A.C. No. 10952, January 26, 2016 ENGEL PAUL ACA, Complainant, v. ATTY.

RONALDO P. SALVADO, Respondent. : JANUARY 2016 PHILIPPINE SUPREME 0060206 October17,2011 P2,120,000.00
COURTJURISPRUDENCECHANROBLESVIRTUALLAWLIBRARY
A.C.No.10952,January26,2016 0060191 October29,2011 P1,060,000.00
ThisreferstotheOctober11,2014Resolution 1oftheIntegratedBarofthePhilippinesBoard
of Governors (IBPBOG) which adopted and approved with modification the Report and 0060195 November16,2011 P1,590,000.00
Recommendation2 oftheInvestigatingCommissionersuspendingAtty.RonaldoP.Salvado
(Atty.Salvado)fromthepracticeoflaw.

TheComplaint:
OnMay30,2012,EngelPaulAcafiledanadministrativecomplaint 3 fordisbarmentagainst
Atty.SalvadoforviolationofCanon1,Rule1.01 4 andCanon7,Rule7.03 5 oftheCodeof
ProfessionalResponsibility(CPR).
Complainantalleged,amongothers,thatsometimein 2010, he metAtty.Salvadothrough
Atty.SamuelDivina(Atty.Divina),hischildhoodfriend;thatAtty.Salvadointroducedhimself
asalawyerandabusinessmanengagedinseveralbusinessesincludingbutnotlimitedtothe
lendingbusiness;thatonthesameoccasion,Atty.Salvadoenticedthecomplainanttoinvestin
hisbusinesswithaguaranteethathewouldbegivenahighinterestrateof5%to6%every
month;andthathewasassuredofaprofitableinvestmentduebyAtty.Salvadoasthelatter
hadvariousclientsandinvestors.
BecauseoftheserepresentationscoupledbytheassuranceofAtty.Salvadothathewouldnot
placehisreputationasalawyerontheline,complainantmadeaninitialinvestmentinhis
business.Thisinitialinvestmentyieldedanamountcorrespondingtotheprincipalplusthe
promisedinterest.Onvariousdatesfrom2010to2011,complainantclaimedthathewasagain
inducedbyAtty.Salvadotoinvestwithpromisesofhighratesofreturn.
Asconsiderationfortheseinvestments,Atty.Salvadoissuedseveralpostdatedchecksinthe
totalamountofP6,107,000.00,representingtheprincipalamountplusinterests.Allchecks
weredrawnfromPSBankAccountnumber040331000879,fullydescribedasfollows:
CheckNumber DateIssued Amount
0060144 August14,2011 P657,000.00
Uponpresentment,however,complainantwasshockedtolearnthattheaforementionedchecks
weredishonoredastheseweredrawnfrominsufficientfundsoraclosedaccount.
Complainant made several verbal and written demands upon Atty. Salvado, who at first,
openlycommunicatedwithhim,assuringhimthathewouldnotabscondfromhisobligations
and that he was just having difficulty liquidating his assets and collecting from his own
creditors.ComplainantwaseveninformedbyAtty.Salvadothatheownedrealpropertiesthat
couldserveaspaymentforhisobligations.Astimewentby,however,Atty.Salvadobeganto
avoidcomplainant'scallsandtextmessages.Attemptstomeetupwithhimthroughcommon
friendsalsoprovedfutile.ThispromptedcomplainanttoreferthemattertohislawyerAtty.
Divina,forappropriatelegalaction.
On December 26, 2011, Atty. Divina personally served the Notice of Dishonor on Atty.
Salvado, directing him to settle his total obligation in the amount of P747,000.00,
correspondingtothecashvalueofthefirsttwo(2)PSBankchecks,withinseven(7)daysfrom
receiptofthesaidnotice. 6Nevertheless,Atty.Salvadorefusedtoreceivethesaidnoticewhen
Atty.Divina'smessengerattemptedtoserveitonhim.
SometimeinApril2012,complainantyetagainengagedtheservicesofAtty.Divina,who,
withhisfilingclerkandthecomplainant'sfamily,wenttoAtty.Salvado'shousetopersonally
servethedemandletter.Acertain"Mark"whoopenedthegatetoldthefilingclerkthatAtty.
Salvadowasnolongerresidingthereandhadbeenstayingintheprovincealready.
Astheywereabouttoleave,aredvehiclearrivedbearingAtty.Salvado.Complainantquickly
alightedfromhisvehicleandconfrontedhimashewasabouttoenterthegateofthehouse.
Obviously startled, Atty. Salvado told him that he had not forgotten his debt and invited
complainanttoenterthehousesotheycouldtalk. Complainant refused theinvitationand
insteadtoldAtty.Salvadothattheyshouldtalkinsidehisvehiclewherehiscompanionswere.

0060147 September29,2011 P530,000.00 During this conversation, Atty. Salvado assured complainant that he was working on
"something"topayhisobligations.Hestillrefusedtopersonallyreceiveor,attheleast,read
0060190 September29,2011 P60,000.00 thedemandletter.

0060194 October16,2011 P90,000.00 Despitehispromises,Atty.Salvadofailedtosettlehisobligations.

For complainant, Atty. Salvado's act of issuing worthless checks not only constituted a
violationof BatasPambansaBilang22(B.P.22) orthe"AntiBouncingChecksLaw,"but
alsoreflectedhisdepravedcharacterasalawyer.Atty.Salvadonotonlyrefusedtocomply
withhisobligation,butalsousedhisknowledgeofthelawtoevadecriminalprosecution.He
hadobviouslyinstructedhishouseholdstafftolieastohiswhereaboutsandtorejectany
correspondencesenttohim.ThisresorttodeceitfulwaysshowedthatAtty.Salvadowasnotfit
toremainasamemberoftheBar.
TheDefenseoftheRespondent
OnJuly24,2012,Atty.SalvadofiledhisAnswer, 7 denyingthathetoldcomplainantthathe
hadpreviouslyenteredintovariousgovernmentcontractsandthathewaspreviouslyengaged
insomeotherbusinessespriortoengaginginthelendingandrediscountingbusiness.Atty.
Salvadoassertedthatheneverenticedcomplainanttoinvestinhisbusiness,butitwasAtty.
Divina'searningsofgoodinterestthatattractedhimintomakinganinvestment.Hefurther
statedthatduring theirinitial meeting, it was complainant whoinquiredif he stillneeded
additionalinvestments;thatitwasAtty.Divinawhoassuredcomplainantofhighreturns;and
thatcomplainantwasfullyawarethatthemoneyinvestedinhisbusinessesconstitutedaloan
tohisclientsand/orborrowers.Thus,fromtimetotime,thereturnofinvestmentandaccrued
interestwhendueasreflectedinthematuritydatesofthechecksissuedtocomplainant
couldbedelayed,wheneverAtty.Salvado'sclientsrequestedforanextensionorrenewalof
theirrespectiveloans.Inotherwords,thechecksheissuedweremerelyintendedassecurityor
evidenceofinvestment.
Atty. Salvado also claimed that, in the past, there were instances when he would request
complainantnottodepositacheckknowingthatitwasnotbackedupbysufficientfunds.This
arrangementhadworkeduntilthedishonorofthechecks,forwhichhereadilyofferedhis
houseandlotlocatedinMarikinaCityascollateral.
TheReplyofComplainant
OnAugust30,2012,complainantfiledhisReply, 8pointingoutthatAtty.Salvadodidnotdeny
receivingmoneyfromhimbywayofinvestment.Thus,hemustbedeemedtohaveadmitted
that he had issued several postdated checks which were eventually dishonored. Atty.
Salvado'sclaimthatitwascomplainanthimselfwhoproddedhimaboutmakinginvestments
must be brushed aside for being selfserving and baseless. Assuming arguendo, that
complainant indeed made offers of investment, Atty. Salvado should have easily refused
knowingfullywellthathecouldnotfundthechecksthathewouldbeissuingwhenthey
become due. If it were true that the checks were issued for complainant's security, Atty.
Salvadocouldhavedraftedadocumentevidencingsuchagreement.Hisfailuretopresentsuch
document,ifoneexistedatall,onlyprovedthatthesubjectcheckswereissuedaspaymentfor
complainant'sinvestment.9chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
ComplainantalsoclarifiedthathiscomplaintagainstAtty.Salvadowasnevermeanttoharass
him.Despitethedishonorofthechecks,hestilltriedtosettlethedisputewithAtty.Salvado
wholefthimwithnochoiceafterherefusedtocommunicatewithhimproperly.
Thereafter,thepartieswererequiredtofiletheirrespectivemandatoryconferencebriefsand
positionpapers.Atty.Salvadoinsistedthathehadactedinallhonestyandgoodfaithinhis
dealings with the complainant. He also emphasized that the title to his house and lot in
GreenheightsSubdivision,MarikinaCity,hadbeentransferredinthenameofcomplainant
after he executed a deed of sale as an expression of his "desire and willingness to settle
whateverisduetothecomplainant."10chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
ReportandRecommendationof
InvestigatingCommissioner
On January 2, 2014, the Investigating Commissioner recommended that Atty. Salvado be
metedapenaltyofsuspensionfromthepracticeoflawforsix(6)monthsforengagingina
conductthatadverselyreflectsonhisfitnesstopracticelawandforbehavinginascandalous
mannertothediscreditofthelegalprofession.Atty.Salvado'sactofissuingcheckswithout
sufficientfundstocoverthesameconstitutedwillfuldishonestyandimmoralconductwhich
underminethepublicconfidenceinthelegalprofession.
TheIBPBOGResolution
On October 11, 2014, the IBPBOG adopted and approved the recommendation with
modification as to the period of suspension. The IBPBOG increased the period of Atty.
Salvado'ssuspensionfromsix(6)monthstotwo(2)years.
NeitheramotionforreconsiderationbeforetheIBPBOGnorapetitionforreviewbeforethis
Courtwasfiled.Nonetheless,theIBPelevatedtothisCourttheentirerecordsofthecasefor
appropriate action with the IBP Resolution being merely recommendatory and, therefore,
would not attain finality, pursuant to par. (b), Section 12, Rule 139B of the Rules of
Court.11chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
TheCourt'sRuling
Thepartiesgaveconflictingversionsofthecontroversy.Complainant,claimedtohavebeen
lured by Atty. Salvado into investing inhis businesses with the promise of yielding high
interests,whichhebelievedbecausehewasalawyerwhowasexpectedtoprotecthispublic
imageatalltimes.Atty.Salvado,ontheotherhand,deniedhavingenticedthecomplainant,
whomheclaimedhadinvestedbyvirtueofhisowndesiretogainprofits.Heinsistedthatthe
checksthatheissuedinfavorofcomplainantwereintheformofsecurityorevidenceof
investment.Itfollowed,accordingtoAtty.Salvado,thathemustbeconsideredtohavenever
ensured the payment of the checks upon maturity. Atty. Salvado strongly added that the
dishonorofthesubjectcheckswas"purelyaresultofhisgullibilityandinadvertence,withthe
unfortunate result that he himself was a victim of failed lending transactions
xxx."12chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
TheCourtsustainsthefindingsoftheIBPBOGandadoptsitsrecommendationinpart.
 theirownandmayproceedindependentlyofcivilandcriminalcases,includingviolationsof
First.Aperusaloftherecordsrevealsthatcomplainant'sversiondeservescredence,notonly B.P.22.
duetotheunambiguousmannerbywhichthenarrativeofeventswaslaiddown,butalsoby
thecoherentreasoningthenarrativehasemployed.Thepublicis,indeed,inclinedtorelyon Accordingly,theonlyissue in disciplinaryproceedings againstlawyersisthe respondent's
representationsmadebylawyers.Asamanoflaw,alawyerisnecessarilyaleaderofthe fitnesstoremainasamemberoftheBar.TheCourt'sfindingshavenomaterialbearingon
community,lookeduptoasamodelcitizen. 13Aman,learnedinthelawlikeAtty.Salvado,is other judicial actions which the parties may choose to file against each
expectedtomaketruthfulrepresentationswhendealingwithpersons,clientsorotherwise.For other.16chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
theCourt,andastheIBPBOGhadobserved,complainant'sbeingbeguiledtopartwithhis
moneyandbelieveAtty..Salvadoasalawyerandbusinessmanwastypicalhumanbehavior All told, the Court finds that Atty. Salvado's reprehensible conduct warrants a penalty
worthyofbelief.TheCourtfindsithardtobelievethatapersonlikethecomplainantwould commensuratetohisviolationoftheCPRandtheLawyer'sOath.
notfindtheprofessionofthepersononwhosebusinesseshewouldinvestasimportantto
consider. Simply put, Atty. Salvado's stature as amember ofthe Bar had,in one way or WHEREFORE,theCourtfindsAtty.RonaldoP.SalvadoGUILTYofviolatingRule1.01,
another,influencedcomplainant'sdecisiontoinvest. Canon1andRule7.03oftheCodeofProfessionalResponsibility.Accordingly,theCourt
SUSPENDShimfromthepracticeoflawforaperiodoftwo(2)years.
Second.ItmustbepointedoutthatthedenialsprofferedbyAtty.Salvadocannotbeliethe
dishonorofthechecks.Hisstrainedexplanationthatthechecksweremeresecuritiescannotbe LetcopiesofthisdecisionbefurnishedtheOfficeoftheBarConfidant,theIntegratedBarof
countenanced.Ofallpeople,lawyersareexpectedtofullycomprehendthelegalimportof thePhilippines,andallcourtsalloverthecountry.Letacopyofthisdecisionbeattachedto
bouncingchecks.In Lozanov.Martinez,14 theCourtruledthatthegravamenoftheoffense thepersonalrecordsoftherespondent.
punishedbyB.P.22istheactofmakingandissuingaworthlesscheck;thatis,acheckthatis
dishonoreduponitspresentationforpayment.Thethrustofthelawistoprohibit,underpain SOORDERED.cralawlawlibrary
ofpenalsanctions,themakingandcirculationofworthlesschecks.Becauseofitsdeleterious
effectsonthepublicinterest,thepracticeisproscribedbythelaw. Sereno, C.J., Carpio, Velasco, Jr., LeonardoDe Castro, Brion, Peralta, Bersamin, Del
Castillo, Perez, Mendoza, Reyes, PerlasBernabe, Leonen, and Jardeleza, JJ.,
Hence,theexcuseof"gullibilityandinadvertence"deservesscantconsideration.Surely,Atty. concur.cralawlawlibrary
SalvadoisawarethatpromotingobediencetotheConstitutionandthelawsofthelandisthe
primaryobligationoflawyers.Whenheissuedtheworthlesschecks,hediscreditedthelegal Endnotes:
professionandcreatedthepublicimpressionthatlawsweremeretoolsofconveniencethat
couldbeused,bendedandabusedtosatisfypersonalwhimsanddesires.InLaov.Medel,15the 1
Rollo,p.143.
Courtwrotethattheissuanceofworthlesschecksconstitutedgrossmisconduct,andputthe
erringlawyer'smoralcharacterinseriousdoubt,thoughitwasnotrelatedtohisprofessional 2
Id.at144148.
dutiesasamemberoftheBar.CoveredbythisdictumisAtty.Salvado'sbusinessrelationship
withcomplainant.Hisissuanceofthesubjectchecksdisplayhisdoubtfulfitnessasanofficer 3
Id.at211.
ofthecourt.Clearly,heviolatedRule1.01andRule7.03oftheCPR.
4
"Alawyershallnotengageinunlawful,dishonest,immoralordeceitfulconduct."
Third.Parenthetically,theCourtcannotoverlookAtty.Salvado'sdeceivingattemptstoevade
paymentofhisobligations.Insteadofdisplayingacommittedattitudetohiscreditor,Atty. 5
"Alawyershallnotengageinconductthatadverselyreflectsonthefitnesstopracticelaw,
Salvadorefusedtoanswercomplainant'sdemands.Heeventriedtomakethecomplainant norshallhe,whetherinpublicorprivatelife,behaveinascandalousmannertothediscreditof
believethathewasnolongerresidingathisgivenaddress.Theseactsdemonstratelackof thelegalprofession."
moralcharactertosatisfytheresponsibilitiesanddutiesimposedonlawyersasprofessionals
andasofficersofthecourt.Thesubsequentoffershehadmadeandtheeventualsaleofhis 6
Rollo,pp.1516.
propertiestothecomplainant,unfortunatelycannotoverturnhisactsunbecomingofamember
oftheBar. 7
Id.at3540.

Fourth.TheCourtneednotelaborateonthecorrectnessoftheInvestigatingCommissioner's 8
Id.at4554.
relianceonjurisprudencestatingthatadministrativecasesagainstlawyersbelongtoaclassof
9
Id.at50. Mario Crespo, otherwise known as Mark Jimenez (Jimenez), filed a complaint for estafa
against complainant, her sister Rosemarie Flaminiano, Marcel Crespo, Geraldine Antonio,
10
Id.at119.Seealsoid.at124132. BrendaHeffron,MagdalenaCunanan,andIsabelGonzalez.5Thesaidcomplaintwasdocketed
asISNo.074314withtheOfficeoftheCityProsecutorofMakatiCity.Jimenezallegedthat
11
Section12.ReviewanddecisionbytheBoardofGovernors. hewasthetrueandbeneficialownerofthesharesofstockinClarionRealtyandDevelopment
Corporation(Clarion),whichwasincorporatedspecificallyforthepurposeofpurchasinga
xxxx residentialhouselocatedinForbesPark,MakatiCity(Forbesproperty).Theincorporatorsand
originalstockholdersofClarionwereasfollows:
b) If the Board, by the vote of a majority of its total membership, determines that the
respondent should be suspended from the practice of law or disbarred, it shall issue a ThomasK.Chua P500,000.00
resolution setting forth its findings and recommendations which, together with the whole
recordofthecase,shallforthwithbetransmittedtotheSupremeCourtforfinalaction.
TeresitaC.Alsua P500,000.00
12
Rollo,p.120.
MylaVillanueva P249,998.00
13
Blanzav.Arcangel,A.C.No.492,September5,1967,21SCRA1,4.
EdgarB.Francisco P1.00
14
230Phil.406,421(1986).

15
453Phil.115(2003).
16
Roav.Moreno,633Phil.1,8(2010).
A.C.No.10548December10,2014
CAROLINECASTANEDAJIMENEZ,Complainant,
vs.
ATTY.EDGARB.FRANCISCO,Respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA,J.:
ThisreferstotheResolutionsoftheIntegratedBarofthePhilippines,BoardofGovernors
(IBPBOG), dated January 3, 20131 and March 22, 2014,2 adopting and approving the
findingsoftheCommissiononBarDiscipline(CBD)whichfoundAtty.Edgar8.Francisco
(AltyFrancisco)administrativelyliableformultipleviolationsoftheCodeofProfessional
Responsibility(CPR)andrecommendedthepenaltyofsuspensionofone(1)yearfromthe
practiceoflaw.
OnSeptember6,2007,theCBDreceivedacomplaint,datedJuly14,2007,3filedbyCaroline
CastaedaJimenez(complainant)againstAtty.FranciscoformultipleviolationsoftheCPR.
OnOctober24,2007,Atty.FranciscofiledhisAnswer.4OnJune26,2009,themandatory
conferencewasheldandterminated.OnlythecounselforAtty.Franciscoappeared.Thenotice
ofthesaidconferenceaddressedtocomplainantwasreturnedwiththenotation"unknownat
the given address." No new address was provided by the complainant. Both parties
wererequired to submit their respective position papers. For this purpose, Atty. Francisco
adoptedhisAnswer.TheAntecedents
SoledadGamat P1.00
Simultaneous with the drafting of Clarions Articles of Incorporation, the abovenamed
stockholders, except for Myla Villanueva (Myla), executed a deed of assignment of their
respective shares in favor of complainant, who was then Jimenezs commonlaw
partner.Clarions total capitalizationwas only P5,000,000.00.Thus, inorder toachieveits
purposeofpurchasingtheForbesproperty,Clarionsimulatedaloanfromthecomplainantin
the amount of P80,750,000.00. Thereafter, Clarion purchased the Forbes property in the
amountofP117,000,000.00fromGerardoContreras.Toeffectthesale,Mylahandedacheck
in the said amount which was funded entirely by Jimenez. The sale, however, was
undervalued.Inthedeedofsale,itwasmadetoappearthattheForbespropertywaspurchased
for P78,000,000.00only.Further,themoneyusedasthepurchasepricewasnotreflectedin
thebooksofClarion.
OnJuly19,2001,ThomasChuaandTeresitaAlsuaassignedtheirsharesinClariontoJimenez
byvirtueofadeedoftrust.Ontheotherhand,Mylas249,997sharesweretransferredto
complainantbasedonadeedofassignment.Theremainingone(1)sharewastransferredto
Ma.CarolinaC.Crespo.ThesetransactionsappearedinClarionsGeneralInformationSheet
(GIS)filedwiththeSecuritiesandExchangeCommission(SEC).Resultantly,thesubscribed
sharesofClarionwereasfollows:
MarkJimenez P500,000.00
CarolineJimenez P749,997.00
Ma.CarolinaC.Crespo P1.00

EdgarB.Francisco P1.00
SoledadGamat P1.00
OnNovember5,2002,Jimeneztransferredallhissharestocomplainantbyanotherdeedof
assignment,makinghertheholderofClarionsharesamountingtoP1,249,997.00.
AccordingtoJimenezscomplaint,whilehewasinprisonintheUnitedStatesin2004,he
learned from Atty. Francisco that his son, Marcel Crespo (Marcel), approached the
complainant and threatened her, claiming that the United States Internal Revenue Service
(IRS)wasabouttogoaftertheirproperties.Marcelsucceededinpersuadingcomplainantto
transfer her nominal shares in Clarion to Geraldine Antonio, through another deed of
assignment.Again,thiswasreflectedinClarionsGISfortheyear2004.
Thereafter, Jimenez was informed by Atty. Francisco that, through fraudulent means,
complainant and her corespondents in the estafa case, put the Forbes property for sale
sometimein August 2004. The said property was eventually sold to Philmetro Southwest
EnterpriseInc.(Philmetro)fortheamountofP118,000,000.00withoutJimenezsknowledge.
This sale was again undervalued at P78,000.000.00 per the deed of sale. Atty. Francisco
relayedtoJimenezthathewastheonewhoreceivedthepaymentforthesaleoftheForbes the subsequent changes in the ownership of Clarion shareholdings were also pursuant to
propertyandthathehandedalltheproceedsthereoftoRosemarieFlaminianointhepresence
ofcomplainant.
Jimenezs complaint for estafa was based on complainants alleged participation in the
fraudulentmeansinsellingtheForbespropertywhichwasacquiredbyClarionwithJimenezs
money.ComplainantwasdutyboundtoremitalltheproceedsofthesaletoJimenezasthe
trueandbeneficialowner.Complainantandhercorespondents,however,misappropriatedand
convertedthefundsfortheirpersonaluseandbenefit.
InsupportofJimenezscomplaintforestafa,Atty.Franciscoexecutedanaffidavitreiterating
itsfactualaverments.6Aperusalofthisaffidavitlikewisewouldshowthefollowingclaims
andadmissions,amongotherthings,ofAtty.Francisco:
1. Sometime in August 2004, complainant called him, asking for assistance in the
documentationofthesaleoftheForbespropertyownedbyClarion.Atty.Franciscoaskedher
if she had secured permission from Mark Jimenez and complainant answered in the
affirmative.
2.TheBoardofDirectorsofClarionissuedaresolutionauthorizinghimtonegotiatethesale
oftheproperty.
3.Forpurposesofthesale,heopenedanaccountwithSecurityBank,SanFranciscoDel
Montebranch.Whenthecashpaymentwasdeposited,hewithdrewtheamountandhandedthe
sametoRosemarieFlaminianointhepresenceofcomplainant.
4.Alltransfersofshareswerecausedwithoutanyconsideration.Thetransfertaxes,however,
werepaid.
5.WhenMarkJimenezreturnedtothePhilippines,hewasabletoconfirmthatthesaleofthe communicationnortheproscriptionagainstrepresentingconflictinginterests,ontheground
Forbespropertywaswithouthisknowledgeandapproval.Theproceedsofthesalehadalready
beenfarmedouttodifferentcorporationsestablishedbycomplainantandhersister.
6.Thefrequentchangesinstockholdingswerepremeditatedinordertostealthemoneyof
MarkJimenez.
TheComplaint
Complainantwasshockeduponreadingtheallegationsinthecomplaintforestafafiledby
Jimenez against her. She felt even more betrayed when she read the affidavit of Atty.
Francisco,onwhomshereliedasherpersonallawyerandClarionscorporatecounseland
secretaryofClarion.ThispromptedhertofileadisciplinarycaseagainstAtty.Franciscofor
representingconflictinginterests.Accordingtoher,sheusuallyconferredwithAtty.Francisco
regardingthe legalimplicationsofClarions transactions. Moresignificantly, theprincipal
documentsrelativetothesaleandtransferofClarionspropertywereallpreparedanddrafted
by Atty. Francisco or the members of his law office.7 Atty. Francisco was the one who
activelyparticipatedinthetransactionsinvolvingthesaleoftheForbesproperty.Without
admittingthetruthoftheallegationsinhisaffidavit,complainantarguedthatitsexecution
clearlybetrayedthetrustandconfidenceshereposedonhimasalawyer.Forthisreason,
complainantprayedforthedisbarmentofAtty.Francisco.
TheRespondentsPosition
InhisAnswer,8Atty.FranciscorepliedthatJimenezinitiallyengagedhisservicesin1998for
theincorporationofClarionforthepurposeofpurchasingaresidentialhouseinForbesPark,
where he intended to live with his longtime partner, the complainant; that the original
incorporatorsandstockholdersofClarionheldtheirrespectivesharesintrustforJimenez;that
Jimenezsorders;andthatasthecorporatesecretaryandlegalcounselofClarion,heprepared
allthelegaldocumentationtogiveeffecttothesaidtransfersand,ultimately,tothepurchaseof
theForbesproperty.
Atty.Franciscofurtherstatedthatsometimein2004,JimenezwasimprisonedintheUnited
StatesforexcessivecontributionstotheDemocraticParty;thatduringthistime,Jimenezs
son,Marcel,andthecomplainant,askedhimagaintochangetheownershipofClarionshares
inordertoavoidtheattachmentofJimenezspropertiesinataxevasioncase;thatheacceded
totherequestonthebeliefthatthiswasinaccordancewithJimenezswishes;andthatasa
result,almost100%ofClarionsownershipwastransferredinthenameofGeraldineAntonio.
Atty.Franciscoalsoclaimedthat,thereafter,complainanttaskedhimtotalktoprospective
buyersandtonegotiatethesaleoftheForbespropertyuntilitwassoldfor P118,000,000.00;
thatMarcelandcomplainantledhimtobelievethatJimenezhadknowledgeofthesaleasthey
wereinconstantcommunicationwithhim;thatalltheserepresentations,however,turnedout
tobefalsewhenJimenezreturnedtothePhilippinesanddiscoveredthattheproceedsofthe
sale were coursed through other corporations set up by complainant and her sister; that
Jimenezlikewiselearnedofthesuccessivesaleofhisotherproperties,includingMeridian
TelekomsInc.,bythemembersofhisfamily;andthatthisledtothefilingoftheestafacase
againstthecomplainantandtheothers.AsawitnesstothefraudcommittedagainstJimenez,
Atty.Franciscoexecutedtheaffidavitnarratingthefactsandcircumstancessurroundingthe
saidtransactions.
Atty.Franciscomainlyarguedthatheviolatedneithertheruleondisclosuresofprivileged
thatcomplainantwasnothisclient.HewasthelawyerofJimenezandthelegalcounselof
Clarion,butneverofthecomplainant.Hemighthaveassistedherinsomematters,butthese
wereallunderthenotionthatJimenezhadgivenhimauthoritytodoso.Further,thoughhe
acted as legal counsel for Clarion, no attorneyclient relationship between him and
complainantwas formed, as a corporation has aseparate and distinctpersonality from its
shareholders.Whileheadmittedthatthelegaldocumentationforthetransferofsharesandthe
saleoftheForbespropertywerepreparedbyhimandnotarizedbythemembersofhislaw
firm,heaverredthattheseactswereperformedinhiscapacityasthecorporatesecretaryand
legal counsel ofClarion, and not as a lawyer of complainant. Therefore, he served no
conflictinginterestsbecauseitwasnota"formerclient"anda"subsequentclient"whowere
theopposingpartiesinlitigation.
He opined that assuming that complainant was indeed his client, the rule on privileged
communicationdoesnotapplytohiscase.Here,complainantfailedtoallege,muchlessprove,
the requisites for the application of the privilege. When Atty. Francisco denied being her
lawyer,thecomplainantshouldhaveestablished,byclearandconvincingevidence,thata
lawyerclientrelationshipindeedexistedbetweenthem.Complainantfailedtodothis.
Arguingthattheexecutionofhisaffidavitintheestafacasewasbutatruthfulnarrationof
factsbyawitness,Atty.FranciscocitedGonzagav.Caete,9wheretheCourtruledthat"the
factthatoneofthewitnessesforthedefendanthadbeenformerlythelawyerforthedefendant
inthissuitwasnogroundforrejectinghistestimony."Inthiscase,hemerelyattestedtothe
fraudulentactsofcomplainant,inthecourseofwhich,hedefendedandservedJimenezasa
client.Thiswaslikewisepursuanttotherulethatunlawfulandillegalmotivesandpurposes
were not covered by the privilege. It was just unfortunate that he fell for the ploy of
complainant.
TheFindingsoftheInvestigatingCommissioner
IntheCommissionersReport,10datedNovember7,2011,theInvestigatingCommissioner,
Atty. Jose I. dela Rama, Jr. (Investigating Commissioner),found Atty. Francisco guilty of
violations of the CPR and recommended that he be suspended for one (1) year from the
practiceoflaw.Initially,theInvestigatingCommissionernotedthatthesubsequentaffidavitof
desistanceexecutedbyJimenezintheestafacasedidnotaffecttheinvestigationconductedby
theCBDasitwasnotanordinarycourtwhichacceptedcompromisesorwithdrawalsofcases.
Afterweighingontheclaimsoftheparties,theInvestigatingCommissionerconcludedthat
nothing in the records would show that a lawyerclient relationship existed between Atty.
FranciscoandJimenez.11ThecircumstanceswouldshowthatAtty.Franciscowasanoriginal
incorporatorandshareholderofClarion.Hewasalsothelegalcounselandcorporatesecretary
ofthesaidcorporation,thearticlesofincorporationofwhichdidnotincludeJimenezasan
originalincorporator.Hebecameastockholderonlyin2001,whenJimenezacquiredshares
from Thomas Chua and Teresita Alsua. Jimenezs participation in Clarion affairs again
stoppedwhenheassignedtheentiretyofhissharesinfavorofcomplainant.
GrantingthatJimenezreallyowned100%ofClarionasalludedtobyAtty.Francisco,the
reportstatedthatitwouldappearthatthelatterpermittedmisrepresentationsastoClarions
ownershiptobereportedtotheSECthroughitsGIS.TheInvestigatingCommissioneralso
pointedoutAtty.FranciscosclearadmissionthatthetransferofshareswithinClarionwere
"withoutanyconsideration,"rancountertothedeedsofassignmentthatheagainadmittedly
executedascorporatecounsel.Worse,Atty.Franciscoadmittedtohavesimulatedtheloanand
undervaluedtheconsiderationoftheeffectedsaleoftheForbesproperty,whichdisplayedhis
unlawful, dishonest, immoral, and deceitful conduct in violation of Canon 1 of the CPR.
Further,whenheexecutedtheaffidavitcontainingallegationsagainsttheinterestofClarion
andcomplainant,theInvestigatingCommissionerheldthatAtty.Franciscoviolatedtheruleon
privilegedcommunicationandengagedinanactthatconstitutedrepresentationofconflicting
interestsinviolationofCanons15and21oftheCPR.
InitsJanuary3,2013Resolution,12theIBPBOGadoptedandapproved,intoto,thefindings
andrecommendationoftheCBDagainstAtty.Francisco.
TherespondentreceivedacopyofthesaidresolutiononMarch26,2013andmovedforits
reconsideration.13
Atty.FranciscoappealedtothecompassionoftheIBPBOG,reasoningoutthatthepenaltyof
suspensionofone(1)yearistoosevereconsideringthatinhismorethanthreedecadesof
practice, he had never been involved in any act that would warrant the imposition of
disciplinaryactionuponhim.Itwasonlyin2007,whenhisclient,Jimenez,experienceda
difficultcrisisinvolvinghischildrenandcommonlawpartnerthatheexperiencedamajor
upheavalinhisprofessionallife.Heapologizedforhisnotbeingtoocircumspectindealing
withtherelativesofJimenez.
Astothechargesagainsthim,Atty.Franciscoreiteratedthathisparticipationintheexecution
of the documents pertaining to the sale of the Forbes property were all connected to his
capacityasClarionscorporatesecretaryandlegalcounsel,nottomentionhistieswithhis
clientand friend, Jimenez.Headmitted thatheowed fidelitytoClarionandJimenez,but
deniedthatthisdutyextendedtotheincorporatorsandshareholdersofClarion.Thus,when
complainantsoughtadviceinhercapacityasashareholderinClarion,nofiduciarydutyarose
onhispart.Inhisownwords,Atty.Franciscoinsistedthat"CarolisnotClarionandvice
versa."14
Attached to Atty. Franciscos motion for reconsideration was an affidavit executed by
Jimenez, stating that he had retained the legal services of Atty. Francisco since 1999.
EspousingAtty.Franciscosdefenses,JimenezassertedthatAtty.Franciscoslawfirmwasin
chargeofallthecompaniesheownedinthePhilippines.HedirectedAtty.Franciscotoexecute
allthedocumentationtoshowhisownershipofthesecompanies,includingClarion.These
documents were in the possession of complainant for safekeeping. When Jimenez ran for
Congress in 2001,Atty. Francisco personally assisted him in the filing ofhis certificate of
candidacyandtheproceedingsbeforetheelectoraltribunals.Whilehewasinprisoninthe
UnitedStates,itwasAtty.Franciscowhovisitedandtoldhimthathischildren,Mylaand
Marcel, were then facilitating the sale of one of his companies, Meridian Telekoms, Inc.,
withouthisknowledge.HeaskedAtty.Franciscotokeepquietabouthischildrensbetrayal
andtowaituntilhecouldgohome.Whenhefiledthecriminalcasesagainsthischildrenand
complainant, the latter even filed a frivolous kidnapping case against Atty. Francisco.
AccordingtoJimenez,thepeoplewhocommittedcrimesagainsthimwerenowexhaustingall
possiblemeanstokeepAtty.Franciscosilentandtopreventthelatterfromperforminghis
dutiesasalawyer.
In its March 22, 2014 Resolution,15 the IBPBOG denied the respondents motion for
reconsideration.
NopetitionforreviewwasfiledwiththeCourt.
TheCourtsRuling
ViolationsofCanons1and10oftheCPRandtheLawyersOath
Canon1andRule1.01oftheCPRprovide:
CANON1ALAWYERSHALLUPHOLDTHECONSTITUTION,OBEYTHELAWSOF
THELANDANDPROMOTERESPECTFORLAWANDLEGALPROCESSES.
Rule1.0Alawyershallnotengageinunlawful,dishonest,immoralordeceitfulconduct.
Canon1clearlymandatestheobedienceofeverylawyertolawsandlegalprocesses.Tothe
bestofhisability,alawyerisexpectedtorespectandabidebythelawand,thus,avoidanyact
oromissionthatiscontrarythereto.Alawyerspersonaldeferencetothelawnotonlyspeaks
ofhischaracterbutitalsoinspiresrespectandobediencetothelaw,onthepartofthepublic.
Rule1.0,ontheotherhand,statesthenormofconducttobeobservedbyalllawyers.
Anyactoromissionthatiscontraryto,orprohibitedorunauthorizedby,orindefianceof,
disobedientto,ordisregardsthelawis"unlawful.""Unlawful"conductdoesnotnecessarily
imply the element of criminality although the concept is broad enough to include such
element.16Tobe"dishonest"meansthedispositiontolie,cheat,deceive,defraudorbetray;be
unworthy;lackinginintegrity,honesty,probity,integrityinprinciple,fairnessandstraight
forwardness17 while conduct that is "deceitful" means the proclivity for fraudulent and
deceptivemisrepresentation,artificeordevicethatisuseduponanotherwhoisignorantofthe
truefacts,totheprejudiceanddamageofthepartyimposedupon.18
Membershipinthelegalprofessionisbestoweduponindividualswhoarenotonlylearnedin
law, but also known to possess good moral character. Lawyers should act and comport
themselveswithhonestyandintegrityinamannerbeyondreproach,inordertopromotethe
publicsfaithinthelegalprofession.19"Tosaythatlawyersmustatalltimesupholdand
respectthe lawis tostatetheobvious,butsuchstatementcan neverbeoveremphasized.
Consideringthat,ofallclassesandprofessions,[lawyersare]mostsacredlyboundtouphold
thelaw,itisimperativethattheylivebythelaw."20
WhenAtty.FranciscowasadmittedtotheBar,healsotookanoathto"obeythelaws,""dono
falsehood," and conduct himself as a lawyer according to the best of his knowledge and
discretion.21
Inthefactsobtaininginthiscase,Atty.Franciscoclearlyviolatedthecanonsandhissworn
duty.Heisguiltyofengagingindishonestanddeceitfulconductwhenheadmittedtohaving
allowed his corporate client, Clarion, to actively misrepresent to the SEC, the significant
mattersregardingitscorporatepurposeandsubsequently,itscorporateshareholdings.Inthe
documents submitted to the SEC, such as the deeds of assignment and the GIS, Atty.
Francisco,inhisprofessionalcapacity,feignedthevalidityofthesetransfersofshares,making
it appear that these were done for consideration when, in fact, the said transactions were
fictitious, albeit upon the alleged orders of Jimenez. The Investigating Commissioner was
correctinpointingoutthatthisrancountertothedeedsofassignmentwhichheexecutedas
corporatecounsel.Inhislongpracticeascorporatecounsel,itisindeedsafetoassumethat
Atty. Francisco is knowledgeable in the law on contracts, corporation law and the rules
enforcedbytheSEC.AscorporatesecretaryofClarion,itwashisdutyandobligationto
registervalidtransfersofstocks.Nonetheless,hechosetoadvancetheinterestsofhisclientele
with patent disregard of his duties as a lawyer. Worse, Atty. Francisco admitted to have
simulatedtheloanenteredintobyClarionandtohaveundervaluedtheconsiderationofthe
effectedsaleoftheForbesproperty.Hepermittedthisfraudulentrusetocheatthegovernment
of taxes. Unquestionably, therefore, Atty. Francisco participated in a series of grave legal
infractionsandwascontenttohavegrantedtherequestsofthepersonsinvolved.
Despite assertions that these were in accordance to Jimenezs wishes, or pursuant to
complainantsmisrepresentations,theCourtcannotturnablindeyeonAtty.Franciscosactof
drafting, or at the very least, permitting untruthful statements to be embodied in public
documents. If the Court allows this highly irregular practice for the specious reason that
lawyersareconstrainedtoobeytheirclientsflawedschemingandmachinations,theCourt
would,ineffect,sanctionwrongdoingandfalsity.Thiswouldunderminetheroleoflawyersas
officersofthecourt.
Timeandagain,theCourthasremindedlawyersthattheirsupportforthecauseoftheirclients
shouldneverbeattainedattheexpenseoftruthandjustice.Whilealawyerowesabsolute
fidelitytothecauseofhisclient,fulldevotiontohisgenuineinterest,andwarmzealinthe
maintenance anddefense ofhisrights, as well asthe exertionof his utmostlearning and
ability,hemustdosoonlywithintheboundsofthelaw.Itneedstobeemphasizedthatthe
lawyer'sfidelitytohisclientmustnotbepursuedattheexpenseoftruthandjustice,and
mustbeheldwithintheboundsofreasonandcommonsense.Hisresponsibilitytoprotectand
advancetheinterestsofhisclientdoesnotwarrantacourseofactionpropelledbyillmotives
andmaliciousintentions.22
In the same vein, Atty. Franciscos admissions show that he lacks candor regarding his
dealings.Canon10oftheCPRprovidesthat,"[a]lawyerowescandor,fairnessandgoodfaith
tothecourt."Corollarythereto,Rule10.0oftheCPRprovidesthat"alawyershalldono
falsehood,norconsenttothedoingofanyinCourt,norshallhemisleadorallowtheCourtto
be misled by an artifice." Lawyers are officers of the court, called upon to assist in the
administrationofjustice.Theyactasvanguardsofourlegalsystem,protectingandupholding
truthandtheruleoflaw.Theyareexpectedtoactwithhonestyinalltheirdealings,especially
withthecourt.23
Fromtheforegoing,Atty.Franciscoclearlyviolatedhisdutiesasalawyerembodiedinthe
CPR,namely,toavoiddishonestanddeceitfulconduct,(Rule1.01,Canon1)andtoactwith
candor,fairnessandgoodfaith(Rule10.01,Canon10).Also,Atty.Francisodesecratedhis
solemnoathnottodoanyfalsehoodnorconsenttothedoingofthesame.
RuleonConflictingInterestsandDisclosureofPrivilegedCommunication
WithrespecttoAtty.Franciscosallegedrepresentationofconflictinginterestsanddisclosure
ofprivilegedcommunication,theCourtdeviatesfromthefindingsoftheIBPBOG.
Rule15.03,Canon15oftheCPRprovidesthat,"[a]lawyershallnotrepresentconflicting
interestsexceptbywrittenconsentofallconcernedgivenafterafulldisclosureofthefacts."24
"Therelationshipbetweenalawyerandhis/herclientshouldideallybeimbuedwiththehighest
level of trust and confidence. This is the standard of confidentiality that must prevail to
promoteafulldisclosureoftheclientsmostconfidentialinformationtohis/herlawyerforan
unhamperedexchangeofinformationbetweenthem.Needlesstostate,aclientcanonlyentrust
confidentialinformationtohis/herlawyerbasedonanexpectationfromthelawyerofutmost
secrecyanddiscretion;thelawyer,forhispart,isdutyboundtoobservecandor,fairnessand
loyaltyinallhisdealingsandtransactionswiththeclient.Partofthelawyersdutyinthis
regardistoavoidrepresentingconflictinginterests"25Thus,eveniflucrativefeesofferedby
prospectiveclientsareatstake,alawyermustdeclineprofessionalemploymentifthesame
wouldtriggeraviolationoftheprohibitionagainstconflictofinterest.
InQuiambaov.Bamba,26theCourtdiscussedtheapplicationoftheruleonconflictofinterest
inthiswise:
Inbroadterms,lawyersaredeemedtorepresentconflictinginterestswhen,inbehalfofone
client,itistheirdutytocontendforthatwhichdutytoanotherclientrequiresthemtooppose.
Developments in jurisprudence have particularized various tests to determine whether a
lawyersconductlieswithinthisproscription.Onetestiswhetheralawyerisdutyboundto
fightforanissueorclaiminbehalfofoneclientand,atthesametime,toopposethatclaimfor
theotherclient.Thus,ifalawyersargumentforoneclienthastobeopposedbythatsame
lawyerinarguingfortheotherclient,thereisaviolationoftherule.
Anothertestofinconsistencyofinterestsiswhethertheacceptanceofanewrelationwould
preventthefulldischargeofthelawyersdutyofundividedfidelityandloyaltytotheclientor
invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or doubledealing in the performance of that duty. Still
anothertestiswhetherthelawyerwouldbecalleduponinthenewrelationtouseagainsta
former client any confidential information acquired through their connection or previous
employment.
Theproscriptionagainstrepresentationofconflictinginterestappliestoasituationwherethe
opposingpartiesarepresentclientsinthesameactionorinanunrelatedaction.Itisofno
momentthatthelawyerwouldnotbecalledupontocontendforoneclientthatwhichthe
lawyer has to oppose for the other client, or that there would be no occasion to use the
confidentialinformationacquiredfromonetothedisadvantageoftheotherasthetwoactions
arewhollyunrelated.Itisenoughthattheopposingpartiesinonecase,oneofwhomwould
lose the suit, are present clients and the nature or conditions of the lawyers respective
retainerswitheachofthemwouldaffecttheperformanceofthedutyofundividedfidelityto
bothclients.
Fromtheforegoing,itisobviousthattheruleonconflictofinterestspresupposesalawyer
clientrelationship.Thepurposeoftheruleispreciselytoprotectthefiduciarynatureoftheties
betweenanattorneyandhisclient.Conversely,alawyermaynotbeprecludedfromaccepting
and representing other clients on the ground of conflict of interests, if the lawyerclient
relationshipdoesnotexistinfavorofapartyinthefirstplace.
In determining whether or not Atty. Francisco violated the rule onconflict of interests, a
scrutiny of the parties submissions with the IBP reveals that the complainant failed to
establishthatshewasaclientofAtty.Francisco.
First, complainants claim of being Atty. Franciscos client remains unsubstantiated,
consideringitsdetailedrefutation.AllthatthecomplaintallegedwasthatAtty.Franciscowas
Clarionslegalcounselandthatcomplainantsoughtadviceandrequesteddocumentationof
severaltransfersofsharesandthesaleoftheForbesproperty.Thiswasonlysuccessfulin
showingthatAtty.Francisco,indeed,draftedthedocumentspertainingtothetransactionand
thathewasretainedaslegalcounselofClarion.Therewasnodetailedexplanationastohow
shesupposedlyengagedtheservicesofAtty.Franciscoasherpersonalcounselandastowhat
andhowshecommunicatedwiththelatteranentthedealingsshehadenteredinto.Withthe
complaintlackinginthisregard,theunrebuttedanswermadebyAtty.Francisco,accompanied
withadetailednarrativeofhisengagementascounselofJimenezandClarion,wouldhaveto
prevail.
Second,thereisastarkdisparityintheamountofnarrativedetailspresentedbytheparties.
Atty. Franciscos claim thathe was the counsel of Clarion and Jimenez, and not of the
complainant, was clearly established in a sworn statement executed by Jimenez himself.
Complainants evidence pales in comparison with her claims of being the client of Atty.
Franciscocouchedingeneraltermsthatlackedparticularityofcircumstances.
Third,noteworthyisthefactthatcomplainantoptednottofileareplytoAtty.Franciscos
answer.Thiscouldhavegivenheropportunitytopresentevidenceshowingtheirprofessional
relationship.ShealsofailedtoappearduringthemandatoryconferencewiththeIBPCBD
withoutevenupdatingherresidentialaddressonrecord.Herparticipationintheinvestigation
ofthecaseapparentlyendedatitsfiling.
Insuspensionordisbarmentproceedings,lawyersenjoythepresumptionofinnocence,andthe
burdenofproofrestsuponthecomplainanttoclearlyprovetheallegationsinthecomplaintby
preponderantevidence.Preponderanceofevidencemeansthattheevidenceadducedbyone
sideis,asawhole,superiortoorhasgreaterweightthanthatoftheother.Itmeansevidence
which is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that which is offered in
opposition thereto. Under Section 1 of Rule 133, in determining whether or not there is
preponderance of evidence, the court may consider the following: (a) all the facts and
circumstances of the case; (b) the witnesses manner of testifying, their intelligence, their
meansandopportunityofknowingthefactstowhichtheyaretestifying,thenatureofthefacts
towhichtheytestify,theprobabilityorimprobabilityoftheirtestimony;(c)thewitnesses
interestorwantofinterest,andalsotheirpersonalcredibilitysofarasthesamemayultimately
appear in the trial; and (d) the number of witnesses, although it does not mean that
preponderanceisnecessarilywiththegreaternumber.27
Markedly,Atty.Franciscocouldhavepreventedhisentanglementwiththisfiascoamongthe
membersofJimenezsfamilybytakinganupfrontandcandidstanceindealingwithJimenezs
childrenandcomplainant.Hecouldhavebeenstaunchinremindingthelatterthathistasks
wereperformedinhiscapacityaslegalcounselforClarionandJimenez.Bethatasitmay,
Atty. Franciscos indiscretion does not detract the Court from finding that the totality of
evidencepresentedbythecomplainantmiserablyfailedtodischargetheburdenofprovingthat
Atty.Franciscowasherlawyer.Atmost,heservedasthelegalcounselofClarionand,based
ontheaffirmationpresented,ofJimenez.Sufficeittosay,complainantfailedtoestablishthat
Atty.Franciscocommittedaviolationoftheruleonconflictofinterests.
Consequently,theruleonlawyerclientprivilegedoesnotapply.InMercadov.Vitriolo,28the
Courtelucidatedonthefactorsessentialtoestablishtheexistenceofthesaidprivilege,viz:
Infine,thefactorsareasfollows:
(1)Thereexistsanattorneyclientrelationship,oraprospectiveattorneyclientrelationship,
anditisbyreasonofthisrelationshipthattheclientmadethecommunication.
Mattersdisclosedbyaprospectiveclienttoalawyerareprotectedbytheruleonprivileged
communicationeveniftheprospectiveclientdoesnotthereafterretainthelawyerorthelatter
declinestheemployment.Thereasonforthisistomaketheprospectiveclientfreetodiscuss
whateverhewisheswiththelawyerwithoutfearthatwhathetellsthelawyerwillbedivulged
orusedagainsthim,andforthelawyertobeequallyfreetoobtaininformationfromthe
prospectiveclient.xxx
(2)Theclientmadethecommunicationinconfidence.
Themererelationofattorneyandclientdoesnotraiseapresumptionofconfidentiality.The
clientmustintendthecommunicationtobeconfidential.
Aconfidentialcommunicationreferstoinformationtransmittedbyvoluntaryactofdisclosure
betweenattorneyandclientinconfidenceandbymeanswhich,sofarastheclientisaware,
discloses the information to no third person other than one reasonably necessary for the
transmissionoftheinformationortheaccomplishmentofthepurposeforwhichitwasgiven.
Ourjurisprudenceonthematterrestsonquiescentground.Thus,acompromiseagreement
preparedbyalawyerpursuanttotheinstructionofhisclientanddeliveredtotheopposing
party,anofferandcounterofferforsettlement,oradocumentgivenbyaclienttohiscounsel fromthepracticeoflawforsix(6)monthsiswarranted.
not in his professional capacity, are not privileged communications, the element of WHEREFORE,theCourtfindsAtty.EdgarB.FranciscoGUILTYofviolationofCanons1
confidentialitynotbeingpresent. and10oftheCodeofProfessionalResponsibilityforwhichheisSUSPENDEDfromthe
(3)Thelegaladvicemustbesoughtfromtheattorneyinhisprofessionalcapacity. practiceoflawforaperiodofsix(6)months,effectiveuponreceiptofthisDecision,witha
The communication made by a client to his attorney must not be intended for mere STERNWARNINGthatacommissionofthesameorsimilaroffenseinthefuturewillresult
information,butforthepurposeofseekinglegaladvicefromhisattorneyastohisrightsor intheimpositionofamoreseverepenalty.
obligations.Thecommunicationmusthavebeentransmittedbyaclienttohisattorneyforthe Let a copy of this Decision be entered into the records of Atty. Edgar B. Francisco and
purposeofseekinglegaladvice. furnishedtotheOfficeoftheClerkofCourt,theOfficeoftheBarConfidant,theIntegrated
If theclientseeksanaccountingservice, orbusinessorpersonal assistance, andnot legal BarofthePhilippines,andallcourtsinthePhilippines,fortheirinformationandguidance.
advice,theprivilegedoesnotattachtoacommunicationdisclosedforsuchpurpose. Atty.FranciscoisDIRECTEDtoinformtheCourtofthedateofhisreceiptofthisDecisionso
[Emphasessupplied] thattheCourtcandeterminethereckoningpointwhenhissuspensionshalltakeeffect.
Consideringthesefactorsinthecaseatbench,theCourtholdsthattheevidenceonrecordfails SOORDERED.
todemonstratetheclaimsofcomplainant.Asdiscussed,thecomplainantfailedtoestablishthe JOSECATRALMENDOZA
professionalrelationshipbetweenherandAtty.Francisco.Therecordsarefurtherbereftofany AssociateJustice
indication that the "advice" regarding the sale of the Forbes property was given to Atty. WECONCUR:
Franciscoinconfidence.Neitherwasthereademonstrationofwhatshehadcommunicatedto DIOSDADOM.PERALTA*
Atty.Francisconorarecitalofcircumstancesunderwhichtheconfidentialcommunication AssociateJustice
wasrelayed.Allthatcomplaintallegedinhercomplainantwasthat"shesoughtlegaladvice
fromrespondentinvariousoccasions."29Consideringthatcomplainantfailedtoattendthe MARIANOC.DELCASTILLO MARTINS.VILLARAM
hearings at the IBP, there was no testimony as to the specific confidential information AssociateJustice AssociateJustice
allegedlydivulgedbyAtty.Franciscowithoutherconsent.Itis, therefore,difficult, ifnot
impossible,todetermineiftherewasanyviolationoftheruleonprivilegedcommunication. MARVICM.V.F.LEONEN
AsheldinMercado,suchconfidentialinformationisacruciallinkinestablishingabreachof AssociateJustice
theruleonprivilegedcommunicationbetweenattorneyandclient.Itisnotenoughtomerely Footnotes
asserttheattorneyclientprivilege.30Itcannotbegainsaidthenthatcomplainant,whohasthe *DesignatedActingMemberinlieuofAssociateJusticeAntonioT.Carpio,whoinhibited
burdenofprovingthattheprivilegeapplies,failedinthisregard. himself,asamemberofhisstaffiscloselyrelatedtoaparty,perRaffledatedDecember9,
ThePenalty 2014.
AmemberoftheBarmaybepenalized,evendisbarredorsuspendedfromhisofficeasan **DesignatedActingMemberinlieuofAssociate.JusticeArturoD.Brion,perSpecialOrder
attorney, for violating of the lawyers oath and/or for breaching the ethics of the legal No.1888,datedNovember28,2014.
professionasembodiedintheCPR,31forthepracticeoflawisaprofession,aformofpublic 1Rollo,p.278.
trust,theperformanceofwhichisentrustedtothosewhoarequalifiedandwhopossessgood 2Id.at309.
moralcharacter.32Theappropriatepenaltyonanerrantlawyerdependsontheexerciseof 3Id.at27.
soundjudicialdiscretionbasedonthesurroundingfacts.33 4Id.at115140.
UnderSection27,Rule138oftheRevisedRulesofCourt,amemberoftheBarmaybe 5Id.at141149.
disbarredorsuspendedonanyofthefollowinggrounds:(1)deceit;(2)malpracticeorother 6Id.at100104.
grossmisconductinoffice;(3)grosslyimmoralconduct;(4)convictionofacrimeinvolving 71)DeedofAssignmentdatedNovember5,2002notarizedbyAtty.PastorM.Reyes,Jr.;2)
moralturpitude;(5)violationofthelawyer'soath;(6)willfuldisobedienceofanylawfulorder GeneralInformationSheetdatedNovember5,2002preparedbyAtty.Francisco;3)Deedof
ofasuperiorcourt;and(7)willfulappearanceasanattorneyforapartywithoutauthority.A Assignment dated August 10, 2004 notarized by Atty. Pastor M. Reyes, Jr.; 4) General
lawyermaybedisbarredorsuspendedformisconduct,whetherinhisprofessionalorprivate InformationSheetdatedSeptember9,2004preparedbyAtty.FranciscoandnotarizedbyAtty.
capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity and good PastorM.Reyes,Jr.;5)DeedofAbsoluteSaledatedJune15,2005betweenClarionand
demeanor,orunworthytocontinueasanofficerofthecourt. PhilmetrocoveringtheForbespropertysignedbyAtty.FranciscoonbehalfofClarion;and6)
While the Court finds no violation of the rule on conflict of interests and disclosure of BoardResolutiondatedMarch28,2005signedbyAtty.Francisco.
privileged communication, the acts of Atty. Francisco, in actively and passively allowing 8Rollo,pp.115140.
Clarion tomake untruthful representations to the SEC and in other public documents, still 93Phil.394,397(1904).
constitutemalpracticeandgrossmisconductinhisofficeasattorney,forwhichasuspension 10Rollo,pp.279288.
11JimenezwasrepresentedbytheLawOfficeofChavezMirandaAseocheintheestafacase
hefiledagainstthecomplainant.
12Rollo,p.278.
13Id.at289304.
14Id.at294.
15Id.at309.
16BlacksLawDictionary(6thed.),p.1538.
17BlacksLawDictionary(6thed.),p.468.
18BlacksLawDictionary(6thed.),p.405.
19Riverav.Corral,433Phil.331,342(2002).
20Resurreccionv.Sayson,360Phil.313,315(1998),citingExparteWall,107U.S.265;
citedinMalcolm,LegalandJudicialEthics,p.214.
21TheLawyersOathstatesinfull:
I, _______ do solemnly swear that I will maintain allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines;IwillsupporttheConstitutionandobeythelawsaswellasthelegalordersofthe
dulyconstitutedauthoritiestherein;Iwilldonofalsehood,norconsenttothedoingofanyin
court;Iwillnotwittinglyorwillinglypromoteorsueanygroundless,falseorunlawfulsuit,or
giveaidnorconsenttothesame;Iwilldelaynomanformoneyormalice,andwillconduct
myselfasalawyeraccordingtothebestofmyknowledgeanddiscretion,withallgoodfidelity
aswelltothecourtsastomyclients;andIimposeuponmyselfthesevoluntaryobligations
withoutanymentalreservationorpurposeofevasion.SohelpmeGod.
22PlusBuilders,Inc.v.Revilla,Jr.,533Phil.250,261(2006),citingChoav.Chiongson329
Phil.270(1996).
23Id.,citingTingDumaliv.Torres,471Phil.1,9(2004);Radjaiev.Alovera,392Phil.1,17
(2000);Zigav.Arejola,486Phil.37,49(2004);Berbanov.Barcelona,457Phil.331,345
(2003);Radjaiev.Alovera,supra;Busiosv.Ricafort,347Phil.687,692(1997).
24Anionv.Sabitsana,Jr.,A.C.No.5098,April11,2012,669SCRA76,81.
25Id.at8081.
26505Phil.126,134135(2005).
27Rodicav.Lazaro,A.C.No.9259,August23,2012,679SCRA1,910,citingAbaSiaov.
Atty.DeGuzman,Jr.,A.C.No.7649,December14,2011,662SCRA361,372.
28498Phil.49,5860(2005).
29Rollo,p.3.
30Supranote28,at61.
31Catuv.Rellosa,569Phil.539,550(2008).
32DirectorofReligiousAffairsv.Bayot,74Phil.579,581(1944).
33LimSantiagov.Saguico,520Phil.538,552(2006). A.C.No.10579,December10,2014ERLINDAFOSTER,Complainant,v.ATTY.JAIME
V. AGTANG, Respondent. : DECEMBER 2014 PHILIPPINE SUPREME COURT
TheLawphilProjectArellanoLawFoundation JURISPRUDENCECHANROBLESVIRTUALLAWLIBRARY
A.C.No.10579,December10,2014
This refers to the Resolution1 of the Board of Governors (BOG), Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP), dated March 23, 2014, affirming with modification the findings of the
InvestigatingCommissioner,whorecommendedthesuspensionofrespondentAtty.JaimeV.
Agtang(respondent)fromthepracticeoflawforone(1)yearforethicalimproprietyand
orderedthepaymentofhisunpaidobligationstocomplainant.

From the records, it appears that the IBP, thru its Commission onBar Discipline ( CBD),
received a complaint2, dated May 31, 2011, filed by Erlinda Foster (complainant) against
respondentforunlawful,dishonest,immoralanddeceitful 3actsasalawyer.
InitsJuly1,2011Order, 4theIBPCBDdirectedrespondenttofilehisAnswerwithin15days
fromreceiptoftheorder.Respondentfailedtodosoandcomplainantsentaqueryastothe
status of her complaint. On October 10, 2011, the Investigating Commissioner issued the
Order5settingthecaseformandatoryconference/hearingonNovember16,2011.Itwasonly
onNovember11,2011,orfive(5)daysbeforethescheduledconferencewhenrespondent
filedhisverifiedAnswer.6
During the conference, only the complainant together with her husband appeared. She
submitted a set of documents contained in a folder, copies of which were furnished the
respondent. The Investigating Commissioner 7 indicated that the said documents would be
reviewedandthepartieswouldbeinformediftherewasaneedforclarificatoryquestioning;
otherwise,thecasewouldbesubmittedforresolutionbasedonthedocumentsonfile.The
Minutes8ofthemandatoryconferenceshowedthatrespondentarrivedat11:10oclockinthe
morningoraftertheproceedingwasterminated.
OnDecember12,2011,thecomplainantfiledherReplytorespondentsAnswer.
OnApril18,2012,complainantsubmittedcopiesoftheJanuary24,2012Decisions 9 ofthe
Municipal Trial Court in Small Claims Case Nos. 20110077 and 20110079, ordering
respondent[defendanttherein]topaycomplainantandherhusbandthesumofP100,000.00
andP22,000.00,respectively,withinterestattherateof12%perannumfromDecember8,
2011untilfullypaid,pluscostofsuit.10
ComplainantsPosition
Fromtherecords,itappearsthatcomplainantwasreferredtorespondentinconnectionwith
herlegalproblemregardingadeedofabsolutesalesheenteredintowithTierraRealty,which
respondent had notarized. After their discussion, complainant agreed to engage his legal
services for the filing of the appropriate case in court, for which they signed a contract.
Complainant paid respondent P20,000.00 as acceptance fee and P5,000.00 for incidental
expenses.11
OnSeptember28,2009,respondentwrotealetter 12toTropicalVillasSubdivisioninrelation
tothelegalproblemreferredbycomplainant.Hethenvisitedthelatterinherhomeandasked
foraloanofP100,000.00,payableinsixty(60)days,fortherepairofhiscar.Complainant,
havingtrustandconfidenceonrespondentbeingherlawyer,agreedtolendtheamountwithout
interest.Apromissorynote13evidencedtheloan.
InNovember2009,complainantbecameawarethatTierraRealtywasattemptingtotransferto
its name a lot she had previously purchased. She referred the matter to respondent who
recommendedtheimmediatefilingofacaseforreformationofcontractwithdamages.On
November8,2009,respondentrequestedandthereafterreceivedfromcomplainanttheamount
ofP150,000.00,asfilingfee. 14Whenaskedabouttheexorbitantamount,respondentcitedthe
highvalueofthelandandthesheriffstravelexpensesandaccommodationsinManila,forthe
serviceofthesummonstothedefendantcorporation.Later,complainantconfirmedthatthe
feespaidforthefilingofCivilCaseNo.1479165,entitled ErlindaFosterv.TierraRealty
andDevelopmentCorporation,onlyamountedtoP22,410.00pertrialcourtrecords.15
During a conversation with the Registrar of Deeds, complainant also discovered that
respondentwastheonewhonotarizedthedocumentbeingquestionedinthecivilcaseshe
filed.Whenaskedaboutthis,respondentmerelyrepliedthathewouldtakeacollaborating
counsel to handle complainants case. Upon reading a copy of the complaint filed by
respondent with the trial court, complainant noticed that: 1] the major differences in the
documentsissuedbyTierraRealtywerenotalleged;2]thecontracttobuyandsellandthe
deedofconditionalsalewerenotattachedthereto;3]thecomplaintdiscussedthemethodof
paymentwhichwasnotthepointofcontentioninthecase;and4]theveryanomaliesshe
complainedofwerenotmentioned.Respondent,however,assuredherthatthosematterscould
bebroughtupduringthehearings.
OnApril23,2010,respondentwrotetocomplainant,requestingthatthelatterextendtohim
the amount of P70,000.00 or P50,000.00 in the moment of urgency or emergency. 16
ComplainantobligedtherequestandgaverespondentthesumofP22,000.00.
On August 31, 2010, respondent came to complainants house and demanded the sum of
P50,000.00, purportedly to be given to the judge in exchange for a favorable ruling.
Complainantexpressedhermisgivingsonthispropositionbutsheeventuallygavetheamount
ofP25,000.00whichwascoveredbyareceipt,17statingthatitisunderstoodthatthebalance
ofP25,000.00shallbepaidlaterafterfavorablejudgmentforplaintiffErlindaFoster.On
November2,2010,respondentinsistedthattheremainingamountbegivenbycomplainant
priortothenexthearingofthecase,becausethejudgewasallegedlyaskingforthebalance.
Yetagain,complainanthandedtorespondenttheamountofP25,000.00. 18
On September 29, 2010, complainants case was dismissed. Not having been notified by
respondent,complainantlearnedofthedismissalonDecember14,2010,whenshepersonally
checkedthestatusofthecasewiththecourt.Shewenttotheofficeofrespondent,buthewas
notthere.Instead,oneoftheofficestaffgaveheracopyoftheorderofdismissal.
OnDecember15,2010,respondentvisitedcomplainantandgaveheracopyofthemotionfor
reconsideration.OnJanuary15,2011,complainantwenttoseerespondentandrequestedhim
toprepareareplytothecommentfiledbyTierraRealtyonthemotionforreconsideration;to
include additional facts because the Land Registration Authority would not accept the
documentsunlessthesewereamended;andtomaketheadditionalavermentthatthedefendant
wasusingfalsedocuments.
OnJanuary18,2011,respondentsdriverdeliveredtocomplainantacopyofthereplywitha
messagefromhimthatthematterssherequestedtobeincludedwerementionedtherein.Upon
readingthesame,however,complainantdiscoveredthatthesematterswerenotsoincluded.
Onthesameoccasion,thedriveralsoaskedforP2,500.00onrespondentsdirectiveforthe
reimbursementofthevalueofabottleofwinegiventothejudgeasapresent.Complainant
wasalsotoldthatoralargumentsonthecasehadbeensetthefollowingmonth. 19
On February 2, 2011, complainant decided to terminate the services of respondent as her
counselandwrotehimaletteroftermination, 20afterherfriendgavehercopiesofdocuments
showing that respondent had been acquainted with Tierra Realty since December 2007.
Subsequently,complainantwrotetorespondent,requestinghimtopayhertheamountshe
receivedfromherlessthecontractfeeandtheactualcostofthefilingfees.Respondentnever
replied.
RespondentsPosition
InhisAnswer,21 respondentallegedthathewas72yearsoldandhadbeenengagedinthe
practiceoflawsinceMarch1972,andwasPresidentoftheIBPIlocosNorteChapterfrom
1998to1999.HeadmittedthefactthathenotarizedtheDeedofAbsoluteSalesubjectof
complainantscase,buthequalifiedthathewasnotpaidhisnotarialfeestherefor.Helikewise
admittedactingascounselforcomplainantforwhichheclaimedtohavereceivedP10,000.00
asacceptancefeeandP5,000.00forincidentalfees.AnenttheloanofP100,000.00,respondent
averred that it was complainant, at the behest of her husband, who willingly offered the
amounttohimforhispatienceinvisitingthemathomeandforhisservices.Thetransaction
wasdeclaredasnoloanandhewastoldnottoworryaboutitspayment.Asregardsthe
amountofP150,000.00hereceivedforfilingfees,respondentclaimedthatthesaidamount
was suggested by the complainant herself who was persistent in covering the incidental
expensesinthehandlingofthecase.Hedeniedhavingsaidthatthesheriffsofthecourtwould
need the money for their hotel accommodations. Complainants husband approved of the
amount.Inthesamevein,respondentdeniedhavingaskedforaloanofP50,000.00andhaving
receivedP22,000.00fromcomplainant.Healsodeniedhavingtoldherthatthecasewouldbe
discussedwiththejudgewhowouldruleintheirfavorattheverynexthearing.Instead,itwas
complainantwhowasbotheredbythepossibilitythattheotherpartywouldbefriendthejudge.
Heneversaidthathewouldpersonallypresentabottleofwinetothejudge.
Further,respondentbeliedtheRegistrarscommentastohisrepresentationofTierraRealtyin
thepast.Respondentsawnothingwronginthissituationsincecomplainantwasfullyaware
thatanothercounselwasassistinghiminthehandlingofcases.Havingbeenfullyinformedof
thenatureofhercauseofactionandtheconsequencesofthesuit,complainantwasawareof
theapplicablelawonreformationofcontracts.Finally,bywayofcounterclaim,respondent
demanded just compensation for the services he had rendered in other cases for the
complainant.
ReplyofComplainant
InherReply,22 complainantmainlycounteredrespondentsdefensesbymakingreferenceto
thereceiptsinherpossession,allevidencingthatrespondentacceptedtheamountsmentioned
inthecomplaint.ComplainantalsoemphasizedthatrespondentandTierraRealtyhadrelations
longbeforeshemethim.WhilerespondentwasemployedasProvincialLegalOfficerofthe
Provincial Government of Ilocos Norte, he was involved in the preparation of several
documentsinvolvingFlyingV,anoilcompanyownedbyErnestVillavicencio,wholikewise
ownedTierraRealty.ComplainantinsistedthattheamountofP100,000.00sheextendedto
respondentwasneverconsideredasnoloan.
On June 26, 2012, complainant furnished the Investigating Commissioner copies of the
Resolution,datedJune20,2012,issuedbytheOfficeoftheCityProsecutorofLaoagCity,
findingprobablecauseagainstrespondentforestafa. 23
FindingsandRecommendationoftheIBP
In its July 3, 2012 Report and Recommendation, 24 the Investigating Commissioner found
respondentguiltyofethicalimproprietyandrecommendedhissuspensionfromthepracticeof
lawforone(1)year.
InitsSeptember28,2013Resolution,theIBPBOGadoptedandapprovedwithmodification
therecommendationofsuspensionbytheInvestigatingCommissionerandorderedrespondent
to returntocomplainant:1)hisloanofP122,000.00;and2)thebalanceofthefilingfee
amountingtoP127,590.00.
RespondentreceivedacopyofthesaidresolutiononJanuary16,2014towhichhefileda
motion for reconsideration.25 Complainant filed her opposition thereto, informing the IBP
BOGthataninformationchargingrespondentforestafahadalreadybeenfiledincourtand
thatacorrespondingorderforhisarresthadbeenissued. 26
In its March 23, 2014 Resolution, the IBPBOG denied respondents motion for
reconsideration but modified the penalty of his suspension from the practice of law by
reducingitfromone(1)yeartothree(3)months.Respondentwaslikewiseorderedtoreturn
thebalanceofthefilingfeereceivedfromcomplainantamountingtoP127,590.00.
NopetitionforreviewwasfiledwiththeCourt.
The only issue in this case is whether respondent violated the Code of Professional
Responsibility(CPR).
TheCourtsRuling
TheCourtsustainsthefindingsandrecommendationoftheInvestigatingCommissionerwith
respecttorespondentsviolationofRules1and16oftheCPR.TheCourt,however,modifies
theconclusiononhisallegedviolationofRule15,onrepresentingconflictinginterests.The
Courtalsodiffersonthepenalty.
Rule 1.0, Canon 1 of the CPR, provides that [a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest,immoralordeceitfulconduct.Itiswellestablishedthatalawyersconductisnot
confined to the performance of his professional duties. A lawyer may be disciplined for
misconductcommittedeitherinhisprofessionalorprivatecapacity.Thetestiswhetherhis
conductshowshimtobewantinginmoralcharacter,honesty,probity,andgooddemeanor,or
whetheritrendershimunworthytocontinueasanofficerofthecourt. 27
Inthiscase,respondentisguiltyofengagingindishonestanddeceitfulconduct,bothinhis
professionalandprivatecapacity.Asalawyer,heclearlymisledcomplainantintobelieving
thatthefilingfeesforhercasewereworthmorethantheprescribedamountintherules,dueto
feigned reasons suchasthehigh valueofthelandinvolved and theextraexpensesto be
incurredbycourtemployees.Inotherwords,heresortedtooverpricing,anactcustomarily
relatedtodepravityanddishonesty.HedemandedtheamountofP150,000.00asfilingfee,
whenintruth,thesameamountedonlytoP22,410.00.Hisdefensethatitwascomplainantwho
suggestedthat amountdeservesnoiotaofcredence. Forone,itishighly improbablethat
complainant,whowasthenplaguedwiththerigorsoflitigation,wouldproposesuchamount
thatwouldfurtherburdenherfinancialresources.Assumingthatthecomplainantwasmore
thanwillingtoshelloutanexorbitantamountjusttoinitiatehercomplaintwiththetrialcourt,
still,respondentshouldnothaveacceptedtheexcessiveamount.Asalawyer,heisnotonly
expectedtobeknowledgeableinthematteroffilingfees,butheislikewisedutyboundto
disclosetohisclienttheactualamountdue,consistentwiththevaluesofhonestyandgood
faithexpectedofallmembersofthelegalprofession.
Moreover,thefiduciarynatureoftherelationshipbetweenthecounselandhisclientimposes
onthelawyerthedutytoaccountforthemoneyorpropertycollectedorreceivedfororfrom
hisclient.28Moneyentrustedtoalawyerforaspecificpurposebutnotusedforthepurpose
shouldbeimmediatelyreturned.Alawyersfailuretoreturnupondemandthefundsheldby
himonbehalfofhisclientgivesrisetothepresumptionthathehasappropriatedthesamefor
hisownuseinviolationofthetrustreposedinhimbyhisclient.Suchactisagrossviolation
ofgeneralmoralityaswellasofprofessionalethics.Itimpairspublicconfidenceinthelegal
professionanddeservespunishment.29
It is clear that respondent failed to fulfill this duty. As pointed out, he received various
amountsfromcomplainantbuthecouldnotaccountforallofthem.Worse,hecouldnotdeny
theauthenticityofthereceiptspresentedbycomplainant.Upondemand,hefailedtoreturnthe
excessmoneyfromtheallegedfilingfeesandotherexpenses.Hispossessiongivesrisetothe
presumptionthathehasmisappropriateditforhisownusetotheprejudiceof,andinviolation
ofthetrustreposedinhimby,theclient. 30Whenalawyerreceivesmoneyfromtheclientfora
particularpurpose,thelawyerisboundtorenderanaccountingtotheclientshowingthatthe
moneywasspentfortheintendedpurpose.Consequently,ifthelawyerdoesnotusethemoney
fortheintendedpurpose,thelawyermustimmediatelyreturnthemoneytotheclient. 31
Somewhat showing a propensity to demand excessive and unwarranted amounts from his
client, respondent displayed a reprehensible conduct when he asked for the amount of
P50,000.00asrepresentationexpensesallegedlyforthebenefitofthejudgehandlingthe
case,inexchangeforafavorabledecision.Respondenthimselfsignedareceiptshowingthat
he initially took the amount of P 25,000.00 and, worse, he subsequently demanded and
received the other half of the amount at the time the case had already been dismissed.
Undoubtedly,thisactistantamounttogrossmisconductthatnecessarilywarrantsthesupreme
penaltyofdisbarment.Theactofdemandingasumofmoneyfromhisclient,purportedlytobe
usedasabribetoensureapositiveoutcomeofacase,isnotonlyanabuseofhisclientstrust
butanovertactofunderminingthetrustandfaithofthepublicinthelegalprofessionandthe
entireJudiciary.Thisistheheightofindecency.Asofficersofthecourt,lawyersowetheir
utmostfidelitytopublicserviceandtheadministrationofjustice.Innowayshouldalawyer
indulgeinanyactthatwoulddamagetheimageofjudges,lestthepublicsperceptionofthe
dispensationofjusticebeovershadowedbyiniquitousdoubts.Thedenialofrespondentand
hisclaimthattheamountwasgivengratuitouslywouldnotexcusehimfromanyliability.The
absenceofproofthatthesaidamountwasindeedusedasabribeisofnomoment.Totolerate
respondentsactuationswouldseriouslyerodethepublicstrustinthecourts.
Asitturnedout,complainantscasewasdismissedasearlyasSeptember29,2010.Atthis
juncture,respondentprovedhimselftobenegligentinhisdutyashefailedtoinformhisclient
of the status of the case, and left the client to personally inquire with the court. Surely,
respondentwasnotonlyguiltyofmisconductbutwasalsoremissinhisdutytohisclient.
Respondentsunbecomingconducttowardscomplainantdidnotstophere.Recordsrevealthat
helikewiseviolatedRule16.04,Canon16oftheCPR,whichstatesthat[a]lawyershallnot
borrowmoneyfromhisclientunlesstheclientsinterestsarefullyprotectedbythenatureof
thecaseorbyindependentadvice.Neithershallalawyerlendmoneytoaclientexcept,when
intheinterestofjustice,hehastoadvancenecessaryexpensesinalegalmatterheishandling
fortheclient.Inhisprivatecapacity,herequestedfromhisclient,notjustone,buttwoloans
of considerable amounts. The first time, he visited his client in her home and borrowed
P100,000.00fortherepairofhiscar;andthenexttime,heimploredhertoextendtohima
loanofP70,000.00orP50,000.00inthemomentofurgencyoremergencybutwasonly
givenP22,000.00bycomplainant.Thesetransactionswereevidencedbypromissorynotesand
receipts, the authenticity of which was never questioned by respondent. These acts were
committedbyrespondentinhisprivatecapacity,seeminglyunrelatedtohisrelationshipwith
complainant, but were indubitably acquiesced to by complainant because of the trust and
confidencereposedinhimasalawyer.Nowhereintherecords,particularlyinthedefenses
raisedbyrespondent,wasitimpliedthattheseloansfellwithintheexceptionsprovidedbythe
rules.TheloansofP100,000.00andP22,000.00weresurelynotprotectedbythenatureofthe
caseorbyindependentadvice.Respondentsassertionthattheamountsweregiventohimout
oftheliberalityofcomplainantandwere,thus,consideredasnoloan,doesnotjustifyhis
inappropriatebehavior.Theactsofrequestingandreceivingmoneyasloansfromhisclient
andthereafterfailingtopaythesameareindicativeofhislackofintegrityandsenseoffair
dealing.Uptothepresent,respondenthasnotyetpaidhisobligationstocomplainant.
Time and again, the Court has consistently held that deliberate failure to pay just debts
constitutesgrossmisconduct,forwhichalawyermaybesanctionedwithsuspensionfromthe
practiceoflaw.Lawyersareinstrumentsfortheadministrationofjusticeandvanguardsofour
legalsystem.Theyareexpectedtomaintainnotonlylegalproficiency,butalsoahighstandard
ofmorality,honesty,integrityandfairdealingsothatthepeoplesfaithandconfidenceinthe
judicialsystemisensured.Theymust,atalltimes,faithfullyperformtheirdutiestosociety,to
thebar,thecourtsandtheirclients,whichincludepromptpaymentoffinancialobligations. 32
Verily,whentheCodeortheRulesspeaksofconductormisconduct,thereferenceisnot
confined to ones behavior exhibited in connection with the performance of the lawyers
professional duties, but also covers any misconduct which, albeit unrelated to the actual
practiceofhisprofession,wouldshowhimtobeunfitfortheofficeandunworthyofthe
privilegeswhichhislicenseandthelawvesthimwith.Unfortunately,respondentmustbe
foundguiltyofmisconductonbothscores.
Withrespecttorespondentsallegedrepresentationofconflictinginterests,theCourtfindsit
proper to modify the findings of the Investigating Commissioner who concluded that
complainant presented insufficient evidence of respondents lawyering for the opposing
party,TierraRealty.
Rule15.03,Canon15oftheCPR,providesthat[a]lawyershallnotrepresentconflicting
interestexceptbywrittenconsentofallconcernedgivenafterafulldisclosureofthefacts.
Therelationshipbetweenalawyerandhis/herclientshouldideallybeimbuedwiththehighest
level of trust and confidence. This is the standard of confidentiality that must prevail to
promoteafulldisclosureoftheclientsmostconfidentialinformationtohis/herlawyerforan
unhamperedexchangeofinformationbetweenthem.Needlesstostate,aclientcanonlyentrust
confidentialinformationtohis/herlawyerbasedonanexpectationfromthelawyerofutmost
secrecyanddiscretion;thelawyer,forhispart,isdutyboundtoobservecandor,fairnessand
loyaltyinalldealingsandtransactionswiththeclient.Partofthelawyersdutyinthisregard
is to avoid representing conflicting interests. 33 Thus, even if lucrative fees offered by
prospectiveclientsareatstake,alawyermustdeclineprofessionalemploymentifthesame
wouldtriggertheviolationoftheprohibitionagainstconflictofinterest.Theonlyexception
providedintherulesisawrittenconsentfromallthepartiesafterfulldisclosure.
The Court deviates from the findings of the IBP. There is substantial evidence to hold
respondentliableforrepresentingconflictinginterestsinhandling thecaseofcomplainant
againstTierraRealty,acorporationtowhichhehadrenderedservicesinthepast.TheCourt
cannotignorethefactthatrespondentadmittedtohavingnotarizedthedeedofsale,whichwas
the very document being questioned in complainants case. While the Investigating
Commissioner found that the complaint in Civil Case No. 1479165 did not question the
validityofthesaidcontract,andthatonlytheintentionsofthepartiesastosomeprovisions
thereofwerechallenged,theCourtstillfindsthatthepurposeforwhichtheproscriptionwas
madeexists.TheCourtcannotbrushasidethedissatisfiedobservationsofthecomplainantas
totheallegationslackinginthecomplaintagainstTierraRealtyandtheclearadmissionof
respondentthathewastheonewhonotarizedtheassaileddocument.Regardlessofwhetherit
was the validity of the entire document or the intention of the parties as to some of its
provisionsraised,respondentfellshortofprudenceinactionwhenheacceptedcomplainants
case, knowing fully that he was involved in the execution of the very transaction under
question. Neither his unpaid notarial fees nor the participation of a collaborating counsel
wouldexcusehimfromsuchindiscretion.Itisapparentthatrespondentwasretainedbyclients
whohadclosedealingswitheachother.Moresignificantly,thereisnorecordofanywritten
consentfromanyofthepartiesinvolved.
The representation of conflicting interests is prohibited not only because the relation of
attorneyandclientisoneoftrustandconfidenceofthehighestdegree,butalsobecauseofthe
principlesofpublicpolicyandgoodtaste.Anattorneyhasthedutytodeservethefullest
confidenceofhisclientandrepresenthimwithundividedloyalty.Oncethisconfidenceis
abusedorviolatedtheentireprofessionsuffers. 34
PenaltiesandPecuniaryLiabilities
AmemberoftheBarmaybepenalized,evendisbarredorsuspendedfromhisofficeasan
attorney, for violation of the lawyers oath and/or for breach of the ethics of the legal
professionasembodiedintheCPR. 35Forthepracticeoflawisaprofession,aformofpublic
trust,theperformanceofwhichisentrustedtothosewhoarequalifiedandwhopossessgood
moralcharacter.36 Theappropriatepenaltyforanerrantlawyerdependsontheexerciseof
soundjudicialdiscretionbasedonthesurroundingfacts.37
UnderSection27,Rule138oftheRevisedRulesofCourt,amemberoftheBarmaybe
disbarredorsuspendedonanyofthefollowinggrounds:(1)deceit;(2)malpracticeorother
grossmisconductinoffice;(3)grosslyimmoralconduct;(4)convictionofacrimeinvolving
moralturpitude;(5)violationofthelawyer'soath;(6)willfuldisobedienceofanylawfulorder
ofasuperiorcourt;and(7)willfulappearanceasanattorneyforapartywithoutauthority.A
lawyermaybedisbarredorsuspendedformisconduct,whetherinhisprofessionalorprivate
capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity and good
demeanor,orunworthytocontinueasanofficerofthecourt.
Here,respondentdemonstratednotjustanegligentdisregardofhisdutiesasalawyerbuta
wantonbetrayalofthetrustofhisclientand,ingeneral,thepublic.Accordingly,theCourt
findsthatthesuspensionforthree(3)monthsrecommendedbytheIBPBOGisnotsufficient
punishmentfortheunacceptableactsandomissionsofrespondent.Theactsoftherespondent
constitutemalpracticeandgrossmisconductinhisofficeasattorney.Hisincompetenceand
appalling indifference to his duty to his client, the courts and societyrender himunfit to
continuedischargingthetrustreposedinhimasamemberoftheBar.
Fortakingadvantageoftheunfortunatesituationofthecomplainant,forengagingindishonest
anddeceitfulconduct,formaligningthejudgeandtheJudiciary,forunderminingthetrustand
faith of the public in the legal profession and the entire judiciary, and for representing
conflictinginterests,respondentdeservesnolessthanthepenaltyofdisbarment. 38
Notably, the Court cannot order respondent to return the money he borrowed from
complainantinhisprivatecapacity.InTriaSamontev.Obias,39theCourtheldthatitcannot
order the lawyer to return money to complainant if he or she acted in a private capacity
because its findings in administrative cases have no bearing on liabilities which have no
intrinsic link to the lawyers professional engagement. In disciplinary proceedings against
lawyers,theonlyissueiswhethertheofficerofthecourtisstillfittobeallowedtocontinueas
amemberoftheBar.TheonlyconcernoftheCourtisthedeterminationofrespondents
administrativeliability.Itsfindingshavenomaterialbearingonotherjudicialactionswhich
thepartiesmaychooseagainsteachother.
Toruleotherwisewouldineffectdepriverespondentofhisrighttoappealsinceadministrative
casesarefileddirectlywiththeCourt.Furthermore,thequantumofevidencerequiredincivil
casesisdifferentfromthequantumofevidencerequiredinadministrativecases.Incivilcases,
preponderanceofevidenceisrequired.Preponderanceofevidenceisaphrasewhich,inthe
lastanalysis,meansprobabilityofthetruth.Itisevidencewhichismoreconvincingtothe
courtasworthierofbeliefthanthatwhichisofferedinoppositionthereto. 40Inadministrative
cases,onlysubstantialevidenceisneeded.Substantialevidence,whichismorethanamere
scintillabutissuchrelevantevidenceasareasonablemindmightacceptasadequatetosupport
aconclusion,wouldsufficetoholdoneadministrativelyliable. 41Furthermore,theCourthasto
considertheprescriptiveperiodapplicabletocivilcasesincontrasttoadministrativecases
whichare,asarule,imprescriptible.42
Thus,theIBPBOGwascorrectinorderingrespondenttoreturntheamountofP127,590.00
representingthebalanceofthefilingfeeshereceivedfromcomplainant,asthiswasintimately
related to the lawyerclient relationship between them. Similar to this is the amount of
P50,000.00whichrespondentreceivedfromcomplainant,asrepresentationexpensesforthe
handlingofthecivilcaseandforthepurportedpurchaseofabottleofwineforthejudge.
These were connected to his professional relationship with the complainant. While
respondentsdeplorableactofrequestingthesaidamountforthebenefitofthejudgeisstained
withmendacity,respondentshouldbeorderedtoreturnthesameasitwasborneoutoftheir
professional relationship. As to his other obligations, respondent was already adjudged as
liableforthepersonalloanshecontractedwithcomplainant,perthesmallclaimscasesfiled
againsthim.
Alltold,intheexerciseofitsdisciplinarypowers,theCourtmerelycallsuponamemberof
the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of
preservingthepurityofthelegalprofession. 43TheCourtlikewiseaimstoensuretheproper
andhonest administration ofjusticebypurgingthe profession ofmembers who,by their
misconduct,haveproventhemselvesnolongerworthytobeentrustedwiththedutiesand
responsibilitiesofanattorney.44
WHEREFORE, finding the respondent, Atty. Jaime V. Agtang, GUILTY of gross
misconduct in violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the Court hereby
DISBARS himfromthepracticeoflawand ORDERS himtopaythecomplainant,Erlinda
Foster,theamountsofP127,590.00,P50,000.00andP2,500.00.
LetacopyofthisDecisionbesenttotheOfficeoftheBarConfidant,theIntegratedBarofthe
PhilippinesandtheOfficeoftheCourtAdministratortobecirculatedtoallcourts.
SOORDERED.
Sereno,(ChiefJustice),Carpio,Velasco,Jr.,LeonardoDeCastro,DelCastillo,Villarama,
Jr.,Mendoza,Reyes,PerlasBernabe,andLeonen,JJ.,concur.
Brion,J.,onleave.
Peralta,J.,nopart.
Bersamin,Perez,andJardeleza,JJ.,onofficialleave.
A.C. No. 9872, January 28, 2014 NATIVIDAD P. NAVARRO AND HILDA S.
PRESBITERO,Complainants,v.ATTY.IVANM.SOLIDUM,JR.,Respondent.:JANUARY
2014PHILIPPINESUPREMECOURTJURISPRUDENCECHANROBLESVIRTUAL
LAWLIBRARY
A.C.No.9872,January28,2014
Thiscaseoriginatedfromacomplaintfordisbarment,dated26May2008,filedbyNatividad
P.Navarro(Navarro)andHildaS.Presbitero(Presbitero)againstAtty.IvanM.Solidum,Jr.
(respondent)beforetheIntegratedBarofthePhilippinesCommissiononBarDiscipline(IBP
CBD).
FromtheReport,dated1July2009,oftheIBPCBD,wegatheredthefollowingfactsofthe
case:
On4April2006,respondentsignedaretaineragreementwithPresbiterotofollowupthe
releaseofthepaymentforthelatters2.7hectarepropertylocatedinBacolodwhichwasthe
subjectofaVoluntaryOffertoSell(VOS)totheDepartmentofAgrarianReform(DAR).The
agreementalsoincludedthepaymentofthedebtsofPresbiteroslatehusbandtothePhilippine
NationalBank(PNB),thesaleoftheretainedareasoftheproperty,andthecollectionofthe
rentalsduefortheretainedareasfromtheiroccupants.ItappearedthattheDARwassupposed
topayP700,000forthepropertybutitwasmortgagedbyPresbiteroandherlatehusbandto
PNB forP1,200,000. Presbiteroallegedthat PNBs claim hadalreadyprescribed,andshe
engagedtheservicesofrespondenttorepresentherinthematter.Respondentproposed the
filingofacase forquietingof title againstPNB. RespondentandPresbiteroagreedtoan
attorneysfeeof10%oftheproceedsfromtheVOSorthesaleoftheproperty,withthe
expenses to be advanced byPresbitero butdeductiblefromrespondents fees. Respondent
receivedP50,000fromPresbitero,supposedlyfortheexpensesofthecase,butnothingcame
outofit.
InMay2006,Presbiterosdaughter,Ma.TheresaP.Yulo(Yulo),alsoengagedrespondents
servicestohandletheregistrationofher18.85hectarelotlocatedinNasudong,Caradioan,
Himamaylan, Negros. Yulo convinced her sister, Navarro, tofinancethe expenses for the
registrationoftheproperty.Respondentundertooktoregisterthepropertyinconsiderationof
30%ofthevalueofthepropertyonceitisregistered.RespondentobtainedP200,000from
Navarrofortheregistrationexpenses.Navarrolaterlearnedthattheregistrationdecreeover
thepropertywasalreadyissuedinthenameofoneTeodoroYulo.Navarroallegedthatshe
wouldnothavespentfortheregistrationofthepropertyifrespondentonlyapprisedherofthe
realsituationoftheproperty.
On25May2006,respondentobtainedaloanofP1,000,000fromNavarrotofinancehissugar
tradingbusiness.RespondentandNavarroexecutedaMemorandumofAgreement(MOA)and
agreedthattheloan(a)shallbeforaperiodofoneyear;(b)shallearninterestattherateof
10%permonth;and(c)shallbesecuredbyarealestatemortgageoverapropertylocatedin
BarangayAlijis,BacolodCity,coveredbyTransferCertificateofTitleNo.304688.Theyalso
agreedthatrespondentshallissuepostdatedcheckstocovertheprincipalamountoftheloanas
wellastheinterestthereon.RespondentdeliveredthecheckstoNavarro,drawnagainstan
accountinMetrobank,BacolodCityBranch,andsignedtheminthepresenceofNavarro.
InJune2006,respondentobtainedanadditionalloanofP1,000,000fromNavarro,coveredby
a second MOA with the same terms and conditions as the first MOA. Respondent sent
Navarro, through a messenger, postdated checks drawn against an account in Bank of
Commerce,BacolodCityBranch.RespondentlikewisediscussedwithNavarroaboutsecuring
aTollingAgreementwithVictoriasMillingCompany,Inc.butnoagreementwassigned.
Atthesametime,respondentobtainedaloanofP1,000,000fromPresbiterocoveredbyathird
MOA,exceptthattherealestatemortgagewasovera263squaremeterpropertylocatedin
BarangayTaculing,BacolodCity.RespondentsentPresbiteropostdatedchecksdrawnagainst
anaccountinMetrobank,BacolodCityBranch.
Presbiterowasdissatisfiedwiththevalueofthe263squaremeterpropertymortgagedunder
thethirdMOA, andrespondentpromisedtoexecute arealestate mortgage overa1,000
squaremeter parcel of landadjacenttothe 4,000squaremeter propertyhemortgaged to
Navarro.However,respondentdidnotexecuteadeedfortheadditionalsecurity.
Respondentpaidtheloaninterestforthefirstfewmonths.Hewasabletopaycomplainantsa
total of P900,000. Thereafter, he failed to pay either the principal amount or the interest
thereon.InSeptember2006,thechecksissuedbyrespondenttocomplainantscouldnolonger
benegotiatedbecausetheaccountsagainstwhichtheyweredrawnwerealreadyclosed.When
complainants called respondents attention, he promised to pay the agreed interest for
SeptemberandOctober2006butaskedforareductionoftheinterestto7%forthesucceeding
months.
InNovember2006,respondentwithdrewascounselforYulo.Ontheotherhand,Presbitero
terminatedtheservicesofrespondentascounsel.Complainantsthenfiledpetitionsforthe
judicial foreclosure of the mortgages executed by respondent in their favor. Respondent
counteredthatthe10%monthlyinterestontheloanwasusuriousandillegal.Complainants
alsofiledcasesforestafaandviolationofBatasPambansaBlg.22againstrespondent.
Complainantsallegedthatrespondentinducedthemtogranthimloansbyofferingveryhigh
interestrates.Healsopreparedandsignedthecheckswhichturnedouttobedrawnagainsthis
sons accounts. Complainants further alleged that respondent deceived them regarding the
identityandvalueofthepropertyhemortgagedbecauseheshowedthemadifferentproperty
from that which he owned. Presbitero further alleged that respondent mortgaged his 263
squaremeterpropertytoherforP1,000,000buthelatersolditforonlyP150,000.
Respondent,forhisdefense,allegedthathewasengagedinsugarandrealtybusinessandthat
itwasYulowhoconvincedPresbiteroandNavarrotoextendhimloans.Yuloalsoassuredhim
that Presbitero would help him with the refining of raw sugar through Victorias Milling
Company,Inc.RespondentallegedthatNavarrofixedtheinterestrateandheagreedbecause
heneededthemoney.Heallegedthattheirbusinesstransactionsweresecuredbyrealestate
mortgages and covered by postdated checks. Respondent denied that the property he
mortgagedtoPresbiterowaslessthanthevalueoftheloan.Healsodeniedthathesoldthe
propertybecausethesalewasactuallyrescinded.Respondentclaimedthatthepropertyhe
mortgagedtoNavarrowasvaluableanditwasactuallyworthmorethanP8,000,000.
Respondentallegedthathewasabletopaycomplainantswhenbusinesswasgoodbuthewas
unabletocontinuepayingwhenthepriceofsugarwentdownandwhenthebusinesswith
VictoriasMillingCompany,Inc.didnotpushthroughbecausePresbiterodidnothelphim.
Respondentalsodeniedthathewashidingfromcomplainants.
Respondent further alleged that it was Yulo who owed him P530,000 as interest due for
SeptembertoDecember2005.Hedeniedmakinganyfalserepresentations.Heclaimedthat
complainantswereawarethathecouldnolongeropenacurrentaccountandtheywerethe
oneswhoproposedthathiswifeandsonissuethechecks.Respondentfurtherallegedthathe
alreadystartedwiththetitlingofYuloslotbuthisserviceswereterminatedbeforeitcouldbe
completed.
Asupplementalcomplaintwasfiledchargingrespondentwithacceptingcaseswhileunder
suspension. Inresponse,respondentallegedthathe acceptedPresbiteros casein February
2006andlearnedofhissuspensiononlyinMay2006.
Afterconductingahearingandconsideringthepositionpaperssubmittedbytheparties,the
IBPCBDfoundthatrespondentviolatedtheCodeofProfessionalResponsibility.
The IBPCBD found that respondent borrowed P2,000,000 from Navarro and P1,000,000
fromPresbiterowhichhefailedtopayinaccordancewiththeMOAsheexecuted.TheIBP
CBDfoundthatbasedonthedocumentspresentedbytheparties,respondentdidnotactin
goodfaithinobtainingtheloans.TheIBPCBDfoundthatrespondenteitherpromisedor
agreedtopaytheveryhighinterestratesoftheloansalthoughheknewthemtobeexorbitant
inaccordancewithjurisprudence.RespondentlikewisefailedtodenythathemisledNavarro
andherhusbandregardingtheidentityofthepropertymortgagedtothem.Respondentalso
mortgagedapropertytoPresbiteroforP1,000,000butdocumentsshowedthatitsvaluewas
only P300,000. Documents also showed that he sold that property for only P150,000.
RespondentconspiredwithYulotosecureloansbypromisinghera10%commissionandlater
 claimedthattheyagreedthatYulowouldrideontheloanbyborrowingP300,000fromthe
amountheobtainedfromNavarroandPresbitero.Respondentcouldnotexplainhowhelostall
themoneyheborrowedinthreemonthsexceptforhisclaimthatthepriceofsugarwentdown.
TheIBPCBDfoundthatrespondentmisledNavarroandPresbiteroregardingtheissuanceof
thepostdatedchecks,andtherewasnothingintherecordsthatwouldshowthatheinformed
themthatitwouldbehiswifeorsonwhowouldissuethechecks.TheIBPCBDalsofound
thatrespondenthadnotbeentransparentinliquidatingthemoneyhereceivedinconnection
with Presbiteros VOS with DAR. He was also negligent in his accounting regarding the
registrationofYulospropertywhichwasfinancedbyNavarro.
The IBPCBD found that respondent was guilty of violating Rule 1.01 of the Code of
ProfessionalResponsibilityforcommittingthefollowingacts:
(1) signingdrawnchecksagainsttheaccountofhissonasiftheywerefromhisownaccount;
(2) misrepresentingtoNavarrotheidentityofthelothemortgagedtoher;
(3) misrepresentingtoPresbiterothetruevalueofthe263squaremeterlothemortgagedtoher;
(4) conspiringwithYulotoobtaintheloansfromcomplainants;
(5) agreeingorpromisingtopay10%interestonhisloansalthoughheknewthatitwasexorbitant;and squaremeterpropertytoPresbiteroforP1,000,000buthelatersoldthepropertyforonly
(6)
failingtopayhisloansbecausethechecksheissuedweredishonoredastheaccountswerealreadyclosed.
TheIBPCBDalsofoundthatrespondentviolatedCanon16andRule16.01oftheCodeof
Professional Responsibility when he failed to properly account for the various funds he
receivedfromcomplainants.
In addition, the IBPCBD found that respondent violated Rule 16.04 of the Code of
ProfessionalResponsibilitywhichprohibitsborrowingmoneyfromaclientunlesstheclients
interestisfullyprotectedortheclientisgivenindependentadvice.
Onthematterofpracticinglawwhileundersuspension,theIBPCBDfoundthattherecords
werenotclearwhetherthenoticeofsuspensionrespondentreceivedon29May2006wasthe
reportandrecommendationoftheIBPCBDorthefinaldecisionofthisCourt.TheIBPCBD
likewisefoundthattherewasinsufficientevidencetoprovethatrespondentmishandledhis
cases.
TheIBPCBDrecommendedthatrespondentbemetedthepenaltyofdisbarment.
InResolutionNo.XIX2011267dated14May2011,theIBPBoardofGovernorsadopted
and approved the recommendation of the IBPCBD with modification by reducing the
recommendedpenaltyfromdisbarmenttosuspensionfromthepracticeoflawfortwoyears.
TheIBPBoardofGovernorslikewiseorderedrespondenttoreturntheamountofhisunpaid
obligationtocomplainants.
Complainantsfiledamotionforreconsideration,prayingthatthepenaltyofdisbarmentbe
insteadimposeduponrespondent.
The only issue in this case is whether respondent violated the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
TherecordsshowthatrespondentviolatedatleastfourprovisionsoftheCodeofProfessional
Responsibility.
Rule1.01oftheCodeofProfessionalResponsibilityprovides:
Rule1.01.Alawyershallnotengageinunlawful,dishonest,immoralordeceitfulconduct.
Withrespecttohisclient,Presbitero,itwasestablishedthatrespondentagreedtopayahigh
interestrateontheloanheobtainedfromher.HedraftedtheMOA.Yet,whenhecouldno
longerpayhisloan,hesoughttonullifythesameMOAhedraftedonthegroundthatthe
interestratewasunconscionable.Itwasalsoestablishedthatrespondentmortgageda263
P150,000,showingthathedeceivedhisclientastotherealvalueofthemortgagedproperty.
Respondentsallegationthatthesalewaseventuallyrescindeddidnotdistractfromthefact
thathedidnotapprisePresbiteroastotherealvalueoftheproperty.
RespondentfailedtorefutethatthechecksheissuedtohisclientPresbiteroandtoNavarro
belongedtohisson,IvanGarciaSolidumIIIwhosenameissimilartohisname.Heonly
claimedthatcomplainantsknewthathecouldnolongeropenacurrentbankaccount,andthat
theyevensuggestedthathiswifeorsonissuethechecksforhim.However,weareinclined
to agree with the IBPCBDs finding that he made complainants believethat theaccount
belongedtohim.Infact,respondentsignedinthepresenceofNavarrothefirstbatchofchecks
heissuedtoNavarro.RespondentsentthesecondbatchofcheckstoNavarroandthethird
batchofcheckstoPresbiterothroughamessenger,andcomplainantsbelievedthatthechecks
belongedtoaccountsinrespondentsname.
ItisclearthatrespondentviolatedRule1.01oftheCodeofProfessionalResponsibility.We
haveruledthatconduct,asusedintheRule,isnotconfinedtotheperformanceofalawyers
professional duties.1 A lawyer may be disciplined for misconduct committed either in his
professionalorprivatecapacity.2Thetestiswhetherhisconductshowshimtobewantingin
moralcharacter,honesty,probity,andgooddemeanor,orwhetheritrendershimunworthyto
continueasanofficerofthecourt.3

Inthiscase,theloanagreementswithNavarroweredoneinrespondentsprivatecapacity.
Although Navarro financed the registration of Yulos lot, respondent and Navarro had no
lawyerclient relationship. However, respondent was Presbiteros counsel at the time she
grantedhimaloan.ItwasestablishedthatrespondentmisledPresbiteroonthevalueofthe
propertyhemortgagedasacollateralforhisloanfromher.ToappeasePresbitero,respondent
evenmadeaDeedofUndertakingthathewouldgiveheranother1,000squaremeterlotas
additionalcollateralbuthefailedtodoso.
Clearly, respondent is guilty of engaging in dishonest and deceitful conduct, both in his
professionalcapacitywithrespecttohisclient,Presbitero,andinhisprivatecapacitywith
respecttocomplainantNavarro.BothPresbiteroandNavarroallowedrespondenttodraftthe
termsoftheloanagreements.RespondentdraftedtheMOAsknowingthattheinterestrates
wereexorbitant.Later,usinghisknowledgeofthelaw,heassailedthevalidityofthesame
MOAsheprepared.Heissuedchecksthatweredrawnfromhissonsaccountwhosenamewas
similartohiswithoutinformingcomplainants.Further,thereisnothingintherecordsthatwill
showthatrespondentpaidorundertooktopaytheloansheobtainedfromcomplainants.
Canon16andRule16.01oftheCodeofProfessionalResponsibilityprovide:
CANON16.ALAWYERSHALLHOLDINTRUSTALLMONEYSANDPROPERTIES
OFHISCLIENTTHATMAYCOMEINTOHISPOSSESSION.
Rule16.01Alawyershallaccountforallmoneyorpropertycollectedorreceivedforor Theinterestofhisclient,Presbitero,aslenderinthiscase,wasnotfullyprotected.Respondent
fromtheclient.
Thefiduciarynatureoftherelationshipbetweenthecounselandhisclientimposesonthe
lawyerthedutytoaccountforthemoneyorpropertycollectedorreceivedfororfromhis
client.4WeagreewiththeIBPCBDthatrespondentfailedtofulfillthisduty.Inthiscase,the
IBPCBDpointedoutthatrespondentreceivedvariousamountsfromcomplainantsbuthe
couldnotaccountforallofthem.
Navarro,whofinancedtheregistrationofYulos18.85hectarelot, claimedthatrespondent
received P265,000from her. Respondent counteredthatP105,000 waspaidforrealestate
taxesbuthecouldnotpresentanyreceipttoprovehisclaim.Respondentalsoclaimedthathe
paidP70,000tothesurveyorbutthereceiptwasonlyforP15,000.Respondentclaimedthathe
paid P50,000 for filing fee, publication fee, and other expenses but again, he could not
substantiatehisclaimswithanyreceipt.AspointedoutbytheIBPCBD,respondenthadbeen
lessthandiligentinaccountingforthefundshereceivedfromNavarrofortheregistrationof
Yulos property. Unfortunately, the records are not clear whether respondent rendered an
accountingtoYulowhohadsincepassedaway.
As regards Presbitero, it was established during the clarificatory hearing that respondent
receivedP50,000fromPresbitero.AstheIBPCBDpointedout,therecordsdonotshowhow
respondent spent the funds because he was not transparent in liquidating the money he
receivedfromPresbitero.
Clearly,respondenthadbeennegligentinproperlyaccountingforthemoneyhereceivedfrom
hisclient,Presbitero.Indeed,hisfailuretoreturntheexcessmoneyinhispossessiongivesrise
tothepresumptionthathehasmisappropriateditforhisownusetotheprejudiceof,andin
violationofthetrustreposedinhimby,theclient.5
Rule16.04oftheCodeofProfessionalResponsibilityprovides:
Rule16.04.Alawyershallnotborrowmoneyfromhisclientunlesstheclientsinterestsare
fullyprotectedbythenatureofthecaseorbyindependentadvice.Neithershallalawyerlend
moneytoaclientexcept,whenintheinterestofjustice,hehastoadvancenecessaryexpenses
inalegalmatterheishandlingfortheclient.
Here,respondentdoesnotdenythatheborrowedP1,000,000fromhisclientPresbitero.Atthe
timehesecuredtheloan,respondentwasalreadytheretainedcounselofPresbitero.
WhilerespondentsloanfromPresbiterowassecuredbyaMOA,postdatedchecksandreal
estatemortgage, itturnedoutthat respondentmisrepresentedthevalue ofthepropertyhe
mortgagedandthatthechecksheissuedwerenotdrawnfromhisaccountbutfromthatofhis
son.RespondenteventuallyquestionedthetermsoftheMOAthathehimselfpreparedonthe
ground that the interest rateimposed on his loan was unconscionable. Finally, the checks
issuedbyrespondenttoPresbiteroweredishonoredbecausetheaccountswerealreadyclosed.
violatedRule16.04oftheCodeofProfessionalResponsibility,whichpresumesthattheclient
isdisadvantagedbythelawyersabilitytouseallthelegalmaneuveringstorenegeonhis
obligation.6 In his dealings with his client Presbitero, respondent took advantage of his
knowledgeofthelawaswellasthetrustandconfidencereposedinhimbyhisclient.
WemodifytherecommendationoftheIBPBoardofGovernorsimposingonrespondentthe
penaltyofsuspensionfromthepracticeoflawfortwoyears.Giventhefactsofthecase,we
seenoreasontodeviatefromtherecommendationoftheIBPCBDimposingonrespondent
the penalty of disbarment. Respondent failed to live up to the high standard of morality,
honesty, integrity, and fair dealing required of him as a member of the legal profession. 7
Instead,respondentemployedhisknowledgeandskillofthelawandtookadvantageofhis
clienttosecureunduegainsforhimself 8 thatwarrantshisremovalfromthepracticeoflaw.
Likewise, we cannot sustain the IBP Board of Governors recommendation ordering
respondent to return his unpaid obligation to complainants, except for advances for the
expenseshereceivedfromhisclient,Presbitero,thatwerenotaccountedatall.Indisciplinary
proceedingsagainstlawyers,theonlyissueiswhethertheofficerofthecourtisstillfittobe
allowed to continue as a member of the Bar. 9 Our only concern is the determination of
respondentsadministrativeliability.10Ourfindingshavenomaterialbearingonotherjudicial
actionwhichthepartiesmaychoosetofileagainsteachother. 11Nevertheless,whenalawyer
receives money from a client for a particular purpose involving the clientattorney
relationship,heisboundtorenderanaccountingtotheclientshowingthatthemoneywas
spent for that particular purpose. 12 If the lawyer doesnot use themoney for the intended 9
Roav.Moreno,supranote1.
purpose, hemust immediately returnthe moneyto his client. 13 Respondent wasgiven an
opportunitytorender an accounting,andhefailed.Hemustreturnthefullamountofthe 10
Id.
advancesgivenhimbyPresbitero,amountingtoP50,000.
11
Id.
WHEREFORE,theCourtfindsAtty.IvanM.Solidum,Jr.GUILTYofviolatingRule1.01,
Canon 16, Rule 16.01, and Rule 16.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. 12
Freemanv.Reyes,A.C.No.6246,15November2011,660SCRA48.
Accordingly,theCourt DISBARS himfromthepracticeoflaweffectiveimmediatelyupon
hisreceiptofthisDecision.
13
Id.

Atty.Solidumis ORDERED toreturntheadvanceshereceivedfromHildaS.Presbitero,

amountingtoP50,000,andtosubmittotheOfficeoftheBarConfidanthiscompliancewith
thisorderwithinthirtydaysfromfinalityofthisDecision.

LetcopiesofthisDecisionbefurnishedtheOfficeoftheBarConfidant,theIntegratedBarof
thePhilippinesfordistributiontoallitschapters,andtheOfficeoftheCourtAdministratorfor
disseminationtoallcourtsalloverthecountry.LetacopyofthisDecisionbeattachedtothe
personalrecordsofrespondent.

SOORDERED.

Sereno, C.J., Carpio, Velasco, Jr., LeonardoDe Castro, Brion, Peralta, Bersamin, Del
Castillo,Abad,Villarama,Jr.,Perez,Mendoza,Reyes,PerlasBernabe,and Leonen,JJ.,
concur.

Endnotes:

1
Roav.Moreno,A.C.No.8382,21April2010,618SCRA693.

2
Id.

3
Id.

4
Bellezav.Macasa,A.C.No.7815,23July2009,593SCRA549.

5
Id.

6
Friasv.Atty.Lozada,513Phil.512(2005).
Heck vs Santos : AM RTJ011657 : February 23, 2004 : J. Vitug : En Banc : Separate
7
Tabangv.Atty.Gacott,A.C.No.6490,9July2013. Opinion
ENBANC
8
Id. [A.M.No.RTJ011657.February23,2004]
HEINZ R. HECK, complainant, vs. JUDGE ANTHONY E. SANTOS, REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 19, CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY,[if !supportFootnotes][1]
[endif]respondent.
DECISION
CALLEJOSR.,J.:
May a retired judge charged with notarizing documents without the requisite notary
commission more than twenty years ago be disciplined therefor? This is the novel issue
presentedforresolutionbeforethisCourt.
TheinstantcasearosewheninaverifiedLetterComplaintdatedMarch21,2001HeinzR.
HeckprayedforthedisbarmentofJudgeAnthonyE.Santos,RegionalTrialCourt,Branch19,
CagayandeOroCity.
ThecomplainantallegedthatpriortotherespondentsappointmentasRTCjudgeonApril11,
1989,heviolatedthenotariallaw,thus:
JudgeSantos,basedonANNEXA,wasnotdulycommissionedasnotarypublicuntilJanuary
9,1984butstillsubscribedandforwarded(onanonregularbasis)notarizeddocumentstothe
ClerkofCourtVIstartingJanuary1980uncommissioneduntilthe9thofJanuary1984.
a) JudgeSantoswas commissionedfurther January 16th1986to December31 st 1987and
January6th1988toDecember31st1989buttherecordsfailtoshowanyentryattheClerkof
CourtafterDecember31st1985untilDecember31st1989.
b)JudgeSantosfailedtoforwardhisNotarialRegisteraftertheexpirationofhiscommission
inDecember1989.[if!supportFootnotes][2][endif]
...
WHEREFOREinlightoftheforegoingcomplainantpray[s]toorderrespondent:
1.TodisbarJudgeAnthonyE.Santosandtoprohibithimfromallfuturepublicservice.
2.Toforfeit[the]retirementbenefitsofJudgeSantos.
3.ToprohibitJudgeSantosfromfuturepracticeofLaw.
4.TofileacriminalsuitagainstJudgeSantos.
5.Toconductaspeedyinvestigationandnottogrant/acceptanydelayingtacticsfromJudge
Santosoranyagencyandorpublicservantsinvolvedinthisadministrativecase.
6.Topayallcostsandrelatedcostsinvolvedinthisadministrativecase.
andpraysforotherreliefinaccordancewithequityandfairnessbasedonthepremises.[if!
supportFootnotes][3][endif]
The complainant submitted a certification from Clerk of Court, Atty. Beverly SabioBeja,
RegionalTrialCourt,MisamisOriental,whichcontainedthefollowing:
THISCERTIFIESthatuponverificationfromtherecordsfoundandavailableinthisoffice,
thefollowingdataappear:
1.ThenameAtty.AnthonyE.Santosislistedasadulycommissionednotarypublicinthe
followingyears:
a.January9,1984toDecember31,1985
b.January16,1986toDecember31,1987
c.January6,1988toDecember31,1989
2.Basedontherecordsoftransmittalsofnotarialreports,Atty.AnthonyE.Santossubmitted
hisnotarialreportsintheff.years:
a.January1980reportwassubmittedonFeb.6,1980
b.FebruarytoApril1980reportwassubmittedonJune6,1980
c.MaytoJune1980reportwassubmittedonJuly29,1980
d.JulytoOctober1980reportsubmittedbutnodateofsubmission
e.NovembertoDecember1980noentry
f.JanuarytoFebruary1981noentry
g.MarchtoDecember1981submittedbutnodateofsubmission
h.JanuarytoDecember1982submittedbutnodateofsubmission
i.JanuarytoJune1983submittedonJanuary5,1984
j.JulytoDecember1983noentry
k.JanuarytoDecember1984submittedonJanuary20,1986
l.JanuarytoDecember1985submittedonJanuary20,1986
4.RecordsfailtoshowanyentryoftransmittalofnotarialdocumentsunderthenameAtty.
AnthonySantosafterDecember1985.
5.ItisfurthercertifiedthatthelastnotarialcommissionissuedtoAtty.AnthonySantoswason
January6,1988untilDecember31,1989.[if!supportFootnotes][4][endif]
InhisAnswerdatedJune13,2001,therespondentjudgecategoricallydeniedthecharges
againsthim.Healsosubmittedacertification[if!supportFootnotes][5][endif]fromClerkof
Court,Atty.SabioBeja,toprovethattherewasnoproperrecordingofthecommissioned
lawyersintheCityofCagayandeOroaswellasthesubmittednotarizeddocuments/notarial
register.Therespondentfurtheraverredasfollows:
Thatthecomplainanthasneverbeenprivytothedocumentsnotarizedandsubmittedbythe
respondentbeforetheOfficeoftheClerkofCourtoftheRegionalTrialCourtofMisamis
Oriental,norhisrightsprejudicedonaccountofthesaidnotarizeddocumentsandtherefore
nottheproperpartytoraisethesaidissues;
That the complainant was one of the defendants in Civil Case No. 94334 entitled Vinas
KuranstaltenGesmbhetal.versusLugaitAquaMarineIndustries,Inc.,andHeinzHeck,for
SpecificPerformance&SumofMoney,filedbeforetheRegionalTrialCourt,Branch19,
CagayandeOroCity,whereinrespondentisthePresidingJudge.Theundersignedresolvedthe
caseinfavoroftheplaintiffs.[if!supportFootnotes][6][endif]
PursuanttothereportoftheOfficeoftheCourtAdministratorrecommendingtheneedto
resort to a fullblown investigation to determine the veracity of the parties assertions, the
Court,inaResolutiondatedSeptember10,2001,resolvedto:(a)treatthematterasaregular
administrativecomplaint;and(b)referthecasetoAssociateJusticeEdgardoP.Cruzofthe
CourtofAppeals(CA)forinvestigation,reportandrecommendation.[if!supportFootnotes][7]
[endif]
InhisLettersdatedDecember10,2001andFebruary1,2002,thecomplainantrequestedthat
thehearingbeheldatCagayandeOroCity.JusticeCruzinitiallydeniedtherequestbutupon
thecomplainantsinsistence,thematterwasforwardedtotheCourt,whichfavorablyacted
thereoninaResolutiondatedJuly8,2002.[if!supportFootnotes][8][endif]Thecomplainant
presentedhisevidenceinCagayandeOroCitybeforeretiredCourtofAppealsJusticeRomulo
S.Quimbo.[if!supportFootnotes][9][endif]
InaSealedReportdatedAugust14,2003,InvestigatingJusticeEdgardoP.Cruzmadethe
followingrecommendation:
It is recommended that [i] respondent (who retired on May 22, 2002) be found guilty of
violationoftheNotarialLawby(a)notarizingdocumentswithoutcommission;(b)tardinessin
submissionofnotarialreports;and(c)nonforwardingofhisnotarialregistertotheClerkof
Courtuponexpirationofhiscommission;and[ii]thatfortheseinfractions,hebesuspended
fromthepracticeoflawandbarredfrombeingcommissionedasnotarypublic,bothforone
year,andhispresentcommission,ifany,berevoked.[if!supportFootnotes][10][endif]
AccordingtotheInvestigatingJustice,therespondentdidnotadduceevidenceinhisdefense,
whilethecomplainantpresenteddocumentaryevidencetosupportthecharges:
Itisnoteworthythatinhisanswer,respondentdidnotclaimthathewascommissionedas
notarypublicfortheyears1980to1983nordenytheaccuracyofthefirstcertification.He
merelyallegedthattherewasnoproperrecordingofthecommissionedlawyersintheCityof
CagayandeOronorofthesubmittedNotarizedDocuments/NotarialRegister.And,asalready
observed,hepresentednoevidence,particularlyonhisappointmentasnotarypublicfor1980
to1983(assuminghewassocommissioned)andsubmissionofnotarialreportsandnotarial
register.
Ontheotherhand,thesecondcertificationshowsthattherewereonlytwoRecordBooks
availableinthenotarialsectionoftheRTCofMisamisOriental(CagayandeOroCity);and
thatthe(f)irstbooktitledPetitionsforNotarialCommissioncontainsitemsontheName,Date
Commission was issued and Expiration of Commission of the notary public. First entry
appearingwasmadeonDecember1982.
Ifrespondentwascommissionedin1980to1983,thenthefirstbookwoulddiscloseso(at
least,fortheyears1982and1983).However,hedidnotpresentsaidbook.Neitherdidhe
presentacertificationfromtheClerkofCourt,RTCofMisamisOriental,ordocumentsfrom
hisfilesshowingthathewascommissionedin1980to1983.Similarly,hedidnotsubmita
certificateofappointmentforallthoseyears.UnderSection238oftheNotarialLaw,such
certificatemustbepreparedandforwardedbytheClerkofCourt,RTC,totheOfficeofthe
SolicitorGeneral,togetherwiththeoathofofficeofthenotarypublic.[if!supportFootnotes]
[11][endif]
Thus,theInvestigatingJusticeconcluded,basedontheevidencepresentedbythecomplainant,
thattherespondentnotarizeddocumentsin1980and1983withoutbeingcommissionedasa
notarypublictherefor,consideringthathisearliestcommissionofrecordwasonJanuary9,
1984.[if!supportFootnotes][12][endif]
TheProceduralIssues
BeforetheCourtpassesuponthemeritsoftheinstantcomplaint,abriefbackgrounder.
OntheApplicabilityof
ResolutionA.M.No.02
902SC
OnSeptember17,2002,weissuedResolutionA.M.No.02902SC,[if!supportFootnotes]
[13][endif]towit:
SomeadministrativecasesagainstJusticesoftheCourtofAppealsandtheSandiganbayan;
judgesofregularandspecialcourts;andthecourtofficialswhoarelawyersarebasedon
groundswhicharelikewisegroundsforthedisciplinaryactionofmembersoftheBarfor
violationoftheLawyersOath,theCodeofProfessionalResponsibility,andtheCanonsof
ProfessionalEthics,orforsuchotherformsofbreachesofconductthathavebeentraditionally
recognizedasgroundsforthedisciplineoflawyers.
In any of the foregoing instances, the administrative case shall also be considered a
disciplinary action against the respondent justice, judge or court official concerned as a
memberoftheBar.Therespondentmayforthwithberequiredtocommentonthecomplaint
andshowcause why he shouldnot alsobesuspended,disbarred orotherwise disciplinary
sanctionedasamemberoftheBar.Judgmentinbothrespectsmaybeincorporatedinone
decisionorresolution.
Before the Court approved this resolution, administrative and disbarment cases against
membersofthebarwhowerelikewisemembersofthecourtweretreatedseparately.Thus,
pursuant to the new rule, administrative cases against erring justices of the CA and the
Sandiganbayan,judges,andlawyersinthegovernmentservicemaybeautomaticallytreatedas
disbarmentcases.TheResolution,whichtookeffectonOctober1,2002,alsoprovidesthatit
shall supplement Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, and shall apply to administrative cases
alreadyfiledwheretherespondentshavenotyetbeenrequiredtocommentonthecomplaints.
Clearly,theinstantcaseisnotcoveredbytheforegoingresolution,sincetherespondentfiled
hisAnswer/CommentonJune13,2001.
TheProcedureToBeFollowed
InDisbarmentCasesInvolving
ARetiredJudgeForActs
CommittedWhileHeWasStill
APracticingLawyer
Theundisputedfactsareasfollows:(1)therespondentisaretiredjudge;(2)thecomplainant
prays for his disbarment; and (3) the acts constituting the ground for disbarment were
committedwhentherespondentwasstillapracticing lawyer,beforehisappointmenttothe
judiciary. Thus, the respondent is being charged not for acts committed as a judge; he is
charged,asamemberofthebar, with notarizingdocumentswithoutthe requisitenotarial
commissiontherefor.
Section 1, Rule 139B of the Rules of Court on Disbarment and Discipline of Attorneys
provides:
Section1.Proceedingsforthedisbarment,suspension,ordisciplineofattorneysmaybetaken
bytheSupremeCourtmotuproprio,orbytheIntegratedBarofthePhilippines(IBP)upon
verifiedcomplaintofanyperson.Thecomplaintshallstateclearly,andconciselythefacts
complainedofandshallbesupportedbyaffidavitsofpersonshavingpersonalknowledgeof
thefactsthereinallegedand/orbysuchdocumentsasmaysubstantiatesaidfacts.
TheIBPBoardofGovernorsmay,motupropriooruponreferralbytheSupremeCourtorbya
Chapter Board ofOfficers, orat theinstance ofany person, initiate and prosecute proper
chargesagainsterringattorneysincludingthoseinthegovernmentservice:Provided,however,
ThatallchargesagainstJusticesoftheCourtofTaxAppealsandlowercourts,eveniflawyers
arejointlychargedwiththem,shallbefiledwiththeSupremeCourt:Provided,further,That
chargesfiledagainstJusticesandJudgesbeforetheIBP,includingthosefiledpriortotheir
appointment to the Judiciary, shall be immediately forwarded to the Supreme Court for
dispositionandadjudication.[if!supportFootnotes][14][endif]
TheinvestigationmaythereaftercommenceeitherbeforetheIntegratedBarofthePhilippines
(IBP),inaccordancewithSections2toSections12ofRule139B,orbeforetheSupreme
CourtinaccordancewithSections13and14,thus:
Section 13. Supreme Court Investigators. In proceedings initiated motu proprio by the
SupremeCourtorinotherproceedingswhentheinterestofjusticesorequires,theSupreme
CourtmayreferthecaseforinvestigationtotheSolicitorGeneralortoanyofficerofthe
SupremeCourtorjudgeofalowercourt,inwhichcasetheinvestigationshallproceedinthe
samemannerprovidedinSections6to11hereof,savethatthereviewofthereportshallbe
conducteddirectlybytheSupremeCourt.
Section14.ReportoftheSolicitorGeneralorotherCourtdesignatedInvestigator.Basedupon
the evidence adduced at the investigation, the Solicitor General or other Investigator
designatedbytheSupremeCourtshallsubmittotheSupremeCourtareportcontaininghis
findingsoffactandrecommendationstogetherwiththerecordandalltheevidencepresented
intheinvestigationforthefinalactionoftheSupremeCourt.
ItisclearfromtheRulesthenthatacomplaintfordisbarmentiscognizablebytheCourtitself,
and its indorsement to the IBP is not mandatory. The Court may refer the complaint for
investigation,reportandrecommendationtotheSolicitorGeneral,anyofficerofthecourtora
judge of a lower court, on which the Court will thereafter base its final action.[if !
supportFootnotes][15][endif]
Although therespondenthasalreadyretired fromthejudiciary,he is still consideredasa
memberofthebarandassuch,isnotimmunetothediscipliningarmoftheSupremeCourt,
pursuanttoArticleVIII,Section6[if!supportFootnotes][16][endif]ofthe1987Constitution.
Furthermore,atthetimeofthefilingofthecomplaint,therespondentwasstillthepresiding
judgeoftheRegionalTrialCourt,Branch19,CagayandeOroCity.Assuch,thecomplaint
wascognizablebytheCourtitself,astheRulemandatesthatincasetherespondentisajustice
oftheCourtofTaxAppealsorthelowercourt,thecomplaintshallbefiledwiththeSupreme
Court.[if!supportFootnotes][17][endif]
TheSubstantiveIssues
TheRetirementOrResignation
OfAJudgeWillNotPreclude
TheFilingThereafterOfAn
AdministrativeChargeAgainst
HimForWhichHeShallStill
BeHeldAnswerableIfFound
LiableTherefor
Thefactthatajudgehasretiredorhasotherwisebeenseparatedfromtheservicedoesnot
necessarilydivesttheCourtofitsjurisdictiontodeterminetheveracityoftheallegationsofthe
complaint,pursuanttoitsdisciplinaryauthorityovermembersofthebench.Asweheldin
Gallosv.Cordero:[if!supportFootnotes][18][endif]
Thejurisdictionthatwasoursatthetimeofthefilingoftheadministrativecomplaintwasnot
lostbythemerefactthattherespondent,hadceasedinofficeduringthependencyofhiscase.
TheCourtretainsjurisdictioneithertopronouncetherespondentpublicofficialinnocentofthe
chargesordeclarehimguiltythereof.Acontraryrulewouldbefraughtwithinjusticeand
pregnantwithdreadfulanddangerousimplications...Ifinnocent,respondentpublicofficial
meritsvindicationofhisnameandintegrityasheleavesthegovernmentwhichhehasserved
wellandfaithfully;ifguilty,hedeservestoreceivethecorrespondingcensureandapenalty
properandimposableunderthesituation.[if!supportFootnotes][19][endif]
However,recognizingtheproliferationofunfoundedormaliciousadministrativeorcriminal
casesagainstmembersofthejudiciaryforpurposesofharassment,weissuedA.M.No.0310
01SC[if!supportFootnotes][20][endif]whichtookeffectonNovember3,2003.Itreadsin
part:
1. If upon an informal preliminary inquiry by the Office of the Court Administrator, an
administrativecomplaintagainstanyJusticeoftheCourtofAppealsorSandiganbayanorany
Judgeofthelower courtsfiledin connectionwithacaseincourtisshown tobeclearly
unfounded and baseless and intended to harass the respondent, such a finding should be
includedinthereportandrecommendationoftheOfficeoftheCourtAdministrator.Ifthe
recommendationisapprovedoraffirmedbytheCourt,thecomplainantmayberequiredto
showcausewhyheshouldnotbeheldincontemptofcourt.Ifthecomplainantisalawyer,he
mayfurtherberequiredtoshowcausewhyheorsheshouldnotbeadministrativelysanctioned
asamemberoftheBarandasanofficerofthecourt.
2.Ifthecomplaintis(a)filedwithinsixmonthsbeforethecompulsoryretirementofaJustice
orJudge;(b)foranallegedcauseofactionthatoccurredatleastayearbeforesuchfilingand
(c) shown prima facie that it is intended to harass the respondent, it must forthwith be
recommendedfordismissal.Ifsuchisnotthecase,theOfficeoftheCourtAdministratormust
requiretherespondenttofileacommentwithinten(10)daysfromreceiptofthecomplaint,
andsubmittotheCourtareportandrecommendationnotlaterthan30daysfromreceiptofthe
comment. The Court shall act on the recommendation before the date of compulsory
retirementoftherespondent,orifitisnotpossibletodoso,withinsix(6)monthsfromsuch
datewithoutprejudicetothereleaseoftheretirementbenefitslesssuchamountastheCourt
mayordertobewithheld,takingintoaccountthegravityofthecauseofactionallegedinthe
complaint.
Thus,inorderforanadministrativecomplaintagainstaretiringorretiredjudgeorjusticetobe
dismissedoutright,thefollowingrequisitesmustconcur:(1)thecomplaintmusthavebeen
filedwithinsixmonthsfromthecompulsoryretirementofthejudgeorjustice;(2)thecauseof
actionmusthaveoccurredatleast ayearbeforesuchfiling;and,(3)itisshownthatthe
complaintwasintendedtoharasstherespondent.
Inthiscase,theAdministrativeComplaintdatedMarch21,2001wasreceivedbytheOfficeof
theCourtAdministratoronMarch26,2001.[if!supportFootnotes][21][endif]Therespondent
retiredcompulsorilyfromtheservicemorethanayearlater,oronMay22,2002.Likewise,
the ground for disbarment or disciplinary action alleged to have been committed by the
respondent did not occur a year before the respondents separation from the service.
Furthermore,andmostimportantly,theinstantcomplaintwasnot primafacie showntobe
withoutmeritandintendedmerelytoharasstherespondent.Clearly,therefore,theinstantcase
doesnotfallwithintheambitoftheforegoingresolution.
AJudgeMayBeDisciplined
ForActsCommittedBeforeHis
AppointmentToTheJudiciary
Itissettledthatajudgemaybedisciplinedforactscommittedpriortohisappointmenttothe
judiciary.[if!supportFootnotes][22][endif]Infact,eventhenewRuleitselfrecognizesthis,as
itprovidesfortheimmediateforwardingtotheSupremeCourtfordispositionandadjudication
of charges against justices andjudges before the IBP, including thosefiledprior to their
appointmenttothejudiciary.[if!supportFootnotes][23][endif]Itneednotbeshownthatthe
respondent continued the doing of the act or acts complained of; it is sufficient that the
evidence on record supports the charge on the respondent, considering the gravity of the
offense.
Indeed,thereisjurisprudencetotheeffectthattheactcomplainedofmustbecontinuingin
order for the respondent judge to be disciplined therefor. In Sevilla v. Salubre,[if !
supportFootnotes][24][endif]therespondentjudgewaschargedwithviolatingCanon16ofthe
CodeofProfessionalResponsibility,foractscommittedwhilehewasstillapracticinglawyer.
The respondent therein refused to turn over the funds of his client despite demands, and
persistedinhisrefusalevenafterhewasappointedasajudge.However,theCourtalsostated
inthiscasethattherespondentssubsequentappointmentasajudgewillnotexculpatehim
from taking responsibility for the consequences of his acts asanofficer ofthe court.[if !
supportFootnotes][25][endif]
InthecaseofAlfonsov.Juanson,[if!supportFootnotes][26][endif]weheldthatproofofprior
immoralconductcannotbeusedasbasisforadministrativedisciplineagainstajudgeifheis
notchargedwithimmoralitypriortohisappointment.Weratiocinated,thus:
...[I]twouldbeunreasonableandunfairtopresumethatsincehehadwanderedfromthepath
ofmoralrighteousness,hecouldneverretracehisstepsandwalkproudandtallagaininthat
path.Nomanisbeyondinformationandredemption.Alawyerwhoaspiresfortheexalted
positionofamagistrateknows,oroughttoknow,thathemustpayahighpriceforthathonor violations fall squarely within the prohibition of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of
hisprivateandofficialconductmustatalltimesbefreefromtheappearanceofimpropriety....
[if!supportFootnotes][27][endif]
TheCourtruledinthatcasethatthecomplainantfailedtoprovethechargesbysubstantial
evidence.[if !supportFootnotes][28][endif] The complainant therein presented evidence
pertainingtotherespondentspreviousindiscretionwhilestillapracticinglawyer;noevidence
was,however,adducedtoprovethatthelattercontinuedtoengageinillicitactsafterbeing
appointed to the bench. Thus, the respondent was exonerated in this case because the
complainant failed to present evidence that the indiscretion continued even after the
respondentwasappointedtothejudiciary.
Thepracticeoflawissoultimatelyaffectedwithpublicinterestthatitisboththerightand
duty of the State to control and regulate it in order to promote the public welfare. The
ConstitutionveststhispowerofcontrolandregulationinthisCourt.[if!supportFootnotes][29]
[endif] The Supreme Court, as guardian of the legal profession, has ultimate disciplinary
poweroverattorneys,whichauthorityisnotonlyarightbutaboundendutyaswell.Thisis
whyrespectandfidelitytotheCourtisdemandedofitsmembers.[if!supportFootnotes][30]
[endif]
NotarizingDocumentsWithout
TheRequisiteCommission
ThereforeConstitutes
Malpractice,IfNotTheCrime
OfFalsificationOfPublic
Documents
Itmustberememberedthatnotarizationisnotanempty,meaningless,routinaryact.Onthe
contrary,itisinvestedwithsubstantivepublicinterest,suchthatonlythosewhoarequalified
orauthorizedmayactasnotariespublic.[if!supportFootnotes][31][endif]Notarizationbya
notarypublicconvertsaprivatedocumentintoapublicone,makingitadmissibleinevidence
without the necessity of preliminary proof of its authenticity and due execution.[if !
supportFootnotes][32][endif]
Therequirementsfortheissuanceofacommissionasnotarypublicmustnotbetreatedasa
merecasualformality.[if!supportFootnotes][33][endif]TheCourthascharacterizedalawyers
act of notarizing documents without the requisite commission therefore as reprehensible,
constituting as it does not only malpractice, but also the crime of falsification of public
documents.[if !supportFootnotes][34][endif] For such reprehensible conduct, the Court has
sanctionederringlawyersbysuspensionfromthepracticeoflaw,revocationofthenotarial
commission and disqualification from acting as such, and even disbarment.[if !
supportFootnotes][35][endif]
InthecaseofNungav.Viray,[if!supportFootnotes][36][endif]theCourthadtheoccasionto
state
WherethenotarizationofadocumentisdonebyamemberofthePhilippineBaratatime
when he has no authorization or commission to do so, the offender may be subjected to
disciplinaryaction.Forone,performinganotarial[act]withoutsuchcommissionisaviolation
ofthelawyersoathtoobeythelaws,morespecifically,theNotarialLaw.Then,too,bymaking
itappearthatheisdulycommissionedwhenheisnot,heis,foralllegalintentsandpurposes,
indulging in deliberate falsehood, which the lawyers oath similarly proscribes . These
ProfessionalResponsibility,whichprovides:Alawyershallnotengageinunlawful,dishonest,
immoralordeceitfulconduct.[if!supportFootnotes][37][endif]
Theimportanceofthefunctionofanotarypubliccannot,therefore,beoveremphasized.No
lessthanthepublicfaithintheintegrityofpublicdocumentsisatstakeineveryaspectofthat
function.[if!supportFootnotes][38][endif]
TheChargeAgainstThe
RespondentIsSupportedBy
TheEvidenceOnRecord
Therespondentdidnotobjecttothecomplainantsformalofferofevidence,promptingthe
Investigating Justice to decide the case on the basis of the pleadings filed.[if !
supportFootnotes][39][endif]Neitherdidheclaimthathewascommissionedasnotarypublic
fortheyears1980to1983,nordenytheaccuracyofthefirstcertification.Therespondent
merelyallegedinhisanswerthattherewasnoproperrecordingofthecommissionedlawyers
intheCityofCagayandeOronorofthesubmittedNotarizedDocuments/NotarialRegister.
Furthermore,asfoundbytheInvestigatingJustice,therespondentpresentednoevidenceofhis
commissionasnotarypublicfortheyears1980to1983,aswellasproofofsubmissionof
notarialreportsandthenotarialregister.[if!supportFootnotes][40][endif]
Therespondentinthiscasewasgivenanopportunitytoanswerthechargesandtocontrovert
theevidenceagainsthiminaformalinvestigation.Whentheintegrityofamemberofthebar
ischallenged,itisnotenoughthathedenythecharges;hemustmeettheissueandovercome
theevidenceagainsthim.[if!supportFootnotes][41][endif]
Therespondentsallegationthatthecomplainantwasnotapartyinanyofthedocumentsso
notarized,andassuchwasnotprejudicedthereby,isunavailing.Anattorneymaybedisbarred
orsuspendedforanyviolationofhisoathorofhisdutiesasanattorneyandcounselorwhich
includethestatutorygroundsunderSection27,Rule138[if!supportFootnotes][42][endif]of
theRevised Rulesof Court.Anyinterestedpersonorthecourt motuproprio may initiate
disciplinaryproceedings.Therecanbenodoubtastotherightofacitizentobringtothe
attention oftheproper authorityactsanddoingsofpublicofficerswhichcitizensfeelare
incompatiblewiththedutiesoftheofficeandfromwhichconductthecitizenorthepublic
mightordoessufferundesirableconsequences.[if!supportFootnotes][43][endif]
AnAdministrativeComplaint
AgainstAMemberOfTheBar
DoesNotPrescribe
Thequalificationofgoodmoralcharacterisarequirementwhichisnotdispensedwithupon
admissiontomembershipofthebar.Thisqualificationisnotonlyaconditionprecedentto
admissiontothelegalprofession,butitscontinuedpossessionisessentialtomaintainones
good standinginthe profession.It is a continuing requirement tothepractice oflaw and
thereforedoesnotprecludeasubsequentjudicialinquiry,uponpropercomplaint,intoany
questionconcerningonesmentalormoralfitnessbeforehebecamealawyer.Thisisbecause
his admission to practice merely creates a rebuttable presumption that he has all the
qualificationstobecomealawyer.[if!supportFootnotes][44][endif]Theruleissettledthata
lawyermaybesuspendedordisbarredforanymisconduct,evenifitpertainstohisprivate
activities,aslongasitshowshimtobewantinginmoralcharacter,honesty,probityorgood
demeanor.Possessionofgoodmoralcharacterisnotonlyaprerequisitetoadmissiontothebar
butalsoacontinuingrequirementtothepracticeoflaw.[if!supportFootnotes][45][endif]
Furthermore,administrativecasesagainstlawyersbelongtoaclassoftheirown,distinctfrom
andmayproceedindependentlyofcivilandcriminalcases.[if!supportFootnotes][46][endif]
AsweheldintheleadingcaseofInreAlmacen:[if!supportFootnotes][47][endif]
[D]isciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor purely
criminal,theydonotinvolveatrialofanactionorasuit,butareratherinvestigationsbythe
Courtintotheconductofoneofitsofficers.Notbeingintendedtoinflictpunishment,[they
are] in no sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a
prosecutortherein.[They]maybeinitiatedbytheCourtmotuproprio.Publicinterestis[their]
primaryobjective,andtherealquestionfordeterminationiswhetherornottheattorneyisstill
afitpersontobeallowedtheprivilegesassuch.Hence,intheexerciseofitsdisciplinary
powers,theCourtmerelycallsuponamemberoftheBartoaccountforhisactuationsasan
officeroftheCourtwiththeendinviewofpreservingthepurityofthelegalprofessionand
theproperandhonestadministrationofjusticebypurgingtheprofessionofmemberswhoby
theirmisconducthaveprove[n]themselvesnolongerworthytobeentrustedwiththeduties
andresponsibilitiespertainingtotheofficeofanattorney.....[if!supportFootnotes][48][endif]
In a case involving a mere court employee[if !supportFootnotes][49][endif] the Court
disregardedtheCourtAdministratorsrecommendationthatthechargeforimmoralityagainst
therespondentbedismissedonthegroundthatthecomplainantsfailedtoadduceevidencethat
therespondentsimmoralconductwasstillongoing.Asidefrombeingfoundguiltyofillicit
conduct, the respondent was also found guilty of dishonesty for falsifying her childrens
certificatesoflivebirthtoshowthatherparamourwasthefather.Thecomplaintinthiscase
was filed on August 5, 1999, almost twenty years after the illicit affair ended.[if !
supportFootnotes][50][endif]TheCourtheldthatadministrativeoffensesdonotprescribe.[if!
supportFootnotes][51][endif]
Pursuant to the foregoing, there can be no other conclusion than that an administrative
complaintagainstanerringlawyerwhowasthereafterappointedasajudge,albeitfiledonly
aftertwentyfouryearsaftertheoffendingactwascommitted,isnotbarredbyprescription.If
therulewereotherwise,membersofthebarwouldbeemboldenedtodisregardtheveryoath
theytookaslawyers,prescindingfromthefactthataslongasnoprivatecomplainantwould
immediatelycomeforward,theystandachanceofbeingcompletelyexoneratedfromwhatever
administrativeliabilitytheyoughttoanswerfor.ItisthedutyofthisCourttoprotectthe
integrityofthepracticeoflawaswellastheadministrationofjustice.Nomatterhowmuch
timehaselapsedfromthetimeofthecommissionoftheactcomplainedofandthetimeofthe
institution of the complaint, erring members of the bench and bar cannot escape the
disciplining arm of the Court. This categorical pronouncement is aimed at unscrupulous
membersofthebenchandbar,todeterthemfromcommittingactswhichviolatetheCodeof
ProfessionalResponsibility,theCodeofJudicialConduct,ortheLawyersOath.Thisshould
particularly apply in this case, considering the seriousness of the matter involved the
respondentsdishonestyandthesanctityofnotarialdocuments.
Thus,eventhelapseofconsiderabletime,fromthecommissionoftheoffendingacttothe
institutionoftheadministrativecomplaint,willnoterasetheadministrativeculpabilityofa
lawyerwhonotarizesdocumentswithouttherequisiteauthoritytherefor.
AtMost,TheDelayInThe
InstitutionOfThe
AdministrativeCaseWould
MerelyMitigateThe
RespondentsLiability
Timeandagain,wehavestressedthesettledprinciplethatthepracticeoflawisnotarightbut
a privilege bestowed bythe State on those who show that they possess the qualifications
requiredbylawfortheconfermentofsuchprivilege. Membershipinthebarisaprivilege
burdenedwithconditions.Ahighsenseofmorality,honesty,andfairdealingisexpectedand
required of a member of the bar.[if !supportFootnotes][52][endif] By his actuations, the
respondentfailedtoliveuptosuchstandards;[if!supportFootnotes][53][endif]heundermined
theconfidenceofthepubliconnotarialdocumentsandtherebybreachedCanonIoftheCode
ofProfessionalResponsibility,whichrequireslawyerstoupholdtheConstitution,obeythe
lawsofthelandandpromoterespectforthelawandlegalprocesses.Therespondentalso
violatedRule1.01thereofwhichproscribeslawyersfromengaginginunlawful,dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct.[if !supportFootnotes][54][endif] In representing that he was
possessedoftherequisitenotarialcommissionwhenhewas,infact,notsoauthorized,the
respondentalsoviolatedRule10.01oftheCodeofProfessionalResponsibilityandhisoathas
alawyerthatheshalldonofalsehood.
The supreme penalty of disbarment is meted out only in clear cases of misconduct that
seriouslyaffectthestandingandcharacterofthelawyerasanofficerofthecourt.Whilewe
willnothesitatetoremoveanerringattorneyfromtheesteemedbrotherhoodoflawyerswhere
theevidencecallsforit,wewilllikewisenotdisbarhimwherealesserpenaltywillsufficeto
accomplish the desired end.[if !supportFootnotes][55][endif] Furthermore, a tempering of
justiceismandatedinthiscase,consideringthatthecomplaintagainsttherespondentwasfiled
twentyfouryearsafterthecommissionoftheactcomplainedof;[if!supportFootnotes][56]
[endif]thattherewasnoprivateoffendedpartywhocameforwardandclaimedtohavebeen
adverselyaffectedbythedocumentssonotarizedbytherespondent;and,thefactthatthe
respondent is a retired judge who deserves to enjoy the full measure of his wellearned
retirementbenefits.[if!supportFootnotes][57][endif]TheCourtfindsthatafineofP5,000.00is
justifiedinthiscase.
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Anthony E. Santos is found GUILTY of notarizing
documentswithouttherequisitenotarialcommissiontherefor.HeisherebyORDEREDtopay
afineintheamountofFiveThousandPesos(P5,000.00).
SOORDERED.
Puno, Panganiban, Quisumbing, YnaresSantiago, SandovalGutierrez, Carpio, Austria
Martinez,Corona,CarpioMorales,Azcuna,andTinga,JJ.,concur.
Davide,Jr.,C.J.,joinMr.JusticeJ.C.Vituginhisseparateopinion.
Vitug,J.,seeseparateopinion.
ENBANC
A.C.No.6490July9,2013(FormerlyCBDCaseNo.031054) UponlearningthatLiliaTabanghadfiledanewsetofpetitions,respondentexecutedseveral
LILIATABANGANDCONCEPCIONTABANG,Complainants,
vs.
ATTY.GLENNC.GACOTT,Respondent.
RESOLUTION
PERCURIAM:
ThiscaseinvolvesacomplaintfordisbarmentdirectlyfiledwiththeIntegratedBarofthe
Philippines(IBP)chargingrespondentAtty.GlennGacottofengaginginunlawful,dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct in violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility(CPR).1
Complainantsallegedthatsometimein1984and1985,complainantLiliaTabangsoughtthe
advice of Judge Eustaquio Gacott, respondent Atty. Glenn Gacotts father. Lilia Tabang
intendedtopurchaseatotalofthirty(30)hectaresofagriculturallandlocatedinBarangay
Bacungan,PuertoPrincesa,Palawan,whichconsistedofseveralparcelsbelongingtodifferent
owners.JudgeGacottnotedthatunderthegovernmentsagrarianreformprogram,Tabangwas
prohibitedfromacquiringvasttractsofagriculturallandasshealreadyownedotherparcels.
Thus,JudgeGacottadvisedhertoputthetitlesoftheparcelsunderthenamesoffictitious InherReportandRecommendationdatedMarch4,2004, 14 IBPInvestigatingCommissioner
persons.2
Eventually,LiliaTabangwasabletopurchasesevenparcelsandobtainedthecorresponding
TransferCertificatesofTitle(TCT)underthenamesoffictitiouspersons,asfollows:
1.TCTNo.12475AmeliaAndes;
2.TCTNo.12476WilfredoOndoy;
3.TCTNo.12790AgnesCamilla;
4.TCTNo.12791LeonorPetronio;
5.TCTNo.12792WilfredoGomez;
6.TCTNo.12793ElizabethDungan;and
7.TCTNo.12794AndesEstoy.3
Later,complainantsLiliaandConcepcionTabangdecidedtosellthesevenparcelsasthey
wereinneedoffundsfortheirmedicationandotherexpenses.Claimingthathewouldhelp
complainantsbyofferingtheparcelstoprospectivebuyers,respondentGlennGacottborrowed
fromLiliaTabangtheTCTscoveringtheparcels.4
Aboutayearafterrespondentborrowedthetitlesandafterhefailedtonegotiateanysale,
complainantsconfrontedrespondent.Respondentthentoldthecomplainantsthathehadlost
allseventitles.5
Onthepretextofofferingaremedytocomplainants,respondentadvisedthemtofilepetitions
incourtforreissuanceoftitles.Pretendingtobethe"authorizedagentrepresentative"ofthe
fictitiousownersofthesevenparcels,LiliaTabangfiledpetitionsforreissuanceoftitles. 6
Inthecourseoftheproceedings,thepublicprosecutornoticedsimilaritiesinthesignaturesof
thesupposedownersthatwereaffixedontheSpecialPowersofAttorney(SPA)purportedly
executedinfavorofLiliaTabang.Thepublicprosecutor,actingonhisobservation,askedthe
courttohavethesupposedownerssummoned.7
Seekingtoavoidembarrassment,LiliaTabanghadthepetitionsvoluntarilydismissedwithout
prejudicetotheirbeingrefiled.8
Subsequently,LiliaTabangfiledanewsetofpetitions.Thistime,shechangedthefictitious
ownerssignaturesinthehopeofmakingthemlookmorevaried. 9
documentsthatincludedrevocationsofSPAsandvariousaffidavitsofrecoverypurportedly
signed bytheparcels(fictitious) owners. Respondentthencaused theannotationofthese
documentsontheTCTsofthesevenparcels.10
Also,respondentcausedthepublicationofnoticeswhereherepresentedhimselfastheowner
oftheparcelsandannouncedthatthesewereforsale. 11Later,respondentsucceededinselling
thesevenparcels.Hereceivedatotalof?3,773,675.00fromtheproceedsofthesales. 12
Allegingthatrespondentcommittedgrossmisconduct,dishonesty,anddeceit,complainants
filedtheircomplaintdirectlywiththeIntegratedBarofthePhilippinesonFebruary3,2003.
ThecasewasdocketedasCommissiononBarDiscipline(CBD)CaseNo.031054.
Inhisdefense,respondentallegedthattheownersofthesevenparcelswerenotfictitiousand
thattheyhadvoluntarilysoldthesevenparcels.HeaddedthatLiliaTabanghadbeenmerely
thebrokerforthesevenparcelsandthatshehadunsuccessfullydemandeda"balato"oftwenty
percent(20%)fromtheproceedsofthesaleofthesevenparcels.Heallegedthataftershehad
beenrefusedtobegivena"balato,"LiliaTabanghadthreatenedtodefamehimandseekhis
disbarment.13
LydiaA.NavarrofoundrespondentguiltyofgrossmisconductforviolatingRule1.01ofthe
CodeofProfessionalResponsibility.Sherecommendedthatrespondentbesuspendedfromthe
practiceoflawforsix(6)months.
InaResolutiondatedApril16,2004, 15 theIBPBoardofGovernorsadoptedthereportof
Commissioner Navarro. However, the IBP Board of Governors increased the penalty to
disbarment.Thereafter,thecasewasreferredtotheSupremeCourtpursuanttoRule139Bof
theRulesofCourt.
InaResolutiondatedSeptember29,2004, 16theSupremeCourtremandedthecasetotheIBP.
TheCourtnotedthatmajorityofthepiecesofevidencepresentedbycomplainantsweremere
photocopies andaffidavitsand thatthe personswho supposedly executed suchdocuments
wereneitherpresentednorsubpoenaed.Thus,therecouldnothavebeenadequatebasisfor
sustainingtheimpositionofapenaltyasgraveasdisbarment.
ThecasewasthenassignedtoInvestigatingCommissionerDennisB.Funa.Hearingswere
conductedonMarch22,2005;October7,2005;July18,2006;August29,2006;November7,
2006;February23,2007;andJuly25,2007.17
Thecomplainantspresentedseveralwitnesses.OnewasDieterHeinze,PresidentoftheSwiss
AmericanLendingCorporation.18HeinzetestifiedthatinApril2001,afriendintroducedhim
torespondentwho,inturn,introducedhimselfastheownerofseven(7)parcelsinPuerto
Princesa City, Palawan. They agreed on the purchase of a lot priced at P900,000.00. His
company,however,paidonlyP668,000.00.Heinzenotedthathiscompanywithheldpayment
uponhisrealizationthatLiliaTabanghadcausedtheannotationofanadverseclaimandupon
respondentsfailuretoproduceLeonorPetronio,theallegedlotowner.
Another of complainants witnesses was Atty. Agerico Paras. 19 He testified that Heinze
introduced him to respondent who, in turn, introduced himself as the owner of seven (7)
parcels in Puerto Princesa City, Palawan. They agreed on the purchase of a lot priced at
P2,300,000.00.Hepaidforthesaidparcelintwo(2)installments.UponlearningthatLilia
Tabanghadcausedtheannotationofanadverseclaim,hewrotetorespondentaskinghimto
eitherworkonthecancellationoftheclaimortoreimbursehim.Headdedthatrespondentwas
unabletoproduceAmeliaAndes,theostensibleowneroftheparcelhehadpurchased.
TeodoroGallinero,anotherbuyerofoneofthesevenparcels,alsotestifiedforcomplainants. 20
HetestifiedthatinFebruary2001,hewasintroducedtorespondentwhoclaimedthatseveral
parcelswithatotalareaofthirty(30)hectareswereownedbyhismother.Gallineroagreedto
purchaseaparcelforthepriceof P2,000,000.00whichhepaidincashandinkind(L300
van).
ComplainantLiliaTabangalsotestifiedonthemattersstatedintheComplaint. 21
On July 25, 2007, Commissioner Funa required the complainants to submit their Position
Paper.RespondentfiledhisMotionforReconsiderationandtheInhibitionofCommissioner
Funawho,respondentclaimed,deprivedhimofthechancetocrossexaminecomplainants
witnesses,andwas"bentonprejudicing"22him.
Commissioner Funa then inhibited himself. Following this, the case was reassigned to
InvestigatingCommissionerRicoA.Limpingco.
Inthemeantime,withtheSupremeCourtEnBancsapprovaloftheIBPCBDsRulesof
Procedure,itwasdeemedproperforanInvestigatingCommissionertosubmithis/herReport
andRecommendationbasedonmattersdiscussedduringthemandatoryconferences,onthe
parties Position Papers (and supporting documents), and on the results of clarificatory
questioning(ifsuchquestioningwasfoundtobenecessary).Assuch,respondentsMotionfor
Reconsiderationwasdenied,andhewasrequiredtofilehisPositionPaper. 23
OnJuly30,2009,respondentfiledhisPositionPaper. 24 Subsequently,thecasewasdeemed
submittedforCommissionerLimpingcosReportandRecommendation.
InhisPositionPaper,respondentnotedthathefiledcriminalcomplaintsagainstLiliaTabang
onaccountofTabangsstatementthatshehadfabricatedtheidentitiesoftheownersofthe
seven(7)parcels.Heclaimedthatsince1996,hehadreliedontheTorrensTitlesoftheseven
(7)ownerswhowereintroducedtohimbyLiliaTabang.HeassertedthatLiliaTabangcould
nothavebeentheowneroftheseven(7)parcelssincetheSPAsexecutedbytheparcels
ownersclearlymadeheramereagentandhimasubagent.Healsoassailedtheauthenticityof
the public announcements (where he supposedly offered the seven 7 parcels for sale) and
MemorandumofAgreement.Hesurmisedthatthesignaturesonsuchdocumentsappearing
abovethename"GlennC.Gacott"hadbeenmereforgeriesandcrudeduplicationsofhisown
signature.
InhisReportandRecommendationdatedAugust23,2010, 25CommissionerLimpingcofound
respondent liable for gross violation of Rule 1.01 of the CPR. He likewise noted that
respondentwasabsentinmostofthehearingswithoutjustifiablereason,inviolationofRule
12.04oftheCPR.26Herecommendedthatrespondentbedisbarredandhisname,strickenfrom
theRollofAttorneys.
OnOctober8,2010,theIBPBoardofGovernorsissuedaResolution 27adoptingtheReportof
InvestigatingCommissionerLimpingco.
On June 26, 2011, the IBP Board of Governors denied respondents Motion for
Reconsideration.28
RespondentthenfiledhisNoticeofAppealwiththeIBPonAugust8,2011.
On August 17, 2011, respondent filed before the Supreme Court his Urgent Motion for
ExtensionofTime(tofilePetitionforReview/Appeal).OnSeptember20,2011,theCourt
grantedrespondentsMotionandgavehimanextensionofthirty(30)daystofilehisAppeal.
TheSupremeCourtwarnedrespondentthatnofurtherextensionwillbegiven.Despitethis,
respondentfiledtwo(2)moreMotionsforExtensionthefirstonSeptember29,2011andthe
secondonNovember3,2011bothofwhichweredeniedbytheCourt.
DespitetheCourtsdenialsofhisMotionsforExtension,respondentfiledonDecember14,
2011 a Motionto AdmitPetitionfor Review/Appeal (withattachedPetition/Appeal). This
MotionwasdeniedbytheCourtonApril17,2012.
For resolution is the issue of whether or not respondent engaged in unlawful, dishonest,
immoralordeceitfulconductviolatingRule1.01oftheCodeofProfessionalResponsibility,
thuswarrantinghisdisbarment.
Afteracarefulexaminationoftherecords,theCourtconcurswithandadoptsthefindingsand
recommendationofCommissionerLimpingcoandtheIBPBoardofGovernors.Itisclearthat
respondentcommittedgrossmisconduct,dishonesty,anddeceitinviolationofRule1.01ofthe
CPRwhenheexecutedtherevocationsofSPAsandaffidavitsofrecoveryandinarrogating
forhimselftheownershipoftheseven(7)subjectparcels.
WhileitmaybetruethatcomplainantLiliaTabangherselfengagedinillicitactivities,the
complainants own complicity does not negate, or even mitigate, the repugnancy of
respondentsoffense.Quitethecontrary,hisoffenseismadeevengraver.Heisalawyerwho
isheldtothehigheststandardsofmorality,honesty,integrity,andfairdealing.Perverting
whatisexpectedofhim,hedeliberatelyandcunninglytookadvantageofhisknowledgeand
skillofthelawtoprejudiceandtormentotherindividuals.Notonlydidhecountenanceillicit
action,heinstigatedit.Notonlydidheacquiescetoinjustice,heorchestratedit.Thus,We
imposeuponrespondentthesupremepenaltyofdisbarment.
UnderRule138,Section27oftheRulesofCourt(Rules),alawyermaybedisbarredforany
ofthefollowinggrounds:
deceit;
malpractice;
grossmisconductinoffice;
grosslyimmoralconduct;
convictionofacrimeinvolvingmoralturpitude;
violationofthelawyer'soath;
willfuldisobedienceofanylawfulorderofasuperiorcourt;and
willfullyappearingasanattorneyforapartywithoutauthoritytodoso.
It is established in Jurisprudence that disbarment is proper when lawyers commit gross
misconduct,dishonesty,anddeceitinusurpingthepropertyrightsofotherpersons.Bywayof
examples:
InBrennisenv.Contawi:29RespondentAtty.RamonU.Contawiwasdisbarredforhavingused
aspuriousSPAtomortgageandsellpropertyentrustedtohimforadministration.
InSabaylev.Tandayag:30Oneoftherespondents,Atty.CarmelitoB.Gabor,wasdisbarredfor
havingacknowledgedaDeedofSaleintheabsenceofthepurportedvendorsandfortaking
advantageofhispositionasAssistantClerkofCourtbypurchasingonehalf(1/2)oftheland
coveredbysaidDeedofSaleknowingthatthedeedwasfictitious.
In Daroy v. Legaspi:31 The Court disbarred respondent Atty. Ramon Legaspi for having
convertedtohispersonalusethefundsthathereceivedforhisclients.
Nevertheless,recoursetodisbarmentmustbedonewithutmostcaution.AsthisCourtnotedin
Moranv.Moron:32
Disbarmentshouldneverbeimposedunlessitisevidentlyclearthatthelawyer,byhisserious
misconduct,shouldnolongerremainamemberofthebar.Disbarmentisthemostsevereform
ofdisciplinarysanction,and,assuch,thepowertodisbarmustalwaysbeexercisedwithgreat
caution,onlyforthemostimperativereasonsandinclearcasesofmisconductaffectingthe
standingandmoralcharacterofthelawyerasanofficerofthecourtandmemberofthebar.
Accordingly,disbarmentshouldnotbedecreedwhereanypunishmentlessseveresuchasa
reprimand,suspension,orfinewouldaccomplishtheenddesired. 33
Moreover, considering the gravity of disbarment, it has been established that clearly
preponderantevidenceisnecessarytojustifyitsimposition. 34
AsexplainedinAbav.DeGuzman, 35"[p]reponderanceofevidencemeansthattheevidence
adducedbyonesideis,asawhole,superiortoorhasgreaterweightthanthatoftheother.It
meansevidencewhichismoreconvincingtothecourtasworthyofbeliefthanthatwhichis
offeredinoppositionthereto."36
Per Rule 133, Section 1 of the Rules, a court may consider the following in determining
preponderanceofevidence:
Allthefactsandcircumstancesofthecase;
The witnesses manner of testifying, their intelligence, their means and opportunity of
knowingthefactstowhichtheyaretestifying,thenatureofthefactstowhichtheytestify,the
probabilityorimprobabilityoftheirtestimony;
Thewitnessesinterestorwantofinterestandalsotheirpersonalcredibilitysofarasthesame
mayultimatelyappearinthetrial;and
Thenumberofwitnesses,althoughitdoesnotmeanthatpreponderanceisnecessarilywiththe
greaternumber.
In this case, complainants have shown by a preponderance of evidence that respondent
committedgrossmisconduct,dishonesty,anddeceitinviolationofRule1.01oftheCPR.
Specifically,complainantshaveshownnotonlythroughLiliaTabangstestimonybutmoreso
throughthetestimoniesofDieterHeinze,Atty.AgericoParas,andTeodoroGallinerothat:
respondentmisrepresentedhimselfastheowneroforhavingtherighttodisposeofthesubject
parcels;
respondentactivelysoughttosellorotherwisedisposeofthesubjectparcels;
respondentperfectedthesalesandreceivedtheproceedsofthesaleswhetherincashorin
kindofthesubjectparcels;
suchsaleswerewithouttheconsentorauthorizationofcomplainants;and
respondentneverremittedtheproceedsofthesalestocomplainants.
Moreimportantly,complainantswitnessesshowedthatwhenrespondenthadbeenconfronted
withLiliaTabangsadverseclaimsandaskedtosubstantiatetheidentitiesofthesupposed
ownersofthesubjectparcels,hehadfailedtoproducesuchpersonsorevenshowaniotaof
proofoftheirexistence.Inthisregard,thetestimoniesofDieterHeinze,Atty.AgericoParas,
andTeodoroGallineroareparticularlysignificantinsofarastheyhavebeenmadedespitethe
fact that their interest as buyers is contrary to that of complainants interest as adverse
claimants.
Incontrast,respondentfailedtopresentevidencetorebutcomplainant'sallegations.
Respondentsdefensecenteredonhisinsistencethattheownersofthesevenparcelswerenot
fictitiousandthattheyhadvoluntarilysoldthesevenparcels.Respondentalsoevadedthe
allegations against him by flinging counterallegations. For instance, he alleged that Lilia
Tabanghadunsuccessfullydemandeda"balato"fromtheproceedsofthesaleofthesubject
parcelsandthataftershehadbeenrefused,shethreatenedtodefamerespondentandseekhis
disbarment.Insupportofthisallegation,hepointedoutthathehadfiledcriminalcomplaints
againstLiliaTabang.Healsosurmisedthatthesignaturesonthesubjectdocumentsappearing
abovethename"GlennC.Gacott"weremereforgeriesandcrudeduplicationsofhissignature.
PerRule131,Section1oftheRulesofCourt, 37theburdenofproofisvestedupontheparty
whoallegesthetruthofhisclaimordefenseoranyfactinissue.Thus,inLeaveDivision,
OfficeofAdministrativeServices,OfficeoftheCourtAdministratorv.Gutierrez 38 wherea
partyresortstobaredenialsandallegationsandfailstosubmitevidenceinsupportofhis
defense,thedeterminationthathecommittedtheviolationissustained.
Itwasincumbentuponrespondenttoprovehisallegationthatthesupposedownersofthe
sevenparcelsarerealpersons.Quitethecontrary,hefailedtoproducetheslightestproofof
theiridentitiesandexistence,muchlessproducetheiractualpersons.Astohisallegations
regardingLiliaTabangssupposedextortionandthreatandtheforgeryorcrudeduplicationof
his signature, they remain just that allegations. Respondent failed to aver facts and
circumstanceswhichsupporttheseclaims.
Atbest,respondentmerelydrawsconclusionsfromthedocumentswhichformtheverybasis
ofcomplainantsownallegationsandwhichareactuallybeingassailedbycomplainantsas
inaccurate,unreliable,andfraudulent.RespondentmakesmuchofhowLiliaTabangcouldnot reasons.HealsovexedthisCourttoadmithisAppealdespitehisownfailuretocomplywith
havebeentheowneroftheseven(7)parcelssincehernamedoesnotappearontheparcels themuch extendedperiodgiventohim, thus inviting theCourt tobe a party indelaying
TCTs39 and how he merely respected the title and ownership of the ostensible owners. 40 complainantscause.Forallhisperversity,respondentdeservesnoneofthisCourtsclemency.
Similarly,hemakesmuchofhowLiliaTabangwasnamedasamereagentintheSPAs. 41 WHEREFORE,respondentATTY.GLENNC.GACOTT,havingclearlyviolatedtheCanons
However,respondentlosessightofthefactthatitispreciselytheaccuracyofwhattheTCTs of Professional Responsibility through his unlawful, dishonest, and deceitful conduct, is
and SPAs indicate and the deception they engender that are the crux of the present DISBARREDandhisnameorderedSTRICKENfromtheRollofAttorneys.
controversy.InurgingthisCourttosustainhim,respondentwouldhaveusrelyonthevery LetcopiesofthisDecisionbeservedontheOfficeoftheBarConfidant,theIntegratedBarof
documentsassailedasfraudulent. thePhilippines,andallcourtsinthecountryfortheirinformationandguidance.Letacopyof
Apartfromthese,allthatrespondentcancomeupwitharegeneric,sweeping,andselfserving thisDecisionbeattachedtorespondent'spersonalrecordasattorney.
allegationsof(1)howhecouldnothaveobtainedtheTCTsfromTabangas"itisastanding SOORDERED.
policyofhislawofficenottoacceptTorrenstitle[sic]unlessitisrelatedtoacourtcase" 42and Sereno,C.J.,Carpio,Velasco,Jr.,LeonardoDeCastro,Peralta,Bersamin,DelCastillo,
because"[he]doesnotborrowanyTorrenstitlefromanybodyandforwhateverpurpose;" 43(2) Abad,Villarama,Jr.,Perez,Mendoza,Reyes,PerlasBernabe,andLeonen,JJ.,concur.
howcomplainantscouldnothaveconfrontedhimtodemandthereturnoftheTCTsandhow Brion,J.,onleave.
hecouldnothavetoldthemthathelosttheTCTsbecause"[a]salawyer,[he]alwaysrespects Footnotes
andrecognizestherightofanownertokeepinhiscustodyorpossessionanyofhisproperties 1
Rule1.01Alawyershallnotengageinunlawful,dishonest,immoralordeceitfulconduct.
of value;"44 and (3) how he could not have met and talked with Lilia Tabang for the 2
Rollo,p.2.
engagementofhisservicesonlytorefuseLiliaTabangbecauselegalpracticeconstitutedhis 3
Id.at3.
livelihood,andtherewasnoreasonforhimtorefuseanoccasiontoearnincome. 45 4
Id.at4.
Ratherthanrespondingsquarelytocomplainantsallegations,respondentmerelyembarkson 5
Id.
conjecturesandascribesmotivestocomplainants.HeaccusesLiliaTabangofdemandinga 6
Id.
"balato"oftwentypercent(20%)fromtheproceedsofthesaleofthesevenparcels,andof 7
Id.at5.
threateningtodefamehimandtoseekhisdisbarmentaftershehadbeenrefused.1wphi1This 8
Id.
evasiveposturingnotwithstanding,whatisclearisthatrespondentfailedtoadduceeventhe 9
Id.
slightestprooftosubstantiatetheseclaims.Fromallindications,LiliaTabanghadsufficient 10
Id.at6.
basistofilethepresentComplaintandseeksanctionsagainstrespondent. 11
Id.at7.
Giventheglaringdisparitybetweentheevidenceadducedbycomplainantsandthesheerlack 12
Id.at8.
ofevidenceadducedbyrespondent,thisCourtisledtonootherreasonableconclusionthan 13
Id.at5859.
thatrespondentcommittedtheactsofwhichheisaccusedandthatheactedinamannerthatis 14
Id.at198211.
unlawful, dishonest, immoral, and deceitful in violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code of 15
Id.at197.
ProfessionalResponsibility. 16
Id.at230241.
ThisCourthasrepeatedlyemphasizedthatthepracticeoflawisimbuedwithpublicinterest 17
Id.at1512.
andthat"alawyerowessubstantialdutiesnotonlytohisclient,butalsotohisbrethreninthe 18
Id.at1515.
profession, to the courts, and to the nation, and takes part in one of the most important 19
Id.at15151516.
functions of the State the administration of justice as an officer of the court." 46 20
Id.at1516.
Accordingly,"[l]awyersareboundtomaintainnotonlyahighstandardoflegalproficiency, 21
Id.
butalsoofmorality,honesty,integrityandfairdealing." 47 22
Id.at1512.
Respondent has fallen dismally and disturbingly short of the high standard of morality, 23
Id.at897898.
honesty, integrity, and fair dealing required of him. Quite the contrary, he employed his 24
Id.at914960.
knowledgeandskillofthelawaswellastookadvantageofthecredulityofpetitionersto 25
Id.at13401358.
secureunduegainsforhimselfandtoinflictseriousdamageonothers.Hedidsooverthe 26
Rule12.04Alawyershallnotundulydelayacase,impedetheexecutionofajudgmentor
course of several years in a sustained and unrelenting fashion and outdid his previous misuseCourtprocesses.
wrongdoingwithevengreater,moredetestableoffenses.Hehashardlyshownanyremorse. 27
Rollo,p.1511.
Fromhowhehasconductedhimselfintheseproceedings,heisallbutaversetorectifyinghis 28
Id.at1510.
ways and assuaging complainants plight. Respondent even foisted uponthe IBP and this 29
A.C.No.7481,April24,2012,670SCRA358.
CourthisduplicitybyrepeatedlyabsentinghimselffromtheIBPshearingswithoutjustifiable 30
A.C.No.140J,March8,1988,158SCRA497.
31
160Phil.306(1975).
32
A.C.No.7390,February27,2012citingKaraanv.Pineda,A.C.No.4306,March28,2007,
519SCRA143,146. A.C.No.6470,July08,2014MERCEDITADEJESUS,Complainant,v.ATTY.JUVY
33
Id. MELLSANCHEZMALIT,Respondent.:JULY2014PHILIPPINESUPREMECOURT
34
Abav.DeGuzman,A.C.No.7649,December14,2011,662SCRA361citingSantosv. JURISPRUDENCECHANROBLESVIRTUALLAWLIBRARY
Dichoso,A.C.No.1825,August22,1978,84SCRA622;174Phil.115(1978),andNoriega A.C.No.6470,July08,2014
v.Sison,A.C.No.2266,October27,1983,125SCRA293;210Phil.236(1983). BeforetheCourtisadisbarmentcomplaintfiledbyMerceditaDeJesus(DeJesus)against
35
Id. respondentAtty.JuvyMellSanchezMalit(SanchezMalit)onthefollowinggrounds:grave
36
Id.at372citingHabagatGrillv.DMCUrbanPropertyDeveloper,Inc.,494Phil.603,613 misconduct,dishonesty,malpractices,andunworthinesstobecomeanofficeroftheCourt.
(2005);BankofthePhilippineIslandsv.Reyes,G.R.No.157177,February11,2008,544 THEFACTSOFTHECASE
SCRA206,216;Republicv.Bautista,G.R.No.169801,September11,2007,532SCRA598,
612. IntheAffidavitComplaint1filedbycomplainantbeforetheOfficeoftheBarConfidanton23
37
Rule131,Sec.1.Burdenofproof.Burdenofproofisthedutyofapartytopresent June2004,sheallegedthaton1March2002,respondenthaddraftedandnotarizedaReal
evidenceonthefactsinissuenecessarytoestablishhisclaimordefensebytheamountof EstateMortgageofapublicmarketstallthatfalselynamedtheformerasitsabsoluteand
evidencerequiredbylaw. registeredowner.Asaresult,themortgageesuedcomplainantforperjuryandforcollectionof
38
A.M.No.P112951,February15,2012,666SCRA29,34. sumofmoney.Sheclaimedthatrespondentwasaconsultantofthelocalgovernmentunitof
39
Rollo,p.941. Dinalupihan,Bataan,andwasthereforeawarethatthemarketstallwasgovernmentowned.
40
Id.at944.
41
Id.at940,945. Priorthereto,respondenthadalsonotarizedtwocontractsthatcausedcomplainantlegaland
42
Id.at948. financialproblems.Onecontractwasaleaseagreementnotarizedbyrespondentsometimein
43
Id. September1999withoutthesignatureofthelessees.However,complainantonlyfoundout
44
Id.at949950. thattheagreementhadnotbeensignedbythelesseeswhenshelosthercopyandsheaskedfor
45
Id.at950. another copy from respondent. The other contract was a sale agreement over a property
46
IntheMatteroftheIBPMembershipDuesDelinquencyofAtty.MARCIALA.EDILLON coveredbyaCertificateofLandOwnershipAward(CLOA)whichcomplainantenteredinto
(IBPAdministrativeCaseNo.MDD1),174Phil.55,62(1978). withacertainNicomedesTala(Tala)on17February1998.Respondentdraftedandnotarized
47
Venturav.Samson,A.C.No.9608,November27,2012. said agreement, but did notadvisecomplainant that the propertywas still covered bythe
periodwithinwhichitcouldnotbealienated.
TheLawphilProjectArellanoLawFoundation
Inadditiontothedocumentsattachedtohercomplaint,complainantsubsequentlysubmitted
threeSpecialPowersofAttorney(SPAs)notarizedbyrespondentandanAffidavitofIrene
Tolentino(Tolentino),complainantssecretary/treasurer.TheSPAswerenotsignedbythe
principalsnamedthereinandboreonlythesignatureofthenamedattorneyinfact,FlorinaB.
Limpioso (Limpioso). Tolentinos Affidavit corroborated complainants allegations against
respondent.2

On4August2004,theSecondDivisionoftheSupremeCourtissuedaResolutionrequiring
respondenttosubmithercommentontheComplaintwithinten(10)daysfromreceiptof
notice.3

In her Comment,4 respondent explained that the mortgage contract was prepared in the
presenceofcomplainantandthatthelatterhadreaditbeforeaffixinghersignature.However,
complainanturgentlyneededtheloanproceedssothecontractwashastilydone.Itwasonly
copiedfromasimilarfileinrespondentscomputer,andthephraseabsoluteandregistered
ownerwasinadvertentlyleftunedited.Still,itshouldnotbeacausefordisciplinaryaction,
becausecomplainantconstructedthesubjectpublicmarketstallunderaBuildOperateand
Transfercontractwiththelocalgovernmentunitand,technically,shecouldbeconsideredits
owner.Besides,therehadbeenapriormortgagecontractoverthesamepropertyinwhich
complainant was represented as the propertys absolute owner, but she did not complain.
Moreover,thecauseoftheperjurychargeagainstcomplainantwasnottherepresentationof
herselfasownerofthemortgagedproperty,butherguaranteethatitwasfreefromallliens
andencumbrances.Theperjurychargewasevendismissed,becausetheprosecutorfoundthat
complainantandherspousehad,indeed,paidthedebtsecuredwiththepreviousmortgage
contractoverthesamemarketstall.
Withrespecttotheleaseagreement,respondentcounteredthatthedocumentattachedtothe
AffidavitComplaint was actually new. She gave the courts copy of the agreement to
complainanttoaccommodatethelattersrequestforanextracopy.Thus,respondentprepared
andnotarizedanewone,relyingoncomplainantsassurancethatthelesseeswouldsignitand
thatitwouldbereturnedinlieuoftheoriginalcopyforthecourt.Complainant,however,
renegedonherpromise.
AsregardsthepurchaseagreementofapropertycoveredbyaCLOA,respondentclaimedthat
complainant was an experienced realty broker and, therefore, needed no advice on the
repercussions of that transaction. Actually, when the purchase agreement was notarized,
complainantdidnotpresenttheCLOA,andsotheagreementmentionednothingaboutit.
Rather,theagreementexpresslystatedthatthepropertywasthesubjectofacasepending
beforetheDepartmentofAgrarianReformAdjudicationBoard(DARAB);complainantwas
thusnotifiedofthestatusofthesubjectproperty.Finally,respondentmaintainedthattheSPAs
submittedbycomplainantasadditionalevidencewereproperly notarized. Itcanbe easily
gleanedfromthedocumentsthattheattorneyinfactpersonallyappearedbeforerespondent;
hence, the notarization was limited to the formers participation in the execution of the
document.Moreover,theacknowledgmentclearlystatedthatthedocumentmustbenotarized
intheprincipalsplaceofresidence.
An exchange of pleadings ensued after respondent submitted her Comment. After her
rejoinder, complainant filed an Urgent ExParte Motion for Submission of Additional
Evidence.5Attachedtheretowerecopiesofdocumentsnotarizedbyrespondent,includingthe
following:(1)anExtraJudicialDeedofPartitionwhichreferredtotheSPAsnamingLimpioso
as attorneyinfact; (2) five SPAs that lacked the signatures of either the principal or the
attorneyinfact;(3)twodeedsofsalewithincompletesignaturesofthepartiesthereto;(4)an
unsignedSwornStatement;(5)aleasecontractthatlackedthesignatureofthelessor;(6)five
unsignedAffidavits;(7)anunsignedinsuranceclaimform(AnnualDeclarationbytheHeirs);
(8) an unsigned Invitation Letter to a potential investor in Japan; (9) an unsigned Bank
Certification;and(10)anunsignedConsenttoAdoption.
Afterthemandatoryconferenceandhearing,thepartiessubmittedtheirrespectivePosition
Papers.6Notably,respondentsPositionPaperdidnottackletheadditionaldocumentsattached
tocomplainantsUrgentExParteMotion.
THEFINDINGSOFTHEIBP
Inhis15February2008Report,IBPInvestigatingCommissionerLelandR.Villadolid,Jr.
recommendedtheimmediaterevocationoftheNotarialCommissionofrespondentandher
disqualification as notary public for two years for her violation of her oath as such by
notarizing documents without the signatures of the parties who had purportedly appeared
beforeher.Heacceptedrespondentsexplanationswithrespecttotheleaseagreement,sale
contract,andthethreeSPAspertainingtoLimpioso.However,hefoundthattheinaccurate
craftingoftherealestatemortgagecontractwasasufficientbasistoholdrespondentliablefor
violationofCanon187andRule18.038oftheCodeofProfessionalResponsibility.Thus,he
alsorecommendedthatshebesuspendedfromthepracticeoflawforsixmonths. 9
The IBP Board of Governors, in its Resolution No. XVIII2008245 dated 22 May 2008,
unanimously adopted and approved the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner,withthemodificationthatrespondentbesuspendedfromthepracticeoflaw
foroneyear.10
Respondent filed her first Motion for Reconsideration 11 and Second Motion for
Reconsideration.12 Shemaintainedthattheadditionaldocumentssubmittedbycomplainant
wereinadmissible,astheywereobtainedwithoutobservingtheproceduralrequisitesunder
Section4,RuleVIofAdm.No.020813SC(2004RulesonNotarialPractice). 13Moreover,
theUrgentExParteMotionofcomplainantwasactuallyasupplementalpleading,whichwas
prohibitedundertherulesofprocedureoftheCommitteeonBarDiscipline;besides,shewas
not the proper party to question those documents. Hence, the investigating commissioner
shouldhaveexpungedthedocumentsfromtherecords,insteadofgivingthemduecourse.
Respondent also prayed that mitigating circumstances be considered, specifically the
following: absence of prior disciplinary record; absence of dishonest or selfish motive;
personalandemotionalproblems;timelygoodfaithefforttomakerestitutionortorectifythe
consequences of her misconduct; full and free disclosure to the disciplinary board or
cooperativeattitudetowardtheproceedings;characterorreputation;remorse;andremoteness
ofprioroffenses.
The IBP Board of Governors, in its Resolution No. XX2012119 dated 10 March 2012,
denied respondents motion for reconsideration for lack of substantial reason to justify a
reversaloftheIBPsfindings.14
PursuanttoRule139BoftheRulesofCourt,DirectorforBarDisciplinePuraAngelicaY.
Santiago through a letter addressed to then acting Chief Justice Antonio T. Carpio
transmittedthedocumentspertainingtothedisbarmentComplaintagainstrespondent. 15
THECOURTSRULING
After carefully reviewing the merits of the complaint against respondent and the parties
submissionsinthiscase,theCourtherebymodifiesthefindingsoftheIBP.
Beforegoingintothesubstanceofthechargesagainstrespondent,theCourtshallfirstdispose
ofsomeproceduralmattersraisedbyrespondent.
Respondentarguesthattheadditionaldocumentssubmittedinevidencebycomplainantare
inadmissibleforhavingbeenobtainedinviolationofSection4,RuleVIofthe2004Ruleson
NotarialPractice.AcomparableargumentwasraisedinTolentinov.Mendoza,16inwhichthe
respondentthereinopposedtheadmissionofthebirthcertificatesofhisillegitimatechildrenas
evidenceofhisgrosslyimmoralconduct,becausethosedocumentswereobtainedinviolation
Rule 24, Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 1993. 17 Rejecting his argument, the Court
reasonedasfollows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Section3,Rule128oftheRevisedRulesonEvidenceprovidesthatevidenceisadmissible
whenitisrelevanttotheissueandisnotexcludedbythelawortheserules.Therecouldbe
no dispute that the subject birth certificates are relevant to the issue. The only question,
therefore, is whether the law or the rules provide for the inadmissibility of said birth
certificatesallegedlyforhavingbeenobtainedinviolationofRule24,AdministrativeOrder
No.1,seriesof1993.
NotethatRule24,AdministrativeOrderNo.1,seriesof1993onlyprovidesforsanctions
againstpersonsviolatingtheruleonconfidentialityofbirthrecords,butnowheredoesitstate
that procurement of birth records in violation of said rule would render said records
inadmissibleinevidence.Ontheotherhand,theRevisedRulesofEvidenceonlyprovidesfor
theexclusionofevidenceifitisobtainedasaresultofillegalsearchesandseizures.Itshould
beemphasized,however,thatsaidruleagainstunreasonablesearchesandseizuresismeant
onlytoprotectapersonfrominterferencebythegovernmentorthestate.InPeoplevs.Hipol,
weexplainedthat:
TheConstitutionalproscriptionenshrinedintheBillofRightsdoesnotconcernitselfwiththe
relation between a private individual and another individual. It governs the relationship
between the individual and the State and its agents. The Bill of Rights only tempers
governmental power and protects the individual against any aggression and unwarranted
interference byanydepartment ofgovernmentanditsagencies.Accordingly, itcannotbe
extendedtotheactscomplainedofinthiscase.Thealleged"warrantlesssearch"madeby
Roque,acoemployeeofappellantatthetreasurer'soffice,canhardlyfallwithintheambitof
theconstitutionalproscriptiononunwarrantedsearchesandseizures.
Consequently,inthiscasewherecomplainants,asprivateindividuals,obtainedthesubject
birthrecordsasevidenceagainstrespondent,theprotectionagainstunreasonablesearchesand
seizuresdoesnotapply.
SincebothRule24,AdministrativeOrderNo.1,seriesof1993andtheRevisedRuleson
Evidencedonotprovidefortheexclusionfromevidenceofthebirthcertificatesinquestion,
said public documents are, therefore, admissible and should be properly taken into
considerationintheresolutionofthisadministrativecaseagainstrespondent. 18
Similarly,the2004RulesonNotarialLawcontainnoprovisiondeclaringtheinadmissibility
ofdocumentsobtainedinviolationthereof.Thus,theIBPcorrectlyconsideredinevidencethe
othernotarizeddocumentssubmittedbycomplainantasadditionalevidence.
Respondents argument that the Urgent ExParte Motion of complainant constitutes a
supplementalpleadingmustfailaswell.Asitsverynamedenotes,asupplementalpleading
onlyservestobolsteroraddssomethingtotheprimarypleading.Itsusualofficeistosetup
newfactswhichjustify,enlargeorchangethekindofreliefwithrespecttothesamesubject
matterasthecontroversyreferredtointheoriginalcomplaint. 19Accordingly,itcannotbesaid
thattheUrgentExParteMotionfiledbycomplainantwasasupplementalpleading.Oneofher
chargesagainstrespondentisthatthelatternotarizedincompletedocuments,asshownbythe
SPAsandleaseagreementattachedtotheAffidavitComplaint.Complainantisnotlegally
barredfromsubmittingadditionalevidencetostrengthenthebasisofhercomplaint.
Going now into the substance of the charges against respondent, the Court finds that she
committedmisconductandgrievouslyviolatedheroathasanotarypublic.
The important role a notary public performs cannot be overemphasized. The Court has
repeatedly stressed that notarization is not an empty, meaningless routinary act, but one
invested with substantive public interest. Notarization converts a private document into a
publicdocument,makingitadmissibleinevidencewithoutfurtherproofofitsauthenticity.
Thus,anotarizeddocumentis,bylaw,entitledtofullfaithandcredituponitsface.Itisfor
thisreasonthatanotarypublicmustobservewithutmostcarethebasicrequirementsinthe
performance of his notarial duties; otherwise, the public's confidence in the integrity of a
notarizeddocumentwouldbeundermined.20
Wherethenotarypublicadmittedlyhaspersonalknowledgeofafalsestatementorinformation
containedintheinstrumenttobenotarized,yetproceedstoaffixthenotarialsealonit,the
Courtmustnothesitatetodisciplinethenotarypublicaccordinglyasthecircumstancesofthe
casemay dictate. Otherwise, theintegrityandsanctityofthenotarizationprocessmaybe
undermined, and public confidence in notarial documents diminished. 21 In this case,
respondentfullyknewthatcomplainantwasnottheownerofthemortgagedmarketstall.That
complainantcomprehendedtheprovisionsoftherealestatemortgagecontractdoesnotmake
respondent any less guilty. If at all, it only heightens the latters liability for tolerating a
wrongfulact.Clearly,respondentsconductamountedtoabreachofCanon1 22 andRules
1.0123and1.0224oftheCodeofProfessionalResponsibility.
Respondents explanation about the unsigned lease agreement executed by complainant
sometimeinSeptember199925isincredulous.If,indeed,herfilecopyoftheagreementbore
thelesseessignatures,shecouldhavegivencomplainantacertifiedphotocopythereof.Iteven
appearsthatsaidleaseagreementisnotararityinrespondentspracticeasanotarypublic.
Records show that on various occasions from 2002 to 2004, respondent has notarized 22
documentsthatwereeitherunsignedorlackingsignaturesoftheparties.Technically,each
documentmaybeagroundfordisciplinaryaction,foritisthedutyofanotarialofficerto
demandthatadocumentbesignedinhisorherpresence.26
Anotarypublicshouldnotnotarizeadocumentunlessthepersonswhosigneditarethevery
sameoneswhoexecuteditandwhopersonallyappearedbeforethesaidnotarypublictoattest
tothecontentsandtruthofwhatarestatedtherein. 27Thus,inacknowledgingthattheparties
personallycameandappearedbeforeher,respondentalsoviolatedRule10.01 28oftheCodeof
ProfessionalResponsibilityandheroathasalawyerthatsheshalldonofalsehood. 29

Certainly,respondentisunfittocontinueenjoyingthesolemnofficeofanotarypublic.In
severalinstances,theCourtdidnothesitatetodisbarlawyerswhowerefoundtobeutterly
oblivioustothesolemnityoftheiroathasnotariespublic. 30Evenso,theruleisthatdisbarment
ismetedoutonlyinclearcasesofmisconductthatseriouslyaffectthestandingandcharacter
ofthelawyerasanofficerofthecourtandtheCourtwillnotdisbaralawyerwherealesser
penaltywillsufficetoaccomplishthedesiredend. 31Theblatantdisregardbyrespondentofher
basicdutiesasanotarypublicwarrantsthelessseverepunishmentofsuspensionfromthe
practiceoflawandperpetualdisqualificationtobecommissionedasanotarypublic.

WHEREFORE,respondentAtty.JuvyMellSanchezMalitisfoundguiltyofviolatingCanon
1andRules1.01,1.02,and10.01oftheCodeofProfessionalResponsibilityaswellasher
oathasnotarypublic.Hence,sheisSUSPENDEDfromthepracticeoflawforONEYEAR
effective immediately. Her notarial commission, if still existing, is IMMEDIATELY
REVOKED and she is hereby PERPETUALLY DISQUALIFIED from being
commissionedasanotarypublic.
A.C.No.5816,March10,2015DR.ELMARO.PEREZ,Complainant,v.ATTY.TRISTAN
LetcopiesofthisResolutionbeenteredintothepersonalrecordsofrespondentasamemberof A. CATINDIG AND ATTY. KAREN E. BAYDO, Respondents. : MARCH 2015
thebarandfurnishedtotheBarConfidant,theIntegratedBarofthePhilippines,andtheCourt PHILIPPINE SUPREME COURT JURISPRUDENCE CHANROBLES VIRTUAL LAW
Administratorforcirculationtoallcourtsofthecountryfortheirinformationandguidance. LIBRARY
A.C.No.5816,March10,2015
Nocosts. BeforetheCourtisanadministrativecomplaint 1 fordisbarmentfiledbyDr.ElmarO.Perez
(Dr.Perez)withtheOfficeoftheBarConfidantonAugust27,2002againstAtty.TristanA.
SOORDERED. Catindig(Atty.Catindig)andAtty.KarenE.Baydo(Atty.Baydo)(respondents)forgross
immoralityandviolationoftheCodeofProfessionalResponsibility.
Carpio,Velasco,Jr.,LeonardoDeCastro,Brion,Peralta,Bersamin,DelCastillo,Villarama,
Jr.,Perez,Mendoza,Reyes,PerlasBernabe,andLeonen,JJ.,concur. TheFacts

Inhercomplaint,Dr.PerezallegedthatsheandAtty.Catindighadbeenfriendssincethemid
1960swhentheywerebothstudentsattheUniversityofthePhilippines,buttheylosttouch
aftertheir graduation.Sometimein1983,thepaths ofAtty.Catindigand Dr.Perezagain
crossed. It was at that time that Atty. Catindig started to court Dr.
Perez.2chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Atty. Catindig admitted to Dr. Perez that he was already wed to Lily Corazon Gomez
(Gomez), having married the latter on May 18, 1968 at the Central Methodist Church in
Ermita,Manila,whichwasfollowedbyaCatholicweddingattheShrineofOurLadyof
LourdesinQuezonCity.3Atty.CatindighoweverclaimedthatheonlymarriedGomezbecause
hegotherpregnant;thathewasafraidthatGomezwouldmakeascandaloutofherpregnancy
shouldherefusetomarryher,whichcouldhavejeopardizedhisscholarshipintheHarvard
LawSchool.4chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Atty.CatindigtoldDr.Perezthathewasintheprocessofobtainingadivorceinaforeign
countrytodissolvehismarriagetoGomez,andthathewouldeventuallymarryheroncethe
divorce had been decreed. Consequently, sometime in 1984, Atty. Catindig and Gomez
obtainedadivorcedecreefromtheDominicanRepublic.Dr.PerezclaimedthatAtty.Catindig
assuredherthatthesaiddivorcedecreewaslawfulandvalidandthattherewasnolongerany
impedimenttotheirmarriage.5chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Thus,onJuly14,1984,Atty.CatindigmarriedDr.PerezintheStateofVirginiaintheUnited
StatesofAmerica(USA).TheirunionwasblessedwithachildwhomtheynamedTristan
JegarJosefFrederic.6chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Yearslater,Dr.PerezcametoknowthathermarriagetoAtty.Catindigisanullitysincethe
divorcedecreethatwasobtainedfromtheDominicanRepublicbythelatterandGomezisnot
recognized by Philippine laws. When she confronted Atty. Catindig about it, the latter
allegedlyassuredDr.Perezthathewouldlegalizetheiruniononceheobtainsadeclarationof
nullityofhismarriagetoGomezunderthelawsofthePhilippines.Healsopromisedtolegally
adopttheirson.7chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Sometimein1997,Dr.PerezremindedAtty.Catindigofhispromisetolegalizetheirunionby
filingapetitiontonullifyhismarriagetoGomez.Atty.Catindigtoldherthathewouldstill
havetogettheconsentofGomeztothesaidpetition. 8chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Sometime in 2001, Dr. Perez alleged that she received an anonymous letter 9 in the mail
informingherofAtty.CatindigsscandalousaffairwithAtty.Baydo,andthatsometimelater,
shecameuponaloveletter 10writtenandsignedbyAtty.CatindigforAtty.BaydodatedApril
25,2001.Inthesaidletter,Atty.CatindigprofessedhislovetoAtty.Baydo,promisingto
marryheroncehisimpedimentisremoved.Apparently,fivemonthsintotheirrelationship,
Atty.BaydorequestedAtty.Catindigtoputahalttotheiraffairuntilsuchtimethatheisable
toobtaintheannulmentofhismarriage.OnAugust13,2001,Atty.Catindigfiledapetitionto
declarethenullityofhismarriagetoGomez.11chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
OnOctober31,2001,Atty. CatindigabandonedDr.Perez andtheir son;hemovedtoan
upscale condominium in Salcedo Village, Makati City where Atty. Baydo was frequently
seen.12chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In a Resolution13 dated October 9, 2002, the Court directed the respondents to file their
respective comments, which they separately did on November 25,
2002.14chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Atty. Catindig, inhisComment, 15 admitted thathemarried Gomez on May 18, 1968. He
claimed, however, that immediately after the wedding, Gomez showed signs that she was
incapableofcomplyingwithhermaritalobligations,asshehadseriousintimacyproblems;
and that while their union was blessed with four children, their relationship simply
deteriorated.
Eventually,theirirreconcilabledifferencesledtotheirdefactoseparationin1984.Theythen
consultedAtty.WilhelminaJoven(Atty.Joven),amutualfriend,onhowtheagreementto
separateandliveapartcouldbeimplemented.Atty.Jovensuggestedthatthecoupleadopta
propertyregimeofcompleteseparationofproperty.Shelikewiseadvisedthecoupletoobtain
adivorcedecreefromtheDominicanRepublicforwhatevervalueitmayhaveandcomfortit
mayprovidethem.16chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Thus,onApril27,1984,Atty.CatindigandGomezeachexecutedaSpecialPowerofAttorney
addressedtoaJudgeoftheFirstCivilCourtofSanCristobal,DominicanRepublic,appointing
anattorneyinfacttoinstituteadivorceactionunderitslaws.Atty.Catindiglikewiseadmitted
thatadivorcebymutualconsentwasratifiedbytheDominicanRepubliccourtonJune12,
1984.Further,Atty.CatindigandGomezfiledaJointPetitionforDissolutionofConjugal
PartnershipbeforetheRegionalTrialCourtofMakatiCity,Branch133,whichwasgrantedon
June23,1984.17chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Atty.CatindigclaimedthatDr.Perezknewoftheforegoing,includingthefactthatthedivorce
decreed by the Dominican Republic court does not have any effect in the Philippines.
NotwithstandingthatsheknewthatthemarriageofAtty.CatindigandGomezstillsubsisted,
Dr.PerezdemandedthatAtty.Catindigmarryher.Thus,Atty.CatindigmarriedDr.Perezin
July1984intheUSA.18chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Atty.CatindigclaimedthatDr.Perezknewthattheirmarriagewasnotvalidsincehisprevious
marriagetoGomezwasstillsubsisting,andthatheonlymarriedDr.Perezbecauseheloved
herandthathewasafraidoflosingherifhedidnot.Hemerelydesiredtolendamodicumof
legitimacytotheirrelationship.19chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Atty.CatindigclaimedthathisrelationshipwithDr.Perezturnedsour.Eventually,helefttheir
homeinOctober2001topreventanyacrimonyfromdeveloping. 20chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
HedeniedthatAtty.BaydowasthereasonthatheleftDr.Perez,claimingthathisrelationship
withDr.Perezstartedtofallapartasearlyas1997.HeassertedthatAtty.Baydojoinedhislaw
firmonlyinSeptember1999;andthatwhilehewasattractedtoher,Atty.Baydodidnot
reciprocateandinfactrejectedhim.HelikewisepointedoutthatAtty.Baydoresignedfrom
hisfirminJanuary2001.21chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Forherpart,Atty.BaydodeniedthatshehadanaffairwithAtty.Catindig.Sheclaimedthat
Atty.Catindigbegancourtingherwhileshewasemployedinhisfirm.Shehoweverrejected
Atty.Catindigsromanticovertures;shetoldhimthatshecouldnotreciprocatehisfeelings
sincehewasmarriedandthathewastoooldforher.Shesaidthatdespitebeingturneddown,
Atty. Catindig still pursued her, which was the reason why she resigned from his law
firm.22chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
OnJanuary29,2003,theCourtreferredthecasetotheIntegratedBarofthePhilippines(IBP)
for investigation, report and recommendation within 90 days from
notice.23chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

OnJune2,2003,theIBPsCommissiononBarDiscipline(CBD)issuedanOrder 24settingthe
mandatoryconferenceoftheadministrativecaseonJuly4,2003,whichwaslaterresetto
August 29, 2003. During the conference, the parties manifested that they were already
submittingthecaseforresolutionbasedonthepleadingsalreadysubmitted.Thereupon,the
IBPCBDdirectedthepartiestosubmittheirrespectivepositionpaperswithin10daysfrom
notice.RespondentsAtty.CatindigandAtty.BaydofiledtheirpositionpapersonOctober17,
200325andOctober20,2003,26respectively.Dr.Perezfiledherpositionpaper 27onOctober24,
2003.
FindingsoftheIBPInvestigatingCommissioner
On May 6, 2011, after due proceedings, the Investigating Commissioner of the IBPCBD
issuedaReportandRecommendation,28whichrecommendedthedisbarmentofAtty.Catindig
for gross immorality, violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of
ProfessionalResponsibility.TheInvestigatingCommissionerpointedoutthatAtty.Catindigs
actofmarryingDr.PerezdespiteknowingfullywellthathispreviousmarriagetoGomezstill
subsistedwasagrosslyimmoralandillegalconduct,whichwarrantstheultimatepenaltyof
disbarment.TheInvestigatingCommissionerfurtheropinedthat:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
In this case, the undisputedfacts gatheredfrom the evidence andthe admissions ofAtty.
Catindigestablishedapatternofgrosslyimmoralconductthatwarrantsfustigationandhis
disbarment. Hisconductwas notonlycorruptorunprincipled;itwas reprehensibleto the
highestdegree.
Thereisnodichotomyofmorality.Alawyerandaprofessoroflaw,bothinhisofficialand
personalconduct,mustdisplayexemplarybehavior.Respondentsbigamousmarriageandhis
proclivity for extramarital adventurism have definitely caused damage to the legal and
teachingprofessions.Howcanheholdhisheaduphighandexpecthisstudents,hispeersand
thecommunitytolookuptohimasamodelworthyofemulationwhenhefailedtofollowthe
tenetsofmorality?Incontractingasecondmarriagenotwithstandingknowingfullywellthat
hehasapriorvalidsubsistingmarriage,Atty.Catindighasmadeamockeryofanotherwise
inviolable institution, a serious outrage to the generally accepted moral standards of the
community.29
Ontheotherhand,theInvestigatingCommissionerrecommendedthatthechargeagainstAtty.
Baydobedismissedfordearthofevidence;Dr.Perezfailedtopresentclearandpreponderant
evidenceinsupportoftheallegedaffairbetweentherespondents.
FindingsoftheIBPBoardofGovernors
OnDecember10,2011,theIBPBoardofGovernorsissuedaResolution, 30whichadoptedand
approvedtherecommendationoftheInvestigatingCommissioner.
Atty.Catindigsoughtareconsideration31 oftheDecember10,2011ResolutionoftheIBP
BoardofGovernors,claimingthattheInvestigatingCommissionererredinrelyingsolelyon
Dr.Perezsuncorroboratedallegations.Hepointedoutthat,underSection1ofRule139Bof
theRulesofCourt,acomplaintfordisbarmentmustbesupportedbyaffidavitsofpersons
havingknowledgeofthefactsthereinallegedand/orbysuchdocumentsasmaysubstantiate
saidfacts.Hesaidthatdespitetheabsenceofanycorroboratingtestimony,theInvestigating
CommissionergavecredencetoDr.Pereztestimony.
Healsoclaimedthathehadabsolutelynointentionofcommittinganyfelony;thathenever
concealedthestatusofhismarriagefromanyone.Infact,Atty.Catindigassertedthathehad
alwaysbeentransparentwithbothGomezandDr.Perez.
The IBP Board of Governors, in its Resolution 32 dated December 29, 2012, denied Atty.
Catindigsmotionforreconsideration.
TheIssue
Theissueinthiscaseiswhethertherespondentscommittedgrossimmorality,whichwould
warranttheirdisbarment.
RulingoftheCourt
Afterathoroughperusaloftherespectiveallegationsofthepartiesandthecircumstancesof
this case, the Court agrees with the findings and recommendations of the Investigating
CommissionerandtheIBPBoardofGovernors.
TheCodeofProfessionalResponsibilityprovides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Rule1.01Alawyershallnotengageinunlawful,dishonest,immoralordeceitfulconduct.
Canon7Alawyershallatalltimesupholdtheintegrityanddignityofthelegalprofession
andsupporttheactivitiesoftheIntegratedBar.
Rule7.03Alawyershallnotengageinconductthatadverselyreflectsonhisfitnessto
practicelaw,norshouldhe,whetherinpublicorprivatelife,behaveinascandalousmannerto
thediscreditofthelegalprofession.cralawred
InArnobitv.Atty.Arnobit,33theCourtheld:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
[T]herequirementofgoodmoralcharacterisofmuchgreaterimport,asfarasthegeneral
publicisconcerned,thanthepossessionoflegallearning.Goodmoralcharacterisnotonlya
conditionprecedentforadmissiontothelegalprofession,butitmustalsoremainintactin
ordertomaintainonesgoodstandinginthatexclusiveandhonoredfraternity.Goodmoral
characterismorethanjusttheabsenceofbadcharacter.Suchcharacterexpressesitselfinthe
willtodotheunpleasantthingifitisrightandtheresolvenottodothepleasantthingifitis
wrong.Thismustbesobecausevastinterestsarecommittedtohiscare;heistherecipientof
unboundedtrustandconfidence;hedealswithhisclientsproperty,reputation,hislife,his
all.34(Citationomitted)
Inthisregard,Section27,Rule138oftheRulesofCourtprovidesthatalawyermaybe
removed or suspended from the practice of law, inter alia, for grossly immoral conduct.
Thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Sec.27.AttorneysremovedorsuspendedbySupremeCourtonwhatgrounds.Amember
ofthebarmayberemovedorsuspendedfromhisofficeasattorneybytheSupreme
Courtforanydeceit,malpractice,orothergrossmisconductinsuchoffice,grosslyimmoral
conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any
violationoftheoathwhichheisrequiredtotakebeforetheadmissiontopractice,orfora
wilfull disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willful
appearingasanattorneyfora partytoa case withoutauthoritysotodo.Thepracticeof
solicitingcasesatlawforthepurposeofgain,eitherpersonallyorthroughpaidagentsor
brokers,constitutesmalpractice.(Emphasisours)
Alawyermaybesuspendedordisbarredforanymisconductshowinganyfaultordeficiency
inhismoralcharacter,honesty,probityorgooddemeanor. 35Immoralconductinvolvesacts
thatarewillful,flagrant,orshameless,andthatshowamoralindifferencetotheopinionofthe
uprightandrespectablemembersofthecommunity.Immoralconductisgrosswhenitisso
corruptastoconstituteacriminalact,orsounprincipledastobereprehensibletoahigh
degree,orwhencommittedundersuchscandalousorrevoltingcircumstancesastoshockthe
communityssenseofdecency.TheCourtmakesthesedistinctions,asthesupremepenaltyof
disbarment arising from conduct requires grossly immoral, not simply immoral,
conduct.36chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Contracting a marriage during the subsistence of a previous one amounts to a grossly
immoralconduct.
The facts gathered from the evidence adduced by the parties and, ironically, from Atty.
Catindigsownadmission,indeedestablishapatternofconductthatisgrosslyimmoral;itis
notonlycorruptandunprincipled,butreprehensibletoahighdegree.
Atty.CatindigwasvalidlymarriedtoGomeztwiceaweddingintheCentralMethodist
Churchin1968,whichwasthenfollowedbyaCatholicwedding.In1983,Atty.Catindig
startedpursuingDr.Perezwhentheirpathscrossedagain.Curiously,15yearsintohisfirst
marriage and four children after, Atty. Catindig claimed that his first marriage was then
alreadyfallingapartduetoGomezseriousintimacyproblems.
A year after pursuing Dr. Perez, Atty. Catindig had a de facto separation from Gomez,
dissolvedtheirconjugalpartnershipofgains,obtainedadivorcedecreefromacourtinthe
DominicanRepublic,andmarriedDr.PerezintheUSAallinthesameyear.Atty.Catindig
wassoenchantedwithDr.Perezatthattimethathemovedheavenandearthjustsohecould
marryherrightawayamarriagethathasatleastasemblanceoflegality.
Fromhisownadmission,Atty.Catindigknewthatthedivorcedecreeheobtainedfromthe
courtintheDominicanRepublicwasnotrecognizedinourjurisdictionasheandGomezwere
bothFilipinocitizensatthattime.HeknewthathewasstillvalidlymarriedtoGomez;thathe
cannotmarryanewunlesshispreviousmarriagebeproperlydeclaredanullity.Otherwise,his
subsequentmarriagewould bevoid.Thisnotwithstanding, hestillmarriedDr. Perez.The
foregoingcircumstancesseriouslytaintAtty.Catindigssenseofsocialproprietyandmoral
values.Itisablatantandpurposefuldisregardofourlawsonmarriage.
IthasalsonotescapedtheattentionoftheCourtthatAtty.CatindigmarriedDr.Perezinthe
USA.ConsideringthatAtty.Catindigknewthathispreviousmarriageremainedvalid,the
logicalconclusionisthathewantedtomarryDr.PerezintheUSAfortheaddedsecurityof
avoidinganychargeofbigamybyenteringintothesubsequentmarriageoutsidePhilippine
jurisdiction.
Moreover,assumingarguendothatAtty.Catindigsclaimistrue,itmattersnotthatDr.Perez
knewthattheirmarriageisanullity.Thefactstillremainsthatheresortedtovariouslegal
strategiesinordertorenderafaadeofvaliditytohisotherwiseinvalidmarriagetoDr.Perez.
Suchactis,attheveryleast,sounprincipledthatitisreprehensibletothehighestdegree.
Further,after17yearsofcohabitingwithDr.Perez,anddespitethevariouslegalactionshe
resortedtoinordertogivetheirunionasemblanceofvalidity,Atty.Catindigleftherandtheir
son.Itwasonlyatthattimethathefinallydecidedtoproperlyseekthenullityofhisfirst
marriagetoGomez.Apparently,hewasthenalreadyentrancedwiththemuchyoungerAtty.
Baydo,anassociatelawyeremployedbyhisfirm.
WhilethefactthatAtty.CatindigdecidedtoseparatefromDr.PereztopursueAtty.Baydo,in
itself,cannotbeconsideredagrosslyimmoralconduct,suchfactformspartofthepattern
showing his propensity towards immoral conduct. Lest it be misunderstood, the Courts
findingofgrossimmoralconductishingednotonAtty.CatindigsdesertionofDr.Perez,but
onhiscontractingofasubsequentmarriageduringthesubsistenceofhispreviousmarriageto
Gomez.
Themoraldelinquencythataffectsthefitnessofamemberofthebartocontinueassuch
includes conduct that outrages the generally accepted moral standards of the community,
conduct for instance, which makes a mockery of the inviolable social institution of
marriage.37Invariouscases,theCourthasheldthatdisbarmentiswarrantedwhenalawyer
abandonshislawfulwifeandmaintainsanillicitrelationshipwithanotherwomanwhohas
bornehimachild.38chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Atty. Catindigs subsequent marriageduringthe subsistenceofhis previous onedefinitely
manifestsadeliberatedisregardofthesanctityofmarriageandthemaritalvowsprotectedby
the Constitutionand affirmedby our laws. By his own admission, Atty. Catindig made a
mockeryoutoftheinstitutionofmarriage,takingadvantageofhislegalskillsintheprocess.
Heexhibitedadeplorablelackofthatdegreeofmoralityrequiredofhimasamemberofthe
bar,whichthuswarrantthepenaltyofdisbarment.
TheCourtisnotunmindfuloftherulethatthepowertodisbarmustbeexercisedwithgreat
caution,andonlyinaclearcaseofmisconductthatseriouslyaffectsthestandingandcharacter
ofthelawyerasanofficeroftheCourtandasamemberofthebar.Wherealesserpenalty,
suchastemporarysuspension,couldaccomplishtheenddesired,disbarmentshouldneverbe
decreed.Nevertheless,inthiscase,theseriousnessoftheoffensecompelstheCourttowield
itspowertodisbar,asitappearstobethemostappropriatepenalty.

Atty.CatindigsclaimthatDr.Perezsallegationsagainsthimarenotcrediblesincetheyare
uncorroboratedandnotsupportedbyaffidavitscontrarytoSection1,Rule139BoftheRules
ofCourt,deservesscantconsideration.Verily,Atty.Catindighimselfadmittedinhispleadings
that he indeed married Dr. Perez in 1984 while his previous marriage with Gomez still
subsisted. Indubitably, such admission provides ample basis for the Court to render
disciplinarysanctionagainsthim.
Thereisinsufficientevidencetoprovetheaffairbetweentherespondents.
The Court likewise agrees with the Investigating Commissioner that there is a dearth of
evidencetoprovetheclaimedamorousrelationshipbetweentherespondents.Asitis,the
evidence that was presented by Dr. Perez to prove her claim was mere allegation, an
anonymousletterinformingherthattherespondentswereindeedhavinganaffairandthe
purportedlovelettertoAtty.BaydothatwassignedbyAtty.Catindig.
TheCourthasconsistentlyheldthatinsuspensionordisbarmentproceedingsagainstlawyers,
the lawyer enjoys the presumption of innocence, and the burden of proof rests upon the
complainanttoprovetheallegationsinhiscomplaint.Theevidencerequiredinsuspensionor
disbarmentproceedingsispreponderanceofevidence. 39chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
ThepresentationoftheanonymousletterthatwasreceivedbyDr.Perezonlyprovesthatthe
latterindeedreceivedaletterinformingheroftheallegedrelationsbetweentherespondents;it
doesnotprovetheveracityoftheallegationstherein.Similarly,thesupposedloveletter,ifat
all,onlyprovesthatAtty.CatindigwroteAtty.Baydoaletterprofessinghisloveforher.It
doesnotprovethatAtty.BaydoisindeedinarelationshipwithAtty.Catindig.
WHEREFORE,inconsiderationoftheforegoingdisquisitions,theCourtresolvestoADOPT
the recommendations of the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines.Atty.TristanA.CatindigisfoundGUILTYofgrossimmoralityandofviolating
the Lawyers Oath and Rule 1.01, Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional
ResponsibilityandisherebyDISBARREDfromthepracticeoflaw.
LetacopyofthisDecisionbeenteredintotherecordsofAtty.TristanA.Catindiginthe
Office of the Bar Confidant and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of
Attorneys.Likewise,copiesofthisDecisionshallbefurnishedtotheIntegratedBarofthe
PhilippinesandcirculatedbytheCourtAdministratortoallappellateandtrialcourts.
ThechargeofgrossimmoralityagainstAtty.KarenE.BaydoisherebyDISMISSEDforlack
ofevidence.
ThisDecisiontakeseffectimmediately.
SOORDERED.
Sereno, C. J., Carpio, Velasco, Jr., LeonardoDe Castro, Brion, Peralta, Bersamin, Del
Castillo,Villarama,Jr.,Perez,Mendoza,Reyes,PerlasBernabe,andLeonen,JJ.,concur.
Jardeleza,J.,nopartrespondentcafindingwascollegueinfaculty.
Endnotes:
ENBANC
A.C.No.10676September8,2015
ATTY.ROYB.ECRAELA,Complainant,
vs.
ATTY.IANRAYMONDA.PANGALANGAN,Respondent.
DECISION
PERCURIAM:
TheCase
Before the Court is a Petition for Disbarment1 filed by Atty. Roy B. Ecraela with the
IntegratedBarofthePhilippinesCommissiononBarDiscipline(IBPCBD)onApril12,2007
againstAtty.IanRaymondA.Pangalanganforhisillicitrelations,chronicwomanizing,abuse
of authority as an educator, and "other unscrupulous activities" which cause "undue
embarrassmenttothelegalprofession."Complainantclaimsthatrespondent'sactionsinvolve
deceit, malpractice, gross misconduct and grossly immoral conduct in violation of the
Lawyer'sOath.
TheFacts
ComplainantandrespondentwerebestfriendsandbothgraduatedfromtheUniversityofthe
Philippines(UP)CollegeofLawin1990,wheretheywerepartofapeergrouporbarkada
withseveraloftheirclassmates.Afterpassingthebarexaminationsandbeingadmittedas
membersoftheBarin1991,theywerebothregisteredwiththeIBPQuezonCity.
RespondentwasformerlymarriedtoSheilaP.Jardiolin(Jardiolin)withwhomhehasthree(3)
children. Complainant avers that while married to Jardiolin, respondent had a series of
adulterousandillicitrelationswithmarriedandunmarriedwomenbetweentheyears1990to
2007.Theseallegedillicitrelationsinvolved:
a.AAA,2whoisthespouseofacolleagueintheUPCollegeofLaw,from1990to1992,
whichcomplainanthadpersonalknowledgeofsuchillicitrelations;
b.BBB,sometimeduringtheperiodfrom1992to1994orfrom1994to1996,despitebeing
alreadymarriedtoJardiolin;
c.CCC,despitebeingmarriedtoJardiolinandwhilealsobeingromanticallyinvolvedwith
DDD;
d.DDD,sometimeduringtheperiodfrom2000to2002,despitestillbeingmarriedtoJardiolin
andwhilestillbeingromantically.involvedwithCCC;
e.EEE,whoisrelatedtocomplainant,sometimeduringtheperiodfromMay2004untilthe
filingofthePetition,whilestillbeingromanticallyinvolvedwithCCC.3
Complainantclaimsthatrespondent, withmaliceandwithoutremorse, deceivedCCCand
DDDbyrepresentinghimselftobeabachelor,therebyconvincingthetwowomentostarta
loveaffairwithhim,whenin.truth,hewasthenstillmarriedtoJardiolin.4
Asidefromtheseillicitaffairs,complainantaversthatsometimeduringtheperiodof1998to
2000,respondent,asalawyeroftheOfficeoftheGovernmentCorporateCounsel(OGCC),
represented the interest of Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA) in cancellation
proceedings filed by MIAA against Kendrick Development Corporation (KOC). However,
despite being a public officer and a government counsel, respondent conspired with Atty.
AbrahamEspejo,legalcounselofKDC,andassistedKDCinitscase,therebysabotaging
MIAA'scase,and,ineffect,thatofthePhilippineGovernment.5
ComplainantfurtherclaimsthatrespondentevenattemptedtobribethenSolicitorRolando
MartinoftheOfficeoftheSolicitorGeneral(OSG)inexchangeforthelatter'scooperationin
the dismissal of the cancellation proceedings in favor of KDC. In return for his "earnest
efforts"inassistingKDCinitscase,respondentwasallegedlyrewardedwithaToyotaCorolla
XL with plate number ULS835 by Atty. Espejo. The vehicle was seen several times by
respondent'sclassmatesandofficematesbeingdrivenandparkedbyrespondentinhisown
homeandintheOGCCpremisesitself.6
InconnectionwithhisinvolvementintheMIAAcase,complainantclaimsthatrespondentwas
summonedinaSenateinquiryconcerningrampantfakingoflandtitlesinthePhilippines,
which included an investigation of the alleged spurious land titles of KDC. In Senate
Committee Final Report No. 367, the Senate Blue Ribbon and Justice & Human Rights
CommitteesrecommendedthatrespondentbeinvestigatedandprosecutedbytheOfficeofthe
Ombudsman (Ombudsman) for graft and corruption, as well as disbarment or disciplinary
sanctionbythisCourtforgravemisconductorviolationoftheRevisedPenalCode.7
It was further alleged that, during the pendency of the Senate Inquiry, respondent even
attemptedtoconcealtheevidencebyrequestingcomplainant'sparents,spousesMarceloF.
EcraelaandVisitacionB.Ecraela,tohavetheToyotaCorollaXLparkedintheirresidencein
Cainta,Rizal,foranindefiniteperiodoftime.Respondent'srequest,however,wasrefusedby
thespouseswhentheylearnedthatthevehiclewasthesubjectoftheSenateInquiry.8
It appears from the documents presented by complainant that the Ombudsman issued a
Resolutionfindingprobablecauseagainstrespondent,andanInformationwasthereafterfiled
with the Sandiganbayan for violation of Section 3 (b) of Republic Act No. (RA) 3019.9
ComplainantalsoclaimsthatrespondentabusedhisauthorityasaneducatorinManuelL.
QuezonUniversity,SanSebastianCollege,CollegeofSt.Benilde,andMaryknollCollege,
where respondent induced his male students to engage in "nocturnal preoccupations" and
entertainedtheromanticgesturesofhisfemalestudentsinexchangeforpassinggrades.10The
PetitionwasdocketedasCBDCaseNo.071973.
InanOrder11datedApril16,2007,theDirectorforBarDiscipline,HonorableRogelioA.
Vinluan,requiredrespondenttofilehisverifiedanswer.
InhisundatedAnswer,12respondentoptednottopresentanycounterstatementoffactsin
supp01i of his defense. Instead, respondent simply argued that the petition suffers from
procedural and substantive infirmities, claiming that petitioner failed to substantiate the
allegationsorchargesagainsthim.Respondent pointedoutthatAnnex "J"ofthe Petition
entitled "Arguments in Support of the Disbarment" lacked formal requirements, and thus,
shouldbetreatedasamerescrapofpaper.Respondentalsoassertsthattheemailmessages
attachedtothepetitionwereinadmissibleforhavingbeenobtainedinviolationoftheRuleson
ElectronicEvidence.13Heclaimsthattheidentitiesoftheownersoftheemailmessages,as
wellastheallegationsofillicitrelationsandabuseofauthority,werenotproperlyestablished.
Respondentfurtherarguesthatthestatementsofcomplainant'switnessesweremerelyself
servinganddeservedscantconsideration.
ComplainantfiledaComment(totheRespondent'sAnswer),14statingthattheallegationsin
thecomplaintweredeemedadmittedbyreasonofrespondent'sfailuretomakespecificoreven
generaldenialsofsuchinhisAnswer.
In his Reply (to the Comment filed by Complainant),15 respondent simply denied all of
complainant'saccusationsinthepetition,allegedlyfor"lackofknowledgeandinformation
sufficienttoformabeliefastothetruthorfalsitythereof."16
On August 3, 2007, IBPCBD Investigating Commissioner Leland R. Villadolid, Jr.
(Commissioner Villadolid) set the case for mandatory conference on August 28, 2007,17
which respondent failed to attend. It appears that respondent filed a Motion to Cancel
Hearing,18prayingfortheresettingofthemandatoryconferenceallegedlyduetoapreviously
scheduledhearingonthesamedate.Respondent'smotionwasopposedbycomplainantand
eventuallydeniedbyCommissionerVilladolidinhisOrder19datedAugust28,2007.Inthe
sameorder,complainant'sManifestation20prayingthatsubpoenasbeissuedtoseveralpersons
who shall be complainant's hostile witnesses was granted by Commissioner Villadolid.
Accordingly, the case was scheduled for the presentation of complainant's witnesses on
September11,2007andtherespectivesubpoenas21wereissued.
A day before the scheduled hearing, the IBPCBD received respondent's Motion for
Reconsideration,22prayingthattheOrderdatedAugust28,2007besetasideandthatthe
hearingberesettosometimeduringthethirdweekofOctober.Insaidmotion,respondent
informedtheIBPCBDthathehasviralconjunctivitisormorecommonlyknownas"sore
eyes"andhasbeenorderedbythedoctortorestforatleastonetotwoweekswhilehiseyes
arebeingtreated.Attachedtohismotionwerephotocopiesoftwomedicalcertificates,stating
thatacertainR.Pangalanganwassufferingfromsoreeyes.
During the scheduled hearing on September 11, 2007, complainant opposed petitioner's
motion,arguingthatbasedonhispersonalverificationwiththecourtpersonnelofBranch77
of Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC) of Parafiaque City, there was no case calendared for
hearingonthedateoftheprevioussetting.Complainantalsoarguedthatthisisanotherployof
respondenttodelaytheproceedingsbecauseheknewthatcomplainantworkedoverseasand
wasonlyinthecountryforalimitedperiodoftime.Findingmeritincomplainant'sopposition,
respondent's motion was denied and complainant was allowed to present his witnesses.23
Complainantpresentedhiswitnesses,asfollows:Assistant SolicitorGeneralKarlMiranda
(ASGMiranda),Ms.LaarniMorallos(Ms.Morallos),Atty.GlendaT.Litong(Atty.Litong),
Atty.EmelynW.Corpus(Atty.Corpus),Mr.MarceloEcraela,andMrs.VisitacionEcraela.
ASGMirandatestifiedonhisparticipationintheKDCcaseasreflectedintheSenateBlue
Ribbon Committee Report, as well as on his recollection that the Senate Report had
recommendedthedisbarmentofrespondent.
Ms. Morallos, Atty. Litong, and Atty. Corpus were presented to establish that the email
messages submitted by complainant indeed originated from respondent based on their
familiaritywithrespondent,paiiicularly,theemailmessageswhichcontainedreferencestohis
daughter,hisrelationshipwithcomplainant,andrespondent'shighbloodpressure.
Atty. Litong further testified that respondent personally introduced DDD to her as his
girlfriendandthatsometimein2002or2003,shesawrespondentwithanothergirlinGlorietta
despitestillbeingmarriedtohiswife.Atty.Litongalsorecalledencounteringrespondentata
partysometimein2007wherehewaswithCCC,whomshe perceivedto be respondent's
girlfriendatthattime.Shealsoconfirmedthatrespondenthad,inmorethanoneoccasion,
broughtwithhimhisstudentsduringtheirdrinkingsessionsandhadevenonestudentdriving
forhim.
For her testimony, Atty. Corpus corroborated Atty. Litong's statements about respondent's
preoccupationswithhisstudents.Atty.CorpusalsotestifiedthatODDcalledheratheroffice
sometimein2000or2001toinformherthatthelatterhadbrokenupwithrespondentupon
learning that he was actually married. Atty. Corpus surmised based on her telephone
conversationwithDDDthatrespondentdidnottellthelatterhisactualmaritalstatus.Aside
from this, Atty. Corpus also recalled that during complainant's farewell party in February
2007,respondentintroducedCCCashisgirlfriendofsixyears,orsincetheyear2000or2001.
To expedite the hearing, the spouses Ecraela were made to affirm the execution of their
affidavitssincetheirtestimonieswerebasedontheaffidavitsthatcomplainantincludedinhis
petition.
Once complainant's presentation of witnesses was concluded, the mandatory
conference/hearing was terminatedand theparties were directedtosubmit theirrespective
verifiedpositionpaperswithsupportingdocumentaryevidencewithinthi1iy(30)daysfrom
receiptofthetranscriptofstenographicnotes.Afterwhich,thecasewasconsideredsubmitted
forreportandrecommendation.
On September 18, 2007, the IBPCBD received complainant's Manifestation (with
Comments),24pertainingtorespondent'sMotiontoCancelHearingandprayingfortheIBP
CBD to formally request for records from Branch 77 of MTC, Paraaque City to verify
respondent'sclaimthathehadahearinginsaidcourtduringthefirstscheduledmandatory
conference.Onthesamedate,theIBPCBDalsoreceivedcomplainant'sCompliance(with
Comments),25submittingthecertifiedphotocopiesoftheSenateCommitteeFinalReportNo.
367,theResolutiondatedJanuary22,2001oftheOmbudsman,andtheInformationdated
June30,2003filedwiththeSandiganbayan.
On January 8, 2008, the IBPCBD received complainant's Position Paper.26 Complainant
thereafter filed two Manifestations,27 asserting that respondent is already barred from
submittinghisverifiedpositionpaperandthatanydecisionorjudgmentwouldhavetobe
basedsolelyoncomplainant'sVerifiedPositionPaper.28
FindingsoftheIBPInvestigatingCommissioner
After the case was submitted for report and recommendation, Commissioner Villadolid
rendered a Report,29 finding that there is more than sufficient evidence establishing
respondent'sgrossmisconductaffectinghisstandingandmoralcharacterasanofficerofthe
courtandmemberofthebar.
Ontheissueofrespondent'sallegedviolationsoftheRevisedPenalCode30and/orRA301931
as reflected in the Senate Report, the Ombudsman's Resolution, and the Information,
Commissioner Villadolid found that despite respondent's denials, complainant was able to
presentcertifiedtruecopiesoftherelevantdocumentswhichsupporthisallegationsinthe
petition.
As for the alleged illicit affairs of respondent, Commissioner Villadolid discredited
complainant'sasse1iionthatrespondentisguiltyofgross immoralconductforhis alleged
adulterousrelationswithEEE.BasedontheRep01i,complainantwasnotabletodischargethe
burdenofprovingtheauthenticityoftheemailmessagespertainingtothisadulterousaffair;
thus, they were deemed inadmissible. However, Commissioner Villadolid found merit in
complainant's claim that respondent committed grossly immoral conduct by having illicit
relationswithODD,CCC,andBBB,allwhilestillmarriedtoJardiolin,towit:
4.21Inengaginginsuchillicitrelationships,Respondentdisregardedthesanctityofmarriage
andthemarital vowsprotectedbytheConstitutionandaffirmedby ourlaws. which as a
lawyerhesworeunderoathtoprotect.The1987Constitution,specificallyArticleXV.Section
2thereofclearlyprovidesthatmarriage,aninviolablesocialinstitution.isthefoundationof
thefamilyandshallbeprotectedbythestate.
xxxx
4.23Moreover.RespondentviolatedRule1.01ofCanonI,andRule7.03ofCanon7ofthe
Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides that .. a lawyer shall not engage in
unlawful,dishonest,immoralordeceitfulconduct"'norshallalawyer"engageinconductthat
adverselyreflectsonhisfitnesstopracticelaw,norshallhe,whetherinpublicorprivatelife.
behaveinscandalousmannertothediscreditofthelegalprofession".32
Accordingly,theIBPCBDreachedandgavethefollowingconclusionandrecommendation:
V.Conclusion/Recommendations
5.1 In view of the foregoing, and considering that there is more than sufficient evidence
establishingRespondent'sgrossmisconductaffectinghisstandingandmoralcharacterasan
officerofthecourtandmemberofthebar,thisCommissionerrespectfullyrecommendsthat
Respondentbesuspendedfromthepracticeoflawforaperiodoftwo(2)yearswithaSTERN
WARNINGthatRespondentshouldreformhisconductinamannerconsistentwiththenorms
prescribedbytheCanonsofProfessionalResponsibility.33
FindingsoftheIBPBoardofGovernors
OnMarch20,2013,theBoardofGovernorsoftheIBPissuedaResolution34adoptingand
approving,withmodification,theReportandRecommendationofCommissionerVilladolid.
Asmodified,theBoardofGovernorsdisbarredrespondent,thus:
RESOLUTIONNO.XX2013280
CBDCaseNo.071973
Atty.RoyB.Ecraelavs.
Atty.IanRaymundoA.Pangalangan
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and
APPROVED, with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissionerintheaboveentitledcase,hereinmadepartofthisResolutionasAnnex"A",
andfindingtherecommendationfullysupportedbytheevidenceonrecordandtheapplicable
lawsandrulesandconsideringRespondent'sviolationsofArticleXVofthe1987Constitution,
Section 2, Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 and Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, and the Lawyer's Oath, Atty. Ian Raymundo A. Pangalangan is hereby
DISBARREDandhisnameOrderedStrickenOfffromtheRollofAttorneys.
OnJuly9,2013,theIBPreceivedrespondent'sMotionforReconsideration35datedJuly3,
2013,towhichcomplainantwasrequiredtosubmithiscomment.36
Forhispart,complainantfiledaMotionforReconsideration(oftheIBPCBDReportdated
June28,2012)37datedAugust17,2013.Similarly,respondentwasrequiredtocommenton
complainant'smotioninanOrder38datedAugust27,2013.Onthesamedate,complainant
filedhisComment and/orOpposition(totheRespondent'sMotionforReconsideration).39
Subsequently,respondentfiledaCommenton/OppositiontotheMotionforReconsideration
with Leave40 dated September 12, 2013, as well as a Reply to the Comment and/or
Opposition41datedSeptember20,2013.
OnMay3,2014,theBoardofGovernorsoftheIBPpassedaresolutiondenyingrespondent's
motionforreconsideration.42Thereafter,theDirectorforBarDisciplineforwardedtherecords
ofthiscasetothisCourtonNovember11,2014.43
TheIssue
Theissueinthiscaseiswhethertherespondentcommittedgrossimmoralconduct,which
wouldwarranthisdisbarment.
TheCourt'sRuling
Afterathoroughexaminationoftherecords,theCourtagreeswiththeBoardofGovernors'
resolutionfindingthatAtty.Pangalangan'sgrosslyimmoralconductwasfullysupportedby
theevidencesoffered.
TheCodeofProfessionalResponsibilityprovides:
CANON1ALAWYERSHALLUPHOLDTHECONSTITUTION,OBEYTHELAWS
OFTHELANDANDPROMOTERESPECTFORLAWANDLEGALPROCESSES.
Rule1.01Alawyershallnotengageinunlawful,dishonest,immoralordeceitfulconduct.
xxxx
CANON 7 A LA WYERSHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND
DIGNITYOFTHELEGALPROFESSIONANDSUPPORTTHEACTIVITIESOFTHE
INTEGRATEDBAR.Rule7.03Alawyershallnotengageinconductthatadverselyreflects
on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life. behaveina
scandalousmannertothediscreditofthelegalprofession.
Thepracticeoflawisaprivilegegiventothosewhopossessandcontinuetopossessthelegal
qualificationsfortheprofession.44Goodmoralcharacterisnotonlyrequiredforadmissionto
theBar,butmustalsoberetainedinordertomaintainone'sgoodstandinginthisexclusive
andhonoredfraternity.45
Wearenotunmindfuloftheseriousconsequencesofdisbarmentorsuspensionproceedings
againstamemberoftheBar.Thus,theCourthasconsistentlyheldthatclearlypreponderant
evidenceisnecessarytojustifytheimpositionofadministrativepenaltiesonamemberofthe
Bar.This,WeexplainedinAbav.DeGuzman,Jr.:
Preponderance of evidence means that the evidence adduced by one side is, as a whole,
superior to orhasgreaterweightthanthatoftheother.It means evidencewhichismore
convincingtothecourtasworthyofbeliefthanthatwhichisofferedinoppositionthereto.
Under Section I of Rule 133, in determining whether or not there is preponderance of
evidence,thecourtmayconsiderthefollowing:(a)allthefactsandcircumstancesofthecase;
(b) the witnesses' manner of testifying, their intelligence, their means and opportunity of
knowingthefactstowhichtheyaretestifying.thenatureofthefactstowhichtheytestify,the
probabilityorimprobabilityoftheirtestimony;(c)thewitnesses'interestorwantofinterest.
andalsotheirpersonalcredibilitysofarasthesamemayultimatelyappearinthetrial;and(d)
thenumberofwitnesses,althoughitdoesnotmeanthatpreponderanceisnecessarilywiththe
greaternumber.
Whentheevidenceofthepartiesareevenlybalancedorthereisdoubtonwhichsidethe
evidencepreponderates,thedecisionshouldbeagainstthepartywiththeburdenofproof,
accordingtotheequipoisedoctrine.
Tosummarize,theCourthasconsistentlyheldthatinsuspensionordisbarmentproceedings
againstlawyers,thelawyerenjoysthepresumptionofinnocence,andtheburdenofproofrests
upon the complainant to prove the allegations in his complaint. The evidence required in
suspensionordisbarmentproceedingsispreponderanceofevidence.Incasetheevidenceof
thepartiesareequallybalanced,theequipoisedoctrinemandatesadecisioninfavorofthe
respondent.46
TheIBPCBDReportsufficientlyshowedbypreponderantevidencethegroundsbywhich
respondenthasbeenfoundcommittinggrossimmoralityintheconductofhispersonalaffairs.
ThisCourthas,innumerousoccasions,revokedthelicensesoflawyerswhowereprovento
havenotonlyfailedtoretaingoodmoralcharacterintheirprofessionalandpersonallives,but
havealsomadeamockeryoftheinstitutionofmarriagebymaintainingillicitaffairs.
InGuevarrav.Eala,respondentAtty.Ealawasdisbarredbecauseheshoweddisrespectforan
institution held sacred by the law, by having an extramarital affair with the wife of the
complainant.Indoingso,hebetrayedhisunfitnesstobealawyer.47
A year later, Atty. Arnobit met the same fate as Atty. Eala when the Court revoked his
privilegetopracticelawafterhisphilanderingwayswasprovenbypreponderantevidencein
Arnobitv.Arnobit.48Weruled:
Asofficersofthecourt,lawyersmustnotonlyinfactbeofgoodmoralcharacterbutmustalso
beseentobeofgoodmoralcharacterandleadinglivesinaccordancewiththehighestmoral
standardsofthecommunity.Amemberofthebarandanofficerofthecourtisnotonly
requiredtorefrainfromadulterousrelationshipsorkeepingamistressbutmustalsosobehave
himselfastoavoidscandalizingthepublicbycreatingtheimpressionthatheisfloutingthose
moralstandards.
xxxx
The fact that respondent s philandering ways are far removed from the exercise of his
professionwouldnotsavethedayforhim.Foralawyermaybesuspendedordisbarredfor
anymisconductwhich,albeitunrelatedtotheactualpracticeofhisprofession,wouldshow
himtobeunfitfortheofficeandunworthyoftheprivilegeswithwhichhislicenseandthelaw
investhim.ToborrowfromOrbev.Adaw,"[t]hegroundsexpressedinSection27,Rule138.
oftheRulesofCourtarenot!imitativeandarebroadenoughto.coveranymisconductxxxof
a lawyer in his professional or private capacity." To reiterate, possession of good moral
characterisnotonlyaconditionprecedenttothepracticeoflaw,butacontinuingqualification
forallmembersofthebar.49
Similarly,inthemorerecentcaseofDr.ElmarO.Perezv.Atty.TristanCatindig,50theCourt
disbarredrespondentAtty.Catindigforblatantlyandpurposefullydisregardingourlawson
marriagebyresortingtovariouslegalstrategiestorenderafacadeofvaliditytohisinvalid
secondmarriage,despitetheexistenceofhisfirstmarriage.Wesaid:
Themoraldelinquencythataffectsthefitnessofamemberofthebartocontinueassuch
includes conduct that outrages the generally accepted moral standards of the community,
conductforinstance.whichmakes'amockeryoftheinviolablesocialinstitutionofmarriage."
Invariouscases,theCourthasheldthatdisbarmentiswarrantedwhenalawyerabandonshis
lawfulwifeandmaintainsanillicitrelationshipwithanotherwomanwhohasbornehima
child.51(emphasisours.)
Inthe presentcase,complainantalleged that respondentcarriedonseveral adulterousand
illicitrelationswithbothmarriedandunmarriedwomenbetweentheyears 1990to2007,
including complainant's own wife. Through documentary evidences in the form of email
messages,aswellasthecorroboratingtestimoniesofthewitnessespresented,complainantwas
abletoestablishrespondent'sillicitrelationswithDODandCCCbypreponderantevidence.
Respondent'smain defense againsttheallegedillicitrelationswasthatthesamewere not
sufficientlyestablished.Inhisanswer,respondentsimplyarguedthatcomplainant'spetition
containsselfservingavermentsnotsupportedbyevidence.Respondentdidnotspecifically
deny complainant's allegations and, instead, questioned the admissibility of the supporting
documents.1wphi1Duetorespondent'sownfailuretoattendthehearingsandevensubmithis
ownpositionpaper,theexistenceofrespondent'sillicitrelationswithDDDandCCCremain
uncontroverted.
TheIBPCBDReportwascorrectwhenitfoundthatrespondentviolatedArticleXV,Section
2ofthe1987Constitution,towit:
4.21Inengaginginsuchillicitrelationships,Respondentdisregardedthesanctityofmarriage
andthemarital vowsprotectedbytheConstitutionandaffirmedby ourlaws, which as a
lawyerhesworeunderoathtoprotect.The1987Constitution,specificallyA1iicleXV,Section
2thereofclearlyprovidesthatmarriage,aninviolablesocialinstitution,isthefoundationof
thefamilyandshallbeprotectedbytheState.52(emphasisintheoriginal.)
Asidefromrespondent'sillicitrelations,WeagreewithCommissionerVilladolid'sfindings
thatrespondentviolatedCanon10oftheCodeofProfessionalResponsibility,aswellasRuleI
0.01andRule10.03thereof.
TheCodeofProfessionalResponsibilityprovides:
CANON10ALAWYEROWESCANDOR,FAIRNESSANDGOODFAITHTOTHE
COURT.Rule10.01Alawyershallnotdoanyfalsehood,norconsenttothedoingofanyin
Court;norshallhemislead,orallowtheCourttobemisledbyanyartifice.
xxx
Rule10.03Alawyershallobservetherulesofprocedureandshallnotmisusethemtodefeat
theendsofjustice.
InthePetition,complainantallegedthatrespondentwasthesubjectofaSenateInquiryand
hadapendingcaseforgraftandcorruptionagainsthimwiththeSandiganbayan,towit:
13.Respondenthas beenrecommendedbythe SenateBlueRibbonandJustice&Human
Rights Committees to be investigated and prosecuted by the Ombudsman, the same as
containedintheir"CommitteeFinalReportNo.367"hereinattachedasAnnexD;
14.Respondenthasalsobeenrecommendedbytheabovementionedcommitteestosufferthe
penaltyofdisbarment,amongothers,asevidencedbythehereinattachedAnnexD1,anditis
believed that a case for graft and corruption against him is still pending with the
Sandiganbayan."53
Insteadofrefutingtheseclaims,respondentmerelypointedoutinhisAnswerthatcomplainant
failed to adduce additional evidence that a case had been filed against him, and that
complainant's statements were merely selfserving averments not substantiated by any
evidence.InhisReply,respondentevenspecificallydeniedcomplainant'savermentsfor"lack
ofknowledgeandinformationsufficienttoformabeliefastothetruthorfalsitythereof."
WeagreewithCommissionerVilladolid'sfindingsintheIBPCBDReport,viz:
4.8It(sic)isthusindisputablethatRespondent'spretensionsinhisAnswerweremadein
attempttomisleadthisCommission.Respondentcouldhaveeasilyadmittedordeniedsaid
allegationsorexplainedthesame,ashe(sic)clearlyhadknowledgethereof,however,he(sic)
chosetotakeadvantageofComplainant'spositionofbeingnotpresentinthecountryandnot
beingabletoacquirethenecessarydocuments,skirttheissue,andmisleadtheCommission.In
doingso,hehasviolatedCanon10oftheCodeofProfessionalResponsibility,whichprovides
that"alawyerowescandor,fairnessandgoodfaithtothecourt"aswellasRule10.01and
Rule10.03thereofwhichstatesthat"alawyershoulddonofalsehoodnorconsenttothedoing
ofanyinCourt;norshallhemislead,orallowthecourttobemisledbyanyartifice"andthat
"alawyershallobservetherulesofprocedureandshallnotmisusethemtodefeattheendsof
justice."
4.9 Courts [as well as this Commission] are entitled to expect only complete candor and
honesty from the lawyers appearing and pleading before them. Respondent, through his
actuations,hasbeenlackinginthecandorrequiredofhimnotonlyasamemberoftheBarbut
alsoasanofficeroftheCourt.Inviewoftheforegoing,theCommissionfindsthatRespondent
hasviolatedCanon10,Rule10.01oftheCodeofProfessionalResponsibility,forwhichhe
shouldbedisciplined.54(emphasisintheoriginal.)
Indenyingcomplainant'sallegations,respondenthadnootherintentionbuttomisleadtheIBP,
whichintentionwasmoresoestablishedbecausecomplainantwasabletosubmitsupporting
documents in the form of certified true copies of the Senate Report, the Ombudsman's
Resolution,andInformation.
WealsoagreewithCommissionerVilladolid'sfindingthatrespondentviolatedthelawyer's
oathwhichhetookbeforeadmissiontotheBar,whichstates:
I, __________, do solemnly swear that I will maintain allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines:IwillsupportitsConstitutionandobeylawsaswellasthelegalordersoftheduly
constitutedauthoritiestherein;Iwilldonofalsehood,norconsenttothedoingofanycourt;I
willnotwittinglynorwillinglypromoteorsueanygroundless,falseorunlawfulsuit,orgive
aidnorconsenttothesame:Iwilldelaynomanformoneyormalice,andwillconductmyself
asalawyeraccordingtothebestofmyknowledgeanddiscretionwithallgoodfidelityaswell
tothecourtsastomyclients;andIimposeuponmyselfthisvoluntaryobligationswithoutany
mentalreservationorpurposeofevasion.SohelpmeGod.
Inall,Atty.Pangalangandisplayeddeplorable arrogance bymakinga mockeryoutofthe
institution of marriage, and taking advantage of his legal skills by attacking the Petition
throughtechnicalitiesandrefusingtoparticipateintheproceedings.Hisactionsshowedthat
helackedthedegreeofmoralityrequiredofhimasamemberofthebar,thuswarrantingthe
penaltyofdisbarment.
WHEREFORE,inconsiderationoftheforegoing,theCourtresolvestoADOPTtheresolution
oftheIBPBoardofGovernorsapprovingandadopting,withmodification,theReportand
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner. Accordingly, respondent Atty. Ian
RaymondA.PangalanganisfoundGUILTYofgrossimmoralityandofviolatingSection2of
A1iicleXVofthe1987Constitution,Canon1andRule1.01,Canon7andRule7.03,andRule
10.01ofCanon10oftheCodeofProfessionalResponsibility,andtheLawyer'sOathandis
herebyDISBARREDfromthepracticeoflaw.
LetacopyofthisDecisionbeenteredintothepersonalrecordsofAtty.IanRaymondA.
PangalanganwiththeOfficeoftheBarConfidantandhisnameisORDEREDSTRICKEN
fromtheRollofAttorneys.Likewise,letcopiesofthisDecisionbefurnishedtoallchaptersof
theIntegratedBarof the Philippines and circulatedby the Cou1iAdministratorto allthe
cou1isinthecountryfortheirinformationandguidance.
ThisDecisiontakeseffectimmediately.
SOORDERED.

ENBANC
A.C.No.7973andA.C.No.10457February3,2015
MELVYNG.GARCIA,Complainant,
vs.
ATTY.RAULH.SESBRENO,Respondent.
DECISION
PERCURIAM:
TwocomplaintsfordisbarmentwerefiledbyDr.MelvynG.Garcia(Garcia)againstAtty.
RaulH.Sesbrefio(Sesbrefio).Thetwocases,docketedasA.C.No.7973andA.C.No.10457,
wereconsolidatedintheCourt'sResolutiondated30September2014.
A.C.No.7973
On30July2008,GarciafiledacomplaintfordisbarmentagainstSesbreobeforetheOfficeof
theBarConfidant.ThecasewasdocketedasA.C.No.7973.Garciaallegedthatin1965,he
marriedVirginiaAlcantarainCebu.Theyhadtwochildren,MariaMargaritaandAngieRuth.
In 1971, he and Virginia separated. He became a dentist and practiced his profession in
CabanatuanCity.Garciaallegedthatin1992,Virginiafiledapetitionfortheannulmentof
theirmarriage,whichwaseventuallygranted.
Garciaallegedthatin2005whilehewasinJapan,Sesbreo,representingMariaMargaritaand
AngieRuth,filedanactionforsupportagainsthimandhissisterMilagrosGarciaSoliman.At
thetimeofthefilingofthecase,MariaMargaritawasalready39yearsoldwhileAngieRuth
was 35 years old. The case was dismissed. In 2007, Garcia returned from Japan. When
SesbreoandGarciaschildrenlearnedabouthisreturn,SesbreofiledaSecondAmended
Complaintagainsthim.GarciaallegedthathelearnedthatSesbreowasconvictedbythe
RegionalTrialCourtofCebuCity,Branch18,forHomicideinCriminalCaseNo.CBU
31733.GarciaallegedthatSesbreoisonlyonparole.Garciaallegedthathomicideisacrime
againstmoralturpitude;andthus,Sesbreoshouldnotbeallowedtocontinuehispracticeof
law.
InhisComment,Sesbreoallegedthaton15August2008,Garciafiledasimilarcomplaint
againsthimbeforetheIntegratedBarofthePhilippines,CommissiononBarDiscipline(IBP
CBD),docketedasCBCCaseNo.082273.SesbreoallegedthatGarciascomplaintwas
motivatedbyresentmentanddesireforrevengebecauseheactedasprobonocounselfor
MariaMargaritaandAngieRuth.
IntheCourtsResolutiondated18January2010,theCourtreferredA.C.No.7973totheIBP
forinvestigation,reportandrecommendation.
A.C.No.10457(CBCCaseNo.082273)
AdaypriortothefilingofA.C.No.7973,oron29July2008,Garciafiledacomplaintfor
disbarmentagainstSesbreobeforetheIBPCBD.HeallegedthatSesbreoispracticinglaw
despitehispreviousconvictionforhomicideinCriminalCaseNo.CBU31733,anddespite
thefactsthatheisonlyonparoleandthathehasnotfullyservedhissentence.Garciaalleged
thatSesbreoviolatedSection27,Rule138oftheRulesofCourtbycontinuingtoengagein
the practice oflaw despite his convictionof acrime involving moral turpitude. Uponthe
directiveoftheIBPCBD,GarciasubmittedhisverifiedcomplaintagainstSesbreoalleging
basicallythesamefactsheallegedinA.C.No.7973.
Inhisanswertothecomplaint,Sesbreoallegedthathissentencewascommutedandthe
phrase"withtheinherentaccessorypenaltiesprovidedbylaw"wasdeleted.Sesbreoargued
thateveniftheaccessorypenaltywasnotdeleted,thedisqualificationappliesonlyduringthe
termofthesentence.Sesbreofurtherallegedthathomicidedoesnotinvolvemoralturpitude.
SesbreoclaimedthatGarciascomplaintwasmotivatedbyextrememalice,badfaith,and
desiretoretaliateagainsthimforrepresentingGarciasdaughtersincourt.
TheIBPCBDconsolidatedA.C.No.7973withCBDCaseNo.082273.Thepartiesagreedon
thesoleissuetoberesolved:whethermoralturpitudeisinvolvedinaconvictionforhomicide.
TheIBPCBDruledthattheRegionalTrialCourtofCebufoundSesbreoguiltyofmurder
and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. On appeal, this Court
downgraded the crime to homicide and sentenced Sesbreo to suffer the penalty of
imprisonmentfor9yearsand1dayofprisionmayorasminimumto16yearsand4monthsof
reclusion temporalas maximum. The IBPCBD found that Sesbreo was released from
confinementon27July2001followinghisacceptanceoftheconditionsofhisparoleon10
July2001.
TheIBPCBDruled thatconvictionfor acrime involvingmoral turpitudeisagroundfor
disbarment or suspension. Citing International Rice Research Institute v. National Labor
RelationsCommission,1theIBPCBDfurtherruledthathomicidemayormaynotinvolve
moralturpitudedependingonthedegreeofthecrime.TheIBPCBDreviewedthedecisionof
thisCourtconvictingSesbreoforthecrimeofhomicide,andfoundthatthecircumstances
leadingtothedeathofthevictiminvolvedmoralturpitude.TheIBPCBDstated:
NeithervictimLucianoAmparadonorhiscompanionChristopherYapchangcowasshownto
beafoeofrespondentandneitherhadthevictimLucianonorhiscompanionChristopher
showntohavewrongedtherespondent.Theysimplyhappenedtobeatthewrongplaceand
timetheearlymorningofJune3,1993.
The circumstances leading to the death of Luciano solely caused by respondent, bear the
earmarksofmoralturpitude.ParaphrasingwhattheSupremeCourtobservedinSorianov.
Dizon,supra,therespondent,byhisconduct,displayedextremearroganceandfeelingofself
importance.Respondentactedlikeagodwhodeservednottobeslightedbyacoupleofdrunks
whomayhaveshatteredthestillnessoftheearlymorningwiththeirboisterousantics,natural
displayofloudbravadoofdrunkenmenwhohadonetoomany.Respondentsinordinateover
reactiontotheramblingsofdrunkenmenwhowerenotevendirectedatrespondentreflected
poorly on his fitness to be a member of the legal profession. Respondent was not only
vindictivewithoutacause;hewascruelwithamisplacedsenseofsuperiority.2
Following the ruling of this Court in Soriano v. Atty. Dizon3 where the respondent was
disbarredforhavingbeenconvictedoffrustratedhomicide,theIBPCBDrecommendedthat
SesbreobedisbarredandhisnamestrickenfromtheRollofAttorneys.
In its Resolution No. XX201319 dated 12 February 2013, the IBP Board of Governors
adoptedandapprovedtheReportandRecommendationoftheIBPCBD.
On6May2013,SesbreofiledamotionforreconsiderationbeforetheIBPCBD.Sesbreo
allegedthattheIBPCBDmisunderstoodandmisappliedSorianov.Atty.Dizon.Healleged
thattheattendantcircumstancesinSorianoaredisparate,distinct,anddifferentfromhiscase.
Hefurtherallegedthattherewasnoconditionsetonthegrantofexecutiveclemencytohim;
andthus,hewasrestoredtohisfullcivilandpoliticalrights.Finally,Sesbreoallegedthat
afterhiswifediedinanambush,healreadystoppedappearingasprivateprosecutorinthecase
forbigamyagainstGarciaandthathealreadyadvisedhisclientstosettletheirothercases.He
allegedthatGarciaalreadywithdrewthecomplaintsagainsthim.
On 11 February 2014, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XX201431
denyingSesbreosmotionforreconsideration.TheIBPCBDtransmittedtherecordsofthe
case to the Office of the Bar Confidant on 20 May 2014. CBD Case No. 082273 was
redocketedasA.C.No.10457.IntheCourtsResolutiondated30September2014,theCourt
consolidatedA.C.No.7973andA.C.No.10457.
Theonlyissueinthesecasesiswhetherconvictionforthecrimeofhomicideinvolvesmoral
turpitude.
WeadoptthefindingsandrecommendationoftheIBPCBDandapproveResolutionNo.XX
201319dated12February2013andResolutionNo.XX201431dated11February2014of
theIBPBoardofGovernors.
Section27,Rule138oftheRulesofCourtstatesthatamemberofthebarmaybedisbarredor
suspendedasattorneybythisCourtbyreasonofhisconvictionofacrimeinvolvingmoral
turpitude.ThisCourthasruledthatdisbarmentistheappropriatepenaltyforconvictionby
finaljudgmentforacrimeinvolvingmoralturpitude.4Moralturpitudeisanactofbaseness,
vileness,ordepravityintheprivatedutieswhichamanowestohisfellowmenortosocietyin
general,contrarytojustice,honesty,modesty,orgoodmorals.5
Thequestionofwhetherconvictionforhomicideinvolvesmoralturpitudewasdiscussedby
thisCourtinInternationalRiceResearchInstitutev.NLRC6whereitruled:
This is not to say that all convictions of the crime of homicide do not involve moral
turpitude.1wphi1Homicidemayormaynotinvolvemoralturpitudedependingonthedegree
ofthecrime.Moralturpitudeisnotinvolvedineverycriminalactandisnotshownbyevery
known and intentional violation of statute, but whether any particular conviction involves
moral turpitude may be a question of fact and frequently depends on all the surrounding
circumstances.Whilexxxgenerallybutnotalways,crimesmalainseinvolvemoralturpitude,
whilecrimesmalaprohibitadonot,itcannotalwaysbeascertainedwhethermoralturpitude
doesordoesnotexistbyclassifyingacrimeasmaluminseorasmalumprohibitum,since
therearecrimeswhicharemalainseandyetrarelyinvolvemoralturpitudeandthereare
crimeswhichinvolvemoralturpitudeandaremalaprohibitaonly.Itfollowstherefore,that
moralturpitudeissomewhatavagueandindefiniteterm,themeaningofwhichmustbeleftto
theprocessofjudicialinclusionorexclusionasthecasesarereached.7
In People v. Sesbreo,8 the Court found Sesbreo guilty of homicide and ruled:
WHEREFORE,theassaileddecisionoftheRegionalTrialCourtofCebuCity,Branch18,in
CriminalCaseNo.CBU31733isherebyMODIFIED.AppellantRaulH.Sesbreoishereby
foundGUILTYofHOMICIDEandherebysentencedtosufferaprisontermof9yearsand1
dayofprisionmayor,asaminimum,to16yearsand4monthsofreclusiontemporal,asa
maximum,withaccessorypenaltiesprovidedbylaw,toindemnifytheheirsofthedeceased
LucianoAmparadointheamountofP50,000.00andtopaythecosts.
SOORDERED.9
WereviewedtheDecisionofthisCourtandweagreewiththeIBPCBDthatthecircumstances
showthepresenceofmoralturpitude.
The Decision showed that the victim Luciano Amparado (Amparado) and his companion
Christopher Yapchangco(Yapchangco)werewalkingandjustpassed bySesbreoshouse
whenthelatter,withoutanyprovocationfromtheformer,wentoutofhishouse,aimedhis
rifle,andstartedfiringatthem.AccordingtoYapchangco,theywereaboutfivemeters,more
orless,fromthegateofSesbreowhentheyheardthescreechingsoundofthegateandwhen
theyturnedaround,theysawSesbreoaiminghisrifleatthem.YapchangcoandAmparado
ranawaybutAmparadowashit.Aneyewitness,RizaldyRabanes(Rabanes),recalledthathe
heardshotsandopenedthewindowofhishouse.HesawYapchangcoandAmparadorunning
awaywhileSesbreowasfiringhisfirearmrapidly,hittingRabaneshouseintheprocess.
Anotherwitness,EdwinParune,sawAmparadofalldownafterbeingshot,thensawSesbreo
inthemiddleofthestreet,carryingalongfirearm,andwalkingbacktowardsthegateofhis
house.TheIBPCBDcorrectlystatedthatAmparadoandYapchangcowerejustatthewrong
place and time. They did not do anything that justified the indiscriminate firing done by
SesbreothateventuallyledtothedeathofAmparado.
WecannotacceptSesbreosargumentthattheexecutiveclemencyrestoredhisfullciviland
politicalrights.SesbreocitedInreAtty.Parcasio10tobolsterhisargument.Inthatcase,Atty.
Parcasiowasgranted"anabsoluteandunconditionalpardon"11whichrestoredhis"fullcivil
and political rights,"12 a circumstance not present inthese cases. Here, the Order of
Commutation13didnotstatethatthepardonwasabsoluteandunconditional.Theaccessory
penalties were not mentioned when the original sentence was recited in the Order of
Commutationandtheywerealsonotmentionedinstatingthecommutedsentence.Itonly
states: By virtue of the authority conferred upon me by the Constitution and upon the
recommendationoftheBoardofPardonsandParole,theoriginalsentenceofprisonerRAUL
SESBREOYHERDAconvictedbytheRegionalTrialCourt,CebuCityandSupremeCourt
andsentencedtoanindeterminateprisontermoffrom9yearsand1dayto16yearsand4
monthsimprisonmentandtopayanindemnityof P50,000.00is/areherebycommutedtoan
indeterminateprisontermoffrom7yearsand6monthsto10yearsimprisonmentandtopay
anindemnityofP50,000.00.14
Again,therewasnomentionthattheexecutiveclemencywasabsoluteandunconditionaland
restoredSesbreotohisfullcivilandpoliticalrights.
TherearefouractsofexecutiveclemencythatthePresidentcanextend:thePresidentcan
grantreprieves,commutations,pardons,andremitfinesandforfeitures,afterconvictionby
finaljudgment.15Inthiscase,theexecutiveclemencymerely"commutedtoanindeterminate
prison term of 7 years and 6 months to 10 years imprisonment" the penalty imposed on
Sesbrefio. Commutation is a mere reduction of penalty.16 Commutation only partially
extinguishedcriminalliability.17ThepenaltyforSesbrefio'scrimewasneverwipedout.He
servedthecommutedorreducedpenalty,forwhichreasonhewasreleasedfromprison.More
importantly,theFinalReleaseandDischarge18statedthat"[i]tisunderstoodthatsuchxxx
accessorypenaltiesofthelawashavenotbeenexpresslyremittedhereinshallsubsist."Hence,
theParcasiocasehasnoapplicationhere.EvenifSesbrefiohasbeengrantedpardon,thereis
nothingintherecordsthatshowsthatitwasafullandunconditionalpardon.Inaddition,the
practiceoflawisnotarightbutaprivilege.19Itisgrantedonlytothosepossessinggood
moralcharacter.20Aviolationofthehighmoralstandardsofthelegalprofessionjustifiesthe
impositionoftheappropriatepenaltyagainstalawyer,includingthepenaltyofdisbarment.21
WHEREFORE,respondentRaulH.SesbrefioisDISBARREDeffectiveimmediatelyuponhis
receiptofthisDecision.
LetcopiesofthisDecisionbefurnishedtheOfficeoftheBarConfidant,theIntegratedBarof
thePhilippinesfordistributiontoallitschapters,andtheOfficeoftheCourtAdministratorfor
disseminationtoallcourtsalloverthecountry.LetacopyofthisDecisionbeattachedtothe
personalrecordsofrespondent.
SOORDERED.
MARIALOURDESP.A.SERENO
SECONDDIVISION
A.C.No.10134November26,2014
PHILIPPINEASSOCIATIONOFCOURTEMPLOYEES(PACE),representedbyits
President,ATTY.VIRGINIAC.RAFAEL,Complainant,
vs.
ATTY.EDNAM.ALIBUTDANDIAZ,Respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA,J.:
ThisresolvesthecomplaintforsuspensionordisbarmentfiledbythePhilippineAssociationof
CourtEmployees(PACE)throughitspresident,Atty.VirginiaC.Rafael(Atty.Rafael),on
July17,2008againstAtty.EdnaM.AlibutdanDiaz(Atty.Diaz),formerNationalTreasurerof
PACE,beforetheIntegratedBarofthePhilippines(IBP).1
PACE,theumbrellaassociationof1stand2ndlevelcourtemployeesintheJudiciaryheldits
11thNationalConvention/SeminarinDavaoCityfromOctober6to8,2005.AsthenNational
TreasurerofPACE,Atty.DiazwasentrustedwithallthemoneymattersofPACE.
The complainant alleged that the liquidation for the 11th PACE national convention was
submittedbyAtty.DiazonlyonMarch29,2007,duringthe12thPACEnationalconventionin
IloiloCity2;thatduringthe12thconvention,anelectionofofficerswasconductedandAtty.
DiazranforthepositionofNationalTreasurer,butshewasnotelected;thatonthelastdayof
theconventionoronMarch31,2007,theoutgoingBoardofDirectors,includingAtty.Diaz,
passedandapprovedResolutionNo.12007appropriatingtheamountof30,000.00astermend
bonusforeachPACEofficialqualifiedthereto;thatAtty.Diazdidnotsubmitaliquidation
report for the 12th convention; that there was no turn over of monies belonging to the
associationasamatterofproceduredespitealetterofdemand,datedJune20,2007sentto
Atty. Diaz;3 and that the new set of PACE officers issued Board Resolution No. 0007
directingpastpresident,RositaD.Amizola;andpasttreasurer,Atty.Diaz,toexplainwhythey
failedtoliquidatethefinancesofPACEfortheDavaoandIloiloconventions.4
Inherdefense,Atty.DiazcounteredthatshehadfiledtheStatementofLiquidationforthe
11thnationalconventioninDavaoinlessthanaweekafterthesaidconvention;thatitwas
dulyauditedbythenationalauditor,LeteciaAgbayani;thatthenetproceedsofthatconvention
was"fullyaccounted,liquidatedandentirelydepositedtoPACEaccounts;"5thatshealsofiled
theStatementofLiquidationforthe12thnationalconventiononMay22,2007;thatthereport,
togetherwiththecash,checksandoriginalreceipts,werereceivedbyRositaAmisolaand
witnessedbyformerPACEofficers;6thatshedeniedrunningforreelectionasPACEnational
treasurerduringtheIloiloconventionasshehadalreadyfiledhercertificateofcandidacyfor
BoardMemberoftheFirstDistrictofIpil,ZamboangaSibugay;7thattheapprovalofthe
P30,000.00termendbonusdidnotrestwithhersolely,rather,itwasapprovedbytheprevious
board of directors; and that she never sponsored the bonus, as it was initiated by Aliven
MaderazaandsecondedbyAtty.LourdesGarciaandSarahAmpong.
Onherpart,Atty.Garciaaverredthatshewasnotprivytothedisbursementofthesaidterm
endbonus.8
Initially,thecasewasassignedtoIBPCommissionerElpidioG.Soriano.Afteranexchangeof
pleadings,themandatoryconferencewasheld.Afterwards,theprotagonistsweredirectedto
submit their respective position papers. Thereafter, the case was reassigned to IBP
CommissionerVictorC.Fernandez(CommissionerFernandez).9
TheloneissuehereiswhetherornotAtty.DiazviolatedChapter1,Canon1,Rule1.01ofthe
CodeofProfessionalResponsibility(CPR),whichreads:
"Alawyershouldnotengageinanunlawful,dishonest,immoralordeceitfulconduct."
In his Report and Recommendation, dated June 28, 2010, Commissioner Fernandez
recommendedthedismissalofthecaseagainstAtty.Diazforlackofmerit.Atty.Diazoffered
documentaryevidencetoshowthatshewasabletosubmittheliquidationreportsforthetwo
aforementioned conventions of PACE. He also took note that Atty. Rafael herself
acknowledged the liquidation report made by Atty. Diaz with respect to the Davao City
convention.10Astothesufficiencyandcompletenessofthesereports,thiswouldbebetter
resolvedthrough an audit rather than in disbarment proceedings.1wphi1 Besides,
CommissionerFernandezdidnotconsiderthepositionofAtty.Diazasnationaltreasurerof
PACEtohaveanyconnectionwithherbeingasalawyer.Thus,accordingtohim,sheshould
besanctionedinaccordancewiththebylawsofPACEinsteadofadisbarmentcase.11
As regards the accusation that Atty. Diaz ran for reelection in the PACE elections even
though she was no longer connected with the Judiciary and therefore disqualified,
Commissioner Fernandez opined that the best evidence, which was the "certificate of
candidacy,"wasneveroffered,12andthatAtty.Diaz,beingalawyer,knewthatherbidforre
electionwouldbeauselessexercisesinceshewouldnotbeabletoassumeofficeifshewon.13
Finally,CommissionerFernandezbelievedAtty.Diazsassertionthatsheneversponsoredthe
appropriationofthe30,000.00termendbonusandthattheapprovalofResolutionNo.12007
wasacollegialactionamongtheBoardofDirectors.Again,CommissionerFernandezwasof
the view that her participation in the passage of the questioned board resolution was not
connectedtoherbeingalawyer.14
OnNovember19,2011,theIBPBoardofGovernors(IBPBOG)passedaresolutionadopting
andapprovingthereportandrecommendationofCommissionerFernandez,anddismissedthe
complaintagainstAtty.Diaz.15
Onreconsideration,theIBPBOGissuedtheExtendedResolution,16datedJune21,2013,
granting the complainants motion for reconsideration. It reversedand set asideits earlier
resolutionandsuspendedAtty.Diazfromthepracticeoflawforone(1)year.17
The IBPBOG explained that the questions regarding (i) Atty. Diaz liquidation of PACE
funds;(ii)herrunningforreelectionwhenshewasnolongerwiththeJudiciary;and(iii)her
entitlement to the termend bonus when she was no longer working in the Judiciary,
constituted a "triple whammy" of questionable actions18 committed by Atty. Diaz in
contraventionofRule1.01oftheCPR.
TheCourtsRuling
This Court agrees with the IBPBOG and adopts its June 21, 2013 Extended Resolution.
Everyoneshouldkeepinmindthatthepracticeoflawisonlyaprivilege.Itisdefinitelynota
right. Inorder to enjoy this privilege, one must show that he possesses, and continues to
possess,thequalificationsrequiredbylawfortheconfermentofsuchprivilege.
One of those requirements is the observance of honesty and candor. Candor in all their
dealingsistheveryessenceofapractitioner'shonorablemembershipinthelegalprofession.
Lawyersarerequiredtoactwiththehigheststandardoftruthfulness,fairplayandnobilityin
theconductoflitigationandintheirrelationswiththeirclients,theopposingparties,theother
counsels and the courts. They are bound by their oath to speak the truth and to conduct
themselvesaccordingtothebestoftheirknowledgeanddiscretion,andwithfidelitytothe
courts and their clients.19 Time and again, the Court has held that the practice of law is
grantedonlytothoseofgoodmoralcharacter.TheBarmaintainsahighstandardofhonesty
andfairdealing.Thus,lawyersmustconductthemselvesbeyondreproachatalltimes,whether
theyaredealingwiththeirclientsorthepublicatlarge,andaviolationofthehighmoral
standardsofthelegalprofessionjustifiestheimpositionoftheappropriatepenalty,including
suspensionanddisbarment.20
ItbearsstressingthatAtty.Diazisaservantofthelawandbelongstothatprofessionwhich
societyentrustswiththeadministrationoflawandthedispensationofjustice.Forthis,heor
she is an exemplar for others to emulate and should not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoralordeceitful conduct.Necessarily, this Court hasbeenexactingin itsdemandfor
integrityandgoodmoralcharacterfrommembersoftheBar.Theyarealwaysexpectedto
upholdtheintegrityanddignityofthelegalprofessionandtorefrainfromanyactoromission
whichmightlessenthetrustandconfidencereposedbythepublicinthefidelity,honesty,and
integrityofthisnobleprofession.21
Atty. Diaz' delay in the liquidation of the finances of PACE; her running for reelection,
includinghernonadmissionthatsheranforsaidelectionasshownnotbyhercertificateof
candidacybutbytheaffidavitsofformerPACEofficers;andherinvolvementintheapproval
orpassageofthequestionedtermendbonusofPACEofficers,includingherselfeventhough
shewasnolongerworkingintheJudiciary,weredefinitelynotthecandortheCourtspeaksof.
TherewasmuchtobedesiredinAtty.Diaz'actions/inactions.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Edna M. AlibutdanDiaz is found GUILTY of violating Chapter 1,
Canon1,Rule1.01oftheCodeofProfessionalResponsibility,andisherebySUSPENDED
fromthepracticeoflawforaperiodofthree(3)months.
Thisdecisionshallbeimmediatelyexecutory.
Letcopiesofthis Decision be furnished theCourt Administrator forits distribution to all
courtsoftheland;theIBP;andtheOfficeoftheBarConfidanttobeenteredintorespondent's
personalrecordsasamemberofthePhilippineBar.
SOORDERED.

A.C. No. 10576, January 14, 2015 ARCATOMY S. GUARIN, Complainant, v. ATTY.
CHRISTINE A.C. LIMPIN, Respondent. : JANUARY 2015 PHILIPPINE SUPREME
COURTJURISPRUDENCECHANROBLESVIRTUALLAWLIBRARY
A.C.No.10576,January14,2015
Beforeusisacomplaint1fordisbarmentfiledbyArcatomyS.GuarinagainstAtty.Christine
AntenorCruzLimpinforallegedlyfilingafalseGeneralInformationSheet(GIS)withthe
SecuritiesandExchangeCommission(SEC)thusviolatingCanon1 2 andRule1.013 ofthe
CodeofProfessionalResponsibility(CPR).
Thefactsareculledfromthepleadings.
In2004,GuarinwashiredbyMr.CelsoG.delosAngelesasChiefOperatingOfficerand
thereafter as President of OneCard Company, Inc., a member of the Legacy Group of
Companies.HeresignedfromhisposteffectiveAugust11,2008andtransferredtoSt.Lukes
MedicalCenterastheVicePresidentforFinance.
OnNovember27,2008,Atty.Limpin,theCorporateSecretaryofLegacyCard,Inc.(LCI),
anothercorporationundertheLegacyGroup,filedwiththeSECaGISforLCIforupdating
purposes. TheGIS4 identifiedGuarinasChairmanoftheBoardofDirectors(BOD)and
President.
Miredwithallegationsofanomalousbusinesstransactionsandpractices,onDecember18,
2008,LCIappliedforvoluntarydissolutionwiththeSEC.
On July 22, 2009, Guarin filed this complaint with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
CommissiononBarDiscipline(IBPCBD)claimingthatAtty.LimpinviolatedCanon1and
Rule1.01oftheCPRbyknowinglylistinghimasastockholder,ChairmanoftheBoardand
PresidentofLCIwhensheknewthathehadalreadyresignedandhadneverheldanysharenor
washeelectedaschairpersonoftheBODorbeenPresidentofLCI. Healsoneverreceived
anynoticeofmeetingoragendawherehisappointmentasChairmanwouldbetakenup. He
hasneveracceptedanyappointmentasChairmanandPresidentofLCI.
Atty.LimpinadmitsthatshefiledtheGISwiththeSEClistingGuarinasastockholder,the
Chairmanofthe BOD andPresidentofLCI. ShearguedthattheGIS wasprovisionalto
complywithSECrequirements.Itwouldhavebeencorrectedinthefuturebutunfortunately
LCIfiledforvoluntarydissolutionshortlythereafter.SheaverredthattheGISwasmadeand
submittedingoodfaithandthathercertificationservedtoattesttotheinformationfromthe
lastBODmeetingheldonMarch3,2008.5chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
SheassertedthatGuarinknewthathewasastockholder.Atty.LimpinsaidthatonOctober
13,2008,shesentGuarinatextmessageandaskedhimtomeetwithhersohemaysigna
DeedofAssignmentconcerningshareholdings.Guarinrespondedintheaffirmativeandsaid
thathewouldmeetwithheronFriday,October17,2008.Guarin,however,neglectedtoshow
upatthearrangedtimeandplaceforreasonsunknowntoAtty.Limpin. Onthestrengthof
Guarinspositivereply,Atty.LimpinfiledtheGISonNovember27,2008.
TobelietheclaimthatLCIneverheldanyboardmeeting,Atty.LimpinpresentedSecretarys
Certificates dated May 16, 2006 6, May 22, 20067, and June 13, 2007 8 bearing Guarins
signature.
Moreover, Atty. Limpin stated that there were pending criminal complaints against the
directorsandofficersofLCI,wheresheandGuarinarecorespondents:SenatorRoxas,etal.
v.CelsodelosAngeles,etal.9 andSECv.LegacyCard,Inc. 10 Inthoseproceedings,Guarin
raisedasadefensethattheNovember27,2008GISwasspuriousand/orperjured.Sheaverred
thatthisCourtheldthatwhenthecriminalprosecutionbasedonthesameactchargedisstill
pendingincourt,anyadministrativedisciplinaryproceedingsforthesameactmustawaitthe
outcome of the criminal case to avoid contradictory findings. 11 During the mandatory
preliminaryconference,however,bothpartiesstipulatedthatthecomplaintfiledbySenator
RoxaswasdismissedastoGuarin.12chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Lastly, Atty. Limpin contends that Guarin failed to present sufficient evidence to warrant
disbarment. ShestatedthatmerelypresentingtheGISdoesnotconstituteasproofofany
unethicalconduct,harassmentandmalpractice.
InitsReport,13theIBPCBDfoundthatAtty.LimpinviolatedCanon1,Rules1.01and1.02 14
oftheCPRandthusrecommendedthatshebesuspendedfromthepracticeoflawforthree
months.Itnotedthatbasedonthesubmissionsoftheparties,Guarinwasneverastockholder
ofLCIconsequentlymakinghimineligibletobeamemberoftheBOD. Neitherwasthere
proof that Guarin acted as the President of LCI but was a mere signatory of LCIs bank
accounts. This made the verified statement of Atty. Limpin
untrue.15chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Moreover,itwasnotedthatonlyMr.CelsodelosAngeleshadtheauthoritytoappointor
designatedirectorsorofficersofLegacy.Atty.Limpinwasawarethatthisprocedurewasnot
legallypermissible. Despiteknowingthistobeirregular,sheallowedherselftobedictated
upon and falsely certified that Guarin was a stockholder, chairman and president of the
company.TheSecretarysCertificateswithGuarinssignatureAtty.Limpinpresentedwereof
nomomentsinceintheseGuarinmerelyaccededtobecomeasignatoryofbankaccountsand
thesedonotshowthatGuarinwasastockholder.
The IBP Board of Governors in its April 15, 2013 Resolution 16 adopted in toto the CBD
Report. Atty. Limpin moved for reconsideration 17 but was denied in the March 21, 2014
Resolution18oftheIBPBoardofGovernors.
WeadoptthereportandrecommendationoftheIBP.Atty.LimpinhasviolatedCanon1,Rule
1.01andRule1.02oftheCPR.
Membersofthebarareremindedthattheirfirstdutyistocomplywiththerulesofprocedure,
ratherthanseekexceptionsasloopholes.19Alawyerwhoassistsaclientinadishonestscheme
orwhoconnivesinviolatingthelawcommitsanactwhichjustifiesdisciplinaryactionagainst
thelawyer.20chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
allegation that Guarin was in fact a stockholder. We thus find that in filing a GIS that
containedfalseinformation,Atty.Limpincommittedaninfractionwhichdidnotconformto
heroathasalawyerinaccordwithCanon1andRule1.01oftheCPR.
WealsoagreewiththeIBPthatinallowingherselftobeswayedbythebusinesspracticeof
havingMr.delosAngelesappointthemembersoftheBODandofficersofthecorporation
despite the rules enunciated in the Corporation Code with respect to the election of such
officers,Atty.LimpinhastransgressedRule1.02oftheCPR.
However,consideringtheseriousnessofAtty.Limpinsactioninsubmittingafalsedocument
weseeitfittoincreasetherecommendedpenaltytosixmonthssuspensionfromthepractice
oflaw.chanrobleslaw
WHEREFORE,wefindrespondentAtty.ChristineA.C.Limpin GUILTY ofviolationof
Canon1,Rule1.01andRule1.02ofthe CodeofProfessionalResponsibility. Accordingly,
we SUSPEND respondentAtty.ChristineA.C.LimpinfromthepracticeoflawforSIX(6)
MONTHSeffectiveuponfinalityofthisDecision,withawarningthatarepetitionofthesame
orsimilaractinthefuturewillbedealtwithmoreseverely.
LetcopiesofthisDecisionbefurnishedtheOfficeoftheBarConfidanttobeappendedto
respondents personal record as an attorney, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the
DepartmentofJustice,andallcourtsinthecountryfortheirinformationandguidance.
SOORDERED.cralawlawlibrary

Disbarmentproceedingsare suigeneris andcanproceedindependentlyofcivilandcriminal

cases. AsJusticeMalcolmstated[t]heseriousconsequencesofdisbarmentorsuspension
shouldfollowonlywherethereisaclearpreponderanceofevidenceagainsttherespondent.
Thepresumptionisthattheattorneyisinnocentofthechargespr[o]ferredandhasperformed
hisdutyasanofficerofthecourtinaccordancewithhisoath. 21chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

GroundsforsuchadministrativeactionagainstalawyermaybefoundinSection27, 22 Rule
138ofthe RulesofCourt. Amongtheseare(1)theuseofanydeceit,malpractice,orother
grossmisconductinsuchofficeand(2)anyviolationoftheoathwhichheisrequiredtotake
beforetheadmissiontopractice.

Aftergoingthroughthesubmissionsandstipulationsoftheparties,weagreewiththeIBPthat
thereisnoindicationthatGuarinheldanysharetothecorporationandthatheistherefore
ineligibletoholdaseatintheBODandbethepresidentofthecompany. 23 Itisundisputed
thatAtty.LimpinfiledandcertifiedthatGuarinwasastockholderofLCIintheGIS. While
she posits that she had made the same in good faith, her certification also contained a
stipulationthatshemadeadueverificationofthestatementscontainedtherein. ThatAtty.
LimpinbelievedthatGuarinwouldsignaDeedofAssignmentisinconsequential:henever
signedtheinstrument. Wealsonotethattherewasnosubmissionwhichwouldsupportthe
 OnApril2,2003,complainant,claimingtobearecognizedillegitimatesonofthelateLuis
Tan,securedtheservicesofrespondentinordertopursueacaseforpartitionofproperty
againsttheheirsofthelatespousesLuisandNatividadValenciaTan. 2 Afteracceptingthe
engagement,respondentfiledthecorrespondingcomplaint 3beforetheRegionalTrialCourtof
BacolodCity,Branch46(RTC),docketedasCivilCaseNo.0311947.Thecomplaintwas
eventuallydismissedbytheRTCinanOrder 4datedJuly25,2007forlackofcauseofaction
andinsufficiencyofevidence. 5 Whilerespondentwasnotifiedofsuchdismissalasearlyas
August14,2007,6complainantlearnedofthesameonlyonAugust24,2007whenhevisited
the formers office.7 On such occasion, respondent allegedly asked for the amount of
P10,000.00forthepaymentofappealfeesandothercosts,butsincecomplainantcouldnot
producethesaidamountatthattime,respondent,instead,askedandwasgiventheamountof
P500.00purportedlyaspaymentofthereservationfeeforthefilingofanoticeofappeal
before the RTC.8 On September 12, 2007, Tan handed the amount of P10,000.00 to
respondent,whoonevendate,filedanoticeofappeal 9beforetheRTC.10cralawred

InanOrder11datedSeptember18,2007,theRTCdismissedcomplainantsappealforhaving
beenfiledbeyondthereglementaryperiodprovidedforbylaw.Respondent,however,didnot
disclose such fact and, instead, showed complainant an Order 12 dated November 9, 2007
purportedlyissuedbytheRTC(November9,2007Order)directingthesubmissionofthe
resultsofaDNAtestingtoprovehisfiliationtothelateLuisTan,within15daysfromreceipt
ofthenotice.Consideringthetechnicalrequirementsforsuchkindoftesting,complainant
proceededtotheRTCandrequestedforanextensionofthedeadlineforitssubmission.Itwas
thenthathediscoveredthattheNovember9,2007Orderwasspurious,ascertifiedbythe
RTCsClerkofCourt.13 Complainantalsofoundoutthat,contrarytotherepresentationsof
respondent, his appeal had long been dismissed. 14 Aggrieved, he filed the instant
administrativecomplaintfordisbarmentagainstrespondent.

In his Comments/Compliance15 dated September 4, 2009, respondent alleged that it was

complainantsfailuretotimelyproducetheamountofP1,400.00topayfortheappealfeesthat
resultedinthelatefilingofhisappeal.Accordingtohim,heinformedcomplainantofthelapse
ofthereglementaryperiodtoappeal,butthelatterinsistedinpursuingthesame.Healso
claimedtohaveassistedcomplainantnotformoneyormalicebutbeingadesperatelitigant,
hewasblamedforthecourtsunfavorabledecision.16cralawred
A.C. No. 7766, August 05, 2014 JOSE ALLAN TAN, Complainant, v. PEDRO S.
DIAMANTE, Respondent. : AUGUST 2014 PHILIPPINE SUPREME COURT TheIBPsReportandRecommendation
JURISPRUDENCECHANROBLESVIRTUALLAWLIBRARY
A.C.No.7766,August05,2014 In a Report and Recommendation 17 dated September 21, 2010, the Integrated Bar of the
FortheCourtsresolutionisanadministrativeComplaint 1 fordisbarmentdatedFebruary1, Philippines(IBP)InvestigatingCommissionerfoundrespondentadministrativelyliable,and
2008filedbycomplainantJoseAllanTan(complainant)againstrespondentPedroS.Diamante accordinglyrecommendedthatthepenaltyofsuspensionforaperiodofone(1)yearbemeted
(respondent),charginghimofviolatingtheCodeofProfessionalResponsibility(CPR)andthe outagainsthim.18cralawred
lawyersoathforfabricatingandusingaspuriouscourtorder,andforfailingtokeephisclient
informedofthestatusofthecase. TheInvestigatingCommissionerfoundcomplainantsimputationsagainstrespondenttobe
wellfounded, observing that instead of meeting complainants allegations squarely,
TheFacts particularly,theissueofthenondisclosureofthedismissalofthepartitioncase,respondent
sidestepped and delved on arguments that hardly had an effect on the issues at
hand.19cralawred
Moreover,theInvestigatingCommissionerdidnotfindcredenceinrespondentsaccusation
thatthespuriousNovember9,2007Orderoriginatedfromcomplainant,ratiocinatingthatit
wasrespondentwhowasmotivatedtofabricatethesametocoveruphislapsesthatbrought
aboutthedismissalofcomplainantsappealandmakeitappearthatthereisstillanavailable
reliefleftforTan.20cralawred
InaResolutiondatedApril16,2013,theIBPBoardofGovernorsunanimouslyadoptedand
approvedtheaforesaidreportandrecommendation.21cralawred
TheIssueBeforetheCourt
Theessentialissueinthiscaseiswhetherornotrespondentshouldbeheldadministratively
liableforviolatingtheCPR.
TheCourtsRuling
Afterajudiciousperusaloftherecords,theCourtconcurswiththeIBPsfindings,subjectto
themodificationoftherecommendedpenaltytobeimposeduponrespondent.
UnderRule18.04,Canon18oftheCPR,itisthelawyersdutytokeephisclientconstantly
updatedonthedevelopmentsofhiscaseasitiscrucialinmaintainingthelattersconfidence,
towit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
CANON 18 A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND
DILIGENCE.
Rule18.04Alawyershallkeeptheclientinformedofthestatusofhiscaseandshallrespond
withinareasonabletimetoclientsrequestforinformation.
As an officer of the court, it is the duty of an attorney to inform his client of whatever
importantinformationhemayhaveacquiredaffectinghisclientscase.Heshouldnotifyhis
clientofanyadversedecisiontoenablehisclienttodecidewhethertoseekanappellatereview
thereof. Keeping the client informed of the developments of the case will minimize
misunderstandingandlossoftrustandconfidenceintheattorney.Thelawyershouldnotleave
theclientinthedarkonhowthelawyerisdefendingtheclientsinterests. 22Inthisconnection,
thelawyermustconstantlykeepinmindthathisactions,omissions,ornonfeasancewouldbe
binding upon his client. Concomitantly, the lawyer is expected to be acquainted with the
rudimentsoflawandlegalprocedure,andaclientwhodealswithhimhastherighttoexpect
notjustagood amountofprofessionallearningandcompetencebutalsoawholehearted
fealtytotheclientscause.23cralawred
Inthecaseatbar,recordsrevealthatasofAugust14,2007,respondentalreadyknewofthe
dismissalofcomplainantspartitioncasebeforetheRTC.Despitethisfact,heneverbothered
toinformcomplainantofsuchdismissalasthelatteronlyknewofthesameonAugust24,
2007whenhevisitedtheformersoffice.Toaddinsulttoinjury,respondentwasinexcusably
negligent in filing complainants appeal only on September 12, 2007, or way beyond the
reglementaryperiodtherefor,thusresultinginitsoutrightdismissal.Clearly,respondentfailed
toexercisesuchskill,care,anddiligenceasmenofthelegalprofessioncommonlypossessand
exerciseinsuchmattersofprofessionalemployment. 24cralawred
Worse,respondentattemptedtoconcealthedismissalofcomplainantsappealbyfabricating
theNovember9,2007OrderwhichpurportedlyrequiredaDNAtestingtomakeitappearthat
complainants appeal had been given due course, when in truth, the same had long been
denied.Insodoing,respondentengagedinanunlawful,dishonest,anddeceitfulconductthat
causedundueprejudiceandunnecessaryexpensesonthepartofcomplainant.Accordingly,
respondent clearly violated Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the CPR, which
provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
CANON1Alawyershallupholdtheconstitution,obeythelawsofthelandandpromote
respectforlawandlegalprocesses.
Rule1.01Alawyershallnotengageinunlawful,dishonest,immoralordeceitfulconduct.
As officers ofthecourt,lawyers areboundtomaintainnotonly a highstandardoflegal
proficiency,butalsoofmorality,honesty,integrity,andfairdealing, 25failinginwhichwhether
inhispersonalorprivatecapacity,hebecomesunworthytocontinuehispracticeoflaw. 26A
lawyers inexcusable neglect to serve his clients interests with utmost diligence and
competenceaswellashisengaginginunlawful,dishonest,anddeceitfulconductinorderto
concealsuchneglectshouldneverbecountenanced,andthus,administrativelysanctioned.
Inviewoftheforegoing,respondentsconductofemployingacrookedanddeceitfulscheme
tokeepcomplainantinthedarkandconcealhiscasestruestatusthroughtheuseofafalsified
courtorderevidentlyconstitutesGrossMisconduct. 27 Hisactsshouldnotjustbedeemedas
unacceptablepracticesthataredisgracefulanddishonorable;theyrevealabasicmoralflaw
thatmakeshimunfittopracticelaw. 28Inthisregard,theCourtspronouncementinSebastian
v.Calis29isinstructive,viz.:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Deceptionandotherfraudulentactsbyalawyeraredisgracefulanddishonorable.They
revealmoralflawsinalawyer.Theyareunacceptablepractices.Alawyersrelationshipwith
othersshouldbecharacterizedbythehighestdegreeofgoodfaith,fairnessandcandor.Thisis
theessenceofthelawyersoath.Thelawyersoathisnotmerefacilewords,driftandhollow,
butasacredtrustthatmustbeupheldandkeepinviolable.Thenatureoftheofficeofan
attorneyrequiresthatheshouldbeapersonofgoodmoralcharacter.Thisrequisiteisnotonly
aconditionprecedenttotheadmissiontothepracticeoflaw,itscontinuedpossessionisalso
essential for remaining in the practice of law. We have sternly warned that any gross
misconductofalawyer,whetherinhisprofessionalorprivatecapacity,putshismoral
characterinseriousdoubtasamemberoftheBar,andrendershimunfittocontinuein
thepracticeoflaw.30(Emphasesandunderscoringsupplied)
Jurisprudencerevealsthatinanalogouscaseswherelawyersfailedtoinformtheirclientsof
thestatusoftheirrespectivecases,theCourtsuspendedthemforaperiodofsix(6)months.In
Mejaresv.Romana,31 theCourtsuspendedthelawyerforthesameperiodforhisfailureto
timelyandadequatelyinformhisclientsofthedismissaloftheirpetition.Inthesamevein,in
Penillav.Alcid,Jr.,32thesamepenaltywasimposedonthelawyerwhoconsistentlyfailedto
updatehisclientofthestatusofhiscases,notwithstandingseveralfollowups.
However,incaseswherelawyersengagedinunlawful,dishonest,anddeceitfulconductby
falsifyingdocuments,theCourtfoundthemguiltyofGrossMisconductanddisbarredthem.In
Brennisen v. Contawi,33 the Court disbarred the lawyer who falsified a special power of
attorneyinordertomortgageandsellhisclientsproperty.Also,inEmbidov.Pe,34thepenalty
ofdisbarmentwasmetedoutagainstthelawyerwhofalsifiedaninexistentcourtdecisionfora
fee.
Asalreadydiscussed,respondentcommittedactsoffalsificationinordertomisrepresenttohis
client,i.e.,complainant,thathestillhadanavailableremedyinhiscase,wheninreality,his
casehadlongbeendismissedforfailuretotimelyfileanappeal,thus,causingundueprejudice
tothelatter.TotheCourt,respondentsactsaresoreprehensible,andhisviolationsoftheCPR
aresoflagrant,exhibitinghismoralunfitnessandinabilitytodischargehisdutiesasamember
ofthebar.Hisactionseroderatherthanenhancethepublicperceptionofthelegalprofession.
Therefore,inviewofthetotalityofhisviolations,aswellasthedamageandprejudicecaused
tohisclient,respondentdeservestheultimatepunishmentofdisbarment.
WHEREFORE, respondent Pedro S. Diamante is hereby DISBARRED for Gross
MisconductandviolationsofRule1.01,Canon1,andRule18.04,Canon18oftheCodeof
Professional Responsibility, and his name is ordered STRICKEN OFF from the roll of
attorneys.
LetacopyofthisDecisionbeattachedtorespondentPedroS.DiamantesrecordinthisCourt.
Further,letcopiesofthisDecisionbefurnishedtotheIntegratedBarofthePhilippinesandthe
OfficeoftheCourtAdministrator,whichisdirectedtocirculatethemtoallthecourtsinthe
countryfortheirinformationandguidance.
SOORDERED.
OCA IPI No. 12204CAJ, March 11, 2014 RE: VERIFIED COMPLAINT FOR
DISBARMENT OF AMA LAND, INC. (REPRESENTED BY JOSEPH B. USITA)
AGAINSTCOURTOFAPPEALSASSOCIATEJUSTICESHON.DANTONQ.BUESER,
HON.SESINANDOE.VILLONANDHON.RICARDOR.ROSARIO.:MARCH2014
PHILIPPINE SUPREME COURT JURISPRUDENCE CHANROBLES VIRTUAL LAW
LIBRARY
OCAIPINo.12204CAJ,March11,2014
Unfoundedadministrativechargesagainstsittingjudgestrulydegradetheirjudicialoffice,and
interferewiththedueperformanceoftheirworkfortheJudiciary.Thecomplainantmaybe
heldliableforindirectcontemptofcourtasameansofvindicatingtheintegrityandreputation
ofthejudgesandtheJudiciary.
AMALand,Inc.,(AMALI)broughtthisadministrativecomplaintagainstAssociateJustice
DantonQ.Bueser,AssociateJusticeSesinandoE.VillonandAssociateJusticeRicardoR.
Rosario,allmembersoftheCourtofAppeals(CA),chargingthemwithknowinglyrendering
an unjust judgment, gross misconduct, and violation of their oaths on account of their
promulgationof the decision in C.A.G.R. SP No. 118994 entitled WackWack Residents
Association,Inc.v.TheHonorableRegionalTrialCourtofPasigCity,Branch264,Assigned
inSanJuan,andAMALand,Inc.
Antecedents
AMALI is the owner and developer of the 37storey condominium project located along
EpifanioDelosSantosAvenuecornerFordhamStreetinWackWack,MandaluyongCity. 1
Duetotheprojectslocation,AMALIwouldhavetouseFordhamStreetasanaccessroadand
stagingareafortheconstructionactivities.Inthatregard,AMALIneededtheconsentofthe
WackWackResidents Association,Inc.(WWRAI).Accordingly,AMALI sentanoticeto
WWRAI,whichignoredthenotice.Leftwithnooption,AMALIsetupafieldofficealong
FordhamStreetthatitenclosedwithatemporaryfence.WWRAIallegedlytriedtodemolish
thefieldofficeandsetupafencetodenyaccesstoAMALIsconstructionworkers,which
promptedAMALItofileapetitionfortheenforcementofaneasementofrightofwayinthe
RegionalTrialCourt(RTC)inPasigCity.Thepetition,whichincludedanapplicationfora
temporaryrestrainingorder(TRO)and/orwritofpreliminarymandatoryinjunction(WPMI),
wasdocketedasCivilCaseNo.65668. 2OnJuly24,1997,theRTCgrantedAMALIsprayer
fortheWPMI.3
Inthemeantime,AMALIconvertedthecondominiumprojectintoa34storeybuildingof
mixed use (to be known as the AMA Residences) after AMALIs petition for corporate
rehabilitationwasapproved.4
OnJanuary26,2010,WWRAIfiledinCivilCaseNo.65668anurgentmotiontosetfor
hearing itsprayer for aTROand/or writofpreliminaryinjunction(WPI) containedinits
answer. Thedenialoftheprayer forinjunctionby the RTCimpelledWWRAI to bringa
petitionforcertiorariwithanapplicationforaTROand/orwritofpreliminaryinjunctionin
theCAtoenjointheRTCfromproceedinginCivilCaseNo.65668. 5

Afterhearing,theCAissuedaTRO,whichpromptedAMALItofileanUrgentMotiontoLift
and/or Dissolve Temporary Restraining Order and later on a Compliance and Motion for
Reconsideration.
OnJuly28,2011,theCAissuedapreliminaryinjunctionandrequiredAMALItofileits
Comment.AMALIcompliedandfiledaCommentwhichalsoservedasitsmotionforpartial
reconsiderationoftheJuly28,2011Resolution.OnOctober12,2011,AMALIfiledanUrgent
Motion to Resolve and to Approve Counterbond. Allegedly, these motions were left
unresolved when the CA Tenth Division, which included Associate Justices Bueser and
Rosario,requiredthepartiestosubmittheirrespectivememoranda. 6
On June 14, 2012, the Special Former Tenth Division of the CA promulgated a decision
grantingthepetitionofWWRAI.7
AMALIconsequentlyfiledapetitionforreviewoncertiorariinthisCourt,docketedasG.R.
No.202342,entitledAMALand,Inc.v.WackWackResidentsAssociation,Inc.8
AMALI then brought this administrative complaint, alleging that respondent Justices had
conspiredwiththecounselsofWWRAI,namely:Atty.ArchibaldF.deMataandAtty.Myra
JenniferD.JaudFetizanan,inrenderinganunjustjudgment.AMALIstatedthatthedecision
oftheCAhadbeenrenderedinbadfaithandwithconsciousanddeliberateintenttofavor
WWRAI,andtocausegraveinjusticetoAMALI.Intherebyknowinglyrenderinganunjust
judgment,respondentJusticeswereguiltyofgrossmisconduct,andviolatedCanon1,Rule
1.01andCanon1,Rules10.01and10.03oftheCodeofProfessionalResponsibility,aswellas
Section27,Rule138oftheRulesofCourt.
Issue
AretherespondentJusticesliableforknowinglyrenderinganunjustjudgmentandviolating
Canon 1, Rule 1.01; Canon 10, Rules 10.01 and 10.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility;andSection27,Rule138oftheRulesofCourt?
Ruling
Theadministrativecomplaintisbereftofmerit.
Inadministrativeproceedings,thecomplainanthastheburdenofprovingtheallegationsofthe
complaintbysubstantialevidence. 9Failuretodosowillleadtothedismissalofthecomplaint
for its lack of merit. This is because an administrative charge against any official of the
Judiciarymustbesupportedbyatleastsubstantialevidence. 10Butwhenthechargeequatesto
acriminaloffense,suchthatthejudicialofficermaysuffertheheavysanctionsofdismissal
fromtheservice,theshowingofculpabilityonthepartofthejudicialofficershouldbenothing
shortofproofbeyondreasonabledoubt,especiallybecausethechargeispenalincharacter. 11
AMALIfellshortoftherequirementsforestablishingitschargeofknowinglyrenderingan
unjustjudgmentagainstrespondentJustices.
Knowinglyrenderinganunjustjudgmentconstitutesaseriouscriminaloffense.Article204,
RevisedPenalCode,providesthatanyjudgewhoknowinglyrender[s]anunjustjudgmentin
anycasesubmittedtohimfordecisionispunishedwithprisionmayorandperpetualabsolute
disqualification.Tocommittheoffense,theoffendermustbeajudgewhoisadequatelyshown
tohaverenderedanunjustjudgment,notonewhomerelycommittedanerrorofjudgmentor
takentheunpopularsideofacontroversialpointoflaw. 12 Thetermknowinglymeanssure
knowledge, consciousanddeliberateintention todoaninjustice. 13 Thus,thecomplainant
mustnotonlyprovebeyondreasonabledoubtthatthejudgmentispatentlycontrarytolawor
notsupportedbytheevidencebutthatitwasalsomadewithdeliberateintenttoperpetratean
injustice.Goodfaithandtheabsenceofmalice,corruptmotivesorimproperconsiderationare
sufficientdefensesthatwillshieldajudgefromthechargeofrenderinganunjustdecision. 14In
otherwords,thejudgewasmotivatedbyhatred,revenge,greedorsomeothersimilarmotive
inissuingthejudgment.15Badfaithis,therefore,thegroundforliability. 16Thefailureofthe
judgetocorrectlyinterpretthelawortoproperlyappreciatetheevidencepresenteddoesnot
necessarilyrenderhimadministrativelyliable. 17
Butwhoistodetermineanddeclarethatthejudgmentorfinalorderthatthejudicialofficer
knowinglyrenderedorissuedwasunjust?Maysuchdeterminationanddeclarationbemadein
administrativeinvestigationsandproceedingslikeapreliminaryinvestigationbythepublic
prosecutor?Theanswerstothesequeriesareobviousonlyasuperiorcourtactingbyvirtue
ofeitheritsappellateorsupervisoryjurisdictionoverthejudicialactionsinvolvedmaymake
suchdeterminationanddeclaration.Otherwise,thepublicprosecutororadministrativehearing
officer may be usurping a basic judicial power of review or supervision lodged by the
Constitutionorbylawelsewhereintheappellatecourt.
Moreover,AMALIsallegationsdirectlyattackedthevalidityoftheproceedingsintheCA
through an administrative complaint. The attack in this manner reflected the pernicious
practicebydisgruntledlitigantsandtheirlawyersofresortingtoadministrativechargesagainst
sitting judges instead of exhausting all their available remedies. We do not tolerate the
practice.InRe:VerifiedComplaintofEngr.OscarL.Ongjoco,ChairmanoftheBoard/CEO
of FHGYMN MultiPurpose and Transport Service Cooperative, against Hon. Juan Q.
Enriquez,Jr.,Hon.RamonM.Bato,Jr.andHon.FloritoS.Macalino,AssociateJustices,
CourtofAppeals,18weemphaticallyheldthatthefilingofadministrativecomplaintsoreven
threatsofthefilingsubvertedandunderminedtheindependenceoftheJudiciary,towit:
ItisevidenttousthatOngjocosobjectiveinfilingtheadministrativecomplaintwastotake
respondentJusticestotaskfortheregularperformanceoftheirsworndutyofupholdingthe
rule of law. He would thereby lay the groundwork for getting back at them for not
favoringhisunworthycause.Suchactuationscannotbetoleratedatall,forevenamere
threatofadministrativeinvestigationandprosecutionmadeagainstajudgetoinfluence
orintimidatehiminhisregularperformanceofthejudicialofficealwayssubvertsand
underminestheindependenceoftheJudiciary.
Weseizethisoccasion,therefore,tostressonceagainthatdisciplinaryproceedingsand
criminalactionsbroughtagainstanyjudgeinrelationtotheperformanceofhisofficial
functionsareneithercomplementarytonorsuppletoryofappropriatejudicialremedies,
norasubstituteforsuchremedies.Anypartywhomayfeelaggrievedshouldresortto
theseremedies,andexhaustthem,insteadofresortingtodisciplinaryproceedingsand
criminalactions.(Boldemphasissupplied)
ItappearsthatAMALIispronetobringingchargesagainstjudicialofficerswhoruleagainstit
initscases.Thatimpressionisnotatalldevoidofbasis.Thecomplainthereinisactuallythe
secondonethatAMALIhasbroughtagainstrespondentJusticesinrelationtotheperformance
oftheirjudicialdutyinthesamecase.InitsfirstcomplaintentitledRe:VerifiedComplaintof
AMALand,Inc.againstHon.DantonQ.Bueser,Hon.SesinandoE.VillonandHon.Ricardo
R.Rosario,AssociateJusticesoftheCourtofAppeals,19AMALIaccusedrespondentJustices
of:(a)dishonestyandviolationofRepublicActNo.3019,grossmisconduct,andknowingly
renderinganunjustjudgmentororder,inviolationofSection8,Rule140ofthe Rulesof
Court;and(b)violatingprovisionsoftheNewCodeofJudicialConduct.TheCourtdismissed
thefirstcomplaintuponfindingthatitcenteredontheproprietyoftheinterlocutoryorders
issuedbyrespondentJusticesinC.A.G.R.SPNo.118994.TheCourtappropriatelyobserved:
Aperusaloftherecordsofthecaseaswellasthepartiesrespectiveallegationsdisclosedthat
theactscomplainedofrelateto thevalidityoftheproceedingsbefore therespondentCA
JusticesandtheproprietyoftheirordersinCAG.R.SPNo.118994whichweredoneinthe
exerciseoftheirjudicialfunctions.Jurisprudenceisrepletewithcasesholdingthaterrors,if
any,committedbyajudgeintheexerciseofhisadjudicativefunctionscannotbecorrected
throughadministrativeproceedings,butshouldinsteadbeassailedthroughavailablejudicial
remedies. Disciplinary proceedings against justices do not complement, supplement or
substitute judicial remedies and, thus, cannot be pursued simultaneously with the judicial
remediesaccordedtopartiesaggrievedbytheirerroneousordersorjudgments.
xxxx
Inthiscase,AMALIhadalreadyfiledapetitionforreviewon certiorarichallengingthe
questionedorderoftherespondentCAjusticeswhichisstillpendingfinalactionbythe
Court.Consequently,adecisiononthevalidityoftheproceedingsandproprietyofthe
orders of the respondent CA Justices in this administrative proceeding would be
premature. Besides, even if the subject decision or portions thereof turn out to be
erroneous, administrative liabilitywillonly attach upon proof that the actions ofthe
respondentCAJusticesweremotivatedbybadfaith,dishonestyorhatred,orattended
byfraudorcorruption,whichwerenotsufficientlyshowntoexistinthiscase.Neither
wasbiasaswellaspartialityestablished.Actsorconductofthejudgeclearlyindicative
ofarbitrarinessorprejudicemustbeclearlyshownbeforehecanbebrandedthestigma
ofbeingbiasedandpartial.Inthesamevein,badfaithormalicecannotbeinferred
simplybecausethejudgmentororderisadversetoaparty. Here,otherthanAMALIs
bareandselfservingclaimthatrespondentCAJusticesconspiredwithWWRAIscounselin
knowingly and in bad faith rendering an unjust judgment and in committing xxx other
misconduct,noactclearlyindicativeofbiasandpartialitywasallegedexceptfortheclaim
thatrespondentCAJusticesmisappliedthelawandjurisprudence.Thus,thepresumptionthat
therespondentjudgehasregularlyperformedhisdutiesshallprevail.Moreover,thematters
raisedarebestaddressedtotheevaluationoftheCourtintheresolutionofAMALIspetition
forreviewoncertiorari.
Finally,resorttoadministrativedisciplinaryactionpriortothefinalresolutionofthe
judicial issues involved constitutes an abuse of court processes that serves to disrupt
ratherthanpromotetheorderlyadministrationofjusticeandfurtherclogthecourts
dockets.Thosewhoseekrelieffromthecourtsmustnotbeallowedtoignorebasiclegal
rulesandabuseofcourtprocessesintheireffortstovindicatetheirrights.(Boldemphasis
supplied)
Thisadministrativecaseisnodifferentfromthefirst.Theyareidentical,withthecomplaint
herein containing only a few but insignificant changes in relation to the first. Both were
intendedtointimidateortodisparagerespondentJusticesintheperformanceoftheirjudicial
functions.
ThefilingofthemeritlessadministrativecomplaintsbyAMALIwasnotonlyrepulsive,but
also an outright disrespect of the authority of the CA and of this Court. Unfounded
administrativechargesagainstjudgestrulydegradethejudicialoffice,andinterferewiththe
dueperformanceoftheirworkfortheJudiciary.AlthoughtheCourtdidnotthendeemfitto
holdinthefirstadministrativecaseAMALIoritsrepresentativepersonallyresponsibleforthe
unfoundedchargesbroughtagainstrespondentJustices,itisnowtime,properandimperative
todosoinordertoupholdthedignityandreputationofrespondentJustices,oftheCAitself,
andoftherestoftheJudiciary.AMALIanditsrepresentativeshavetherebydemonstrated
theirpenchantforharassmentofthejudgeswhodidnotdoitsbidding,andtheyhavenot
stoppeddoingsoevenifthelatterweresittingjudges.TotoleratetheactuationsofAMALI
anditsrepresentativeswouldbetorewardthemwithundeservedimpunityforanobviously
wrongattitudetowardstheCourtanditsjudicialofficers.
Indeed,nojudicialofficershouldhavetofearorapprehendbeingheldtoaccountortoanswer
forperforminghisjudicialfunctionsandofficebecausesuchperformanceisamatterofpublic
dutyandresponsibility.Theofficeanddutytorenderandadministerjusticeareafunctionof
sovereignty,andshouldnotbesimplytakenforgranted.Asarecognizedcommentatoron
publicofficesandpublicofficershaswritten: 20
Itisageneralprinciple,abundantlysustainedbyauthorityandreason,thatnocivilactioncan
besustainedagainstajudicialofficerfortherecoveryofdamagesbyoneclaimingtohave
beeninjuredbytheofficersjudicialactionwithinhisjurisdiction. Fromtheverynatureof
thecase,theofficeriscalleduponbylawtoexercisehisjudgmentinthematter,andthe
lawholdshisdutytotheindividualtobeperformedwhenhehasexercisedit,however
erroneousordisastrousinitsconsequencesitmayappeareithertothepartyortoothers.
Anumberofreasons,anyoneofthemsufficient,havebeenadvancedinsupportofthis
rule.Thusitissaidofthejudge:Hisdoingjusticeasbetweenparticularindividuals,
whentheyhaveacontroversybeforehim,isnottheendandobjectwhichwereinview
whenhiscourtwascreated,andhewasselectedtopresideoverorsitinit.Courtsare
createdonpublicgrounds;theyaretodojusticeasbetweensuitors,totheendthatpeace
and order mayprevail in the political society, and that rights may be protected and
preserved.Thedutyispublic,andtheendtobeaccomplishedispublic;theindividual
advantage or loss results from the proper and thorough or improper and imperfect
performanceofadutyforwhichhiscontroversyisonlytheoccasion.Thejudgeperforms
hisdutytothepublicbydoingjusticebetweenindividuals,or,ifhefailstodojusticeas
betweenindividuals,hemaybecalledtoaccountbytheStateinsuchformandbefore
suchtribunalasthelawmayhaveprovided.Butasthedutyneglectedisnotadutytothe Contempt of court has been defined as a willful disregard or disobedience of a public
individual,civilredress,asforanindividualinjury,isnotadmissible.21
Accordingly,wenowdemandthatAMALIsauthorizedrepresentative,JosephB.Usita,its
SeniorAssistantVicePresident,andtheMembersoftheBoardofDirectorsofAMALIwho
hadauthorizedUsitatofilethepresentcomplaint,toshowcauseinwritingwhytheyshould
notbeheldinindirectcontemptofcourtforbringingtheunfoundedandbaselesscharges
againstrespondentJusticesnotonlyoncebuttwice.Tobeclear,thefilingofunfoundedand
baseless administrative charges against sitting judicial officers may constitute indirect
contemptunderSection3(d),Rule71oftheRulesofCourt,towit:
Section3. Indirectcontempttobepunishedafterchargeandhearing.Afterachargein
writinghasbeenfiled,andanopportunitygiventotherespondenttocommentthereonwithin
suchperiodasmaybefixedbythecourtandtobeheardbyhimselforcounsel,apersonguilty
of any of the following acts may be punished for indirect
contempt:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(a)Misbehaviorofanofficerofacourtintheperformanceofhisofficialdutiesorinhis
officialtransactions;
(b)Disobedience oforresistancetoalawfulwrit,process,order,orjudgmentofacourt,
includingtheactofapersonwho,afterbeingdispossessedorejectedfromanyrealproperty
by the judgment or process of any court of competent jurisdiction, enters or attempts or
inducesanothertoenterintooruponsuchrealproperty,forthepurposeofexecutingactsof
ownership or possession, or in any manner disturbs the possession given to the person
adjudgedtobeentitledthereto;
(c)Anyabuseoforanyunlawfulinterferencewiththeprocessesorproceedingsofacourtnot
constitutingdirectcontemptundersection1ofthisRule;
(d)Anyimproperconducttending,directlyorindirectly,toimpede,obstruct,ordegrade
theadministrationofjustice;
(e)Assumingtobeanattorneyoranofficerofacourt,andactingassuchwithoutauthority;
(f)Failuretoobeyasubpoenadulyserved;
(g)Therescue,orattemptedrescue,ofapersonorpropertyinthecustodyofanofficerby
virtueofanorderorprocessofacourtheldbyhim.
Butnothinginthissectionshallbesoconstruedastopreventthecourtfromissuingprocessto
bringtherespondentintocourt,orfromholdinghimincustodypendingsuchproceedings.(3a)
Anent indirect contempt, the Court said in Lorenzo Shipping Corporation v. Distribution
ManagementAssociationofthePhilippines:22
authority.Initsbroadsense,contemptisadisregardof,ordisobedienceto,therulesororders
ofalegislativeorjudicialbodyoraninterruptionofitsproceedingsbydisorderlybehavioror
insolentlanguageinitspresenceorsoneartheretoastodisturbitsproceedingsortoimpairthe
respectduetosuchabody.Initsrestrictedandmoreusualsense,contemptcomprehendsa
despising of the authority, justice, or dignity of a court. The phrase contempt of court is
generic,embracingwithinitslegalsignificationavarietyofdifferentacts.
Thepowertopunishforcontemptisinherentinallcourts,andneednotbespecifically
grantedbystatute.Itliesatthecoreoftheadministrationofajudicialsystem.Indeed,
thereoughttobenoquestionthatcourtshavethepowerbyvirtueoftheirverycreation
to impose silence, respect, and decorum in their presence, submission to their lawful
mandates,andtopreservethemselvesandtheirofficersfromtheapproachandinsultsof
pollution.Thepowertopunishforcontemptessentiallyexistsforthepreservationof
order in judicial proceedings and for the enforcement of judgments, orders, and
mandatesofthe courts, and,consequently,forthe dueadministration ofjustice. The
reasonbehindthepowertopunishforcontemptisthatrespectofthecourtsguarantees
the stability of their institution; without such guarantee, the institution of the courts
wouldberestingonaveryshakyfoundation.23(Boldemphasissupplied)
ACCORDINGLY,theCourt(a)DISMISSEStheadministrativecomplaintagainstAssociate
JusticeDantonQ.Bueser,AssociateJusticeSesinandoE.VillonandAssociateJusticeRicardo
R.Rosarioforitsutterlackofmerit;and(b)ORDERSJosephB.Usita,theSeniorAssistant
VicePresidentofAMALand,Inc.,andallthemembersoftheBoardofDirectorsofAMA
Land,Inc.whohadauthorizedUsitatobringtheadministrativecomplaintagainstrespondent
AssociateJusticestoshowcauseinwritingwithin10daysfromnoticewhytheyshouldnotbe
punished for indirect contempt of court for degrading the judicial office of respondent
AssociateJustices,andforinterferingwiththedueperformanceoftheirworkfortheJudiciary.
SOORDERED.