The Battle of Manzikert: Military Disaster or Political Failure?

By Paul Markham

On the 26th of August 1071, an army under the command of the Byzantine emperor
Romanus IV Diogenes (1068-1071AD) was defeated on the borders of Armenia by
the army of the Seljuk Turkish Sultan, Alp Arslan (1063-1072AD). Since that time,
historians have identified the Battle of Manzikert as the mortal blow that led to the
inevitable collapse of the Byzantine Empire. How accurate is this
interpretation? Was the loss of Anatolia the result of Romanus IV Diogenes failed
military campaign against the Seljuks or was it a political failure of his predecessors
or successors? This paper examines Romanus Manzikert campaign and the
significance of his defeat, and assesses whether the Byzantine position in Anatolia
was recoverable, and if so, why that recovery failed?

Before Manzikert

The Byzantine Empire in the eleventh century

The mid-eleventh century was the high water mark of the Byzantine Empire. The
successive reigns of the military emperors of the Macedonian dynasty had pushed the
boundaries of the Empire to their furthest geographical extent since Justinian the
Great had reconquered Italy and North Africa in the sixth century. The Empire now
stretched from Dalmatia in the west, incorporating the whole of the Balkans, to
Antioch in Syria in the south, and all of Anatolia to Armenia in the east.

The Byzantine recovery had been a long time coming. The seventh century had seen the drastic
dismemberment of the Empire. In the west, the Balkans and most of Greece had been lost to the
Slavs; the Byzantines maintaining a toehold only in eastern Thrace, Thessalonica and scattered
outposts on the Dalmatian coast. In the east, Syria, Palestine, Egypt and Africa had been
permanently lost to the Arabs. The loss of these valuable provinces triggered the rampant
inflation that caused the virtual collapse of the monetary economy during the reign of Constans
II (630- 662AD).[1] This crisis led to two permanent changes within the Empire; the old
Roman provinces were restructured into smaller administrative units called thema, under the
administration of a military governor (strategos), and the assignment land grants to the soldiery
in place of paying wages.[2]
The Empire also faced an energetic and expansionist challenger in the Umayyad
Caliphate. Larger and far more prosperous than the rump Byzantine Empire, the Umayyad
Caliphate had sufficient resources to envisage the complete conquest of the Empire.[3] The
Umayyads made two serious attempts to conquer the Empire, laying siege to Constantinople in
674-8AD and again in 717AD. Fortunately for Byzantium, the Umayyad Caliphate was
overthrown in 750AD by the Abbasids, who gave up such ambitious plans, opting instead for
regular military campaigns that sometimes penetrated right into the heart of Byzantine Anatolia.
[4] These raids culminated in Caliph Mutasims (833-842AD) destruction of Amorium in
central western Anatolia in 838AD.[5]

By the end of the eighth century however, Byzantiums situation began to improve. With
inflation checked and the currency stabilized the Byzantine economy slowly began recover, and
after the empress Irene (780- 802AD) secured a longstanding peace with the Abbasid Caliphate
in 782AD, trade between the two empires resumed, much to Byzantiums advantage.[6] Peace in
the east allowed Irene to turn her attention to the west. There, the Slavic tribes of the interior had
become increasingly integrated with the Byzantine enclaves along the coast and a short military
campaign in 784AD was sufficient to recover the land route between Constantinople and
Thessalonica, which until that time had been accessible only by sea.

By the reign of Michael III (842-867AD) the balance of power between the Byzantines and the
Abbasid Caliphate had shifted significantly. The Abbasid economy was in decline and the
government paralysed by religious and political factionalism. The Byzantines exploited Abbasid
disunity to take the offensive and over the course of two centuries recovered their lost provinces
of Illyricum, Greece, Bulgaria,[7] Northern Syria, Cilicia, and Armenia. Byzantine
expansionism reached its peak with Constantine IX Monomachus annexation of the Armenian
city of Ani in 1045AD. Yet, at the same time as Constantine was celebrating Anis annexation, a
new player in international affairs arrived on the scene - the Seljuk Turks.

The Seljuk Turks

For centuries, the Caliphate had been a bulwark against the southwesterly migration of the
nomadic tribes of Central Asia. Progressive waves of nomads were diverted northwards across
the Russian steppes and around the Caspian and Black Seas, before emerging in the Danube
basin. Nomadic migrations were monitored and reported by the Byzantine outpost in Cherson in
the Crimea, which usually gave Constantinople sufficient notice to bring its powers of diplomacy
to bear. As Constantine VIIs De Administrando Imperio makes clear, there was no shortage of
tribes around the Black Sea who could be encouraged or bribed to deny passage to the nomads.
[8] However, with the Caliphate in disarray there was no effective force to stop the migration of
Central Asian nomads. In 1040AD, the first Seljuk horsemen penetrated the Caliphates eastern
border and, without encountering any effective Abbasid opposition, began plundering their way
across Iran and Iraq. They soon crossed into Armenian and drove deep into Anatolia, reaching
the Byzantine port city of Trebizond on the Black Sea coast in 1054AD. The following year the
Abbasids bowed to the inevitable and conceded political and military authority to Tughrul, Beg
of the Great Seljuks. Tughrul (1056-1067AD) was granted the title of Sultan and took Baghdad
as his capital.[9] Suddenly the Seljuks were elevated from nomadic raiders to masters of a vast
and sophisticated empire.

The Byzantine Response

The annexation of Armenia was a strategic disaster for the Byzantines. In 1022AD,
the emperor Basil II had forced the Armenian king, John Smbat III, to cede Ani to
Basil if he died without direct heirs. When he died in 1040AD there were still plenty
of claimants to the throne and Armenia quickly degenerated into chaos. John Smbats
nephew, Gagik II seized the city in 1040AD and held it against all challengers. The
Armenian historian, Vardapet Aristakes Lastivertci relates with copious tears, In
these days Byzantine armies entered the land of Armenia four times in succession
until they had rendered the whole country uninhabited through sword, fire, and
captive taking.[10] In an attempt to destabilise the Armenians, Constantine IX
secretly encouraged the Seljuks to attack Ani in 1044AD. Gagik eventually agreed to
abdicate and was rewarded with titles, honours and lands in
Cappadocia. Unfortunately he would not have long to enjoy them. Although
fractious, the Armenian princes provided a secure buffer zone on the Byzantines
eastern border. Now the Byzantines came into direct contact with the Seljuks, whose
fighting style of mobile horse archery they were unfamiliar with. Nor could the
Byzantines rely on the Armenians for support. One of Constantines first acts after the
fall of Ani was to instigate a purge of the Monophysite clergy of Armenian
Church. Fleeing war and persecution, a mass exodus began, including the Armenian
troops the Byzantines relied on to garrison the border fortresses. Many now sought
their fortune elsewhere, some in Persia, some in Greece, some in
Georgia.[11] Some Armenian troops joined the Seljuk bands that now began raiding
across the Armenian border.
Constantine IX made no attempt to stop the Seljuk raids before he died in
1055AD. Constantines successor, Michael VI Bringas (1056-1057AD), although portrayed as
weak and elderly, attempted to rally the defence. Michael was clearly unhappy with the chaos
ensuing on the Armenian frontier and during the Easter Holy Week celebrations when the
empires leading generals and public servants attended an audience with the Emperor, he berated
them, saying Either go forth in war against the Persians and prevent the land from being ruined,
or else I shall pay the Persians your stipends and thus keep the land in peace.[12] The two
leading generals of the east, Catacalon Kecaumenus and Isaac Comnenus were singled out for
particular criticism. Michaels stinging rebuke did little to resolve the crisis on the Armenian
front as within a month the army of the east had risen in rebellion and proclaimed Isaac
Comnenus emperor.

The rebellion of the army of the east against Michael VI is often portrayed as a conflict between
the military and civil factions within the Byzantine government. In fact it reveals a deeper, east
versus west division within the Empire. The army of the west remained loyal to Michael and
fought hard in his defence outside Nicea on 20 August 1057AD.[13] Contemporary historians
claim the slaughter was considerable and although Michaels army was forced to withdraw, Isaac
could not claim victory with certainty. Michael however, was overthrown in a palace coup
and abdicated in favour of Isaac Comnenus. [14] Although Michaels reign is portrayed as little
more than a by-line in Byzantine history, understanding why the western armies remained loyal
to him is important to explaining what happened after Manzikert.

Irenes reconquest of Hellas and Thrace in 784AD had been a simple affair largely because the
bubonic plague and the Slavic invasion of the seventh century had left the provinces largely
depopulated.[15] Nicephorus I (802-808AD), attempted to solidify the Byzantine hold on these
territories by offering subsidies and tax incentives to encourage their resettlement.[16] The
military aristocracys financial interests were centred on Anatolia and showed little interest
in Rumelia.[17] The newly ascendant civil bureaucracy, however, were largely excluded from
investing in Anatolia, and began buying up estates in the west, effectively splitting the Empire
into an old money, Anatolian party and a new money, western bureaucratic party. As a career
civil servant it is likely that Michael Bringas was amongst the many courtly investors who
established estates in the west, which may explain both the reason the courtier faction selected
Michael as their candidate, and for the support he seems to have enjoyed in the west.

The unravelling of the Byzantines eastern policy

The Byzantine civil war was a disaster. [As] soon as the [Seljuks] realized that [the
Byzantine nobles] were fighting and opposing one another, they boldly arose and
came against us, ceaselessly raiding, destructively ravaging.[18] Although an
energetic general, Isaac Comnenus proved equally unable to stop the Seljuk raiders
who, in 1075AD, destroyed city of Melitene on the Mesopotamian frontier. Isaac
realised that a complete overhaul of both the army and the administration was
required, but he had few allies in Constantinople and his attempts at reform came to
nothing.[19] When Isaac died in 1059AD, the courtier faction secured the election of
their candidate, Constantine X Ducas. Although a member of the Anatolian military
aristocracy, Constantine dedicated his reign to internal legal reform while neglecting
the defence of the Empire. As the Byzantine economy began to flounder, Constantine
cut costs by cashiering thousands of native troops, which only accelerated the
Byzantine collapse in the east. In 1064AD the Seljuks captured and sacked Ani.

Byzantine Defensive Strategy

Ani was critical to the Byzantines eastern defence strategy. Byzantine defensive
strategy was based on the possession of key fortified positions, which, in the event of
invasion were expected to hold out until relieved, or the enemy withdrew. It was a
strategy of calculated risk; sometimes with disastrous results. After the Arab victory
at the Battle of Yarmuk in 636AD, the emperor Heraclius ordered what remained of
the Byzantine forces in Syria to withdraw to fortified positions and hold until
relieved. The promised relief never eventuated however, and the isolated garrisons
were progressively forced to surrender. The Byzantines defence of Syria and Egypt
had been hamstrung by overextended lines of supply and communication and a lack of
defensible fallback positions. Within the Anatolian plateau however, the situation was
quite different as the Byzantines had a network of carefully prepared defensive
positions, and because the cold, windswept steppes of the plateau were largely
unsuitable for settled agriculture it was very difficult for an invading army, which
relied on plunder for its supply, to sustain itself in the field.[20] Nevertheless, while
static defence may have been effective against the Abbasid field armies of the eighth
century, it was ineffectual against mobile Turkish raiders who, finding Anatolias
steppe almost indistinguishable from their Central Asian homeland, were able to rove
at will and live off the meagre resources of the land.[21]

Romanus IV and the legacy of Basil II

Constantine X died in 1067AD leaving the administration in the hands of his wife
Eudocia as regent for their son, Michael Ducas. Eudocia Makrembolitissa was a
strong and intelligent woman and in stark contrast to her husband, she recognised the
loss of Ani a massive gap had opened up in the chain of fortifications running from
Kars to Edessa[22] through which Seljuk raiders could penetrate right into the heart of
Anatolia. Decisive military action was required. Eudocias ability to direct
government policy however, was severely restricted by the influence of the powerful
Ducas clan, dominated by Constantines brother, John Ducas. Discretely, Eudocia
cast about for an ally to counterbalance the Ducas and eventually settled on Romanus
Diogenes. Romanus was in his mid thirties, a member of a Cappadocian military
family, and currently under sentence of death for his part in a rebellion against
Constantine X. His lack of connections in Constantinople was probably a factor in
Eudocia choice, for it ensured that Romanus had no independent constituency to
threaten Eudocias interests.[23] Romanus for his part swore to be her servant in all
things and uphold the rights of the legitimate heir, Michael Ducas. To the horror of
the Ducas faction, Eudocia and Romanus were married and Romanus immediately set
about revitalizing an army largely neglected since the death of Basil II in 1025AD.
[24]

Romanus immediate predecessors cannot be held entirely to blame for the mediocre
state of the Byzantine army in the mid-eleventh century; the policies of the military
emperors of the tenth century were also a contributing factor in Byzantiums military
decline. Historically, Byzantium had relied on defence in depth, rather than stationing
large garrisons of troops along Byzantiums borders. Three professional armies,
called tagmata, were stationed in western Anatolia, Constantinople and Thrace where
they could be quickly mobilised in response to an invasion.[25] Every city in the
Empire also had a garrison of local troops for defence and policing
actions. These thematic troops were not full time soldiers, but were farmer-soldiers
who received a grant of land in return for periodic service.

In order to meet the needs of Byzantiums aggressive foreign policy, Nicephorus II,
John Tzimisces and Basil II changed the tagmata from a rapid response, primarily
defensive, citizen army into a professional, campaigning army, increasingly manned
by mercenaries. Mercenaries however, were expensive and as the threat of invasion
receded in the tenth century, so did the need for maintaining large garrisons and
expensive fortifications. In order save money to finance his Syrian campaigns,
Nicephorus II Phocas (963-969AD) cashiered many thousands of garrison troops and
allowed the fortifications of many Anatolian cities to fall into disrepair.[26] All
Nicephorus successors, up to Constantine X continued this policy.

Basil IIs spent most of his 50-year reign on campaign and conquered a massive
amount of territory, and although he left a burgeoning treasury upon his death, he did
so at the expense of neglecting domestic affairs and ignoring the cost of incorporating
his conquests into the Byzantine eokoimene.[27] He also failed to plan for his
succession and left the Empire to his worthless brother and co-emperor, Constantine
VIII. None of Basils immediate successors had any particular military or political
talent and the governing of the Empire increasingly fell into the hands of the civil
service. Their efforts to spend the Byzantine economy back into prosperity only
resulted in burgeoning inflation and a debased gold coinage.[28] In an effort to
balance the increasingly unstable budget, Basils large standing army was seen as both
an unnecessary expense and a political threat, as under employed troops became the
focus of sedition. Native troops were cashiered and replaced by foreign mercenaries
on specific contract.

The Manzikert Campaign

Romanus did not immediately confront the Turks in Armenia, choosing instead to
personally lead the army on a campaign in Syria in 1068AD. The next year he led a
campaign into Armenia, but the Turkish forces were simply too illusive to be drawn
into a pitched battle. The historian and courtier, Michael Psellus, whose plotting on
behalf of the Ducas clan led to his being forced to join the campaign, unfairly slanders
Romanus by accusing him of not knowing where he was marching nor what he was
going to do. Nevertheless this campaign provided a valuable opportunity to improve
the operational efficiency of the army. [29]

Romanus failure to crush the Turks led to open plotting by the Ducas faction and by
1070AD Romanus position in Constantinople was so precarious that he was unable to
leave the capital. Romanus entrusted that years campaign to Manuel Comnenus,
elder brother of the future emperor, Alexius Comnenus. Unfortunately, the campaign
ended in a debacle when Manuel was defeated and captured by a band of
Turks. Surprisingly, Manuel convinced his captors to release him and defect to the
Byzantines. Romanus rewarded the Turks with honours and titles and enlisted into his
army. [30] Manuels coup allowed Romanus to regain some political capital, but it
wasnt enough. Romanus needed a decisive victory not only to protect Armenia but
also his throne.

In the summer of 1071AD, Romanus decided to gamble everything on a massive

eastern campaign that would draw the Seljuks into a general engagement with the
Byzantine army. All contemporary historians commented on the size of the army;
Matthew of Edessa absurdly claims the Byzantine army exceeded one million men,
[31] while Vadarpet describes a countless host. The army itself consisted of the
eastern and western tagmatas, mercenary units, Armenian conscripts and the private
levies of the Anatolian landholders, along with the siege engines, sappers, engineers
and Romanus would need to recover the Armenian fortresses recently lost to the
Turks. All told, the army probably amounted to about forty thousand effective
fighting men; however, with the presence of the thousands of non-combatants,
servants, baggage handlers and camp followers that always travelled with medieval
armies the army would undoubtedly have appeared larger.[32]

Despite the failure of Manuel Comnenus 1069AD campaign, the Sultan of the Great
Seljuks Alp Arslan had been quick to seek a peace treaty with the Byzantines. Alp
Arslan had inherited the Abbasids wary respect for Byzantiums military power and
at any rate regarded the Fatimid Caliphate of Egypt as his main enemy; he had no
desire to engage the Byzantines in unnecessary hostilities. Under the terms of the
treaty, Alp Arslan had committed to preventing Seljuk raiding on Byzantine
territory. Unfortunately, despite his grand title, Alp Arslan was in no position to
control the Seljuk raiders. Most of the Seljuk clans still lived according to their
Central Asian nomadic traditions and tended to acknowledge the Sultans authority
only when they were forced to, or it suited their interests. Their raiding and constant
feuding made them as much a nuisance to the Great Seljuks as to their neighbours, so
to preserve order the most unruly Turcoman clans were pushed to the borders of the
Sultanate where they could be encouraged to raid and plunder infidel territory.
[33] Consequently Seljuk raiding into Anatolia continued unabated.

In February 1071AD, Romanus sent an embassy to Alp Arslan to renew the treaty of
1069AD. Romanus envoys reached the Sultan outside Edessa, which he was
besieging.[34] Keen to secure his northern flank against Byzantine attack, Alp Arslan
happily agreed to the terms, abandoned the siege and immediately led his army south
to attack Aleppo in Fatimid Syria. The offer to renew the peace treaty was a key
element of Romanus plan, distracting the Sultan long enough to allow Romanus to
lead an army into Armenia and recover the lost fortresses before the Seljuks had time
to respond. Then, with his eastern border secure and his rear protected, Romanus
would be in a perfect position to either attack the Seljuk army if it attempted enter
Anatolia through the Taurus Mountains to intercept him, or strike deep into the
heartland of the Sultanate down the Euphrates river valley, as the emperor Heraclius
had done in the seventh century.[35] Either way, Romanus would hold the tactical
advantage while Alp Arslan would be out of position and vulnerable. By our
standards, Romanus offer to renew the treaty while at the same time preparing for a
war was deceptive, but the use of deception in warfare was a skill the Byzantines
prized very highly. Byzantine tactical manuals regularly recommended using ploys,
deception and negotiation and to either avoid battle or gain advantage.[36] Romanus
envoys would undoubtedly have been charged to assess the strength of the Sultans
army, the mood of the camp and the Sultans enthusiasm for war.

Satisfied that his ploy was successful, Romanus mustered his army outside
Constantinople in March 1071. Romanus army included contingents of Normans,
Cumans, Turks, Bulgarians, Germans, Pechenegs, Byzantines, Armenians, Syrians,
Varangians, Uz, and Russians. There was nothing unusual in the heterogenous
composition of the army. The Byzantine army was a prestige service and drew
professional soldiers from all around the medieval world.[37] As the army marched
east it continued to gather recruits, bands of Turks who were happy enough to contract
their services to the Byzantines. Unfortunately, it was not with the soldiery that the
problems within Romanus army lay. The loyalty of many of Romanus officers was
highly questionable, especially as there were members of the Ducas clan and their
allies occupying key positions within the army.[38] There appear to have been
incidences of sabotage during the march, such as the destruction of his personal
baggage train, which led Romanus to camp separately from the main army. By the
time the army reached Armenia, tensions were running high.

The Battle of Manzikert

When the Byzantine army reached Theodosiopoulis in July, Romanus received reports
that the news of his campaign had led the Sultan to abandon the siege of Aleppo and
was withdrawing in some disorder towards the Euphrates. It appeared many of the
Sultans troops had deserted and he was now commanding a much-reduced army of
between ten and fifteen thousand men. Romanus rejected the advice of some his
generals to await the Seljuks at Theodosiopoulis and ordered the army to advance on
Manzikert in Seljuk held territory. Romanus expected the Seljuks would advance
from the south, so when he reached Lake Van in late August, Romanus split his army,
sending the tagmata under general Joseph Tarchaneiotes to secure the southern road to
Khilat and protect against a Seljuk attack, while he headed east to besiege Manzikert.
[39] At the sight of the Byzantine army, Manzikerts Turkish garrison immediately
surrendered and the Romanus settled down to await news from Tarchaneiotes.

Romanus intelligence about Arslans flight from Aleppo had been correct. The
Sultan had learned of Romanus campaign from Romanus own envoys and the news
had its desired effect.[40] The Sultan immediately recognised the danger, raised the
siege and hurried towards Armenia. Because Aleppo was a wealthy city offering
attractive opportunities for plunder the Sultan had been able to raise a large army, but
a campaign against the Byzantine army in Armenia offered no such incentive, and as
he advanced towards Armenia his army began to melt away. By the time he reached
the Euphrates River he was left with only about ten thousand men. By forced
marches, Arslan reached Armenia in late August. He had managed to recruit
additional troops on the way but his army was probably only half the size of
Romanus. The Seljuks did have one advantage over the Byzantines though they
had good intelligence. Roving Seljuk horsemen fed the Sultan a constant stream of
reports of the Byzantine armys progress. Unlike Romanus, Arslan knew exactly
where his enemy was and he planned his response accordingly.

While Romanus was busy besieging Manzikert, Tarchaneiotes army encountered a

strong Seljuk force advancing from the south. Without advising Romanus,
Tarchaneiotes chose not to engage and withdrew his forces to the west. His troops
took no part in the subsequent battle and returned to Constantinople. Unaware of the
desertion of half his army, Romanus encountered the main Seljuk army on 24 August
1071 and immediately joined battle. The battle was to last two days. The first day
involved a hard fought battle between Seljuk forces and a column of the western
tagmata under Nicephorus Bryennius. Bryennius managed to extricate his forces and
withdraw in order, but a relief column under the Doux of Theodosiopoulis,
Nicephorus Basilakes was ambushed and Basilakes was captured. Determined to
draw the Seljuks into a general engagement, Romanus drew up all his forces for
battle on the second day. Romanus followed textbook strategic planning; he
commanded the centre with the Varangian guard and a large body of
mercenaries. Bryennius commanded the left wing; Theodore Alyates commanded the
right wing. Turkish and Uz auxiliaries provided a light cavalry screened on each
wing. A reserve force under Andronicus Ducas followed a discrete distance behind
the main column.

The Seljuk army formed a broad crescent in front of the Byzantine position. Alp
Arlsan commanded from a nearby hilltop where he could survey the field of battle.

Romanus initiated the battle by beginning a slow advance. The Seljuks poured arrows
into the Byzantine ranks and retired as they advanced. Skirmishing occurred between
the wings of both armies but neither side gained any advantage. Towards dusk,
Romanus called a halt to the advance and began an orderly withdrawal back to the
camp. As the Byzantines began to reverse direction the Seljuks launched a fierce
attack against the wings. The Byzantine right wing, which had been particularly hard
pressed during the advance, broke in confusion. At this point the reserve force, under
Andronicus Ducas, should have come to the aid of the emperor but instead turned and
withdrew from the field, sparking a general rout. The left wing under Nicephorus
Bryennius fought its way clear, but the centre, including Romanus was overwhelmed
and captured.

Byzantine troop losses

Later historians, such as Alfred Friendly, Edward Foord, and John Norwich have left
us with the impression that the Byzantine army was annihilated at
Manzikert. [41] Although it was a momentous battle, contemporary Byzantine and
Armenian narratives indicate that most of the army was either not present, deserted,
or withdrew before the final collapse. It is notoriously difficult to assess casualties
from medieval sources, who tend to use exaggerated death tolls as a moral device;
nevertheless, we are able to make a general assessment of Byzantine losses at
Manzikert based on historical troop sizes and what we know of the fate of the various
participants.

1. Tarchaneiotes army of approximately 20,000 troops, including the most of the

tagmata did not engage the Turks at all and had withdrawn towards
Constantinople before the battle;
 2. Roussel de Baillious 500 strong Norman contingent, which were scouting the
road to Khilat, escaped virtually intact ahead of the main battle;
3. A contingent of approximately one thousand Turkish Uz mercenaries defected
on 25 August 1071, before the final battle;
4. Andronicus Ducas reserve force of approximately 5,000, including most of the
Anatolian levies, deserted the battle ahead of the collapse;
5. The 5,000 troops of the left wing under Nicephorus Bryennius managed to
fight their way clear of the battle after the collapse. It would be reasonable to
assume approximately one thousand casualties, including losses from the first
days battle.[42]
6. Romanus Diogenes and the Varangian Guard were defeated and captured. We
must assume that most of the Varangians were killed as Alp Arslan provided
Romanus with a new escort of troops (although such a gesture was
customary). Even so, no more than 500 Varangians can have present at
Manzikert as there was still a Varangian contingent at Constantinople to
acclaim Michael VIII Ducas.
7. A contingent of 2 3,000 Turkish mercenaries in the centre remained loyal to
Romanus and was virtually annihilated.
8. The right wing, which mainly consisted of Armenian troops, was hard-pressed
throughout the battle and was the first to break so we must assume they bore
most of losses. We also know a contingent of Armenia troops on the wing
deserted during the battle. After casualties and desertions probably only a
thousand troops escape to Manzikert.
9. Romanus had left the camp, the baggage and the non-combatants with only a
token guarded. We know from Michael Attaleiates, who was a secretary on
Romanus staff, that survivors from both the right wing and the reserve warned
the camp of Romanus defeat, which was immediately abandoned to the
enemy. Because the battle was fought in the late afternoon it was dusk by the
time the Turks reached the camp, allowing the survivors to escape under the
cover of darkness to the safety of nearby Manzikert.

The Byzantines probably suffered no more than about 8,000 casualties at

Manzikert. If we factor in the permanent desertion of the Armenian and Uz
auxiliaries, approximately 30,000 troops survived the battle. Based on the assumption
that the Byzantine army had a total military strength of some 100,000 men in 1071AD
and that approximately 50,000 garrison and thematic troops remained at their stations
around the Empire,[43] then Manzikert cost the Byzantines about 20% of their total
military strength. This was not a significant loss and would quickly be made up by
the recruitment of native soldiers from the military estates, while service with the
Byzantine army would continue to draw professional recruits from around the
medieval world. The defeat at Manzikert however, cut off the Byzantines from their
supply of Armenian manpower, a critical source of recruitment for the army.
[44] Initially it would be the Turks themselves how would make up this loss, but this
had its own complications.

After Manzikert

Although Manzikert was a serious blow to Byzantine prestige, Romanus position was
in no way irrecoverable. Alp Arslan treated Romanus with the respect due to his
position and imposed no harsh terms on the Byzantines. Although he had long
campaigned on the Byzantine periphery, he had no intention of embarking on a full-
scale invasion of the Empire. He also recognised that his victory at Manzikert had
been a narrow run thing; if Andronicus Ducas reserve force had not deserted the
battle would very likely have had a different result. In a fictional speech written by a
later Arab historian, Romanus underlines the threat Alp Arslan faced, Tell the sultan
to return me to the capital of my kingdom before the Rum agree on another emperor
and he openly declares battle and war[45] If Arslan was to fulfil his ambition of
conquering Fatimid Egypt he could not afford the risk of a war with Byzantium, so it
served his interests to have a grateful and subdued Romanus restored to the throne and
his Byzantine border secure. Romanus and Arslan negotiated a new peace treaty in
which both sides agreed to a return to the status quo ante; in exchange for a ransom of
one million solidii and marriage alliance between Arslans son and Romanus
daughter, Armenia would be restored to the Byzantines and, after the exchange of
several disputed border fortresses, Arslan would endeavour to prevent further Seljuk
incursions into Byzantine territory.

Romanus remained at Arslans his camp for a week and was entertained as an
honoured guest. The Sultan released his prisoners and provided Romanus was gifts
suitable to his rank, supplies, and an armed escort. News of his defeat would
undoubtedly have reached the capital so it was imperative Romanus take steps to calm
the situation. He hurriedly sent a report of his engagement to the Senate and,
gathering what troops he encountered on the way, rushed back to Constantinople.

In Constantinople however, the Ducas faction used news of Romanus defeat to stage
a coup in favour of Michael Ducas. Although Michael was now 20 years old he
showed no capacity for governing and left affairs of state in the hands of his mother,
who continued to act as regent on his behalf. The Empress Eudocia, however,
remained aligned with Romanus. While the court debated what action to take, John
Ducas rushed to Constantinople from exile in Bithynia and ordered the immediate
arrest of the Empress. Romanus was declared deposed and Michael VII Ducas
(1071- 1078AD) proclaimed sole emperor. John reinforced his own position by
claiming the title Caesar and effectively became the power behind the throne.

After learning of his deposition Romanus gathered his forces and marched on
Constantinople. In late September or October, Romanus was defeated outside Amasia
by an army under the command of Caesar Johns youngest son, Constantine Ducas,
forcing him to withdraw towards his native Cappadocia, where he hoped to winter and
regroup his forces. But the following spring his new army was engaged and defeated
by troops under his erstwhile reserve commander, Andronicus Ducas. Realising that
his position was hopeless, Romanus agreed to surrender in return for a promise of safe
conduct into exile. John, however, had him savagely blinded and he died shortly
afterwards.[46]

Political Disaster

Manzikert was less an invitation for the Turks to invade than for the Byzantines to
begin a civil war. The emperor Michael inspired neither confidence nor loyalty and
Caesar John proved as incapable of securing Anatolia against the Turks as his
predecessors, which encouraged the Anatolian magnates to turn their back on the
central government and see to their own defence. In northeast Anatolia, Theodore
Gabras seized the area around Theodosiopoulis and Trebizond; while in the southeast
the Armenian general, Philaretos Brachamius, seized Byzantine Cilicia all the way
from Edessa in the east, to Antioch in the west.[47] Theodore and Philaretos used the
troops at their disposal to put up a stubborn defence and pushed the Turks back, but
their efforts were uncoordinated and the frontier between their territories remained
wide open.

Despite the disorder in Anatolia, there was no Seljuk invasion. Alp Arslan had
respected his treaty with Romanus, and at any rate died the year after his victory at
Manzikert. His son and successor, Malik Shah (1072-1092AD) was too busy
solidifying his rule in Iran to consider invading the Byzantine Empire, and, like his
father had designed on Fatimid Egypt. What neither state could do at this time was
prevent the Turcoman raiders, who recognised no authority, from penetrating the
Seljuk-Byzantine border and raiding at will. The Turcomen were raiders of
opportunity and simply bypassed areas of stiff resistance and pushed further and
further west. One emir named Kutalamis raided Kayseri and Niksar in central
Anatolia and penetrated as far west as Amorium without encountering Byzantine
resistance.[48]

With the east in rebellion and virtually no loyal troops available to it, the Ducas
government was forced to turn to Norman and Turkish mercenaries. Norman heavy
cavalry proved surprisingly effective against the Turks, but they were expensive and
often hard to control; having observed the Empires weakness first hand many
harboured their own imperial ambitions. Roussel de Balliou, after a successful
campaign against the Seljuks, rebelled against the Ducas and carved a dukedom for
himself in eastern Armenia,[49] while in the west, the Norman duke of Apulia and
Calabria, Robert Guiscard, seized Byzantiums last Italian possession, Bari.[50] The
Norman contribution to the Byzantine army was relatively small however and
confined to service in crack regiments, such as The Immortals.[51] The majority of
mercenary troops in the Byzantine army were Turks. The abundance of Turkish
manpower, their fighting prowess, and their availability as troops for hire made them
indispensable to both the central government and the Anatolian rebels. Caesar John
used both Turkish and Norman troops in his campaign against Roussel de Balliou in
1072AD, but his Normans mutinied and handed him over to Roussel, who then
proclaimed John Emperor and led their combined force against Constantinople. In
response, Michael Ducas commissioned the young and talented Alexius Comnenus to
lead an army of Turkish auxiliaries against the rebels. Through guile and bribery
Alexius convinced John and Roussels Turks to arrest their erstwhile leaders and
defect to Michael.[52]
In 1078AD, the governor of the Anatolic theme,[53] Nicephorus Botaniates led a
revolt against Michael Ducas. Lacking sufficient native troops for an assault against
Constantinople, Botaniates sought the support of the Seljuk emir, Suleyman ibn
Kutalamis. As Botaniates advanced on Constantinople at the head of a Turkish army,
Nicephorus Bryennius and Nicephorus Basiliacius launched separate and
simultaneous revolts in the west. Michael Ducas realised his position was hopeless
and abdicated, becoming a monk. Botaniates reached Constantinople first and was
duly proclaimed emperor. Botaniates then sent Alexius Comnenus with another army
of Turks to defeat Bryennius and Basiliacius, however, when his own kinsman,
Nicephorus Melissenus, revolted against Botaniates in 1081AD, Alexius refused to
fight and instead usurped the throne himself.

The Byzantine civil war had continued for ten years and completely exhausted
Byzantine resources in Anatolia. While the Byzantines had been busy fighting each
other the Turks had advanced into a power vacuum, initially as raiders, later as
mercenaries and finally as settlers. They had successfully exploited Byzantine
factionalism by supporting various usurpers as their interests dictated and had profited
immensely. By 1081AD the Seljuks occupied virtually the entire Anatolian plateau
from Armenia in the east to Bithynia in the west and Suleyman occupied Nicea as his
nominal capital.

Consolidation and neglect under Alexius Comnenus

Alexius displayed an ambivalent attitude towards the collapse of the Byzantine

position in Anatolia. It is true that Robert Guiscard posed the most immediate threat
to his throne, but even after the Normans were defeated in 1084AD, Alexius made no
serious attempt to recover Anatolia. One of his first acts as emperor had been to write
to those magnates still holding territory against the Turks confirming them in their
possessions and bidding them to continue their resistance with all the resources at
their disposal.[54] It was a purely political act; Alexius could not forget that the
Anatolian magnates were potential rivals who needed to be placated while he faced
Robert Guiscard. He then embarked on a brief campaign to clear the Bithynian coast
of roving Turkish nomads before signing a peace treaty with Sultan Suleyman, by
which the Sultan agreed to prevent further Turkish raiding west of the de facto border
between their states.[55] Alexius had very effectively redirected Turkish pressure
away from his territory and against that of his Anatolian rivals. Relentless Turkish
pressure would eventually make Philaretos defence of Cilicia untenable and in
1086AD he was overthrown by his son, who surrendered Antioch to Suleyman and
became a Muslim. Similarly Theodore Gabras would lose all the territory from
Kastamouni in western Paphlagonia to Sinope in the east, retaining only Trebizond as
a vassal of the Georgians.

With his eastern frontier secure, Alexius turned to the west. As father-in-law to the
legitimate heir to the throne, Constantine Ducas, Robert Guiscard had his own designs
on the Byzantine throne and he rightly regarded Alexius as a usurper. To protect his
rights, in June 1081AD he landed an army on the Greek mainland and began
besieging the city of Dyrrachium.[56] The imbalance between the Norman and
Byzantine forces was marked. Guiscard was able to call on the substantial resources
of Norman Italy and Sicily, as well call on the services of dissatisfied Byzantines and
defectors, while Alexius was forever desperately short of cash and
manpower. Alexius turned to Suleyman for assistance, who willingly supplied him
with troops.[57] In fact, Alexius dependence on a constant supply of Turkish
manpower was underlined by his creation of two new units in the Byzantine army: the
elite Vardariots (Christianised Turks resettled to Rumelia) and the Turcopouloi (sons
of the Turks).[58]

Alexius suffered three serious defeats at the hands of Robert Guiscard and his son,
Bohemond, but Norman enthusiasm for the war was slowly worn down by a storm
that sank their fleet in 1081AD, and an epidemic which swept through the army
outside Dyrrachium in 1082AD, killing up to 10,000 men. When Robert Guiscard
died in 1084AD, Bohemond agreed a peace with Alexius and withdrew to
Italy. Alexius victory however, did not bring him much political capital. He was still
an usurper and he had funded his war with unpopular measures such as the
confiscation of church plate and the devaluation of the gold coinage.[59] Alexius was
forced by necessity to turn his attention to domestic affairs, so securing peace in
Anatolia was essential. As part of a settlement with the new Sultan, Kilij Arslan
(1092-1109AD), Alexius evacuated Byzantine refugees from Rum Seljuk territory and
resettled them into western Anatolia. He created a zone of devastated no mans land
along the border between the states and established military settlements in key
locations. Given Byzantiums economic and demographic situation, Alexius decision
makes sense; the emperor Heraclius had done the same thing in the seventh century
when he evacuated Syria. But it was also an admission that Byzantium had lost the
Anatolian plateau.

Anatolia as the Byzantine Heartland the interests of the landed elite

For almost two centuries since the near collapse of the Byzantine Empire in the
seventh century, Anatolia had been the Byzantine heartland. However, this was less
through choice than through necessity. Anatolia was a defensible bastion behind
which the Byzantines were able to defend themselves against Arab invasion but
outside of the western coastal hinterland Anatolia was not particularly fertile. After
the creation of the thema system in the seventh century military necessity meant
access to good land in Anatolia was restricted to the soldiery. Over time, the officers,
who were assigned larger estates, came to take on the character of a military
aristocracy. After the economic upturn of the eighth century these aristocrats began
buying up the lands of the small-hold soldier farmers.[60]
By the tenth century the military aristocracy and had grown so powerful they were
able challenge the powers of the emperor. The emperors Romanus I (920-944AD)
and Basil II sought to break the power of the magnates by enacting laws that banned
the alienation of military lands. Basil II went so far as to reverse without
compensation all land transfers that had occurred in Anatolia since the reign of
Romanus I. Basils compulsory requisitions effectively broke the power of several
great families, such as the Phocai and Sclerii, while others simply withdrew from
politics and retired to their pastoral estates.[61] Basils land reforms, while noble in
the sense they aimed to protect the small-holder against the greed of the magnates, did
little to actually improve the security of the Empire. Small-hold farmer soldiers were
both militarily and economically ineffective, while his land confiscations so alienated
the Anatolian aristocracy that many would throw off their allegiance to the state the
moment he died.[62]

In contrast to Anatolia, Rumelia was rich and fertile and because it was not subject to
the same rigorous military settlement or land holding structures there was a diversity
of investment. It was not long before an obvious economic imbalance between the
east and west began to develop, leading the emperors to ignore the interests of the
isolationist Anatolian magnates and devote more and more attention to the
west. Although the Comneni were themselves members of the Anatolian aristocracy,
once they were in power they were quick to realise that their real economic interest
lay in the west.[63] The protection of the Empires western interests is a consistent
policy that runs through the reigns of Alexius, John II and Manuel.[64] By contrast,
Andronicus Comnenus spent his life in Anatolia in either Byzantine and Seljuk
service, so his antipathy towards his predecessors western orientated policies are
perhaps easier to understand.

The system of land use in Byzantine Anatolia was also a key factor assisting the
Turkish conquest. As horse and sheep herding required less manpower than small-
hold farming, the creation of great pastoral estates led to the displacement of the
peasantry and general depopulation of the plateau. To the original Turkoman raiders,
the virtually undefended great estates and their immense herds of livestock were
targets too tempting to ignore. As they plundered their way across Anatolia the
scattered population fled westwards or to the cities and coasts, virtually abandoning
the plateau to the Turks.[65] The economic impact of this loss was not as great as
might have been expected as the central government had long lost its ability to collect
taxes from, and enforce its authority over, the Anatolian magnates. The areas of real
agricultural prosperity - the coastal districts and the rich farmland of Bithynia and the
Meander valley - remained in Byzantine hands.

The lack of a clearly defensible border made it difficult for the Byzantines to defend
their remaining territory during the early years of Turkish conquest; however, the
bandits and cattle rustlers who made up the first wave of Turkish raiders had neither
the resources nor inclination to besiege cities and limited their activities to ravaging
the countryside. The Turkish elite, such as the Kutalami, who entered Anatolia after
Manzikert however, fully understood the economic value of towns and cities but they
also lacked the resources to undertake a fully-fledged campaign of conquest. The
cities that did fall to the Turks by conquest were the consequence of neglected defence
and poor leadership. In most cases however, once it became clear that the Turks were
in control of the countryside, cities voluntarily switched their allegiance to the Turks,
usually with the city administration remaining intact. It was common practice for
individual cities to change their allegiance this way during war; it had happened
during both the Persian invasion of 615AD and the Arab conquest of 637AD. What is
surprising in this instance is that the Byzantine government itself assigned several
cities to the Turks to administer on their behalf. In 1078AD when Nicephorus
Botaniates left his base in Nicea to claim the throne, he assigned the city along with
Cyzicus, Nicomedia, Chalcedon and Chrysopolis to Suleyman to garrison and
administer as his vassal.[66] The generally peaceful transfer of power that occurred in
western Anatolia prevented a recurrence of the physical and economic devastation that
had occurred in Armenia, and ensured an alignment of interest between the Byzantine
and Turkish elites. There was surprisingly little disruption to the normal patterns of
Anatolian trade. The production of the plateau, now in Turkish hands, still travelled
to markets on the Byzantine coast. Byzantine coinage remained official tender and
the Seljuk economy remained closely integrated with Byzantium. Only during the
reign of Masud I (1116-1156AD) did the Seljuks begin striking bronze coins for
local use. Gold and silver coinage did not appear until the thirteenth century.[67]

The Byzantine-Turkish Condominium

The 1081AD peace treaty between Alexius and Suleyman was of far greater import
than simply establishing a Byzantine Seljuk border and normalising trade relations,
for it actually established a place for the Seljuk Sultanate of Rum within the
Byzantine eokoimene. All Byzantine emperors from Michael Ducas to Nicephorus
Botaniates to Alexius Comnenus were to some degree in debt to him for his support
and rewarded him with money, lands and titles.[68] It was natural therefore that
Suleyman found it in his interest to align with the Byzantines rather than with the
Great Seljuks of Iran, who increasingly regarded him as a threat.[69] It is possible
Suleyman was influenced by the many Byzantine officials who occupied positions in
his court, who would have undoubtedly stressed the benefits of maintaining good
relations with the emperor. At any rate it seems certain that Suleyman accepted
protectorate status from the Byzantines. In return for his fealty, Alexius conferred on
Suleyman the title of Sultan, a title he may have adopted unofficially but had no
legitimate claim to. Malik Shah certainly did not recognise Suleyman as a Sultan and
would have regarded such a claim as treasonous. Suleymans official title
was beglerbegi, or chief of chiefs, a rank akin to first amongst equals.[70]

In 1086AD, Suleymans ambition turned against the Great Seljuks and he led an
expedition into Syria but was defeated and killed. Alexius exploited the chaos that
followed Suleymans death to recover some border fortresses and solidify his hold on
western Anatolia, but he did not have the resources to embark on a campaign of
reconquest. The Great Seljuk Sultan Malik Shah was not unhappy with the apparent
disintegration of the Rum Sultanate. He still felt that suzerainty over all Seljuks was
his by right and in 1090AD he made Alexius an extraordinary offer. In exchange for a
peace treaty and a marriage alliance[71]the Sultan would withdraw all Seljuk forces
from Anatolia and restore all Byzantine lands lost since Manzikert. It may have been
a tempting offer but Alexius refused. Publicly Alexius could not consent to a
marriage between his Christian daughter and a Moslem; while politically, the Seljuks
of Rum were a useful buffer between Byzantium and the much more powerful Great
Seljuks. It was important therefore that Alexius maintained his alliance with the Rum
Seljuks, whilst continuing to exploit their disorder to his own advantage. He must
also have realised Malik Shahs authority did not extend to the Turks of Anatolia and
few if any would have obeyed his call to withdraw; and even if they did they would
simply leave a gaping power vacuum in their wake. Most importantly, Alexius was
dependent on Turkish military manpower and without them he would have little to
contribute to the alliance. Malik Shah repeated the offer again in 1092AD but died
before he received Alexius second refusal. The same year, Suleymans thirteen-year-
old son, Kilij Arslan escaped from exile in Isfahan and made his way to
Nicea. Alexius came out in support of Kilij Arslans claim to the Sultanate. They
signed a peace treaty and campaigned together against the emir of Smyrna, Tzachas,
who had proclaimed himself emperor.[72]

Whatever hopes Alexius had of maintaining his influence over Kilij Arslan were
quickly dashed. The young Sultan proved to be a strong and capable leader and
quickly reasserted his authority over his rebellious emirs. He then led his army
against the Byzantines and soon recovered the fortresses that Alexius had recently
recaptured. Threatened with the potential collapse of the Byzantine position in
western Anatolia, Alexius turned to the Normans for assistance. What he ended up
with however was a Crusade. The Byzantines had been battling with Muslims for
centuries but concept of Crusade or Holy War, was completely alien to
them. Nevertheless, Alexius used the Crusaders to recover Nicea, Kilij Arslans
erstwhile capital, from the Turks and clear a passage to Antalya. Alexius treatment of
the Turkish garrison of Nicea is revealing; offering them a choice to leave with all of
their moveable possessions or to stay and accept a commission into Byzantine service.
[73] Kilij Arslan resettled in Iconium and despite his defeat soon restored good
relations with Byzantium. Both the Byzantines and the Seljuks of Rum remained
aloof from the Crusading phenomenon; the Rum Seljuks never offered assistance to
their Syrian cousins; while the Byzantines often aligned with the Seljuks against the
Crusaders.[74]

Alexius policy of maintaining cordial Byzantine-Rum Seljuk relations seemed to

have finally paid off when Kilij Arslans son and successor, Shahanshah (1109-
1116AD)[75] formally accepted Byzantine federate status in 1116AD.
[76] Unfortunately, it proved short-lived as Shahanshah was overthrown and
assassinated shortly afterwards. But even though Shahanshahs brother, Masud I
was determined to exercise Seljuk independence, Byzantine-Seljuk affairs continued
to remain aligned. Manuel I Comnenus (1143-1185AD) allied with Masud against
the transiting armies of the Second Crusade in 1146AD and later intervened in the
succession crisis that followed Masuds death, accepting the fealty of his son and
successor, Kilij Arslan II (1156-1192AD). Like his namesake, Kilij Arslan proved to
be a dangerous and unreliable vassal. He regularly broke his arrangements with
Manuel whenever it seemed advantageous to do so. A military demonstration by
Manuel was usually sufficient to draw Kilij Arslan back to the negotiating table. Kilij
Arslan even attended Manuel in Constantinople and was treated as an honoured
guest. Nevertheless, in 1175AD, after continued breaches of their treaty Manuel
decided led an army against Iconium but overreached himself and was defeated at
Myriocephalum. Even though Manuels defeat significantly undermined the
Byzantines position in Anatolia, Kilij Arslan imposed no harsh terms and Byzantine-
Seljuk affairs quickly returned to normal. Even a decade later, Eustathios, the
Archbishop of Thessalonica, could still write of the Seljuk Sultan, Kilij Arslan as an
ally of the Byzantines and defender of the interests of the young Emperor, Alexius II
(1180AD).[77]

Sovereignty and Identity in the Byzantine Eokoimene

The Byzantines were a deeply spiritual people. In their worldview the imperium
romanorum or eokoimene was the centre of a Cosmic Empire, eternal and
indivisible. The Empires fortunes rose or fell upon the will of God; God chose to
chastise the Byzantine with wars and defeats or crown them with victories according
to His will. This cosmology allowed the Byzantines to constantly adjust their
worldview to accommodate the loss or reacquisition of territory. Control of territory
was therefore less important than the recognition of the emperors place in the Divine
order. In the Byzantine universe the emperor was Gods vice regent on Earth and
protector of the eokoimene, or civilised world. Those outside the eokoimene, were
either barbarians or rebels against the Divine order. So, while the Seljuks may have
defeated the Byzantines in battle and seized their territories in Anatolia, Suleymans
recognition of the emperors authority allowed Byzantines to incorporate the Seljuks
within the eokoimene, or at least maintain the fiction that Anatolia had been restored
to the Romans. The fact of the Seljuks incorporation into the Empire is highlighted by
the descriptive clarification appended to Suleymans title of Sultan.

Ethnicity was irrelevant in the multi-ethnic Empire that was Byzantium. Anna
Comnena might call the Turks barbarians, but it was a term she also used to describe
the Normans, Italians and Franks. To be considered a Byzantine one needed accept
Orthodox Christianity and have an appreciation for civilised culture, that is, classical
literature, order, rule of law and other such amenities of civilisation. Accepting the
Turks as foederati was the first step in a longer process aimed at transforming them
from barbarians into Byzantines, much as the Byzantines had transformed the pagan
Slavs, Bulgarians and Russians before them.[78] Even the Turks Islamic faith was
not considered an insurmountable obstacle to their hoped for integration as the Turks
in the eleventh century did not distinguish greatly between Islam and
Christianity. The Rum Seljuks placed no restrictions on the Christians within their
territories. This was significant as many Byzantine officials occupied key posts at
Seljuk court. Some, such as Philaretos son converted to Islam, but this was not a
requirement. Many Byzantines stayed true to their Christian faith and this does not
seem to have hindered their career. Indeed, the Rum Seljuks recognised the right of
the Patriarchate of Constantinople to exercise full ecclesiastic authority over the
Orthodox Christians within their territories, despite having a rival Patriarchate under
their control at Antioch.[79]

Islam was however an obstacle for advancement for those Turks who entered
Byzantine service and many regularly converted to Christianity, at least nominally.
[80] While the Orthodox authorities remained suspicious of Turkish converts, Manuel
Comnenus took a pragmatic approach and attempted to encourage conversion by
making the process as simple as possible.[81] Unfortunately, clerical opposition
thwarted his plans and, as the twelfth century drew to a close, the Seljuks began to
realign themselves with the Islamic ulema. Although incorporating significant
Byzantine and Persian influences, in the end, Turkish culture proved its
resilience. Both Christian and Islamic travellers were to comment on the distinctively
Turkish culture of Turchia, as Anatolia came to be called.

The mythologizing of Manzikert

History is rarely about what actually happened but more about how events are
interpreted. For Michael Attaleiates and the Armenian cleric Vardapet, Manzikert was
a disaster and they described it as such. For Michael Psellus, Manzikert was a
convenient misfortune and he described it as such.[82] By the time Anna Comnena
wrote her history in 1148AD, Manzikert was recognized as an important key historical
event, but it had not become the disaster of later legend.[83] The Byzantines
themselves seemed not to have imbued Manzikert with any great significance. For
them their defeat and decline were simply Gods punishment for their sins. It was
later, with the rise of modern secular history that people began searching for an
identifiable event that would mark the beginning of the decline. Thanks to
Michael Attaleiates mythologising of Romanus and his doomed campaign and the
triumphalism of later Arab historians, Manzikert had taken on the necessary romantic
qualities to become that terrible day. None of this was necessarily true. The real
causes of the loss of Anatolia were far more diverse and had little to do with battles
and conquests, although these did occur and were in their own way significant.
The political and ethnic transformation of Anatolia was a much more complex process
and can be summarised as follows:

Byzantiums military success during the tenth century eroded both the internal
and external defences of the empire. Allowing the decline of the thematic
armies and city fortifications was permissible if the Empire was able to
maintain the offensive capabilities of the Byzantine army, but this was neither
economically nor politically possible in the long term;
The decision to conquer and directly administer territories in Armenia,
Mesopotamia and Syria was a strategic error that removed natural buffer states
and over-extended the military resources of the Empire. Given that the central
government was demonstrably unable to control the magnates on its own
territory, the incorporation of large, non-assimilated populations into the
Empire created significant problems of policing and governance that the
Byzantines were ill equipped to cope with at that time;
Basil IIs failure to adequately plan for the succession invited political disorder
after his death, resulting in two key developments detrimental to the
state. Firstly, the Anatolian magnates, who Basil had antagonised during his
lifetime, either withdrew entirely from the political process, or else used their
influence to restore and extend their privileges. Secondly, the general political
instability of the period encouraged the growth of a strong, but generally
corrupt and self-serving civil administration. None of Basils immediate
 successors had either the strength, the ability or the legitimacy to prevent these
developments;
As the central governments authority disintegrated during the 1060s and 70s
it was forced to dramatically reduce its expenditure. As the largest single
expense in the Byzantine budget, the military bore the brunt of the budget
cuts. These cuts proved untenable given the extended borders the military had
to police and defend. And, as the central government proved increasingly
unable to secure the interests of the provinces or protect them from raiding, the
provinces broke down in rebellion and separatism;
Romanus Manzikert campaign was tactically sound if he was aiming to strike
a blow against the Great Seljuks of Iran, but it completely failed to solve the
problem of Turcoman raiding, which could only have been addressed by
providing additional resources to the local garrisons. Nevertheless, having
chosen to attack the wrong enemy, Romanus fought a textbook action at
Manzikert and was only defeated by poor intelligence and treachery. The
majority of the Byzantine army escaped intact however and Romanus managed
to secure an equitable peace treaty from the Seljuks;
After Manzikert, Byzantine separatism was allowed to run its destructive
course. Had the Empire been better run and the civil war not occurred a
coordinated defence against Turkish raiding may have diverted the Seljuks
back towards Fatimid Egypt;
For a variety of reasons the Byzantines did not recognized the Turks as a long-
term threat. The Seljuks who conquered Anatolia had little or no centralized
political structure and were undisciplined and fractious, likely as not to attack
each other as the Byzantines. Nor were the Seljuks an unstoppable military
force. After the Manzikert the Georgians expanded their territory at the Seljuks
expense, as did many of the Armenian principalities of Cilicia. The Byzantines,
however, were more interesting in fighting challengers to their throne than
repelling the Seljuks;
As Anatolia broke apart in disorder the Turks began to exercise an increasingly
important role in Byzantine politics. Sultan Suleyman variously assisted the
Byzantine central government or rebellious magnates to his advantage and by
the time Alexius Comnenus secured the Byzantine throne the Seljuks occupied
the entire Anatolian plateau;
 From the central governments perspective the economic loss of the Anatolian
plateau was not as significant as it might appear, given the amount of territory
lost, as it had long ago lost control of those territories. It was therefore sensible
policy to concentrate the governments limited resources on the defence of
western Anatolia and Rumelia;
The repopulation of Anatolia and the subsequent revival of several deserted
Byzantine cities under the Rum Seljuk provided a stimulus to the Byzantine
economy, at least in the short term;
Cut off from its traditional Armenian recruiting grounds, the Byzantine army
was quick to utilise the Turks as an abundant supply of available military
manpower. By the eleventh century the Byzantine army was completely
dependent on Turkish manpower and would remain so until the fourteenth
century;
To a great extent, the Sultanate of Rum owed its existence to the
Byzantines. Byzantines occupied positions in the Rum court and help guide
and structure its administration, at least in the early decades. The Byzantines
conferred legitimacy on its rulers and recognised the states borders and
possessions. Sultan Suleyman enjoyed good relations with Michael Ducas,
Nicephorus Botaniates, Nicephorus Melissenus and Alexius Comnenus and was
generally a good ally to the Byzantines throughout his life. If Suleymans
successors were less reliable vassals this was simply because they were in a
position put Seljuk interests ahead of their relationship with the Byzantines;
Despite occasional conflicts, Byzantium and the Rum Sultanate enjoyed
unusually close relations throughout their existence. There was a constant
exchange of personnel and personalities between their respective societies, and,
surprisingly considering their religious differences, regular intermarriage. Both
states provided sanctuary and employment for the others exiles and
adventurers, such as the future Emperor Michael Palaeologos, who commanded
a Byzantine contingent in Sultan Kay Kuwas army in the twelfth century.
[84] This constant exchange of personnel and culture between Byzantium and
Seljuk Rum ensured that the interests of their respective elites were, if not
always aligned, at least understood. Nevertheless, Byzantine endeavours to
acculturalise the Rum Seljuks, who in the eleventh century at least were only
vaguely Islamic, were half hearted and hampered by religious and political
 arrogance. The Byzantines failure to impress their culture on the Rum Seljuks
made it inevitable that they would eventually realign with the Islamic world;
Finally, the Seljuks use of Byzantine coinage, while important symbolically,
permanently disrupted the Empires carefully balanced economic cycle. The
Byzantines had very limited gold reserves and so carefully regulated the
circulation of gold nomisma within their economy. All taxes had to be paid in
currency, which guaranteed that most coinage circulated through the economy
but ultimately returned to the treasury.[85] Unless politically sanctioned, gold
exports were strictly prohibited. The Seljuk court however became a
significant consumer of coinage, which over time eroded Byzantiums gold
reserve.[86] This significance of this cannot be overstated and over time was
probably more damaging to Byzantiums long-term viability than any loss of
territory.
Paul Markham
1 August 2005
Perth, Western Australia

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End Notes

[1] The gold coinage retained its value however the bronze coinage of the Empire,
which was so essential to local trade and taxation, plunged in size, quality and value,
forcing a return to a barter economy. Heraclius and Constans attempted to address the
problem by increasing the number of local mints and coin issues but this only had the
effect of devaluing the bronze coinage further. P D. Whiting. Byzantine Coins,
1973. Jenkins & Barrie, London. Pg 119

[2] W H Haussig identifies the origin of the theme system as Diocletians (284-
305AD) restructure of the Roman Empires defences in Mesopotamia and Syria,
where the limes system of border fortifications were abandoned in favour of a series
of strategically sited fortresses, manned by military settlers. Kulturgeschichte von
Byzanz. 1966 Revised edition (translated by J M Hussey). 1971. Thames and Hudson,
London). Pg 91.

[3] The early Caliphs desired Constantinople as the capital of their Islamic Empire.
Nadia Maria El Cheikh. Byzantium Viewed by Arabs. 2004. Harvard University
Press, London. Pg 62.

[4] Ahmad Shboul. Byzantium and the Arabs: The image of the Byzantines as
mirrored in Arabic literature. Byzantine Papers. 1981. Australian Association for
Byzantine Studies, Sydney. Pgs 52-55

[5] Mutasim targeted Amorium specifically because it the native city of the emperor
Theophilus (829-842AD). Theophilus led an army in its defence but suffered a
massive defeat and was lucky to escape alive. When his opponents in Constantinople
heard of his defeat they attempted to have him deposed. Only the swift action by his
step mother, Euphrosyne, saved his throne.

[6] Arab sources are complimentary of Irene and her decision to maintain peaceful relations with the Caliphate. By
contrast, her son Constantine VI (780-797AD) was seen as an irresponsible leader and his subsequent deposition by
Irene was regarded a logical act of statesmanship on her part. El Cheikh. Ibid. Pg 91.

[7] In the west the Byzantines defeated and crushed the resurgent Bulgarian Empire.

[8] The De Administrando Imperio devotes significant space to Byzantiums relations

with the Danubian tribes.
[9] The Seljuks proclaimed themselves protectors of Sunni Orthodoxy in the name of
the Abbasid Caliphate against the rival Shia Fatimid Caliphate of Egypt. It is
interesting to note the parallels to the career of the Normans in Italy. After invading
Italy at about the same time, the formerly pagan Norman Vikings set themselves up as
protectors of Papal authority.

[10] Vardapet Aristakes Lastivertci. 11th century. Regarding the Sufferings

Occasioned by Foreign Peoples Living Around Us. Translated by Robert
Bedrosian. Published by Medieval Source Book @ http://rbedrosian.com/a1.htm pg
3. Successive Byzantine emperors from Michael IV (1034-1041AD) through to
Constantine IX sent troops into Armenia but failed to take it.

[11] Lastivertci, ibid. http://rbedrosian.com/a1.htm pg 3

[12] In this context, the Persians are the Turks. Lastivertci, ibid,
(http://rbedrosian.com/a7.htm pg 5).

Michael Psellus relates the whole incident without any context (a certain indication
he is hiding something), saying Michael started by finding fault with them en bloc
a mean thing to do. Then, having made their leader stand forth in the centre of the
group, together with his second-in-command Isaac Comnenushe poured out a
torrent of abuse on Isaac. (Michael
Psellus. Chronographia. 11th century. Translated by E R A Sewter, 1966. Published
as Fourteen Byzantine Rulers by Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, pg 276). Theodore
Skoutariotes however, describes the scene differently. He states that Isaac was very
well received by the Emperor himself but was abused and ignored by those advising
the emperor. Michael, being rather powerless, was unable to prevent his courtiers
offending the powerful Isaac and the incident sparked the civil war. (Theodoros
Skoutariotes: Synopsis Chronika: The Emperors of the 11th Century @ the Internet
Medieval Sourcebook. Translated for by Nikos
Koukounas http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/source/skoutariotes1.html). Lastivertci,
provides the background that explains the cause of Michaels outburst. It is likely he
received this information from someone in one of the many embassies sent by the
Armenian princelings (who had retired to estates in Cappodocia) that would have
travelled to Constantinople to do homage to Michael as his vassals after his
accession.

[13] Michael VI was at least able to raise an army to fight in his defence. His
predecessor, Constantine IX Monomachus had been forced to face the rebellions of
George Maniacus and Leo Tornikes with a scratch force enlisted from the palace
guard, local mercenaries and prisoners.
[14] There was so much blood shed that people said that such carnage in one place
had not occurred before in Byzantium. Lastivertci, Ibid,
(http://rbedrosian.com/a8.htm page 3). The army of Michael VI suffered the greater
loss but remained intact.

[15] Justinian II (685-695AD) had also forcibly relocated tens of thousands of Slavs
from the Balkans to western Anatolia in 689AD.

[16] Nicephorus I set about repopulating Thrace and Hellas with Byzantine settlers in
805AD, first through voluntarily resettlement programs, and then forcibly in 809AD
when it became apparent insufficient settlers were migrating. Thrace and Hellas
recovered quickly and soon became peaceful and prosperous. Treadgold. Revival. Pgs
136-7 & 157-8

[17] Rumelia is a later term to describe the western provinces of the late Byzantine
and Ottoman Empires. It is used here as a collective description of all Byzantiums
western provinces.

[18] Lastivertci uses the archaic term Persians when he in fact means
Turks. @ http://rbedrosian.com/a8.htm page 1.

[19] Isaac seems to have been an unpopular emperor. Soon after his elevation he
deposed the powerful and popular patriarch, Michael Celularius, resulting in
riots. His first coin issue featuring his portrait standing with an unsheathed sword was
extremely unpopular, resulting in the issue being withdrawn and replaced with new
portrait with the sword sheathed. Whiting. Ibid, pg 198.

[20] During the Manzikert campaign, Romanus would reject the advice of several of
his generals to wait for the Seljuks at Theodosiopolis (Erzerum in modern
Turkey) specifically because he knew he could not sustain his large army in the region
for an extended period

[21] The loss of Anatolia to the Turks has clear parallels to the loss of Syria, Palestine
and Egypt to the Arabs. Both the Arabs and Turks were nomads with no need for
complex military apparatus and extended supply lines. On both occasions the
Byzantines did not initially recognise the threat, expecting the invaders to plunder the
countryside, bypass the cities and then move on. Once the Turks and the Arabs gained
possession of the countryside however, the Byzantines found their position
untenable. Walter E. Kaegi. (Byzantium and the early Islamic conquests. 1992.
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
[22] A chain of fortified cities comprised the Empires eastern and southeastern
border. They included (north to south) Kars, Ani, Manzikert, Khilat, Edessa and
Antioch. Ani was the easternmost city in the chain.

[23] The empress Zoe and Theodora, the last of the Macedonian line, had both lost
control of their respective consorts (Romanus III, Michael IV and Constantine IX) and
found themselves sidelined from positions of power. Eudocia was careful in her
choice to ensure she retained control of political affairs, leaving Romanus to
concentrate on military matters. Barbara Hill. Imperial Women in Byzantium. 1025-
1204. Power, Patronage and Ideology. 1999. Pearson Education limited, Harlow. Pgs
63-64.

[24] The historian Michael Attaleiates served with Romanus on his campaign and has
left us a grim account of his experiences. We should not necessarily take Attaleiates
account at face value though, as Attaleiates was seeking to place the blame for
Byzantium decline on Romanus effete predecessors and therefore emphasized the
difficulties Romanus faced. Paul Magadalino. The Byzantine Background to the
First Crusade. 1996. Canadian Institute of Balkan Studies,
Toronto. @ http://deremilitari.org/RESOURCES/ARTICLES/magadalino.htm.

[25] W H. Haussig. Ibid, pg 91.

[26] Warren Treadgold. A History of the Byzantine State and Society. 1997. Stanford
University Press, Stanford. Pgs 548-49.

[27] Eokoimene, meaning community (of believers). Catherine Holmes argues that
the administrations of Nicephorus II and Basil II took care to ensure the trade of Syria
was preserved by encouraging Muslims to remain resident in the provinces and
leaving the indigenous administration intact (How the east was won in the reign of
Basil II, from Eastern Approaches to
Byzantium @ www.deremilitari/RESOURCES/PDFs/HOLMES.pdf.) P D Whiting
(Ibid, pg 173) supports this analysis with speculation that the gold tetarteron
introduced by Nicephorus II was intended to replace the Fatimid dinar. Haussig,
however, points out that the failure to integrate the new conquests into the
Byzantine eokoimene meant the central government was left to bear the costs but was
unable to secure the benefits, which accrued to the Anatolian magnates (ibid, pgs 304-
05). Also see Haussig, pg 59 for a discussion of the causes of the 3 rd century inflation
in the Roman Empire.

[28] Vasso Penna. Byzantine Coinage. Medium of transaction and manifestation of

imperial propaganda. 2002. Bank of Cyprus Cultural Foundation, Nicosia. Pgs 96 &
116.
[29] Psellus skips over this incident embarrassedly with the statement The fact is, he
put such overwhelming compulsion on me to join him on the campaign that I could
not possibly refuse. I would rather not say anything at the moment of the reason why
he was so insistent that I should accompany him, because I am abridging most of this
story, but I will speak of it when I write the history of these events. I am still under an
obligation in the matter. (Michael Psellus. Chronographia. 11th century. Translated
by E R A Sewter, 1966. Published as Fourteen Byzantine Rulers by Penguin Books,
Harmondsworth, pg 352 & 353).

[30] Anna Comnena. Alexiad. 11th century. Translated by E R A Sewter, 1960.

Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, pg 31. The emirs name was Chrysoskoulos. He
was given the rank of proedros and would remain a loyal to the Byzantines, even after
the disaster at Manzikert. Charles M. Brand. The Turkish Element in Byzantium,
Eleventh-Twelfth Centuries. Dumbarton Oaks Papers no 43. 1989. Dumbarton Oaks
Publications, Washington. Pg 2.

[31] Lord John Julius Norwich. Byzantium. The Apogee. 1991. Penguin Books,
Harmondsworth, pg 346

[32] Haldon. Byzantine Wars, pg 115.

[33] Justin McCarthy. The Ottoman Turks. An Introductory History to 1923. 1997.
Longman Books, London. Pg 12

[34] Edessa had only been brought within the Byzantine sphere in 1032AD, when
George Maniaces captured the city after Romanus IIIs (1028-1034AD) disastrous
Syrian campaign. Alp Arslans sought to restore the city to Abbasid control.

[35] The emperor Julian II (360-363AD) attempted a similar manoeuvre in his Persian
campaign of 363AD.

[36] ..battles are decided by strategy and skill. Strategy makes use of times and
places, surprises and various tricks to outwit the enemy with the idea of achieving its
objectives without actual fighting. Maurice
Tiberius. Strategikon. 6th century. Translated by George T Dennis, 1984. University
of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia. Pg 23.

[37] Amongst some of the more famous mercenaries who served with the Byzantines
were the Norwegian king, Harald Hardrada (then in exile), Edward the Confessors
natural son (and dispossessed heir) Edward Aethling, as well as numerous other Saxon
nobles, exiled from Britain following the Norman Conquest of 1066AD.
[38] Romanus had left behind the experienced general, Nicephorus Botaniates, as he
did not trust his loyalty. Nicephorus would later make his own challenge for the
throne, usurping Romanus successor, Michael VII. Romanus most dangerous rival,
Constantine Xs brother, John Ducas, to his estates in Bithynia. Johns son,
Andronicus Ducas, was with the army as a commander of the reserve force and
potential hostage.

[39] Manzikert was a key fortress on the Armenian frontier and had been held by the
Turks for several years. Psellus and Lastivertci are highly critical of Romanus
decision to split his army, attributing his decision to engage the Turks with only half
his forces to arrogance. Psellus. Ibid, pg 355 &
Lastivertci, http://rbedrosian.com/a10.htm pg 2.

[40] Maurices Strategikon recommends the use of envoys to sow dissention in an

enemy camp. Ibid, pg 65.

[41] Alfred Friendly, Manzikert: The Terrible Day, Lord Norwich, Byzantium. The
Apogee; and Edward Foord, The Byzantine Empire. A more modern example is: That
Terrible Day: The Byzantine defeat at Manzikert, AD 1071. Published @ Journal of
Ancient and Medieval History at Dickson College. November
1997 http://www.dicksonc.act.edu.au/Showcase/ClioContents/Clio2/manzikert.html.

[42] Given that Bryennius was reported wounded with two arrows in his back and
spear thrust in his side on the first day of battle, one thousand casualties might even be
a little excessive.

[43] Western troops were carrying out a campaign in Bulgaria and at the same time,
while the garrisons at Dyrrachium and Corfu were on alert against Norman
aggression.

[44] Sirarpie Der Nersessian. Armenia and the Byzantine Empire. A Brief Study of
Armenian Art and Civilization. 1945. Harvard University Press, Cambridge. Pgs 22-
23.

[45] El Cheikh. Ibid, pg 178

[46] Edward Foord reports that after his defeat Romanus sent his entire fortune to Alp
Arslan as part payment for his ransom. The story is likely to be an apocryphal later
invention, like much of the Manzikert legend. Foord. Ibid, pg 328.

[47] Philaretos did not seize Antioch until the beginning of Nicephorus Botaniates
reign in 1081AD.
[48] Niki Gamm. Celebrating the Beginning of the Beginning. Turkish Daily News.
29 August
1999. @ http://www.turkishdailynews.com/past_probe/08_29_99/Art2.htm viewed
14 September 2004.

[49] The young Alexius Comnenus defeated Roussel would later be captured by the
young Alexius Comnenus in his first military campaign, in 1073AD. Anna
Comnena. Ibid, pgs 31-37.

[50] In an attempt to neutralise Guiscard and retain Calabria within the Byzantine
sphere of influence, Michael Ducas offered him a marriage alliance between his son
and heir, Constantine, and Guiscards daughter. The marriage never eventuated as
Michael abdicated before the marriage could go ahead.

[51] The Immortals were established by Michael Ducas to replace the tagmata of the
east. Anna Comnena. Ibid, pg 38.

[52] John prudently became a monk and retired once more to his estates in
Bithynia. In gratitude to his earlier loyal service, Roussel escaped blinding and was
rehabilitated to the emperors service.

[53] The Anatolic theme was situated in the north central Anatolia, directly north of
the Cappadocian theme.

[54] Anna Comnena, ibid, pg 125. Alexius assigned them the right to collect and
spend taxes on behalf of the central government (known by the term pronoia). Anna
names Dabatanus, governor of Pontic Heracleia and Paphlagonia and Burtzes,
governor of Cappadocia and other officers but does not mention Theodore Gabras
and Philaretos.

[55] Anna Comnena, ibid, pg 130. The River Drakon was now made the border
between them, with the proviso that the Turks were absolutely forbidden to cross it
and under no circumstances to invade the frontiers of Bithynia. [My emphasis].

[56] Now Durres in Albania. Dyrrachium was a strategically important city as it

marked the start of the Via Egnatia, the military highway leading to Constantinople.

[57] Anna Comnena, ibid, pg 137. Anna is very reluctant to stress the importance of
Alexius Turkish allies. She initially devotes only two bare sentences to Alexius
decision to obtain troops from Suleyman and does not even mention the Sultan by
name. In contrast, she goes into great detail over the negotiations between Alexius
and the Venetians and the German emperor, Henry IV. Later, on page 167 she adds
that Suleyman supplied an additional 7000 troops, including officers for Alexius
second campaign against Guiscard.

[58] Ian Heath. Byzantine Armies. 886-1118. 1979. Osprey Books, London. Pg
30. The Turcopouloi would be a fixture of the Byzantine army right through to the
Palaeologian period.

[59] Alexius instigated a major overhaul of the taxation system and a complete reform
the coinage, which stabilised the economy and restored government solvency.

[60] Many small-hold farmers simply abandoned their allotments for reasons of safety
(due to raiding) or economic pressure. Their neighbours, who were collectively
responsible for payment of the taxes, were often forced to absorb abandoned
allotments in order to meet tax obligations.

[61] The attitude of Anatolian aristocracy can be summed up by the writings of

Kekaumenos, who was a contempory of Romanus IV. As far as possible, the
Anatolian landowners sought to secure their own advantage and avoid the authority of
the central government. N. Kekaumenos. Logos Nouthetetikos or Oration of
Admonition to an Emperor. 11th century. Translated by W North, 1972. It has been
speculated that Kekaumenos was either the same Kekaumenos who was abused by
Michael VI Bringas in 1057AD, or his son.

[62] It is interesting to note that Basil II refused to be buried amongst his predecessors
in the funerary Church of the Holy Apostles but outside the walls of Constantinople
near the palace of the Hebdomon. In this way he ensured that even in death he would
not party to the pomp and ritual that he so despised in life. Epitaph.of Basil
II. 11th Century. Translated by Paul Stephenson.
@ http://homepage.mac.com/paulstephenson/trans/epitaph.html

[63] The Comneni family held estates in Kastamouni in Paphalgonia, although they
apparently originated from a village near Adrianople in Thrace. Suleyman took
Kastamouni from Theodore Gabras in the mid 1080s.

[64] John Haldon. Warfare, State and Society in the Byzantine World. 565-1204. 1999. UCL Press, London. Pg 95.

[65] Claude Cahen. The Formation of Turkey. The Seljukid Sultanate of Rum:
Eleventh to Fourteenth Century. 1988. Translated from the French by P M Holt,
2001. Pearson Education Limited, Harlow pg 100.

[66] Sir Steven Runciman. A History of the Crusades. Volume 1. The First
Crusade. 1951. Penguin Books, Harmondsworth. Pg 68.
[67] Cahen. Ibid, pg 97.

[68] Amin Maalouf. The Crusades Through Arab Eyes. 1984. Al Saqi Books,
London. Pg 4.

[69] In 1072AD, the Great Seljuk Sultan, Malik Shah had granted Suleyman ibn
Kutalamis nominal authority over the Seljuks of Anatolia. This was less of an honour
than it might appear however, as Malik Shahs aim was to keep the rebellious
Kutalamis clan at a safe distance while he consolidated his power over the Great
Seljuk Sultanate. Once securely in power, Malik Shah sent an army against
Suleymans authority.

[70] Cahen. Ibid, pg 136. Alexius himself had no right to confer the title of Sultan,
which in theory could only be granted by the Caliph, but the Byzantines often used
titles and administered oaths in forms that were familiar to their recipients.

[71] The Seljuks appear to have put great stock in political marriages.

[72] It is interesting that Tzaches proclaimed himself emperor, rather than Sultan. He
had served in Constantinople for many years and his choice of title clearly indicates
he felt himself a naturalised Byzantine.

[73] ..the next day all those Turks who were eager to serve him received numerous
benefits; those who desired to go home were permitted to follow their inclination
and they too departed with not a few gifts. Anna Comnena. Ibid, pg 339-340. It is
also notable that Boutoumites, the Byzantine general Alexius sent to accompany the
Crusaders was a converted Turk. His troops were primarily Turkish mercenaries.

[74] Cahen. Ibid, pg 22. Manuel Comnenus aligned with Masud to drive the troops
of the Second Crusade quickly through Byzantine and Rum Seljuk territory.

[75] His real name was Malik Shah, Shahanshah being a Persian title meaning King of
Kings.

[76] Anna Comnena explains the treaty terms in speech she attributes to her
father. If you are willing, he said, to yield to the authority of Rome and put an end
to your raids on the Christians, you will enjoy favours and honours, living in freedom
for the rest of your lives on lands set aside for you. I refer to the lands where you
used to dwell before Romanus Diogenes became emperor and before in met the sultan
in battle.. Ibid, pg 488. The claim to lands set aside outside of Roman territory is
likely an invention of Anna. It is worthwhile comparing these terms with treaty
between Kilij Arslan II and Manuel from 1161AD, as reported by John
Kinnamos. Kilij Arslan promised throughout his life to be hostile to those who
cherished enmity against the emperor, but to be friendly to those who on the contrary,
were settled in his favour. Of the cities which he had won, he would give the greater
or more notable to the emperor. It was not allowed for him to make peace with any
enemy unless the emperor directed. He would fight as ally with the Romans on
request, and come with his entire force whether the conflict was an eastern or western
one. Nor would he allow those who lay beneath his authorityto do any harm
whatsoever to the Romans land, unpunished. John
Kinnamos. Epitome. 12th century. Translated by Charles M Brand, 1976. Published
as The Deeds of John and Manuel Comnenos. Columbia University Press, New York
pg 158. These appear to be standard terms of a Byzantine federate state.

[77] Eustathios of Thessaloniki. The Capture of

Thessalonica. 12th century. Translated by John Melville-Jones. 1987. Australian
Association for Byzantine Studies, Canberra. Pg 57

[78] Dimitri Obolensky. The Byzantine Commonwealth. Eastern Europe 500

1453. 1971. Cardinal Books (1974 edition), London.

[79] Cahen. Ibid, pgs 124-130. Aristeides Papadakis reports constant pressure from
the political and religious hierarchy in Constantinople to force those bishops and
priests who had fled during the conquest to return their diocese. The Christian East
and the Rise of the Papacy. The Church in History volume IV. 1994. SVS Press, New
York. Pg 186.

[80] An example might be the emir Tzachas of Smyrna, who served for a period at
court of Alexius Comnenus. Claiming the title of emperor for himself implied he was
Orthodox, as opposed to using the Islamic title of sultan.

[81] Brand. Ibid, Pg 22.

[82] After his cursory I told you so description of Romanus downfall after
Manzikert, Psellus moves directly on to a panegyric of the Ducas family and paints a
picture of the empire at peace with itself and its neighbours. Psellus, Ibid, pg 355 on.

[83] The barbarians had gone unchecked, from the time when they invaded the
Empire soon after Diogenes elevation to the throne and his eastern campaign (which
was ill-starred from the very beginning) right down to my fathers reign. (Anna
Comnena, Ibid, pg 504-05). The implication being that Alexius had checked the
Turks. Annas assessment was somewhat optimistic as the Turks were now a
permanent fixture in Anatolia. That she did not use John IIs inability to dislodge the
Turks as opportunity to slander her hated brother suggests she failure of Alexius
eastern policy.

[84] Amongst those who moved between the two societies were Manuel Comnenus
brother, Isaac Comnenus and several of his children, Andronicus Comnenus, Alexius
III Angelus, Michael Palaeologus and Kay Khusraw.

[85] Penna. Ibid, pg 103-108.

[86] On must also factor in the trading concessions Alexius granted the
Venetians. Both actions were economically disastrous in the long-term.