Energy Research & Social Science 27 (2017) 174180

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Energy Research & Social Science

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/erss

Perspectives

Contested deep geothermal energy in GermanyThe emergence of an

environmental protest movement
Conrad Kunze a, , Mareen Hertel b
a
Helmholtz-Zentrum fr UmweltforschungUFZ, Department Stadt- und Umweltsoziologie, Germany
b
Martin-Luther-Universitt Halle-Wittenberg, Germany

a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t

Article history: Geothermal Energy is regarded an important element of many future scenarios of 100% renewable energy.
Received 16 March 2016 Besides biomass, hydrodams and wave plants, geothermal can provide a steady base load of energy. While
Received in revised form 9 November 2016 the technology received little attention compared to wind or solar for most of its history, this has signif-
Accepted 10 November 2016
icantly changed in Germany in recent years. Since an earthquake attributed to geothermal development
in Swiss Basel in 2006, a risk discourse evolved in German language media reports. Subsequently local
Keywords:
protest groups have been founded that establish a new environmental protest movement. According to
Geothermal energy
the theory of vested interests (Kousis, 1993; Schnaiberg, 1993) and socially constructed risk perceptions
Protest movement
Technology acceptance
(Douglas and Wildavsky, 1982) the future development of deep geothermal technologies will continue
Risk perception to be accompanied by strong conicts of acceptance, that are likely to slow down its dissemination
signicantly.
2017 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction
Deep Geothermal Energy (DG) is an old form of renewable
energy. The rst plant was installed in Italy in 1904 and produced
at this time 220 kWh thermal energy. Since then many other plants
have followed in regions with geological dislocations (zones e.g.
with volcanic activity where hot reservoirs are available closer
to the surface than usual). For most geothermal techniques, this
dislocation is necessary and thus their range of application is lim-
ited. Newer techniques known as hot dry rock, hot wet rock, hot
fractured rock, petrothermal DG, deep heat mining or enhanced
geothermal system (EGS) depend to a smaller degree on these dislo-
cations, some predict even an applicability anywhere, independent
from dislocations. Porous rock has been the basic requirement for
using hot underground water in DG. The technology became widely
applied in some geological hotspots such as Iceland, Tuscany in
Italy, the Geysers in the USA and Cooper Basin in Australia [1]. The
principle is simple, a hole is drilled, usually between a thousand up
to 5000 m to exploit naturally occurring hot water. Above ground
it drives a steam turbine or is fed into a heating grid. With a second
drilling the water is reinjected in the ground.
The geographical limitation of traditional geothermal systems
restricted it to a minor role in the global energy provision until
Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: conrad.kunze@ufz.de (C. Kunze), hertel.mareen@gmail.com
(M. Hertel).
now. In 2004 DG supplied only 0.414% of the total primary energy
supply and 0.4% of global annual electric power consumption ([2],
p. 183), in 2012 the situation had not altered and no take-off of
geothermal energy is in sight yet.1
However this is supposed to change dramatically according to
some scenarios for a future of renewable energy provision that
expect steep increases for the use of geothermal power [37]. The
challenge of a provision with renewable energy baseload for 24 h
7 days a week can be addressed by DG, as proponents argue. The
predicted take-off in the coming years shall mainly be made pos-
sible by technological improvement, to which we will refer here
as EGS (see the listing above for alternative names). This involves
foremost a method known from the gas industry, hydraulic frac-
turing. Fracking is often promoted as the technological panacea
to reduce the dependence on limited natural geological conditions
by creating the required porous rock formations articially.
However as our ndings indicate, social acceptance is crucial
for the technologys dissemination in Germany and probably in
1
Also in 2012 geothermal contributed only 0,47% of the global primary energy
supply and 0,3165% of electricity production. Own calculation: 153,59 PWh global
primary energy consumption (http://www.eia.gov/cfapps/ipdbproject/iedindex3.
cfm?tid=44andpid=44andaid=2andcid=ww,andsyid=2008andeyid=2012andunit=QBTU),
12,8% covered by renewable energies and 3,7% of them are geothermal; 22752 TWh
global electricity production and 72 TWh production of electricity from geothermal
(http://de.statista.com/statistik/daten/studie/166918/umfrage/stromerzeugung-
weltweit-seit-1990; http://www.iea.org/topics/renewables/subtopics/geothermal/
).

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2016.11.007
2214-6296/ 2017 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
 C. Kunze, M. Hertel / Energy Research & Social Science 27 (2017) 174180
other countries as well. Since a series of earthquakes began in 2006
in Switzerland caused by EGS, and continued with more seismic
accidents caused by conventional systems in Germany, DG has sig-
nicantly lost popularity in both countries as was indicated by a sea
change in mass media reports that rather emphasize the technol-
ogys detriments than its benets [8,9]. As we found out, a wave of
local protest groups emerged in Germany, which can be interpreted
as a new environmental protest movement. As it is steadily grow-
ing in numbers, the scheduled mass application of DG becomes
much less likely. As our research shows, protests probably slow
down or even stop DG development in what could be called local
environmental justice conicts [10].
In the next section we sketch the used methods, section three
provides a brief overview of the used theories and section four
gives a historical outline of DG related accidents and the protest
movement. Section six locates DG in the German energy transition
Energiewende. Section seven provides an overview of the turning
point of public opinion and the emergence of the protest move-
ment. In section eight statistical ndings are interpreted with the
two theories. In section nine impact of protests on the future of DG
is discussed and section ten offers a conclusion and policy recom-
mendations.
2. Methods
There was no other research available except the media stud-
ies and an unpublished qualitative work. We decided to pursue
a quantitative approach, to gain an oversight of the local groups,
their dissemination and to nd statistical correlations. The studied
period covers the time from 2006 (rst major earthquake in Basel)
to 2015 and is limited to Germany.
We rst conducted an extensive online review between
November 2014 and April 2015 to complete existing data (from
the association of Geothermal Energy GtV) on running, planned and
abandoned DG projects, the protests against those and the related
seismic accidents. The GtV is a German lobby association with
about 600 active companies and individual members mostly from
industry, science and energy utilities. It offers the major dataset of
existing DG projects in Germany. Nevertheless the data required
numerous corrections and critical review, as we found some aws
seemingly stemming from an interest to portray DG as successful
as possible, not mentioning canceled projects.
To evaluate protests we surveyed and indexed all internet pages
of protest groups available, including facebook. By spending nearly
one year time on the dataset, we nally came up with a dataset
that we believe assembles a complete list of the locations, statuses,
types and energy outputs of DG projects in Germany in 2015.
We identied local citizen initiatives against DG (LCI) by their
internet presence, facebook groups or newspaper reports covering
them, that were available online. Most LCI are part of quite active
and branched networks, and refer to one another, which greatly
helped us nding them. After several months of research we could
not nd new LCI and concluded searching.
We came along a few cases, in which a protest popped up,
that even changed local politics, which was invisible before to our
inquiry.2 This happened only in few cases, and we hold it to be
reasonable that most protest groups seek public recognition and
thus have an online existence, or are at least reported about by
newspapers (that usually make articles available online). Minding
possible exceptions means that the real number of LCI is probably
higher than our numbers indicate. However it is very unlikely that
we missed any site of signicant protests.
2 5
E.g. in Neuried, 16.12.2014, http://www.bo.de/nachrichten/nachrichten-
regional/wir-sind-versuchskaninchen.
175
To draw a clear line between an informal group or people that
are unhappy with a DG project and a proper protest group is of
course to a certain degree a random choice. We decided to involve
only groups that display some real political activity (in contrast to
complaints in Facebook or a blog in the internet) and some local
members that were active (in contrast to one person initiatives
or declarations without active members behind). Furthermore we
checked if internet pages were still updated, and if other sources
(usually a newspaper) also reported on activities like public gath-
erings, meetings etc.3
A special case are villages and regions, that did not have an
LCI because feelings of opposition and anger were already chan-
neled into formal political forums, the local parliament, its parties
or the administration. In some cases local councils voted against DG
projects, without an LCI present.4 We included these cases in a chart
and a statistical analysis. We did not research further into formal
local political processes, as this requires eld research and a much
higher effort. Possibly more local councils have voted against DG,
than we know of, so the quota of regions in opposition (if coun-
cil votes against DG are counted as such) might again be higher
than indicated by our numbers. The real number of local protests
is therefore likely to be higher than indicated in our data.
Seismic accidents were counted as any seismic activity close to a
geothermal project site, with a likely connection of both. The con-
nection of DG and seismicity was usually made by press reports,
protest groups and administrations, and sometimes challenged
by DG advocates. We relied mostly on media reports as indica-
tors in the form of local newspapers online articles. In Germanys
dense media landscape it can be expected that no larger earth-
quake remains unmentioned by press coverage. However there is
no ofcial earthquake reporting scheme like in Japan, so data is
incomplete and possibly smaller earthquakes remained unmen-
tioned by news media and are thus missing in our statistics. The
reported earthquakes had magnitudes between 2 and 2,4.
Our data analysis was supported by an unpublished qualita-
tive study from a colleague, based on expert interviews and focus
group discussion in two towns with DG projects, Meiningen and
Bad Schleema, with a erce conict in the former.5 Our interpre-
tation of the data was informed by the theories of risk perception
[11], vested interests [12] and one in depth single case study on a
DG site in Greece [13].
3. The theory of risk perception and the theory of vested
interests
Risks are socially constructed and gain relevance by social pro-
cesses ([11], p. 186). Also a perceived need to act is only created
if risks are dened as such in scientic and public discourses [14].
Douglas and Wildavsky assume that the selection of risks for public
attention is not primarily based on the depth of scientic evidence
or on the likelihood of danger but on the public discourse on haz-
ardous issues ([15], p. 110; [11]). Socialized cognitive patterns work
like lters in the evaluation of information about a risk [16]. There-
fore, accidents alone do not necessarily lead towards a certain risk
perception, they can however change the discourse on risk [17].
The second set of theories, Schnaibergs treadmill of produc-
tion and the theory of vested interests allow for an analysis of the
development of a specic environmental conict and to categorize
the actors involved [18]. Schnaiberg offers an explanation of the
3
E.g. in Neuried, 16.12.2014, http://www.bo.de/nachrichten/nachrichten-
regional/wir-sind-versuchskaninchen.
4
E.g. in Bellheim, Rlzheim, December 2014.
The qualitative data was kindly made available by our colleague Dr. Alena Ble-
icher at Helmholtz Center UFZ, Leipzig.
176 C. Kunze, M. Hertel / Energy Research & Social Science 27 (2017) 174180
Table 1
Induced Earthquakes by Geothermal: referred to Hirschberg et al. [1], p. 264, Fig.
110; Landau included by the authors.
Year Area
1972 Geysers, California, USA
2003 Cooper Basin, Australia
2006 Basel, Switzerland
2007 Landau, Germany
2011 Hengill, Iceland
2012 Rotokawa, New Zealand
2012 Newberry, Oregon, USA
2013 St. Gallen, Switzerland
proliferation of environmental conicts; ecosystem services that
were formerly non-commodied and non-commercialised use val-
ues, are converted into exchange values to be traded and turned into
prots. By this process, the logic of prot maximisation is expanded
on areas of the natural world hitherto not integrated, thus sub-
jugating them to the necessity of being protable and productive
[18].
Maria Kousis applied Schnaibergs theory on a local DG conict
in Greece over decisions to allocate or restrict access by groups or
social classes (1993: 6). These are political struggle[s] between
those who will lose and those who will gain in the future [12]. The
involved parties are categorised by Schnaiberg [12] as the state,
producers (usually private investors) and consumers (local envi-
ronmental movement groups, workers, residents). The state plays
a double role as on one side supporting capital accumulation and
growth and on the other side protecting citizens rights e.g. with
environmental legislation. Producers are exclusively interested in
building up capital by capturing the exchange value of a natural
resource (in the Greek case study that was electricity from DG).
Consumers in contrast focus on their well-being depending on the
not-commercialised use value of a natural resource at stake (in the
Greek case study that was freedom from harmful pollution). Con-
icts evolve because each party acts according to their interests,
that are detrimental.
4. A history of protests and accidents
This chapter provides an overview of accidents and protests
in the international history of DG development. Table 1 provides
an incomplete map of areas where induced seismicity has been
reported from 1972 to today ([1], p. 264).
The number of recorded protests against geothermal energy is
much lower. Fierce protests are reported from the Greek Island of
Milos during the late 1980s [13], in recent years opposition from
traditional bath house (Onsen) owners is reported from Japan [19]
and Australia saw some negative community reactions [20]. In
the USA, DG was most notably opposed in Central Oregon [21]
and in Switzerland the local government bodies Kantone stopped
many geothermal projects after the 2006 Basel accident [1]. Since
2009 Germany has become the hotspot for a series of local protests
against DG that developed into an environmental protest move-
ment. This was surprising to some, as DG was usually acknowledged
as being part of the still popular Energiewende, the transition to
renewable energy.
5. Geothermal energy and the energiewende
The German energy context is very much shaped by the
Energiewende. In a 2013 survey 93% of interviewees from the
general population stressed the importance of further developing
renewable energies [22]. DG is portrayed by its industry advo-
cates, governmental and non-governmental organisations alike as
clearly being part of the Energiewende (c.f. [6], p. 59;[7], p. 53).
It is included in the feed in tariff (FiT) for renewable energies and
part of future energy scenarios, however only as a marginal con-
tribution to electricity and even (although to a larger degree) heat
Magnitude provision [7]. Nevertheless the status as a renewable form of energy
4.6 production is not agreed upon by many experts. The German Gov-
3.7 ernment Report from 2003 labels DG as only partially renewable
3.4 ([23], p. 18) and the International Energy Agency does not include
2.7
it amongst RES according to its denition [24]. The depletion of
3.8
3.5 a local underground thermal potential (constituted in the form of
2.6 hot fossil water or hot rock) by DG in a few decades is unavoidable
3.5 and even scheduled when DG plants are planned. DG can therefor
only be called renewable in the broadest sense, as after centuries
or even millennia the subterranean zone once tapped, regains its
original temperature from the steady but slow heat stream ema-
nating from the earths core ([23], p. 18). The International Energy
Agency denes renewable energy as a form of energy conversion
that does not exceed regeneration while being extracted, which
is the case for solar, wind and wave systems, but not for DG [24].
Nevertheless, electricity from DG is part of the German FiT scheme
and receives the highest rate amongst all renewable energy systems
with 25.2 cent/kWh (EEG [43]: 48). Furthermore it was not subject
to the severe cuts in FiT schemes in the 2014 law reform like solar
and wind power [25]. Even beyond the FiT DG enjoys additional
nancial governmental support.6 Possibly the biggest privilege is
its jurisdiction by the mining law which does neither involve a deci-
sion by a local parliament for a new DG site, nor an Environmental
Impact Assessment (EIA), as it is usual for wind parks. Thus, DG
prots twice, from being counted as part of the Energiewende and
being treated under the mining law.
6. Basel 2006, the turning point in public perception
DG was not a conictive technology and did not even receive
public attention for most of the time. Germany is naturally not very
suitable for DG due to its geological condition, and the rst plant
was only installed in 1984 in East Germany. Until the end of 2009
the total number increased to 14 that did neither stir up reported
protests nor induce seismicity or accidents.
When the accidents in Swiss Basel 2009 and in the German
towns Staufen (2007),7 Landau and Unterhaching 2009 occurred,
protests against various infrastructure projects, including energy,
were already on the rise [26,27]. The nearly annual protests against
nuclear energy were joined by protests against Carbon Capture and
Storage (CCS), Shale Gas, and also against renewable energy, mostly
notably wind parks [26,27].
The temporal correlation of the two accidents, in Basel and
Staufen, that received much media attention, and the turn in media
reports from rather positive to rather negative opinions on DG was
obvious [9,8] (Fig. 1).
7. The emergence of anti-geothermal protests
In 2009 the rst German citizen initiative against a DG project
emerged in the village of Duttweiler. Close by, a series of small
earthquake of magnitudes from 2 to 2,7 MW had occurred, trig-
gered by a DG site. Until 2014, as new DG sites were explored
and started operating, smaller earthquakes below 3 MW where
6
KFW bank gives credit up to 10 Mio. D with low interest rates for deep geother-
mal projects and there is research funding from the Federal Environment Ministry
and the Federal Ministry of Economics and Energy [4042].
7
It is noteworthy, that the Staufen accident was caused by a drilling for a close to
surface, not a deep geothermal system. Despite the fact that heat pumps are quite
different from deep geothermal systems, their accidents have likely had a halo-effect
on deep geothermal energy as well [8].
 C. Kunze, M. Hertel / Energy Research & Social Science 27 (2017) 174180
80
70
amount of arcles
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
year
Fig. 1. Media reporting about DG referred to Leucht [29].
reported (see Fig. 3). Subsequently 18 anti DG initiatives and
one nationwide federation of German citizens initiatives against
geothermal energy formed. In the years from 2010 to 2012, with-
out another major accident,8 new citizen initiatives kept emerging.
Since 2010 a nationwide network against DG tries to connect
all local protest groups. In 2011 and 2014 larger regional groups
merged from existing local groups. Referring to Rammstedt [28]
a protest movement is not only measured by its success but by
the overcoming of a social crisis. The movement must comprise
social inequalities and not just a local problem. The ongoing com-
mitment of anti-geothermal-initiatives, that have already achieved
their regional target, for environmental and energy policy is a sign
for such a protest movement. Furthermore the high number of new
initiatives and the intensied networking indicates the emergence
of a new environmental protest movement rather than isolated
not-in-my-backyard protests.
The question is of course why DG caused such a wave of protests
in the rst place.
The rst LCI has likely been caused by the three seismic events
in 2009, three events that clearly happened while DG where drilled
or began operation. The preeminent change in media reporting
following the earlier Basel and Staufen accident probably further
fostered the protest wave. However we dont nd Leuchts [29] the-
sis convincing, that it was only the media reports that caused the
wave of LCI, as protests continued even in absence of further major
accidents and media reports on them (Fig. 2).
As Graphic 4 indicates, the reason for the emergence of LCI is
not simply the higher number of new DG projects. From 1984 until
the end of 2008 13 DG systems went into operation in Germany
unchallenged by any protests. The new media discourse and the
Basel accident are probably a reason for beginning of the protest
wave in 2010 (Fig. 4).
8. Anti-geothermal protests in relation to other
technologies
Amongst renewable energies, new power lines, pumped storage
power stations and wind turbines often provoke intense protests
[30]. To evaluate the relative likeliness of protests against DG, if it
resembles the average or is above usual levels, we will compare
it with wind power. With regard to total numbers, the 18 protest
groups against DG are hardly noticed in Germanys very politicized
and conictive energy landscape [31].
8
As mentioned before, there is no ofcial earthquake or seismicity service in
Germany, like in Japan. Therefore the source for earthquakes are media reports.
Local protest groups usually report much more earthquakes than can be found in
media and ofcial reports. Smaller events might not be reported or we might not
have found them online.
177
Table 2
Impact of Protests and Parliamentarian Opposition on the 20 canceled DG Projects,
own research.
LCI no LCI total
Opposing local parliament 5 3 8
posive No opposing local parliament 4 8 12
total 9 11 20
neutral
negave
Protests against fossil and nuclear energy are well established
but in recent years also renewable energy projects were increas-
ingly contested, mostly so wind power. Approximately 70 local
citizen initiatives try to prevent single wind turbines and whole
wind parks [30].9 Put in relation to the total number of 1.870 wind
parks [32], the relative ratio is 3.7%. A much higher number of 400
protest groups is claimed by the association of anti-wind initia-
tives [33]. In this case the ratio was 21.4%. If the 56 DG projects
that are planned or constructed or operated are put in relation to
the 18 LCI, the relative rate of protests is 32% and thus higher than
wind power. We can thus conclude, that geothermal energy is rel-
atively more conictive than wind energy, and thus probably the
most conictive technology within the group of renewable energy
in Germany.
9. The impact of local citizen initiatives on deep
geothermal development
If 32% of all DG projects are opposed by local protests, the
question arises, in how far that slows down or even stops the dis-
semination of the technology. In the period from 2009 to 2015 16
DG systems successfully went into operation and 19 were canceled
or suspended without being further developed. Graphic 5 shows,
based on our ndings, the steady accumulation of canceled and
stopped DG projects.
It seems reasonable to assume a causation of canceled projects
and LCI. However only one DG project was ofcially canceled due to
local protests, in the town Meiningen. In other cases either no rea-
son was ofcially given at all, or nancial or geological conditions
blamed. As DG projects face multiple challenges, LCI could possibly
be one serious hindrance amongst others, even if not admitted by
developers. The two statistics cannot be a nal proof for a causal
relationship, as is always the case with two variables. The connec-
tion might still be coincidental. However the parallel rise of DG sites
and protests is at least a serious indicator for a connection of both
variables (Graphic 5).
A cross chart further supports the assumed link of protests and
canceled DG projects. From 20 canceled DG sites, 9 faced an LCI.
From the remaining 11 projects, 3 faced opposition from the local
parliament. Only the smaller part, 8 out of 20 projects did not face
one of the two forms of opposition. In a test of statistical signi-
cance using Cramers V respectively (The coefcient concerns the
strength of correlation of two dichotomous characters.) the result
of 0.28 indicates a correlation of protests from LCI and local par-
liaments and canceled projects. We can thus conclude that there is
some statistical evidence for a link between abandoned DG plans
and local protests, although further research should verify the nd-
ing (Table 2).
10. Limited prospects for enhanced geothermal energy
Deep geothermal energy has recently been promoted with an
enhanced version of the technology. The planned expansion of
9
This is still the newest reliable data available, the number is likely to be higher
in 2016.
178
Accidents
8.12.2006 seismicity in Basel (3,4 MW)
December 2007 enhancement in Staufen
(Breisgau)
02.02.&10.02.2009 seismicity in Unterhaching,
Taufkirchen (2,11 MW)
15.08.&14.09.2009 seismicity in Landau (2,7
and 2,4 MW)
06.11.2009 water fountain in Wiesbaden
17.02.2013 seismicity in Insheim (2,0 MW)
Fig. 2. Overview Anti Deep Geothermal Protests in Germany, own research.
35
amount of geothermal energy power plants /
30
25
20
LCI's
15
10
5
Fig. 3. comparison of geothermal energy power plants with local citizens initiatives (LCI) by year of implementing/foundation, own research.
DG in Germany and other countries would very likely be accompa-
nied by a shift in technology from conventional to rather enhanced
geothermal systems (EGS) [1]. As EGS involve hydraulic fractur-
ing, that has already caused worldwide protests in the gas industry
[34], the shift to EGS is likely to further amplify protests against
DG. Stephens and Jiusto [35] predict that EGS will certainly face
resistance, though its relatively low environmental prole and lack
of an established opposition compared with coal or with CCS sug-
gests developmental risks due to real and perceived environmental
harms may be lower (2010: 2024). Furthermore, they write that in
C. Kunze, M. Hertel / Energy Research & Social Science 27 (2017) 174180
Year Citizens initiative
2006
2007
2008
April 2009 BI Duttweiler
October 2009 BI BIFUNAE
2009 December 2009 BI Schutz Westufer Starnberger See
e.V.
January 2010 BI Freckenfeld Geothermie e.V.
February 2010 BI Geothermie Steinweiler
February 2010 BI Schaidt Aktiv e.V.
June 2010 BI Umwelt- und Naturschutz Haloch e.V.
2010 August 2010 Bundesverband Brgerinitiativen
Geothermie e.V.
September 2010 BI Geothermie Landau e.V.
November 2010 BI Geothermie Geinsheim
2011 February 2011 BifO Brgerinitiative frs Oberland
2012 April 2012 BI Geothermie Brhl Ketsch e.V.
December 2012 BI Brucker Holz
May 2013 BI Energieforum Rohrbach Insheim e.V.
2013 May 2013 Uttinger gegen Geothermie
September 2013 BI gegen Tiefengeothermie Meiningen
June 2014 BI gegen Tiefengeothermie im Sdlichen
2014 Oberrheingraben e.V.
September 2014 BI Contra Geothermie Mauerstetten
2015 January 2015 BI Massenheim (founded 1976) now
active against geothermal energy in Massenheim
accumulated amount of
geothermal energy power
plants in Germany
accumulated amount of LCI's
year of implemenng / foundaon
the USA, the technology has received limited attention [35]. With
regard to our ndings in Germany, we assume quite the opposite.
As more DG projects both of conventional and enhanced type are
planned and constructed, more protests will erupt, at least as long
as other conditions, like the legal embedding remain unchanged.
11. Conclusion and policy implications
We argued that a new risk discourse following a series of acci-
dents caused the emerging protest movement against DG. Building
 C. Kunze, M. Hertel / Energy Research & Social Science 27 (2017) 174180
20
amount of cancelled or stopped GT projects /
18
16
14
12
LCI's
10
8
6
4
2
0
2009
Fig. 4. Stopped and canceled geothermal energy power plants (blue) and local citizens initiatives opposing them (red) by year of implementing/foundation, own research
for Germany for the period from 1984 to 2015.
on theories of vested interests, it is expectable that the shift in
the risk discourse translates into a permanent and structurally
conictive relationship between project developers and local pop-
ulations. After two decades with a complete absence of protests,
deep geothermal energy in Germany is now as conictive as wind
parks.
With Perrows concept of normal risks (1984), the likeliness
of seismic events can be understood as inevitably connected with
DG, moderated by statistical chance. This seems to have become a
general perception, or at least a very much shared one in regions
with deep geothermal plants or plans for such. Who buys the car
buys the car accident, as Berthold Brecht said. Still this knowledge
leaves few car owners so worried to choose public transport or a
bicycle instead [36].
One difference of DG is that in contrast to other technologies,
the legal embedding of these risks is underdeveloped. The nancial
and legal liability for earthquakes is unevenly distributed between
project developers and the local population to the detriment of the
latter. The mining law offers little possibilities for insurances and
risk management, as costs for accidents are simply externalised to
the general public [37]. This does not lead to protests in all locations,
but the rate of protests is likely to stay on a high level as more sites
of DG planning face organised opposition.
A solution could be an insurance against seismic accidents most
notably earthquakes, that would shift costs of damages away from
the local population and public administration towards project
developers. The legal position of residents and local municipalities
to hold project developers liable is precarious, as many examples
have demonstrated. As a policy recommendation, we suggest that
the national government establishes mechanisms to grant com-
pensation to house owners or municipalities for degraded public
infrastructure by seismicity and against other environmental dam-
ages. Furthermore, citizens and councils need to have legal and
administrative channels to be part of a DG planning process, well
before it is nally shaped and permitted. Such an inclusion of risks
and accidents would certainly increase the price of heat and elec-
tricity from DG (as it would do so for all fossil and nuclear energy
production), so a second policy recommendation was to accept the
limitation of DG to few geologically suitable regions.
References
[1] S. Hirschberg, S. Wiemer, P. Burgherr, Energy from the Earth, Eidgenssische
Technische Hochschule Zrich, Zrich, 2015.
179
accumulated cancelled or
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