Documente Academic
Documente Profesional
Documente Cultură
RESOURCE SUPER PROFITS TAX
Measure description
A Resource Super Profits Tax (RSPT) will be introduced on 1 July 2012 at a rate of 40 per cent on profits
made from the exploitation of Australia’s non‐renewable resources.
The RSPT will replace the crude oil excise, and operate in parallel with State and Territory royalty regimes.
Projects within the scope of the Petroleum Resource Rent Tax (PRRT) will have the option of opting into the
RSPT or staying in the PRRT. The election into the RSPT will be irrevocable.
• Under the RSPT a refundable credit for royalties paid to State and Territory Governments will be
available.
• The refundable credit will eliminate investment distortions associated with the state royalty systems
and ensure there is no ‘double taxation’ of resource profits.
The Government will consult extensively with stakeholders on the design of the RSPT. This consultation has
commenced with the release of an Announcement Paper, The Resource Super Profits Tax: a fair return to
the nation. The consultation will also cover the need for exemptions from the RSPT where, due to
compliance costs, there is no net benefit to society in applying the RSPT. This may occur in respect of low
value minerals or micro businesses.
Rationale
The RSPT will provide a more appropriate return to the Australian community from the exploitation of its
non‐renewable resources compared with the current charging arrangements.
Australia’s current resource charging arrangements fail to collect an appropriate return for the community
from private firms exploiting non‐renewable resources. This is largely due to those arrangements not
responding to changes in profits.
The RSPT will provide a more efficient mechanism for collecting a share of the returns to the community
and remove impediments to mining investment and production. The RSPT will encourage greater
investment and employment in the resource sector.
Key facts
International movement towards resource profit taxes
The Australia’s Future Tax System Review’s Consultation Paper noted that current international trends in
resource charging include a shift towards profit‐based royalties. This has occurred mainly in developed
countries. A meaningful comparison of profit‐based tax rates among countries is difficult to make due to
variability across jurisdictions in the measurement of the tax base.
1
Most provinces in Canada, as well as the state of Nevada in the United States, have adopted profit‐based
charging for mining. These arrangements are generally based on an income tax model but with various
allowances and concessional deductions that begin to approximate a tax on rents. The taxes under these
arrangements are generally less than 20 per cent. However, these arrangements often typically tax part of
the normal return on an investment and are often combined with low rate ad valorem royalties.
Norway’s petroleum tax system approximates a rent‐based tax. Though based on its company income tax
system, it utilises an uplift on expenditure to exempt the normal return and reimburses the tax value of
exploration expenditure for companies in a loss position. Norway imposes a total tax rate on petroleum
resource rents of 78 per cent, consisting of a 50 per cent rent‐based tax rate and a company income tax of
28 per cent, with no deduction at the company tax level for the rent‐based tax paid.
Indicative timeline
The measure will apply from 1 July 2012. The Government will undertake consultation on the detailed
design of the RSPT.
2
ATTACHMENT A
HOW THE RSPT WILL WORK
Background
Australia has abundant non‐renewable resources, which are expected to continue to command high prices,
primarily driven by strong demand from China and India.
The community, through the Australian and State governments, owns Australian’s non‐renewable
resources and charges private firms to exploit those resources through a large range of charging regimes
involving royalties and taxes.
Current resource charging arrangements provide an inadequate return to the community and do not
recognise the cost of resource investment and production, which can be particularly important during
periods of low resource prices. Royalties are quite unresponsive to changes in resource profits, and the
community has largely missed out on sharing in the vast wealth generated from the sale of Australia’s
non‐renewable resources.
The RSPT will yield a return to the community as a share of resource profits that is more comparable to
early 2000s, before the last mining boom. It will provide a more efficient mechanism for collecting a share
of the returns to the community and remove impediments to mining investment and production.
The community will receive a higher share of resource profits under the RSPT. Specifically:
• a higher proportion of the resource profits from high‐profit projects;
• a proportion of the resource profits from the start‐up of viable projects that would otherwise not go
ahead under royalty regimes; and
• a share in the continued operation of viable projects that would otherwise be prematurely curtailed
by royalties.
Moreover, the RSPT will capture a stable share of the increases, and decreases, in resource profits as they
occur. This is because the RSPT will be struck at a constant proportion of annual resource profits.
Approach
The RSPT will apply to super profits made from all non‐renewable resources on or after 1 July 2012 at a rate
of 40 per cent. RSPT liabilities will be deductible with RSPT refunds being assessable for income tax
purposes.
Through the RSPT, the Government will effectively make a contribution of 40 per cent to the costs of the
project outlaid by the entity. An entity will be able to access the contribution by deducting the costs outlaid
on a project from: the project’s RSPT income; from income of another project owned by the entity or
owned by another entity of the same wholly owned company group.
Any remaining costs will be carried forward to be deducted as a loss against future income or be refundable
at the 40 per cent rate on a reasonable basis, such as when an entity exits the resource sector. The basis for
refundability will be determined through consultation with stakeholders.
3
Delays in utilising the costs could occur due to costs exceeding income and due to depreciating assets being
expensed over the life of the asset. These undeducted costs are held in an account called the RSPT capital
account. The government will compensate an entity for this delay by providing an interest allowance on the
balance in the RSPT capital account. The RSPT allowance rate will be set at the long term government bond
rate.
Entities that have interests in existing projects that will be subject to the RSPT will be given an RSPT starting
base to recognise past investment. Special arrangements will be provided to allow the starting base to be
used over the first five years of the operation of the RSPT to reduce the RSPT payable on these projects
interests. Any unused starting base can be carried forward to be deducted against future income of that
project interest, though it cannot be deducted against income from other project interests and is not
refundable.
Investment expenses by an entity between the time of announcement and commencement of the RSPT will
be given the same treatment as for that outlaid post commencement.
4
ATTACHMENT B
TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENTS
Background
The RSPT will apply to all existing resource projects, except those already within the scope of the PRRT
regime. These projects will have the option of electing into the RSPT regime or staying in the PRRT regime.
To provide certainty for projects already covered by the PRRT, the Commonwealth will consult with
industry on arrangements that would allow an irrevocable election into the RSPT. The Government
anticipates that, over time, many projects within the scope of the PRRT will migrate into the RSPT.
Bringing existing projects into the RSPT will ensure that the expansion of existing projects will be treated in
the same way as the development of new projects. A significant part of the expected growth in the
resource sector’s output is likely to come from the expansion of existing projects.
Approach
Existing projects will be transitioned into the RSPT with a generous RSPT starting base to reduce future
RSPT liability in recognition of past investment. This RSPT starting base can be deducted against RSPT
revenue from the project but is not transferable between projects or refundable. Capital expenditure
between the announcement and commencement of the RSPT (the interim period) will be entitled to the
RSPT loss transfer rules and loss refund rules following commencement.
Transition for projects
For projects subject to the RSPT, the Government will recognise in the RSPT starting base, the accounting
book value of existing project assets as at the most recent audited accounts available at the time of
announcement. The book value will be required to reflect a value consistent with Australian Accounting
Standards. Market valuation will be used where audited accounting book values are not available.
If the asset is acquired after the accounts are audited but before announcement of the RSPT, the assets
historical cost will be included in the starting base.
Taxpayers will be able to increase their RSPT capital account to account for the acquisition of new capital.
To do this, all acquisitions of capital and exploration expenditure during the interim period will be included
in the RSPT capital account valued at its historical cost and indexed, from the time of purchase, at the RSPT
allowance rate. Acquisitions of capital and exploration expenditure will not be depreciated for RSPT
purposes during the interim period.
Where an asset is disposed of during the interim period, the asset’s indexed RSPT capital account value will
be removed from the RSPT capital account.
To soften the impact on after tax cash flows following commencement, the Government will allow early
access to the RSPT starting base through accelerated depreciation of the base over the first five years of
operation of the RSPT.
The first phase of consultation with industry will focus on the design of the transitional arrangements to
ensure they are fair on firms while maintaining the integrity of the RSPT objectives.
5
ATTACHMENT C
CALCULATING TAXABLE PROFITS — THE TAXING POINT
Background
The taxing point defines the scope of revenues and costs taken into consideration in assessing liability for
the Resource Super Profits Tax (RSPT). The RSPT tax base is the value of the resource at the taxing point less
all allowable costs incurred in getting the resource to the taxing point — for example, exploration costs,
mine/well development costs, processing and haulage costs.
The AFTS report proposed that, in principle, the taxing point be set close to the point of extraction of the
resource — for example, the mine gate or well head — to be consistent with taxing the market value of the
underlying non‐renewable resource. It notes, however, that the value of a resource at this stage in the
production process is rarely observable and needs to be derived.
In setting the 40 per cent tax rate, the AFTS report recognised the difficulty in taxing resource super profits
and that some part of any super profit attributable to the firm specific value that a company might add in
undertaking a resource activity may also be subject to the RSPT.
The existing arrangements
Under Australia’s existing resource regimes, a proxy for the unobservable value of a resource at the
relevant taxing point is usually derived using a ‘comparable market price’ or by ‘netting back’ from an
observable downstream price, the additional production costs incurred downstream of the taxing point.
Under the Petroleum Resource Rent Tax (PRRT) the taxing point is when a saleable commodity arises1. The
stage of production and the value and costs assessable under the PRRT varies by commodity. For example,
crude oil may be assessed at the wellhead, whereas gas may be assessed after first stage processing to
remove water, liquid hydrocarbons and certain other by products. Where gas is used in to produce LNG in
an integrated operation, Gas Transfer Price Regulations apply to determine the value of upstream gas. The
value of the gas is determined by:
• summing the costs for a unit of dry gas to the point of the first saleable commodity;
• netting back from the first arms length or comparable price, the costs of the downstream LNG and
transport operations per unit of dry gas;
• dividing the difference in the gas price determined in steps 1 and 2 by two; and
• adding half the difference in step 3 to the as price calculated in step 1.
This methodology produces a 50:50 split in the rents of the integrated project to the upstream and
downstream activities.
The taxing point under the PRRT and the valuation methodologies have been a point of concern to industry.
1 Strictly speaking, the PRRT taxing point occurs when the marketable petroleum commodity becomes an
excluded commodity, that is, when it has been sold; after being produced has been further
processed/treated; has been moved away from its place of production other than a storage site adjacent to
that place or has been moved away from a storage site adjacent to the place of production.
6
Approach
This is an aspect of policy design that is open to stakeholder input through the consultation process. In
particular, industry input is sought in establishing a suitable methodology for taxing super profits earned
from the resource, while balancing administration and compliance costs.
The value of a resource is rarely identifiable at the well head or mine gate. Establishing such value requires
a methodology for subtracting the cost of processing required to make the raw material saleable and any
handling costs incurred up to the point where an arm’s length sale occurs or there is a comparable market
price. Identifying the value of the taxable resource is particularly difficult in vertically integrated operations
such as the production of LNG from gas, alumina from bauxite and electricity from brown coal.
These difficulties may be minimised by setting the taxing point where a saleable commodity exists, similar
to the approach under the PRRT. For some commodities this could include initial processing, such as first
stage processing of gas or smelting of metal ores. This point could reduce the number of circumstances
where costs and prices need to be imputed and potentially avoid issues concerning the attribution of value
where resource value and the returns to extraction technology are co‐dependent.
It is proposed to also explore the feasibility of a flexible approach to setting the taxing point, such that
some additional downstream processes (beyond the existence of a saleable commodity) might be included
within the reach of the RSPT, where there is no earlier observable arm’s length or comparable market price.
Such an approach might apply to operations with integrated transport facilities or integrated resource
processing operations. Extending the taxing point may reduce compliance costs and recognise the
co‐dependency of the value of extracted resources with resource transport or processing in integrated
operations.
The consultation process will explore methodologies for establishing taxing point values where arm’s length
prices occur downstream of the taxing point.
7
ATTACHMENT D
CREDITING STATE ROYALTIES
Background
In Australia, governments allow private firms to exploit non‐renewable resources and in return collect a
charge for resource production — predominantly through taxation arrangements. The form of tax varies
across jurisdictions. While governments have typically adopted output‐based royalties, the Australian
government also includes a charge on some resource rents.
For the resources sector as a whole, royalties can ‘underprice’ the extraction of non‐renewable
resources — which are owned by the community. As royalties are relatively unresponsive to changes in
resource profits, the community has largely missed out on sharing in the vast wealth generated from the
sale of Australia’s non‐renewable resources.
Royalties tax high profit projects proportionately less and low profit projects proportionally more, thus
distorting the pattern of investment. This may mean some of the more risky deposits, or those that are
more costly to develop, are not pursued. It may also lead to the early closure of resource projects. This
affects how much of Australia’s resources are utilised, and the return available to be collected through
resource charges. This can lower the return to the community collected through its resource charges.
The RSPT will yield a return to the community as a share of resource profits that is more comparable to
early 2000s, before the last mining boom.
The RSPT will capture a stable share of the increases, and decreases, in resource profits as they occur. This
is because the RSPT relates the community’s resource charge to the value of each resource deposit. The
RSPT only taxes super profits.
A tax structured on super profits, rather than systems of royalty charges, will minimise the current adverse
effects that resource charging has on investment and production decisions, and provide a clear and stable
means for the community to receive its share of the value of its non‐renewable resource deposits.
Approach
The Australian Government will provide a refundable credit to resource entities for state royalties paid to
State governments following commencement of the RSPT. The objective of the refundable credit is to
reduce distortions from state royalties and negate concerns that the resource profits tax is a ‘double’ tax.
Resource projects would then be subject only to the RSPT scheme.
The Government will discuss with the States on what royalty rates to credit, given that some royalty rates
are in nominal dollars and need to be increased from time to time, while others are applied on a mine by
mine basis.
The refundable credit will be available at least up to the amount of royalties imposed at the time of
announcement, including scheduled increases and appropriate indexation factors.
8
ATTACHMENT E
THE IMPACTS OF THE RSPT
Background
A Resource Super Profits Tax (RSPT) will provide the Australian community with a more appropriate return
on its non‐renewable resources. It will provide a more consistent tax treatment of resource projects that
will promote efficient investment and production outcomes.
Broad implications
Modelling by Econtech suggests that under an RSPT scheme, mining investment will rise by 4.5 per cent,
jobs by 7 per cent and mining production by 5.5 per cent in the long run.
Resource firms
The effect of the introduction of the RSPT on resource firms will vary dependent upon the size of their
resource profits.
• Existing project that are very profitable would pay more resource charges under the RSPT.
• Existing projects that are marginally profitable may pay less resource charges under the RSPT.
• Existing projects that are in a net loss position would not have to pay any RSPT.
• Existing projects that have costs for new investment would be able to obtain a tax credit for those
costs once the resource tax commences.
Under the current system, royalties are paid on the extraction/sale of resources — irrespective of the
profitability of a project. Under the RSPT, firms will receive a refundable credit to offset royalties paid. A
project will not incur a tax liability under the RSPT until it becomes profitable after recovering its costs. By
extension, no project that was profitable under the royalty system will become unprofitable because of the
RSPT. Rather, some projects that would eventually become unviable under the royalty system may now
remain viable for longer because the RSPT is a profit‐based system that recognises costs associated with
the project in deriving profits. The crediting of State royalties is discussed in the accompanying fact sheet.
The effects on individual resource firms will vary depending upon their mix of high and low profit projects.
Firms will typically pay more tax when commodity prices (and, by implication when profits are high), and
less tax when commodity prices and profits are low.
State and Territory governments
State and Territory governments will continue to operate their royalty systems and receive royalty
payments from resource firms.
9
ATTACHMENT F
INTERNATIONAL COMPARISONS
Background
The on‐going significance of Australia’s non‐renewable resources to the community and the economy
provides a strong argument in its own right for introducing the RSPT. It will enhance the performance of the
resource sector and, at the same time, deliver a greater return to the community from the extraction and
sale of its non‐renewable resources.
Approach
What occurs elsewhere?
IMF studies show that where countries have specific mineral taxation arrangements, these arrangements
are usually royalties set at around 5 per cent of gross revenue. These are similar to the existing State and
Territory based royalty rates in Australia. More recently, developed countries with significant resource
endowments (such as Canada, Norway and the United States) have moved towards tax systems based on
resource rents or super profits.
Most provinces in Canada, as well as the state of Nevada in the United States, have adopted profit‐based
charging for extracting resources. These arrangements are generally based on an income tax model but
with various allowances and deductions that begin to approximate a tax on resource super profits. The
taxes under these arrangements are generally less than 20 per cent of profits. However, they are often
combined with ad valorem royalties (but with no credit against the profit tax) and company income tax at
differing rates.
Norway’s petroleum tax system approximates a super profit‐based tax. Though based on the company
income tax system, it utilises an uplift on expenditure to exempt the normal return and reimburses the tax
value of exploration expenditure for companies in a loss position. Norway imposes a total tax rate on
resource super profits of 78 per cent, consisting of a 50 per cent super profit based tax rate and company
income tax of 28 per cent, with no deduction at the company tax level for payments of the super profit
based tax.
The fact that other OECD countries with significant resource endowments have moved towards profit
based taxation sets a benchmark for Australia.
Can a comparison be made?
Comparing resource taxation arrangements across countries is not straightforward. Meaningful
comparisons should be based on effective ‘all in’ rates (rates that include income tax as well as resource
taxes and royalties). In addition, effective tax rates will also depend on project profitability.
10