On Hong Kong Umbrella Movement

The Journal of Asian Studies Vol. 75, No. 3 (August) 2016: 673702.
The Association for Asian Studies, Inc., 2016 doi:10.1017/S0021911816000565
Creating a Textual Public Space: Slogans and Texts

from Hong Kongs Umbrella Movement
SEBASTIAN VEG
Hong Kongs Umbrella Movement (SeptemberDecember 2014) represented a watershed

in Hong Kongs political culture and self-understanding. Based on over 1,000 slogans and
other textual and visual material documented during the movement, this study provides
an overview of claims, which are oriented towards an assertion of agency, articulated at
different levels: in a universalistic mode (democracy), in relation with a political com-
munity (Hong Kong autonomy and decolonization), and through concrete policy aims. At
the same time, slogans mobilize diverse cultural and historical repertoires that attest the
hybrid quality of Hong Kong identity and underscore the diversity of sources of political
legitimacy. Finally, it will be argued that by establishing a system of contending discours-
es within the occupied public spaces, the movement strived to act out a type of discursive
democracy. Despite the challenges that this discursive space encountered in interacting
with the authorities and the public at large, it represented an unfinished attempt to
build a new civic culture among Hong Kongs younger generation.
UMBRELLA MOVEMENT TOOK place in Hong Kong from September 28, 2014, when
T HE
tear gas first mobilized masses of democracy supporters, until December 15, 2014,
when the last occupation site was cleared at Causeway Bay. Coming at the end of a
long process to reform the mechanism for Hong Kongs next chief executive election
in 2017, it began in response to a decision issued by the National Peoples Congress
Standing Committee (NPC-SC) on August 31, 2014, setting a restrictive legal framework.
This decision confirmed the fears that had led to the formation of the group Occupy
Central with Love and Peace (OCLP) in 2013: initiated by two academics and a
Baptist minister, this group advocated civil disobedience and occupation of public
space as a last resort against a decision by Beijing disallowing significant universal suffrage
in Hong Kong. In the event, the occupation of public space took place more spontane-
ously, led by two student groups (Scholarism, which had established its credentials in the
Anti-National Education campaign of 2012, and the Hong Kong Federation of Students
or HKFS), and began in Admiralty (the site of Hong Kongs Central Government Offices)
rather than Central (the business district), before spreading to Causeway Bay and
Mongkok. It was fueled by the use of tear gas by the Hong Kong police on September
28, 2014, considered unusual, which mobilized several tens of thousands of people (pos-
sibly 100,000 or more at its peak). The government dug in its heels against the movement,
Sebastian Veg (veg@ehess.fr) is Professor at the Centre for the Study of Modern and Contemporary China,
EHESS (School for Advanced Studies in the Social Sciences).
Downloaded from http:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Toronto, on 01 Dec 2016 at 03:29:31, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
http:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0021911816000565
674 Sebastian Veg
which it called illegal, and encouraged transportation companies to take legal action;
court injunctions were eventually used to clear the main occupation areas.1
The Umbrella Movement has defied easy characterizations, sharing aspects of differ-
ent movements, as well as encapsulating some of the contradictions of Hong Kong itself.
As a territory in which a society that is in some respects post-materialistic is governed by a
political system that is not (yet) democratic (Ma 2011), Hong Kong presents an interest-
ing theoretical paradox that had implications for the nature of the movement. The argu-
ment developed below suggests that, contrary to much of the rhetoric developed in the
1989 democracy movement, for example, in which many participants articulated their
role as making personal sacrifices in the name of the future of the Chinese nation, the
Umbrella Movement mobilized a great diversity of cultural references, constructing a
far more heterogeneous notion of China. These diverse frames nurtured an open
debate on the nature of the democratic community itself, in the occupying zones, and
more broadly in Hong Kong. In this sense, the movements particular significance lies
in its ability to represent an alternative model to many of the democratic movements
that developed in mainland China over the twentieth century.
The present essay is devoted to a specific aspect that has not yet been studied system-
atically: over the seventy-nine-day occupation, the three occupied areas (Causeway Bay,
Admiralty, and Mongkok) were colonized not only by artwork,2 but also by textual mate-
rial in every size and form. Produced by diverse authors, some of them political groups,
some of them unorganized participants, some of them just passersby, what do these texts
express? How do they relate to the movement as a whole and help us to characterize it?
There has not been much theoretical engagement with movement slogans as such. A
chapter devoted to slogans in a classic work on social movements (Stewart, Smith, and
Denton 2001, 17198) proposes a typology based mainly on their persuasive function.3
Most discourse analysis on social movements, using the notions of strategic framing and
discursive repertoires, focuses either on manifestos and press statements by movement
leaders or on how the movement and its claims are portrayed in the media or in subse-
quent historiography.4 More recent studies in the field of cultural sociology have revived
interest in slogans as speech acts within performances that cannot be reduced to stra-
tegic framing.5
The present article adopts an interdisciplinary approach, based on a close contextual
reading of the texts themselves. In order to consider different aspects of the slogans, the
argument is structured following J. L. Austins (1973, 94108) threefold analysis of speech
acts. The first part discusses the illocutionary dimension of the slogans, or their intended
1
For a detailed chronological account of the movement and an initial attempt to characterize it, see
Veg (2015).
2
To view some examples of artwork, music, and slogans, see Human Rights in China (2014) and
This Is Our Moment (n.d.). For a more theoretical approach, see S. Wong (2015).
3
The typology distinguishes three species (spontaneous, sanctioned, and advertising slogans) and
five functions (transforming perceptions of reality, altering self-perceptions of protestors, legitimiz-
ing the movement, prescribing courses of action, and mobilizing for action).
4
This approach is adopted by Sidney Tarrow (2013), who analyzes the use of terms like boycott,
sabotage, terror, or revolution to characterize social movements.
5
For example, Sveta Klimova (2009) argues that protest texts are mainly created to communicate
normative disagreement.
Creating a Textual Public Space 675
meaning. The second part looks at the textuality of the slogans themselves (locutionary
dimension), paying specific attention to the repertoire of cultural and historical referenc-
es they mobilize. Finally, the third section discusses their communicational effect (perluc-
tionary dimension) within a communicational framework inspired by Habermass
definition of the public sphere. The essay suggests that the movement represented an
attempt to articulate a culturally hybrid democratic community, struggling to define
deliberation as a political mechanism to regulate both its internal differences and its in-
teraction with the broader polity of Hong Kong.
CORPUS AND METHODOLOGY
This study draws on over 1,000 slogans, texts, and other artifacts containing texts,
which were photographed during several visits to the three sites of the Umbrella Move-
ment between September 28 and December 11, 2014. Visits took place on twenty-one
separate days to Admiralty, three separate days to Causeway Bay, and four separate
days to Mongkok.
The sample is limited to text-based occurrences. However, exploiting this corpus of
material raises some significant challenges, in particular quantification. The textual ma-
terial can be classified into three main categories: (1) handwritten (unique) posters in
various formats ranging from A4 to huge banners; (2) computer-printed or photocopied
posters (potentially mass-produced) mainly in A4 or A3 format; and (3) textual parts on
graphically designed and color-printed posters, usually in A3 format or above. To these
can be added some artifacts or installations with textual components (e.g., the scale
model of Lions Rock with the slogan hanging on it). Material that is smaller than A4
format has been mainly excluded, with the exception of a few particularly significant
objects. Documenting and exploiting the Post-it notes on which bystanders and partici-
pants alike left words of encouragement or random thoughts is a whole separate
project, which is currently being carried out by others.
It should be noted that the length of the texts varies very significantly. In a classical
definition, George Shankel describes a slogan as: some pointed term, phrase or expres-
sion, fittingly worded, which suggests action, loyalty, or which causes people to decide
upon and to fight for the realization of some principle or decisive issue. It is thus
usually assumed that slogans are short and snappy (Shankel 1941, 7; quoted in
Stewart et al. 2001, 174). Generally speaking, the survey has been limited to texts of
one or two lines. Some exceptions, such as short poems, are included. Anything
lengthy (whole pages of text) has been excluded. On the other hand, no material has
been excluded on the base of its content or type of speech act.
The language is mainly Chinese with some English. Chinese is mainly standard
written Chinese, but significant parts of text are in written Cantonese, which is rarely
used in formal settings.6
6
In these cases (i.e., when at least one Chinese character in a sentence can be identified as non-
standard), Cantonese Romanization (Yale system) is used to transcribe the slogan. These are
marked with an asterisk to distinguish from the ones transcribed in Mandarin pinyin. When no
Chinese appears in parentheses, this means that the original slogan was in English.
676 Sebastian Veg
Printed and photocopied materials raise the challenge of duplication. It is impossible

to attribute authors and time of production to most texts. Although some slogans or
posters contain references to political groups (parties or other groups, like Falungong),
most are anonymous and undated, making it hard to know whether the time of documen-
tation corresponds with the time of production. This also makes it difficult to establish a
chronology of the movement. For similar reasons, it is difficult to differentiate between
the three locales of Admiralty, Causeway Bay, and Mongkok: many of the slogans were
mass-produced and migrated from one venue to another. For these reasons, quantitative
analysis is impossible to carry out rigorously, as there are too many biases. Hence, the
qualitative approach adopted here has consisted of attempting to maximize diversity in
selecting a small number of slogans, and conducting a form of inductive analysis using
these reduced samples to attempt a kind of thick description of the movement.
ASSERTING AGENCY: A DEMOCRATIC COMMUNITY WITH VARYING PERIMETERS
The slogans and texts produced by the movement may firstly be seen as the expres-
sion of claims formulated by participants. In Austins perspective, the preexisting claims
expressed by the movement texts correspond with their semantic content, or intended
meaning. All observers were struck by the extraordinary variety of slogans and claims
that they encountered in the protest sites, ranging from local identity and language to en-
vironmentalism, gay rights, or anti-capitalism. They are all the harder to classify, as many
are saturated with irony or cultural references that all but drown out the literal meaning
of the words. It would be easy to dismiss this diversity of claims as the expression of a
post-modern carnival in which different groups vie for recognition (Taylor 1994),
typical of the new social movements that appeared in the 1970s. These movements,
which opposed both liberal capitalism and repressive communism, distrusted bureauc-
racy and affirmed spontaneity, emphasized culture rather than class, and appealed to par-
ticipants identities, are generally seen as having given birth to identity politics.7 Similarly,
in Hong Kong, opponents of the Umbrella Movement were quick to dismiss its claims as
the expression of an identity politics driven by the young generations growing alien-
ation from China (usually conjectured to be fueled by economic difficulties).
By contrast, a survey conducted on the protest sites in late October (Cheng and Yuen
2014) showed surprising consistency: using net percentages (difference between rating
as important and unimportant), it isolated seven main reasons given by participants
for their implication: (1) struggle for democracy (87 percent); (2) dissatisfaction with the
governments ignoring of demands (68 percent); (3) dissatisfaction with the polices re-
sponse (51 percent); (4) identification with the ideal of civil disobedience (46 percent);
(5) resistance to the central governments meddling in Hong Kong affairs (33 percent);
(6) struggle for a space of discussion for public policy (22 percent); and (7) struggle to
improve livelihood (3 percent). This surveywhich is quite exhaustive, as interviewees
were asked to supplement the available answers with their owntends to show an over-
whelming engagement with democracy, which in its most abstract formulation represents
the most widely shared claim, but also, in its more concrete declinations, accounts for
7
This description is inspired by Hall (1992, 290).
reasons 2 to 6. How can these findings be reconciled with the wide spectrum of textual
claims?
Craig Calhoun criticizes the notion of new social movements, underlining that
identity politics is not new, or limited to post-materialist ideologies of stages of devel-
opment. Rather, he highlights, every collective identity is open to both internal subdi-
vision and calls for incorporation into some larger category of primary identity (Calhoun
1994, 23, 27). In a similar perspective, this section argues that the variety of claims doc-
umented in the slogans can be understood as expansive or restrictive variations on an un-
derlying theme that connects them. It attempts to show that notions of democracy,
universal suffrage, or civil disobedience, as they are expressed in the slogans, are under-
pinned by an affirmation of moral and political agency, grounded in a community with
variable boundaries.
Democracy
Firstly, the term democracy itself was massively quoted in movement texts, with a
varying degree of abstraction. One of the iconic slogans was: Dont forget the original
intent: fight for democracy (Wuwang chuzhong: zhengqu minzhu :).
As suggested by the ubiquitous notion of struggle (zhengqu), many slogans connected
democracy to an affirmation of agency: Democracy is fought for standing up, not begged
for kneeling down (Minzhu shi zhanqilai zheng, bushi guixialai qiu de
). This variation contains a critical allusion to the student leaders of 1989 who
famously knelt on the steps of the Great Hall of the People, asking leaders to receive their
petition.
Other slogans denounce a lack of political participation in Hong Kong (deploring that
citizens are pawns or slaves of the government). Democracy is connected to an un-
derstanding of rights of citizens or natural rights that are being denied by the govern-
ment. This rights-awareness was expressed in either Western (natural, human rights)
or Chinese references (Menciuss notion of minben or people as foundation). On the
one hand, democracy was connected to the framework of the Basic Law and claimed
in a minimal, self-limiting manner: This is not a revolution. We only want universal suf-
frage. We only want civil nomination.
In other cases, democracy was endorsed for its utopian, not strictly political, dimen-
sion. In a frequently recurring image disseminated by pop culture, democracy is de-
scribed as a flowering: The flowers of democracy are blooming everywhere
(Minzhu biandi kaihua ). Throughout the occupied areas, this text suggests,
democratic practices of consultation, self-expression, and autonomy are developing.
Other slogans connected democracy to a moral imperative, like the following one
borrowed from Taiwans Sunflower Movement: When dictatorship becomes a fact, rev-
olution becomes a duty.8 Civil disobedience, as advocated by OCLP, is in this way jus-
tified as the affirmation of a higher form of justice, in the face of an unjust law. Similar
slogans, affirming love, dignity, or humanity (People driven by dignity will
always stay longer than those driven by money)9 implicitly provide a simple moral
8
On the Taiwan connection, see, e.g., shanny23 (2014). On the movement, see also Rowen (2015).
9
This slogan can also be read as a reply to Chinese state media reports that protesters were paid by
foreign forces.
678 Sebastian Veg
Figure 1. Determine our own destiny, flowers blooming

everywhere. Photograph by the author.
frame for empirical events, ascribing to the government a set of negative values: violence,
the use of force, and money (paying triads and patriotic or other groups to stir up trouble
against protesters). The ideals embraced by the protesters are thus translated into a
strong contentious claim of the moral high ground.
Most importantly, on a moral level, democracy was frequently presented as an asser-
tion of agency and individual autonomy: Masters of our own destiny (Mingyun zizhu
); Determine our own destiny, flowers blooming everywhere (Mingyun zijue,
hua kai biandi ; see figure 1).
The idea of destiny or fate (mingyun) is closely linked to the central Chinese state
and the traditional moral discourse of the unity of the nation. When the protesters affirm
democracy as their own destiny, they reference a longstanding tension between tradi-
tional moral vocabulary and a modern political system, which goes back to May Fourth
1919, when students in Beijing first marched for science and democracy, affirming
the power of human agency (determine) to change history, of individuals to change po-
litical systems. In a context in which Hong Kongs return to China has been portrayed as
the expression both of its rightful return to the motherland and of a law of history
(linking the traditional moral vocabulary of the unity of the nation with communist anti-
colonial historicism), the protesters call to challenge the laws of destiny implicitly questions
the status of Hong Kong. Indeed, there is an interesting nuance between the two slogans:
while zizhu (autonomy) arguably remains within the framework of Hong Kongs constitu-
tional status, zijue (self-determination), possibly inspired by the much-discussed February
2014 issue of the Hong Kong University student union journal Undergrad,10 marks a depar-
ture from the status quo, foreshadowing Joshua Wongs August 2015 call for a constitutional
referendum on Hong Kongs status after 2047 (see J. Wong 2015a, 2015b).
10
The title of the issue was Xianggang minzu. Mingyun zijue (Hong Kong nation. Determining
[our] own destiny); the notion of a Hong Kong nation drew some very harsh criticism, including
from the chief executive himself, who targeted this issue in his 2015 policy address to LegCo.
Hong Kong Identity

Much ink has been spilt, especially in the pro-Beijing press, about the connection
between the Umbrella Movement and the small group of Hong Kong pro-independence
activists, a connection that remains largely unsubstantiated: while many slogans refer to
Hong Kong itself and affirm its distinct local identity, almost none call for independence.
(One such slogan was documented on-site.) Many do affirm a connection between the
cultural community of Hong Kong and the political community of citizens claiming uni-
versal suffrage. Echoing Calhouns critique of the new social movements paradigm and
wariness of a reified notion of identity, it should be noted that slogans affirming Hong
Kong are hard to divide neatly between an inclusive political notion of democracy and
an exclusionary definition of identity. Many proclaim a personal, even intimate connec-
tion with the city that is neither directly political, nor culturally exclusive: Hong Kong
I love you (Xianggang wo ai ni ); The most beautiful thing in Hong Kong
are its people (Xianggang zui mei de shi ren ). In some cases, slogans
express pride and belonging to a home, or loyalty (implicitly criticizing politicians
for not putting Hong Kongs interests first) but what lies outside the home, or what
threatens it, is not defined, or only in vague moral terms: Protect our home, resist
dark forces (Baowei jiayuan, jujue hei shili ); Protect our home
from darkness; We support Hong Kong (*Heung Gong, ngohdei chaang ).
In some cases, the expression of cultural identity is indeed exclusive, when Chinese
people are designated as others: Refuse to be Chinese, nothing more than that (Ju zuo
Zhongguoren, meiyou dabuliao ). This sense of cultural distance
from China was shared by many of the participants in the movement: according to a
survey, 81 percent of occupiers identified exclusively as Hongkongers, as opposed to
41 percent in the general population (Cheng and Yuen 2015a).
However, at the same time, the expression of local identity presents itself as an affir-
mation of agency by a civic community: Our Hong Kong, lets save it ourselves (Ziji
Xianggang ziji jiu ); Hong Kong history, written by Hongkongers (Xiang-
gang lishi you Xianggangren bianxie ). Borrowed from Taiwans Sun-
flower Movement, the first slogan brings together several discursive strands. On one
level, it grounds Hong Kongs subjectivity within the citys civic community, rather than
within the Chinese nation as a whole. More broadly, it represents an affirmation of the
end of a colonial mindset pervasive among Hong Kong elites, in which an ultra-efficient
bureaucracy looks to the outside (London, Beijing, Washington) to determine ultimate
political goals. It marked a growing awareness that Hongkongers would not be helped
by the intervention of foreign powers (while leaders of the previous generation of dem-
ocrats, like Anson Chan and Martin Lee, traveled to Washington), but had to organize on
their own and take responsibility for their political community. The second slogan points
to a similar aspiration to write Hong Kongs own history, not its history as a colony that
has returned to the motherland to fulfill its destiny. Consequently, some critiques of
China are framed in political terms, when mainland tourists are accused of colonizing
Hong Kong (tourism has strongly reshaped urban geography over the last decade), some-
times using anti-colonial vocabulary (becoming slaves).
In one drawing, the curtailing or erosion of political freedoms after the handover is
denounced as a form of castration: Castrated before adoption as a pet (accompanied
680 Sebastian Veg
Figure 2. Castrated before adoption as a pet. Photograph

by the author.
by a drawing of a cat; see figure 2). The opposite of being a pet or a slave is an implicit
affirmation of agency. Yet the political community in whose name universal suffrage is
claimed could be elastic: I want real universal suffrage. Hongkongers support Hon-
gkongers (*Ngoh yiu jan pousyun, Heung Gong yahn chaang Heung Gong yahn
); Umbrella Revolution Hong Kong. Peace for our motherland.
While in the first slogan, democracy is linked to the affirmation of Hong Kong as a po-
litical community that does not immediately encompass China, the second one, while
designating the movement as a revolution, also refers to an imprecise motherland
(in English) which may refer to Hong Kong, but also to China. In this sense, the affirma-
tion of Hong Kong identity as a central claim of the movement should not be opposed to
democracy, but viewed as an expression of the political community claiming democracy.
To what extent this community is open or closed to outsiders depends on individual
slogans, but its central meaning is closely connected to democracy.
Anti-Capitalist and Post-Materialist Claims

A third group of slogans can be summarized as post-materialist, mainly critiquing
crony capitalism, affirming the need to preserve the environment, and supporting alter-
native lifestyles (gay pride, vegetarianism, organic farming). Ecological concerns were
linked to a more inclusive and democratically accountable decision-making process, as
echoed by the establishment of an organic garden in the midst of the Admiralty
protest site, with a banner proclaiming: Organic guerilla garden of plurality. Plentiful
garden of organic disobedience (Kangming youji fengfu zhi yuan );
Freedom has taken root. Peace strengthens it (Ziyou yi zhigen, heping zhuozhuang
ta ). The first slogan links civil disobedience with cultural plurality
and organic farming, which some alternative communities advocated in the aftermath of
the Choi Yuen Tsuen incident in 2010 (see also Cheung 2014). Other slogans similarly
connect democracy to a more accountable mode of town-planning. The second slogan
features a photograph taken on one of the Admiralty flyovers, in which a hole has
Figure 3. Freedom has taken root. Peace strengthens it.

Photograph by the author.
been drilled into the concrete highway to make room for a small cactus to take root in the
soil below (see figure 3). Like in the blooming flower analogy, political freedom is in-
carnated by the image of a plant: by taking over the highways that serve as arteries of
Hong Kongs capitalism, and planting flowers on them, the city may develop an ecosystem
more conducive to the realization of political freedoms. It points out that democracy is
impeded by crony capitalism and the widely shared endorsement of a productivist life-
stylean obstacle generated not only in Beijing but within Hong Kong. The occupied
zones served as a model: not only was refuse collection ensured, but a complex system
of refuse sorting and recycling was organized, in contrast with the SAR government,
which has been dragging its feet on the issue for many years, taking the position
that recycling should be subcontracted to private companies that can make a profit on
it.11 Recyclable materials thus figured prominently in many of the emblematic produc-
tions of the occupied areas, like the Umbrella Man statue, made of recycled wood,
11
For this reason, glass, for example, is not recycled in the territory. The initiative of a local green
group to find an economically viable model for recycling glass has met only with obstruction from
the authorities.
682 Sebastian Veg
and the canopy hung between footbridges over Umbrella Square, made of discarded
umbrella tops. Ecological self-organization thus served as a kind of scale-model for the
democratic process the occupiers were advocating.
The critique of capitalism, productivity, and Hong Kongs economic model based on
real estate also featured prominently. Many of the protesters tents were ironically named
in the style of Hong Kongs pretentious real estate developments, such as Mount Har-
court 1 in Admiralty. A series of slogans directly targeted the real estate sector, denounc-
ing government-business collusion and referencing a famous quote by C. Y. Leung (see
Buckley and Bradsher 2014): HK has too many poor people to allow direct elections
(Carry Yourself Leung).12 The rule of law itself, a mantra in the pan-democrat camp,
was questioned as skewed: Rule of law? Wake up, Hong Kong people. The law?
Skewed toward tycoons and finance! (*Faatjih? Sing ha, Heung Gong yahn. Faatleuht?
Heung fuhouh choihtyuhn kingcheh dik! ?.?!).
These pronouncements establish a clear link between political and economic issues. Con-
templating a system that screens out candidates put forward by poor people and over-
represents vested interests and pro-Beijing crony capitalists, this slogan again calls for an
awakening that would empower citizens anew.
Two significant strands run through the entire range of slogans: democracy, the Hong
Kong community that supports it, and the critique of capitalism are all presented as ex-
pressions of an affirmation of agency and justified in moral terms. They can simply be
seen as different levels of generalization of the same core claim, which is made in a uni-
versalistic mode (democracy), in relation with a geographical community (Hong
Kong), or by advancing more concrete policy agendas like opposing the hegemony of
corporate productivism.
PERFORMING CULTURAL REPERTOIRES: AN EXPRESSIVE MOVEMENT
In a classic political science approach, social movements are often discussed through
the lens of a cost-benefit calculation, against a larger background of the structure of po-
litical opportunities. In such a framework of strategic calculation and mobilization, move-
ment slogans are generally understood as frames or scripts, that echo a repertoire of
collective action (Tilly 1978). In an insightful commentary published just after the end of
the movement, Law Wing-sang points out that the Umbrella Movement evolved from an
instrumental model (implicit in the demands made by OCLP) to become an expres-
sive social movement: while its instrumental demands (citizen nomination of candidates
for the chief executive election) had already failed before the movement began (evi-
denced by the August 31 NPC-SC decision), the most important aspect was the move-
ments spontaneity (zifaxing ) as expressed in the antitear gas protests on
September 28 (An Tu 2014). In this perspective, the slogans and other textual materials
can be seen not simply as the expression of well-defined claims, but as part of a broader
performance of the democratic or spontaneous nature of the movement itself.
12
In another slogan, the income threshold given by Leung for people who should not be allowed to
vote (US$1,800 or 14,000 HK dollars/month or 14K), was ironically described as protection
money and connected to the famous triad 14K.
Similarly, cultural sociology studies social movements as oppositional performances, in

which cultural references or frames are particularly significant in establishing meanings
shared with larger groups of society (Johnston 2009, 6). If we consider such texts as
speech acts in Austins perspective, this section deals with their locutionary content, or
textuality.
In the Chinese context, Jeffrey Wasserstrom and Joseph Esherick use the categories
of ritual and theatre to explain the mobilization of respectively traditional and modern
historical repertoires of protest in the 1989 democracy movement. They argue that the
three main traits of the movement are its address to the authorities as the implied audi-
ence, its public nature as street theatre that invites all citizens to join, and its symbolic
self-definition of students within the tradition of selfless martyrs. This performed
street theatre, they argue, is ultimately the result of Chinas lack of a structured civil
society in 1989 (Esherick and Wasserstrom 1990). Protesters in Hong Kong similarly re-
sorted to culturally specific practices of big-character and small-character posters
(dazibao and xiaozibao). However, Hong Kong in 2014 had a well-developed civil
society, in which the Umbrella Movement was strongly embedded. By contrast with
the nationalist martyr imagery in 1989, the hybrid cultural identities performed in the
Umbrella Movement reflect Hong Kongs complex position within the Chinese and
global context. This section examines the cultural frames mobilized in texts.
Framing China
The Umbrella Movement was sparked by a decision made in Beijing, and it became
apparent to many of the participants early on that a satisfactory answer to their claims
could only be found if Beijing intervened. At the same time, the Chinese state media
were continually castigating the movement as an illegal attempt to overthrow the local
and central governments with the help of foreign forces (e.g., Guo Ping 2014), and
the Chinese government moved decisively to arrest scores of sympathizers in China. It
is hence unsurprising that the movements textual production would implicitly address
both the central government and the Chinese population at large, attempting to
correct the distorted image painted by state media. Furthermore, in Hong Kongs polit-
ical culture, traditional Confucianism, encouraged both under British colonialism and
after the handover (Law 2009), plays an important role as a widely shared frame.
A group of slogans thus establishes a strong connection with traditional China, using
classical references to reaffirm a position of moral superiority and principle:
Both born of the same root [why torment each other so cruelly?] (Ben shi
tonggen sheng ) [Romance of the three kingdoms].
Choose virtue and persevere (Ze shan gu zhi ) [Book of Rites].
Virtue is not left to stand alone. He who practices it will have neighbors (De bu
gu, bi you ling ) [Analects].
The people do not fear death, why try to scare them with it? (Min bu wei si,
naihe yi si shen zhi? ) [Laozi].
Each of these slogans references a classical text. The first one, which appeared as a
rebuke to the Hong Kong police after the use of tear gas, took on a new meaning in
684 Sebastian Veg
the context of the rise of localist discourse, alluding to the fact that China and Hong Kong
share the same cultural roots. The last slogan uses Laozi to criticize the use of force by the
police. The other two use terms like shan or de to refer to the protesters, implicitly
marking their claims as morally superior. In these texts, protesters are able to phrase
their claims in the vocabulary of traditional political wisdom that enjoys wide acceptance
in Hong Kong and China. Many of these explicitly reaffirmed the connection to the
Chinese nation (some of them explicitly addressed to our Chinese compatriots),
defined by Sun Yat-sens both traditional and democratic concept of the world
belongs to all. Traditional popular culture was also referenced in the Guandi shrine
that appeared in the Mongkok area (see figure 4). The shrine was supposed to protect
protesters from both triads and police because both of these groups worship him.13
Here also, traditional culture, in its local variant, provides a frame that unites the protest-
ers and their apparent opponents with the goal of defending the country and protecting
the people (hu guo bao min ) that appeared in the parallel scrolls bearing
Guandis full name.
Some famous literary quotes also appeared in the occupied zones, most prominent
among them two lines respectively by Lu Xun (18811936) and Gu Cheng (195693):
Although originally there was no path on the ground, as more and more people
walked through, it became a path (Dishang ben meiyou lu, zou de ren duole, bian
chengle lu ; see figure 5).
The black night has given me black eyes, but I use them to search for light
(Heiye geile wo heise de yanjing, wo que yong ta xunzhao guangming
; see figure 6).
Lu Xuns quote, the last line of his short story My hometown (Guxiang, 1921), refers to
the dialectics of hope and despair: although hope may not be visible at first, it can slowly
form even in the midst of despair. Gu Chengs quote, taken from the poem A genera-
tion (Yi dai ren, 1979), affirms a similar search for moral light in the midst of darkness,
and encapsulated the quest of a whole generation to leave Maoism behind. Both slogans
inscribe the movement within a century-long quest for democracy in China.
A third subgroup of slogans refers more directly to the contemporary PRC. In some
cases, the occupiers strategically use quotes from CCP leaders (Maos call to support
student movements, and another to oppose unelected governments; Xi Zhongxuns en-
dorsement of the peoples power) to reaffirm their loyalty to the central government
and at the same time highlight the CCPs nominal commitment to democracy. Enrolling
Mao and Xi Zhongxun (father of Xi Jinping) under their banner, these slogans attempt to
confront the CCP with its own contradictions: calling for democracy and universal suf-
frage, as well as a critical approach to patriotism before taking power, it then proceeded
to do away with elections and demand blind obedience in the name of patriotism. A par-
ticularly ironic and graphically striking banner hanging from the footbridge in Admiralty
13
Duara (1988, 792) mentions the connection with police and KMT secret societies in passing but
does not view it as central to the Guandi myth. However, he does consider that no god was more
identified as a representative of Chinese culture than Guandi (786). On Guandi in Hong Kong, see
Levin (2014).
Figure 4. Guandi shrine in Mongkok. Photograph by the

author.
Figure 5. Although originally there was no path on the

ground, as more and more people walked through, it
became a path (Lu Xun). Photograph by the author.
686 Sebastian Veg
Figure 6. The black night has given me black eyes, but I

use them to search for light (Gu Cheng). Photograph by
the author.
demanded the resignation of C. Y. Leung using calligraphy executed in an imitation of

Maos style (see figure 7).
In other cases, the occupiers affirm their connection with a community of dissent in
China. A series of texts explicitly or implicitly connected with Falungong stand out
through their direct challenge to the CCPs legitimacy (e.g., Only without the Commu-
nist Party will there be a new China, parodying a famous song). Expressions of support
appeared from groups like the Southern Street movement, a well-known rights-defense
movement in Guangzhou in 201314. In several venues, occupiers drew attention to their
supporters in China, with a regularly updated count of arrests: How many people are still
detained [in China] for supporting Occupy Central? (Yinwei zhichi zhanzhong, you
duoshao ren reng bei qiujin? ?). In another example, Hong
Kongs historical role as a safe haven from communism was highlighted, asserting a gen-
erational continuity between members of the movement and their parents generation.
Altogether, the cultural references to greater Chinese identity are rich and varied.
Drawing on different historical frames and political repertoires, the occupiers perform
China through a mix of classical and modern references, with a strong moral-
philosophical bend. Implicitly refusing the definition of patriotism advanced by
Beijing, they establish a parallel tradition of Chineseness, which culminates in the strate-
gic use of pronouncements by communist leaders to demonstrate their double standards
and a direct critique of the CCPs legitimacy.
The World as Audience

While some texts highlight a Chinese connection, other slogans are firmly situated
within a cosmopolitan tradition of worldwide protest. For a movement that relied
strongly on the presence of the international media to resist skewed reporting by
Chinas state organs, cosmopolitan framing had a definite strategic dimension.
However, it also corresponds to Hong Kongs status as a hybrid cultural entity, where
Figure 7. Leung Chun-ying, resign! (left-hand banner). Photograph by the author.
identification with cosmopolitan values is now higher than identification as Chinese.14

Multilingual slogans appeared in various locations, with for example a long series of trans-
lations in several dozen languages of Hong Kong democracy on one of the flyovers
leading from Admiralty to Central, underscoring that the Umbrella Movement was
part of a more global struggle for democracy.15
Slogans mainly quote pronouncements by worldwide protest leaders or thinkers, and
international popular culture. While Gandhi is perhaps the most quoted leader (First
they ignore you, then they laugh at you, then they fight you, then you win), Aung San
Suu Kyi, Nelson Mandela (Its always impossible until its done), and Martin Luther
King (Change does not roll in on the wheels of inevitability but comes through contin-
uous struggle) all made repeated appearances. Most of the individuals (many of them
non-Western) represent moral authorities who fought for seemingly hopeless causes,
against colonialism, military dictatorship, apartheid, Nazism (Dietrich Bonhoeffer), or
racial discrimination. The slogans are generally abstract, reaffirming agency, and
framing the necessary continuous struggle as a moral choice between good and evil,
vindicated by history. Orwells famous satire of communism in Animal Farm (All
14
A Hong Kong University Public Opinion Programme (HKUPOP) poll shows that, rated on a scale
from 1 to 10, identification as PRC citizens topped identification as Global citizens in 20089;
however, it has fallen abruptly since 2012, reaching an all-time low at 5.95 in June 2014, against 7.01
for identification as global citizens (HKUPOP 2015).
15
Another example was the Add Oil Machine, projecting support messages from social media
around the world onto Lennon Wall at Admiralty.
688 Sebastian Veg
animals are equal but some are more equal than others) is used to make a comment on
the equality of representation on the proposed Nomination Committee, skewed towards
pro-Beijing forces.
Finally, a crucial component of the Umbrella Movements international appeal was
its performance of international pop culture. While some of it can be read in slogans,
these quotations from popular songs were not only written down but also repeatedly per-
formed, especially in Admiralty: Do you hear the people sing? (Les Misrables); You
may say Im a dreamer, but Im not the only one (John Lennon); and We dont need
no thought control (Pink Floyd). Do you hear the people sing became a core cultural
reference of the movement, and was often sung in its Cantonese version (*Seuih waahn
meih goksing Who has not yet awoken?) at the protest sites. It anchored the
movement in a historical series of struggles against tyranny, while its Cantonese lyrics em-
phasized the defense of Hong Kong. John Lennon and Pink Floyd refer to the 1960s and
1970s, underscoring the continued appeal among the new generations of a protest
culture that their predecessors (among the pan-democratic parties) may have taken
part in but did not generally embrace politically.
The Hong Kong Story

The richest and most significant examples of performance can be associated with the
expression of local identity. They were targeted both at reinforcing a sense of cultural
community among the occupiers and more broadly at appealing to the Hong Kong pop-
ulation at large. The Cantonese language was central: to give only one example, an alter-
native name for the movement developed through a typical play on words: Chater
Revolution / Umbrella Revolution (*Jeda gaakmihng ). Part of the early occupa-
tion took place around Chater Road and Chater Garden in Central, a name transcribed
on street signs as Jeda; by a particular coincidence je is also the Cantonese word for um-
brella (rather than the standard word san or yusan ). In addition, this slogan uses
revolution rather than movement, further highlighting its transgressive content. It is
not clear, however, that Cantonese slogans are consistently more localist in content,
though they may generally be more contentious in tone.
The performance of Hong Kong identity referenced the citys popular protest
culture. Well-rehearsed song lines from the June Fourth vigil in Victoria Park include
the following two, respectively affirming democracy and freedom: Democracy will
return victoriously from battle (Minzhu hui zhansheng guilai ); and No
matter how hard the rain beats down, freedom will still blossom (Wulun yu zenme
da, Ziyou reng shi hui kaihua ). The first line is the title of
a song composed in 2012 by the band VIIV, and the second is a line from the song
Flower of freedom, which became popular at June Fourth vigils after it was given
new lyrics in 1993. Several compositions by the 1980s and 1990s Cantopop band
Beyond, known for its political commitment, were widely sung and referenced in the
movement, in particular Boundless ocean, vast skies (Haikuo tiankong ,
1993), which became one of the anthems of the Umbrella Movement, and Glorious
years (Guanghui suiyue 1990), originally devoted to Nelson Mandela.
These references are significant in that the mainstream of the Umbrella Movement
was quite critical with respect to the traditional pan-democratic political agenda,
including the commemoration of June Fourth. They suggest, despite a growing distance
from the mainland, that the June Fourth commemorations have become part of Hong
Kong identity and as such are not rejected by the younger generation of protesters.16
In a broader sense, Hong Kong pop culture was also performed through references
to a number of songs by indie music composers like Denise Ho (strongly implicated in the
movement), Fiona Fung, or Eason Chan. A line from a song by Denise Ho titled Glam-
orous (Yan guang si she ), originally part of an album released in 2005, which she
performed at the Gay Parade during the Umbrella Movement, became widely quoted
during the movement, appearing on posters and t-shirts: Being born in troubled
times entails certain responsibilities (Sheng yu luanshi you zhong zeren
). It encapsulates the feeling of a generational cohesion among the participants, as
well as expressing an analogy between speaking out both about gay rights and political
rights, as Ho has done. Another indie band, My Little Airport, has risen in popularity in
parallel with the political critiques of the new generation: lines from the song Ngau Tau
Kok youth (Niutoujiao qingnian ) were used to criticize youth apathy. Similar-
ly, the song Stubborn (Juejiang ) by Taiwanese rock band Mayday (Wuyuetian) was
widely quoted for its line, Although I may be disappointed I cannot despair (Jiusuan
shiwang bu neng juewang ).17
Most interestingly, several slogans attempted to redefine the political community of
Hong Kong by reworking state and government symbols. The British wartime slogan
Keep calm and carry on (going back to a 1944 propaganda effort, it was recently
revived by designers) encapsulating the British spirit of stoic resistance, can be seen
as an example of colonial heritage that has become part of Hong Kong. Lions Rock
became a symbol of the movement after a group of climbers hung a huge banner on it
on October 23, 2014, inscribed with the slogan I want real universal suffrage. A
symbol of the Hong Kong spirit of hard work and surviving in adversity, it was popular-
ized by the 1970s television series and theme song Below the Lion Rock (sung by Can-
topop icon Roman Tam) and referenced in many slogans: Displaying the Hong Kong
spirit under the Lion Rockreal universal suffrage (Shizishan xia tixian Xianggang
jingshenzhen puxuan ); Hongkongers, undefeatable
(Xianggangren, da bu si ); Flowers blooming everywhere under Lions
Rock (Shizishan xia biandi kaihua ). As part of the liberal discourse of
the value of hard work, Lion Rock may sit uncomfortably with some of the more anti-
capitalist pronouncements in the movement, but strongly resonates with the affirmation
of identity and political agency.
In some examples, Hong Kong identity was expressed by reappropriating political
symbols. In one striking graphic creation, the PRC flag was redesigned, replacing the
five yellow stars on a red background with five yellow umbrellas (see figure 8). The official
name of the PRC and the symbolism of the flag were reinterpreted in the design, which
read: Peoples Village of Occupy Central (Zhanzhong renmin gonghecun ).
The explanation below reads: The red color symbolizes revolution. The big umbrella
16
In a survey conducted at the June Fourth vigil in 2015, 88 percent of participants in Victoria Park
claimed to be participating as Hongkongers (9 percent as Chinese; 43 percent as citizens of the
world). See Cheng and Yuen (2015b).
17
Wuyuetian also wrote two songs in support of the Sunflower Movement in Taiwan.
690 Sebastian Veg
Figure 8. Peoples Village of Occupy Central (PRC flag).

represents universal suffrage. Four small umbrellas represent the four occupied areas of
Admiralty, Causeway Bay, Mong Kok and Tsim Sha Tsui. This graphic creation encapsu-
lates many of the complexities of Hong Kong identity. Flags are a sensitive symbol in
China: no local entities are allowed to have their own flag or emblem, and the Hong
Kong SAR flag must, according to the Basic Law, always be flown in a smaller size than
and together with the PRC flag. By reinterpreting the PRC flag, the occupiers avoid ag-
itating for Hong Kong independence, but at the same time subvert it thoroughly. The idea
of the nation is replaced by the notion of a village, the preferred term by which the
occupiers referred to their camp (the term gonghecun also ironically alludes to the non-
democratic nature of the PRC). An ironic commitment to the CCPs early ideals of revo-
lution is suggested by the explanation of the red background, and connected with the four
revolutionary sites in Hong Kong, replacing the four revolutionary classes in the orig-
inal interpretation of the flag. By using the trivial symbol of the umbrella, and elevating it
to ironically integrate it into the national flag, this design in fact subverts the whole notion
of the nation-state. Rather than contesting Hong Kongs return to the PRC, it mocks the
hollow pomp of national flags in general, proposing instead the organic community of the
village. Other variants include a parody of the SAR flag, in which the five petals of the
bauhinia are replaced by five black umbrellas on a yellow background.
The diversity of cultural repertoires mobilized in the movement represents the com-
plexity of identity issues in Hong Kong. Occupiers performed different cultural reper-
toires that both strategically played to different audiences and substantially expressed
different aspects of a hybrid Hong Kong identity, bringing together traditional Chinese
political vocabulary and modern Chinese culture, local and international pop icons, as
well as colonial nostalgia and a preference for small, organic communities over large, ag-
gressive nation-states. As pointed out by critics, at times the expressive dimension of the
movement became overwhelming and drowned out other dimensions, such as the delib-
erative one that will be discussed below. Nonetheless, both aspects remain crucial to a full
understanding of the movement.
SPEECH ACTS AND PUBLIC SPACE
Performance suggests strategic framing and a playful mode of interaction

between an active group of performers and a more passive audience, which ultimately
contributes to forming a group culture. There may, however, be another strand to the
Umbrella Movement. As E. P. Thompson (1971, 119) famously pointed out, popular pro-
tests do not only derive from a strategic calculation but also rely on implicit moral norms
around which a community reaches a consensus. Similarly, Paul Lichterman (2012, 214)
notes that the mobilization of cultural frames can be part of a process of civic debate:
people use, enact, or rely on cultural forms to solve problems publicly so the forms
they are using together in those instances are civic. The moral undercurrent in many
of the claims has already been highlighted above. Participants repeatedly expressed a
strong commitment to creating spaces for deliberation and making decisions by consen-
sus. In this sense, the movements spontaneism may be seen as acting out contending
public discourses, with as implicit model not only the dramatic stage, but also the delib-
erative forum (see, e.g., Della Porta 2009, 206). Sampson Wong (2015), in his analysis of
the artistic production of the Umbrella Movement, moves from an externalist reading
in which art is essentially a tool for protesters to communicate ideas to the outside, to a
communicative framework in which artworks reflect the desire of the occupiers to speak
to other fellow participants of the movement.
It should be remembered that the Umbrella Movementlike other occupy move-
mentswas uniquely structured around the prolonged takeover of urban space, trans-
formed into a forum of deliberative democracy. In a recent article, Craig Calhoun
(2013) characterizes occupy movements by the following traits: (a) claiming the right
to public space; (b) demonstrating the ability to maintain spontaneous order; (c)
making the assembled group a demonstration of participatory democracy; (d) bringing
together a group of like-minded people without a clear political program; and (e)
being less a movement than a dramatic performance. The last two points have already
been discussed above.18 However, the three first points merit further attention. The Um-
brella Movement began with a claim for public space (the storming of civic square, the
public protest space in front of government headquarters that had been closed off);
devoted tremendous resources and energy to maintaining spontaneous order (wardens
organized security, supply stations provided food and drink, waste disposal and recycling
were entirely self-organized); and, most importantly, repeatedly asserted its ideal of par-
ticipatory democracy, expressed in the slogan, Only the masses, no assembly (Zhiyou
qunzhong, meiyou dahui ).
In this perspective, the texts produced and performed in the movement may also
reflect an attempt to redraw the boundaries and rules of the public sphere. The exchange
of slogans can be viewed as constitutive of a type of communicative action that for Hab-
ermas (1984, 1:86)
18
Chan Kin-man has expressed the similar view that the Umbrella Movement lost its
direction but created a utopian community around the four values of equality, sharing, sus-
tainability, and artistic creation. HKU-CEFC Umbrella Movement Round Table, June 17,
2015.
692 Sebastian Veg
refers to the interaction of at least two subjects capable of speech and action who
establish interpersonal relations. The actors seek to reach an understanding
about the action situation and their plans of action in order to coordinate
their actions by way of agreement. The central concept of interpretation
refers in the first instance to negotiating definitions of the situation which
admit of consensus.
Rather than the theatrical performance, referencing and subverting traditional political
ritual, which played out on the stage of Tiananmen, it can be argued that the Hong
Kong protests emphasized a deliberative exchange, grounded in a well-established tradi-
tion of civil society and civil discourse. As one of the student leaders underlined in an in-
terview: Democracy is about debate.19
Habermass model has been criticized for its lack of attention to conflictuality, in par-
ticular to the process by which certain topics may be historically included or excluded from
the public sphere (e.g., Fraser 1995, 293). Craig Calhoun (1992, 24) points out that the
public sphere became depoliticized and impoverished in the nineteenth century, as critical
discussion bowed to cultural consumption, a tendency that the Umbrella Movement also
experienced. One way of admitting conflictuality into Habermass framework is to acknowl-
edge a multiplicity of spheres: as Calhoun writes, Social movements are among the several
possible sorts of subsidiary public spheres we might conceptualize if we break with the idea
that there must be one public sphere for each state (37). Slogans can then be seen as the
enactment of one of these alternative spheres where public debate takes place. In Austins
typology, this exchange derives from the perlocutionary dimension of the slogans, or their
effect on and interaction with an intended audience.
Satire of Official Doublespeak

Caricatures and mocking slogans targeting politicians and members of the Hong
Kong establishment, often in Cantonese, were ubiquitous. The main target was the
chief executive, C. Y. Leung, and other members of the pro-Beijing camp. Leung was
depicted as a CCP member, a wolf (a homophone of his surname), or a corrupt
mafioso. One poster portrays him as Lei Feng, the communist model worker from the
Cultural Revolution. Another uses characters homophonous with his English initials to
highlight his warped thoughts: Crooked thinking (*si waai ). Regina Ip, the
former security secretary, was similarly mocked when her name, Ip ne Lau (*Yip-Lau
), was glossed as malignant tumor (*yiht lauh ). Several slogans mocked govern-
ment phrases or catchwords. The one coined in support of the electoral reform package
(Pocket it first), was reformulated to call for Leungs resignation: CY resign: pocket it
first (*lohk jyuh toih sin ). Others denounced the undermining of the constitu-
tional arrangements under the Basic Law and of the motto of the police: One country,
two systems: in name only. Hong Kong people rule Hong Kong: only idle talk (Yiguo
liangzhi, mingcun shiwang, Gangren zhi Gang, zhide koujiang
); Candid and upright (Guangming leiluo ). While the first
asserts that the Basic Law has become meaningless, the second one contrasts the SAR
19
Alex Chow, interview with the author, August 10, 2015.
polices motto with the alleged violence on September 28 (tear gas) and subsequent days
(policemen were caught beating protester Ken Tsang on October 15), and the alleged
police-triad collusion (police allegedly stood by as triad members beat protesters in
Mongkok). We may note that, as contributions to a public debate, all these slogans high-
light a gap between reality and speech.
Interestingly, Chinese president Xi Jinping also became an icon of the satirical cre-
ations of the movement. Using a photo taken during flooding in Wuhan, where Xi Jinping
appeared with rolled-up trousers and holding an umbrella (in keeping with his down to
earth image), life-size cardboard figures of him holding a yellow umbrella blossomed
throughout Admiralty (see figure 9). In this case, the visual power of the protest signs
requires no slogan. On the one hand, this imagery alludes to Xis anti-corruption cam-
paign and grassroots image to communicate directly with the supreme leader and
denounce corrupt local officials (highlighted in the HKFSs two open letters to the
central government on October 11 and November 15), implicitly acknowledging the
centers supreme authority over Hong Kong. At the same time, it mocked Xis undignified
appearance, which, in another poster, was unfavorably contrasted with the last British
governor Chris Patten, under the slogan Different tastes (Pinwei bu yiyang
; see figure 10). This plays into the idea that British administration was superior, at
least in style, to post-handover arrangements.
While some of these texts may not exactly suit the framework of civil discussion, they
can be seen as conflictual interventions to extend the legitimate area of political debates
in the face of the governments denial that the occupiers had a legitimate say in the dis-
cussion of public affairs. Critiques of Leungs ties to the Party and real estate promoters
(and alleged ties to the mafia) and his preference for rich people politics point to this
need to extend the public sphere. Similarly, referencing Xi Jinpings populist image, while
at the same time mocking it, is also a way of highlighting how far removed the CCP has
become from its original ideals.
Public Debate
Many of the movements texts were explicitly designed to appear as interventions
into an ongoing discussion, using personal pronouns (we, you). There was an
ongoing internal debate on the strategy, goals, and nature of the movement. After the
dialogue between the students and the government on October 21, some called to
step up the action: Without resistance, how can we have peace? Step up the move-
ment! (Meiyou kangzheng, na you heping? Xingdong shengji!
!). Critiques of the Occupy Trio (Benny Tai, Chan Kin-man, and Chu Yiu-ming) tar-
geted their moderation and their proposed exit strategy of handing themselves in to the
police: Self-surrender yourselves! (Zishou ni ziji qu! !); Occupy Trio go
home, the rest is our business. Umbrella Revolution: self-determination by the
masses (Sanzi tuichang, shengxia jiushi zanmen de shi le. Yusan geming minzhong
zijue .).
One signboard in Mongkokwhere slogans were often quite contentious
denounced the Romantic losers in Admiralty (Jinzhong de langman shibai zhuyi
). Critiques of the festive atmosphere in Admiralty, with singing, perform-
ing, and art creation, were also aired: Not a carnival but a protest. Were serious
694 Sebastian Veg
Figure 9. Hong Kong People want universal suffrage.

Raise the umbrella, support it together. Photograph by
the author.
Figure 10. Different tastes. Photograph by the author.
(documented in Admiralty, November 13). The three protest sites were usually consid-
ered as representative of different strands of the movement: Causeway Bay more aca-
demic and idealistic; Admiralty more middle class, reasonable, and dominated by
HKFS; and Mong Kok more working class, with a stronger presence of anarchists and
localists.20 However, it is hard to substantiate these differences using the slogans
alone, which appeared to migrate between the three venues. The only notable difference
is the larger proportion of slogans dealing with issues of strategy and internal debate in
Mongkok. The protestors most critical of traditional democrats often targeted left
plastic (or leftist pricks), which refers to pan-democrats who supported democratic
reunification and believe their struggle is linked to the fight for democracy in China:
If we dont get rid of leftist pricks, there is no end to Hong Kongs problems
(Zuojiao bu chu, Gang nan bu zhi ). Many posters criticized the project-
ed referendum at Admiralty on October 26, which in the end had to be called off. These
contentious claims highlight the growing politicization of Hong Kong society, which used
to pride itself on its pragmatic and apolitical stance.
Others wanted to stick to the spirit of nonviolence and resisted calling the movement
a revolution. They reasserted the value of peaceful resistance: The dialogue has failed,
why be angry? Sit tight and wait for arrest (Duihua wu jieguo, fenhen you ruhe? Zuo ding
deng ren suo ); Retreat? Then we lose forever! (Che?
Jiu hui shu yi shi! !). Some proposed alternative strategies, like rotating oc-
cupation (Be water, my friend, an iconic quote from Bruce Lee referring to his unique
martial arts style). Many texts highlighted the need for deliberative democracy inside the
movement: Debate our own HK. Umbrella is our common project, let the masses
discuss it in common (Ziji Xianggang, ziji jiang. Yusan gong ye, qunzhong gong yi
.). This idea was of course both a strength and a vulnera-
bility of the movement, which in the end prevented it from developing a consensual exit
strategy, as various groups and individuals tried to leverage their own agenda and failed to
develop consensus-building institutions or mechanisms.
Self-Reflexive Texts
An original aspect of the movement was the continual production of self-portrayal,
self-description, and self-commentary by its members. September 28 was commemorat-
ed as a foundational date almost as soon as it had passed: We will not forget 9.28 (928
women bu hui wangji 928 ). Civil society, encompassing both the occupiers
and the public at large, was represented in a series of Mr Men drawings that appeared
around the occupation sites: Little Mr and Mrs HK People stood for all the citizens who
at one time or another had visited the sites or spoken out against the political reform
project (see figure 11). Many self-representations highlighted the generational aspect
of the movement. The slogan If not us, who? If not now, when? (a quotation from
John F. Kennedy) came to refer to the Occupy generation, the us fixing an in-group
identity and generational sense of belonging. Echoing a ubiquitous subway announce-
ment, a drawing states: Please mind the generation gap (see figure 12). It shows a
20
For a remarkable analysis of some of the micro-politics in Mongkok, see Chen (2014).
696 Sebastian Veg
Figure 11. Little Mr and Mrs Hong Kong People.

young girl holding a yellow umbrella inside an MTR subway train and an older man stand-
ing outside on the platform, presumably hesitating to join her onboard.
A group of movement texts can be read as performative redefinitions of space. By
renaming the occupied areas, they raise deeper questions about the nature of the occu-
pying community and the political organization of Hong Kong. Predictably, the occu-
pation of public space was an ongoing topic of public discussion: Sorry, the congestion
of the roads today is to ensure the smooth circulation of democracy in the future
(Duibuqi, malu jintian de tanhuan shi weile weilai de minzhu changtong
); There will be a short battle because democracy is still in
the next platform. Please accept our apologies. Both of these poke fun at the Hong
Kong nanny-state for its costly public works and paternalistic discourse justifying them
in the name of the common good. They turn around this claim and assure the public
Figure 12. Please mind the generation gap. Photograph

by the author.
that the outcome of democracy is worth enduring some hardship for. However, this argu-
ment ultimately failed to convince a large slice of public opinion, which grew increasingly
impatient with the inconvenience.
A culture of satirizing and redesigning signs developed in the occupied zones. One
sign designated an area as a Temporary Camp of Extraterrestrial forces (waixing shili
linshi zhuzhaying ), mocking the chief executives repeated assurance
that the movement was due to manipulation by foreign forces. After the alleged collu-
sion between police and triads, a sign pointing to the government building was relabeled
Central Government and Triad Offices (see figure 13). More seriously, the central
space in Admiralty where the stage was installed, under the umbrella canopy, was
renamed Umbrella Square (Yusan Guangchang ), affirming its role as a deliber-
ative forum. A large banner appeared at the Western end of the Admiralty occupation
zone, close to the PLA building, announcing: Welcome to the Hong Kong
Commune (see figure 14). Highway signs were rewritten to indicate the road to
democracy or universal suffrage. One street sign was covered with an inscription pro-
claiming the refusal of the NPC Standing Committee decision (not a road). These dis-
cussions point to a growing, substantive debate about the nature of the Hong Kong polity.
On one of the flyovers, a sign with a classical flavor explicitly referred to the village,
the preferred term used by the occupiers to designate their settlement: Here be the
village entrance; good citizens dwell inside (Ci nai cunkou, nei you liangmin
). It uses traditional political vocabulary to refer to the occupiers as liangmin
(good, law-abiding subjects of the emperor). The traditional strand in defining the occu-
pying community was also notable in the artwork, a full discussion of which is regrettably
beyond the scope of this article. The famous Song dynasty scroll painting Along the River
During the Qingming Festival or Qingming shang he tu (Zhang Zheduan,
approx. twelfth century) inspired two carefully executed artworks displayed at Admiralty:
a scroll-style drawing on several juxtaposed sheets of A3 paper exhibited at the Admiralty
MTR station (Exit A), as well as a smaller version with an umbrella by Cuson Lo that
Figure 13. Central government and triad offices. Photo-

graph by the author.
698 Sebastian Veg
Figure 14. Welcome to the Hong Kong commune. Pho-

tograph by the author.
circulated widely on the Internet. Both of them titled Along the river under the umbrella
(Yusan shang he tu ), they depict daily life in the Admiralty village (see figure
15). They also attest the potential of traditional representations to contribute to the
debate about redefining a community in the present.
Figure 15. Along the river, under the umbrella (detail, Admiralty station). Photo-
graph by the author.
These self-representations all redesign the urban space, as other Occupy movements
have also done, by highlighting different forms of political organization. Combining the
commune from the leftist repertoire, the village from traditional Chinese represen-
tations, and the square or forum that may be associated with the origins of democracy,
these representations all eschew the level of the state and of overly institutionalized pol-
itics. They highlight the search for an adequately representative political community (tra-
ditional or modern) and the difficulties the movement encountered in creating such a
community.
Despite the challenges raised by the sheer number and diversity of the slogans doc-
umented, it is possible to draw some tentative conclusions from the analysis. The claim of
democracy, with its declinations ranging from an abstract moral concept of human agency
to a norm-based political system in a well-circumscribed community, is central to the
movement texts. There is no contradiction between the claims of democracy and most
of the assertions of localism, which often take the form of the geographical or cultural
affirmation of a civic-based community. The affirmation of agency is situated on both a
philosophical and a historical level: while democracy supposes individual agency
(hence its moral appeal), Hong Kongs emergence as a democratic political community
also entails the affirmation of agency against the legacy of colonization and post-handover
recolonization. These claims are more largely framed within different sets of cultural ref-
erences, ranging from the traditional Chinese to the cosmopolitan, and encompassing the
specific spirit of Hong Kong and its own democratic dimension. A composite civic
culture emerges from this synthesis, referencing elements of the colonial era, the
moral appeal of traditional Chinese philosophy, cosmopolitan pop culture, and defense
of human rights in mainland China.
The most original part of the movement, inseparable from its highly organized, non-
violent, rational principles, is undeniably the reappropriation of public space as an alter-
native democratic community. This essay makes the argument that a civil discourse
developed in the slogans, which debated the nature of the democratic community
itself: the occupying community and more largely the Hong Kong community. This
sets the Umbrella Movement apart from many more contentious forms of social move-
ments. The deliberative nature of the movement was admittedly sometimes overshad-
owed by the dramatic appeal of its performative dimension. As highlighted by one of
the student leaders in an interview, it is possible that this civil discourse did not
develop strongly or quickly enough to enable new mechanisms of democratic consulta-
tion and decision to guide the development of the movement. We lacked trust within
the occupied areas. There was no possibility to persuade one another through
debate. Democracy is about debate. We held consultation forums in certain areas,
but we [the student leaders] were not on equal status, we were not self-aware enough.
Even the [aborted] referendum was still decided by the organizers.21 Some of the
slogans indeed attest the insufficiently democratic or civil nature of the deliberative ex-
changes among occupiers, which ultimately led to internal division and a disconnect
between the occupiers and public opinion at large. However, Alex Chows self-critical as-
sessment is surely productive, and we may hence also choose to highlight the importance
21
Alex Chow, interview with the author, August 10, 2015.
700 Sebastian Veg
of the both radical and civil questioning of the nature of the Hong Kong community that
took place in the slogans and artwork, with options ranging from the traditional village to
the alternative commune. This long-overdue, self-reflexive questioning of the nature of
the Hong Kong polity is probably the movements most important legacy.
Acknowledgments
This article was first presented at the AAS in Asia at Academia Sinica, Taipei, in June
2015. I would particularly like to thank my three copanelists: Edmund Cheng and
Samson Yuen offered critical comments, support, and inspiration, while Hung
Ho-fung pointed out the significance of the notion of self-determination.
List of References
AN TU (LAW WING-SANG). 2014. Zhanzhong yihou: hou zhanling shidai de juewang douz-
heng [After Occupy Central: The hopeless post-Occupy struggle]. Mingpao,
December 14.
AUSTIN, J. L. 1973. How to Do Things with Words. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
BUCKLEY, CHRIS, and KEITH BRADSHER. 2014. Hong Kong Leader Reaffirms Unbending
Stance on Elections. New York Times, October 20. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/
10/21/world/asia/leung-chun-ying-hong-kong-china-protests.html (accessed April
30, 2016).
CALHOUN, CRAIG, ed. 1992. Habermas and the Public Sphere. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT
Press.
. 1994. Social Theory and the Politics of Identity. In Social Theory and the Politics
of Identity, ed. Craig Calhoun, 936. Oxford: Blackwell.
. 2013. Occupy Wall Street in Perspective. British Journal of Sociology 64(1):
2638.
CHEN, HOLOK. 2014. Hotpot, Gods and Leftist Pricks: Political Tensions in the Mong
Kok Occupation. Libcom.org, October 15. https://libcom.org/blog/mk-hotpot-
tensions (accessed April 30, 2016).
CHENG, EDMUND, and SAMSON YUEN. 2014. Hou yusan yundong: Gaobie zhengzhi
lenggan de niandai [After the Umbrella Movement: Farewell to the age of
political indifference]. Mingpao, November 29. http://news.mingpao.com/
pns1411291417197542046 (accessed April 30, 2016).
. 2015a. Hong Kongs Umbrella Protests Were More Than Just a Student Move-
ment. Chinafile, July 1. http://www.chinafile.com/reporting-opinion/features/
hong-kongs-umbrella-protests-were-more-just-student-movement (accessed April
30, 2016).
. 2015b. Zai bentu yu pushi zhijian de Liu Si [June Fourth between localist and
universal]. Mingpao, June 13. http://news.mingpao.com/pns150613143413
0657456 (accessed April 30, 2016).
CHEUNG, CHOR-YUNG. 2014. Hong Kongs Systemic Crisis of Government and the Revolt
of the Post-80s Youth: The Anti-Express Rail Campaign. In New Trends of Polit-
ical Participation in Hong Kong, ed. Joseph Y. S. Cheng, 41747. Hong Kong: City
University Press.
DELLA PORTA, DONATELLA. 2009. Making the New Polis. In Culture, Social Movements
and Protest, ed. Hank Johnston, 181207. Farnham, England: Ashgate.
DUARA, PRASENJIT. 1988. Superscribing Symbols: The Myth of Guandi, Chinese God of
War. Journal of Asian Studies 47(4):77895.
ESHERICK, JOSEPH, and JEFFREY WASSERSTROM. 1990. Acting Out Democracy: Political
Theatre in Modern China. Journal of Asian Studies 49(4):83565.
FRASER, NANCY. 1995. Politics, Culture, and the Public Sphere: Toward a Postmodern
Conception. In Social Postmodernism: Beyond Identity Politics, eds. Linda Nichol-
son and Steven Seidman, 287314. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
GUO PING. 2014. Meiyou ren bi quanti Zhongguoren geng guanxin Xianggang de qiantu
mingyun [No one cares for the future destiny of Hong Kong more than the entire
Chinese people]. Peoples Daily, September 29. http://opinion.people.com.cn/n/
2014/0929/c1003-25761887.html (accessed April 30, 2016).
HABERMAS, JRGEN. 1984. The Theory of Communicative Action. 2 vols. Cambridge,
England: Polity Press.
HALL, STUART. 1992. The Question of Cultural Identity. In Modernity and Its Futures,
eds. Stuart Hall, David Held, and Tony McGrew, 273325. Cambridge, England:
Polity Press.
HKUPOP (HONG KONG UNIVERSITY PUBLIC OPINION PROGRAMME). 2015. Strength of
Identity Combined Charts Per Poll (22/12/2015). https://www.hkupop.hku.
hk/english/popexpress/ethnic/overall/poll/datatables.html (accessed May 1, 2016).
HUMAN RIGHTS IN CHINA. 2014. Steadfast in the Storm: Hong Kong Towards 2017 and
Beyond. China Rights Forum. http://www.hrichina.org/en/crf/2014.2/steadfast-
in-the-storm (accessed May 1, 2016).
JOHNSTON, HANK. 2009. Protest Cultures: Performance, Artifacts, Ideations. In Culture,
Social Movements and Protest, ed. Hank Johnston, 329. Farnham, England:
Ashgate.
KLIMOVA, SVETA. 2009. Speech Act Theory and Protest Discourse: Normative Claims in
the Communicative Repertoire of Three Russian Movements. In Culture, Social
Movements and Protest, ed. Hank Johnston, 10534. Farnham, England: Ashgate.
LAW WING SANG. 2009. Collaborative Colonial Power: The Making of the Hong Kong
Chinese. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press.
LEVIN, NED. 2014. Hong Kong Protests: Guan Yu Is the Peoples Deity. Wall Street
Journal, October 30. http://www.wsj.com/articles/guan-yu-the-peoples-deity-
1414704590 (accessed April 30, 2016).
LICHTERMAN, PAUL. 2012. Reinventing the Concept of Civic Culture. In The Oxford
Handbook of Cultural Sociology, eds. Jeffrey Alexander, Ronald Jacobs, and Philip
Smith, 20731. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
MA NGOK. 2011. Value Changes and Legitimacy Crisis in Post-Industrial Hong Kong.
Asian Survey 51(4):683712.
ROWEN, IAN. 2015. Inside Taiwans Sunflower Movement: Twenty-Four Days in a
Student-Occupied Parliament, and the Future of the Region. Journal of Asian
Studies 74(1):521.
SHANKEL, GEORGE. 1941. American Mottoes and Slogans. New York: Wilson.
SHANNY23. 2014. When Dictatorship Is a Fact, Revolution Is a Duty. CNN, March 19.
http://ireport.cnn.com/docs/DOC-1108986 (accessed April 30, 2016).
STEWART, CHARLES, CRAIG ALLEN SMITH, and ROBERT E. DENTON, JR. 2001. Persuasion and
Social Movements. Prospect Heights, Ill.: Waveland Press.
702 Sebastian Veg
TARROW, SIDNEY. 2013. The Language of Contention: Revolutions in Words, 16882012.

New York: Cambridge University Press.
TAYLOR, CHARLES. 1994. The Politics of Recognition. In Multiculturalism: Examining
the Politics of Recognition, ed. Amy Gutmann, 2573. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
University Press.
THIS IS OUR MOMENT. n.d. http://www.thisisourmoment.hk/ (accessed May 1, 2016).
THOMPSON, E. P. 1971. The Moral Economy of the English Crowd in the Eighteenth
Century. Past and Present 50:76136.
TILLY, CHARLES. 1978. From Mobilization to Revolution. Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley.
VEG, SEBASTIAN. 2015. Legalistic and Utopian: Hong Kongs Umbrella Movement. New
Left Review 92:5573.
WONG, JOSHUA CHI-FUNG. 2015a. Minzhu yundong xia yi bu: gongtou xiuxian zijue [The
next step of the democracy movement: A constitutional referendum on self-
determination]. Mingpao, August 2. http://news.mingpao.com/pns1508021438
452134295 (accessed April 30, 2016).
. 2015b. The Next Phase of the Democracy Movement: A Referendum on Consti-
tutional Reform and Sustainable Democratic Self-Governance. Translated by Kong
Tsung-gan. Medium, August 18. https://medium.com/@KongTsungGan/the-next-
phase-of-the-democracy-movement-a-referendum-on-constitutional-reform-and-
sustainable-b66c164842b7 (accessed April 30, 2016). (English translation of Wong
2015a.)
WONG, SAMPSON YU-HIN. 2015. The Attentive Creators. Workshop on the Umbrella
Movement, Chinese University of Hong Kong, June 16.

On Hong Kong Umbrella Movement

Încărcat de

Informații document

Drepturi de autor

Formate disponibile

Partajați acest document

Partajați sau inserați document

Opțiuni de partajare

Vi se pare util acest document?

Este necorespunzător acest conținut?

Drepturi de autor:

Formate disponibile

On Hong Kong Umbrella Movement

Încărcat de

Drepturi de autor:

Formate disponibile

The Journal of Asian Studies Vol. 75, No. 3 (August) 2016: 673702.

The Association for Asian Studies, Inc., 2016 doi:10.1017/S0021911816000565

Creating a Textual Public Space: Slogans and Texts

Hong Kongs Umbrella Movement (SeptemberDecember 2014) represented a watershed

CORPUS AND METHODOLOGY

Printed and photocopied materials raise the challenge of duplication. It is impossible

ASSERTING AGENCY: A DEMOCRATIC COMMUNITY WITH VARYING PERIMETERS

Figure 1. Determine our own destiny, flowers blooming

Hong Kong Identity

Figure 2. Castrated before adoption as a pet. Photograph

Anti-Capitalist and Post-Materialist Claims

Figure 3. Freedom has taken root. Peace strengthens it.

PERFORMING CULTURAL REPERTOIRES: AN EXPRESSIVE MOVEMENT

Similarly, cultural sociology studies social movements as oppositional performances, in

Figure 4. Guandi shrine in Mongkok. Photograph by the

Figure 5. Although originally there was no path on the

Figure 6. The black night has given me black eyes, but I

demanded the resignation of C. Y. Leung using calligraphy executed in an imitation of

The World as Audience

Figure 7. Leung Chun-ying, resign! (left-hand banner). Photograph by the author.

identification with cosmopolitan values is now higher than identification as Chinese.14

The Hong Kong Story

Figure 8. Peoples Village of Occupy Central (PRC flag).

SPEECH ACTS AND PUBLIC SPACE

Performance suggests strategic framing and a playful mode of interaction

Satire of Official Doublespeak

Figure 9. Hong Kong People want universal suffrage.

Figure 10. Different tastes. Photograph by the author.

Figure 11. Little Mr and Mrs Hong Kong People.

Figure 12. Please mind the generation gap. Photograph

Figure 13. Central government and triad offices. Photo-

Figure 14. Welcome to the Hong Kong commune. Pho-

TARROW, SIDNEY. 2013. The Language of Contention: Revolutions in Words, 16882012.

S-ar putea să vă placă și