Co., was
traversing the Laurel Highway, Barangay Balintawak, LipaCity. It was driven by Flaviano Isaac
with Conrado Geronimo (Asst. Manager of said bank), was hit and bumped by an 18-wheeler Fuso
Tanker Truck, owned by defendants-appellants PCI Leasing & Finance, Inc. allegedly leased to and
operated by defendant-appellant Superior Gas & Equitable Co., Inc. (SUGECO) and driven by its
employee, defendant appellant Renato Gonzaga. The impact caused heavy damage to the Mitsubishi
Lancer car resulting in an explosion of the rear part of the car. The driver and passenger suffered
physical injuries. However, the driver defendant-appellant Gonzaga continued on its way to its
destination and did not bother to bring his victims to the hospital.
As the 18-wheeler truck is registered under the name of PCI Leasing, repeated demands were
made by plaintiff-appellee for the payment of the aforesaid amounts. However, no payment was made.
PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc., (petitioner) interposed the defense that it could not be held liable for the
collision, since the driver, Gonzaga, was not its employee, but that of its co-defendant SUGECO. In fact,
it was SUGECO, that was the actual operator of the truck, pursuant to a Contract of Lease signed by
petitioner and SUGECO. Petitioner, however, admitted that it was the owner of the truck in question.
RTC rendered judgment in favour of UCPB General Insurance and ordered PCI Leasing and Gonzaga, to
pay jointly and severally the former. CA affirmed with the lower courts decision.
ISSUES:
1) Whether petitioner, as registered owner of a motor vehicle that figured in a quasi-delict may be held
liable, jointly and severally, with the driver thereof, for the damages caused to third parties.
2) Whether petitioner, as a financing company, is absolved from liability by the enactment of Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 8556, or the Financing Company Act of 1998.
RULING:
1) YES. The principle of holding the registered owner of a vehicle liable for quasi-delicts resulting from
its use is well-established in jurisprudence. As explained in the case of Erezo v. Jepte, thus:
Registration is required not to make said registration the operative act by which ownership in vehicles
is transferred, as in land registration cases, because the administrative proceeding of registration does
not bear any essential relation to the contract of sale between the parties (Chinchilla vs. Rafael
and Verdaguer, 39 Phil. 888), but to permit the use and operation of the vehicle upon any public
highway (section 5 [a], Act No. 3992, as amended.) The main aim of motor vehicle registration is to
identify the owner so that if any accident happens, or that any damage or injury is caused by
the vehicle on the public highways, responsibility therefor can be fixed on a definite individual, the
registered owner. Instances are numerous where vehicles running on public highways caused accidents
or injuries to pedestrians or other vehicles without positive identification of the owner or drivers, or with
very scant means of identification. It is to forestall these circumstances, so inconvenient or prejudicial
to the public, that the motor vehicle registration is primarily ordained, in the interest of the
determination of persons responsible for damages or injuries caused on public highways.
2) NO. The new law, R.A. No. 8556, notwithstanding developments in foreign jurisdictions, do not
supersede or repeal the law on compulsory motor vehicle registration. No part of the law expressly
repeals Section 5(a) and (e) of R.A. No. 4136, as amended, otherwise known as the Land Transportation
and Traffic Code. Thus, the rule remains the same: a sale, lease, or financial lease, for that matter, that
is not registered with the Land Transportation Office, still does not bind third persons who are aggrieved
in tortious incidents, for the latter need only to rely on the public registration of a motor vehicle as
conclusive evidence of ownership. A lease such as the one involved in the instant case is an
encumbrance in contemplation of law, which needs to be registered in order for it to bind third
parties. Under this policy, the evil sought to be avoided is the exacerbation of the suffering of victims
of tragic vehicular accidents in not being able to identify a guilty party. A contrary RULING will not
serve the ends of justice. The failure to register a lease, sale, transfer or encumbrance, should not
benefit the parties responsible, to the prejudice of innocent victims.
Coca Cola Bottlers vs. CA G.R.No. 110295 (October 18, 1993)

FACTS: Lydia Geronimo is the proprietress of a school canteen. On August 12, 1989, a group of parents
complained before Geronimo that they found fibrous material in the bottles of Coke and Sprite that
their children bought from her store. Geronimo examined her stock and found that there were indeed
fibrous materials in the unopened soda bottles. She brought the bottles to the Department of Health
Regional Office and was informed that the soda samples she sent were adulterated.
Because of this, the canteen had to close down due to the big drop in its sales of soft drinks. On
Geronimo filed a complaint for damages against Coca cola. Coca-Cola moved to dismiss the complaint
on the grounds of failure to exhaust administrative remedies and prescription. According to Coca-Cola,
under the law on sales on breach of warranty, more particularly Article 1561, the action should have
been brought within six months from the delivery of the goods.
Coca cola moved to dismiss on the basis of failure to exhaust all administrative remedies and
prescription. It contends that the existence of a contractual relation between the parties (arising from
the contract of sale) bars the application of the law on quasi-delicts and that since Geronimos cause of
action arose from the breach of implied warranties, the complaint should have been filed within six
months from delivery of the soft drinks pursuant to Article 1571 of the Civil Code. Geronimo claims that
the cause of action is based on injury to her right and can be brought within four years pursuant to
Article 1146 of the civil code.
ISSUE: Has the action prescribed? Can Geronimos action based on quasi-delict exist despite the pre-
existing contract of sale?
Held: While it may be true that the pre-existing contract between the parties may, as a general rule,
bar the applicability of the law on quasi-delict, the liability may itself be deemed to arise from quasi-
delict, i.e., the act which breaks the contract may also be a quasi-delict.
In Singson vs. Bank of the Philippine Islands," this Court stated: "We have repeatedly held, however,
that the existence of a contract between the parties does not bar the commission of a tort by the one
against the other and the consequent recovery of damages therefor. Indeed, this view has been, in
effect, reiterated in a comparatively recent case. Thus, in Air France vs. Carrascosa, involving an
airplane passenger who, despite his first-class ticket, had been illegally ousted from his first-class
accommodation and compelled to take a seat in the tourist compartment, was held entitled to recover
damages from the air-carrier, upon the ground of tort on the latter's part, for, although the relation
between the passenger and a carrier is contractual both in origin and nature x x x the act that breaks
the contract may also be a tort.'''
Otherwise put, liability for quasi-delict may still exist despite the presence of contractual relations.
Therefore, Geronimo has four years to file the case, reckoned from the time the cause of action
accrued.
City of Manila vs. Teotico G.R. No. L-23052 (January 29, 1968)
FACTS: Genaro N. Teotico fell inside an uncovered and unlighted manhole when he attempted to board
a jeepney at a "loading and unloading" zone. As a result of the fall, Teoticos eyeglasses broke and its
shards pierced his left eyelid, impairing his vision. Aside from the lacerated wound in his left upper
eyelid, he also suffered from several contusions to his body and an allergic eruption caused by anti-
tetanus injections administered to him in the hospital. His medical expenses amounted to P1,400.00.
As a consequence of the foregoing occurrence, Teotico filed a complaint for damages against the City of
Manila, its mayor, city engineer, city health officer, city treasurer and chief of police. The City of Manila
and its officers contended that every time a report that a cover of a manhole is missing, the Office of
the City Engineer immediately had it replaced and that they were attentive thereto.
The trial court rendered a decision in favour of the City of Manila but the Court of Appeals sentenced
the City of Manila to pay damages amounting to P6,750.00.
ISSUE: Whether the City of Manila is liable for payment of damages to Teotico
Held: Between RA 409, the Charter of Manila, exempting the City from liability, and the Civil Code, the
Civil Code applies because its subject-matter is more particular. RA 409 refers to liability arising from
negligence, in general, regardless of the object thereof. On the other hand, Article 2189 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines provides:
Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the death of, or injuries suffered by,
any person by reason of defective conditions of road, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other public
works under their control or supervision.
Article 2189 governs liability due to "defective streets," in particular. Since the present action is based
upon the alleged defective condition of a road, said Article 2189 is decisive thereon.
Even assuming that the incident took place in a national highway, it is not necessary for liability to
attach that the defective roads or streets belongs to the province, city or municipality from which
responsibility is exacted. What Article 2189 requires is that the province, city or municipality have
either "control or supervision" over said street or road.
Republic Act No. 917 provides that the construction, maintenance and improvement of national,
provincial and city roads shall be accomplished by the Highway District Engineers and Highway City
Engineers.
Bernardino Jimenez vs City of Manila| Paras G.R. No. 71049 May 29, 1987|
FACTS: Public Market and as tort-feasor under Article 2176 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts.
Article 2189 of the Civil Code of the Philippines which provides that:
In the morning of August 15, 1974, Jimenez, together with his neighbors, went to Sta. Ana public
market to buy "bagoong" at the time when the public market was flooded with ankle deep rainwater.
After purchasing the "bagoong" he turned around to return home but he stepped on an
uncovered opening which could not be seen because of the dirty rainwater, causing a dirty and rusty
four- inch nail, stuck inside the uncovered opening, to pierce the left leg of plaintiff-petitioner
penetrating to a depth of about one and a half inches.
After administering first aid treatment at a nearby drugstore, his companions helped him hobble
home.
He felt ill and developed fever and he had to be carried to Dr. Juanita Mascardo.
Despite the medicine administered to him by the latter, his left leg swelled with great pain. He
was then rushed to the Veterans Memorial Hospital where he had to be confined for twenty (20) days
due to high fever and severe pain.
Upon his discharge from the hospital, he had to walk around with crutches for fifteen (15) days.
His injury prevented him from attending to the school buses he is operating. As a result, he had to
engage the services of one Bienvenido Valdez to supervise his business for an aggregate compensation
of nine hundred pesos (P900.00).
Petitioner sued for damages the City of Manila and the Asiatic Integrated Corporation under
whose administration the Sta. Ana Public Market had been placed by virtue of a Management and
Operating Contract.
The lower court decided in favor of respondents, and against the plaintiff dismissing the
complaint with costs against the plaintiff. For lack of sufficient evidence, the counterclaims of the
defendants are likewise dismissed.
On appeal, the Intermediate Appellate Court held the Asiatic Integrated Corporation liable for
damages but absolved respondent City of Manila.
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS

W.N the Intermediate Appellate Court erred in not RULING that respondent City of Manila should
be jointly and severally liable with Asiatic Integrated Corporation for the injuries petitioner suffered.
Yes. Respondent City of Manila and Asiatic Integrated Corporation being joint tort-feasors are solidarily
liable under Article 2194 of the Civil Code.
The City of Manila is likewise liable for damages under Article 2189 of the Civil Code, respondent
City having retained control and supervision over the Sta. Ana Public Market and as tort-feasor under
Article 2176 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts.
Article 2189 of the Civil Code of the Philippines which provides that:
Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the death of, or injuries suffered by
any person by reason of defective conditions of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings and other
public works under their control or supervision.
Petitioner had the right to assume that there were no openings in the middle of the
passageways and if any, that they were adequately covered. Had the opening been covered, petitioner
could not have fallen into it. Thus the negligence of the City of Manila is the proximate cause of the
injury suffered, the City is therefore liable for the injury suffered by the petitioner.
Guilatco vs. City of Dagupan 171 SCRA 382 (Mar 21, 1989)
FACTS: Florentina Guilatco, a Court Interpreter, was about to board a tricycle along a sidewalk when
she accidentally fell into a manhole that was partially covered by a concrete flower pot leaving a gaping
hole about 2 ft long by 1 feet wide and 150 cm deep. Florentina suffered a fracture on her right leg
and as result thereof, had to be hospitalized. Florentina averred that she suffered mental and physical
pain, and that she has difficulty in locomotion. She became incapable of reporting for duty within quite
some time and thus lost income. She also lost weight, and is no longer her former jovial self.
Florentina sued the City of Dagupan. The City contends that the manhole is owned by the National gov
and the sidewalk on which it is found is located in Perez Blvd., which was also under the supervision of
the National Government. While the lower court held the City of Dagupan liable, the appellate court
reversed the RULING on the ground that no evidence was presented to prove that the City of Dagupan
had "control or supervision" over the Boulevard, where the manhole is located.
ISSUE: Whether or not the City of Dagupan is liable for damages?
RULING: Yes. The City of Dagupan is liable for damages. The liability of public corporations for
damages arising from injuries suffered by pedestrians by reason of the defective condition of roads is
expressed in the Art. 2189 of Civil Code, which states:
Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the death of, or injuries suffered by,
any person by reason of the defective condition of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other
public works under their control or supervision.
For liability to attach, it is not even necessary for the defective road or street to belong to the province,
city or municipality. The article only requires that either control or supervision is exercised over the
defective road or street.
In the case at bar, this control or supervision is provided for in the charter of Dagupan City and is
exercised through the City Engineer. This function of supervision over streets, public buildings, and
other public works is coursed through a Maintenance Foreman and a Maintenance Engineer. Although
these last two officials are employees of the National Government, they are detailed with the City of
Dagupan and receive instruction and supervision from the city through the City Engineer.
The express provision in the charter holding the city not liable for damages or injuries sustained by
persons or property due to the failure of any city officer to enforce the provisions of the charter, cannot
be used to exempt the city from liability. The charter only lays down general rules regulating the
liability of the city. On the other hand article 2189 applies in particular to the liability arising from
"defective streets, public buildings and other public works.
Municipality of San Juan vs. CA G.R. No. 121920, August 9, 2005

FACTS
Under a "Contract For Water Service Connections, between the Metropolitan Waterworks and
Sewerage System (MWSS) and Kwok Cheung as sole proprietor of K.C. Waterworks System Construction
(KC, for short), the former engaged the services of the latter to install water service connections.
o The agreement provides:
The CONTRACTOR agrees to install water service connections, transfer location of tapping to the
nearest main, undertake separation of service connection, change rusted connections, within the
service area of the MWSS specified in each job order covered by this Contract, from the water main up
to the installation of the verticals. Tapping of the service pipe connection and mounting of water meter
shall be undertaken exclusively or solely by the MWSS;
That same day, KC dispatched five (5) of its workers under Project Engineer Ernesto Battad, Jr. to
conduct the digging operations in the specified place.
The workers dug a hole one (1) meter wide and 1.5 meters deep, after which they refilled the
excavated portion of the road with the same gravel and stone excavated from the area.
o At that time, only of the job was finished in view of the fact that the workers were still required to
re-excavate that particular portion for the tapping of pipes for the water connections to the
concessionaires.
Meanwhile, between 10 oclock and 11 oclock in the evening of 31 May 1988, Priscilla Chan was
driving her Toyota Crown car with Plate No. PDK 991 at a speed of thirty (30) kilometers per hour on the
right side of Santolan Road towards the direction of Pinaglabanan, San Juan, Metro Manila. With her on
board the car and seated on the right front seat was Assistant City Prosecutor Laura Biglang-awa.
o The road was flooded as it was then raining hard. Suddenly, the left front wheel of the car fell on a
manhole where the workers of KC had earlier made excavations. As a result, the humerus on the right
arm of Prosecutor Biglang-awa was fractured.
Consequent to the foregoing incident, Biglang-awa filed before the Regional Trial Court at Pasig,
Metro Manila a complaint for damages against MWSS, the Municipality of San Juan and a number of San
Juan municipal officials.
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS
W/N the municipality is liable.
Yes
Jurisprudence teaches that for liability to arise under Article 2189of the Civil Code, ownership of
the roads, streets, bridges, public buildings and other public works, is not a controlling factor, it being
sufficient that a province, city or municipality has control or supervision thereof.
Municipality argues, however, that under Section 149, [1][z] of the Local Government Code,
petitioner has control or supervision only over municipal roads and not national roads, like Santolan
Road.
o Regulate the drilling and excavation of the ground for the laying of gas, water, sewer, and other
pipes; the building and repair of tunnels, sewers, drains and other similar structures; erecting of poles
and the use of crosswalks, curbs and gutters therein, and adopt measures to ensure public safety
against open canals, manholes, live wires and other similar hazards to life and property, and provide
just compensation or relief for persons suffering from them
Doubtless, the term "regulate" found in the aforequoted provision of Section 149 can only mean
that petitioner municipality exercises the power of control, or, at the very least, supervision over all
excavations for the laying of gas, water, sewer and other pipes within its territory.
The [petitioner] cannot validly shirk from its obligation to maintain and insure the safe
condition of the road merely because the permit for the excavation may have been ISSUEd by a
government entity or unit other than the Appellant San Juan or that the excavation may have been
done by a contractor under contract with a public entity like the Appellee MWSS.
It is the duty of the municipal authorities to exercise an active vigilance over the streets; to see
that they are kept in a reasonably safe condition for public travel. They cannot fold their arms and shut
their eyes and say they have no notice. (Todd versus City of Troy, 61 New York 506). (Words in bracket
supplied).
Gotesco vs. Chatto and Lina Delza Chatto 210 SCRA 18 (June 16, 1992)
FACTS: Gloria E. Chatto and her 15-year old daughter, Lina, went to see the movie "Mother Dear" at
Superama I theater, owned by defendant Gotesco Investment Corporation. They bought balcony tickets
but even then were unable to find seats. Hardly ten (10) minutes after entering the theater, the ceiling
of its balcony collapsed. The theater was plunged into darkness and pandemonium ensued. Shocked
and hurt, the mother and daughter managed to crawl under the fallen ceiling. As soon as they were
able to get out to the street they walked the nearby FEU Hospital where they were confined and treated
for one (1) day.
Chatto filed a complaint for damages against Gotesco. Defendant tried to avoid liability by alleging that
the collapse of the ceiling of its theater was due to force majeure. The trial court ordered Gotesco to
pay the plaintiffs moral damages, actual damages, attorney's fees, plus the cost of the suit. The CA
affirmed the decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not the collapse of the ceiling was due to an act of God or Force Majeure?
Held: No. The collapse of the ceiling was not due to Force Majeur. Mr. Jesus Lim Ong, admitted that "he
could not give any reason why the ceiling collapsed." Having interposed it as a defense, it had the
burden to prove that the collapse was indeed caused by force majeure. It could not have collapsed
without a cause. The fact that Mr. Ong could not offer any explanation does not imply force majeure.
Petitioner could have easily discovered the cause of the collapse if indeed it were due to force majeure.
To Our mind, the real reason why Mr. Ong could not explain the cause or reason is that either he did not
actually conduct the investigation or that he is, as the respondent Court impliedly held, incompetent.
He is not an engineer, but an architect who had not even passed the government's examination. Verily,
post-incident investigation cannot be considered as material to the present proceedings. What is
significant is the finding of the trial court, affirmed by the respondent Court that the collapse was due
to construction defects. There was no evidence offered to overturn this finding. The building was
constructed barely four (4) years prior to the accident in question. It was not shown that any of the
causes denominates as force majeure obtained immediately before or at the time of the collapse of the
ceiling. Such defects could have been easily discovered if only petitioner exercised due diligence and
care in keeping and maintaining the premises. But as disclosed by the testimony of Mr. Ong, there was
no adequate inspection of the premises before the date of the accident. The fact that structural designs
and plans of the building were duly approved by the City Engineer and that building permits and
certificate of occupancy were issued, do not at all prove that there were no defects in the construction,
especially as regards the ceiling, considering that no testimony was offered to prove that it was ever
inspected at all.
Besides, even assuming for the sake of argument that, as petitioner vigorously insists, the cause of the
collapse was due to force majeure, petitioner would still be liable because it was guilty of negligence,
which the trial court denominated as gross. As gleaned from Bouvier's definition of and Cockburn's
elucidation on force majeure for one to be exempt from any liability because of it, he must have
exercised care, i.e., he should not have been guilty of negligence.
De Roy vs. CA G.R. No. 80718, January 29, 1988 | 157 SCRA 757
FACTS
The firewall of a burned-out building owned by petitioners collapsed and destroyed the tailoring
shop occupied by the family of private respondents, resulting in injuries to private respondents and the
death of Marissa Bernal, a daughter.
Private respondents had been warned by petitioners to vacate their shop in view of its proximity
to the weakened wall but the former failed to do so.
The Regional Trial Court, rendered judgment finding petitioners guilty of gross negligence and
awarding damages to private respondents.
On appeal, the decision of the trial court was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals in a
decision promulgated on August 17, 1987, a copy of which was received by petitioners on August 25,
1987.
On September 9, 1987, the last day of the fifteen-day period to file an appeal, petitioners filed a
motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration, which was eventually denied by the
appellate court in the Resolution of September 30, 1987 .Habaluyas Enterprises, Inc. v. Japzon,
Petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration on September 24, 1987 but this was denied in
the Resolution of October 27, 1987.
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS
W/N the CA erred in its decision especially when it held petitioner liable under Art 2190 of the Civil Code
NO..
The Court finds that the Court of Appeals did not commit a grave abuse of discretion when it
denied petitioners' motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration, directed entry of
judgment and denied their motion for reconsideration.
The court correctly applied the rule laid down in Habaluyas Enterprises, Inc. v. Japzon that the
fifteen-day period for appealing or for filing a motion for reconsideration cannot be extended.
This Court likewise finds that the Court of Appeals committed no grave abuse of discretion in
affirming the trial court's decision holding petitioner liable under Article 2190 of the Civil Code, which
provides that "the proprietor of a building or structure is responsible for the damage resulting from its
total or partial collapse, if it should be due to the lack of necessary repairs.
there is a one-month grace period from the promulgation on May 30, 1986 of the Court's Resolution in the
clarificatory Habaluyas case, or up to June 30, 1986, within which the rule barring extensions of time to file motions
for new trial or reconsideration is, as yet, not strictly enforceable.
Since petitioners herein filed their motion for extension on February 27, 1986, it is still within the grace period,
which expired on June 30, 1986, and may still be allowed.
This grace period was also applied in Mission v. Intermediate Appellate Court [G.R. No. 73669, October 28, 1986,
145 SCRA 306].
In the instant case, however, petitioners' motion for extension of time was filed on September 9, 1987, more than a
year after the expiration of the grace period on June 30, 1986. Hence, it is no longer within the coverage of the
grace period. Considering the length of time from the expiration of the grace period to the promulgation of the
decision of the Court of Appeals on August 25, 1987, petitioners cannot seek refuge in the ignorance of their
counsel regarding said rule for their failure to file a motion for reconsideration within the reglementary period.
Petitioners contend that the rule enunciated in the Habaluyas case should not be made to apply to the case at bar
owing to the non-publication of the Habaluyas decision in the Official Gazette as of the time the subject decision of
the Court of Appeals was promulgated. Contrary to petitioners' view, there is no law requiring the publication of
Supreme Court decisions in the Official Gazette before they can be binding and as a condition to their becoming
effective. It is the bounden duty of counsel as lawyer in active law practice to keep abreast of decisions of the
Supreme Court particularly where issues have been clarified, consistently reiterated, and published in the advance
reports of Supreme Court decisions (G.R.s) and in such publications as the Supreme Court Reports Annotated
(SCRA) and law journals.
petitioner liable under Article 2190 of the Civil Code, which provides that "the proprietor of a building or structure is
responsible for the damage resulting from its total or partial collapse, if it should be due to the lack of necessary
repairs."
Nor was there error in rejecting petitioners argument that private respondents had the "last
clear chance" to avoid the accident if only they heeded the warning to vacate the tailoring shop and ,
therefore, petitioners prior negligence should be disregarded, since the doctrine of "last clear chance,"
which has been applied to vehicular accidents, is inapplicable to this case.
Dingcong vs. Kanaan G.R. No. L-47033 (April 25, 1941)

FACTS: The Dingcong brothers leased the upper floor of house owned by Emilia Saenz, where they
established and managed the Central Hotel.
A guest by the name of Francisco Echivarria occupied Room No. 10 of the hotel for P30. Kanaan, on the
other hand, occupies the ground floor the house of Saenz and where they established a store named
"American Bazaar" dedicated to the buy and sell of articles and merchandise.
Echivarria, before going to bed, let his faucet leak while the pipes of the hotel were undergoing repairs.
A bucket was placed underneath the leaking faucet to catch the dripping water, but still the bucket
overflowed. Water seeped through the floor and the merchandise in the bazaar below got wet and
caused damages worth around P1,000.00 (considerable amount in 1941). The Kanaans brought an
action for damages against the managers, the brothers Dingcong, and Echivarria. During trial one of
the Dingcong brothers died, but suit continued against the surviving Dingcong.
ISSUE: Whether or not Jose Dingcong and Francisco Echevarria are liable for damages.
Held: Francisco Echevarria, the hotel guest, is liable for being the one who, by his negligence in leaving
the faucet open, caused the water to spill on the ground and wet the articles and merchandise of the
Kanaans.
Jose Dingcong, the surviving co-renter and manager of the hotel, had complete possession of the
house, and consequently must also be responsible for the damages caused. As a co-lessee and
manager of the hotel, the Dingcongs have to answer for the damage caused by things that thrown or
falling from the hotel (Art. 1910 of the Codigo Civil).
The Dingcongs likewise failed to exercise the diligence of a good father of the family to prevent the
damages. They knew that the pipes of the hotel were under repair, as managers, they should have
presumed that the guest Echivarria would use the faucet, but only provided a bucket to deal with the
problem of the leaks.
Lilius vs. Manila Railroad Co. 59 Phil. 758

FACTS: Lilius accompanied by his wife and daughter was driving his car for Pagsanjan, Laguna. At
about 7 to 8 meters from the railroad crossing at Dayap he saw a truck parked on the left side of the
road with several people who have alighted from the truck walking on the opposite side.
He slowed down to about 12 miles an hour and sounded his horn for the people to get out of the way.
While his attention was thus occupied, he heard two short whistles and immediately thereafter his car
was hit by a passing train dragging it at a distance of about 10 meters. The train was not able to stop
until about 70 meters from the crossing. The approach of the train could not be noted because there
were houses, shrubs and trees along the road. Lilius, his wife and daughter were injured and this case
was instituted to recover damages.
Held: Upon examination of the oral as well as of the documentary evidence which the parties
presented at the trial in support of their respective contentions, and after taking into consideration all
the circumstances of the case, this court is of the opinion that the accident was due to negligence on
the part of the defendant-appellant company, for not having had on the occasion any semaphore at the
crossing at Dayap to serve as a warning to passers-by of its existence in order that they might take the
necessary precautions before crossing the railroad; and, on the part of its employees - the flagman and
switchman, for not having remained at their posts at the crossing in question to warn passers-by of the
approaching train; the station master, for failure to send the said flagman and switchman to their posts
on time; and the engineer, for not having taken the necessary precautions to avoid an accident, in view
of the absence of said flagman and switchman, by slackening his speed and continuously ringing the
bell and blowing the whistle before arriving at the crossing.
Although it is probable that the defendant-appellant entity employed the diligence of a good father of a
family in selecting its aforesaid employees, however, it did not employ such diligence in supervising
their work and the discharge of their duties because, otherwise, it would have had a semaphore or sign
at the crossing and, on previous occasions as well as on the night in question, the flagman and
switchman would have always been at their posts at the crossing upon the arrival of a train. The
diligence of a good father of a family, which the law requires in order to avoid damage, is not confined
to the careful and prudent selection of subordinates or employees but includes inspection of their work
and supervision of the discharge of their duties.
xxxxx
In view of the foregoing considerations, this court is of the opinion that the defendant Manila Railroad
Company alone is liable for the accident by reason of its own negligence and that of its employees, for
not having employed the diligence of a good father of a family in the supervision of the said employees
in the discharge of their duties.
Yamada vs. Manila Railroad 33 Phil. 11
FACTS: The plaintiffs with three companions hired an automobile from the defendant Bachrach Garage
& Taxicab Co. for a trip to Cavite Viejo.
The automobile was hired by the hour and was driven and controlled by the driver of the taxicab
company.
On the return trip to Manila, while crossing the tracks of the railroad company, the automobile was
struck by a train and the plaintiffs were inured. Plaintiffs sued both the railroad and taxicab companies.
The lower court absolved the railroad company and condemned the taxicab company to pay damages
to the plaintiffs.
On appeal Bachrach Co. contended that on approaching the railroad crossing the view of the railroad
tracks in both directions was obstructed by bushes and trees growing alongside thereof, and that it was
impossible for a person approaching the crossing, even though on guard to detect by sight the
approach of a train. In answer to this argument, the Supreme Court said:
HELD:
If that were the case, it was clearly the duty of the driver to reduce the speed of his car and the noise
thereof to such an extent that he would be able to determine from the unrestricted and uninterrupted
use of all his faculties whether or not a train was near. It is the law that a person must use ordinary care
and prudence in passing over a railroad crossing. While we are not prepared to lay down any absolute
rule as to what precise acts of precaution are necessary to be done or left undone by a person who may
have need to pass over a railroad crossing, we may say that it is always incumbent on him to use
ordinary care and diligence. What acts are necessary to constitute such care and diligence must
depend on the circumstances of each particular case. Greater care is necessary in crossing a road
where the cars are running at a high rate of speed and close together than where they are running at
less speed and remote from one another. But in every case due care should be exercised. It is very
possible that where, on approaching a crossing, the view of the tracks in both directions is unobstructed
for such a distance as to render it perfectly safe to pass over without the use of any other faculty than
sight, such use alone is sufficient and it is not necessary to stop or even to slacken speed or listen. On
the other hand, where the view of the tracks is obstructed, then it is a drivers duty to slacken speed, to
reduce the noise, if any, of the vehicle, to look and to listen, if necessary, or do any other act necessary
to determine that a train is not in dangerous proximity to the crossing.
xxxxx
Defendant also contended that the negligence of the driver was imputable to the plaintiffs since they
allowed the driver to approach the railroad crossing without exercising due care to determine the
proximity of a train and having made no effort to caution of instruct him or compel him to take
reasonable care in making the crossing. On this contention the Supreme Court said:
We think the better rule, and one more consonant with the weight of authority, is that a person who
hires a public automobile and gives the driver directions as to the place he wished to be conveyed, but
exercises no other control over the conduct of the drivier, is not responsible for acts of negligence of
the latter or prevented from recovering for injuries suffered form a collision between the automobile
and a train, caused by the negligence of either the locomotive engineer or the automobile driver.
Defendant taxicab company was held liable to the plaintiffs.
Del Rosario vs. Manila Electric 57 Phil. 478

FACTS: Shortly after 2 oclock in the afternoon trouble developed in an overhead wire conducting
electricity for lighting purposes in the City of Manila. The wire soon parted and one of the charged ends
fell to the ground in the shrubbery close to the way. The lighting company received a telephonic report
of this incident as 2:25 p.m., and promised to send an inspector. At 4 p.m. the neighborhood school was
dismissed and as the children went home one of the boys, of the age of 9 years, touched the wire with
his hand and received a shock which resulted in death. This action was instituted by the parents of the
deceased boy to recovery damages from the defendant.
Held: We are of the opinion that the presumption of negligence on the part of the company from the
breakage of its wire has not been overcome, and the defendant is in our opinion responsible for the
accident. Furthermore, when notice was received at the Malabon station at 2:25 p.m. somebody should
have been dispatched to the scene of the trouble at once, or other measures, taken to guard the point
of danger, but more than an hour and a half passed before anyone representing the company appeared
on the scene, and in the meantime this child had been claimed as a victim.
Del Prado vs. Manila Electric 52 Phil. 900

FACTS: The plaintiff attempted to board a streetcar belonging to the defendant at a point not intended
for stopping. He raised his hand as an indication to the motorman of his desire to board the car and in
response to which the motorman eased up a little without stopping. The plaintiff held the handpost with
his left hand and placed his left foot upon the platform. Before plaintiffs position had however become
secure, the motorman applied the power and the car gave a slight lurch forward. The sudden impulse to
the car caused the plaintiffs foot to slip and he fell to the ground with the result that his right foot was
caught and crushed by the moving car.
Held: The motorman was negligent in accelerating the speed of the street-car before the position of
the intending passenger in the car had become secure.
The relation between a carrier of passengers for hire and its patrons is of a contractual nature; and the
failure to use due care in conveying its passengers safely is a breach of obligation under Article 1101
and related provisions.
The defense indicated in the last paragraph of Article 1903 of the Civil Code is not available to the
master when his servant is guilty of a breach of duty under Article 1101 and related provisions of said
Code.
To the same effect are the RULINGs of the Supreme Court in Manila Railroad Co. vs. Compania Trans-
Atlantica, 38 Phil. 875 and Mercado vs. Lira, 3 SCRA 124, 131).
Same; Proof of defendants fault or negligence not necessary in cases of breach of contract of carriage.
In cases of breach of contract of carriage it is not necessary for the plaintiff to prove that the defendant
or his employees are guilty of fault or negligence in order to recover. The burden is on the part of the
defendant to show that his failure to comply with the contract is not due to his fault or negligence or
that of his employee. (See Mercado v. Lira, 3 SCRA 124, 131).
Astudillo vs. Manila Electric 55 Phil. 427 (source)

FACTS: The district of Intramuros, Manila, is surrounded by a wall with openings at intervals for ingress
or egress. One of these openings toward Manila Bay is known as the Santa Lucia Gate. Above the gate
and between the wall and a street is a considerable space sodded with grass with the portion directly
over the gate paved with stone. This has become a public place where persons come to stroll, to rest,
and enjoy themselves. Near this place is an electric light pole with the corresponding wires. The pole
was located close enough to the public place above described that a person by reaching his arm out of
the full length would be able to hold of one of the wires. At about 6 oclock in the evening of August 14,
1923, a group of boys came to this place.
One of these boys for some unknown reason, placing one foot on a projection reached out and grasped
a charged electric wire. Death resulted almost instantly. This action was instituted by the mother of the
deceased boy to recover damages from the electric company.
Held: It is a well established that the liability of electric light companies for damages for personal
injuries is governed by the rules of negligence.
Such companies are, however, not insurers of the safety of the public.
But considering that electricity is an agency, subtle and deadly, the measure of care required of electric
companies must be commensurate with or proportionate to the danger. The duty of exercising this high
degree of diligence and care extends to every place where persons have a right to be. The poles must
be so erected and the wires and appliances must be so located that persons rightfully near the place
will not be injured. Particularly must there be proper insulation of the wires and appliances in places
where there is likelihood of human contact therewith.
We cannot agree with the defense of the Manila Electric Co. in the lower court to the effect that the
death of Juan Diaz Astudillo was due exclusively to his negligence. He only did the natural thing to be
expected of one not familiar with the danger arising from touching an electric wire, and was wholly
unconscious of his peril. Had not the wire caused the death of this young man, it would undoubtedly be
only a question of time when someone else, like a playful boy, would have been induced to take hold of
the wire, with fatal results. The cause of the injury was one which could have been foreseen and
guarded against. The negligence came from the act of the Manila Electric Co. in so placing its pole and
wires as to be within proximity to a place frequented by many people, with the possibility ever present
of one of them losing his life by coming in contact with a highly charged and defectively insulated
wire.
Defendant condemned to pay P1,500.00 damages to the plaintiff.

MAKATI SHANGRI-LA vs. HARPER G.R. No. 189998. August 29, 2012
DOCTRINE:
Negligence Article 2176 0f the New Civil Code provides Whoever by act or omission causes damage
to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or
negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict
and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
The hotel business is imbued with public interest. Hotelkeepers are bound to provide not only lodging
for their guests but also security to their persons and belongings to their guest. The twin duty
constitutes the essence of the business (Arts 2000-2001 New Civil Code).
Hotel owner is liable for civil damages to surviving heirs of hotel guest whom strangers murder inside
his hotel room.
FACTS:
Christian Harper was a Norweigian who came to Manila on a business trip. He stayed at Makati Shangri-
la Hotel, but he was murdered in his hotel room [Specifically Room 1428. His ghost can be found there].
It was found that the muderer, a caucasian male, was able to trespass into the hotel room of the victim
and was then able to murder and rob the victim. The heirs of the victim blame the hotel's gross
negligence in providing the most basic security system of its guests.
The RTC held in favor of the heirs and ordered Shangri-la to pay damages. CA affirmed.
ISSUE: WON Shangri-la Hotel is liable for damages.
HELD:
Yes. Shangri-la is liable due to its own negligence.
The testimony revealed that the management practice of the hotel prior to the death of the victim was
to deploy only one security or roving guard for every three or four floors of the hotel, which is
inadequate because the hotel is L-shaped that rendered hallways not visible end to end. That there was
a recommendation to increase security to one guard per floor but this was not followed. This ommission
is critical. The hotel business is imbued with public interest. Hotelkeepers are bound to provide not only
lodging for their guests but also security to their persons and belongings to their guest. The twin duty
constitutes the essence of the business.
Therefore, the hotel has a greater degree of care and responsibility for its guests , otherwise the
hotelkeepers would just stand idly by while strangers have unrestricted access to all hotel rooms on the
pretense of being visitors of the guests which is absurd.
Note: The decision of the CA was reproduced in the decision to which the SC concurred. The CA
discussed the test of negligence as:
The test of negligence is objective. WE measure the act or ommission of the tortfeasor with a
perspective as that of an ordinary reasonable person who is similarly situated. The test, as applied to
the extant case, is whether or not [Shangri-la Hotel], under the attendant circumstances, used that
reasonable care and caution which an ordinary person would have used in the same situation.
E.M. Wright V Manila Electric R.R. & Light Co. 28 Phil 122 (October 1, 1914)
FACTS: Manila Electric is a corporation engaged in operating an electric street railway. Wrights
residence in Caloocan fronts on the street along which defendants tracks run. To enter his premises
from the street, Wright must cross defendants tracks.
One night, Wright drove home in a calesa and in crossing the tracks to enter the premises of his home,
the horse stumbled, leaped forward, and fell, throwing the Wright from the vehicle, causing injuries. On
the location where Wright crossed the tracks, the rails were above-ground, and the ties upon which the
rails rested projected from one-third to one-half of their depth out of the ground, making the tops of the
rails some 5 or 6 inches or more above the level of the street.
Manila Electric admitted that it was negligent in maintaining its tracks, but it also claimed that Wright
was also negligent in that he was so intoxicated, and such intoxication was the primary cause of the
accident.
The trial court held that both parties were negligent, but that plaintiffs negligence was not as great as
defendants. It awarded Wright damages.
ISSUE: Whether or not the negligence of Wright contributed to the principal occurrence or only to
his own injury.
HELD: NO. Intoxication in itself is not negligence. It is but a circumstance to be considered with the
other evidence tending to prove negligence. No FACTS, other than the fact that Wright was intoxicated,
are stated which warrant the conclusion that the plaintiff was negligent. The conclusion that if he had
been sober he would not have been injured is not warranted by the FACTS as found. It is impossible to
say that a sober man would not have fallen from the vehicle under the conditions described.
A horse crossing the railroad tracks with not only the rails but a portion of the ties themselves
aboveground, stumbling by reason of the unsure footing and falling, the vehicle crashing against the
rails with such force as to break a wheel, might be sufficient to throw a person from the vehicle no
matter what his condition; and to conclude that, under such circumstances, a sober man would not
have fallen while a drunken man did, is to draw a conclusion which enters the realm of speculation and
guesswork. Wright was not negligent. No FACTS to merit a higher award of damages to plaintiff
National Power Corporation vs CA 1993 GR 103442-45 May 21, 1993

FACTS:
This is a consolidated case comprising of four separate complaints., filed against NPC and a particular
Chavez.
Plaintiffs filed a complaint against respondent for the lost of lives and destruction of properties due to
the negligence of the latter in releasing water from Angat dam during the typhoon Kading
Benjamin Chavez, being the supervisor at that time of a multi-purpose hydroelectric plant in the Angat
River at Hilltop, Norzagaray, Bulacan, failed to exercise due diligence in monitoring the water level at
the dam.
NPCs allegations were as follows:
1) the NPC exercised due care, diligence and prudence in the operation and maintenance of the
hydroelectric plant;
2) the NPC exercised the diligence of a good father in the selection of its employees; 3) written notices
were sent to the different municipalities of Bulacan warning the residents therein about the impending
release of a large volume of water with the onset of typhoon "Kading" and advise them to take the
necessary precautions;
4) the water released during the typhoon was needed to prevent the collapse of the dam and avoid
greater damage to people and property;
5) in spite of the precautions undertaken and the diligence exercised, they could still not contain or
control the flood that resulted and;
6) the damages incurred by the private respondents were caused by a fortuitous event or force majeure
and are in the nature and character of damnum absque injuria. By way of special affirmative defense,
the defendants averred that the NPC cannot be sued because it performs a purely governmental
function.
The trial court dismissed the complaints as against the NPC on the ground that the provision of its
charter allowing it to sue and be sued does not contemplate actions based on tort. Its decision on 30
April 1990 dismissing the complaints "for lack of sufficient and credible evidence."
Court of Appeals reversed the appealed decision and awarded damages in favor of the private
respondents. Based on the findings that From the mass of evidence extant in the record, We are
convinced, and so hold that the flash flood on October 27, 1978, was caused not by rain waters (sic),
but by stored waters (sic) suddenly and simultaneously released from the Angat Dam by defendants-
appellees, particularly from midnight of October 26, 1978 up to the morning hours of October 27, 1978.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent is negligent?
Whether or not the notices of warning were insufficient?
Whether or not The damages suffered was not DAMNUM ABSQUE INJURIA?
HELD:
We declared therein that the proximate cause of the loss and damage sustained by the plaintiffs therein
who were similarly situated as the private respondents herein was the negligence of the
petitioners, and that the 24 October 1978 "early warning notice" supposedly sent to the affected
municipalities, the same notice involved in the case at bar, was insufficient.
The petitioners were guilty of "patent gross and evident lack of foresight, imprudence and negligence in
the management and operation of Angat Dam," and that "the extent of the opening of the spillways,
and the magnitude of the water released, are all but products of defendants-appellees' headlessness,
slovenliness, and carelessness."
To exempt the obligor from liability under Article 1174 of the Civil Code, for a breach of an obligation
due to an "act of God," the following must concur: (a) the cause of the breach of the obligation must be
independent of the will of the debtor; (b) the event must be either unforseeable or unavoidable; (c) the
event must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a moral manner;
and (d) the debtor must be free from any participation in, or aggravation of the injury to the creditor.
(Vasquez v. Court of Appeals, 138 SCRA 553; Estrada v. Consolacion, 71 SCRA 423; Austria v. Court of
Appeals, 39 SCRA 527; Republic of the Phil. v. Luzon Stevedoring Corp., 21 SCRA 279; Lasam v. Smith,
45 Phil. 657).
Accordingly, petitioners cannot be heard to invoke the act of God or force majeure to escape liability for
the loss or damage sustained by private respondents since they, the petitioners, were guilty of
negligence. The event then was not occasioned exclusively by an act of God or force majeure; a human
factor negligence or imprudence had intervened. The effect then of the force majeure in question
may be deemed to have, even if only partly, resulted from the participation of man. Thus, the whole
occurrence was thereby humanized, as it were, and removed from the laws applicable to acts of God.
Keppel Cebu Shipyard vs. Pioneer Insurance and Surety September 25, 2009
FACTS: KCSI and WG&A Jebsens Shipmanagement, Inc. (WG&A) executed a Shiprepair Agreement
wherein KCSI would renovate and reconstruct WG&As M/V Superferry 3 using its dry docking facilities
pursuant to its restrictive safety and security rules and regulations. Prior to the execution of the
Shiprepair Agreement, Superferry 3 was already insured by WG&A with Pioneer for US$8,472,581.78.
The Shiprepair Agreement provides, among others, for the following terms:
(1) that the owner shall inform its insurer and shall include Keppel Cebu Shipyard as a co-
assured in
its insurance policy;
(2) that the owner shall waive its right to claim for any loss of profit or loss of use or damages
consequential on such loss of use resulting from the delay in the redelivery of the above vessel;
(3) that the owner shall indemnify and hold Keppel Cebu Shipyard harmless from any or all
claims, damages, or liabilities arising from death or bodily injuries to Owners workers, or
damages to the vessel or other property however caused.
In the course of its repair, M/V Superferry 3 was gutted by fire. Claiming that the extent of the
damage was pervasive, WG&A declared the vessels damage as a total constructive loss and, hence,
filed an insurance claim with Pioneer. Pioneer paid the insurance claim in the amount of
US$8,472,581.78. WG&A, in turn, executed a Loss and Subrogation Receipt in favor of Pioneer. Pioneer
then tried to collect from KCSI, but the latter denied any responsibility for the loss of the subject vessel
despite repeated demands. Hence, Pioneer, filed a Request for Arbitration before the Construction
Industry Arbitration Commission (CIAC) praying for the payment of the amount paid to WG&A, the
expenses of the arbitration (P500 million), and damages. It further
prayed that Clauses 1 and 2 on the unsigned page 1 of the Shiprepair Agreement as well as the
hardly legible Clauses 20 and 22 (a) and other similar clauses printed in very fine print on the unsigned
dorsal page thereof, be all declared illegal and void ab initio.
KCSI and WG&A reached an amicable settlement, leading to the dismissal of the claim of WG&A against
KCSI and the arbitration to proceed with Pioneer as the remaining claimant. Pioneer alleges that it is the
real party in interest and that Keppel had custody of and control over the M/V Superferry 3 while said
vessel was in Respondent Keppels premises. It likewise alleged that the Vessels Safety Manual cannot
be relied upon as proof of the Masters continuing control over the vessel ; Yard is liable under the
Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur. Moreover , the liability of Respondent does not arise merely from the
application of the Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur, but from its negligence in this case. It futher alleged
that the shipowner had no legal duty to apply for a hotworks permit since it was not required by the
yard, and the owners hotworks were conducted by welders who remained employees of the yard. In
supplying welders and equipment as per The Work Order Dated 26 January 2000, the Yard did so at its
own risk, and acted as a Less Than Prudent Ship Repairer.
KCI on the other hand alleged:

1. that pioneer as claimant has no standing to file the Request for Arbitration and the Tribunal
has no jurisdiction over the case.
2. The Ship [R]epair Agreement was not imposed upon the Vessel. The Vessel knowingly and
voluntarily accepted that agreement. Moreover, there are no signing or other formal defects that
can invalidate the agreement.
3. The proximate cause of the fire and damage to the Vessel was not any negligence committed
by Angelino Sevillejo in cutting the bulkhead door or any other shortcoming by the Yard. On the
contrary, the proximate cause of the fire was Dr. Jonigas and the Vessels deliberate decision to
have Angelino Sevillejo undertake cutting work in inherently dangerous conditions created by
them.
4. Even assuming that Angelino Sevillejo cut the bulkhead door close to the deck floor, and that
this circumstance rather than the extremely hazardous conditions created by Dr. Joniga and the
Vessel for that activity caused the fire, the Yard may still not be held liable for the resulting
damage.
5. Assuming that the Yard is liable, it cannot be compelled to pay the full amount of P360 million
paid by the Claimant as subrogee, for an amount greater than that which the Vessel could have
recovered, even if the Claimant may have paid a higher amount under its policies. In turn, the
right of the Vessel to recover is limited to actual damage to the MV
Superferry 3, at the time of the fire.
CIA declared both WG&A and KCSI guilty of negligence. The Court of appeals, in its amended decision
ordered the Yard to pay Pioneer P25 Million, without legal interest, within 15 days from the finality of
the decision.
ISSUES:
1. To whom may negligence over the fire that broke out on board M/V Superferry 3 be
imputed?
2. Is subrogation proper? If proper, to what extent can subrogation be made?
Held:
KCI should be liable. Undeniably, the immediate cause of the fire was the hot work done by Angelino
Sevillejo (Sevillejo) on the accommodation area of the vessel, specifically on Deck A. The fire broke out
shortly after 10:25 and an alarm was raised. Angelino Sevillejo tried to put out the fire by pouring the
contents of a five-liter drinking water container on it and as he did so, smoke came up from under Deck
A. He got another container of water which he also poured whence the smoke was coming. In the
meantime, other workers in the immediate vicinity tried to fight the fire by using fire extinguishers and
buckets of water. But because the fire was inside the ceiling void, it was extremely difficult to contain or
extinguish; and it spread rapidly because it was not possible to direct water jets or the fire
extinguishers into the space at the source.
Fighting the fire was extremely difficult because the life jackets and the construction materials of the
Deck B ceiling were combustible and permitted the fire to spread within the ceiling void. From there,
the fire dropped into the Deck B accommodation areas at various locations, where there were
combustible materials. Respondent points to cans of paint and thinner, in addition to the plywood
partitions and foam mattresses on deck B.
Indeed, KCSI was the employer of Sevillejopaying his salaries; retaining the power and the right to
discharge or substitute him with another welder; providing him and the other welders with its
equipment; giving him and the other welders marching orders to work on the vessel; and monitoring
and keeping track of his and the other welders activities on board, in view of the delicate nature of
their work. Thus, as such employee, aware of KCSIs Safety Regulations on Vessels Afloat/Dry, which
specifically provides that (n)o hotwork (welding/cutting works) shall be done on board [the] vessel
without [a] Safety Permit from KCSI Safety Section,[35]it was incumbent upon Sevillejo to obtain the
required hot work safety permit before starting the work he did, including that done on Deck A where
the fire started. In this light, therefore, Sevillejo, being one of the specially trained welders specifically
authorized by KCSI to do the hot works on M/V Superferry 3 to the exclusion of other workers, failed
to comply with the strict safety standards of KCSI, not only because he worked without the required
permit, fire watch, fire buckets, and extinguishers, but also because he failed to undertake other
precautionary measures for preventing the fire. For instance, he could have, at the very least, ensured
that whatever combustible material may have been in the vicinity would be protected from the sparks
caused by the welding torch. He could have easily removed the life jackets from the ceiling void, as well
as the foam mattresses, and covered any holes where the sparks may enter.
Picart vs. Smith 37 Phil 809 (March 15, 1918)

FACTS: Plaintiff, Picart was riding a pony on Carlatan Bridge, San Fernando. He pulled his pony over the
bridges railing on the right instead of left upon seeing the automobile rapidly approaching. His pony
was unfortunately frightened when the automobile passed so close to them. The horse was struck on
the hock of the left hind leg by the flange of the car and the limb was broken. The horse fell and its
rider was thrown off with some violence. As a result of its injuries the horse died. Picart received
contusions which caused temporary unconsciousness and required medical attention for several days.
Picart seeks to render the sum of Php31,000 as damages. CFI- La Union absolved Smith.
ISSUE:Whether or not defendant was negligent and if the concept of last clear chance is attributable to
him?
Held: The defendant Smith is negligent and liable under the doctrine of last clear chance even though
the plaintiff was on the wrong side of the bridge. Defendant has had the opportunity to avoid the
accident after realizing that the negligence by the plaintiff could not have placed him in a position of
better safety.
The last clear chance was passed unto the defendant driving the automobile. It was his duty to bring
the car to an immediate stop or upon seeing no other persons were on the bridge to take the other side
and pass far away from the pony to avoid collision. Instead of doing this, Smith ran straight on until he
was almost upon the horse. When Smith exposed the horse and rider to this danger he was negligent in
the eye of the law. Under the circumstances, the law is that the person who has the last clear chance to
avoid the impending harm and fails to do is chargeable with the consequences, without reference to the
prior negligence of the other party. The existence of negligence in a given case is not determined by
reference to the personal judgment of the actor in the situation before him. The law considers what
would be reckless, blameworthy, or negligent in the man of ordinary intelligence and prudence and
determines liability by that.
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the lower court, and rendered judgment that Picart
recover of Smith the sum of P200, with costs of both instances. The court held that the sum awarded
was estimated to include the value of the horse, medical expenses of Picart, the loss or damage
occasioned to articles of his apparel, and lawful interest on the whole to the date of this recovery.
Sarreal, Sr. vs. Japan Airlines Co. Ltd. (1992)

FACTS: Lope Sarreal, Sr. purchased in Bangkok from Japan Air Lines (JAL) a ticket, having various
foreign destinations from Bangkok and back to Bangkok.
As he was in Los Angleles, USA with his business representative Atty. Pol Tiglao, and Luis Espada,
the boxing manager of World Flyweight Boxing Champion Hilario Zapata where they were
negotiating a possible boxing match. Sarreal, Sr. then flew from Los Angeles to Tokyo.
At the Narita Airport Office, the Sarreal, Sr. inquired if there was a JAL flight from Bangkok to Manila
on July 2, 1980. The JAL lady employee looked into her scheduled book put a stamp on the
petitioner's ticket and told him not to worry because she has endorsed his JAL ticket to Thai
International leaving Bangkok on July 2, 1980 for Manila.
Relying on the assurance of the lady employee, the petitioner then proceeded to Bangkok.
However, in the morning of July 2, 1980, when the petitioner was about to board the said Thai
International, he was not allowed to board the said plane through it had available seats because he
was told that his ticket was not endorseable.
Since the petitioner failed to reach Manila by July 2, 1980, Espada cancelled his transaction with
the petitioner and decided to have the champion fight in Japan instead.
Had the petitioner been able to reach Manila on July 2, 1980, he could have earned a lot. This led
the petitioner to file an action for damages with the Regional Trail Court (RTC ), Pasay City against
private respondent JAL premised on the breach of contract of carriage. The RTC of Pasay City
rendered a decision against JAL which was reversed on appeal.
ISSUE: Whether JAL is liable
HELD: In finding for the petitioner, the lower court held that JAL through the lady employee at Narita
Airport had endorsed petitioner's ticket to Thai International on its July 2, 1980 10:30 A.M. scheduled
flight. Assuming that petitioner's ticket was not at all endorsed to Thai International, the petitioner was
nevertheless assured of a seat in Thai International by the JAL lady employee. JAL was held liable for
breaching the contract of carriage entered into when it ISSUEd the ticket to the petitioner. JAL
undertook the obligation to carry petitioner to his destination. The trial court ruled that since on July 2,
1980, JAL had no flight schedule from Bangkok to Manila, the request made by the lady employee of JAL
to Thai International to accommodate petitioner in the latter's flight No. 620 on July 2, 1980 for Bangkok
to Manila and the undisputed assurance by the said lady employee that petitioner would have a seat in
that flight became definitely part of that contract of carriage.
This argument is not based on the records. The evidence on record, reveals that the ticket bears no
endorsement at all nor an assurance that petitioner would get a seat in Thai International flight from
Bangkok to Manila on July 2. The ticket purchased by the petitioner was a discounted one and as
testified by the JAL Traffic Supervisor, it was not endorseable. We agree with the respondent court that
the assurance made by the lady employee to the petitioner was merely the latter's chances of getting a
seat in Thai International flight from Bangkok to Manila considering that from the data gathered by said
lady employee, Thai International on the average runs about half full on its flight from Bangkok to
Manila. It was from this reliable information that petitioner decided to make the side trip to Bangkok.
There was no assurance from the lady employee nor from Thai International that the petitioner's ticket
would be honored by the airline. (Rollo, p. 34)
The stub that the lady employee put on the petitioner's ticket showed among other coded items, under
the column "status" the letters "RQ" which was understood to mean "Request". Clearly, this does not
mean a confirmation but only a request. JAL Traffic Supervisor explained that it would have been
different if what was written on the stub were the letters "OK" in which case the petitioner would have
been assured of a seat on said flight. But in this case, the petitioner was more of a wait-listed
passenger than a regularly booked passenger.
The petitioner is said to be a well-traveled person who average two long trips to Europe and two trips to
Bangkok every month since 1945. He claims to have used practically all the airlines but mostly
Philippine Airlines whenever he travels abroad in connection with his occupation as international boxing
matchmaker and manager of world- champion boxers. (Rollo, p. 64) Certainly, a man of such stature
was aware of the restrictions carried by his ticket and the usual procedure that goes with traveling. The
petitioner ought to know that it was still necessary to verify first from Thai International if they would
honor the endorsment of his JAL ticket or confirm with the airline if he had a seat in the July 2 flight. The
petitioner left Narita on June 26, 1980. He was scheduled to leave for Manila on July 2, 1980. It is
standard procedure for any passenger with a two day stop over in a foreign city to confirm the validity
of his ticket and the availability of a seat on his next flight out of that city. Unfortunately, the petitioner
failed to take these standard precautions. JAL cannot now be faulted for the petitioner's omission or
negligence.
Wild valley Shipping Company, Ltd. vs. Court of Appeals & Phillipine
President Lines
FACTS:
The Philippine Roxas, a vessel owned by Philippine President Lines, Inc., respondent herein, arrived in
Puerto Ordaz, Venezuela, to load iron ore. Upon the completion of the loading and when the vessel was
ready to leave port, an official pilot of Venezuela, was designated by the harbour authorities in Puerto
Ordaz to navigate the Philippine Roxas through the Orinoco River.
The Philippine Roxas experienced some vibrations when it entered the San Roque Channel. The vessel
proceeded on its way, with the pilot assuring the watch officer that the vibration was a result of the
shallowness of the channel. The master (captain) checked the position of the vessel and verified that it
was in the centre of the channel.
The Philippine Roxas ran around in the Orinoco River, thus obstructing the ingress and egress of
vessels. As a result of the blockage, the Malandrinon, a vessel owned by herein petitioner Wild valley
Shipping Company, Ltd., was unable to sail out of Puerto Ordaz on that day.
Subsequently, Wild valley Shipping Company, Ltd. filed a suit with the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch III against Philippine President Lines, Inc. and Pioneer Insurance Company (the
underwriter/insurer of Philippine Roxas) for damages in the form of unearned profits, and interest
thereon amounting to US $400,000.00plus attorney's fees, costs, and expenses of litigation.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Venezuelan law is applicable to the case at bar?
RULING:
IIt is well-settled that foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not
authorized to take judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proved. For a
copy of a foreign public document to be admissible, the following requisites are mandatory:
It must be attested by the officer having legal custody of the records or by his deputy;
It must be accompanied by a certificate by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general,

consul, vice consular or consular agent or foreign service officer, and with the seal of his office.
The latter requirement is not a mere technicality but is intended to justify the giving of full faith and
credit to the genuineness of a document in a foreign country. With respect to proof of written laws,
parol proof is objectionable, for the written law itself is the best evidence. According to the weight of
authority, when a foreign statute is involved, the best evidence rule requires that it be proved by a duly
authenticated copy of the statute. At this juncture, we have to point out that the Venezuelan law was
not pleaded before the lower court.
A foreign law is considered to be pleaded if there is an allegation in the pleading about the existence of
the foreign law, its import and legal consequence on the event or transaction in ISSUE.
A review of the Complaint revealed that it was never alleged or invoked despite the fact that the
grounding of the M/V Philippine Roxas occurred within the territorial jurisdiction of Venezuela. We
reiterate that under the rules of private international law, a foreign law must be properly pleaded and
proved as a fact. In the absence of pleading and proof, the laws of a foreign country, or state, will be
presumed to be the same as our own local or domestic law and this is known as processual
presumption.
Pilapil vs. CA (G.R. No. 52159, December 22, 1989)

FACTS:
Petitioner Pilapil, on board respondents bus was hit above his eye by a stone hurled by an unidentified
bystander. Respondents personnel lost no time in bringing him to a hospital, but eventually petitioner
partially lost his left eyes vision and sustained a permanent scar.
Thus, Petitioner lodged an action for recovery of damages before the Court of First Instance of
Camarines Sur which the latter granted. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed said decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not common carriers assume risks to passengers such as the stoning in this case?
HELD:
In consideration of the right granted to it by the public to engage in the business of transporting
passengers and goods, a common carrier does not give its consent to become an insurer of any and all
risks to passengers and goods. It merely undertakes to perform certain duties to the public as the law
imposes, and holds itself liable for any breach thereof.
xxx
While the law requires the highest degree of diligence from common carriers in the safe transport of
their passengers and creates a presumption of negligence against them, it does not, however, make
the carrier an insurer of the absolute safety of its passengers.
xxx
Article 1763. A common carrier is responsible for injuries suffered by a passenger on account of the
wilful acts or negligence of other passengers or of strangers, if the common carrier's employees
through the exercise of the diligence of a good father of a family could have prevented or stopped the
act or omission.
Clearly under the above provision, a tort committed by a stranger which causes injury to a passenger
does not accord the latter a cause of action against the carrier. The negligence for which a common
carrier is held responsible is the negligent omission by the carrier's employees to prevent the tort from
being committed when the same could have been foreseen and prevented by them. Further, under the
same provision, it is to be noted that when the violation of the contract is due to the willful acts of
strangers, as in the instant case, the degree of care essential to be exercised by the common carrier for
the protection of its passenger is only that of a good father of a family.
Reyes v Sisters of Mercy Hospital G.R. 130547 October 3, 2000

FACTS
Petitioner Leah Alesna Reyes is the wife of the late Jorge Reyes. The other petitioners, namely, Rose
Nahdja, Johnny, Lloyd, and Kristine, all surnamed Reyes, were their children. Five days before his death
on January 8, 1987, Jorge had been suffering from a
recurring fever with chills. After he failed to get relief from some home medication he was taking, which
consisted of analgesic, antipyretic, and antibiotics, he decided to see the doctor.
On January 8, 1987, he was taken to the Mercy Community Clinic by his wife. He was attended to by
respondent Dr. Marlyn Rico, resident physician and admitting physician on duty, who gave Jorge a
physical examination and took his medical history. She noted that at the time of his admission, Jorge
was conscious, ambulatory, oriented, coherent, and with respiratory distress. Typhoid fever was then
prevalent in the locality, as the clinic had been getting from 15 to 20 cases of typhoid per month
Suspecting that Jorge could be suffering from this disease, Dr. Rico ordered a Widal Test, a standard test
for typhoid fever, to be performed on Jorge. Blood count, routine urinalysis, stool examination, and
malarial smear were also made After about an hour, the medical technician submitted the results of the
test from which Dr. Rico concluded that Jorgewas positive for typhoid fever. As her shift was only up to
5:00 p.m., Dr. Rico indorsed Jorge to respondent Dr. Marvie Blanes.
Dr. Marvie Blanes attended to Jorge at around six in the evening. She also took Jorges history and gave
him a physical examination. Like Dr. Rico, her impression was that Jorge had typhoid fever. Antibiotics
being the accepted treatment for typhoid fever, she ordered that a compatibility test with the antibiotic
chloromycetin be done on Jorge. Said test was administered by nurse Josephine Pagente who also gave
the patient a dose of triglobe. As she did not observe any adverse reaction by the patient to
chloromycetin, Dr. Blanes ordered the first five hundred milligrams of said antibiotic to be administered
on Jorge at around 9:00 p.m. A second dose was administered on Jorge about three hours later just
before midnight.
At around 1:00 a.m. of January 9, 1987, Dr. Blanes was called as Jorges temperature rose to 41C. The
patient also experienced chills and exhibited respiratory distress, nausea, vomiting, and convulsions.
Dr. Blanes put him under oxygen, used a suction machine, and administered hydrocortisone,
temporarily easing the patients convulsions. When he regained consciousness, the patient was asked
by Dr. Blanes whether he had a previous heart ailment or had suffered from chest pains in the past.
Jorge replied he did not After about 15 minutes, however, Jorge again started to vomit, showed
restlessness, and his convulsions returned. Dr. Blanes re-applied the emergency measures taken before
and, in ddition, valium was administered. Jorge, however, did not respond to the treatment and slipped
into cyanosis, a bluish or purplish discoloration of the skin or mucous membrane due to deficient
oxygenation of the blood. At around 2:00 a.m., Jorge died. He was forty years old. The cause of his
death was Ventricular Arrythemia Secondary to Hyperpyrexia and typhoid fever.
ISSUE & ARGUMENTS
Whether or not petitioner is entitled to damage applying res ipsa loquitur?
HOLDING & RATION DECIDENDI
No. There is a case when expert testimony may be dispensed with, and that is under the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur. Thus, courts of other jurisdictions have applied the doctrine in the following situations:
leaving of a foreign object in the body of the patient after an operation, injuries sustained on a healthy
part of the body which was not under, or in the area, of treatment, removal of the wrong part of the
body when another part was intended, knocking out a tooth while a patients jaw was under anesthetic
for the removal of his tonsils, and loss of an eye while the patient was under the influence of
anesthetic, during or following an operation for appendicitis, among others.
Petitioners now contend that all requisites for the application of res ipsa loquitur were present, namely:
(1) the accident was of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent;
(2) the instrumentality or agency which caused the injury was under the exclusive control of the person
in charge; and
(3) the injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution of the person
injured.
The contention is without merit. We agree with the RULING of the Court of Appeals. In the Ramos case,
the question was whether a surgeon, an anesthesiologist, and a hospital should be made liable for the
comatose condition of a patient scheduled for
cholecystectomy. In that case, the patient was given anesthesia prior to her operation.
Noting that the patient was neurologically sound at the time of her operation, the Court applied the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur as mental brain damage does not normally occur in a gallblader operation
in the absence of negligence of the anesthesiologist.
Taking judicial notice that anesthesia procedures had become so common that even an ordinary person
could tell if it was administered properly, we allowed the testimony of a witness who was not an expert.
In this case, while it is true that the patient died just a few hours after professional medical assistance
was rendered, there is really nothing unusual or extraordinary about his death. Prior to his admission,
the patient already had recurring fevers and chills for five days unrelieved by the analgesic, antipyretic,
and antibiotics given him by his wife. This shows that he had been suffering from a serious illness and
professional medical help came too late for him.
Respondents alleged failure to observe due care was not immediately apparent to a layman so as to
justify application of res ipsa loquitur. The question required expert opinion on the alleged breach by
respondents of the standard of care required by the circumstances. Furthermore, on the ISSUE of the
correctness of her diagnosis, no presumption of negligence can be applied to Dr. Marlyn Rico.
CANLAS vs. CA & ASIAN SAVINGS BANK G.R. No. 112160 (February 28 2000)
FACTS: In August 1982, Osmundo S. Canlas, and Vicente Maosca, decided to venture in business and
to raise the capital needed therefor. Canlas executed a Special Power of Attorney authorizing Maosca
to mortgage two parcels of land situated in BF Homes, Paranaque. Each lot has a semi-concrete
residential house in the name of the Canlas and his wife. Spouses Canlas agreed to sell the two lots to
Maosca, for and in consideration of PhP 850,000.00, P500,000.00 of which payable within one week,
and the balance of PhP 350,000.00 shall serve as serve as Canlas investment in the business. Canlas
delivered to Maosca the transfer certificates of title of the two lots sold. Maosca, on his part, ISSUEd
two postdated checks in favor of Osmundo Canlas in the amounts of P40,000.00 and P460,000.00,
respectively, but it turned out that the check covering the bigger amount was not sufficiently funded. In
sum, the spouses Canlas received only PhP40,000.00, despite delivering the TCTs to the supposed
vendee.
On September 1982, Maosca, with the use of the SPA previously ISSUEd by Canlas, was able to secure
a P100,000.00 loan from a certain Atty. Manuel Magno by mortgaging the same parcels of land, with the
help of impostors who misrepresented themselves as the spouses Canlas. On September 29, 1982,
Vicente Maoscam, using the same parcels of land as security and through the involvement of the
same impostors who again introduced themselves as the Canlas spouses, applied and was approved of
another loan by Asian Savings Bank (ASB) in the amount of P500,000.00. When the loan was not paid,
the bank, extra-judicially foreclosed the mortgage.
On January 1983, the spouses Canlas wrote a letter informing the bank that the execution of subject
mortgage over the two parcels of land was without their authority. They requested that steps be taken
to annul the questioned mortgage.
ISSUEs: Is the mortgage with the bank valid? And if the answer is in the negative, should the bank bear
the loss?
A contract of mortgage must be constituted only by the absolute owner on the property mortgaged; a
mortgage, constituted by an impostor is void. Considering that it was established that the contract of
mortgage was entered into and signed by impostors who misrepresented themselves as the spouses
Canlas, the subject contract of mortgage is a complete nullity.
As to who shall bear the loss, The doctrine of last clear chance is applicable, the respondent bank must
suffer the resulting loss. In essence, the doctrine of last clear chance is to the effect that where both
parties are negligent but the negligent act of one is appreciably later in point of time than that of the
other, or where it is impossible to determine whose fault or negligence brought about the occurrence of
the incident, the one who had the last clear opportunity to avoid the impending harm but failed to do
so, is chargeable with the consequences arising therefrom. The respondent bank did not observe the
required diligence in verifying the real identity of the couple who introduced themselves as the spouses
Osmundo Canlas and Angelina Canlas. Not a single identification card was presented by the impostor-
loan applicants to show their true identity. And yet the bank approved the loan on sheer finding that the
signatures affixed on a deed of mortgage previously executed in favor of a certain Atty. Magno matched
the signatures in the residence certificates presented by the impostors. In fact the deed of mortgage
referred to did not bear the tax identification number of the spouses, as well as the Community Tax
Certificate of Angelina Canlas.
Applying Art. 1173 It could be said that the degree of diligence required of banks is more than that of a
good father of a family in keeping with their responsibility to exercise the necessary care and prudence
in dealing even on a registered or titled property. Under such principle, the bank would be denied the
protective mantle of the land registration law, accorded to purchasers or mortgagees for value and in
good faith. Asian Savings Bank has to bear the loss.
Mercury Drug Corporation and Rolando J. Del Rosario vs. Spouses Huang |
June 22, 2007
FACTS:
Petitioner Mercury Drug is the registered owner of a Mitsubishi truck, with petitioner del Rosario
as driver. Respondents Richard and Carmen Huang are parents of respondent Stephen Huang, who
owned a Sedan.
The two vehicles got into an accident as they were traversing a highway. The Sedan was on the
left innermost lane while the truck was on the next lane to its right, when the latter swerved to its left
and slammed in the front right side of the car. As a consequence, the car was wrecked and Stephen
Huang incurred massive injuries and became paralyzed.
The parents of Stephen faulted Del Rosario for committing gross negligence and reckless
imprudence, and Mercury Drug for failing to exercise the diligence of a good father of a family in the
selection and supervision of its driver.
The RTC found the petitioners jointly and severally liable for damages. The CA affirmed, hence
this appeal.
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS
W/N Mercury Drug is liable as employer of Del Rosario.
HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI Mercury Drug is liable.

Mercury Drug is jointly and solidarily liable with Del Rosario, as the employer of the latter. In
order to be relieved of such liability, Mercury should show that it exercised the diligence of a good
father of a family, both in the selection and supervision of the employee in the performance of his
duties. Mercury failed in both respects.
In selecting employees, the employer is required to examine them as to their qualifications,
experience and service records. With respect to supervision, the employer should formulate standard
operating procedures, monitor their implementation and impose disciplinary measures for their breach.
To establish such, concrete proof, such as documentary evidence must be submitted by him.
In the case at bar, it was shown that Del Rosario didn't take driving tests and psychological
exams when he applied for the position of a Truck Man. In addition, Mercury didn't present Del Rosario's
NBI and police clearances. Next, the last seminar attended by the driver occurred a long 12 years
before the accident occurred. Lastly, Mercury didn't have a backup driver for long trips. When the
accident happened Del Rosario has been out on the road for more than 13 hours.
As to negligence with regard to supervision over its employees, Mercury didn't impose any
sanction on Del Rosario when the latter reported to the former about the incident. Hence, Mercury
didn't exercise due diligence.
In the end, the SC found that Mercury and Del Rosario are jointly and solidarily liable to the
Huangs.
Equitable Banking Corp. v. Special Steel Products and Pardo
SSPI a private domestic corporation selling steel products.

Pardo SSPIs President and majority stockholder
Interco regular customer
Uy son-in-law of its majority stockholder
Equitable depository bank of Interco and of Uy
FACTS:
SSPI sold welding electrodes to Interco, as evidenced by sales invoices. It is due on March 16 1991 (for
the first sales invoice_ and May 11 1991 (for others). It also provided that Interco would pay interest at
the rate of 36% per annum in case of delay. In payment of for the products, Interco issued 3 checks
payable to the order of SSPI.
Each check was crossed with the notation account payee only and was drawn against Equitable. The
records do not identify the signatory for the checks, or explain how Uy came in possession of these
checks. He claimed that he had good title thereto. He demanded the deposits in his personal accounts
in Equitable. The bank did so relying on Uys status as a valued client and as son-in-law of Intercos
majority stockholder.
SSPI reminded Interco of the unpaid welding electrodes, explaining that its immediate need for
payment as it was experiencing some financial crisis of its own. It replied that it has already issued 3
checks payable to SSPI and drawn against Equitable, which was denied by SSPI.
Later on it was discovered that it was Uy, not SSPI, who received the proceeds of 3 checks. Interco
finally paid the value of 3 checks to SSPI plus portion of accrued interests. Interco refused to pay entire
accrued interest on the ground that it was not responsible for the delay. Hence, Pardo filed a complaint
for damages against Uy and Equitable Bank alleging that the 3 crossed checks, all payable to order of
SSPI could be deposited and encashed by SSPI only. Trial Court rendered decision in favor of Pardo
which was affirmed by CA.
ISSUE: What is the nature of crossed check?

Whether SSPI has a cause of action against Equitable for quasi-delict, whereby it can recover actual
damages from Equitable?
Held: SSPIs cause of action based on quasi-delist. SSPI does not ask Equitable or Uy to deliever to it
the proceeds of the checks as the rightful payee. The courts below correctly ruled that SSPI has a cause
of action for quasi-delict.
The checks that Interco issued in favor of SSPI were all crossed, made payable to SSPIs order and
contained the notation account payee only. This creates a reasonable expectation that the payee
alone would receive the proceeds of the checks and that diversion of the checks would be averted.
This expectation arises from the accepted banking practice that crossed checks are intended for
deposit in the named payees account only and no other. At the very least, crossed checks should place
a bank on notice that it should exercise more caution or expend more than a cursory inquiry, to
ascertain whether the payee on the check has authorized the holder to deposit the same in different
account.
A crossed check with the notation account payee only can only be deposited in the
named payees account. It is gross negligence for a bank to ignore this rule solely on the
basis of a third partys oral representations of having a good title there to.
CASUMPANG VS CORTEJO
FACTS: Mrs.Jesusa Cortejo brought her 11-year old son, Edmer Cortejo (Edmer), to the Emergency
Room of the San Juan de Dios Hospital (SJDH) because of difficulty in breathing, chest pain, stomach
pain, and fever.
Dr Casumpang, the attending physician using only a stethoscope, he confirmed the initial diagnosis of
"Bronchopneumonia."
Mrs.Cortejo recalled entertaining doubts on the doctor's diagnosis. She immediately advised
Dr.Casumpang that Edmer had a high fever, and had no colds or cough10 but Dr.Casumpang merely told
her that her son's "blood pressure is just being active,"11 and remarked that "that's the usual
bronchopneumonia, no colds, no phlegm."12
Dr. Casumpang next visited and examined Edmer at 9:00 in the morning the following day. 13 Still
suspicious about his son's illness, Mrs. Cortejo again called Dr. Casumpang's attention and stated that
Edmer had a fever, throat irritation, as well as chest and stomach pain. Mrs.Cortejo also alerted
Dr.Casumpang about the traces of blood in Edmer's sputum. Dr. Casumpang simply nodded, inquired if
Edmer has an asthma, and reassured Mrs. Cortejo that Edmer's illness is bronchopneumonia. 14
At around 11:30 in the morning of April 23, 1988, Edmer vomited "phlegm with blood
streak"15prompting the respondent (Edmer's father) to request for a doctor at the nurses' station. 16
Forty-five minutes later, Dr. Ruby Sanga-Miranda (Dr. Miranda), one of the resident physicians of SJDH,
arrived. She claimed that although aware that Edmer had vomited "phlegm with blood streak," she
failed to examine the blood specimen because the respondent washed it away. She then advised the
respondent to preserve the specimen for examination.
Thereafter, Dr. Miranda conducted a physical check-up covering Edmer's head, eyes, nose, throat,
lungs, skin and abdomen; and found that Edmer had a low-grade non-continuing fever, and rashes that
were not typical of dengue fever. Dr. Miranda then examined Edmer's "sputum with blood" and noted
that he was bleeding.
At 4:40 in the afternoon, Dr. Miranda called up Dr. Casumpang at his clinic and told him about Edmer's
condition.22 Upon being informed, Dr.Casumpang ordered several procedures done including:
hematocrit, hemoglobin, blood typing, blood transfusion and tourniquet tests.
Dr. Miranda advised Edmer's parents that the blood test results showed that Edmer was suffering from
"Dengue Hemorrhagic Fever." One hour later, Dr. Casumpang arrived at Edmer's room and he
recommended his transfer to the Intensive Care Unit (ICU), to which the respondent consented. Since
the ICU was then full, Dr.Casumpang suggested to the respondent that they hire a private nurse. The
respondent, however, insisted on transferring his son to Makati Medical Center.
After the respondent had signed the waiver, Dr. Casumpang, for the last time, checked Edmer's
condition, found that his blood pressure was stable, and noted that he was "comfortable." The
respondent requested for an ambulance but he was informed that the driver was nowhere to be found.
This prompted him to hire a private ambulance that cost him P600.00. 23
At 12:00 midnight, Edmer, accompanied by his parents and by Dr.Casumpang, was transferred to
Makati Medical Center.
Dr.Casumpang immediately gave the attending physician the patient's clinical history and laboratory
exam results. Upon examination, the attending physician diagnosed "Dengue Fever Stage IV" that was
already in its irreversible stage.
Edmer died at 4:00 in the morning of April 24, 1988.24 His Death Certificate indicated the cause of
death as "Hypovolemic Shock/hemorrhagic shock;" "Dengue Hemorrhagic Fever Stage IV."
Believing that Edmer's death was caused by the negligent and erroneous diagnosis of his doctors, the
respondent instituted an action for damages against SJDH, and its attending physicians: Dr. Casumpang
and Dr. Miranda (collectively referred to as the "petitioners") before the RTC of Makati City.
ISSUE:
1 Whether or not the petitioning doctors had committed "inexcusable lack of precaution" in
diagnosing and in treating the patient;
2 Whether or not the petitioner hospital is solidarity liable with the petitioning doctors;
3 Whether or not there is a causal connection between the petitioners' negligent act/omission and
the patient's resulting death; and
RULING:
(1)The doctor committed inexcusable lack of precaution in diagnosing and treating the patient.
Medical Malpractice Suit as a Specialized Area of Tort Law
The claim for damages is based on the petitioning doctors' negligence in diagnosing and treating the
deceased Edmer, the child of the respondent. It is a medical malpractice suit, an action available to
victims to redress a wrong committed by medical professionals who caused bodily harm to, or the
death of, a patient.33 As the term is used, the suit is brought whenever a medical practitioner or health
care provider fails to meet the standards demanded by his profession, or deviates from this standard,
and causes injury to the patient.
The Elements of a Medical Malpractice Suit
The elements of medical negligence are: (1) duty; (2) breach; (3) injury; and (4) proximate
causation.
In the present case, the physician-patient relationship between Dr.Casumpang and Edmer was created
when the latter's parents sought the medical services of Dr.Casumpang, and the latter knowingly
accepted Edmer as a patient. With respect to Dr. Miranda, her professional relationship with Edmer
arose when she assumed the obligation to provide resident supervision over the latter. Whether or not
Dr.Casumpang and Dr. Miranda committed a breach of duty is to be measured by the yardstick of
professional standards observed by the other members of the medical profession in good standing
under similar circumstances.49 We find that Dr.Casumpang, as Edmer's attending physician, did
not act according to these standards and, hence, was guilty of breach of duty. We do not
find Dr. Miranda liable for the reasons discussed below.
Dr.Casumpang's Negligence
a. Negligence in the Diagnosis
At the trial, Dr.Casumpang declared that a doctor's impression regarding a patient's illness is 90%
based on the physical examination, the information given by the patient or the latter's parents, and the
patient's medical history. It will be recalled that during Dr.Casumpang's first and second visits to Edmer,
he already had knowledge of Edmer's laboratory test result (CBC), medical history, and symptoms (i.e.,
fever, rashes, rapid breathing, chest and stomach pain, throat irritation, difficulty in breathing, and
traces of blood in the sputum). However, these information did not lead Dr.Casumpang to the
possibility that Edmer could be suffering from either dengue fever, or dengue hemorrhagic
fever, as he clung to his diagnosis of broncho pneumonia. This means that given the symptoms
exhibited, Dr.Casumpang already ruled out the possibility of other diseases like dengue.
In the present case, evidence on record established that in confirming the diagnosis of
bronchopneumonia, Dr.Casumpang selectively appreciated some and not all of the symptoms
presented, and failed to promptly conduct the appropriate tests to confirm his findings. In sum,
Dr.Casumpang failed to timely detect dengue fever, which failure, especially when reasonable
prudence would have shown that indications of dengue were evident and/or foreseeable, constitutes
negligence.
a. Negligence in the Treatment and Management of Dengue
Apart from failing to promptly detect dengue fever, Dr.Casumpang also failed to promptly
undertake the proper medical management needed for this disease.
Dr. Miranda is Not Liable for Negligence
In considering the case of Dr. Miranda, the junior resident physician who was on-duty at the time of
Edmer's confinement, we see the need to draw distinctions between the responsibilities and
corresponding liability of Dr.Casumpang, as the attending physician, and that of Dr. Miranda. Dr.
Miranda was not entirely faultless. Nevertheless, her failure to discern the import of Edmer's
second bleeding does not necessarily amount to negligence as the respondent himself admitted
that Dr. Miranda failed to examine the blood specimen because he washed it away. In addition,
considering the diagnosis previously made by two doctors, and the uncontroverted fact that the burden
of final diagnosis pertains to the attending physician (in this case, Dr.Casumpang), we believe that Dr.
Miranda's error was merely an honest mistake of judgment influenced in no small measure by her
status in the hospital hierarchy; hence, she should not be held liable for medical negligence.
(2) We now discuss the liability of the hospital.
The respondent submits that SJDH should not only be held vicariously liable for the petitioning doctors'
negligence but also for its own negligence. He claims that SJDH fell short of its duty of providing its
patients with the necessary facilities and equipment as shown by the following circumstances:
(a) SJDH was not equipped with proper paging system;
(b) the number of its doctors is not proportionate to the number of patients;
(c) SJDH was not equipped with a bronchoscope;
(d) when Edmer's oxygen was removed, the medical staff did not immediately provide him with
portable oxygen;
(e) when Edmer was about to be transferred to another hospital, SJDH's was not ready and had no
driver; and
(f) Despite Edmer's critical condition, there was no doctor attending to him from 5:30 p.m. of April 22,
to 9:00 a.m. of April 23, 1988.
SJDH on the other hand disclaims liability by claiming that the petitioning doctors are not its employees
but are mere consultants and independent contractors.
We affirm the hospital's liability not on the basis of Article 2180 of the Civil Code, but on the basis of the
doctrine of apparent authority or agency by estoppel.
(3) The Causation Between Dr.Casumpang's Negligent Act/Omission, and the Patient's
Resulting Death was Adequately Proven
Dr.Jaudian's testimony strongly suggests that due to Dr.Casumpang's failure to timely diagnose Edmer
with dengue, the latter was not immediately given the proper treatment. In fact, even after
Dr.Casumpang had discovered Edmer's real illness, he still failed to promptly perform the standard
medical procedure. We agree with these findings.
Dr. Rubi Li vs. Spouses Soliman G.R. No. 165279 June 7, 2011
Legal ISSUE: How is medical malpractice proven?
Legal FACTS:
Respondents 11-year old daughter, Angelica Soliman, underwent a biopsy of the mass located in
her lower extremity at the St. Lukes Medical Center (SLMC) on July 7, 1993 and results showed that
Angelica was suffering from osteosarcoma, osteoblastic type, (highly malignant) cancer of the bone
because of that a necessity of amputation was conducted by Dr, Tamayo on Angelicas right leg in
order to remove the tumor and to prevent the metastasis that chemotherapy was suggested by Dr.
Tamayo, which he referred to petitioner Dr. Rubi Li, a medical oncologist.
The respondent was admitted to SLMC on August 18, 1993; however, she died eleven (11) days
after the (intravenous) administration of chemotherapy first cycle.
Respondents brought their daughters body to the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory
at Camp Crame for post-mortem examination after the refusal of the hospital to release the death
certificate without full payment of bills.
The Medico-Legal Report showed that the cause of death as "Hypovolemic shock secondary to
multiple organ hemorrhages and Disseminated Intravascular Coagulation.
The respondents filed charges against the SLMC and physicians involve for negligence and failure
to observe the essential precautions in to prevent Angelicas untimely death.
Petitioner denied the allegation for damages as she observed best known procedures, highest skill
and knowledge in the administration of chemotherapy drugs despite all efforts the patient died.
The trial court was in favor of the petitioner and ordered to pay their unpaid hospital bill in the
amount of P139, 064.43, but the Court of Appeals reversed the decision supporting the
respondents pray.
Holding:
In this case medical malpractice is proven because the four essential elements of such action
are present based upon the doctrine of informed consent.
Reasoning:
There are four essential elements a plaintiff must prove in a malpractice action based upon the doctrine
of informed consent: "(1) the physician had a duty to disclose material risks; (2) he failed to disclose or
inadequately disclosed those risks; (3) as a direct and proximate result of the failure to disclose, the
patient consented to treatment she otherwise would not have consented to; and (4) plaintiff was
injured by the proposed treatment." Informed consent case requires the plaintiff to "point to significant
undisclosed information relating to the treatment that would alter her decision to undergo. The
physician is not expected to give the patient a short medical education, the disclosure rule only
requires of him a reasonable general explanation in nontechnical terms.
Policy Formation:
In all sorts of medical procedures either invasive or not, medical institution must have a certificate of
competency in rendering standards of care to delicate medical procedures before initiating a general
protocol that would establish a guideline principle in a form of proper disclosure of such procedure and
presenting a consent or waiver to their patients so that possible future medico-legal suits will be
prevented.
Synthesis:
In Dr. Rubi Li, vs. Spouses Reynaldo and Lina Soliman, as parents/heirs of deceased Angelica Soliman,
Respondents, G.R. No. 165279, promulgated on June 7, 2011, the Court ruled that medical malpractice
is proved base on lack/impaired informed consent, and reasonable expert testimony subject a breach of
duty causing gross injury to its patient.
Teague vs. Fernandez 51 SCRA 181 (L-29745) (1973)

NOTE: To easily remember, call this the Maghulos dili ka case.
FACTS: Realistic Institute is a vocational school for hair and beauty culture owned and operated by
defendant. It is located at the 2nd floor of Gil-Armi Building. A fire broke out 10 meters away from the
building. The students upon seeing the fire panicked. The six instructresses tried to calm them down.
Mrs. Prieto, one of the instructresses even slapped three students to quiet them down.
The panic could not be subdued, thereby causing a stampede. No part of the building was burned. But
after the panic was over, four students including Lourdes Fernandez, sister of plaintiffs were found
dead.
Deceaseds five brothers and sisters filed an action for damages against Teague, as owner and operator
of Realistic Institute. CFI dismissed the case. CA reversed, and awarded damages of P11,000. CA held
that defendants negligence was the proximate cause of Hernandez death. The negligence was
primarily predicated on the violation of the city ordinance of Manila, which consisted in the fact that the
second storey of the Gil-Armi building had only one stairway, 1.5 meters wide, instead of two of at least
1.2 meters each, although at the time of the fire the owner of the building had a second stairway under
construction. Hence a petition for review was filed in SC.
ISSUE: Are there independent causes/efficient intervening causes?
Held: None. The panic and stampede cannot be considered efficient intervening causes. It is true that
the petitioners non-compliance with the ordinance was ahead and prior to the other events in point of
time, in the sense that it was contemporaneous with its occupancy of the building. But the violation
was a continuing one, since the ordinance was a measure of safety designed to prevent a specific
situation which would pose a danger to the occupants of the building. That situation was undue
overcrowding in case it should become necessary to evacuate the building, which, it could be
reasonably foreseen, was bound to happen under emergency conditions if there was only one stairway
available.
the fact that it was the use of the building for school purposes which brought the same within the
coverage of the ordinance; and it was the petitioner and not the owners who was responsible for such
use.
The violation of a statute or ordinance is not rendered remote as the cause of an injury by the
intervention of another agency if the occurrence of the accident, in the manner in which it happened
was the very thing which the statute or ordinance was intended to prevent.
De Guzman v. CA
FACTS:
Respondent Ernesto Cendana was a junk dealer. He buys scrap materials and brings those that he
gathered to Manila for resale using 2 six-wheeler trucks. On the return trip to Pangasinan, respondent
would load his vehicle with cargo which various merchants wanted delivered, charging fee lower than
the commercial rates.
Sometime in November 1970, petitioner Pedro de Guzman contracted with respondent for the delivery
of 750 cartons of Liberty Milk. On December 1, 1970, respondent loaded the cargo. Only 150 boxes
were delivered to petitioner because the truck carrying the boxes was hijacked along the way.
Petitioner commenced an action claiming the value of the lost merchandise. Petitioner argues that
respondent, being a common carrier, is bound to exercise extraordinary diligence, which it failed to do.
Private respondent denied that he was a common carrier, and so he could not be held liable for force
majeure. The trial court ruled against the respondent, but such was reversed by the Court of Appeals.
ISSUEs:
(1) Whether or not private respondent is a common carrier
(2) Whether private respondent is liable for the loss of the goods
Held:
(1) Article 1732 makes no distinction between one whose principal business activity is the carrying of
persons or goods or both, and one who does such carrying only as an ancillary activity. Article 1732
also carefully avoids making any distinction between a person or enterprise offering transportation
service on a regular or scheduled basis and one offering such service on an occasional, episodic or
unscheduled basis. Neither does Article 1732 distinguish between a carrier offering its services to the
"general public," i.e., the general community or population, and one who offers services or solicits
business only from a narrow segment of the general population. It appears to the Court that private
respondent is properly characterized as a common carrier even though he merely "back-hauled" goods
for other merchants from Manila to Pangasinan, although such backhauling was done on a periodic or
occasional rather than regular or scheduled manner, and even though private respondent's principal
occupation was not the carriage of goods for others. There is no dispute that private respondent
charged his customers a fee for hauling their goods; that fee frequently fell below commercial freight
rates is not relevant here. A certificate of public convenience is not a requisite for the incurring of
liability under the Civil Code provisions governing common carriers.
(2) Article 1734 establishes the general rule that common carriers are responsible for the loss,
destruction or deterioration of the goods which they carry, "unless the same is due to any of the
following causes only:
a. Flood, storm, earthquake, lightning, or other natural disaster or calamity;
b. Act of the public enemy in war, whether international or civil;
c. Act or omission of the shipper or owner of the goods;
d. The character of the goods or defects in the packing or in the containers; and
e. Order or act of competent public authority."

The hijacking of the carrier's truck - does not fall within any of the five (5) categories of exempting
causes listed in Article 1734. Private respondent as common carrier is presumed to have been at fault
or to have acted negligently. This presumption, however, may be overthrown by proof of extraordinary
diligence on the part of private respondent. We believe and so hold that the limits of the duty of
extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods carried are reached where the goods are lost as
a result of a robbery which is attended by "grave or irresistible threat, violence or force." we hold that
the occurrence of the loss must reasonably be regarded as quite beyond the control of the common
carrier and properly regarded as a fortuitous event. It is necessary to recall that even common carriers
are not made absolute insurers against all risks of travel and of transport of goods, and are not held
liable for acts or events which cannot be foreseen or are inevitable, provided that they shall have
complied with the standard of extraordinary diligence.
Mallari Sr. and Mallari Jr. v. CA and Bulletin Publishing Corp. | G.R. No.128607,
January 31, 2000
FACTS
The passenger jeepney driven by petitioner Alfredo Mallari Jr. and owned by his co-petitioner Alfredo
Mallari Sr. collided with the delivery van of respondent Bulletin Publishing Corp. along the National
Highway in Bataan.
The van of respondent BULLETIN was coming from the opposite direction. It was driven by one Felix
Angeles. The collision occurred after Mallari Jr. overtook the Fiera while negotiating a curve in the
highway. The points of collision were the left
rear portion of the passenger jeepney and the left front side of the delivery van of BULLETIN.
The impact caused the jeepney to turn around and fall on its left side resulting in injuries to its
passengers one of whom was Israel Reyes who eventually died.
Claudia G. Reyes, the widow of Israel M. Reyes, filed a complaint for damages against Mallari Sr. and
Mallari Jr., and also against BULLETIN, its driver Felix Angeles, and the N.V. Netherlands Insurance
Company.
TC found that the proximate cause of the collision was the negligence of Felix Angeles, driver of the
Bulletin delivery van, considering the fact that the left front portion of the delivery truck driven by Felix
Angeles hit and bumped the left rear
portion of the passenger jeepney driven by Mallari Jr. Hence, it ordered BULLETIN and Felix Angeles to
pay jointly and severally Claudia G. Reyes. It also dismissed the complaint against the other defendants
Mallari Sr. and Mallari Jr.
CA modified the decision and found no negligence on the part of Angeles and of his employer,
respondent BULLETIN. Instead, it ruled that the collision was caused by the sole negligence of petitioner
Mallari Jr. who admitted that immediately before
the collision and after he rounded a curve on the highway, he overtook a Fiera which had stopped on
his lane and that he had seen the van driven by Angeles before overtaking the Fiera. It also ordered
petitioners Mallari Jr. and Mallari Sr. to
compensate Claudia G. Reyes.
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS
W/N CA erred in finding Mallari Jr. negligent and holding him liable.
NO. CA is correct.
Contrary to the allegation that there was no evidence whatsoever that petitioner Mallari Jr. overtook a
vehicle at a curve on the road at the time of or before the accident, the same petitioner himself
testified that such fact indeed did occur .
CA correctly found, based on the sketch and spot report of the police authorities which were not
disputed by petitioners, that the collision occurred immediately after petitioner Mallari Jr. overtook a
vehicle in front of it while traversing a curve on the
highway. This act of overtaking was in clear violation of Sec. 41, pars. (a) and (b), of RA 4136 as
amended, otherwise known as The Land Transportation and Traffic Code. The proximate cause of the
collision was the sole negligence of the driver of
the passenger jeepney, petitioner Mallari Jr., who recklessly operated and drove his jeepney in a lane
where overtaking was not allowed by traffic rules.
The rule is settled that a driver abandoning his proper lane for the purpose of overtaking another
vehicle in an ordinary situation has the duty to see to it that the road is clear and not to proceed if he
cannot do so in safety.
When a motor vehicle is approaching or rounding a curve, there is special necessity for keeping to the
right side of the road and the driver does not have the right to drive on the left hand side relying upon
having time to turn to the right if a car approaching from the opposite direction comes into view.
Under Art. 2185 of the Civil Code, unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person
driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap he was violating a traffic
regulation. As found by the appellate court, petitioners failed to present satisfactory evidence to
overcome this legal presumption.
The negligence and recklessness of the driver of the passenger jeepney is binding against petitioner
Mallari Sr., who admittedly was the owner of the passenger jeepney engaged as a common carrier,
considering the fact that in an action based on contract of carriage, the court need not make an
express finding of fault or negligence on the part of the carrier in order to hold it responsible for the
payment of damages sought by the passenger.
Under Art. 1755 of the Civil Code, a common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as
human care and foresight can provide using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons with due
regard for all the circumstances.
Moreover, under Art. 1756 of the Civil Code, in case of death or injuries to passengers, a common
carrier is presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless it proves that it observed
extraordinary diligence. Further, pursuant to Art. 1759 of the same Code, it is liable for the death of or
injuries to passengers through the negligence or willful acts of the formers employees. This liability of
the common carrier does not cease upon proof that it exercised all the diligence of a good father of a
family in the selection of its employees.
Petition denied. CA decision reversing TC decision is affirmed.
Africa vs. Caltex, Boquiren and the CA| G.R. No. L-12986, March 31, 1966 | 16
SCRA 448
FACTS
A fire broke out at the Caltex service station in Manila. It started while gasoline was being hosed
from a tank truck into the underground storage, right at the opening of the receiving truck where the
nozzle of the hose was inserted The fire then spread to and burned several neighboring houses,
including the personal properties and effects inside them.
The owners of the houses, among them petitioners here, sued Caltex (owner of the station) and
Boquiren (agent in charge of operation).
Trial court and CA found that petitioners failed to prove negligence and that respondents had
exercised due care in the premises and with respect to the supervision of their employees. Both courts
refused to apply the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur on the grounds that as to its applicability xxx in the
Philippines, there seems to be nothing definite, and that while the rules do not prohibit its adoption in
appropriate cases, in the case at bar, however, we find no practical use for such docrtrine.
ISSUES & ARGUMENTS
W/N without proof as to the cause and origin of the fire, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur should apply as
to presume negligence on the part of the appellees.

DOCTRINE OF RES IPSA LOQUITUR APPLIES. CALTEX LIABLE.
Res ipsa Loquitur is a rule to the effect that where the thing which caused the injury
complained of is shown to be under the management of defendant or his servants and the accident is
such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have its management or control
use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in absence of explanation of defendant, that the
incident happened because of want of care.
The aforesaid principle enunciated in Espiritu vs. Philippine Power and Development Co. is
applicable in this case. The gasoline station, with all its appliances, equipment and employees, was
under the control of appellees. A fire occurred therein and spread to and burned the neighboring
houses. The person who knew or could have known how the fire started were the appellees and their
employees, but they gave no explanation thereof whatsoever. It is fair and reasonable inference that
the incident happened because of want of care.
The report by the police officer regarding the fire, as well as the statement of the driver of the
gasoline tank wagon who was transferring the contents thereof into the underground storage when the
fire broke out, strengthen the presumption of negligence. Verily, (1) the station is in a very busy district
and pedestrians often pass through or mill around the premises; (2) the area is used as a car barn for
around 10 taxicabs owned by Boquiren; (3) a store where people hang out and possibly smoke
cigarettes is located one meter from the hole of the underground tank; and (4) the concrete walls
adjoining the neighborhood are only 2 meters high at most and cannot prevent the flames from
leaping over it in case of fire.
Decision REVERSED. Caltex liable.
Layugan vs. IAC 167 SCRA 363 November 14, 1968

FACTS: Pedro Layugan testified that while he and his companion were repairing the tire of their cargo
truck that was parked along the right side of the National Highway, Godofredo Isidros truck, recklessly
driven by Daniel Serrano bumped Layugan. As a result, Layugan had his left leg amputated.
Defendant Isidro admitted his ownership of the vehicle involved in the accident. Isidro said that
Layugan was merely a bystander, not a truck helper being a brother-in-law of the driver of said truck;
that the truck allegedly, while being repaired was parked, occupying almost half of the right lane right
after the curve; that the proximate cause of the incident was the failure of the driver of the parked
truck in installing the early warning device.
Daniel Serrano, defendant driver, said that he knew the responsibilities of a driver; that before leaving,
he checked the truck. The truck owner used to instruct him to be careful in driving. He bumped the
truck being repaired by Layugan, while the same was at a stop. Serrano also testified that, When I was
a few meters away, I saw the truck which was loaded with round logs. I stepped on my foot brakes but
it did not function with my many attempts. I have (sic) found out later that the fluid pipe on the rear
right was cut that's why the breaks did not function. Layugan, on the other hand, claims that a
warning device consisting of the lighted kerosene lamp was placed 3-4 Meters from the back of the
truck.
Isidro points to the driver of parked truck as negligent, and says that absent such proof of care, it
would, under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, there exists a presumption of negligence on the part of
the driver of the parked cargo truck as well as his helper.
ISSUES
1. Whether or not defendant driver Serrano was negligent. RECKLESS DRIVING VS RECKLESS
PARKING
2. Whether or not the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies in this case.
HELD:
1. NO. The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case may be stated as
follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution
which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of
negligence.
Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by those considerations
which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing of something which a
prudent and reasonable man would not do. Applying the definition and the test, it is clear that the
absence or want of care of Daniel Serrano has been established by clear and convincing evidence.
Whether the cargo truck was parked along the road or on half of the shoulder of the road is immaterial
taking into account the warning device consisting of the lighted kerosene lamp placed 3-4m from the
back of the truck. But despite this warning, the Isuzu truck driven by Serrano, still bumped the rear of
the parked cargo truck. As a direct consequence of such accident, Layugan sustained injuries on his left
forearm and left foot.
2. NO. In our jurisdiction, Res ipsa loquitur as a rule of evidence is peculiar to the law of negligence
which recognizes that prima facie negligence may be established without direct proof and furnishes a
substitute for specific proof of negligence. The doctrine is not a rule of substantive law but merely a
mode of proof or a mere procedural convenience. The doctrine merely determines and regulates what
shall be prima facie evidence thereof and facilitates the burden of plaintiff of proving a breach of the
duty of due care.
The doctrine can be invoked when and only when, under the circumstances involved, direct evidence is
absent and not readily available. So, it is inapplicable where plaintiff has knowledge and testifies or
presents evidence as to the specific act of negligence which is the cause of the injury, or where theres
direct evidence as to the precise cause of the accident and all the
Facts and circumstances attendant on the occurrence clearly appear. And once the actual cause of
injury is established beyond controversy, no presumptions will be involved and the doctrine becomes
inapplicable when the circumstances show that no inference of defendant's liability can reasonably be
made, whatever the source of the evidence. In this case, it is inapplicable because it was established by
clear and convincing evidence the negligence of the defendant driver.
(Note: The discussion in this case of res ipsa loquitur is merely stated in the obiter dictum.)
Ramos vs. CA and Delos Santos Medical Center | 321 SCRA 584 (December 29,
1999)
FACTS: Erlinda Ramos was a robust woman except for occasional complaints of discomfort due to pains
caused by the presence of a stone in her gall bladder. She was advised to undergo an operation for the
removal of the stone in her gall bladder. She underwent a series of examinations which included blood
and urine tests which indicated she was fit for surgery.
She and her husband, Rogelio, met Dr. Hozaka, one of the defendants in this case, for the first time.
They agreed on the date of the operation and the doctor decided that she undergo a
cholecystectomy operation. Erlinda was admitted in the hospital and was accompanied by her sister-
in-law, Herminda Cruz. At the operating room, Cruz saw about two or three nurses and Dr. Perfecta
Gutierrez, the other defendant, who was to administer the anesthesia. Although not a member of the
hospital staff, Herminda Cruz introduced herself as the Dean of the College of Nursing at the Capitol
Medical Center and was allowed to stay inside the operating room.
Hours later, Cruz, who was inside the operating room with the patient, heard somebody say Dr. Hosaka
is already here. As she held the hand of Erlinda, she then saw Dr. Gutierrez intubating the hapless
patient. She thereafter heard Dr. Gutierrez say, ang hirap maintubate nito, mali yata ang
pagkakapasok. O lumalaki ang tiyan. Due to the remarks of Dr. Gutierrez, she focused her attention on
what Dr. Gutierrez was doing. She noticed a bluish discoloration of the nailbeds of the left hand of
Erlinda. Cruz then heard Dr. Hosaka issue an order for someone to call Dr. Calderon, another
anesthesiologist. After Dr. Calderon arrived in the operating room, Cruz saw him trying to intubate
Erlinda. Erlindas nailbed became bluish and the patient was placed in a trendelenburg position.
Immediately, thereafter, Cruz went out of the operating room, and told Erlindas husband (her brother)
that something wrong was happening. Cruz immediately rushed back, and saw Erlinda was still in
trendelenburg position. On that fateful day, she saw Erlinda taken to the Intensive Care Unit (ICU).
Erlinda stayed for about four months in the hospital and has been in a comatose condition.
When asked by the hospital to explain what happened to the patient, Doctors Gutierrez and Hosaka
explained that the patient had bronchospasm. After being discharged from the hospital, she has been
staying in their residence, still needing constant medical attention, with her husband Rogelio incurring
monthly expenses. She was diagnosed to be suffering from diffuse cerebral parenchymal damage.
The Ramoses filed a civil case for damages against the private respondents alleging negligence in the
management and care of Erlinda Ramos.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is applicable.
(2) Whether or not private respondents were negligent in the care of Erlinda during the anesthesia
phase of the operation and, if in the affirmative, whether the alleged negligence was the proximate
cause of Erlindas comatose condition.
(3) Is the hospital liable?
Held:
YES. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is appropriate in the case at bar. As will hereinafter be explained,
the damage sustained by Erlinda in her brain prior to a scheduled gall bladder operation presents a
case for the application of the doctrine.
In holding that res ipsa loquitur is available to the present case we are not saying that the doctrine is
applicable in any and all cases where injury occurs to a patient while under anesthesia, or to any and
all anesthesia cases. Each case must be viewed in its own light and scrutinized in order to be within the
res ipsa loquitur coverage.
Res ipsa loquitur is a Latin phrase which literally means the thing or the transaction speaks for itself.
The phrase res ipsa loquitur is a maxim for the rule that the fact of the occurrence of an injury, taken
with the surrounding circumstances, may permit an inference or raise a presumption of negligence, or
make out a plaintiffs prima facie case, and present a question of fact for defendant to meet with an
explanation.
However, res ipsa loquitur is not a rule of substantive law and, as such, does not create or constitute an
independent or separate ground of liability. Instead, it is considered as merely evidentiary or in the
nature of a procedural rule. Mere invocation and application of the doctrine does not dispense with the
requirement of proof of negligence. It is simply a step in the process of such proof. Still, before resort to
the doctrine may be allowed, the following requisites must be satisfactorily shown: 1.The accident is of
a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someones negligence; 2. It is caused by an
instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant or defendants; and 3. The possibility of
contributing conduct which would make the plaintiff responsible is eliminated.
In the above requisites, the fundamental element is the control of the instrumentality which caused
the damage. Such element of control must be shown to be within the dominion of the defendant.
But it does not automatically apply to all cases of medical negligence as to mechanically shift the
burden of proof to the defendant to show that he is not guilty of the ascribed negligence. The real
question, therefore, is whether or not in the process of the operation any extraordinary incident or
unusual event outside of the routine performance occurred. If there were such extraneous
interventions, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur may be utilized and the defendant is called upon to
explain the matter, by evidence of exculpation, if he could.
(2) YES. Private respondents were unable to disprove the presumption of negligence on their part. Their
negligence was the proximate cause of her condition. Dr. Gutierrez failed to properly intubate the
patient. She admitted that she saw Erlinda for the first time on the day of the operation. And no prior
consultations with, or pre-operative evaluation of Erlinda was done by her. She was unaware of the
physiological make-up and needs of Erlinda. This is an act of exceptional negligence and professional
irresponsibility.
Private respondents repeatedly hammered the view that the cerebral anoxia which led to Erlindas
coma was due to bronchospasm mediated by her allergic response to a drug introduced into her
system. Proximate cause has been defined as that which, in natural and continuous sequence,
unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces injury, and without which the result would not
have occurred.
Respondent Dr. Hosakas negligence can be found in his failure to exercise the proper authority (as the
captain of the operative team) in not determining, if his anesthesiologist observed proper anesthesia
protocols. No evidence on record exists to show that Dr. Hosaka verified if respondent Dr. Gutierrez
properly intubated the patient. Furthermore, it does not escape us that respondent Dr. Hosaka had
scheduled another procedure in a different hospital at the same time as Erlindas cholecystectomy, and
was in fact over three hours late for the latters operation. Because of this, he had little or no time to
confer with his anesthesiologist regarding the anesthesia delivery.
(3) We now discuss the responsibility of the hospital. The unique practice (among private hospitals) of
filling up specialist staff with attending and visiting consultants, who are allegedly not hospital
employees, presents problems in apportioning responsibility for negligence in medical malpractice
cases. The truth is, Private hospitals, hire, fire and exercise real control over their attending and visiting
consultant staff. While consultants are not, technically employees, a point which respondent
hospital asserts in denying all responsibility for the patients condition, the control exercised, the hiring,
and the right to terminate consultants all fulfill the important hallmarks of an employer-employee
relationship, with the exception of the payment of wages.
The basis for holding an employer solidarily responsible for the negligence of its employee is found in
Article 2180 of the Civil Code which considers a person accountable not only for his own acts but also
for those of others based on the formers responsibility under a relationship of patria potestas. Such
responsibility ceases when the persons or entity concerned prove that they have observed the
diligence of a good father of the family to prevent damage. In other words, while the burden of proving
negligence rests on the plaintiffs, once negligence is shown, the burden shifts to the respondents
(parent, guardian, teacher or employer) who should prove that they observed the diligence of a good
father of a family to prevent damage. In the instant case, respondent hospital, apart from a general
denial of its responsibility over respondent physicians, failed to adduce evidence showing that it
exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the hiring and supervision of the latter. Upon
these disquisitions we hold that private respondents are solidarily liable for damages under Article 2176
of the Civil Code.
D.M. Consunji vs. CA | 357 SCRA 249 (April 20, 2001)

FACTS: Jose Juego, a construction worker of D. M. Consunji, Inc., fell 14 floors from the Renaissance
Tower, Pasig City to his death. Investigation disclosed that while victim Jose A. Juego together with
Jessie Jaluag and Delso Destajo were performing their work on board a steel platform with plywood
flooring and cable wires attached to its four corners and hooked at the 5 ton chain block, when
suddenly, the bolt or pin which was merely inserted (not secured by lock)to connect the chain block
with the platform came loose causing the whole platform assembly and the victim to fall down to the
basement of the elevator core of the building under construction, save his 2 companions who luckily
jumped out for safety.
Jose Juegos widow, Maria, filed with the RTC a complaint for damages against D.M. Consunji, Inc. The
employer raised, among other defenses, the widows prior availment of the benefits from the State
Insurance Fund. The RTC rendered a decision in favor of the widow. On appeal by D. M. Consunji, the CA
affirmed the decision of the RTC in toto.
ISSUE: Whether or not the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is applicable to prove D.M. Consunjis
negligence.
Held: YES. As a rule of evidence, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is peculiar to the law of negligence
which recognizes that prima facie negligence may be established without direct proof and furnishes a
substitute for specific proof of negligence. It is based in part upon the theory that the defendant in
charge of the instrumentality which causes the injury either knows the cause of the accident or has the
best opportunity of ascertaining it and that the plaintiff has no such knowledge, and therefore is
compelled to allege negligence in general terms and to rely upon the proof of the happening of the
accident in order to establish negligence. Res ipsa loquitur is a rule of necessity and it applies where
evidence is absent or not readily available, provided the following requisites are present: (1) the
accident was of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent; (2) the
instrumentality or agency which caused the injury was under the exclusive control of the person
charged with negligence; and (3) the injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action or
contribution on the part of the person injured.
No worker is going to fall from the 14th floor of a building to the basement while performing work in a
construction site unless someone is negligent; thus, the first requisite is present. As explained earlier,
the construction site with all its paraphernalia and human resources that likely caused the injury is
under the exclusive control and management of appellant; thus, the second requisite is also present.
No contributory negligence was attributed to the appellees deceased husband; thus, the last requisite
is also present. A reasonable presumption or inference of appellants negligence arises. Regrettably,
petitioner does not cite any evidence to rebut the inference or presumption of negligence arising from
the application of res ipsa loquitur, or to establish any defense relating to the incident.
VICENTE JOSEFA vs. MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY | G.R. No. 182705 July
18, 2014
FACTS:
At around 1:45 p.m. on April 21, 1991, a dump truck, a jeepney and a car figured in a vehicular
accident along Ortigas Avenue, Pasig City. As a result of the accident, a 45-foot wooden electricity post,
3 75 KVA transformers, and other electrical line attachments were damaged. Upon investigation,
Meralco discovered that it was a truck registered in Josefa's name that hit the electricity post. Meralco
demanded from Josefa reimbursement for the replacement cost of the electricity post and its
attachments, but Josefa refused to pay. Thus, Meralco sued Josefa and Pablo Manoco, the truck driver,
for damages before the RTC of Pasig City.
In its complaint, Meralco alleged that (Bautista) Manoco's reckless driving resulted in damage to its
properties. It also imputed primary liability on Josefa for his alleged negligence in the selection and
supervision of Manoco. The RTC dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of evidence. The RTC held that
Meralco failed to establish that it was the truck that hit the electricity post. The RTC ruled that SPO2
Galang's account of the accident was merely hearsay since he did not personally witness
the incident. It also did not give probative value to the police blotter entry dated January 7, 1994 since
the accident had long occurred in 1991.
The CA reversed the RTC RULING and held that the RTC erred in disregarding the parties' stipulation at
the pre-trial that it was the truck that hit the electricity post. The CA also found that Bautista was
Josefa's employee when the accident occurred since Josefa did not specifically deny this material
allegation in the amended complaint. It likewise noted that the sheriff's return stated that Bautista was
under Josefa's employ until 1993. The CA concluded that the fact that the truck hit the electricity post
was sufficient to hold Josefa vicariously liable regardless of whether Bautista was negligent in driving
the truck. In the same breath, the CA also stated that the employer's presumptive liability in quasi-
delicts was anchored on injuries caused by the employee's negligence. Even assuming that Bautista
was not Josefa's employee, the CA maintained that Josefa would still be liable for damages since the
law presumes that the registered owner has control of his vehicle and its driver at the time of the
accident. It thus ordered Josefa to pay Meralco. Josefa filed the present petitionafter the CA denied his
motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE/s:
(1) Whether or not Bautista exercised due diligence in driving when the truck hit the electricity post;
(2) Whether or not Josefa was the employer of driver Bautista being the registered owner of the vehicle
making the former vicariously liable for the latters negligence under paragraph 5, Article 2180 of the
Civil Code;
(3) Whether Meralco is entitled to actual damages, attorney's fees, and expenses of litigation.
Held:
(1) Bautista did not exercise due diligence. Bautista's negligence was the proximate cause of the
property damage caused to Meralco. Bautista is presumed to be negligent in driving the truck under the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.
Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to
pay for the damage done. This fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation
between the parties, is called quasi-delict. Thus, for a quasi-delict case to prosper, the complainant
must establish: (1) damages to the complainant; (2) negligence, by act or omission, of the defendant or
by some person for whose acts the defendant must respond, was guilty; and (3) the connection of
cause and effect between such negligence and the damages. With respect to the third element, the
negligent act or omission must be the proximate cause of the injury.
Contrary to the CA's finding, the parties did not stipulate that the truck hit the electricity post. The pre-
trial order shows that the parties merely agreed that the truck "was involved in an accident on April 21,
1991. Nonetheless, Meralco has sufficiently established the direct causal link between the truck and the
electricity post through Abio's testimony. Abio categorically stated during trial that he saw the truck hit
the electricity post. We find his first-hand account of the incident during the direct examination frank
and straightforward. Even without Abio's testimony, it does not escape this Court's attention that Josefa
judicially admitted in his motions and pleading that his truck hit the electricity post. These statements
constitute deliberate, clear and unequivocal admissions of the causation in fact between the truck and
the electricity post.
Contrary to the CA's opinion, the finding that it was the truck that hit the electricity post would not
immediately result in Josefa's liability. It is a basic rule that it is essentially the wrongful or negligent act
or omission that creates the vinculum juris in extra-contractual obligations. In turn, the employee's
negligence established to be the proximate cause of the damage would give rise to the disputable
presumption that the employer did not exercise the diligence of a good father of a family in
the selection and supervision of the erring employee.
The procedural effect of res ipsa loquitur in quasi-delict cases is that the defendant's negligence is
presumed. For this doctrine to apply, the complainant must show that:
(1) the accident is of such character as to warrant an inference that it would not have happened except
for the
defendant's negligence;
(2) the accident must have been caused by an agency or instrumentality within the exclusive
management or control of the person charged with the negligence complained of; and
(3) the accident must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the
person injured. The present case satisfies all the elements of res ipsa loquitur. It is very unusual and
extraordinary for the truck to hit an electricity post, an immovable and stationary object, unless
Bautista, who had the exclusive management and control of the truck, acted with fault or negligence.
We cannot also conclude that Meralco contributed to the injury since it safely and permanently installed
the electricity post beside the street. Thus, in Republic v. Luzon Stevedoring Corp., we imputed
vicarious responsibility to Luzon Stevedoring Corp. whose barge rammed the bridge, also an immovable
and stationary object.
(2) YES. Josefa is vicariously liable under paragraph 5, Article 2180 of the Civil Code because there is an
employer-employee relations between Bautista and Josefa, and Josefa failed to show that he exercised
the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of Bautista.
The finding that Bautista acted with negligence in driving the truck gives rise to the application of
paragraph 5, Article 2180 of the Civil Code which holds the employer vicariously liable for damages
caused by his employees within the scope of their assigned tasks.
In the present case, Josefa avoids the application of this provision by denying that Bautista was his
employee at the time of the incident. Josefa cannot evade his responsibility by mere denial of
his employment relations with Bautista in the absence of proof that his truck was used
without authorization or that it was stolen when the accident occurred. In quasi-delict
cases, the registered owner of a motor vehicle is the employer of its driver in
contemplation of law. The registered owner of any vehicle, even if not used for public
service, would primarily be responsible to the public or to third persons for injuries caused
while the vehicle was being driven on highways or streets.
In order for Josefa to be relieved of his vicarious liability, he must show that he exercised due diligence
in the selection and supervision of Bautista. In concrete terms, Josefa should show by competent object
or documentary evidence that he examined Bautista as to the latter's qualifications, experience and
service records prior to employment. He should likewise prove by competent object or documentary
evidence that he formulated standard operating procedures, monitored their implementation and
imposed disciplinary measures for breach of these procedures. However, Josefa failed to overcome the
presumption of negligence against him since he waived his right to present evidence during trial.
(3) Meralco is only entitled to temperate damages with interest at legal rate. Notwithstanding Josefa's
vicarious liability, Meralco failed to point out the specific FACTS that afford a basis for its claim for
actual damages. Actual damages cannot be presumed; they must be pleaded and proven in court in
order to be recoverable. One is entitled to an adequate compensation only for the pecuniary loss that
he has adequately proved based upon competent proof and on the best evidence obtainable by him.
We cannot give weight to Exhibit "D" as to the amount of actual damages for being hearsay. Exhibit "D"
constitutes hearsay evidence since it was derived on alleged pieces of documentary evidence that were
not identified and authenticated in court during trial.
Meralco is entitled to temperate damages because it clearly suffered pecuniary loss as a result of
Bautista and Josefa's negligence. When the court finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but
the amount cannot, from the nature of the case, be proven with certainty, the court may award
temperate damages in the exercise of its sound discretion. Considering the attendant circumstances of
this case, we find the amount of P200,000.00 to be a fair and sufficient award by way of temperate
damages.
Meralco is not entitled to attorney's fees and expenses of litigation. The CA likewise erred in awarding
Meralco attorney's fees and expenses of litigation without explaining its basis. In Buan v. Camaganacan,
we held that the text of the decision should state the reason why attorney's fees are being awarded;
otherwise, the award should be disallowed. Besides, no bad faith has been imputed to Josefa that would
warrant the award of attorney's fees under Article 2208 (5) of the Civil Code. It is a settled rule that
attorney's fees shall not be recovered as cost where the party's persistence in litigation is based on his
mistaken belief in the righteousness of his cause. There is also no factual, legal, or equitable
justification that would justify the Court's award of attorney's fees under Article 2208 (11) of the Civil
Code.
Finally, we impose an interest rate of 6% per annum on temperate damages pursuant to the guidelines
enunciated in Eastern Shipping Lines v. CA, as modified by Nacar v. Gallery Frames.
Rosit vs Davao Doctors Hospital

(Alex, di to case digest, news article topero mukang andun naman lahat ng kailangan mo ng info)
The Supreme Court (SC) has affirmed a Regional Trial Courts (RTC) decision holding a medical doctor
liable for negligence in performing a surgery to a motorcycle-accident victim using a wrong screw
affecting the patients speaking and eating ability.
In a 12-page decision promulgated on December 7, 2015, the High Courts Third Division, reversed the
earlier decision by the Court of Appeals (CA) setting aside the verdict handed down by RTC Branch 33
finding Dr. Rolando Gestuvo of the Davao Doctors Hospital (DDH) liable for allegedly using a wrong
screw on the jaw of patient Nilo Rosit.
DDH was included in the damage suit filed by Rosit but the trial court absolved the hospital of any
liability RULING that the hospital had exercised proper diligence in the selection and supervision of
Gestuvo.
The SC sustained RTC Branch 33s decision ordering Gestuvo to pay some P380,000 to Rosit.
Court records showed that on January 15, 1999, Rosit figured in a motorcycle accident and suffered a
fractured jaw.
Gestuvo, a specialist in mandibular injuries, operated on Rosit on January 19, 1999 at the Davao
Doctors Hospital.
To immobilize Rosits mandible, Gestuvo used a metal plate fastened to the jaw with metal screws.
But despite knowing that the procedure required smallest titanium screws which were locally available,
Gestuvo used longer screws which he had on hand and just cut it to fit on Rosit.
Gestuvo admitted not informing Rosit about the availability of smaller screws in Manila thinking that his
patient could not afford it.
After the procedure, Rosit claimed that he could not properly open and close his mouth and was in pain
prompting him to go back to Gestuvo who subjected him to an X-ray.
Rosit said the X-ray result showed that his jaw was aligned but the screws had touched his molar and
he was referred by Gestuvo to a certain Dr. Pangan, a dentist.
Upon examination, Dr. Pangan, told Rosit that the operation on his mandible was improperly done and
recommended another operation on his mouth in Cebu City.
During the operation, Rosit said Pangan removed the plate and screws placed by Gestuvo and replaced
it with smaller titanium plate and screws and extracted his molar that was hit with a screw and some
bone pigments.
After the operation by Pangan, the complainant said he was able to eat and speak well as well as open
and close his mouth normally.
With this development, Rosit demanded from Gestuvo a reimbursement of the expenses he incurred
during the operation by Pangan but Gestuvo allegedly refused to pay, prompting him to seek legal
action.
On September 14, 204, RTC Branch 33 ruled to award damages to Rosit by Gestuvo but the decision
was reversed by the Court of Appeals (CA) on January 22, 2013.
In RTC 33 decision, the court used the doctrine res ipsa loquitur (the thing speaks for itself) in finding
Gestuvo liable for damages, thus, there was no need for a medical expert to prove negligence, but the
CA ruled otherwise.
In assessing the evidence on record, the Supreme Court Third Division composed by Associate Justices
Presbitero Velasco, Diosdado Peralta, Bienvenido Reyes, Martin Villarama and Francis Jardeleza,
reversed the CA decision and ruled that the doctrine on res ipsa loquitur was established in the case,
thus, the RTC decision was reinstated and affirmed.
The SC noted that Gestuvo failed to get the patients informed consent when he did not inform Rosit
that smaller screws were available in Manila but at a higher price.
Manila Electric Co. vs. Remoquillo | G.R. No. L-8328 (1956)

FACTS: Efren Magno went to the 3-story house of his stepbrother to repair a "media agua" said to be in
a leaking condition. The "media agua" was just below the window of the third story. Magno received
from his son thru that window a galvanized iron sheet to cover the leaking portion, turned around and
in doing so, the lower end of the iron sheet came into contact with the electric wire of the Manila
Electric Company. He died by electrocution.
His widow and children filed suit to recover damages from the electric company.
ISSUE:Were the acts of Magno the proximate or the remote cause of the incident.
Held: Magnos acts were the proximate cause. It is clear that the principal and proximate cause of the
electrocution was not the electric wire, evidently a remote cause, but rather the reckless and negligent
act of Magno in turning around and swinging the galvanized iron sheet without taking any precaution.
Magno was expected, as a person who is deemed a professional in his line of work, to have looked back
toward the street and at the wire to avoid contacting with the iron sheet, the same being length of 6
feet. For a better understanding of the rule on remote and proximate cause with respect to injuries, the
following citation is helpful:
"A prior and remote cause cannot be made the basis of an action if such remote cause did nothing
more than furnish the condition or give rise to the occasion by which the injury was made possible, if
there intervened between such prior or remote cause and the injury a distinct, successive, unrelated,
and efficient cause of the injury, even though such injury would not have happened but for such
condition or occasion. If no danger existed in the condition except because of the independent cause,
such condition was not the proximate cause. And if an independent negligent act or defective condition
sets into operation the circumstances which result in injury because of the prior defective condition,
such subsequent act or condition is the proximate cause." (45 C. J. pp. 931-332.).
Furthermore, the owner of the house disregarded a city ordinance, declaring illegal the length of less
than 3 feet distance between a building and the electric pole. And added to this violation, was its
approval by the city through its agent, possibly an inspector. The electric company cannot be expected
to be always on the lookout for any illegal construction which reduces the distance between its wires
and said construction, and after finding that said distance of 3 feet had been reduced, to change the
stringing or installation of its wires so as to
preserve said distance. It would be much easier for the City, or rather it is its duty, to be ever on the
alert and to see to it that its ordinances are strictly followed by house owners and to condemn or
disapprove all illegal constructions.
Of course, in the present case, the violation of the permit for the construction of the "media agua" was
not the direct cause of the accident. It merely contributed to it. And contrary to the case of Astudillo vs.
Manila electric, in the case at bar, the construction cannot be said to be a public place as it is a private
construction. The deceased person was also a person of age who is expected to be more careful and
knowledgeable as to what he is doing.
Vda. DE BATACLAN vs. MEDINA
FACTS:
Medina is the owner and operator of a bus. This bus, on Sept. 13, 1952 around 2:00AM somewhere in
Imus, Cavite, crashed and fell into a ditch. Apparently, its front tire burst, zig-zagged and turned turtle
into the ditch. Bataclan was one of the 18 passengers. Most of the passengers were able to get out, but
Bataclan and 3 others were trapped. It appears that the bus drivers and the passengers who already
got out did not try to help Bataclan et al get out, instead, about 10 of the locals in the area came to
their aid, they were carrying a burning torch for illumination, but then a fierce fire started and engulfed
the bus and killed Bataclan et al. It appears that there was a gas leak from the bus and it caught fire
from the torch the would-be rescuers were using.
The heirs of Bataclan sued Medina.
The trial court found that there was a breach of a contract of carriage where Medina undertook to take
Bataclan to his destination safely. The trial court also found that there was negligence on the part of
Medina since at the time of the blow-out, the bus was speeding. There is no question that under the
circumstances, the defendant carrier is liable. The only question is to what degree. The trial court
argued that Medina is only liable for the injuries suffered by Bataclan and not by his death, the
proximate cause of which was the fire, which was not caused by Medina.
ISSUE: Whether or not it was the negligence of Medina, owner of the bus company, which was the
proximate cause of the death of Bataclan.
HELD:
Yes. In this case, the proximate cause of the death was the overturning of the bus, because of the
overturning, it leaked gas which is not unnatural or unexpected. The locals coming to the aid of the
trapped passengers was most likely because the driver and the conductor went out looking for help. It
is only natural that the would-be rescuers bring with them a torch because it was 2:30AM and the place
was unlit. The fire could also be attributed to the bus driver and conductor because he should have
known, from the circumstances, and because he should have been able to smell gasoline and therefore
he should have warned the rescuers not to bring the torch. Said negligence on the part of the agents of
the carrier come under the codal provisions above-reproduced, particularly, Articles 1733, 1759 and
1763.
Proximate Cause that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any
efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.
And more comprehensively, the proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury,
either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain
of events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the
chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted,
under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinarily
prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default
that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom.

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Mendoza and Elvira Lim vs Spouses Leonora and Gabriel Gomez

**Caravan Travels and Tours vs Abejar 2016 (UGH DI KO TALAGA MAHANAP )

ISSUES & ARGUMENTS

W/N Filamer is liable as Funtechas employer.

HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI

Yes, Filamer is liable

ISSUES & ARGUMENTS

W/N Castilex as employer of Abad can be held liable with Abad.

HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI

**De Leon Brokerage V Ca Digest 1967 (UGH DI KO TALAGA MAHANAP )

Merrit vs. Government of the Philippine Islands

ISSUES & ARGUMENTS

W/N the Government is liable?

HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI

Paragraph 5 of article 1903 of the Civil Code reads:

Fontanilla vs. Maliaman | Paras G.R. No. L-55963, December 1, 1989|

ISSUES & ARGUMENTS

HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI

Art. 2176 thus provides:

Paragraphs 5 and 6 of Art. 21 80 read as follows:

The liability of the State has two aspects. namely:

Rosete vs. The Auditor General

Republic vs. Palacio

Garnishment declared null and void.

Municipality of San Fernando vs Firme

1. Are municipal corporations suable?

Renato was not aware that the pitogo belonged to Augusto.

ISSUES & ARGUMENTS

NO. CHILDREN WERE NOT IN THEIR CUSTODY.

Palisoc vs. Brillantes| Teehankee G.R. No. L-29025, October 4, 1971| 41

ISSUES & ARGUMENTS

HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI

YES, DEFENDANTS-SCHOOL OFFICIALS ARE LIABLE UNDER ART. 2180

ISSUES & ARGUMENTS

W/N private respondents are liable

HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI

TC: Juanito is guilty, serve sentence of 1yr-8mos, plus 5K indeminity.

Salvosa vs. IAC| Padilla G.R. No. 70458 October 5, 1988

CA affirmed with modification in the amount of damages.

ISSUES & ARGUMENTS

HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI

RTC dismissed the MTD. CA affirmed. The CA ratiocinated as follows:

ISSUES & ARGUMENTS

HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI

NO, THEY ARE NOT LIABLE.

ISSUES & ARGUMENTS

W/N Republic Central Colleges may be held liable for damages.

HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI

ISSUES & ARGUMENTS

HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI

No negligence could be attributable to the petitioners-teachers to warrant the award of damages

Actually it was the detachment of the steering that caused it.

ISSUES & ARGUMENTS

Whether the Capistranos are entitled to the award of moral damages.

HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI

ST. JOSEPHS COLLEGE vs. JAYSON MIRANDA

ISSUE: Whether the petitioners were liable for the accident.

Worcester v. Ocampo February 27, 1912

Held: No. The SC agrees with the RULING of the CA.

Vestil vs. IAC G.R. No. 74431 (November 6, 1989)

J. H. Chapman vs. James M. Underwood 27 Phil 374 (March 28, 1914)

ISSUE: Is defendant liable in the case at bar?