[G.R. No. 131492.
September 29, 2000] Later, on motion of petitioners, the Special Prosecutor's
ROGER POSADAS, ROSARIO TORRES-YU, and MARICHU
LAMBINO, petitioners, vs. THE HON. OMBUDSMAN,
THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, and ORLANDO V.
DIZON, respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
Dennis Venturina, a member of Sigma Rho at the University
of the Philippines, was killed in a rumble between his fraternity
and another fraternity on December 8, 1994. In a letter dated
December 11, 1994, petitioner Roger Posadas, then Chancellor
of U.P. Diliman in Quezon City, asked the Director of the National
Bureau of Investigation for assistance in determining the persons
responsible for the crime. In response to the request, respondent
Orlando V. Dizon, Chief of the Special Operations Group of the
NBI, and his men went to U.P. on December 12 and, on the basis
of the supposed positive identification of two alleged
eyewitnesses, Leandro Lachica and Cesar Mangrobang, Jr.,
attempted to arrest Francis Carlo Taparan and Raymundo Narag,
officers/members of the Scintilla Juris Fraternity, as suspects in
the killing of Venturina. It appears that the two suspects had
come that day to the U.P. Police Station for a peace talk between
their fraternity and the Sigma Rho Fraternity.
Petitioners Posadas, Marichu Lambino, and Rosario Torres-
Yu, also of U.P., and a certain Atty. Villamor, counsel for the
suspects, objected on the ground that the NBI did not have
warrants of arrest with them. Posadas and Atty. Villamor
promised to take the suspects to the NBI Office the next day. As
a result of their intervention, Taparan and Narag were not
arrested by the NBI agents on that day.[1] However, criminal
charges were filed later against the two student suspects.[2]
Dizon then filed a complaint in the Office of the Special
Prosecutor, charging petitioners Posadas, Torres-Yu, Lambino,
Col. Eduardo Bentain, Chief of the Security Force of the U.P.
Police, and Atty. Villamor with violation of P.D. 1829, [3] which
makes it unlawful for anyone to obstruct the apprehension and
prosecution of criminal offenders.
On May 18, 1995, an information[4] was filed against them,
alleging that:
That on or about December 12, 1994 and for sometime prior or
subsequent thereto, in Quezon City, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-named accused,
namely: ROGER POSADAS, Chancellor; ROSARIO YU - Vice
Chancellor; ATTY. MARICHU LAMBINO - Asst. Legal Counsel; and
COL. EDUARDO BENTAIN - Chief, Security Force, all of the
University of the Philippines, Diliman, Quezon City, all public officers,
while in the performance of their respective official functions, taking
advantage of their official duties and committing the crime in relation to
their office, conspiring and confederating with each other and with a
certain ATTY. VILLAMOR, did then and there wilfully, knowingly and
criminally obstruct, impede and frustrate the apprehension of FRANCIS
CARLO TAPARAN and RAYMUNDO NARAG, both principal
suspects involved in the brutal killing of DENNIS VENTURINA, a U.P.
graduating student and Chairperson of the UP College of
Administration, Student Council, and delaying the investigation and
prosecution of the said heinous case by harboring and concealing said
suspects thus, leading to the successful escape of suspects Narag and
another principal suspect JOEL CARLO DENOSTA; that said above
acts were done by the above-named accused public officials despite
their full knowledge that said suspects were implicated in the brutal
slaying of said Dennis Venturina, thus preventing the suspects arrest,
prosecution and conviction.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Office recommended the dismissal of the case. But the
recommendation was disapproved. In a memorandum, dated
September 8, 1997, the Office of the Ombudsman directed the
Special Prosecutor to proceed with the prosecution of petitioners
in the Sandiganbayan. Hence this petition for certiorari and
prohibition to set aside the resolution of the Ombudsman's office
ordering the prosecution of petitioners.
Petitioners contend that:
I. THE HONORABLE OMBUDSMAN COMMITTED
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN HE
RULED THAT: 1) STUDENTS COULD BE
ARRESTED WITHOUT WARRANT ON MERE
SUSPICION; 2) PD 1829 INCLUDES ARRESTS
WITHOUT WARRANTS ON MERE SUSPICION;
AND WHEN HE REVERSED THE FINDINGS AND
RESOLUTION OF THE SPECIAL PROSECUTION
OFFICER, THE DEPUTY SPECIAL
PROSECUTOR AND THE SPECIAL
PROSECUTOR, WHO CONDUCTED THE
REINVESTIGATION OF THE CASE; AND
FINALLY WHEN HE RESOLVED THAT
PETITIONERS SHOULD BE SUBJECTED TO
PUBLIC TRIAL WHEN THERE IS NO PROBABLE
CAUSE AND NO BASIS.
II. SECTION 1, PARAGRAPH C OF PRESIDENTIAL
DECREE NO. 1829 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL.[5]
Two issues are raised in this case, to wit: (1) Whether the
attempted arrest of the student suspects by the NBI could be
validly made without a warrant; and (2) Whether there was
probable cause for prosecuting petitioners for violation of P.D.
No. 1829. We answer these questions in the negative.
First. In view of Art. III, 2 of the Constitution, the rule is that
no arrest may be made except by virtue of a warrant issued by a
judge after examining the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce and after finding probable cause to believe that the
person to be arrested has committed the crime. The exceptions
when an arrest may be made even without a warrant are
provided in Rule 113, 5 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure which
reads:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has
personal knowledge of the facts indicating that the person to be arrested
has committed it;
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a
penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while
being transferred from one confinement to another.
There is no question that this case does not fall under
paragraphs (a) and (c). The arresting officers in this case did not
witness the crime being committed. Neither are the students
fugitives from justice nor prisoners who had escaped from
confinement. The question is whether paragraph (b) applies
because a crime had just been committed and the NBI agents
had personal knowledge of facts indicating that Narag and
Taparan were probably guilty.
Respondents contend that the NBI agents had personal
knowledge of facts gathered by them in the course of their
investigation indicating that the students sought to be arrested
were the perpetrators of the crime.[6] They invoke the ruling
in People v. Tonog, Jr.[7] in which it was held:
It may be that the police officers were not armed with a warrant when
they apprehended Accused-appellant. The warrantless arrest, however,
was justified under Section 5 (b), Rule 133 (sic) of the 1985 Rules of
Criminal Procedure providing that a peace officer may, without a
warrant, arrest a person "when an offense has in fact just been
committed and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the
person to be arrested has committed it." In this case, Pat. Leguarda, in
effecting the arrest of Accused-appellant, had knowledge of facts
gathered by him personally in the course of his investigation indicating
that Accused-appellant was one of the perpetrators.
In that case, the accused voluntarily went upon invitation of
the police officer who later noticed the presence of blood stains
on the pants of the accused. Upon reaching the police station,
the accused was asked to take off his pants for examination at
the crime laboratory. The question in that case involved the
admissibility of the maong pants taken from the accused.It is
clear that Tonog does not apply to this case. First, the accused in
that case voluntarily went with the police upon the latter's
invitation. Second, the arresting officer found blood stains on the
pants of the accused, on the basis of which he concluded that the
accused probably committed the crime for which reason the latter
was taken into custody. Third, the arrest was made on the same
day the crime was committed. In the words of Rule 113, 5(b), the
crime had "just been committed" and the arresting officer had
"personal knowledge of the facts indicating that the person to be
arrested had committed it."
In contrast, the NBI agents in the case at bar tried to arrest
Narag and Taparan four days after the commission of the
crime. They had no personal knowledge of any fact which might
indicate that the two students were probably guilty of the
crime. What they had were the supposed positive identification of
two alleged eyewitnesses, which is insufficient to justify the arrest
without a warrant by the NBI.
We have already explained what constitutes "personal
knowledge" on the part of the arresting officers:
"Personal knowledge" of facts in arrests without a warrant under
Section 5 (b) of Rule 113 must be based upon "probable cause" which
means an "actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion." The
grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual
belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion that the person to be
arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense is based on actual
facts, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves
to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. A
reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on probable cause,
coupled with good faith on the part of the peace officers making the
arrest.[8]
Indeed, at the time Dennis Venturina was killed, these
agents were nowhere near the scene of the crime. When
respondent Dizon and his men attempted to arrest Taparan and
Narag, the latter were not committing a crime nor were they
doing anything that would create the suspicion that they were
doing anything illegal. On the contrary, Taparan and Narag, under
the supervision of the U.P. police, were taking part in a peace talk
called to put an end to the violence on the campus.
To allow the arrest which the NBI intended to make without
warrant would in effect allow them to supplant the courts. The
determination of the existence of probable cause that the
persons to be arrested committed the crime was for the judge to
make. The law authorizes a police officer or even an ordinary
citizen to arrest criminal offenders only if the latter are committing
or have just committed a crime. Otherwise, we cannot leave to
the police officers the determination of whom to apprehend if we
are to protect our civil liberties. This is evident from a
consideration of the requirements before a judge can order the
arrest of suspects. Art. III, 2 of the Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature
and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.
For the failure of the NBI agents to comply with
constitutional and procedural requirements, we hold that their
attempt to arrest Taparan and Narag without a warrant was
illegal.
Second. In ordering the prosecution of petitioners for
violation of P.D. No. 1829, 1(c), the Office of the Ombudsman
stated in its memorandum dated September 8, 1997:
From the facts adduced, it is submitted that respondents had reasonable
ground to suspect that the SJ members sought to be arrested participated
in the clubbing of Dennis Venturina, eventually leading to the latter's
demise. It must be remembered that these SJ members were positively
identified by two eyewitnesses. A reasonably prudent mind could not
just ignore this positive identification. In fact, respondents do not
dispute the identification made on the alleged participants in the
clubbing of Dennis Venturina.
Respondent U.P. officials justify their act of barring the apprehending
officers from arresting the SJ members on the ground that the
warrantless arrest sought to be effected did not conform with Sec. 5,
Rule 113 of the Rules of Court; thereby averting, what would be in their
opinion, an illegal arrest. While this justification may, at best, show
their good faith, it does not detract from the fact that they had
reasonable ground to suspect that the SJ members sought to be arrested
committed the heinous crime of murder as a result of the positive
identification made by two eyewitnesses. Besides, the reliance on the
alleged illegality of the arrest just shows the clear intent, on
respondents' part, to wilfully obstruct, frustrate or, at the least, delay the
apprehension and investigation and prosecution of the SJ members
positively identified.
To be sure, respondents knew fully well that inquest proceedings follow
warrantless arrests. It is in this forum where the prosecutor conducting
the inquest may rule on their opinion on whether or not the warrantless
arrest effected was valid; he having the quasijudicial authority to rule on
this matter. Of course, there are various remedies under the law which
respondents may have likewise availed of or resorted to in order to
secure the liberty of the SJ members had the latter been arrested,
without prejudice to any criminal or administrative actions that they
may have filed against the arresting NBI agents.However, it appears
that they took the law into their own hands in a manner that obstructed
and delayed the investigation being conducted by a law enforcement
agency like the NBI. They facilitated the escape of the two SJ members
pinpointed by eyewitnesses as among those who clubbed to death
Dennis Venturina.[9]
The question is not whether petitioners had reasonable
grounds to believe that the suspects were guilty. The question is
whether the suspects could be arrested even in the absence of a
warrant issued by a court, considering that, as already explained,
the attempted arrest did not fall under any of the cases provided
in Rule 113, 5. Regardless of their suspicion, petitioners could
not very well have authorized the arrest without warrant of the
students or even effected the arrest themselves. Only courts
could decide the question of probable cause since the students
were not being arrested in flagrante delicto. As the Special
Prosecutor stated in his memorandum, dated May 18, 1995, in
recommending the dismissal of the case against petitioners:
All told, the evidence adduced in this case do not show that on the night
of December 12, 1994, the accused knew or had reasonable ground to
believe that the students who were then at the U.P. police headquarters
had committed a crime. Neither were the warrantless arrest being
sought to be made on campus that night, legal. The U.P. officials then
present had every right to prevent the commission of illegal arrests of
students on campus.
Based on all the foregoing, the obvious conclusion is that, there is no
probable cause to charge Posadas, Torres-Yu, Lambino, Bentain and
Atty. Villamor of violating Section 1(c) of P.D. 1829. Probable cause is
defined as "sufficient ground to engender a well founded belief that a
crime cognizable by the court has been committed and that the
respondents are probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial"
(Section 1, Rule 12, Rules of Court). The absence of an arrest warrant,
the absence of knowledge or reasonable ground on the part of the
accused to believe that the students had committed a crime, the absence
of any law punishing refusal to attend an investigation at the NBI, all
show that there is no sufficient ground to charge the accused with
Obstruction of Justice. On the contrary, the circumstances show that the
accused, in safeguarding the rights of students, were acting within the
bounds of law.[10]
Third. Petitioners are being prosecuted under the following
provision of P.D. No. 1829:
SEC. 1. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period, or a
fine ranging from 1,000 to 6,000 pesos, or both, shall be imposed upon
any person who knowingly or wilfully obstructs, impedes, frustrates or
delays the apprehension of suspects and the investigation and
prosecution of criminal cases by committing any of the following acts:
....
(c) harboring or concealing, or facilitating the escape of, any person he
knows, or has reasonable ground to believe or suspect, has committed
any offense under existing penal laws in order to prevent his arrest,
prosecution and conviction;
The rule, of course, is that a criminal prosecution cannot be
enjoined.[11] But as has been held, "[i]nfinitely more important than
conventional adherence to general rules of criminal procedure is
respect for the citizen's right to be free not only from arbitrary
arrest and punishment but also from unwarranted and vexatious
prosecution."[12] As we held in the similar case of Venus v.
Desierto:[13]
Conformably with the general rule that criminal prosecutions may not
be restrained either through a preliminary or final injunction or a writ of
prohibition, this Court ordinarily does not interfere with the discretion
of the Ombudsman to determine whether there exists reasonable ground
to believe that a crime has been committed and that the accused is
probably guilty thereof and, thereafter, to file the corresponding
information with the appropriate courts. There are, however, settled
exceptions to this rule, such as those enumerated in Brocka v. Enrile, to
wit:
a. To afford protection to the constitutional rights of the accused
(Hernandez vs. Albano, et al. L-19272, January 25, 1967, 19 SCRA 95);
b. When necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid
oppression or multiplicity of actions (Dimayuga, et al. vs. Fernandez, 43
Phil. 304; Hernandez vs. Albano, supra; Fortun vs. Labang, et al., L-
38383, May 27, 1981, 104 SCRA 607);
c. When there is a prejudicial question which is sub judice (De Leon vs.
Mabanag, 70 Phil. 202);
d. When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority
(Planas vs. Gil, 67 Phil. 62);
e. Where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or
regulation (Young vs. Rafferty, 33 Phil. 556; Yu Cong Eng vs. Trinidad,
47 Phil. 385, 389);
f. When double jeopardy is clearly apparent (Sangalang vs. People and
Alvendia, 109 Phil. 1140);
g. Where the court has no jurisdiction over the offense (Lopez vs. City
Judge, L-25795, October 29, 1966, 18 SCRA 616);
h. Where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution (Rustia vs.
Ocampo, CA-G.R. No. 4760, March 25, 1960);
i. Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for
vengeance (Recto vs. Castelo, 18 L.J. (1953), cited in Raoa vs.
Alvendia, CA G.R. No. 30720-R, October 8, 1962; Cf. Guingona, et al.
vs. City Fiscal, L-60033, April 4, 1984, 128 SCRA 577);
j. Where there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and
a motion to quash on that ground has been denied (Salonga vs. Pao, et
al., L-59524, February 18, 1985, 134 SCRA 438); and
k. Preliminary injunction has been issued by the Supreme Court to
prevent the threatened unlawful arrest of petitioners (Rodriguez vs.
Castelo, L- 6374, August 1, 1953) cited in Regalado, Remedial Law
Compendium, p. 188, 1988 Ed.)
In this case, petitioners' objection to the arrest of the
students cannot be construed as a violation of P.D. No. 1829,
1(c) without rendering it unconstitutional. Petitioners had a right
to prevent the arrest of Taparan and Narag at the time because
their attempted arrest was illegal. Indeed, they could not have
interfered with the prosecution of the guilty parties because in
fact petitioner Posadas had asked the NBI for assistance in
investigating the death of Venturina. On the other hand, just
because petitioners had asked for assistance from the NBI did
not authorize respondent Dizon and his men to disregard
constitutional requirements.
The Office of the Ombudsman, however, found that the
intervention by petitioners resulted in the escape of the student
suspects as petitioner Posadas and Atty. Villamor failed in their
undertaking to surrender the students the following day.[14] Hence,
the information against them charged that petitioners willfully
obstructed the apprehension of the suspects Taparan and Narag,
leading to the successful escape of these students and another
principal suspect, a certain Joel Carlo Denosta.[15] The student
suspect mentioned by both the resolution dated May 18, 1995
and the information, a certain Joel Carlo Denosta, was not one of
the students whose arrest by the NBI agents petitioners
prevented on December 12, 1994. Moreover, whether or not
petitioner Posadas surrendered the student suspects to the NBI
agents the following day is immaterial. In the first place, they
were not sureties or bondsmen who could be held to their
undertaking. In the second place, the fact remains that the NBI
agents could not have validly arrested Taparan and Narag at the
U.P. Police Station as they did not have a warrant at that
time. Hence, only the NBI agents themselves could be faulted for
their inability to arrest Taparan and Narag. If the NBI believed the
information given to them by the supposed eyewitnesses, the
NBI should have applied for a warrant before making the
attempted arrest instead of taking the law into their own
hands. That they chose not to and were prevented from making
an arrest for lack of a warrant is their responsibility
alone. Petitioners could not be held accountable therefor.
We understand that the highly publicized death of Dennis
Venturina caused a public clamor to bring to justice those
responsible therefor. We also recognize the pressures faced by
law enforcement agencies to effect immediate arrests and
produce results without unnecessary delay. But it must be
remembered that the need to enforce the law cannot be justified
by sacrificing constitutional rights. The absence of probable
cause for the filing of an information against petitioners is evident
from the records. They cannot be indicted because they dared to
uphold the rights of the students. Hence, we see no other
recourse but to enjoin the Sandiganbayan and the Ombudsman
from proceeding with the case against petitioners.
Fourth. The conclusion we have thus far reached makes it
unnecessary to consider petitioners' challenge to P.D. No. 1829,
1(c). For a cardinal rule of constitutional adjudication is that the
Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although
properly presented by the record if the case can be disposed of
on some other ground such as the application of a statute or
general law.[16]
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the
Ombudsman and his agents are hereby prohibited from
prosecuting petitioners for violation of P.D. No. 1829 1(c) as a
result of the incident complained of in Criminal Case No. 22801
and the Sandiganbayan is ORDERED to dismiss the information
in Criminal Case No. 22801 against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 133925. November 29, 2000]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs. AGUSTIN GOPIO, accused-appellant.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision [1] of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 12, Bulacan, finding accused-appellant Agustin
Gopio guilty of statutory rape and sentencing him to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of the
victim in the amount of P3,727.00 as actual
damages, P30,000.00, as moral damages, and to pay the costs
of the suit.
The information against accused-appellant charged:[2]
That sometime in the year 1995, in the municipality of Obando,
province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused Agustin Gopio y Arcillas, by
means of violence, force and intimidation, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of the
said Ma. Princess Millano y San Diego, 11 years of age, against
her will.
Contrary to law.
Trial proceeded as accused-appellant pleaded not guilty
when arraigned on March 7, 1997. The prosecution presented as
witnesses the victim, Ma. Princess Millano, her mother,
Luzviminda Millano, and the Municipal Health Officer of Obando,
Bulacan, Dr. Rufino Bautista.
The offense charged was committed by Agustin Gopio, [3] in
Brgy. San Pascual, Obando, Bulacan sometime between the
months of May and June 1995. At that time, the barangay was
celebrating its fiesta. The victim stepped out of their house
around 10:00 a.m. to buy cooking oil from accused-appellants
store. However, it was closed.[4] As she was about to leave the
store, accused-appellant called her. When she came near him,
he suddenly seized her and brought her inside the house. There
was nobody inside the house when the victim was taken by
accused-appellant to the bedroom. The victim resisted and
screamed but accused-appellant threatened to hurt her and her
family. Accused-appellant laid the victim on the bed in such a
way that her feet were dangling on the floor. Then, he removed
her underwear, bent over the victim, and started licking her
vagina. Later on, accused-appellant removed his briefs, knelt on
the floor, and placed his penis in the victims vagina. The victim
cried in pain as accused-appellant penetrated her. As the victim
would not stop crying, accused-appellant let her go.[5]
The victim immediately went outside accused-appellants
house and rushed home. On the way to her house, she felt
intense pain in her vagina and noticed that she was bleeding. As
soon as she reached home, she changed her clothes. She was
confused and afraid her mother would get angry because of what
happened to her. When her mother saw her inside the house and
asked her if she was able to buy cooking oil, the victim told her
mother that the store was closed. So, she was again sent out to
buy cooking oil from another store.
The victim related that on two other occasions after the
incident, also in 1995, she was again molested by accused-
appellant. On one occasion, the victim stated that she went to the
house of her godsister, Rachel, also in San Pascual, Bulacan, to
invite the latter to play, but Rachel was not around. Inside the
house were several men playing tong-its. Among them was
accused-appellant. When the victim was about to leave, she saw
Rachels younger brother inside the bedroom crying, so she went
there and picked him up. To the victims surprise, accused-
appellant went to the bedroom and closed the door behind
him. The victim tried to cry out for help but accused-appellant
tightly covered her mouth and ordered her to put the child
down. When she did so, he lowered her shorts and panty and
started caressing her vagina. After more or less one month had
elapsed, accused-appellant once again molested the victim when
she went to her grandfathers abandoned house to get the pail
requested by her aunt. She did not know that accused-appellant
followed her to the house and she was too afraid to resist the
sexual advances by accused-appellant.
The victim did not confide to her family about these
incidents because she was very afraid of accused-appellant and
of what her parents would do to her. Likewise, the victim was
ashamed and worried that her friends would spread the news
regarding her unfortunate experience.[6]
To corroborate the testimony of the victim, Luzviminda
Millano initially testified that her daughter, who was born on
February 7, 1985, was 10 years old at the time of the rape
incident, as evidenced by the victims birth certificate (Exh. D).
[7]
On cross-examination, Luzviminda recalled that when the
victim came back from the store, she observed that her daughter
looked pale and worried. She also noticed that her daughter had
changed her clothes. However, Luzviminda did not bother to ask
her daughter what happened to her because she had several
things to do and was very busy preparing for lunch. The victim
did not eat lunch on that day and ate supper ahead of
them. Luzviminda added that since the time of the incident, the
victim had become inattentive and withdrawn. She started getting
noticeably low grades in school.[8]
In November 1996, Luzviminda brought the victim to the
Municipal Health Center of Obando, Bulacan because the latter
had been experiencing pain in her navel. The health officer of
Obando, Dr. Rufino Bautista, conducted the physical examination
of the victim and made the following findings in his report: [9]
On external examination of the genital organ -
Presence of irregular and hardened surface of both labia majora
and labia minora, around the edges of both labia
On internal examination -
a) easily admits size of thumb without any resistant (sic)
b) ruptured hymen with hard edges (scar)
Medical Opinion:
Virginity was destroyed, sexual intercourse was consummated.
Dr. Bautistas findings showed that the victims hymen had
been ruptured, caused possibly by the insertion of a male
organ. He concluded that the victim had already lost her virginity
and explained that the looseness of the vaginal canal could not
have been caused by strenuous physical activities or accidental
falling.[10]
 Based on the result of the physical examination,
Luzviminda, with the help of her brother-in-law, asked her
daughter if something happened to her. At first, the victim was
hesitant but, later on, she finally told them that she was raped by
their neighbor, accused-appellant Agustin Gopio.[11] Thereafter, on
November 25, 1996, Luzviminda filed a criminal complaint in
behalf of the victim charging accused-appellant with rape. The
information for rape was formally filed on February 12, 1997.
Luzviminda presented several receipts covering medical,
transportation, food, and other expenses which she allegedly
incurred on account of the incident.[12]
The defense, on the other hand, presented accused-
appellant Agustin Gopio and his wife, Susita Gopio, as
witnesses. Accused-appellant testified that he knew the victim
and her family because they were neighbors in Obando,
Bulacan. He testified that it was impossible for him to commit the
crime of rape against the victim in May and June of 1995
because he was then in Novaliches, Quezon City. Accused-
appellant explained that he has been selling fish there almost
everyday since 1994. He said that he usually left his house at
1:00 a.m. to buy fish from the pondohan and sell them in the
market from 7:00 a.m. until 11:00 a.m. Accused-appellant would
then go home and reach his house between 12:00 noon to 1:00
p.m. Afterwards he would usually go to the cockpit between 1:00
p.m. to 2:00 p.m. Moreover, accused-appellant alleged that the
victims father told him that, sometime in 1995, the victim and the
other members of her family were in Quezon. Accused-appellant
stated that he last saw the victim in 1994 although he admitted
that she used to go to their store either to buy food or play with
one of his daughters.
Accused-appellant further declared that at one time he
failed to bring along the victims mother to the market to sell fish
and his failure to do so started the animosity between their
families. Accused-appellant testified that it could be why the
victims family filed a case against him.
Accused-appellants wife, Susita Gopio, testified that they
had a retail store at home. She opened the store at around 7:00
a.m. and closes it at 10:00 p.m. everyday. Hence, it was unlikely
that there was nobody in the house at the time of the alleged
incident.[13]
On November 23, 1996, several policemen came looking
for accused-appellant in his house. When accused-appellant
arrived and learned about this, he went to their barangay captain
for assistance. Thereafter, the barangay captain accompanied
accused-appellant to the police station to clear his
name. However, when they arrived at the police station, accused-
appellant was informed of the charges against him. He was then
placed in jail despite his protests. Moreover, while he was
imprisoned, accused-appellant executed a sworn statement
denying the charges against him.[14]
After trial, the court a quo rendered its decision, dated April
6, 1998, finding accused-appellant guilty of rape. The dispositive
portion of its decision reads:[15]
WHEREFORE, finding accused Agustin Gopio y Arcillas guilty as
principal beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of statutory rape
as charged in the information, there being no aggravating or
mitigating circumstance attending the commission of said crime,
he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, to indemnify the private offended party in the amount of
P3,727.00 as actual damage, and in the further sum of
P30,000.00 as moral damages, and pay the costs of the
proceedings.
In the award of the above moral damages the filing fee
corresponding thereto shall constitute a first lien on said
judgment.
In the service of his sentence the accused who is a detention
prisoner shall be credited with the time during which he has
undergone preventive imprisonment, pursuant to Art. 29 of the
Revised Penal Code.
SO ORDERED.
Hence this appeal. Accused-appellant assigns the following
errors as having been allegedly committed by the trial court:
I.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE
INFORMATION IS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT A JUDGMENT
OF CONVICTION FOR ITS FAILURE TO STATE THE PRECISE
DATE OF THE OFFENSE CHARGED.
II.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED-
APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE
CRIME CHARGED.
In the prosecution for rape cases, this Court has been
guided by the following principles in its review of trial court
decisions: (1) an accusation for rape can be made with facility; it
is difficult to prove but more difficult for the person accused,
though innocent, to disprove; (2) in view of the nature of the
crime of rape where only two persons are usually involved, the
testimony of the complainant is scrutinized with extreme caution;
and (3) the evidence for the prosecution stands or falls on its own
merits and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the
weakness of the defense.[16]
In the case at bar, our review of the evidence confirms the
finding of the trial court that accused-appellant is guilty of
statutory rape. The two elements that must be established to hold
the accused guilty of statutory rape are: (1) that the accused had
carnal knowledge of a woman, and (2) that the woman is below
12 years of age. Thus, the age of the victim, as an essential
element for the conviction thereof, must unquestionably be
proved by the prosecution.[17]
The evidence presented by the prosecution shows that
accused-appellant had carnal knowledge of the victim. In the
sworn statement, dated November 23, 1996, which the victim
executed and properly identified during the trial, she stated:[18]
T: Ano ba ang ginawa sa yo ni Jhun Gopio at gusto mong
makulong ito?
S: Dahil po sa ginawang panghahalay niya sa akin.
T: Ano bang klaseng panghahalay ang ginawa sa iyo ni
Jhun?
S: Ginahasa po niya ako.
T: Maaari mo bang sabihin sa pagsisiyasat na ito kung paano
ka ginahasa ni Jhun?
S: Opo, hinubaran po ako ng panty, pinahiga po ako sa
kama, dinila-dilaan po ang ari ko (kiki) at tapos po ay
naghubad po siya ng short at brief pinasok po niya ang
ari (titi) niya sa kiki ko.
T: Ano pa ang ginawa ni Jhun ng nakapasok na ang titi niya
sa ari mo?
S: Hindi ko na po matandaan.
T: Ano ang ginawa mo ng nakapasok na ang titi ni Jhun sa ari
mo?
S: Umiiyak po ako at sinasabi ko na Huwag po, tama na po, Q: What was that?
pero hindi po siya nakikinig sa akin.
A: When he inserted his penis inside my vagina, Maam.
T: Ang ibig mo bang sabihin ng ikaw ay pinahiga sa kama ay
pumatong ba ang katawan ni Jhun sa katawan mo? Q: Do you know as to when was this or when did this take
place?
S: Hindi po, nakaluhod po siya sa sahig at ang dalawa ko
pong paa ay nasa sahig. A: That was in 1995, Maam.

T: Ikaw ba ay nakakaintindi sa orasan? Q: Around what month?

S: Opo. A: Between the months of May and June, Maam.

T: Humigit-kumulang, gaano ba katagal na ginawa sa iyo ni Q: Why do you know that this incident took place between the
Jhun ang bagay na yun? months of May and June, 1995?

S: Humigit kumulang po sa isang (1) minuto. A: Because there was an occasion then, Maam.

T: Nang pinasok ni Jhun ang kanyang ari sa iyong ari ano ang Q: What occasion?
naramdaman mo?
A: Our barangay fiesta, Maam.
S: Masakit po ang ari ko.
....
T: Hindi ka ba sumigaw o humingi ng saklolo para matigil ang
gingawa sa iyo ni Jhun? Q: So what happened when he dragged you inside his
bedroom?
S: Hindi po dahil natakot po ako sa kanya.
A: He advised me to undress, Maam.
T: Hindi ka ba tinakot ni Jhun?
Q: When he advised you to undress, did you follow his order?
S: Tinakot po ako pagkatapos ng ginawa sa akin ng Huwag
daw po akong magsusumbong kahit kanino dahil may A: Yes, Maam, because he threatened me.
masamang mangyayari sa akin.

Q: What did he tell you as a means of threatening?

T: Papaanong natapos ang ginawa sa iyo ni Jhun?

A: He told me not to tell that matter to anybody or else

S: Yun pong kahulihulihan ko pong sinabi sa kanya na Tama something bad would happen to my family, Maam.
na po tapos saka lang po siya tumigil, pinagbihis po niya
ako ng short ko at panty at tapos pinauwi na po ako.
Q: After he threatened you with those words and after
ordering you to undress which according to you, you
T: Paano ka naman ba napunta sa bahay ni Jhun? followed, what happened next?

S: Bibili po ako sa tindahan nila at nakita ko po na sarado ang A: He inserted his penis inside my vagina, Maam.
tindahan tapos po pauwi na po ako tinawag po ako ni
Jhun at pinapasok ako sa bahay nila at may sasabihin
Q: What did you do when he inserted his penis inside you
daw po siya sa akin.
vagina?

T: Natatandaan mo ba kung saan, kailan at kung anong oras

A: I was then crying.
nangyari ito?

Q: Why were you crying?

S: Natatandaan ko po nangyari ito duon po sa bahay nila sa
Brgy. San Pascual, Obando, Bulacan, hindi ko na po
matandaan ang buwan, araw pero ang oras po ay alas A: Because it was painful, Maam.
10:00 ng umaga noon pong 1995.
Q: What happened next after that?
....
A: When I was then crying and told him to stop it, he stopped
T: Minsan lang ba ito ginawa sa iyo ni Jhun Gopio? and he let me go outside his house, Maam.

S: Isang (1) beses lang po yun panghahalay sa akin pero ....

dalawang (2) beses pong naulit ang panghihipo po sa
ari ko (kiki). Q: What happened to your vagina after the accused finished
inserting his penis in your vagina?
The victim consistently testified:[19]
A: There was blood, Maam.
FISCAL:
The victim was unshaken by her cross-examination. She
Q: Madam witness, do you know of any unusual incident or testified:[20]
any unusual thing that has been done to you by this
accused if any? ATTY. JOSON:

A: Yes, Maam.
 Q: Madam witness, you also stated that you are going to buy
cooking oil and you saw that the house of the accused
was closed. Now, why despite the fact that the house of
the accused was closed then you still went there at his
store?
A: I was about to go back home when he called me and when
I came to him, he suddenly pulled me inside his house,
sir.
Q: Miss witness, you said that the accused called you. Where
was the accused then when he called you at that time?
A: By the door of his house, sir.
....
Q: Madam witness, you also stated that your vagina bled. Is it
not a fact that you were very afraid at that time?
A: I became afraid because of his threat not to tell my family
or bad things will happen to me and to my family, sir.
Q: What did you think of your blood coming from your vagina
at that time, Madam witness?
A: I became very afraid worried that something might happen
to me which was bad, sir.
....
Q: Madam witness, when you went back home and bought
again another cooking oil as your mother have told you
at that time, were you wearing the same clothes at that
time - were you wearing the same clothes when you
came from the house of Gopio back to your house and
then went out again to buy cooking oil?
A: No, sir, I changed my clothes.
COURT:
Q: Why did you change your clothes?
A: My mother might notice the blood on my panty and she
might scold me, your honor.
The age of the victim at the time was likewise proven by the
prosecution. In fact, it has not been raised as an issue in this
case.
The trial court in its decision observed:[21]
. . . . The penal code penalizes carnal knowledge by a man of a
woman under twelve years of age, under any circumstance,
whether force or intimidation is used or not, whether or not she is
deprived of reason or consciousness, or even if the girl
consented or herself was the one who initiated the act. She is
presumed by law not in any position to give either consent or
resistance because of her young age, and no man is allowed by
law to have sex with her unpunished.
In People v. Alegado,[22] it was held that, under 39 and 40 of
the Revised Rules on Evidence, the reputation or tradition
existing in a family previous to the controversy in respect to the
pedigree of any of its members may be received in evidence if
the witness testifying thereon be also a member of the family,
either by consanguinity or affinity. The word pedigree includes
relationship, family genealogy, birth, marriage, death, and the
dates when, the places where these facts occurred, and the
names of the relatives. Hence, the testimonies of the victim and
her mother are sufficient to prove the victims age. In addition,
aside from the testimonies of the victim and her mother that the
former was born on February 7, 1985 and was 10 years old when
the incident took place, the prosecution also presented the birth
certificate of the victim.
Accused-appellant interposes a number of defenses.
First. Accused-appellant claims that in May and June of
1995, he was in Novaliches selling fish. This defense merits no
consideration. Accused-appellant has not shown that it was
physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the
crime at the time of its commission. Moreover, other than the
testimony of accused-appellant and his wife that the latter never
leaves their house, no evidence was presented to substantiate
his defense of alibi.
In contrast, the victim positively identified accused-appellant
as the perpetrator of the crime and categorically testified that she
had been raped by accused-appellant in the latters house to
which she was taken between the months of May and June
1995. It has been held that when a rape victims testimony is
straightforward and candid, unshaken by rigid cross-examination
and unflawed by inconsistencies or contradictions in its material
points, the same must be given full faith and credit. [23] Thus, this
Court said in one case:[24]
Alibi as a means of defense is weak when not substantiated by
the testimony of a credible witness. Courts have always looked
upon the defense of alibi with suspicion and have always
received it with caution not only because it is inherently weak and
unreliable but also because it is easily fabricated. Alibi as basis
for acquittal must be established with clear and convincing
evidence. The accused must convincingly demonstrate that it
was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of
the crime at the time of its commission. And, where accused was
positively identified by the victim herself who harbored no ill
motive against the rapist, as in this case, the defense of alibi
must fail.
Between the positive assertions of the prosecution
witnesses and the negative averments of accused-appellant, the
former indisputably deserve more credence and are entitled to
greater evidentiary weight.[25]
The defense further argues that accused-appellant could
not have committed the crime in his house between those
months because, as testified to by accused-appellants wife, she
was always there tending the store and taking care of their two
small children. The trial court correctly gave credence to the
victims testimony that there was no one in accused-appellants
house when she was raped by the latter. As she testified:[26]
FISCAL:
....
Q: You said that he inserted his penis inside your vagina and
you said that it took place between May and June. My
question to you now is, where did this takes place?
A: In his house, Maam.
Q: And when you said in his house, where is his
house? Where is this house located?
A: At Brgy. San Pascual, Obando, Bulacan, Maam.
Q: Now, how come that you were in his house at this time?
A: I was then going to his house because he has a store,
Maam.
Q: And what will you suppose to do in that store?
A: I would buy something, Maam.
 Q: And do you still remember what you were suppose to buy
that time?
A: Yes, Maam.
Q: What will you suppose to buy?
A: Cooking oil, Maam.
Q: Were you able to buy this cooking oil?
A: No, Maam.
Q: Why were you not able to buy the cooking oil?
A: Because his house was then closed and nobody [was]
inside, Maam.
Q: How were you able to go inside his house which according
to you were just to buy from the store? (sic)
A: When I was about to leave the store, I did not see him but
he immediately grabbed me inside the house, Maam.
Q: When you were immediately grabbed inside his house, to
what part of his house were you brought to?
A: At his bedroom, Maam.
Q: Did you notice if there were other persons inside the
house or in the bedroom?
A: Nobody, Maam.
The evaluation of testimonies rests primarily on trial
courts. Our function is to review the testimonies only if it is shown
that the trial court has overlooked a matter of substance which, if
considered, is likely to result in a different conclusion. We have
not been shown any such evidence in this case.
And even assuming that accused-appellants family
members were around at the time, this does not discount the
possibility that a rape was perpetrated inside the house. It has
time and again been said that rape is no respecter of time or
place as it can be committed in small, confined places or in
places which many would consider as unlikely and inappropriate,
or even in the presence of other family members.[27]
Indeed, the testimony of Susita Gopio is rendered suspect
because of her relationship to accused-appellant. In one case, it
was contended that the trial court should have given more weight
to the testimonies of the defense witnesses which uniformly
provided them with convenient alibis. This Court held that these
witnesses were either wives or mothers of the accused who, in
almost all instances, would freely perjure themselves for the sake
of their loved ones. The defense of alibi may not prosper if it is
established mainly by the accused themselves and their relatives
and not by credible persons.[28]
Second. Accused-appellant likewise questions the veracity
of the victims charges against him because of her failure to
immediately report the incident to the authorities. This, too,
deserves scant consideration. It has been ruled that the victims
delay in reporting the offense is not an indication of a fabricated
charge.[29] In this case, it has not been established that the victim,
of tender age, has any ill motive to falsely testify against
accused-appellant.[30] As the records show, the victim had no
intention at all to report the incident even to her parents for fear
that accused-appellant would hurt her and her family and that her
friends would spread the news about her plight. In fact, by reason
of such immense fear on the part of the victim, accused-appellant
succeeded in molesting her on two other occasions after the
incident.
What accused-appellant did to complainant would not have
been discovered by the latters parents were it not for the fact that
she complained of pains in her navel which prompted her mother
to bring her to Dr. Bautista for a medical check-up. There it was
found that the victim was no longer a virgin. Only then did the
victim confess that she was raped by accused-appellant. Had it
not been for that medical examination, the victim would not have
told them about the rape committed by accused-appellant. This
explains the delay in reporting the crime in this case.
Nor can this Court consider the victims charges as purely
fabricated or maliciously motivated. A young girls revelation that
she has been raped, coupled with her willingness to undergo
public trial where she could be compelled to give out details of an
assault on her dignity, cannot be easily dismissed as a mere
concoction. For it is difficult to imagine that she would undergo
the indignities and hardships concomitant to a prosecution for
rape unless she was motivated by a desire to have the offender
apprehended and punished.[31]
Neither can any ill motive be ascribed against the victims
mother based on accused-appellants testimony that he was
being charged because he failed to bring along the victims
mother at his place of business. No mother would sacrifice her
own daughter, a child of tender years at that, and subject her to
the rigors and humiliation of a public trial for rape if she was not
driven by an honest desire to have her daughters transgressor
punished accordingly.[32] This futile effort to extricate himself from
the charge is so lame for such omission on the part of accused-
appellant would not have impelled the victim and her family to
impute so grave a crime against accused-appellant were it not
the truth. Thus, in one case, this Court ruled:[33]
The absence of any ill motive on the part of a rape victim to
institute charges does not render her testimony less credible, for
no woman, especially one of tender age, will agree to undergo
the trouble of having her private parts medically examined and
the humiliation of a public trial if she had not been raped. The
only clear and evident reason for her to institute rape charges is
to get justice for her plight. Besides, a mother like Thelma
Penafiel herein would not subject her child to a public trial, with
its accompanying stigma as the victim of rape, if the charges filed
were not true.
Time and again when the issue is one of credibility of
witnesses, we have held that appellate courts will generally not
disturb the findings of the trial courts, considering that the latter
are in a better position to decide the question as they have heard
the witnesses and observed their deportment and manner of
testifying during trial.[34] This Court has said:[35]
We have consistently adhered to the rule that where the
culpability or innocence of an accused would hinge on the issue
of credibility of witnesses and the veracity of their testimonies,
findings of the trial court are given the highest degree of
respect. These findings will not ordinarily be disturbed by an
appellate court absent any clear showing that the trial court has
overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or
circumstances of weight or substance which could very well
affect the outcome of the case. The reason for the rule is an
excellent chance on the part of the trial court, an opportunity that
is not equally open to an appellate court, of being able to
personally observe the expression of declarants on the witness
stand and their demeanor under questioning. And the Court
agrees with the observation of the trial court that the testimony of
Maricris was straightforward, guileless and credible. She gave a
plain and candid account of her harrowing experience in a
manner reflective of honest and unrehearsed testimony. The rule
is well settled that when the question of credence as to which of
the conflicting versions of the prosecution and the defense where
a rape as committed is in issue, the trial courts answer is
generally viewed as correct.
Third. Accused-appellant claims that he was denied his
constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of
accusation against him for failure of the information to indicate
the approximate time of the commission of the offense. This
claim is not tenable. The phrase in the information, that sometime
in 1995. . . has sufficiently apprised accused-appellant of the
crime which he allegedly committed in 1995. It bears stressing
that, in the case of rape, the date of commission is not an
essential element of the offense, what is material being the
occurrence thereof and not the time of its commission. In the
case at bar, a reading of the information would readily reveal
satisfactory compliance with the rules and that appellant
unquestionably has been properly apprised of the charges
proffered against him. Thus, in People v. Isug Magbanua,[36] it
was held:
Although the information did not state with particularity the dates
when the sexual attacks took place, we believe that the
allegations therein that the acts were committed on (sic) the year
1991 and the days thereafter substantially apprised appellant of
the crime he was charged with since all the essential elements of
the crime of rape were stated in the information. As such,
appellant cannot complain that he was deprived of the right to be
informed of the nature of the case filed against him. An
information can withstand the test of judicial scrutiny as long as it
distinctly states the statutory designation of the offense and the
acts or omissions constitutive thereof.
The above ruling was reiterated in the case of People v.
Pambid,[37] where it was held that, under Rule 110, 6 and 11 of
the Rules on Criminal Procedure, an information is sufficient as
long as it states the statutory designation of the offense and the
acts or omissions constituting the same, since in rape cases, the
time of commission of the crime is not a material ingredient of the
offense. It is thus sufficient if it is alleged that the crime took place
as near to the actual date at which the offense(s) are committed
as the information or complaint will permit. In this connection, this
Court also ruled that in rape cases, victims of rape hardly retain
in their memories the dates, number of times, and manner they
were violated. In the same vein, to be material, discrepancies in
the testimony of the victim should refer to significant facts which
are determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused, not to
mere details which are irrelevant to the elements of the crime,
such as the exact time of its commission in a case of rape.
In any event, it is now too late in the day to question the
form or substance of the information because when he entered
his plea at his arraignment, accused-appellant did not object to
the sufficiency of the information against him. The rule is that, at
any time before entering his plea, the accused may move to
quash the information on the ground that it does not conform
substantially to the prescribed form. The failure of accused-
appellant to assert any ground for a motion to quash before he
pleads to the information, either because he did not file a motion
to quash or failed to allege the same in said motion, shall be
deemed a waiver of the grounds for a motion to quash, except
when the grounds are that no offense was charged, the court
trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged, the
offense or penalty has been extinguished, and the accused
would be twice put in jeopardy.[38]
Regarding his arrest, while accused-appellant claimed that
he protested when he was imprisoned by the police authorities,
he failed to raise objections to his arrest at the earliest possible
opportunity. The record shows that he voluntarily entered a plea
of not guilty when he was arraigned on March 7, 1997, thereby
waiving his right to question any irregularity in his arrest. By
pleading guilty, accused-appellant submitted to the jurisdiction of
the trial court, thereby curing any defect in his arrest, for the
legality of an arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court over
his person. Furthermore, any such irregularity will not negate the
validity of his conviction duly proven beyond reasonable doubt by
the prosecution.[39]
Therefore, the trial court correctly ruled that accused-
appellant Agustin Gopio is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of statutory rape.
The award of damages by the trial court in favor of the
victim should, however, be modified. The award of actual
damages, in the sum of P3,727.00, must be deleted in the
absence of proof required by Art. 2199 of the Civil Code. To be
entitled to actual and compensatory damages, there must be
competent proof constituting evidence of the actual amount
thereof, such as receipts showing the expenses incurred on
account of the rape incident.[40] In this case, only the laboratory
fee issued by Our Lady of Salambao Hospital in Bulacan
amounting to P350.00 was duly receipted. The rest of the
documents, which the prosecution presented to prove the actual
expenses incurred by the victim, were merely a doctors
prescription and a handwritten list of food
expenses. Nevertheless, under Article 2221 of the Civil Code,
nominal damages are adjudicated in order that the right of the
plaintiff, which has been violated or invaded by the defendant,
may be vindicated or recognized, and not for the purpose of
indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by him. As has
been held, whenever there has been a violation of an ascertained
legal right, although no actual damages resulted or none are
shown, the award of nominal damages is proper.[41] In this case,
the victims family clearly incurred medical expenses due to the
rape committed by accused-appellant. The victim suffered from
pains in her navel which required her physical examination. An
award of P2,000.00 as nominal damages is thus appropriate
under the circumstances.
On the other hand, based on our current rulings, the award
of P30,000.00 as moral damages should be increased
to P50,000.00 irrespective of proof thereof.[42] In addition, the
victim is entitled to the award of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity
which must be given even if there is neither allegation nor
evidence presented as basis therefor.[43]
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 12, Bulacan, finding accused-appellant Agustin Gopio
guilty of statutory rape and sentencing him to reclusion
perpetuais AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that accused-
appellant is ordered to pay the victim the amounts of P2,000.00,
by way of nominal damages, P50,000.00, as moral damages,
and the additional amount of P50,000.00, as civil indemnity, plus
the costs of the suit.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 129299. November 15, 2000]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs. RODOLFO OLING MADRAGA, accused-
appellant.
DECISION
BUENA, J.:
Before the Court, for its automatic review, is the
Decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court of Isabela, Basilan, Branch
2, in Criminal Case No. 2511-599, which has found herein
accused-appellant, Rodolfo Oling Madraga, guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of rape committed against his 16-
year old daughter. The death sentence having been decreed by
the trial court, the records of the case have, accordingly, been
elevated to this Court.
Rodolfo Oling Madraga was charged with two (2) counts of
rape committed against his own 16-year old daughter, Fe C.
Madraga. One was committed on May 19, 1995 (Crim. Case No.
2511-599), and the other one on August 24, 1996 (Crim. Case
No. 2515-602).[2]
 At the arraignment on November 4, 1996, accused-
appellant, with the assistance of Atty. Antonio D. Banico, entered
separate pleas of not guilty for each case. Thereafter, the trial
proper of the cases was set to November 18, 19, and 20, 1996.[3]
On November 18, 1996, Atty. Banico, counsel for the
accused, moved that they be given time up to December to talk
with complainants mother so that the accused will plead guilty to
the first case, but will seek for the dismissal of the second
case. The complainants mother, who was in Court, manifested
that she does not agree to the proposition. Trial of the cases was
re-set to December 2, 3 & 4, 1996.[4]
On December 2, 1996, counsel for the accused manifested
that the accused was willing to enter a plea of guilty to the crime
of rape, which was committed in the month of May, 1995,
provided that the other case be tried on another date.
Thus, accused pleaded guilty in Criminal Case No. 2511-
599 upon the following complaint:
The undersigned complainant, a minor of sixteen (16) years of
age, under oath, accuses her father, Rodolfo Oling Madraga, of
the crime of Rape, committed as follows:
That sometime in the month of May, 1995, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, viz., at Barrio Militar,
Barangay Menzi, Municipality of Isabela, Province of Basilan,
Philippines, the above-named accused who was under the
influence of liquor, entered the room of the undersigned
complainant, who was then sleeping, and by means of force and
intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and
feloniously remove the short pant (sic) and panty of the
undersigned complainant, lay on top of her and insert his penis
inside her vagina, and succeeded in having carnal knowledge of
the undersigned complainant, against her will.
Contrary to law.[5]
Thereafter, the prosecution presented its evidence which
consisted of the private complainants testimony and the medical
certificate issued by Dr. Nilo Barandino.
Private complainants testimony revealed that:
Fe Madraga, 16 years old, is the daughter of Rodolfo Madraga, a
tricycle driver (TSN, December 2, 1996, pp. 4-5). Her mother,
Flordelina Madraga, was in Sabah, Malaysia, working as a
domestic helper.
When her mother left for Malaysia, Fe and her brothers and
sisters stayed with their grandfather, Luis Cotamco Sr., at Calle
Bisaya (Ibid., p. 5). On the other hand, Rodolfo Madraga
remained at the family residence at Barrio Militar, Menzi, Isabela,
Basilan Province (Ibid, p. 6).
Sometime in January 1995, Rodolfo Madraga took his children
from their grandfather and forced them to stay with him at the
family residence (Ibid, pp. 6 & 7).
Sometime in May 1995, at 12:00 midnight, Rodolfo Madraga
sexually abused her (sic) 16-year old daughter, Fe Madraga, in
one of the rooms of the family residence. (Ibid, pp. 7-8)
On the third night after the rape, Rodolfo Madraga repeated his
bestial act toward her (sic) own daughter and did it every night
thereafter (Ibid, p. 9).
On August 24, 1996, Flordelina Madraga arrived from Malaysia
(Ibid, p. 10). The presence of her mother gave Fe Madraga
enough courage to report to her the sexual abuses committed
against her by her father (Ibid).
Fe Madraga was brought to the doctor, and her medical
examination confirmed that she was sexually molested
(Ibid; Exhibits A, A-1, A-2 and B).
Fe Madraga, reported the matter to the police authorities (Ibid, p.
13).[6]
On December 10, 1996, the trial court rendered its
Decision,[7] the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds the
accused, RODOLFO OLING MADRAGA, GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of committing the said crime of RAPE against
his own daughter, who is only more than 16 years old at the time
of the commission of the offense. And hereby sentences said
accused to suffer the extreme penalty of DEATH.
The plea of guilty of the accused being offset by his being drunk
during the commission of the crime, which according to the
complainant, her father is not a habitual drinker, cannot be taken
into consideration in his favor.
The penalty imposable for the crime of Rape especially if it is
committed by the accused against his children is really harsh. In
fact this Presiding Judge was a little bit reluctant to impose that
extreme penalty of death upon the accused, but since it is the
mandate of the law, then the Court when the evidence warrant
must have to obey its command. And besides, the Court cannot
cleanse its conscience if the perpetrator of the crime of rape
committed against his own blood would be able to escape the
punitive sanction of the law.
And as this Court had repeatedly pronounced over and over
again, under no circumstance, shall a father use his own
daughter as a vehicle to satisfy his bestial instinct for it is his
moral and legal responsibility to take care, to nourish, and to
educate his children to become useful citizens of this country. But
since the accused herein had chosen to place the honor and the
dignity of her (sic) daughter into shame, into disgrace, and into ill-
repute, then the heavy burden of the law that catches upon him
cannot show him any mercy.
With respect to Criminal Case No. 2515-602, for the same
offense of Rape committed by the same accused, against the
same complainant, the hearing thereof is hereby set to the
January calendar of this Court.
SO ORDERED.
Two Appellants Brief were filed with this Court -- one filed by
the Free Legal Assistance Group (FLAG) Anti Death Penalty Task
Force, and another one filed by Public Attorney Antonio D.
Banico, appellants counsel, before the court a quo.
The Appellants Brief filed by the Free Legal Assistance
Group (FLAG), submits the following assignment of errors:
I
Accused-appellant was denied due process.
II
The plea of guilt of accused-appellant is null and void as the trial
court violated Section 3, Rule 116 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure.
On the first assigned error, appellant contends that he was
illegally arrested, because there was no warrant of arrest issued
for his arrest. Worse, appellant avers, his right to preliminary
investigation was not observed, although there is no showing that
he waived his right thereto. Appellant further alleges that there
was irregularity in the filing of the information in that a criminal
complaint was filed on September 10, 1996. However, in the
Order of the Court dated October 7, 1996, it mentioned an
information not attached to the records of the case. The trial court
directed the prosecution to submit the resolution which became
the basis for the filing of the alleged information. A resolution
dated October 8, 1996 was submitted by the prosecution on
October 17, 1996 in compliance with the Order dated October 7,
1996. The resolution was issued only on October 8, 1996, hence,
appellant concludes that the same could not have been the basis
for the alleged information (assuming such information exists)
which was obviously filed earlier.[8]
The contentions have no merit.
In the recent case of People vs. Galleno, [9] this Court held
that an accused, as in this case, is estopped from questioning
any defect in the manner of his arrest if he fails to move for the
quashing of the information before the trial court, or if he
voluntarily submits himself to the jurisdiction of the court by
entering a plea, and by participating in the trial.
With regards to the absence of preliminary investigation,
this Court ruled in Sanciangco, Jr. vs. People[10] and cited in
Larranaga vs. Court of Appeals,[11] that the absence of preliminary
investigation does not affect the courts jurisdiction over the
case. Nor does it impair the validity of the (complaint) or,
otherwise, render it defective.
On the second issue, appellant, through the FLAG, argues
that the trial judge failed to conduct a searching inquiry into the
voluntariness and full comprehension of the accuseds plea of
guilty to the capital offense, as mandated in Sec. 3, Rule 116 [12] of
the New Rules on Criminal Procedure. Thus, this case should be
remanded to the court of origin for further and appropriate
proceedings, citing People vs. Estomaca.[13]
This contention[14] of the FLAG would have been correct
were it not for the circumstance that accused-appellant did not, in
fact, plead guilty to a capital offense in the first place. On this
matter, Atty. Banico correctly pointed out that only the first
paragraph of the complaint mentions the age of the private
complainant and the relationship of the accused to the private
complainant, i.e., that the accused is the father of the private
complainant. Atty. Banico is correct in arguing that the first
paragraph of the complaint is not part of the allegation of the
charge for rape to which appellant pleaded guilty. Therefore, said
complaint charges only simple rape under Art. 335, for which the
penalty is only reclusion perpetua, and not for rape under R.A.
7659, qualified by the circumstance that the offender is the father
of the victim who is a minor, for which the penalty is death.[15]
In other words, since the appellant did not plead guilty to a
capital offense, he cannot properly invoke Sec. 3, Rule 116,
and People vs. Estomaca, to have this case remanded to the
trial court for compliance with said rule.
In order for rape to be punishable with death, the
information/complaint must properly allege the qualifying
circumstance of relationship between the accused and the victim,
and the latters minority, and the same must be proved beyond
reasonable doubt, in the same manner that circumstances that
qualify a killing to murder, must be alleged in the information, and
also proved beyond reasonable doubt during the trial. Failure to
allege the fact of filiation and minority in the information for rape
is fatal and consequently bars conviction of its qualified form
which is punishable with death.[16]
In the case at bar, such relationship is not stated in the
cause of the accusation, or in the narration of the act or omission
constituting the offense, but only in the preamble or opening
statement of the complaint. The complaint upon which the
appellant was arraigned does not state in the specifications of the
acts constitutive of the offense, that he is charged as the father of
the victim. Such omission is prejudicial to the right of the accused
to be informed of the nature of the accusations against him.
In the recent case of People vs. Bali-Balita,[17] the Court,
through Madam Justice Minerva P. Gonzaga-Reyes, reiterated
the ruling in Buhat vs. Court of Appeals[18]that: xxx the real
nature of the criminal charge is determined not from the caption
or the preamble of the information, nor from the specification of
the provision of law alleged to have been violated xxx, but from
the actual recital of the facts as alleged in the body of the
information.
We should now discuss the issue of whether or not the
prosecution was able to prove appellants guilt beyond
reasonable doubt, and the appropriate penalty to be imposed on
appellant. But first, the manner in which appellant entered his
plea of guilt should be tackled.
Accused-appellant entered a plea of guilty, but it appears
from the records of the proceedings before the court a quo that
the same was a conditional plea, because appellants counsel
argued that the mitigating circumstances of plea of guilty and
drunkenness should be appreciated in favor of the appellant.
[19]
Said counsel was apparently unaware that the mitigating
circumstances of plea of guilty, and the fact that the appellant
was drunk when he committed the crime, cannot be appreciated
in the latters favor because a plea of guilty would not, under any
circumstance, affect or reduce the death sentence.
As heretofore discussed, the appellant pleaded upon a
charge of simple rape. The penalty for simple rape under Art. 335
of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion perpetua, a single
indivisible penalty. It appears that said counsel is also not aware
that under Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code, in all cases in
which the law prescribes a single indivisible penalty, it shall be
applied by the courts regardless of any mitigating or aggravating
circumstances that may have attended the commission of the
deed (except where there is a privileged mitigating circumstance
of minority of the accused under Art. 68, and when the crime
committed is not wholly excusable under Art. 69 neither of which
is the case here[20]). While the records do not show that appellant
entered his plea with the proviso that a certain penalty be
imposed upon him, this can be inferred from the arguments made
by his counsel during the hearing on December 2, 1996, and in
the appellants brief filed by said counsel, asking that appellant be
entitled to the benefit of the plea.[21]
We would, thus, assume that appellant made a conditional
plea because this assumption would be more favorable to the
accused. A conditional plea of guilty, or one entered subject to
the provision that a certain penalty be imposed upon him, is
equivalent to a plea of not guilty and would, therefore, require a
full-blown trial before judgment may be rendered.[22] The question
now arises: Was a full-blown trial conducted?
We answer in the affirmative. The prosecution presented
evidence to prove the commission of the crime as charged in the
Complaint. The victim testified and was cross-examined. An
examination of the victims testimony shows that she testified in a
categorical, straightforward, spontaneous and frank manner, and
remained consistent. Also, we find the victims testimony to be
natural and consistent with human nature and the normal course
of things. A rape victim who testifies in a categorical,
straightforward, spontaneous and frank manner, and remains
consistent, is a credible witness.[23] Although no other evidence
was presented by the prosecution, in rape cases, the accused
may be convicted solely on the testimony of the victim, provided
that such testimony is credible, natural, convincing and
consistent with human nature and the normal course of things.
[24]
We, therefore, find that the trial court correctly found the
appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape.
The victim is entitled to indemnity of P50,000.00 in line with
prevailing jurisprudence[25] in addition to moral damages in the
amount of P50,000.00. Award of moral damages to a rape victim
is proper even if there was no proof presented during the trial as
basis therefor.[26]
 WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED
insofar as it finds the accused-appellant Rodolfo Oling Madraga
guilty of the crime of rape, with the MODIFICATION that the
penalty imposed is reduced to reclusion perpetua, and the
accused-appellant is directed to pay the victim P50,000.00 by
way of indemnity, in addition to P50,000.00 as moral damages.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 135045. December 15, 2000]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. IRENEO
GAKO, JR. (Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial
Court, 7th Judicial Region, Branch 5, Cebu City) and
VICENTE GO, respondents.
DECISION
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
Before us is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45, Rules of
Court of the Resolution[1] of public respondent Court of Appeals
(Former Third Special Division) dated August 12, 1998 in CA-
G.R. SP No. 47142, entitled PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
versus HON. IRENEO GAKO, JR. ET. AL., dismissing the petition
of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), herein petitioner.
This instant petition stems from a murder case filed against
private respondent Vicente Go (Go) and two co-accused Sonny
Herodias (Herodias) and Leopoldo dela Pea (de la Pea).The
victim, Rafael Galan, Sr. (Galan, Sr.), was shot dead on June 25,
1991.
Judge Priscila S. Agana (Judge Agana) originally presided
over the criminal case subject of this petition. The prosecution
sought to inhibit said judge for her alleged collusion with the
accused when she repeatedly sustained the objections of the
defense every time the prosecution attempted to establish the
conspiracy to kill the victim. Judge Agana denied the motion to
inhibit and dismissed the case with prejudice on the ground that
the rights of the accused to a speedy trial were violated. The
prosecution challenged the dismissal in the Court of Appeals,
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 32954. In its Decision dated April
18, 1994, the Court of Appeals set aside the order of dismissal,
granted the inhibition of the judge, and ordered the re-raffle of the
case. The decision of the Court of Appeals gained finality when
this Court dismissed the appeal of private respondent Go and co-
accused Herodias in a Minute Resolution dated June 26,
1995. The criminal case was thus set for retrial. A series of
delays beset the case when the judges to whom the case was
raffled inhibited themselves. The case was finally presided over
by public respondent Judge Ireneo Gako, Jr (Judge Gako, Jr.).
With the foregoing events as backdrop, the pertinent facts
that led to the filing of this instant petition are as follows:
On July 3, 1991, de la Pea executed an Extra-judicial
Confession implicating therein Herodias and Go in the conspiracy
to kill and murder the victim.
On July 9, 1991, an Information was filed against the three
accused namely, de la Pea, Herodias and Go, charging them
with the murder of Galan, Sr. and the case was docketed as
Criminal Case No. CBU-22474. Judge Godardo Jacinto,[2] then
the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City,
issued a Warrant of Arrest against the accused.
On July 22, 1991 an Urgent Motion to Confine private
respondent Go in a hospital was filed.
On August 2, 1991, the hearing on said motion was
conducted with the prosecution reserving its right to cross-
examine Dr. Gonzales.
On August 6, 1991 an Order was issued to confine private
respondent Go in a hospital without the prosecution having
cross-examined Dr. Gonzales on his medical report.
On July 15, 1992, a hearing was conducted where de la
Pea was presented as a witness for the prosecution. Presiding
Judge Agana sustained the objections of the defense counsels
each time that the prosecution attempted to establish the
conspiracy to kill the victim. The prosecution filed a motion to
inhibit Judge Agana, which motion was denied.
On November 20, 1992, the Information against Go and
Herodias was dismissed with prejudice on the ground that their
right to a speedy trial had been violated, leaving de la Pea to face
trial.
The prosecution then challenged the Order of Dismissal
with Prejudice before the Court of Appeals in CA-GR SP No.
32954. In its Decision dated April 18, 1994, the Court of Appeals
annulled and set aside the Order of Dismissal, ordered the
inhibition of Judge Agana, and ordered the raffle of the case to
another branch. With the dismissal of the appeal of private
respondent Go and co-accused Herodias by this Court in a
Minute Resolution dated June 26, 1995, the criminal case was
set anew for trial.
The case was re-raffled to RTC-17 and on October 28,
1996, an Alias Warrant of Arrest was issued against private
respondent Go and co-accused Herodias.
On February 2, 1997, Dr. Matig-a, the physician of Go, filed
a Clinical Summary on the illness of Go and on February 13,
1997 Go filed a Petition for Bail.
On March 7, 1997 and March 10, 1997, the prosecution
presented de la Pea who was acquitted in 1993. De la Pea
testified on matters which he was not allowed by then presiding
Judge Agana to testify on.
On March 21, 1997, a Manifestation on the Confinement of
private respondent Vicente Go was filed urging his arrest
because he was out of the intensive care unit.
The motion of the prosecution to transfer the criminal case
to a Special Heinous Crimes Court was denied by then presiding
Judge Jesus de la Pea (Judge de la Pea). The case was finally
assigned to Branch 5 with public respondent Judge Gako, Jr. as
presiding judge.
On September 16 and 17, 1997, the hearing was resumed,
now presided by public respondent Judge Gako, Jr.
On September 26, 1997, an Urgent Motion to Enforce the
Alias Warrant of Arrest was filed praying for the arrest of private
respondent Go first before his Clinical Summary Report could be
heard.
On November 10, 1997, public respondent Judge Gako, Jr.
issued an Order granting the Petition for Bail of private
respondent Go.
On November 11, 1997, the prosecution filed a Vehement
Motion to Inhibit public respondent Judge Gako, Jr. due to his
alleged delay in resolving the incidents in connection with the
arrest of private respondent Go.
On November 12, 1992, the prosecution moved for the
reconsideration of the Order of the court dated November 10,
1997, the order which granted bail to private respondent Go.
 On November 14, 1997, a Supplemental Motion to Inhibit
public respondent Judge Gako, Jr. was filed by the counsel of the
offended party because Judge Gako, Jr. allegedly pre-judged the
evidence of the prosecution without carefully evaluating why it is
short of the requirement to sustain a verdict of life imprisonment.
On November 15, 1997, a Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration was filed from the Order dated November 10,
1997 because the transcripts were allegedly not read.
On December 1, 1997, a Motion for the Issuance
of Subpoena Duces Tecum to produce the records of Dr. Matig-a
was filed to determine if the medical findings on private
respondent Go were not exaggerated to prevent his arrest.
On December 11, 1997, public respondent Judge Gako, Jr.
issued an Order in which he denied the prosecutions
Manifestation dated March 21, 1997 on the confinement of
private respondent Go, and the Urgent Motion to Enforce the
Alias Warrant of Arrest dated September 26, 1997 against private
respondent Go.
On January 20, 1998, public respondent Judge Gako, Jr.
issued an Order denying the: (1) Motion for Reconsideration of
the Order dated November 10, 1997; (2) Motion to Inhibit; and (3)
Supplemental Motion to Inhibit the Presiding Judge. The
prosecution received this order on February 10, 1998.
On March 20, 1998, private complainant Guadalupe Galan
(Galan), the widow of the victim, filed a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court docketed as
CA-G.R. SP No. 471460 before public respondent Court of
Appeals. The petition sought to annul or set aside the orders of
public respondent Judge Gako, Jr. and then acting Presiding
Judge de la Pea, to wit:
a) Order dated May 23, 1997, which set aside the earlier
order of the court that granted the re-raffle of this case to a
heinous crime court upon the defenses motion for
reconsideration.
b) Order dated November 10, 1997, the dispositive portion
of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the court hereby grants
bail to accused Vicente Go which is fixed at P50,000.00, after
taking into consideration, and this fact has not been disputed,
that said accused is presently confined in the hospital and is
suffering from the following ailments:
a) Ischemic Heart Disease, S/P Coronary
Angiogram, Single Vessel Disease, LAD,
Chronic Stable Angina;
b) Essential Hypertension;
c) NIDDM
d) Hypercholesterolemia; and
e) Respiratory Tract Infection
And, as per clerical summary report of Dr. Generoso
Matiga, dated February 4, 1997, the confinement of
accused Go in prison will cause his disease to terminate
fatally.
xxx
c) Order dated December 11, 1997, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Manifestation dated
March 3, 1997 and the Motion to Enforce the Alias Warrant of
Arrest are hereby denied for want of merit. Besides the accused
was already released on bail and the issue on the enforcement of
the Alias Warrants of Arrest is already moot and academic.
d) Order dated January 20, 1998, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Omnibus Motions for
Reconsideration on the order of the court granting Bail to
accused Vicente Go with Supplemental pleading, xxx and thirdly,
to disqualify the herein Presiding Judge, are hereby denied for
lack of merit. xxx[3]
The petition was signed by the counsel of private
complainant, Atty. Antonio Guerrero with the conformity of Vidal
Gella, Prosecutor I of the Office of the City Prosecutor of Cebu
City.
On March 26, 1998, public respondent Court of Appeals
(Special Third Division) issued a Resolution dismissing the said
petition on these grounds: (1) that the petition was not filed by the
Solicitor General in behalf of the People of the Philippines; and
(2) that the certification on non-forum shopping was signed by
counsel for petitioner Galan, not by petitioner herself.[4]
On April 14, 1998, private complainant Galan, through
counsel, filed a Motion for Reconsideration of said Resolution
indicating that petitioner OSG was going to adopt her petition. On
the same date, petitioner OSG manifested before public
respondent Court of Appeals that it was joining private
complainant Galan in her petition and was adopting her petition
as its own.
On June 18, 1998, the Court of Appeals issued a resolution
that denied said motion for reconsideration of private complainant
Galan on the ground that the certification on non-forum shopping
was not signed by therein petitioner Galan. The Court of Appeals
also reasoned that the fact that the OSG joined petitioner Galan
in her petition did not cure the above deficiency.[5] Petitioner OSG
received copy of the resolution on June 29, 1998.
On August 3, 1998 petitioner OSG filed a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with the Court of
Appeals docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 47142.
On August 12, 1998, said petition of petitioner OSG was
dismissed by public respondent Court of Appeals, the pertinent
portions of the resolution read:
The Court notes that said petition is practically a reproduction of
the petition earlier filed by complainant Guadalupe Galan, which
was dismissed on March 26, 1998. The dismissal was reaffirmed
by the Court in its resolution dated June 18, 1998, copy of which
was received by the OSG on June 29, 1998.
Instead of seeking, on time, the amendment of the first petition or
a review of the resolution dismissing it, the OSG has come to this
Court through the instant petition which not only raises the same
matters ventilated in the same petition but also was filed beyond
the 60-day period prescribed in Section 4, Rule 65 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition dated July 17,
1998, is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.[6]
In seeking the allowance of this instant petition, petitioner
OSG relies upon the following grounds:
I. PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS
ERRED IN NOT GIVING DUE COURSE TO THE
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION OF (sic) CERTIORARI
 FILED BY PETITIONER DOCKETED AS CA-G.R.
SP NO. 47142.
II. PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS
ERRED IN HOLDING THAT SAID SPECIAL CIVIL
ACTION WAS FILED BEYOND THE SIXTY-DAY
PERIOD PRESCRIBED IN SECTION 4, RULE 65
OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.
III.PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS
ERRED IN NOT TOUCHING ON THE MERITS OF
THE SAID PETITION.[7]
Public respondent Court of Appeals correctly ruled that
there was sufficient ground to dismiss the petition filed by private
complainant Galan since it was her counsel who signed the
certificate on non-forum shopping and not private complainant
herself. The petition clearly failed to comply with the requirement
imposed by Section 1, Rule 65[8], in relation to Section 3, Rule
46[9] of the 1997 Rules of Court. We also agree with the Court of
Appeals, that the mere fact that petitioner OSG manifested that it
was adopting the petition of therein petitioner Galan did not cure
the defective petition considering that the certificate on non-forum
shopping was still not signed by petitioner Galan but by her
counsel. The manifestation of petitioner OSG also did not contain
a certification on non-forum shopping. By the time that petitioner
OSG filed its petition for certiorari in behalf of the People of the
Philippines on August 3, 1998, the dismissal of the petition of
private complainant Galan had already been reaffirmed and the
60-day period for petitioner OSG to file its petition had already
lapsed.
In dismissing the petition of petitioner OSG, public
respondent Court of Appeals pointed out that private complainant
Galan had no legal standing to file the petition before it because
only the Solicitor General can represent the People before this
Court (Court of Appeals) and the Supreme Court. [10] On this point,
we differ.
In the recent case of Narciso vs. Romana-Cruz [11], we
reiterated the doctrine enunciated in People vs. Calo[12] that:
While the rule is, as held by the Court of Appeals, only the
Solicitor General may bring or defend actions on behalf of the
Republic of the Philippines, or represent the People or the State
in criminal proceeding pending in this Court and the Court of
Appeals (Republic vs. Partisala, 118 SCRA 320 [1982]), the ends
of substantial justice would be better served, and the issues in
this action could be determined in a more just, speedy and
inexpensive manner, by entertaining the petition at bar. As an
offended party in a criminal case, private petitioner has sufficient
personality and a valid grievance against Judge Adaos order
granting bail to the alleged murderers of his (private petitioners)
father.
In Paredes vs. Gopengco, 29 SCRA 688 (1969), this Court ruled
that the offended parties in criminal cases have sufficient interest
and personality as person(s) aggrieved to file the special civil
action of prohibition and certiorari under Sections 1 and 2 of Rule
65 in line with the underlying spirit of the liberal construction of
the Rules of Court in order to promote their object, thus:
Furthermore, as offended parties in the pending criminal case
before petitioner judge, it cannot be gainsaid that respondents
have sufficient interest and personality as person(s) aggrieved by
petitioner judges ruling on his non-disqualification to file the
special civil action under sections 1 and 2 of Rule 65. Recently in
line with the underlying spirit of a liberal construction of the Rules
of Court in order to promote their object, as against the literal
application of Rule 110, section 2, we held, overruling the
implication of an earlier case, that a widow possesses the right
as an offended party to file a criminal complaint for the murder of
her deceased husband. (Id., p. 699)[13]
Hence, private complainant Galan had sufficient interest and
personality as the aggrieved party[14] in a criminal case to file the
special civil action for certiorari before public respondent Court of
Appeals. The proper ground therefore for dismissing her petition
is the fact that it was her counsel who signed the certificate on
non-forum shopping and not herself as petitioner.
Petitioner OSG submits that assuming that the petition
for certiorari it filed with public respondent Court of Appeals was
filed out of time, nonetheless the following issues raised in said
petition warranted resolution:
I. WHETHER OR NOT THE ORDER DATED
NOVEMBER 10, 1997 GRANTING BAIL IS
PROPER WITHOUT EXPRESSING THE
COURTS FINDING THAT THE EVIDENCE OF
GUILT OF THE ACCUSED IS NOT STRONG.
II. WHETHER OR NOT PRIVATE RESPONDENT
VICENTE GO IS CONSIDERED UNDER LEGAL
CUSTODY AS OF NOVEMBER 20, 1992 UNTIL
THE PRESENT BECAUSE OF HIS HOSPITAL
CONFINEMENT BY ORDER OF THE COURT
DATED AUGUST 6, 1991.
III. WHETHER OR NOT IT IS NECESSARY THAT
CRIMINAL CASE NO. CBU-22474 SHOULD BE
TRIED BY THE SPECIAL HEINOUS CRIMES
COURT NOTWITHSTANDING THAT THE
MURDER WAS COMMITTED IN 1991 BEFORE
THE PASSAGE OF THE LAW CREATING THESE
SPECIAL COURTS.
This instant petition also seeks to set aside the following
orders: (1) Order dated May 23, 1997 which set aside the earlier
order of the trial court that granted the re-raffle of this case to a
heinous crime court upon the motion for reconsideration of the
defense; (2) Order dated November 10, 1997 that granted the
bail of accused Go in the amount of P 50,000.00; (3) Order dated
December 11, 1997 denying the Motion to Enforce the Alias
Warrants of arrest; and (4) Order dated January 20, 1998
denying the Omnibus Motions for Reconsideration of the order of
the court granting bail to accused Go and ruling against the
disqualification of respondent Judge Gako, Jr.
While the petition of private complainant Galan was indeed
defective in form and the petition of petitioner OSG was
demonstrably filed beyond the 60-day period, we however
resolve to grant this petition in part in view of the primordial
interest of substantial justice.
The just cited issues in the petition before public respondent
Court of Appeals presented extenuating circumstances that
should have compelled the latter to pass upon the merits of said
petition. In a number of cases,[15] we have set aside the strict
application of procedural technicalities in the higher interest of
justice. As we shall show hereunder, the issues raised by
petitioner OSG deserve disposition to avoid a miscarriage of
justice and to end the streaks of delay which have saddled the
criminal case subject of this petition.
First, the assailed Order dated November 10, 1997 granting
bail is legally infirm for failing to conform with the requirement
that in cases when the granting of bail is not a matter of right, a
hearing for that purpose must first be conducted. Section 13,
Article III of the Constitution provides the instances when bail is a
matter of right or discretionary, to wit:
All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by
reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before
conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on
recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall
not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.
 Section 7, Article 114 of the Rules of Court, as amended,
reiterates that:
No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense
punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, when
evidence of guilt is strong, shall be admitted to bail regardless of
the stage of the criminal prosecution.
Based on the foregoing, bail is not a matter of right with
respect to persons charged with a crime the penalty for which
is reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment, or death, when the
evidence of guilt is strong. Private respondent Go, accused in the
criminal case, was charged with murder in 1991, before the
passage of RA 7659, the law that re-imposed the death
penalty. Murder then was a crime punishable by reclusion
perpetua. Thus, accused Gos right to bail is merely discretionary.
We have consistently held that when bail is discretionary, a
hearing, whether summary or otherwise in the discretion of the
court, should first be conducted to determine the existence of
strong evidence or lack of it, against the accused to enable the
judge to make an intelligent assessment of the evidence
presented by the parties.[16] A summary hearing is defined as
such brief and speedy method of receiving and considering the
evidence of guilt as is practicable and consistent with the
purpose of hearing which is merely to determine the weight of
evidence for the purposes of bail. On such hearing, the court
does not sit to try the merits or to enter into any nice inquiry as to
the weight that ought to be allowed to the evidence for or against
the accused, nor will it speculate on the outcome of the trial or on
what further evidence may be therein offered and admitted. The
course of inquiry may be left to the discretion of the court which
may confine itself to receiving such evidence as has reference to
substantial matters, avoiding unnecessary examination and cross
examination.[17]
It is inconceivable how Judge Gako, Jr. could have
appreciated the strength or weakness of the evidence of guilt of
the accused when he did not even bother to hear the
prosecution.The reliance of Judge Gako, Jr. on the voluminous
records of the case simply does not suffice. As judge, he was
mandated to conduct a hearing on the petition for bail of the
accused since he knew that the crime charged is one that carries
a penalty of reclusion perpetua, and in that hearing, the
prosecution is entitled to present its evidence. It is worth
stressing that the prosecution is equally entitled to due process.
[18]
Another compelling reason why a hearing of a petition for
bail is necessary is to determine the amount of bail based on the
guidelines set forth in Section 6, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court.
[19]
Without the required hearing, the bail granted to accused Go
in the amount of P 50,000.00 is undoubtedly arbitrary and without
basis.
Second, the order granting bail issued by Judge Gako, Jr.
merely made a conclusion without a summary of the evidence, a
substantive and formal defect that voids the grant of bail.Well
settled is the rule that after the hearing, whether the bail is
granted or denied, the presiding judge is mandated to prepare a
summary of the evidence for the prosecution. A summary is
defined as a comprehensive and usually brief abstract or digest
of a text or statement.[20] Based on the summary of evidence, the
judge formulates his own conclusion on whether such evidence is
strong enough to indicate the guilt of the accused. The
importance of a summary cannot be downplayed, it is considered
an aspect of procedural due process for both the prosecution and
the defense; its absence will invalidate the grant or denial of bail.
[21]
Thus, we laid down the duties of a judge in case an
application for bail is filed, viz:
(1) Notify the prosecutor of the hearing for bail or require him to
submit his recommendation;
(2) Conduct a hearing of the application for bail regardless of
whether or not the prosecution refuses to present evidence to
show that the guilt of the accused is strong for the purpose of
enabling the court to exercise its discretion;
(3) Decide whether the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong
based on the summary of evidence of the prosecution; (Italics
supplied)
(4) If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused
upon the approval of the bail bond. Otherwise, petition should be
denied.[22]
In dispensing with the required hearing for bail, Judge
Gako, Jr. pointed out in the assailed order that the accused was
confined in the hospital, was suffering from a number of ailments
and that the eventual confinement of accused Go in prison will
allegedly cause his disease to terminate fatally.[23] The irregularity
in the grant of bail however is not attenuated since respondent
judges findings were based on the summary clinical report of Dr.
Matiga dated February 4, 1997 while the order granting bail was
issued on November 10, 1997. It could not therefore be
reasonably assumed that the actual state of health of accused
Go could still be accurately reflected by the said medical report
when nine months had already passed from the time that said
medical report was prepared. It was therefore clear error for
Judge Gako, Jr. to depend solely on the dated medical report in
granting bail when the defense failed to present a more recent
one that would convincingly raise strong grounds to apprehend
that the imprisonment of the accused would endanger his life.
Petitioner OSG advances the theory that the accused,
private respondent Go, is not entitled to bail because he was
allegedly not under the custody of the law at the time that he
applied for bail. Petitioner OSG anchors this theory on the
following arguments: that the August 6, 1991order commanding
the confinement of accused Go in the hospital was void because
the prosecution was not able to cross-examine the doctor who
prepared the medical report pertaining to the accused illnesses;
that when the Information in this case was ordered dismissed
with prejudice on November 20, 1992 by then presiding Judge
Agana, accused Go was bodily released from his confinement;
that at that point, the trial court had lost its jurisdiction over the
person of the accused; that before the dismissal with prejudice
was voided by the Court of Appeals, accused traveled
extensively abroad; that when the case was re-raffled and finally
presided by Judge Gako, Jr. accused continued to be confined in
the hospital on the strength of the allegedly void order of
confinement dated August 6, 1991; that Judge Gako, Jr. refused
to enforce the alias warrant of arrest on the ground that the order
of confinement was still in effect; and that accused Go voluntarily
admitted himself to the hospital, hence was not yet deprived of
his liberty at the time that he applied for bail.
We must first correct the perception that the trial court was
ousted of its jurisdiction over the person of accused Go after
Judge Agana erroneously dismissed the case and upon the
refusal of Judge Gako, Jr. to enforce the alias warrant of arrest
during the re-trial of the case. Applicable to this issue is the basic
principle that the jurisdiction of a court, whether in criminal or civil
cases, once it attaches cannot be ousted by subsequent
happenings or events although of a character which would have
prevented jurisdiction from attaching in the first instance; and it
retains jurisdiction until it finally disposes of the case.[24]
Prior to the dismissal of the case by Judge Agana, the court
had already acquired its jurisdiction over accused Go when he
was duly arraigned on December 11, 1991.[25] The fact that this
Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals that voided
the order dismissing the criminal case with prejudice is a clear
declaration that the jurisdiction of the trial court over the criminal
case and over the person of the accused continued to
subsist. With the nullification of the dismissal of the case, it then
became explicit that the court should have tried the case to its
end. The case was ordered remanded and re-raffled because the
inhibition of then presiding Judge Agana was granted, in no way
was the jurisdiction of the trial court over the case and over the
person of the accused ever placed in doubt.
We now discuss the theory of petitioner OSG that the right
of accused Go to bail did not accrue because he was not under
the custody of the law or deprived of his liberty. Petitioner OSG
rests this claim on the allegations that accused Go voluntarily
admitted himself to the hospital during the re-trial of the case and
that Judge Gako, Jr. refused to enforce the alias warrant of arrest
as evidenced by the questioned Order dated December 11, 1997.
By the very definition of bail in Section 1, Rule 114 of the
Rules of Court[26], the person applying for bail must be in the
custody of the law. A person is considered to be in the custody of
the law (a) when he is arrested either by virtue of a warrant of
arrest issued pursuant to Section 6, Rule 112, or even without a
warrant under Section 5, Rule 113 in relation to Section 7, Rule
112 of the Revised Rules of Court, or (b) when he has voluntarily
submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court by surrendering
to the proper authorities.[27]
We do not agree with petitioner OSG that accused Go was
not in custody of the law at the time that he applied for bail. In the
same assailed order, Judge Gako, Jr. explained his refusal to
enforce the alias warrant of arrest in this manner:
Secondly, the movant wanted this court to order the arrest of the
accused in view of the Alias Warrant of Arrest issued by Acting
Judge Andres Garalza, Jr. on October 28, 1996. For the
information of the movant, there is another Alias Warrant of Arrest
issued by Judge Jose Burgos on May 27, 1996 after he denied
the Investigation Report submitted by the Office of the Cebu City
Prosecutor which recommended the dismissal of the case
against Vicente Go.
The court believes honestly that these two (2) Alias Warrants of
Arrest were improvidently issued because at that time the
Warrant of Arrest issued by then Judge Godardo Jacinto on July
9, 1991 was still valid and subsisting. In fact it was this latter
Warrant of Arrest that handed to this court jurisdiction over the
person of the accused Go.
The Alias Warrant of Arrest issued by Judge Burgos has no legal
basis not only because the Warrant of Arrest issued by Judge
Jacinto is still valid and subsisting but also for the fact that it was
issued as an aftermath of the courts denial of the Reinvestigation
Report of the Office of the Cebu City Prosecutor which
recommended the dismissal of Gos case. Under Section 6, Rule
112 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, the
Regional Trial Court may issue a warrant of arrest after a
preliminary investigation, not after reinvestigation when one was
already was (sic) issued.
Likewise, the Alias Warrant of Arrest issued by Judge Garalza,
which came about five months (5) later, had no legal basis, firstly,
because there was already an Alias Warrant of Arrest issued by
Judge Burgos on May 27, 1996, secondly, the Warrant of Arrest
issued by Judge Jacinto on July 9, 1991 is still valid and
subsisting. But what appears more funny is the Alias Warrant of
Arrest issued by Judge Garalza against accused Go who was at
that time lawfully confined in the hospital pursuant to an Order of
the court, dated August 6, 1991. When Judge Garalza issued
said alias (sic) Warrant of Arrest, there was no showing that
accused Go had escaped, or refused to obey a lawful Order of
the court.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Manifestation, dated
March 21, 1997, and the Motion to Enforce the Alias Warrant of
Arrest are hereby denied for want of merit. Besides, the accused
was already released on bail and the issue on the enforcement of
the Alias Warrants of Arrest is already moot and academic.[28]
As pointed out by Judge Gako, Jr., accused Go had already
been arrested on the basis of a warrant of arrest issued by Judge
Jacinto on July 9, 1991 which gave the trial court jurisdiction over
the accused. As mentioned earlier, accused Go was duly
arraigned before the case was erroneously dismissed. From the
time that accused Go was arrested, he was already deprived of
his liberty and was in the custody of the law. At the re-trial of the
case, accused Gos confinement in the hospital was by virtue of a
court order dated August 6, 1991; the restraint on the freedom of
accused Go is evident. There was therefore no more need to
enforce the alias warrant of arrest since accused Go was still
under the custody of the law, and there being no evidence that
accused Go had escaped or refused to obey a lawful order of the
court. At this point, the setting aside of the questioned order
dated December 11, 1997 that denied the enforcement of the
alias warrant of arrest against accused Go has become moot and
academic with the provisional freedom of accused Go after his
bail was erroneously granted by Judge Gako, Jr.
We however find merit in the argument of petitioner OSG
that the order dated August 6, 1991 authorizing the confinement
of accused Go in the hospital was, in the words of petitioner
OSG, a continuing one and built-in license for the accused to
automatically confine himself as many times as he likes. It may
be true that said order subsisted for it was never quashed, but at
the re-trial of the case, the prosecution through its motion to
enforce the alias warrant of arrest dated September 26, 1997 had
already put in issue the health of the accused. Yet, Judge Gako,
Jr. in an Order dated December 11, 1997 justified the
confinement of accused Go in the hospital on the basis of the
August 6, 1991 order of confinement.
The prosecution vigorously objected to the confinement of
accused Go in the hospital, questioning the alleged ill health of
the accused. Judge Gako, Jr. was called upon to rule on this
matter and instead of ascertaining the true state of health of said
accused, Judge Gako, Jr. instead inexplicably relied on a court
order authorizing the confinement of accused Go in the hospital,
an order that was issued six years ago. The proper course of
action in this case should have been to recall the order of
confinement and to order the detention of accused Go until the
defense could prove through competent evidence that the
imprisonment of said accused would imperil his health. The order
to arrest accused Go in such case would be the consequence of
the recall of the order of confinement, not for the purpose of
placing him under the custody of the law since to repeat, he
already was under the custody of the law.
As discussed earlier, accused Go is currently already out on
bail,[29] the granting of which is void for want of a hearing and
summary of evidence. In cases when the grant of bail is void, this
Court will not hesitate to set aside the order granting bail and
order that the accused be recommitted to jail pending his
application for bail,[30] as this Court now holds in the case at bar.
As to the issue of whether or not public respondent Judge
Gako, Jr. should be inhibited on the ground of partiality, the
relevant provision to consider is Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules
of Court, it provides:
SECTION 1. Disqualification of judges.No judge or judicial officer
shall sit in any case in which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily
interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he is
related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or
affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree, computed
according to the rules of civil law, or in which he has been
executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which
he has presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is
the subject of review, without the written consent of all parties in
interest, signed by them and entered upon the records.
A judge, may in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify
himself from sitting in a case, for just or valid reasons other than
those mentioned above.
The ground of partiality is not one of the grounds enumerated in
the first paragraph of the just quoted provision that would per
se disqualify a judge from sitting in a case. Jurisprudence is clear
that partiality is a recognized ground for the voluntary inhibition of
the judge under the second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137.
[31]
In this case, Judge Gako, Jr. has already ruled in the assailed
Order dated January 20, 1998 that he will not inhibit himself.
To overturn the ruling of Judge Gako, Jr. and rule for his
disqualification, there must be clear and convincing evidence to
prove the charge of partiality. Material to this issue are the
following parameters we have set in disqualifying a judge: mere
suspicion that a judge was partial to a party is not enough; that
there should be adequate evidence to prove the charge; that
there must be showing that the judge had an interest, personal or
otherwise, in the prosecution of the case at bar; and that to be
disqualifying, the bias and prejudice must be shown to have
stemmed from an extra-judicial source and result in an opinion on
the merits on some basis other than what the judge learned from
his participation in the case.[32]
Petitioner OSG accuses Judge Gako, Jr. of partiality
supposedly shown by the grant of bail without a hearing and the
alleged suppression of the hearing on the Clinical Summary
Report of the accused. Again, to successfully disqualify a judge
on the ground of bias or partiality, there must be concrete proof
that a judge has a personal interest in the case and his bias is
shown to have stemmed from an extra-judicial source. This
precept springs from the presumption that a judge shall decide
on the merits of a case with an unclouded vision of its facts.
[33]
Thus, we have held that an erroneous ruling on the grant of
bail alone does not constitute evidence of bias. [34] Likewise,
respondent judges reliance on the order of confinement even if
erroneous is not sufficient to point to a conclusion that he was
manifestly partial to the defense. To allow the disqualification of a
judge on the mere allegation of partiality with nothing more would
open the floodgates to forum shopping.[35]
Corollary to the foregoing, we do not find well taken the
recommendation of petitioner OSG that the criminal case be
raffled to a Special Heinous Crimes Court. Even petitioner OSG
concededly recognizes that Supreme Court Administrative Order
No. 51-96 dated May 3, 1996 creating the Special Heinous
Crimes Court provides that: All cases covered by this order
where trial has already been commenced shall continue to be
heard by the branches to which these were originally
assigned. Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 104-96 dated
October 21, 1996 which amended Supreme Court Administrative
Order No. 51-96, also contains a similar provision, to wit: Where
trial has already begun, the same shall continue to be heard by
the respective branches to which they have been originally
assigned. For purposes hereof, a criminal case is considered
begun when the accused or any of them has already been
arraigned; in a civil case, it is when pre-trial has already been
conducted and a pre-trial order issued.
We thus see no cogent reason to set aside the order dated
May 23, 1997 that denied the transfer of Criminal Case No. CBU-
22474 to a Special Heinous Crimes Court when the trial of the
case has already begun and when the crime for which the
accused is being charged with occurred prior to the creation of
the Special Heinous Crimes Court. Furthermore, there are no
extraordinary circumstances that would compel this Court to
exercise its power under the Constitution to order a change of
venue or place of trial.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the assailed
resolution of public respondent Court of Appeals dated August
12, 1998 is SET ASIDE. The order dated November 10, 1997 of
the trial court in Criminal Case No. CBU-22474 is SET ASIDE for
being void in so far as it grants bail to the accused and the
accused is ordered recommitted to jail pending the hearing on
the bail application. The order dated May 23, 1997 denying the
re-raffle of Criminal Case No. CBU-22474 to a Special Heinous
Crimes Court and the resolution dated January 20, 1997 ruling
against the inhibition of presiding Judge Ireneo Gako, Jr. are
hereby AFFIRMED. The court a quo is ordered to proceed with
dispatch in the disposition of this case.
SO ORDERED.
[A.M. No. MTJ-00-1289. August 1, 2000]
JESUSA M. SANTIAGO, complainant, vs. JUDGE
EDUARDO U. JOVELLANOS, MCTC Alcala-
Bautista, Pangasinan; ADORACION R.
MARCOS, Clerk of Court, MCTC Alcala-
Bautista, Pangasinan; and CELESTINA B.
CORPUZ, Clerk of Court, Municipal Trial
Court, Urdaneta, Pangasinan, respondents.
MARGARITA SANCHEZ, complainant, vs. JUDGE
EDUARDO U. JOVELLANOS, MCTC, Alcala-
Bautista, Pangasinan, respondent.
DECISION
DE LEON, JR., J.:
For resolution are (1) the verified complaint dated
September 9, 1996, earlier docketed as A.M. OCA IPI No.
96-216-MTJ, against Judge Eduardo U. Jovellanos,
presiding judge of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court
(MCTC) of Alcala-Bautista, Pangasinan, Adoracion R.
Marcos, clerk of court of said MCTC, and Celestina
Corpuz, clerk of court of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC)
of Urdaneta, Pangasinan for ignorance or blatant defiance of
the law, grave abuse of authority/discretion, gross
misrepresentation/falsification and/or acts inimical to the
service, and (2) the verified complaint dated January 9,
1997, earlier docketed as A.M. No. OCA IPI 97-262-MTJ,
against Judge Edgardo U. Jovellanos for violation of the
second paragraph of Section 19, Administrative Circular
No. 12-94.
These two (2) verified complaints were consolidated
into one (1) administrative case docketed as Adm. Matter
No. MTJ-00-1289. In her verified complaint, complainant
Jesusa M. Santiago alleges that she is the private
complainant in Criminal Cases Nos. 6333-6336, 6360-6362
and 6663, all entitled: People of the Philippines vs. Violeta
Madera, pending before the sala of Judge Henry L.
Domingo of the MTC of San Ildefonso, Bulacan. On March
26, 1996, Madera failed to appear at the scheduled hearing
of Criminal Cases Nos. 6333-6336 and 6360-6362,
prompting Judge Domingo to issue a bench warrant against
her. Madera was arrested on July 2, 1996 and detained at the
municipal jail of San Ildefonso, Bulacan. She was released
the following day pursuant to the Order of Release dated
April 3, 1996 issued by respondent Judge Jovellanos.
Complainant Santiago questions the propriety of the
said Order of Release on two (2) grounds: first, the
authority of Judge Jovellanos to issue the said Order of
Release and, second, the date of issuance thereof. Santiago
points out that Madera was arrested and detained in San
Ildefonso, Bulacan and her cases were pending before the
MTC of said municipality but it was respondent judge from
the MCTC of Alcala-Bautista, Pangasinan which issued the
Order of Release. Also, while Madera was arrested on July
2, 1996, the Order of Release was dated April 3, 1996.
Santiago further alleges that the MCTC of Alcala-
Bautista, Pangasinan failed to forward to the MTC of San
Ildefonso, Bulacan the bail bond allegedly posted by
Madera despite the letter dated August 8, 1996 of the clerk
of court of the MTC of San Ildefonso, Bulacan and the
Order dated August 23, 1996 of Judge Domingo. Instead,
the MTC of San Ildefonso, Bulacan received from Clerk of
Court Adoracion R. Marcos a letter dated September 3,
1996 stating that the Order dated August 23, 1996 could not
be complied with due to the cancellation of Maderas bail
bond. Attached to the letter was the Order dated August 28,
1996 of Judge Jovellanos stating that:
For failure of the accused Violeta Madera to register her bailbond in
accordance with Section 14, Rule 114 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal
Procedure, this Court hereby orders the cancellation of the order of
release previously issued for her provisional liberty.[1]
Santiago likewise assails the authority of Judge
Jovellanos to issue the Order of Release dated July 3, 1996
in connection with Criminal Case No. 6663. She avers that
a warrant of arrest was issued against Madera on July 1,
1996. On July 2, 1996, Madera was arrested and detained in
San Ildefonso, Bulacan but was released from custody on
the basis of said Order of Release.
On July 29, 1996, Judge Domingo issued an Order
directing the clerk of court of the MCTC of Alcala-Bautista,
Pangasinan to forward Maderas bail bond to the MTC of
San Ildefonso, Bulacan.Upon receipt thereof, Judge
Domingo noted that:
On August 6, 1996, this court received the Bail Bond posted by the
accused with the MCTC of Alcala-Bautista, Alcala, Pangasinan,
together with the original of the Order of Release dated August 5, 1996.
The Court notes that the subject Bail Bond and the Order of Release are
dated August 5, 1996, whereas the Order of Release signed by the same
Judge which was the basis for the release of the accused from detention
is dated July 3, 1996.[2]
In his Answer/Comment dated August 5, 1997, Judge
Jovellanos cites Section 19, Rule 114 of the 1985 Rules of
Criminal Procedure and argues that an accused must be
released upon approval of the bail by any judge, who shall
forward the release papers to the court where the case is
pending. He further explained that:
x x x Since the accused is from Pangasinan, she can go to any
available Judge especially so that it was nighttime when her
bailbond was presented to said respondent judge.
x x x [S]ince the warrant of arrest against the accused as claimed
by the complainant was issued on March 26, 1996, it is very
highly probable that accused was already aware of its existence
and she was able to secure her bailbond. Thus, the release order
dated April 3, 1996 was chronologically correct.
x x x [T]he failure to send the bailbond on time to the MTC San
Ildefonso was due to the fact that the accused failed to register her
bailbond within ten (10) days from the date the order of release
was issued by the respondent. Non-compliance with the order to
register the bailbond shall be sufficient cause for the cancellation
of the property bond (Sec. 14, Rule 114, 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure).It is the policy of herein respondent not to send the
bailbond to the Court where the case or cases are pending unless
and until the bailbond is registered within ten (10) days from the
time the order of release was issued.
xxx
Approval of bailbonds is a ministerial duty for any judge as long as the
requirements are fully satisfied. When the said bailbond was presented
to herein respondent, he examined it carefully and he saw no reason
why the same should not be approved taking into account that it was
sufficient in form and in substance.
When the herein respondent approved the subject bailbond, he was
desirous not only to perform a judicial function required of his office
but also moved by humanitarian considerations thinking that cases
involving detention should be acted upon with dispatch. [3]
Meanwhile, Marcos avers:
2) It is a vital matter that she wishes to make emphasis that one of the
duties of her office is ministerial in nature. Thus, she transmits records,
processes, and other vital court documents with dispatch and with
proper authority emanating only from the Court. This stress aims to
establish that she was not in a position to perform her duty of
transmitting the questioned bailbond of the accused after its approval by
the Court to the MTC, San Ildefonso, Bulacan because of the following:
a) That she has no knowledge of the bailbond alluded to, much less to
its appendages, i.e. release order, receipts, tax declarations, etc., and that
she never saw the bailbond presented to her nor to the Judge in the 8th
MCTC, Alcala-Bautista, Pangasinan, during the required office hours
that it should have been presented. This fact can be proven by the
answer/comment of her co-respondent Clerk of Court of MTC,
Urdaneta, Pangasinan.
b) That she only learned of the existence of such bailbond when she
received the letter dated August 8, 1996, Annex B, of the Clerk of Court
of MTC, San Ildefonso, Bulacan, requesting for the transmittal of the
bailbond being referred to. She replied to the request through her letter
dated August 15, 1996, Annex C, explaining therein that she was not
aware of the presentation and approval of said bailbond.
xxx
d) Annex F which is an order of the Court dated August 28, 1996
cancelled the release order and the bailbond for that matter, due to the
failure of the accused to register her bailbond. As ordered by the Court,
the undersigned respondent transmitted the same, WITH DISPATCH, to
the Clerk of Court, MTC, San Ildefonso, Bulacan x x x. [4]
For her part, respondent Corpuz, Clerk of Court,
Municipal Trial Court of Urdaneta, denies having facilitated
the approval of Maderas bail bond. She adds that:
The truth of the matter was that as far as her recollection, when the bail
bond alluded to was presented to Respondent Judge Eduardo
Jovellanos, all the documents as well as the order for the Release of the
accused were all prepared and since it was already nighttime, the family
of the accused begged that they be accompanied [to] the house of
Respondent Judge so that the said Order maybe signed and since herein
Respondent knew personally the accused and her family being
townmates and knowing that Respondent Judge Eduardo Jovellanos
certainly would be of help and nothing is wrong if said bailbond would
be approved and the subsequent Order of Release be issued, the herein
Respondent obliged thereby she accompanied the family of the accused
[to] the residence of the Judge for the approval of the said bailbond. [5]
She also complied with the instructions of respondent Judge
Jovellanos that the original copy of the Order of Release
dated April 3, 1996 and its attachments be sent to the MTC
of San Ildefonso.With respect to Criminal Case No. 6663,
she did not give any comment since there was no mention
of her participation therein.
In her verified complaint, complainant Margarita
Sanchez alleges that she is the private complainant in
Criminal Case No. 3712 entitled People of the Philippines
vs. James H. Orallo pending before Branch 53 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Rosales, Pangasinan. Orallo
was arrested and detained at Rosales, Pangasinan and later
transferred to the Balungao District Jail in Balungao,
Pangasinan. Despite the pendency of said case before the
RTC of Rosales, Pangasinan, Orallo posted a property bond
with the MCTC of Alcala-Bautista, and thus, released from
custody by virtue of an Order of Release dated December 6,
1996 issued by respondent Judge Jovellanos.
On December 9, 1996, complainant Sanchez,
accompanied by her lawyer, Atty. Dominador B. Fernando,
and Mrs. Fely Pulido who is a neighbor of the accused in
that case proceeded to the office of Judge Jovellanos and
requested permission to read and examine the records
relating to Orallos bail bond. Judge Jovellanos replied that
the records were in the possession of Atty. Isaias
Asuncion. Atty. Fernando politely told Judge Jovellanos
that he should have refrained from acting on Orallos bail
bond as the presiding judge of Branch 53 of the RTC of
 Rosales, Pangasinan was not unavailable. Atty. Fernando
further suggested that Judge Jovellanos take necessary
action on the matter. Judge Jovellanos assured Sanchez and
Atty. Fernando that he will issue an order and that a copy
thereof shall be available the following day.
On December 10, 1996, Judge Jovellanos issued the
following order:
In view of the failure of the accused James Orallo to register his
bailbond in accordance with Section 14, Rule 114 of the 1985 Rules of
Criminal Procedure, this Court hereby orders the cancellation of the
Order of Release and the bailbond previously issued for his provisional
liberty.[6]
Having secured a copy of the foregoing Order, Sanchez and
Mrs. Pulido proceeded to Branch 53 of the RTC of Rosales,
Pangasinan and gave a copy of the same to its staff for
comment. However, the staff explained that they could not
act on the Order because they do not have the
records. Sanchez, Mrs. Pulido and Atty. Fernando again
contacted Judge Jovellanos, who informed them that the
records of Orallos bail bond were not yet in the possession
of Branch 53. He then assured them that if Atty. Asuncion
will not forward the records of the bail bond, he or his
representative will do so.Notwithstanding these assurances,
Sanchez, Mrs. Pulido and Atty. Fernando learned that, as of
January 7, 1997, the records of the bail bond have not yet
been transmitted to the RTC of Rosales, Pangasinan.
In response to Sanchez complaint, Judge Jovellanos
alleged that:
x x x when the bailbond was presented to the undersigned respondent,
he was told by the father of the accused that his son, has been
languishing in the jail for sometime because the RTC Judge Sergio
Garcia could not be contacted as he was preparing to retire; and so the
father of the accused was asking the favor of the undersigned
respondent in order to save his son from further disconforts [sic] and
inconvenience, that his property bond be approved and the undersigned
respondent Judge, for humanitarian reasons and considering that upon a
thorough examination, the property bond is proper and in order,
proceeded to approve his property bond and issued the corresponding
Order of Release in accordance with the Provisions of Section 14, Rule
114 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure.
x x x respondent judge was not in possession of said property bond
because it was given to the accused to be registered with the Office of
the Register of Deeds in accordance with the Provision of Section 8,
Rule 114 of the 1985 Rules in Criminal Procedure x x x.
Finally, when respondent Judge found out that the RTC Presiding Judge
Sergio Garcia was still holding sessions although he was already about
to retire, undersigned respondent Judge immediately issued an Order
cancelling his previous Order of Release (Annex G Complaint) which
he issued to the accused James Orallo on December 6, 1997 in Criminal
case No. 3712, pending before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 53,
Rosales, Pangasinan.[7]
On July 8, 1998, upon recommendation of the Office
of the Court Administrator (OCA), the Third Division of
this Court resolved to consolidate A.M. OCA IPI No. 96-
216-MTJ with OCA IPI No. 97-262-MTJ and to refer the
cases to Hon. Alicia B. Gonzales-Decano, Executive Judge
of the RTC of Urdaneta, Pangasinan, for investigation,
report and recommendation. Surprisingly, on October 29,
1998, and subsequently on November 11, 1998, Judge
Decano dismissed both cases due to complainants alleged
lack of interest to prosecute the same. In a Resolution dated
March 24, 1999, the Third Division required Judge Decano
to explain why she ordered the dismissal of the cases
without any authority from this Court[8] and simultaneously
directed Vice Executive Judge Modesto C. Juanson of the
RTC of Dagupan City to conduct a thorough investigation
of the complaints and to submit a report and
recommendation thereon.
In his report dated September 8, 1999, the
investigating judge, Judge Modesto C. Juamson, concluded
that, with respect to A.M. OCA IPI 96-216-MTJ, Judge
Jovellanos failed to observe the procedure for the release of
an accused on bail. He also found that:
x x x It is also the conclusion of this Court that the Order of
Release dated April 3, 1996, was issued without any approved
property bond. Judge Jovellanos deliberately lied when he said he
cancelled the property bond posted by the accused for her failure
to register the property within ten (10) days to the proper
office. No property bond had reached the Court [that] issued the
warrant of arrest. Judge Jovellanos had taken advantage of his
position as Presiding Judge, MCTC, Alcala-Bautista, Pangasinan,
knowing fully well that he issued an order for the release of a
detained person, ordered the release of Violeta Madera under
Order of Release dated April 3, 1996 even without the approved
property bond. Judge Jovellanos deliberately lied again when he
issued an Order of Recall of Order dated April 3, 1996 for failure
of accused Madera to register the bailbond in accordance with
Sec. 14, Rule 114 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure. Recall order dated August 28, 1996 is another instance
of dishonesty. When unable to produce the property bond, He
(Jovellanos) thought of another lies by issuing said Order dated
August 28, 1996. The fact that the record of Criminal Case No.
6663 was forwarded from MTC San Ildefonso, Bulacan to RTC,
Bulacan does not render the propriety of issuing the Order of
Release without property bond, moot and academic. The Order of
Release on the basis of property bond is valid unless revoked by
the Appellate Court.
The Court likewise found Celestina Corpuz having conspired and
confabulated with Judge Jovellanos in the issuance of the Order of
Release dated April 3, 1996. Corpuz averred that upon instruction of
Judge Jovellanos, she sent by registered mail [a] copy of the bailbond
and other pertinent documents together with the original of the Order of
Release dated April 3, 1996 as evidenced by the registry receipt
attached to the letter of Adoracion Marcos. As clerk of Court, Corpuz
knows that sending an important document to MTC San Ildefonso, it
must require a registry return card or in the absence thereof, she must
produce [a] certification from the post office concerned evidencing the
sending of the letter. Besides, the Court is certain that the letter will
reach the addressee if really mailed. The truth is that, in order to cover
up and protect themselves (Judge Jovellanos and Corpuz) she concocted
the idea that she sent the copy of the property bond together with the
Order of Release to MTC, San Ildefonso by registered mail. The
actuation of Judge Jovellanos and Corpuz pretending to have mailed the
property bond together with the Order of Release may be described as
pure and simple dishonesty in the performance of their duties. Corpuz
facilitated the Order of Release dated April 3, 1996 even without [a]
covering property bond. Judge Jovellanos cooperated for reasons known
only to him. Both (Jovellanos and Corpuz) have violated their Oath of
Office. Corpuz facilitated the Order of Release dated April 3, 1996 as
evidenced by the reply letter of Adoracion Marcos dated August 15,
1996.
xxx
Adoracion Marcos did not facilitate, participate or have any knowledge
about the property bond and Order of Release dated April 3, 1996.
xxx
As to the second Order of release dated July 3, 1996, in Criminal Case
No. 6663 where Violeta Madera was ordered arrested on July 1, 1996. x
x x Again, Judge Jovellanos failed to indorse and deliver the property
bond to MTC San Ildefonso, Bulacan. The truth is that the questioned
Order of Release dated July 3, 1996 was issued without approved
property bond.[9]
The investigating judge recommended that Judge Jovellanos
and Corpuz be dismissed from the service without forfeiture
 of their retirement benefits and leave credits considering
that Judge Jovellanos was already 67 years old, half of
whose body was paralyzed due to a stroke, and Corpuz
years of service in the judiciary. Insofar as respondent
Adoracion R. Marcos is concerned, the investigating judge
recommended the dismissal of the complaint for lack of
substantial evidence.
In OCA IPI No. 97-262-MTJ, the investigating judge
reported that:
Judge Jovellanos assertion that he had cancelled the bailbond posted by
James Orallo when the latter failed to register said bond in accordance
with law is another pure and simple [lie], insulting to the intelligence of
the Court. It is the duty of the respondent Judge that before he issues
and releases the questioned Order of Release dated December 6, 1996 x
x x he must require the accused to register first the property bond [with]
the Local Register of Deeds (for registered property) or Local Assessors
Office (for unregistered property). x x x
Besides, the records of either the instant administrative case or Regional
Trial Court, Branch 53, Rosales, Pangasinan (Pp vs. James Orallo,
Criminal Case No. 3712-R) nor the MCTC, Alcala-Bautista,
Pangasinan, do not show the existence of the approved property bond
which was the basis of the release order dated December 6, 1996. The
Order of Cancellation of the bond of James Orallo issued by Judge
Jovellanos dated December 10, 1996 was done in order to appease Mrs.
Margarita Sanchez and her lawyer Atty. Fernando who has been
searching the records in Criminal Case No. 3712-R, RTC, Branch 53,
Rosales, Pangasinan and that of the MCTC, Alcala-Bautista for the copy
of the property bond. When Judge Jovellanos could not produce a copy
of the approved property bond, thus, he issued an order of cancellation,
dated December 10, 1996.[10]
The investigating judge likewise recommended that
respondent Judge Jovellanos be dismissed from the service
without forfeiture of his retirement benefits and leave
credits.
The OCA upheld the findings of the investigating
judge in both cases but recommends the forfeiture of the
retirement pay and leave credits of respondent Judge
Jovellanos and respondent Corpuz.
This Court agrees with the factual findings of the
investigating judge and the OCA. In Victorino Cruz v.
Judge Reynold Q. Yaneza,[11] this Court held that:
Section 17, par. (a), of Rule 114, as amended by Administrative Circular
No. 12-94, provides:
(a) ....Bail in the amount fixed may be filed with the court where the
case is pending, or, in the absence of unavailability of the judge thereof,
with another branch of the same court within the province or city.If the
accused is arrested in a province, city or municipality other than where
the case is pending, bail may be filed also with any regional trial court
of said place, or if no judge thereof is available, with any metropolitan
trial judge, municipal trial judge or municipal circuit trial judge therein.
The foregoing provision anticipates two (2) situations. First, the
accused is arrested in the same province, city or municipality where his
case is pending. Second, the accused is arrested in the province, city or
municipality other than where his case is pending. In the first situation,
the accused may file bail in the court where his case is pending, or in
the absence or unavailability of the judge thereof, with another branch
of the same court within the province or city. In the second situation, the
accused has two (2) options. First, he may file bail in the court where
his case is pending or, second, he may file bail with any regional trial
court in the province, city, municipality where he was arrested. When
no regional trial judge is available, he may file bail with any
metropolitan trial judge, municipal trial judge or municipal circuit trial
judge therein.
Interestingly, almost all the cases wherein respondent Judge approved
bail bonds and issued release orders were not pending before his
sala. To complicate matters, the accused were neither arrested nor
detained within the territorial jurisdiction of respondent Judges court.
xxx
xxx Since Judge Yaneza presides over MeTC-Branch 54 in Navotas,
Metro Manila, his territorial jurisdiction is confined therein. Therefore,
to approve bail applications and issue corresponding release orders in
cases pending in courts outside his territorial jurisdiction, some even in
courts as far as Nueva Ecija and Palawan, particularly so where the
accused are detained thereat and not in his jurisdiction and therefore
cannot personally appear before him as required, constitute ignorance of
the law so gross as to amount to incompetence and even corruption.
xxx
Section 35 of BP Blg. 129 and Sections 17 and 19 of Rule 114 are to be
construed and applied in conjunction with each other. The abovecited
rules do not give the Metropolitan Trial Judge blanket authority to grant
applications for bail. There are prerequisites to be complied with. First,
the application for bail must be filed in the court where the case is
pending. In the absence or unavailability of the judge thereof, the
application for bail may be filed with another branch of the same court
within the province or city. Second, if the accused is arrested in a
province, city or municipality other than where the case is pending, bail
may be filed with any regional trial court of the place. If no judge
thereof is available, then with any metropolitan trial judge or municipal
circuit trial judge therein.[12]
It is clear from this Courts disquisition in Yaneza that
Judge Jovellanos reliance on Section 19, Rule 114 of the
1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure is misplaced. Yaneza, in
fact, only highlights that Judge Jovellanos, contrary to
prescribed procedures, approved the applications for bail of
accused whose cases were not only pending in other courts
but who were likewise arrested and detained outside his
territorial jurisdiction. It also does not appear from the
records of these cases that the judges having jurisdiction
over the accused were absent or otherwise unavailable to act
upon their applications for bail. Worse, in A.M. OCA IPI
96-216-MTJ, Judge Jovellanos ordered the release of
Madera without the corresponding bail bond being posted.
Judge Jovellanos invocation of good faith and his plea
that he was only moved by humanitarian considerations
cannot excuse his conduct. We have often stressed that as an
advocate of justice and a visible representation of the law, a
judge is expected to keep abreast with and be proficient in
the interpretation of our laws. A judge should be acquainted
with legal norms and precepts as well as with statutes and
procedural rules. Unfamiliarity with the Rules of Court is a
sign of incompetence which goes against Canon 3,
specifically Rule 3.01, of the Code of Judicial Conduct.
[13]
Having accepted the exalted position of a judge, Judge
Jovellanos owes the public and the court he sits in
proficiency in the law. He must have the basic rules at the
palm of his hands as he is expected to maintain professional
competence at all times.[14]
Insofar as respondent Corpuz is concerned, she has
evidently been remiss in the performance of her
duties. Although she claims that she followed the
instructions of respondent Judge Jovellanos and transmitted
the records of Maderas bail bond to the MTC of San
Ildefonso, Bulacan by registered mail, the MTC of San
Ildefonso, Bulacan has yet to receive the same. As pointed
out by the investigating judge, respondent Corpuz failed to
secure a registry return card or, in the absence thereof, a
certification from the post office to show that said records
were mailed. Indeed, even in the absence of a registry return
card or certification, the Court is certain that the
[documents] will reach the addressee if really mailed.
[15]
This circumstance leads us to doubt whether respondent
Corpuz actually transmitted the records to the MTC of San
Ildefonso, Bulacan, and more importantly, whether Madera
 indeed posted a bail bond for her temporary liberty in
Criminal Case Nos. 6333-6336 and 6360-6362. We have
consistently held that the conduct required of court
personnel must always be beyond reproach and is
circumscribed with a heavy burden of responsibility. [16] This
Court cannot countenance any act or omission on the part of
those involved in the administration of justice which would
violate the norm of public accountability and diminish, or
even just tend to diminish, the faith of the people in the
judiciary.[17]
As to the penalty that should be imposed on
respondents Judge Jovellanos and Corpuz, we find the
recommended penalty of dismissal too harsh. In Yaneza, we
meted upon respondent judge therein the penalty of
dismissal considering the number of times he exceeded his
authority in approving applications for bail outside his
territorial jurisdiction and his persistence in doing so despite
the pendency of the administrative complaint against
him. This was further aggravated by his summary approval
of an application for bail in a case where the penalty
imposable was life imprisonment. However, in the case at
bar, similar circumstances are wanting.
For similar conduct, less severe penalties were
imposed upon two (2) erring judges, thus -
[18]
1. In Paz v. Tiong, we imposed upon respondent
therein, a judge of the MTC of Bolinao, Pangasinan, a fine
of P3,000.00 for signing the bail bond and the order of
release of an accused whose case was pending before the
RTC of Alaminos, Pangasinan absent any showing that the
judge having jurisdiction over the same was unavailable.
2. In Adapon v. Domagtoy,[19] we fined respondent
judge of the MCTC of Santa Monica-Burgos, Surigao del
Norte in the amount of P10,000.00 for ordering the release
of an accused whose cases were pending before the MCTC
of Dapa, Surigao del Norte notwithstanding the fact that the
accused was neither arrested nor did he surrender to the
authorities before the order of release was issued, and that
the judge having jurisdiction over the cases was likewise
unavailable.
Considering the advanced age and poor health of
respondent Judge Jovellanos and the long years of service in
the judiciary of respondent Corpuz, we find that suspension
from the service will be sufficient punishment for their acts
complained of.
WHEREFORE, the complaint against Adoracion
Marcos is DISMISSED for lack of merit. Respondent Judge
Eduardo U. Jovellanos is hereby SUSPENDED, without
pay, for a period of one (1) year while respondent Celestina
Corpuz is likewise SUSPENDED, without pay, for a period
of four (4) months, with the WARNING that a repetition of
the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with
more severely.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. Nos. 121201-02. October 19, 2001]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. GIO
CONCORCIO @ JUN, EDWIN YUNGOT, ROMMEL
MAGPATOC and JOSEL AYALA @ DODONG
LANAY, accused.
EDWIN YUNGOT and ROMMEL MAGPATOC, accused-
appellants.
DECISION
BUENA, J.:
This is an appeal from the joint decision [1] dated March 28, 1995,
of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Branch 16, [2] finding
accused-appellants, Edwin Yungot and Rommel Magpatoc guilty of two
counts of murder and imposing upon them two terms of reclusion
perpetua. Accused-appellants were ordered to reimburse the heirs of the
victims, Jernie Sumagaysay and Oscar Celis, of actual expenses, and to
pay compensatory and moral damages, and costs.[3]
The antecedent facts are as follows:
The two informations[4] charging accused Gio Concorcio @ Jun,
Edwin Yungot, Rommel Magpatoc and Josel Ayala @ Dodong Lanay,
with two counts of murder read:
Criminal Case No. 15,377-87
That on or about May 24, 1987, in the City of Davao, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-mentioned
accused, armed with a knife, conspiring, confederating together and
helping one another, with intent to kill, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, with treachery and evident premeditation,
and during nighttime, suddenly attacked, assaulted and stabbed one
Jernie Sumagaysay, with the use of said bladed instrument, thereby
afflicting [upon] the latter stabbed (sic) wounds which directly caused
his immediate death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[5]
Criminal Case No. 15,378-87.
That on or about May 24, 1987, in the City of Davao, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-mentioned
accused, armed with a knife, conspiring, confederating together and
helping one another, with intent to kill, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, with treachery and evident premeditation,
and during nighttime, suddenly attacked, assaulted and stabbed one
Oscar Celis, with the use of said bladed instrument, thereby afflicting
[upon] the latter stabbed (sic) wounds which directly caused his
immediate death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[6]
Accused-appellants, Edwin Yungot and Rommel Magpatoc were
arrested on September, 1991[7] and February, 1993,[8] respectively. The
two (2) other accused remained at large.
When arraigned on October 21, 1991, Yungot pleaded not guilty
to both charges. Immediately, a joint trial for the two counts of murder
ensued against him. On the other hand, subsequent to his arrest in 1993,
Magpatoc also pleaded not guilty to both charges upon his arraignment.
[9]
An urgent motion for bail was filed by Magpatoc on March 1,
1993. After the hearing[10] on the said motion, the trial court issued an
Order dated June 16, 1993, denying the motion for bail. [11] Since the
prosecution had already finished presenting its evidence-in-chief against
Yungot, and had rested its case against Yungot at the time of Magpatocs
arrest, Magpatoc was given a separate trial whereupon the prosecution
presented its evidence-in-chief against Magpatoc. After the prosecution
rested its case against Magpatoc, a joint trial was conducted for the
defense, rebuttal and surrebuttal.
The prosecution presented the following witnesses against
Yungot: Delilah Celis Banderado, Sgt. Virgilio Jaranilla, Romeo
Sumagaysay, SPO4 Leonor Sonza, P/Cpl. Dionisio Erispe, Jonathan
Abellana, Jose Lagamon, Jr. and Dr. Jose Pagsaligan. The following
witnesses testified against Magpatoc: Jose Oyson and Jose Lagamon,
Jr.,[12] SPO4 Leonor Sonza, P/Cpl. Dionisio Erispe, Sgt. Virgilio
Jaranilla, Delilah Celis Banderado and Dr. Jose Pagsaligan. Notably,
except for Jose Oyson, the foregoing witnesses also testified against
Yungot. On rebuttal, the prosecution recalled witnesses Jose Oyson and
Sgt. Virgilio Jaranilla, and in addition, presented Ruth Dionson and
Democrito Madiclum as witnesses. On surrebuttal, Yungots defense
counsel presented Lorna Surbito as a witness.
On the other hand, in his defense, Magpatoc presented Allen
Ledesma, Noel Cahiwat, Ysmael Cahiwat and himself as witnesses;
while Yungot, along with Bernardo Bajenteng and Leovigildo Bautista
testified in court.
The prosecution adduced the following evidence against Yungot
during his trial. Prosecution witness Jose Lagamon, Jr. testified that he
knew the deceased Oscar Celis, who was his former classmate and the
other deceased, Jernie Sumagaysay,[13] whom he had met at
school. According to Lagamon, Jr., on May 24, 1987, he had a drinking
spree with Oscar Celis, Jernie Sumagaysay and Ben Hur Barol at the
Davao Fiesta.[14] Around 9 or 10 p.m.,[15] after consuming four (4) or
five (5) bottles of beer, Lagamon, Jr. and his companions paid their bill
and proceeded home. While walking along Claveria St., Lagamon, Jr.,
who was walking alongside Ben Hur Barol some five (5) to six (6)
meters ahead of Oscar Celis and Jernie Sumagaysay, heard a
commotion at his back.[16] He immediately turned around and saw
accused-appellant Edwin Yungot stab Oscar Celis two (2) or three (3)
times at the left side of his chest, while three (3) or four (4) other
persons were holding Celis.[17] He also saw another person thrust a knife
at the right side of the chest of Jernie Sumagaysay while riding at the
latters back.[18] He tried to assist his friend but the latters assailant
threatened to stab him as well. [19] His companion, Ben Hur Barol did
nothing because he was in shock. In his estimation, about five (5) to six
(6) persons were involved in the stabbing incident, three (3) or four (4)
of whom were armed.[20] He was then about a meter away from Celis
and Sumagaysay. He further testified that the place was well-
lighted. After the incident, the assailants scampered away. Lagamon, Jr.
and Barol flagged down a jeepney and brought Celis to the Davao
Doctors Hospital.[21] Lagamon, Jr. did not notice where Jernie
Sumagaysay had gone after the latter was stabbed. On cross-
examination, he testified that he is a member of the Philippine National
Police (PNP) and that he joined the Philippine Constabulary in 1988;
but in 1987, when the stabbing incident occurred, he was a bet-taker.
[22]
He insisted that he saw the assailants of Celis and Sumagaysay
because the place where the stabbing incident occurred was well-lighted
with fluorescent lamps.[23] He could not remember what kind of knife
was used by Yungot in stabbing Celis but recalled that it was about six
(6) to seven (7) inches long.[24] He was not summoned by the police
authorities for an investigation; neither did he report what he had
witnessed to the police authorities.
Jonathan Abellana, who was serving sentence for murder,
[25]
testified that on May 24, 1987, at around 9 p.m., he was at a dance in
Roxas St., in front of the Holy Child School, and between Roxas and
Claveria Sts., with Dodong Lanay, Allen Ledesma, Jun-jun Oyson,
Edwin Yungot and Omi Magpatoc. [26] They proceeded to Barrio Fiesta
for a drinking spree upon the invitation of a certain Jun. After the group
consumed two (2) cases of beer, Abellana went back to the dance. Later,
the rest of the group[27] also returned to the dance.
P/Cpl. Dionisio Erispe, a member of the Philippine National
Police (PNP), assigned at the Homicide and Arson Section of the San
Pedro Patrol Station, testified that on May 24, 1987, at around 12
midnight, he received information regarding a stabbing incident which
took place at Claveria St. Together with the members of the Mobile
Patrol, he went to the San Pedro Hospital and Davao Doctors Hospital,
where the stabbed victims were brought, and conducted an
investigation. From the said hospitals, they proceeded to the scene of
the crimes and continued with the investigation. Based on his
investigation, P/Cpl. Erispe learned that one (1) of the victims was
stabbed near RCBC while the other victim was able to run towards the
Martinez Pawnshop. From the hospital records, he was able to identify
the stabbed victims as Oscar Celis and Jernie Sumagaysay.[28]
SPO4 Leonor Sonza, of the Criminal Record Branch,
Metrodiscom, PNP, brought the Record of Events of the San Pedro
Patrol Station, dated May 24, 1987, [29] showing the entry of the stabbing
incident involving Celis and Sumagaysay.
Dr. Jose Pagsaligan, Medical Specialist II, Regional Health Office
No. XI, Department of Health (DOH), Davao City, performed the
autopsy on the victims cadavers on May 25, 1987 and issued Autopsy
Report Nos. N-039-87 and N-040-87, showing the following findings:
Autopsy Report No. N-039-87[30]
POSTMORTEM FINDINGS
1. STABBED WOUND 3.5 cm. long, gaping, running
medially and slightly upward, edges cleancut, sharp
edge inferiorly, located in the left chest, 10 cm. from the
anterior median line, 4 cm. from the left nipple at the
level of the 3rd intercostal space, penetrating the skin
and muscles and the heart through and through.
2. Contusion-abrasion 3 cm. x 1.5 cm. in diameter below
the right eye along the outer canthus of the right eye, 7
cm. from the anterior median line and 6 cm. from the
right ear.
3. Contusion-abrasion 3 cm. x 1.5 cm. in diameter, slightly
above the right mandible, 2 cm. from the anterior
median line and 10 cm. from the right ear.
CAUSE OF DEATH: SHOCK SECONDARY TO SEVERE
HEMORRHAGE DUE TO STAB WOUND, CHEST,
LEFT.[31]
Autopsy Report No. N-040-87[32]
POSTMORTEM FINDINGS
1. STABBED WOUND 1.5 cm. long, gaping, running
medially downward, edges cleancut, sharp edge
inferiorly medially, located in the right side of the chest,
4 cm. from the anterior median line, 12 cm. from the
right nipple, penetrating the skin and muscles in the
2nd intercostal space, right, cutting the pulmonary artery.
CAUSE OF DEATH: SHOCK SECONDARY TO SEVERE
HEMORRHAGE DUE TO STAB WOUND, CHEST,
RIGHT.[33]
In Dr. Pagsaligans opinion, each stab wound which caused the death of
Celis and Sumagaysay was inflicted using a single-bladed weapon.
[34]
He further opined that the assailants might have used two (2)
weapons.[35]
Delilah Celis Banderado, sister of Oscar Celis, presented the
death certificate of Celis [36] and testified on the actual expenses
amounting to P13,990.00, which they incurred due to the death of Celis.
[37]
She further testified that at the time of his death, her brother was 24
years old and had just graduated from an Electrical Engineering course
at the University of Mindanao.[38]
Romeo Sumagaysay, father of Jernie Sumagaysay, proffered the
death certificate of Jernie, [39] and testified that he incurred P12,000.00 as
funeral and burial expenses arising from the death of Jernie. He also
testified that at the time of Jernies death, Jernie was a second year
college student at the University of Mindanao.[40]
As pointed out earlier, after the prosecution rested its case against
Yungot, the other accused, Rommel Magpatoc was arrested and given a
separate trial only insofar as the presentation of the prosecutions
evidence-in-chief against him. A joint trial, however, was subsequently
conducted for the defense of both accused-appellants as well as for
rebuttal and surrebuttal.
Subsequent to his arrest and arraignment, accused-appellant
Rommel Magpatoc filed a motion for bail dated March 1, 1993. [41] At
the hearing[42] on the said motion, the prosecution presented as
witnesses, Jose Oyson and Jose Lagamon, Jr. The defense, however, did
not present any evidence.[43]
At the said hearing, Lagamon, Jr. claimed that he came to know
Sumagaysay at the Davao Fiesta where they started drinking at around 8
p.m., on May 24, 1987.[44] He was with Celis, Sumagaysay and Ben
Hur. He reiterated his testimony at Yungots trial that they left Davao
Fiesta between 9 and 10 p.m.; and walked towards RCBC, with himself
and Ben Hur about two (2) meters ahead of Celis and
Sumagaysay. Upon hearing footsteps behind them, he turned around
and saw Celis being stabbed. [45] When asked by the trial judge if he
knew the person who stabbed Celis, Lagamon, Jr. answered that he
could not recognize the person who stabbed Celis because it happened
so suddenly.[46] But when asked by the prosecutor if he could identify
the assailants if he were to see them again, he answered, I could
recognize them by face.[47] He further recalled that about four (4)
persons attacked his companions, two (2) or three (3) of whom were
armed with knives. He also declared that Sumagaysay was stabbed in
the same manner that Celis was stabbed, i.e., the assailants left hand
was placed on the victims shoulder, while the formers right hand
stabbed the victim.[48] He admitted that he could not clearly recognize
Sumagaysays assailant because the incident happened suddenly;
[49]
however, he maintained that Magpatoc was one of those who killed
his companions.[50] On cross-examination and upon query by the trial
court, Lagamon, Jr. pointed to Magpatoc as the person who stabbed
Celis,[51] contrary to his testimony during Yungots trial that Yungot was
the one who stabbed Celis. When asked if he could recognize the person
who attacked Sumagaysay if in court, he replied, [h]e is not here. [52]
The prosecution also presented Jose Oyson as a witness at the
hearing on Magpatocs motion for bail. [53] Oyson testified that on May
24, 1987, at about 8:30 p.m., he was drinking at the Davao Fiesta in
Claveria St., along with Jun Concorcio, Jun Laos, Edwin Yungot, Omie
Magpatoc,[54] Allen Ledesma, Joe Dalman alias Idi, Jun Suaner alias
Siquio and Jose Dodong Cahiwat. [55] He recounted that Jun Concorcio
pointed at the group of Celis, Sumagaysay and two (2) others, who were
laughing at him.[56] Corsiga[57] told them to birahan (to do some harm to)
Celis, Sumagaysay and the two (2) others. [58] At about 10 p.m., when
Celis, Sumagaysay and their two (2) companions left Barrio Fiesta,
Oysons group followed them.[59] Celis, Sumagaysay and their two (2)
companions went towards Land Bank in Claveria St. Celis and
Sumagaysay were walking behind their two (2) companions. Edwin
Yungot, Josel Ayala alias Bobong Lanay[60] and Omie Magpatoc rushed
towards Celis and Sumagaysay. Edwin Yungot stabbed Oscar Celis.
[61]
Oyson could not ascertain who between Magpatoc and Ayala
actually stabbed Jernie Sumagaysay.[62] Yungot, Ayala and Magpatoc
were armed with knives. [63] One (1) of the stabbed victims fell on the
ground while the other victim was able to run away. Oyson was about
seven (7) meters away from the place where the stabbing incident
occurred. The said place was lighted with a fluorescent bulb. After the
incident, Oyson and his companions ran away and proceeded to the
dance on Roxas Avenue. [64] On cross-examination, Oyson testified that
the group which followed Celis, Sumagaysay and their two (2)
companions from Barrio Fiesta, included himself, accused-appellants,
Edwin Yungot and Omie Magpatoc, Joe Dalman, Allen Ledesma, Josel
Ayala, Jun Laos, Edic, Jun Suaner alias Siquio, and Dodong Cahiwat.
[65]
They were all members of the Looban Young Killer (LYK) gang.
[66]
Oyson recalled that three (3) among his companions on the night of
May 24, 1987, were armed with knives, namely, Yungot, Ayala and
Magpatoc, because they were [walking] ahead of the group. [67] They
followed Celis, Sumagaysay and their two (2) companions in order to
do harm to them.[68]
As pointed earlier, the prosecution adopted the foregoing
testimonies of Jose Oyson and Jose Lagamon, Jr. during the hearing on
Magpatocs motion for bail, as part of its evidence-in-chief against
Magpatoc. In addition to the foregoing testimonies, the prosecution
presented anew five (5) witnesses, namely, P/Cpl. Dionisio Erispe,
SPO4 Leonor Sonza, Sgt. Virgilio Jaranilla, Dr. Jose Pagsaligan and
Delilah Celis Banderado, whom it had earlier presented during Yungots
trial. These five (5) witnesses respective testimonies at Magpatocs trial
were substantially identical with their testimonies at Yungots trial.
At Magpatocs trial, P/Cpl. Dionisio Erispe further testified that
while he was at the Davao Doctors Hospital, he was able to talk with
the two (2) companions of the stabbed victim who was brought there.He
identified these two (2) companions as Ben Hur and Joe Lagamon. [69] At
the San Pedro Hospital, hospital employees gave him two (2)
identification cards of Jernie Sumagaysay for safekeeping, which he
subsequently turned over to the desk officer at the station. [70]
Dr. Jose Pagsaligan, the medical specialist from the Regional
Health Office No. XI of the Department of Health (DOH), Davao City,
who performed the autopsy on the two victims cadavers on May 25,
1987, and issued Autopsy Report Nos. N-039-87 and N-040-87, also
testified that because of the trajectory of the wound which Sumagaysay
sustained, his assailant was most probably at his back, holding the
bladed weapon.[71]
Delilah Celis Banderado, sister of Oscar Celis, testified anew on
the actual expenses amounting to P13,990.00, which they incurred due
to the death of Celis.
With leave of court, accused-appellants, Yungot and Magpatoc
filed their respective Demurrers to Evidence, [72] which, however, were
denied by the trial court in an Order dated November 10, 1993. [73]
Subsequently, a joint trial was conducted for the presentation of
evidence for the defense. Rommel Magpatoc, in his defense, testified
along with Allen Ledesma, Noel Cahiwat and Ysmael Cahiwat; while
Edwin Yungot, also in his defense, presented Bernardo Bajenteng,
Leovigildo Bautista and himself as witnesses.
According to accused-appellant Magpatoc, on May 24, 1987, at
about 7:30-8:00 p.m., he went with his girlfriend to the dance held at the
back of the Aldevinco building.[74] Together with three (3) others,
namely, his girlfriend, Noel Cahiwag and the latters friend, Magpatoc
left the dance at around 11 p.m. and went home. [75] He denied having
gone to Barrio Fiesta on that night.[76]
Allen Ledesma, a friend of Magpatoc, testified that on May 24,
1987, at 10 p.m., he was inside the disco house at Aldevinco Shopping
Center with Magpatoc and Dodong Abellana. [77] At around 10:30 p.m.,
he went to the Davao Fiesta with Dodong Abellana upon the latters
invitation, leaving behind Rommel Magpatoc, who stayed in the disco
house.[78] Ledesma and Abellana joined six (6) others at the Davao
Fiesta. After consuming three (3) bottles of beer, Ledesma left Davao
Fiesta with a certain Anak, [79] bought some cigarettes and went back to
the disco house. Among the six (6) persons left behind at the Davao
Fiesta were Dodong Cahiwat, a certain Caloy and a certain Lanay.
[80]
Jose Oyson was later identified as one of the six (6) persons,
[81]
whom Ledesma and Abellana joined at the Davao Fiesta.Likewise,
Edwin Yungot was at the Davao Fiesta when they arrived there. [82]
Noel Cahiwat testified that on the night of May 24, 1987, he was
at the dance held behind the Aldevinco Shopping Center, with Rommel
Magpatoc, Allen Ledesma and several others. At about 9:30 p.m., a
certain Jun Driver invited them to drink at the Davao Fiesta. He went to
the Davao Fiesta with Dodong Siquio and another person whose name
he could not remember.[83] Rommel Magpatoc and the others were left at
the disco house.[84] At 10 p.m., Noel Cahiwat left the Davao Fiesta with
a companion and went back to the dance hall. [85] At the dance hall,
Dodong Lanay told him that Jun Driver stabbed somebody. [86] On cross-
examination, he admitted that in the evening of May 24, 1987, Jose
Oyson was at the Barrio Fiesta with his group.
Ysmael Cahiwat, barangay captain of 33-B Poblacion, Davao
City, testified to prove the good moral character of accused-appellant
Magpatoc. He stated that Magpatoc had been active in community
activities and had demonstrated leadership in the youth activities for the
IKP chapel. According to Cahiwat, at the time of Magpatocs arrest, the
latter was an elected Sangguniang Kabataan member.
On the other hand, in his defense, Edwin Yungot testified that in
the evening of May 24, 1987, he operated the radio phono at the benefit
dance held at the back of the Aldevinco Center.[87] He operated the said
radio phono, without anybodys assistance, until the benefit dance ended
at 1 a.m. of the following day. He confirmed that Magpatoc was at the
benefit dance and that Magpatoc left when the dance ended at 1 a.m. [88]
Bernardo Bajenteng, a neighbor of Yungot and former president
of the Pag-asa Youth Movement, corroborated Yungots testimony that
on May 24, 1987, he (Yungot) operated the sound system from 8 p.m.
until 1 a.m. of the following day.[89] However, according to Bajenteng,
Yungot was assisted by the son of the owner of the sound
system. Furthermore, Bajenteng insisted, on cross-examination, that
Yungot did not leave the benefit dance from 8 p.m. until 1 a.m. of the
following day, except at one instance, that is, at about 9 p.m., Yungot
left, but after five minutes, he returned back to the dance. [90]Bajenteng
acted as the emcee at the dance.
Leovigildo Bautista,[91] a youth organizer associated with the
Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), issued a
certification confirming that Yungot was a bonafide member of the Pag-
asa Youth Movement.
On rebuttal, the prosecution presented Jose Oyson, who refuted
Yungots testimony that he was the operator of the phonograph system
used at the benefit dance held on the night of May 24, 1987; and
declared that it was Ruth Dionson, granddaughter of the owner of the
phonograph system, who operated the said system. [92] Oyson further
claimed that Yungot and Magpatoc were at the Davao Fiesta in the
evening of May 24, 1987.[93] He maintained that he saw Yungot,
Magpatoc and Ayala stab Celis and Sumagaysay.[94] On cross-
examination, he asserted that at 7:30 p.m., on May 24, 1987, he left the
dance and went to the Davao Barrio Fiesta with accused-appellants,
Edwin Yungot and Rommel Magpatoc, Jossel Ayala, Jun Laos, Allen
Ledesma, Jun Suaner, Edi (Edic in footnote 65), Jose Dalman and
Dodong Cajiwat.[95] After three (3) hours, all of them left the Barrio
Fiesta, and returned to the dance after the stabbing incident had
occurred.[96]
Still on rebuttal, Ruth Dionson disputed Yungots testimony that he
operated the sound system at the benefit dance held on May 24, 1987,
and claimed she operated the said sound system with her aunt, Melanie
Guinagao.[97]
The prosecution also recalled Sgt. Virgilio Jaranilla who testified
that a week after May 24, 1987, as investigator, he went to the house of
Yungot but failed to find Yungot.
On April 17, 1995, the trial court promulgated its joint decision
dated March 28, 1995, finding both Yungot and Magpatoc guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of murder in both Criminal Cases Nos.
15,377-87 and 15,378-87, imposing upon them two terms of reclusion
perpetua, and the payment of actual, compensatory and moral damages,
and costs. The dispositive part of the said decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in Criminal Case No. 15,377-87, finding the accused
Rommel (Umi) Magpatoc and Edwin Yungot guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of MURDER punishable under Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code with no attendant circumstance, both are hereby
sentenced to a penalty of reclusion perpetua, and to pay the cost; to pay
the offended party jointly and severally the amount of P12,000.00 as
actual damages; each to indemnify the offended party the amount of
P50,000.00 as compensatory damages and P50,000.00 as moral
damages.
In Criminal Case no. 15,378-87, finding the two (2) accused Rommel
(Umi) Magpatoc and Edwin Yungot guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of MURDER punishable under Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code with no attendant circumstance, both are hereby sentenced
to a penalty of reclusion perpetua, and to pay the cost; to pay the
offended party jointly and severally the amount of P13,990.00 as actual
damages; each to indemnify the offended party the amount of
P50,000.00 as compensatory damages and P50,000.00 as moral
damages.[98]
Hence, this appeal. Accused-appellant Edwin Yungot raises the
following assignment of errors:[99]
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED-
APPELLANT YUNGOT GUILTY OF THE CRIME OF
MURDER DESPITE THE FACT THAT HIS GUILT THEREOF
WAS NOT DETERMINED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
 II
AT ANY RATE, THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN
APPRECIATING THE QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF
TREACHERY DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE SAME WAS
NOT PROVEN DURING THE PROCEEDINGS THEREIN.
Accused-appellant Rommel Magpatoc, on the other hand, raises the
following assignment of errors:
I the two holding Celis while the third one stabbed Celis at his breast
THE TRIAL COURT HAD PREJUDGED THE GUILT OF
THE ACCUSED BY REASON OF HIS DEFENSE OF
ALIBI.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE
TO THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES TESTIMONIES
DESPITE MATERIAL AND SUBSTANTIAL
INCONSISTENCIES.
III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT APPRECIATING
THE CHARACTER EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE
ACCUSED.
IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING THE
ACCUSED DESPITE THE STRENGTH OF THE
DEFENSE OF ALIBI.
This Court is not persuaded.
Accused-appellant Edwin Yungots arguments, in fine, revolve on
the matter of credibility of the prosecution witnesses. In particular,
Yungot cites several instances of inconsistencies in the testimony of
prosecution witness Jose Lagamon, Jr. For instance, on direct
examination at Yungots trial, Lagamon, Jr. claimed that Yungot stabbed
Celis. However, during the hearing on Magpatocs motion for bail at
Magpatocs trial, Lagamon, Jr. asserted on both direct and cross-
examinations that he could not recognize the person who stabbed Celis
because the incident happened suddenly; but immediately thereafter, he
declared that he could recognize Celis assailants only by face, [100] and in
open court pointed at accused-appellant Rommel Magpatoc as the
person who stabbed Celis.[101] Yungot argues that the [s]aid
inconsistencies in the testimony of Jose Lagamon, Jr. should not have
been overlooked by the trial court, for it not only puts to doubt the
identity of the assailant[s] in the crime[s] but likewise casts doubt as to
the credibility of the said witness, the very foundation of the crime for
which ... [he] stand[s] to lose his liberty.[102]
The argument is plainly unmeritorious. Well-settled to the point of
being elementary is the rule of procedure that in rendering its
judgment, the court must consider only such evidence, duly
presented during the trial, for or against any party to the
action, and made the sole basis of the decision therein. [103] Thus,
Lagamon, Jr.s testimony in the separate trial of Magpatoc cannot, at this
stage, be used by Yungot to exculpate himself. Under Section 1(f), Rule
115 of the Rules of Court, xxx xxx. [e]ither party may utilize as part of
its evidence the testimony of a witness who is deceased, out of, or
cannot, with due diligence be found in the Philippines, unavailable or
otherwise unable to testify, given in another case or proceeding, judicial
or administrative, involving the same parties and subject matter, the
adverse party having had the opportunity to cross-examine him. Thus,
the only instance when Lagamon, Jr.s testimony at the separate trial of
Magpatoc could have been utilized as part of Yungots evidence was if
the said witness was deceased, out of or cannot with due diligence be
found in the Philippines, unavailable or otherwise unable to testify,
which was not proved at all in this case.
The trial court found Lagamon, Jr.s testimony to be clear,
straightforward, convincing and rigning (sic) with sincerity.
[104]
According to the trial court:
There were two prosecutions witnesses, namely, Jose Lagamon, Jr. and
Jose Oyson who were in the scene of the crime when it happened and
actually witnessed the stabbing incident and saw who were the
perpetrator[s].
Jose Lagamon, Jr. testified twice, during the presentation of the
prosecutions evidence against Edwin Yungot and in the hearing of the
petition for bail of Rommel Magpatoc.
Jose Lagamon, Jr. was a classmate of the victim Oscar Celis, both
graduated from the same school. On that night of September (should
have been May) 24, 1987, he went to the Davao Barrio Fiesta place at
Claveria St. to drink beer and found inside Oscar Celis and Jermie
Sumagaysay and Ben Hur. Ben Hur was his former classmate and
Jermie Sumagaysay was also known to him for they already met in the
school.
After paying for the beers they drank, they proceeded home along the
Claveria St., he and Ben Hur were walking a few meters ahead of Oscar
Celis and Jermie Sumagaysay who were trailing closed (sic) behind. He
heard a commotion at his back and when he turned around, he saw Celis
and Sumagaysay were being stabbed. Three persons ganged up at Celis,
while Celis was facing the assailant sidewise. He pointed to the accused
Edwin Yungot as the person who stabbed Oscar Celis. The place where
the stabbing incident occured (sic) was well lighted by [f]luorescent
light so that he could fully recognized (sic) the faces of the assaillants
(sic). The person who stabbed Sumagaysay was different from the
person who stabbed Celis and he could also identify the assaillant (sic)
of Sum[a]gaysay. He looked around the [c]ourtroom when asked to
identify the assaillant (sic) of Sumagaysay and answered that he is (sic)
not in the [c]ourt room. [L]et it be noted that he testified before the
arrest of Rommel Magpatoc. xxx xxx. [105]
The above findings of the trial court are fully supported by the
records. As shown by the transcripts, Lagamon, Jr. testified as follows:
PROSECUTOR DAYANGHIRANG III:
xxx xxx.
Q: Who were with you walking?
A: Ben Hur, myself, Sumagaysay and Celis.
Q: How far were Celis and Sumagaysay?
A: About 5 to 6 meters.
xxx xxx.
Q: What happened while you were walking?
A: We were walking towards the direction of Land Bank when
suddenly there was a commotion at the back.
Q: What did you do when you heard the commotion?
INTERPRETER:
Witness demonstrating that Ben Hurs arm was around him at the
back and when a commotion ensued he turned immediately
his back and that he saw somebody thrust a knife.
PROSECUTOR DAYANGHIRANG III:
Q: You said you turned your back, what did you see?
A: When I turned my back I saw the commotion at the back and
somebody was stabbing Celis and Sumagaysay.
Q: How far were you when you turned your back from Celis and
Sumagaysay?
A: Very near.
Q: Can you estimate?
COURT:
The distance between?
A: Between me and Sumagaysay, about a meter away.
PROSECUTOR DAYANGHIRANG III:
xxx xxx.
Q: How about Celis? Did you see and demonstrate?
Please demonstrate how he was stabbed?
A: Celis was pushed and he turned around and 3 persons were
ganging up on Celis and stabbed him.
COURT:
Q: The persons whom you saw stabbed Sumagaysay also stabbed
Celis?
A: No, sir, different persons.
PROSECUTOR DAYANGHIRANG III:
Q: But that happened at the same time?
A: Yes, simultaneous.
Q: Will you be able to identify the assailants?
 A: Yes, sir.
xxx xxx.
Q: You said you can identify the assailants. With regard to
Celis, can you identify the persons who stabbed him?
A: Yes, because the place was well lighted.
Q: Look around this courtroom and see if any of the assailants
is in Court?
INTERPRETER:
The witness is looking around the courtroom and after looking
for a while pointed to a person wearing a t-shirt with a
print Free and when asked his name answered that he is
Edwin Yungot.
xxx xxx.
Q: Earlier, you pointed to a person who answered by the name
of Edwin Yungot. What is his participation in the stabbing
of Celis.
A: He was the one who stabbed first.
Q: What do you mean by bira?
A: He was the one who stabbed first. The other persons were
holding on (sic) Celis.
COURT:
Q: Who were the other persons? How many were they?
A: 3 or 4 persons held Celis.
Q: And so, while those 3 or 4 persons held Celis this Edwin
Yungot stabbed Celis from the back?
A: From the back.
PROSECUTOR DAYANGHIRANG III:
Q: Please demonstrate how Edwin Yungot stabbed Celis?
INTERPRETER:
The witness is demonstrating that Celis was stabbed at the left side
of the body.
COURT:
Q: You mean the body of Celis was facing sidewise Edwin Yungot
when the latter stabbed Celis at his breast?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: So the one who stabbed Celis was Yungot?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: How many times did you see Celis hit by Yungot?
A: About 2 or 3 times.
Q: While Yungot was stabbing Celis, the 3 or 4 companions of
Yungot were holding Celis?
INTERPRETER:
The witness demonstrating that 2 or 3 persons held the backside of
the deceased Celis and he was twisted so that his left side was
facing the assailant Edwin Yungot.
xxx xxx. (emphasis supplied)[106]
Even assuming arguendo that Lagamon, Jr.s testimony at
Magpatocs trial could be considered as part of Yungots evidence, we
have previously ruled that [c]ourts are not bound to accept or reject the
whole of the testimony of a witness. They may believe one part and
disbelieve the other part of the testimony. If there are conflicts in the
testimony which cannot be so reconciled as to admit every witness
swearing the truth, the Court adopts that testimony which it believes to
be true, taking into consideration the general character of the witness,
his manner and demeanor on the stand while testifying, the consistency
or inconsistency of his statements, their probability or improbability, his
ability and willingness to speak the truth, his intelligence and means of
knowledge, his motive to speak the truth or swear a falsehood. [107] As it
were, the trial court aptly found the testimony of Lagamon, Jr. to be
clear, straightforward, convincing and ringing with sincerity.
Nonetheless, even if we were to consider Lagamon, Jr.s entire
testimony as unreliable, unworthy of belief and undeserving of credence
because of some inconsistency in his testimony, particularly regarding
the identity of Celis assailant, Yungots active participation in the crimes
charged was positively asserted by another eyewitness for the
prosecution, Jose Oyson. In other words, Yungots conviction was based
not only on Lagamon, Jr.s testimony but also on the testimony of
another eyewitness, Jose Oyson, who categorically testified that:
PROSECUTOR DAYANGHIRANG III:
xxx xxx.
Q: Accused Yungot also declared before this court that on said date
May 24, 1987 during the benefit dance held at the back of
Aldevinco Shopping Center, he did not leave the dancing
place during the duration of the dance party. What can you
say to that declaration?
A: That is not true.
Q: If you know, where did Yungot go on the said date?
A: They were at the Davao Fiesta.
Q: What time did he go to the Davao Fiesta? On May 24, 1987?
A: About 8:30.
Q: 8:30 in the evening?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: When you said we, who were your companions who went to the
Davao Fiesta on May 24, 1987 at 8:30 in the evening?
A: Alias Jun Driver, Edwin Yungot, Rommel Magpatoc, Jun Laos,
Joe Dalman, Jun Suaner, Edi, Allen Ledesma, Dodong
Cahiwat and me.
COURT:
Q: What time was it when you and the group you mentioned left the
dancing place in order to go to the Barrio Fiesta?
A: About 7:30.
COURT:
Proceed.
PROSECUTOR DAYANGHIRANG III:
Q: 7:30 in the evening?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: So the declaration of the other accused Magpatoc that they never
left the dancing (sic) party during the whole duation (sic) of
May 24, 1987 in the evening is also not true?
A: Not true.
Q: The 2 accused Yungot and Magpatoc declared before the Court
that they have no participation in the stabbing incident on the
evening of May 24, 1987 which resulted to (sic) the death of
Oscar Celis and Gernie Sumagaysay which incident is now
subject of these 2 criminal cases. What can you say to that?
ATTY. MONTEJO:
It is not covered by the offer. The offer is only to rebut the
testimony that they never left the dancing place.
PROSECUTOR DAYANGHIRANG III:
It is in the record, Your Honor.
STENOGRAPHER:
(Reading back the offer of testimony by the Public Prosecutor and
the last question propounded by the Public Prosecutor.)
COURT:
It is there.
A: That is not true.
PROSECUTOR DAYANGHIRANG III:
Q: You said the declaration of the 2 accused is not true. What is the
participation of Edwin Yungot to that stabbing incident which
resulted to (sic) the death of Oscar Celis and Jernie
Sumagaysay?
A: They were really the ones who stabbed. The three (3) of them.
Q: Who were the three (3) who stabbed?
A: Edwin Yungot, Rommel Magpatoc and Josel Ayala.
Q: Did you see these three (3) stab the victims?
A: Yes, sir.
 Q: How far were you from the stabbing of the 2 victims?
A: About seven (7) meters.
Q: The scene of the stabbing incident, was it well-lighted?
A: Yes, sir.
xxx xxx. (emphasis supplied)[108]
Furthermore, the following circumstances, duly established by the
evidence for the prosecution, which Yungots defense of alibi could not
surmount, proved that Yungot was one of those who participated in the
killing of Celis and Sumagaysay and is, therefore, guilty beyond
reasonable doubt:
1. Yungot was positively identified by his companions on the night of
May 24, 1987, Jonathan Abellana and Jose Oyson, as one of those who
were drinking with them at the Davao Barrio Fiesta; and by Jose
Lagamon, Jr. who was also drinking at the Davao Barrio Fiesta with
Celis and Sumagaysay.
2. Yungot and his companions left the Davao Barrio Fiesta after three
hours.
3. Celis, Sumagaysay, Lagamon, Jr. and Barol left the Davao Barrio
Fiesta and walked towards Claveria St.
4. Yungot was one of the five or six persons involved in the stabbing
incident, three or four of whom were armed.
5. Celis and Sumagaysay each died of a stab wound inflicted using a
single-bladed weapon.
6. Immediately after the commission of the crimes, Yungot and
Magpatoc resorted to flight.
7. Prosecution witnesses Jose Oyson, Jose Lagamon, Jr. and Jonathan
Abellana were not shown to have any cause to testify falsely against
Yungot.
The inconsistencies between the testimony of Lagamon, Jr. and
Jose Oysons testimony, particularly, the manner how Celis and
Sumagaysay were attacked,[109] and the number of persons involved in
the stabbing incident,[110] as further pointed out by Yungot, are more
apparent than real, if not altogether immaterial and
insignificant. Concededly, some inconsistencies may be noted; they are,
however, not so material and substantial as to affect the credibility of
the said witnesses; thus there is no compelling reason to disturb the
findings of the trial court in this regard.
We now tackle the issue of whether treachery and conspiracy
attended the commission of the crimes. Yungots allegation that the trial
court erred in appreciating the presence of treachery and conspiracy, is
not supported by the records.
In People vs. Rivera,[111] we held that:
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against
the person, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution
thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without
risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might
make. Thus, for treachery or alevosia to be appreciated as a qualifying
circumstance, the prosecution must establish the concurrence of two (2)
conditions: (a) that at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a
position to defend himself; and (b) that the offender consciously
adopted the particular means, method or form of attack employed by
him.[112]
Indeed, the foregoing requisites were evidently present in the case at
bar. Accused-appellant Yungots attack, coming from behind, on the
unarmed Oscar Celis, was sudden, unprovoked, unexpected and
deliberate. To ensure or afford impunity, three (3) other persons were
holding Celis while he was being stabbed by Yungot. Clearly, under
these circumstances, Celis was in no position and without any means to
defend himself. The attack was done in a manner which directly and
specially insured the execution of the act without any risk to Yungot
arising from the defense which Celis might have made. Thus, as
correctly held by the trial court, treachery was present in this case,
qualifying the crime to murder.
We are also in agreement with the trial courts finding that there
was conspiracy between the accused-appellants, as alleged in the
informations. As enunciated by the trial court:
xxx xxx.
Conspiracy of both the two accused and the others who participated in
the stabbing was clearly proven by the evidence independent of the
crime itself. It was shown that there was a unity of purpose of the two
(2) accused and the others and the intention to stab the two victims
simultaneously. When the two accused left the Davao Barrio Fiesta with
the others immediately after the two victims and their two companions
left said place, there was already the intention and plan to inflict injury
upon the two victims. xxx xxx.[113]
Conspiracy, as alleged in the informations, was convincingly
established. There is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an
agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit
it.[114] Conspiracy may be deduced from the mode and manner by which
the offense was perpetrated, or inferred from acts of the accused
themselves when such point to a joint purpose and design, concerted
action and community of interest. [115] In this case, the prosecution
established that accused-appellants, Yungot and Magpatoc, and their
companions left the Davao Barrio Fiesta right after Celis, Sumagaysay
and their companions left the said place, with the intention to do harm
to Celis, Sumagaysay and their two (2) companions. Coming from
behind, Yungot stabbed Celis while three (3) others held and restrained
him; and simultaneously or almost at the same time, Magpatoc rode on
Sumagaysays back and stabbed him. Yungot and Magpatoc each
inflicted one fatal stab wound which caused the death of the
victims. These concerted actions of accused-appellants reveal their
common intent to harm Celis and Sumagaysay, if not cause them death.
In sum, we find no reason to disturb the findings of the trial court
that the prosecution witnesses are more credible, that their testimonies
were clear, straightforward, convincing and rigning (sic) with sincerity
and that there was, as well, no reason for them to testify falsely against
the accused-appellants, specially since the trial court had the
opportunity to observe the witnesses demeanor and deportment on the
witness stand, hence, its assessment of the credibility of the witnesses,
is entitled to great respect. It may not be amiss to reiterate that on the
issue of credibility of witnesses, appellate courts will not disturb the
findings arrived at by the trial court, which was certainly in a better
position to rate the credibility of the witnesses after hearing them and
observing their deportment and manner of testifying during the
trial. This rule stands absent any showing that certain facts and
circumstances of weight and value have been overlooked,
misinterpreted or misapplied by the trial court which, if considered,
would affect the result or outcome of the case. [116] There is no such
showing in this case, notwithstanding the valiant efforts of counsels for
accused-appellants to create such an impression.
In like manner, accused-appellant Rommel Magpatoc, in his
defense, submits that the credibility of prosecution witnesses, Jose
Lagamon, Jr. and Jose Oyson, are suspect, pointing out several material
and substantial inconsistencies in their respective testimonies which
were simply overlooked and not considered by the trial court.
As to Lagamon, Jr.s testimony, Magpatoc cites the following
inconsistencies: first, the distance between Lagamon, Jr. and the two
victims at the time of the stabbing incident; second, the number of
persons who attacked the victims; third, the number of assailants who
were armed with knives; fourth, the act of the person who pointed a
knife at Lagamon, Jr.; fifth, the identity of the person who stabbed Oscar
Celis; and sixth, Lagamon, Jr.s reaction when he was threatened by one
of the assailants.[117] As to Jose Oysons testimony, Magpatoc points out
the following inconsistencies: first, the identity of the
assailants; second, the number of assailants; third, the unusual incident
or conversation at the Barrio Fiesta; and fourth, the activities/purpose of
the Looban Young Killers group.[118] Magpatoc likewise cites the
inconsistency between Oysons testimony and that of Dr. Pagsaligan as
to the relative positions of the victims and their assailants at the time of
the stabbing incident.[119]
After a careful and thorough review of the evidence on record,
particularly the testimonies of the witnesses, the Court notes that these
alleged inconsistencies refer, at best, only to trivial, minor, and
insignificant details and slight variations. In People vs. Alolod,[120] we
held that:
xxx xxx. Recollection of different witnesses with respect to time, place
and other circumstances of a criminal event would naturally differ in
various details. Not all persons who witness an incident are impressed
in the same manner and it is but natural that in relating their
impressions, they disagree on the minor details and that there be
contradictions in their testimonies. Witnesses cannot be expected to
recollect with exactitude every minute detail of an event. This is
especially true when the witnesses testify as to facts which transpired in
rapid succession, attended by flurry and excitement. The testimony of
each witness should not be expected to be identical to and coinciding
with each other. It is enough that the principal points covered by their
testimonies are established although they do not dovetail in all details
which would even prove well-rehearsed and studied declarations. If
witnesses should agree as to every detail of a transaction which
occupied a considerable space of time, and should undertake to tell all
that occurred in precisely the same order, each giving the same incident
as the other in precisely the same words, that fact would be of itself a
suspicious circumstance.[121]
The alleged inconsistencies bear no materiality to the commission
of the crimes imputed against accused-appellants. As pointed out by the
Solicitor General, xxx xxx. [t]hese [seeming] discrepancies may be
attributed to the fact that the witnesses were called to relate the incident
almost five years after it transpired. It is not unusual for a witness to a
startling occurrence, not to vividly and exactly remember minute details
of the occurrence, such as [the] number and location of the wounds
inflicted on the victim[s] especially, when he was called to testify only
after a lapse of almost five years. xxx xxx.[122] Trivial incongruities
within a testimony and between testimonies likewise do not impair the
credibility of the witness/witnesses. Minor lapses are to be expected
when a person is recounting details of a traumatic experience too
painful to recall. In fact, the discordance in the testimonies of witnesses
on minor matters heightens their credibility and shows that their
testimonies were not coached or rehearsed, especially where there is
consistency in relating the principal occurrence and positive
identification of the assailant.[123]
Moreover, accused-appellant Magpatoc bewails the supposed
failure of prosecution witness Jose Lagamon, Jr. to promptly report the
crimes to the authorities; and assails the delay of prosecution witness
Jose Oyson in testifying before the trial court.
The contention is untenable.
This Court has already taken judicial notice of the actuality that
witnesses in this country are usually reluctant to volunteer information
about a criminal case or are unwilling to be involved in or dragged into
criminal investigations.[124] The initial reluctance to volunteer
information about a criminal case and/or the unwillingness to be
involved in a criminal investigation due to fear of reprisal are common
and have been judicially declared to have no effect on credibility.[125]
Finally, Magpatoc alleges that the trial court erred in disregarding
evidence of his good moral character. The allegation has no
merit. In People vs. Cerelegia,[126] we ruled that xxx xxx. [i]t is true that
the good moral character of an accused having reference to the moral
trait involved in the offense charged may be proven by him. But an
accused is not entitled to an acquittal simply because of his previous
good moral character and exemplary conduct if the Court believes he is
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. The affirmance or
reversal of his conviction must be resolved on the basic issue of whether
the prosecution had discharged its duty of proving his guilt beyond
peradventure of doubt.[127] After reviewing the evidence in this case, we
are convinced that the prosecution has satisfactorily overcome the
presumption of innocence accorded to every accused and that accused-
appellants, Yungot and Magpatoc are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime charged; thus, evidence of good moral character will not
prevail.
Regarding accused-appellants mutual defense of alibi, we rule
that the trial court correctly rejected their alibi since it was not
physically impossible for both accused-appellants to be at the scene of
the crime at the time of its commission. We have ruled, time and again,
that alibi is the weakest of all defenses and cannot stand against strong
and positive identification, as in this case. [128]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed judgment of
the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Branch 16, in Criminal Case
Nos. 15,377-87 and 15,378-87, finding accused-appellants, Edwin
Yungot and Rommel Magpatoc guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
murder on two counts, and sentencing each of them to reclusion
perpetua for each count, and ordering them to pay the offended partly,
jointly and severally, the amount of P50,000.00 as indemnity, and
P50,000.00 as moral damages in each case and the amount of
P12,000.00 and P13,990.00 as actual damages in Criminal Cases Nos.
15,377-87 and 15,378-87, respectively, is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 120468. August 15, 2001]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. LOPE
LIWANAG y BUENAVENTURA, SANDY SIMBULAN y
GARCIA and RAMIL VENDIBIL y CASTRO, accused.
LOPE LIWANAG y BUENAVENTURA, accused-appellant.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Accused-appellant Lope Liwanag y Buenaventura, and his co-
accused Randy Simbulan and Ramil Vendibil, were charged with the
crime of highway robbery with multiple rape in an Information [1]which
reads, thus:
That on or about the 27th day of April, 1992, in the Municipality of
Paraaque, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with an icepick,
conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping and aiding
one another, with intent to gain and by means of force, violence and
intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously,
take, rob and divest from the complainant, Corazon Hernandez y Delfin
the amount of P60.00; That on the occasion thereof, the above-named
accused, conspiring and confederating together and each of them
mutually helping and aiding one another and by means of force and
intimidation, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
one at a time have carnal knowledge of the said complainant, inside the
Levitown Subdivision, Paraaque, Metro Manila, against her will and
consent;
That accused Randy Simbulan y Garcia, who is allegedly 14 years old,
has acted with discernment in the commission of the offense; and
That the aggravating circumstance of that means employed or
circumstance brought about which add ignominy to the natural effect of
the act where one of the accused, by means of force and intimidation,
caused the victim to suck his penis made the effect of the crime more
humiliating to the victim, attended the commission of the offense.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
During the arraignment, all of them pleaded not guilty to the
charge. Accused Randy Simbulan and Ramil Vendibil were earlier
released on recognizance, and were later ordered rearrested for their
failure to appear at the scheduled hearings. However, the warrants for
their arrest were not implemented. Trial on the merits, thus, ensued only
against accused-appellant Lope Liwanag y Buenaventura.
Complainant Corazon Hernandez was on her way home to
Paraaque at around 1:00 oclock in the early morning of April 27,
1992. Upon reaching the tricycle terminal at Doa Soledad St., Better
Living Subdivision, Paraaque, Metro Manila, she was offered by
tricycle driver Ramil Vendibil a special trip, which means that she
would be brought right in front of her house. She agreed and boarded
the tricycle.While they were about to leave, Randy Simbulan and Lope
Liwanag also rode the tricycle behind the driver. When they reached
India Street, Lope Liwanag entered the sidecar and sat beside
complainant. He immediately grabbed complainants shoulder, pointed
an instrument at the side of her neck, and declared a hold-up. Surprised
and fearing for her life, complainant told accused-appellant that she
only had sixty pesos (P60.00) in her bag. Accused-appellant Lope
Liwanag instructed Randy Simbulan to get her bag.
While the tricycle was traversing the road leading to the
municipal building of Paraaque, accused-appellant informed
complainant that since they could not get anything from her anyway,
she might as well submit herself to them. Then, accused-appellant
began kissing complainant and touching her private parts. Randy
Simbulan, meanwhile, inserted his finger into complainants vagina.
As they were entering Levitown Subdivision, accused-appellant
ordered complainant to act naturally while they passed the
guardhouse. Once they got through, accused-appellant asked her to give
in to his desire, and then, he again began touching her private
parts. Complainant answered that she would rather be killed than accede
to his desire. This prompted accused-appellant to hit her with an icepick
on the abdomen.
Upon reaching a vacant lot, accused-appellant ordered Vendibil to
stop the tricycle. He then tried to strangle complainant, causing her to
fall down from her seat and lose consciousness. When she regained
consciousness, she was forced to board the tricycle. Again, they rode
around the village. Accused-appellant tried to strangle her with a
bandana and ordered her to remove her underwear. When she refused,
accused-appellant himself removed her underwear, opened his pant
zipper and forced her to sit on his lap. Complainant struggled, so
accused-appellant ordered the tricycle to stop and dragged complainant
out. Accused-appellant then brought complainant to a grassy vacant lot
and forced himself on her. After satisfying his lust, they again boarded
the tricycle and accused-appellant informed complainant that his
companions would follow. Complainants pleas were in vain. After a few
minutes of driving around, they came upon another vacant lot where
accused-appellant and Vendibil dragged complainant. There, Vendibil
forced complainant to put his penis into her mouth. Unsatisfied,
Vendibil forced her to lie down and succeeded in having sexual
intercourse with her while accused-appellant and Simbulan
watched. Thereafter, Simbulan took his turn. After he satisfied his lust,
they talked of killing complainant.
Complainant pleaded for her life and, in desperation, she offered
them money in exchange for her life. Accused-appellant asked her if she
can produce P10,000.00, but she said she could not. Accused-appellant
lowered his demand to P5,000.00. They negotiated until they finally
agreed on the sum of P2,000.00. Accused-appellant instructed
complainant to deliver the money at Guadalupe, Makati. She was to
place the amount inside a bag together with a sandwich she was to buy
at Burger Machine. They agreed to meet at 11:30 that same
morning. When they finally let go of her, complainant proceeded to a
church. At daybreak, she went home and told her mother the whole
incident. Together, they proceeded to the Fort Bonifacio police station
and reported the matter. The police, in turn, devised an entrapment
operation.
At the appointed hour, complainant went to Guadalupe, Makati,
bringing with her an envelope containing pieces of plain
paper. Accused-appellant arrived after 45 minutes. Complainant handed
the envelope to him, then she ran away. Accused-appellant also ran and
boarded a bus, but he was collared and arrested by the police.
Dr. Louella Nario, Medico Legal Officer of the National Bureau
of Investigation conducted an examination on the complainant and
issued a medical certificate[2] with the following findings:
Extragenital Physical Injuries:
Abrasions, linear, leg, right, upper third, anterior aspect, 4.8 cms., in
length and left, lower third, anterior aspect, 4.7 cm. in length.
Contused abrasion, epigastric region, 2.4 x 0.3 cm.
Contusions, reddish, mandibular region, right side, 1.8 x 1.5 cm. and
left side, 2.0 x 1.0 cms.; neck, lateral aspect, right side, 5.5 x 0.5 cms.,
and 9.8 x 0.5 cms. and 2.5 x 0.5 cms. deltoid region, left side, 2.4 x 1.3
cms. purplish, deltoid region, left side, 4.2 x 2.5 cms.
Genital Examination:
Pubic hair, fully grown, abundant. Labia majora and minora,
gaping. Fourchette, lax. Vestibular mucosa, congested, with fresh
superficial abrasion at the fossa navicularis. Hymen, thick, short,
intact.Hymenal orifice, annular, admits a tube, 2.0 cms., in diameter
with moderate resistance. Vagina walls, tight. Rugosities, prominent.
Conclusion:
1. The above-described extragenital physical injuries noted on the body
of the subject at the time of examination.
2. Genital injury present.
Accused-appellant denied the accusation against him. He claimed
that at around 12:00 oclock midnight of April 27, 1992, he was at his
house at Texas Street, Better Living Subdivision, Paraaque, Metro
Manila. His uncle, Emilio Changco, dropped by and, together with
Ponciano Buenaventura and Hermenegildo Liwanag, they had a
drinking session up to 3:00 oclock in the morning. At around 4:00
oclock in the morning, Changco left and accused-appellant went to
sleep. He woke up at 7:30 in the morning to prepare for his trip to San
Miguel, Bulacan to see his grandfather.
He alleged that while waiting for a ride in front of Jollibee at
Guadalupe, Makati, he was arrested by policemen in civilian clothes for
being a rebel soldier, based on a mark on his right fist indicating his
membership in the Guardians Luzon, an association of soldiers. He was
brought to Fort Bonifacio where he allegedly met for the first time
Randy Simbulan and Ramil Vendibil. He claimed that the three of them
were beaten and subjected to electric shocks. He also claimed that
policemen forced his co-accused to point to him.
On April 17, 1995, a decision [3] was rendered by the Regional
Trial Court of Makati, Branch 138, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Lope Liwanag y Buenaventura
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of having violated Presidential
Decree No. 532, known as the Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery
Law of 1974. Considering that on the occasion of the highway robbery,
rape was committed, a situation which calls for the imposition of death
penalty under Presidential Decree No. 532 but which penalty was still
proscribed at the time of the commission of the offense alleged in the
Information, said accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua, the penalty next lower in degree (People v. Miranda,
235 SCRA 202). He is further ordered to indemnify the complainant
Corazon Hernandez of the amount of One Million Pesos
(P1,000,000.00) representing moral damages; P20,000.00 as litigation
expenses and attorneys fees and to return the P60.00 taken from
her. Filing fees due on the award shall be a lien on the amount which
may be recovered by the complainant from the accused.
As to the two other co-accused, Randy Simbulan and Ramil Vendibil,
trial of the case shall therefore continue.
Aggrieved by the trial courts decision, accused-appellant
interposed the instant appeal assigning as errors the following:
1. The trial court erred in convicting accused-appellant notwithstanding
the fact that he was deprived of his constitutional right to effective and
competent counsel, and, consequently, other constitutional rights
afforded an accused;
2. The trial court erred in convicting accused-appellant notwithstanding
that there was no sufficient evidence positively identifying him as the
perpetrator of the crime charged;
3. The trial court erred in convicting accused-appellant in spite of the
inconsistencies that tainted the evidence for the prosecution;
4. The trial court erred in convicting accused-appellant in spite of the
improbability of the manner by which the crime was allegedly
committed;
5. The trial court erred in convicting accused-appellant inspite of
complainants failure to offer any resistance prior to and even during her
alleged rape; and
6. The trial court erred in disregarding the defense of accused-appellant
as a mere alibi.
Accused-appellant submits that he was deprived of his
constitutional right to counsel under Article III, Section 14, (2) of the
1987 Constitution which provides, thus:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent
until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by
himself and counsel, x x x. (Italics supplied)
As a consequence, accused-appellant claims that from the time he
was arrested up to the time of his conviction, he was deprived of his
other constitutional rights, particularly his right to be secure in his
person against unreasonable searches and seizures, [4] his right to
preliminary investigation,[5] and his right to bail.[6]
In addition, accused-appellant claims that the assistance extended
to him by his former counsel was ineffective to the extent that private
complainant, as well as prosecution witnesses SPO1 Armando P. Sevilla
and Editha Hernandez, were hardly cross-examined, while Dra. Louella
Nario was not cross-examined at all.
In any case, accused-appellant claims that he could not have
committed the crime being imputed to him as he was engaged in a
drinking session at the very moment when the alleged crime was
committed.
Accused-appellant maintains that the trial court erred in
convicting him because: 1) the prosecution failed to provide sufficient
evidence positively identifying him as the perpetrator of the crime; 2)
inconsistencies tainted the prosecution evidence; 3) the manner by
which the crime was committed was improbable; and, 4) complainant
failed to offer any resistance prior to and even during her alleged rape.
This appeal revolves primarily on the issue of whether accused-
appellant was denied his constitutionally guaranteed right to be heard by
himself and counsel. He argues that his right to be heard through his
counsel means that he should be effectively assisted by counsel
throughout the proceedings, from the time he was arrested up to the
time judgment is rendered.
The records show that at the start of the proceedings before the
trial court, accused-appellant was represented by counsel de officio,
Atty. William T. Uy of the Public Attorneys Office. In the middle of the
trial, accused-appellant retained the services of counsel de parte Atty.
Bienvenido R. Brioso, replacing Atty. Uy. After the trial court rendered
the judgment of conviction, Atty. Brioso filed the Notice of Appeal on
behalf of accused-appellant. Atty. Brioso, however, failed to file the
appellants brief because of the refusal of accused-appellants mother to
transmit the entire records of the case to him. Thus, accused-appellant
was required to manifest whether he still desired to be represented by
Atty. Brioso in this appeal. Upon accused-appellants failure to reply,
Atty. Francis Ed. Lim was appointed counsel de officio.
There is no dispute that accused-appellant was provided with a
counsel de officio who assisted him during the arraignment and
conducted the cross examination of all prosecution witnesses as well as
his direct examination. Thereafter, from the time he was cross-examined
up to the presentation of other defense witnesses, he was assisted by a
counsel of his choice.
Accused-appellants citation of People v. Holgado[7] and Powell v.
Alabama,[8] insofar as the right to be heard by counsel is concerned, is
misleading. Both cases only defined the right to be heard by counsel as
the right to be assisted by counsel. It cannot be inferred from these cases
that the right to be heard by counsel presupposes the right to an
intelligent counsel. The requirement is not for counsel to be intelligent,
but to be effective.
Jurisprudence defined the meaning of effective counsel only in
the light of Article III, Section 12 (1) of the Constitution, which refers
to the right of persons under custodial investigation. In People v.
Lucero,[9] the rationale for this constitutional right was elucidated by this
Court, to wit:
The 1987 Constitution requires that a person under investigation for the
commission of a crime should be provided with counsel. We have
constitutionalized the right to counsel because of our hostility against
the use of duress and other undue influence in extracting confessions
from a suspect. Force and fraud tarnish confessions and render them
inadmissible. In providing for said right, this Court has held in the same
case that when the Constitution requires the right to counsel, it did not
mean any kind of counsel but effective and vigilant counsel. The
requirements of effectiveness and vigilance of counsel during that stage
before arraignment were for the purposes of guarding against the use of
duress and other undue influence in extracting confessions which may
taint them and render them inadmissible. (Italics supplied)
On the other hand, Article III, Section 14 (2) of the 1987
Constitution requires that the accused shall enjoy the right to be heard
by himself and counsel. The reason for the latter provision was
explained in People v. Holgado, thus:
One of the great principles of justice guaranteed by our Constitution is
that no person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due
process of law, and that all accused shall enjoy the right to be heard by
himself and counsel. In criminal cases there can be no fair hearing
unless the accused be given an opportunity to be heard by counsel. The
right to be heard would be of little avail if it does not include the right to
be heard by counsel. Even the most intelligent or educated may have no
skill in the science of the law, particularly in the rules of procedure,
and, without counsel, he may be convicted not because he is guilty but
because he does not know how to establish his innocence. And this can
happen more easily to persons who are ignorant or uneducated. It is for
this reason that the right to be assisted by counsel is deemed so
important that it has become a constitutional right and it is so
implemented that under our rules of procedure it is not enough for the
Court to apprise an accused of his right to have an attorney, it is not
enough to ask him whether he desires the aid of an attorney, but it is
essential that the court should assign one de oficio for him if he so
desires and he is poor or grant him a reasonable time to procure an
attorney of his own.[10] (Italics supplied)
In essence, the right to be heard by counsel simply refers to the
right to be assisted by counsel for the purpose of ensuring that an
accused is not denied the collateral right to due process, a fundamental
right which cannot be waived by an accused. The underlying basis for
due process is the concept of fairness, without which there can be no
justice. In other words, there can be no due process accorded an accused
if he is not given the right to be heard through counsel or assisted by
counsel. It follows that in order to be heard, and therefore be accorded
due process, the assistance given by counsel must be effective as
implied in the rationale of Article III, Section 14 (2). In this sense, this
Court subscribes to American jurisprudence when it held that [t]he right
of an accused to counsel is beyond question a fundamental
right. Without counsel, the right to a fair trial itself would be of little
consequence, for it is through counsel that the accused secures his other
rights. In other words, the right to counsel is the right to effective
assistance of counsel.[11]
In the light of the above ratiocination, accused-appellant contends
that the right to be heard by counsel is the right to effective assistance of
counsel. Citing Strickland v. Washington,[12] accused-appellant contends
that the assistance rendered by counsel is ineffective or is defective if
the following elements are present: (1) that counsels performance was
deficient, which requires a showing that counsel was not functioning as
the counsel guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment; and (2)
that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense, which requires a
showing that counsels errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant
of a fair trial, a trial which result is reliable. Accused-appellant claims
that the assistance afforded him by his counsel during the course of the
trial was ineffective since the counsel de officio failed to safeguard his
rights necessary for the reversal of his conviction.
One of the rights which accused-appellant contends his
counsel de officio failed to safeguard was his right to be secure in his
person against unreasonable searches and seizures as enshrined in the
Bill of Rights. He claims that his right was violated when he was
arrested without a warrant which his counsel should have contested.
Accused-appellants argument is not well-taken. As reiterated
in People v. Costelo:[13]
[A]ppellants failure to quash the information, his participation in the
trial and presenting evidence in his behalf, placed him in estoppel to
make such challenge. He has patently waived any objection or
irregularities and is deemed as having submitted himself to the
jurisdiction of the court. It should be noted that the legality of arrest
affects only the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the
accused.Consequently, if objection on such ground is waived, the
illegality of the arrest is not sufficient reason for setting aside an
otherwise valid judgment rendered after the trial, free from error. The
technicality cannot render the subsequent proceedings void and deprive
the State of its right to convict the guilty when the facts on the record
point to the culpability of the accused. (Italics supplied)
Any objection involving a warrant of arrest must be made before
he enters his plea, otherwise the objection is deemed waived. [14]
Accused-appellant, likewise, claims that he was deprived of his
right to a preliminary investigation. Had his counsel de oficio been
effective, he should have filed the proper motion on his behalf.
There is no merit in this contention.
Considering that accused-appellant submitted himself to the
jurisdiction of the trial court, he is deemed to have waived his right to
preliminary investigation.
As aptly stated in People v. Buluran:[15]
The failure to accord appellants their right to preliminary investigation
did not impair the validity of the information nor affect the jurisdiction
of the trial court. While the right to preliminary investigation is a
substantive right and not a mere formal or technical right of the
accused, nevertheless, the right to preliminary investigation is deemed
waived when the accused fails to invoke it before or at the time of
entering a plea at arraignment. It appearing that appellants only raised
the issue of lack of preliminary investigation during appeal, their right
to a preliminary investigation was deemed waived when they entered
their respective pleas of not guilty.[16]
Accused-appellant next contends that he was deprived of his right
to bail. He contends that had his counsel de officio been effective, he
would have filed the proper motion.
The contention is without any merit. As ruled by this Court
in People v. Manes:[17]
The issue of bail has been rendered academic by the conviction of the
accused. When an accused is charged with a capital offense, or an
offense punishable by reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment or death,
and evidence of guilt is strong, bail must be denied, as it is neither a
matter of right nor of discretion.
In the case of Strickland,[18] the United States Supreme Court:
Judicial scrutiny of counsels performance must be highly deferential. It
is all too tempting for a defendant to secondguess counsels assistance
after conviction or adverse sentence, and it is all too easy for a court,
examining counsels defense after it has proved unsuccessful, to
conclude that a particular act or omission of counsel was
unreasonable. A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that
every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to
reconstruct the circumstances of counsels challenged conduct, and to
evaluate the conduct from counsels perspective at the time. Because of
the difficulties inherent in making the evaluation, a court must indulge a
strong presumption that counsels conduct falls within the wide range of
reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome
the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action
might be considered sound trial strategy. There are countless ways to
provide effective assistance in any given case. Even the best criminal
defense attorneys would not defend a particular client in the same way.
 In showing the ineffectiveness of the assistance rendered by
counsel de officio, accused-appellant points out the following:
The private complainant, whose testimony was the principal basis of the
conviction, was hardly cross-examined. The same is true with
prosecution witnesses SPO1 Armando P. Sevilla and Editha
Hernandez.In fact, prosecution witness Dra. Louella Nario was not
cross-examined at all.
As a result of the insufficient cross-examination of the witnesses for the
prosecution, particularly the private complainant, the defense of the
accused-appellant failed to bring to the attention of the trial court
several matters which amplify the improbability, if not impossibility, in
the complainants testimony on how the crime was allegedly
committed. Thus, the defense was not able to highlight several crucial
points, among which are: (1) the impossibility that the alleged crime,
particularly the rape, was committed in a populated area - an inhabited
and well-developed subdivision in Paraaque, with a 24-hour store
(Burger Machine) at that - without being noticed; (2) the fact that,
assuming that accused-appellant had carnal knowledge of the
complainant, the latter did not offer any form of resistance; and (3) the
impossibility that after the crime charged was allegedly committed,
accused-appellant and his co-accused gentlemanly accompanied
complainant to a place of her choice (the church).
Moreover, several questions remained unanswered. For example (1)
What time did the complainant report the incident to the police?; (2)
How long did the police plan the alleged entrapment?; (3) Were there
other officers involved in the entrapment?; and (4) Why was the money
and other materials used for entrapment not presented in evidence?
Furthermore, there were also no attempts to impeach the testimony of
the private complainant on the scene of the crime through the use of
contradictory evidence as provided in the Rules. For instance, accused-
appellants counsel could have presented a resident of the subdivision
where the crime was allegedly committed to describe the area. Such
witness can establish: (1) whether or not the area where the crime was
allegedly committed was indeed too dark for anyone to notice the
commission of the alleged crime; (2) whether or not the houses in the
subdivision are indeed too far apart that occurrences outside one house
would not be discernible from within; and (3) whether or not the
location of the houses in the subdivision is such that it would indeed be
useless for a woman, faced with the threat of rape to even attempt to ask
for help.
We are not convinced. The assistance extended by Attorney Uy of
the Public Attorneys Office was sufficiently effective. As noted by the
Office of the Solicitor General, to wit:
The pertinent transcripts of stenographic notes would show that
appellants counsel de oficio, Atty. William Uy, cross-examined the
private complainant extensively as well as two other prosecution
witnesses (SPO1 Sevilla and Edith Hernandez). That said counsel opted
not to cross-examine the prosecution expert witness, Dr. Louella Nario,
is of no moment because said witness merely explained in court her
findings and conclusions that she had arrived at after conducting the
medical examination on the private complainant [Exhibit C] (TSN,
March 30, 1993, pp. 10-12). In fact, at one point, Atty. Uy raised an
objection to the private prosecutors question on how private
complainants genital injuries were sustained for being incompetent to
answer, which objection was impliedly sustained by the trial judge
(Ibid., p. 13).
In assessing the effectiveness of counsels assistance,
the Strickland standard invoked by accused-appellant is too stringent for
application in Philippine judicial setting. Strickland only seeks to ensure
that the adversarial testing process is present in a case by requiring that
the assistance rendered by counsel be effective. The presence of an
adversarial testing process, in other words, ensures that the trial is fair
by according the accused due process through the effective assistance of
counsel.
While fairness is likewise the object of Article III, Section 14 (2)
of the Philippine Constitution, the assistance afforded by counsel to an
accused in light of the Philippine constitutional requirement need only
be in accordance with the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court, the
Code of Professional Responsibility and the Canons of Professional
Ethics. In Philippine judicial setting, a counsel assisting an accused is
presumed to be providing all the necessary legal defense which are
reasonable under the circumstances in accordance with said norms.
In this regard, a counsel assisting an accused is guided by the
following provisions of Section 20 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court:
Sec. 20. Duties of attorneys. -- It is the duty of an attorney:
xxxxxxxxx
(c) To counsel or maintain such actions or proceedings only as appear to
him to be just, and such defenses only as he believes to be honestly
debatable under the law;
(d) To employ, for the purpose of maintaining the causes confided to
him, such means only as are consistent with truth and honor, and never
seek to mislead the judge or any judicial officer by an artifice or false
statement of fact or law;
xxxxxxxxx
(h) Never to reject, for any consideration personal to himself, the cause
of the defenseless or oppressed;
(i) In the defense of a person accused of crime, by all fair and
honorable means, regardless of his personal opinion as to the guilt of
the accused, to present every defense that the law permits, to the end
that no person may be deprived of life or liberty, but by due process of
law. (Italics supplied)
The following canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
likewise, provide:
Canon 2 -- A lawyer shall make his legal services available in an
efficient and convenient manner compatible with the independence,
integrity and effectiveness of the profession.
xxxxxxxxx
Canon 12 -- A lawyer shall exert every effort and consider it his duty to
assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice.
xxxxxxxxx
Canon 17 -- A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he
shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him.
Canon 18 -- A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and
diligence.
xxxxxxxxx
Canon 19 -- A lawyer shall represent his client with zeal within the
bounds of the law.
Lastly, the Canons of Professional Ethics provide:
4. A lawyer assigned as counsel for an indigent prisoner ought not to
ask to be excused for any trivial reason and should always exert his best
efforts in his behalf.
5. It is the right of the lawyer to undertake the defense of a person
accused of crime, regardless of his personal opinion as to the guilt of the
accused; otherwise, innocent persons, victims only of suspicious
circumstances, might be denied proper defense. Having undertaken such
defense, the lawyer is bound, by all fair and honorable means, to present
every defense that the law of the land permits, to the end that no person
may be deprived of life or liberty but by due process of law.
15. x x x x x x x x x
The lawyer owes entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal
in the maintenance and defense of his rights and the exertion of his
utmost learning and ability, to the end that nothing be taken or be
withheld from him, save by the rules of law, legally applied. No fear of
judicial disfavor or public unpopularity should restrain him from the full
discharge of his duty. In the judicial forum the client is entitled to the
benefit of any and every remedy and defense that is authorized by the
law of the land, and he may expect his lawyer to assert every such
remedy or defense. But it is steadfastly to be borne in mind that the
great trust of the lawyer is to be performed within and not without the
bounds of the law. The office of attorney does not permit, much less
does it demand of him for any client, violation of law or any manner of
fraud or chicanery. He must obey his own conscience and not that of his
client.
The above-cited norms are more than adequate to guide a
counsels conduct in the performance of his duty to assist a client in an
effective manner as required by Article III, Section 14 (2). Said
constitutional provision is patterned after the Sixth Amendment of the
American Constitution. As in Article III, Section 14 (2), the Sixth
Amendment refers simply to counsel, not specifying particular
requirements of effective assistance. It relies instead on the legal
professions maintenance of standards sufficient to justify the laws
presumption that counsel will fulfill the role in the adversary process
that the Amendment envisions. The proper measure of attorney
performance remains simply reasonableness under prevailing
professional norms.[19]
Coupled with the presumption that counsels performance was
reasonable under the circumstances, as long as the trial was fair in that
the accused was accorded due process by means of an effective
assistance of counsel, then the constitutional requirement that an
accused shall have the right to be heard by himself and counsel is
satisfied. The only instance when the quality of counsels assistance can
be questioned is when an accused is deprived of his right to due
process. Otherwise, there is the danger that questioning counsels acts or
omissions in the conduct of his duties as counsel for an accused may
breed more unwanted consequences than merely upholding an accuseds
constitutional right or raising the standard of the legal profession.
In the case at bar, accused-appellants right to due process has
been observed and the trial was conducted in a fair manner. Corollarily,
this Court sees no reason to doubt or overcome the presumption that
counsel de officio reasonably assisted accused-appellant in accordance
with the prevailing norms of professional conduct and his sworn duties
as an officer of the court.
Based on the findings of the trial court, accused-appellant was not
at all prejudiced by the alleged ineffectiveness of his counsel. The
alleged failures by his counsel to safeguard his rights from the time he
was arrested up to the time he was sentenced and the alleged
inadequacies in the direct and cross-examinations of prosecution
witnesses were ultimately inconsequential to the eventual outcome of
the case. If at all, the outcome was the result of the strength of the
prosecution evidence rather than the failures and inadequacies in the
conduct of the defense as shown by the following:
First, counsels decision to adopt the defense of denial and alibi as
part of the trial strategy merely highlighted the strength of the
prosecution evidence. While its adoption may have been dictated by the
factual circumstances of the case as perceived by accused-appellant,
however, denial is an inherently weak defense vis--vis the positive and
categorical assertion of prosecution witnesses. In fact, the trial court
found accused-appellants denial to be self-serving.
Like denial, accused-appellants alibi was not looked upon with
favor by the trial court. Not only is it one of the weakest defenses due to
its being capable of easy fabrication, it also cannot prevail over
witnesses positive identification of accused-appellant as the perpetrator
of the crime. In any event, for the defense of alibi to prosper, it is not
enough that the accused can prove his being at another place at the time
of its commission, it is likewise essential that he can show physical
impossibility for him to be at the locus delicti.[20] The trial court found
accused-appellants and his witnesses testimonies on the formers alibi
unconvincing.
In the instant case, accused-appellant claims that he was engaged
in a drinking session with some persons at their house in Texas Street,
Better Living Subdivision at about the time when the crime was
committed until 3:00 oclock in the morning. However, Better Living
Subdivision is adjacent to Levitown Subdivision, where the rape was
committed. In fact, it was in Better Living Subdivision where
complainant was robbed and sexually molested prior to being raped at
Levitown Subdivision.
Second, accused-appellant also points to alleged discrepancies
between some of complainants accounts in her sworn statement and
some of her declarations in her direct testimony regarding the position
of accused relative to that of complainant, the kind of instrument used
to threaten complainant and the person who got complainants
money. The apparent discrepancies, however, only refer to immaterial
or irrelevant details. Complainant was consistent in her narration in her
sworn statement as well as during her direct examination and even in
the cross-examination regarding the roles played by the three accused in
the commission of the crime.
A Sinumpaang Salaysay or a sworn statement is merely a short
narrative subscribed to by the complainant in question and answer
form. Thus, it is only to be expected that it is not as exhaustive as ones
testimony in open court. The contradictions, if any, may be explained by
the fact that an affidavit can not possibly disclose the details in their
entirety, and may inaccurately describe, without deponent detecting it,
some of the occurrences narrated. Being taken ex-parte, an affidavit is
almost always incomplete and often inaccurate, sometimes from partial
suggestions, and sometimes from the want of suggestions and
inquiries. It has thus been held that affidavits are generally subordinated
in importance to open court declarations because the former are often
executed when an affiants mental faculties are not in such a state as to
afford her a fair opportunity of narrating in full the incident which has
transpired. Further, affidavits are not complete reproductions of what
the declarant has in mind because they are generally prepared by the
administering officer and the affiant simply signs them after the same
have been read to her.[21]
In People v. Mangat,[22] this Court has reiterated the doctrine that
discrepancies between sworn statements and testimonies made at the
witness stand do not necessarily discredit the witness. Sworn
statements/affidavits are generally subordinated in importance to open
court declarations because the former are often executed when an
affiants mental faculties are not in such a state as to afford him a fair
opportunity of narrating in full the incident which has
transpired. Testimonies given during trials are much more exact and
elaborate. Thus testimonial evidence carries more weight than
statements/affidavits.
Third, accused-appellant alleges that complainant failed to offer
any resistance prior to or even during her alleged rape thereby
concluding that it could have been consensual. She did not ask for help
when the alleged rape took place in a populated area. She likewise did
not try to escape when she had the opportunity to do so.
This Court finds the above argument specious and
unmeritorious. It should be noted that accused-appellant was
brandishing an icepick which clearly showed his readiness to use the
same by hitting complainant with it. Besides, she testified that she was
already weak and tired to be able to do anything against three
malefactors who were stronger than her. It would have been foolhardy
for complainant to resist the accused considering her weakened
condition. The workings of a human mind placed under emotional stress
are unpredictable and people react differently - some may shout, some
may faint, and some may be shocked into insensibility while others may
openly welcome the intrusion. In any case, the law does not impose
upon a rape victim the burden of proving resistance. Physical resistance
need not be established in rape when intimidation is exercised upon the
victim and she submits herself against her will to the rapists lust
because of fear for life and personal safety.[23]
Lastly, complainant positively pointed at accused-appellant as one
of the perpetrators of the crime. Accused-appellant could not show any
reason why complainant would point him as one of the perpetrators of
the crime. It is settled that where there is no evidence to show any
dubious reason or improper motive why a prosecution witness would
testify falsely against an accused or falsely implicate him in a crime, the
testimony is worthy of full faith and credit.[24]
The trial court ordered accused-appellant to pay complainant
moral damages in the amount of P1,000,000.00. This award must be
reduced to P50,000.00. The purpose of this award is not to enrich the
victim but to compensate her for injuries to her feelings. Moreover,
moral damages for rape is fixed at P50,000.00.[25]
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 138, finding accused-appellant
Lope Liwanag guilty of violating P.D. No. 532 and sentencing him to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, to indemnify complainant
Corazon Hernandez P20,000.00 as litigation expenses and attorneys
fees and to return the P60.00 is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION
that the amount of moral damages is reduced to P50,000.00. Costs
against accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
[A.M. No. RTJ-01-1610. October 5, 2001]
ATTY. EDGAR H. TALINGDAN, complainant, vs. JUDGE
HENEDINO P. EDUARTE, RTC-Br. 20, Cauayan,
Isabela, respondent.
RESOLUTION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
Atty. Edgar H. Talingdan, a private practitioner, charges
respondent Judge Henedino P. Eduarte, RTC-Br. 20, Cauayan, Isabela,
with improvidently issuing a warrant of arrest in Crim. Case No. Br. 20-
1373 for libel without the requisite preliminary investigation being first
conducted by the Office of the Public Prosecutor.
Specifically, complainant alleged in his Letter-Complaint dated 14
June 2000 that sometime in April 2000 elements of the PNP Bambang,
Nueva Vizcaya stormed into his residence to arrest him and his client,
Modesto Luzano, on the strength of a Warrant of Arrest dated 12 April
2000[1] issued by respondent Judge Eduarte in Crim. Case No. Br. 20-
1373 entitled "People v. Edgar Talingdan and Modesto Luzano" of the
RTC-Br. 20, Cauayan, Isabela for the supposed crime of libel. Surprised
that such a case existed against him and his client as they had not been
previously charged, complainant filed a Very Urgent Motion to Quash
and/or Set Aside Warrant of Arrest and Direct Prosecutors Office to
Conduct Preliminary Investigation dated 5 May 2000 asking that the
Warrant of Arrest be set aside for being premature since they had not
been previously notified of the charge against them and no preliminary
investigation was ever conducted by the public prosecutors office yet,
and for being defective since the amount of bail was not specified
therein in violation of their constitutional right to bail. Respondent
Judge granted the motion and recalled the warrant of arrest in an Order
dated 12 May 2000 admitting that he issued the same under the
mistaken belief that a preliminary investigation had already been
conducted and an information already filed in court.
Complainant nonetheless filed this administrative case allegedly
to help the Court in purging the Judiciary of those who undermine its
dignity and credibility as his faith therein was almost eroded by the
unfortunate incident.
In his Comments dated 28 August 2000[2] respondent Judge did
not deny that he issued the improvident warrant of arrest. He only
alleged by way of explanation and exculpation that on 24 March 2000 a
complaint for libel was directly filed with the RTC-Br. 19, Cauayan,
Isabela, by Leoncio Dalin Sr. which was docketed as Crim. Case No.
2881. The case was assigned to his sala after raffle and was re-docketed
as Crim. Case No. Br. 20-1373. The records of the case then went to the
Criminal Docket Clerk, Ms. Imelda Severino who, under the Check List
for Criminal Cases[3] that he had prepared for her, was supposed to
verify from the records first whether an information had already been
filed and if there was, to prepare the corresponding warrant of arrest if
the accused had not yet been arrested. Thus when he saw the Warrant of
Arrest prepared by Ms. Severino in Crim. Case No. Br. 20-1373, he
signed the same honestly thinking that she had faithfully complied first
with her duty of going over the records of the case. Respondent Judge
assured the Court that the incident was a simple mistake on his part and
that he had not been actuated by malice, corrupt motive, or improper
consideration in its commission.
We referred this case on 17 January 2001 to the Presiding Justice,
Court of Appeals, for assignment who would conduct an investigation
and thereafter submit a report and recommendation within ninety (90)
days from notice.[4]
In his Report and Recommendation[5] Associate Justice Salvador
J. Valdez, Jr. recommended that respondent Judge be adjudged guilty as
charged and fined Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) for the
improvident issuance of the Warrant of Arrest in Crim. Case No. Br. 20-
1373.
We find the recommendation to be well-taken and adopt the same.
Enshrined in our Constitution is the rule that "[n]o x x x warrant
of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of
the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing x x x the persons x x x to be seized."[6] Interpreting the words
"personal determination" we said[7] that it does not thereby mean that
judges are obliged to conduct the personal examination of the
complainant and his witnesses themselves. To require thus would be to
unduly laden them with preliminary examinations and investigations of
criminal complaints instead of concentrating on hearing and deciding
cases filed before them. Rather what is emphasized merely is
the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy
himself as to the existence of probable cause. To this end he may: (a)
personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted
by the prosecutor regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the
basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (b) if on the basis thereof he
finds no probable cause, disregard the prosecutors report and require the
submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in
determining its existence. What he is never allowed to do is follow
blindly the prosecutors bare certification as to the existence of probable
cause. Much more is required by the constitutional provision.Judges
have to go over the report, the affidavits, the transcript of stenographic
notes if any, and other documents supporting the prosecutors
certification. Although the extent of the judges personal examination
depends on the circumstances of each case, to be sure, he cannot just
rely on the bare certification alone but must go beyond it. This is
because the warrant of arrest issues not on the strength of the
certification standing alone but because of the records which sustain it.
[8]
He should even call for the complainant and the witnesses to answer
the courts probing questions when the circumstances warrant. [9]
In the case at bench respondent Judge not only failed to follow the
required procedure but worse, was negligent enough not to have noticed
that there was not even a prosecutor's certification to rely upon since no
information had even been filed yet in court, and that Crim. Case No.
Br. 20-1373 was merely docketed as such on the strength of a mere
complaint filed by the private complainant Leoncio Dalin Sr.
himself. Respondent Judge admitted that he signed the Warrant of
Arrest against complainant and the latters client simply because it was
presented to him for signature by the Criminal Docket Clerk. There was
thus a total and unwarranted abdication of a judicial
function. Respondent cannot exculpate himself from administrative
liability by contending that the mistake was entirely attributable to the
Criminal Docket Clerk who failed to faithfully comply with her "duty"
of going over the records of criminal cases and ensuring first that an
information had already been filed in court before preparing the warrant
of arrest. As we have already repeatedly said, a judge cannot take refuge
behind the inefficiency of his court personnel for they are not guardians
of his responsibilities.[10] More importantly the responsibility delegated
by respondent was clearly unauthorized and unwarranted, as already
explained above. He cannot without abandoning his judicial obligation
just instruct the Criminal Docket Clerk, through the much
vaunted Check List for Criminal Cases that he had prepared for her to
follow, to automatically prepare warrants of arrest simply because
informations have been filed against the accused. Although respondents
purpose in preparing the Check List, i.e., to help him comply with RA
8493 otherwise known as the Speedy Trial Act of 1998, [11] may be
considered laudable, we have already said that shortcuts in judicial
processes are to be avoided when they impede rather than promote a
judicious dispensation of justice.[12] Much more when, as in the instant
case, the shortcut amounted to a violation of a constitutional provision.
A judge fails in his bounden duty if he relies merely on the
certification of the investigating officer as to the existence of probable
cause[13] making him administratively liable. We can do no less in the
case of herein respondent who issued the subject warrant of arrest
without even such certification to rely upon, and worse, merely at the
instance of the Criminal Docket Clerk who mechanically typed the
Warrant of Arrest for his signature.
ACCORDINGLY, respondent Judge Henedino P. Eduarte, RTC-
Br. 20, Cauayan, Isabela, is FINED P10,000.00 for improvidently
issuing the Warrant of Arrest dated 12 April 2000 in Crim. Case No. Br.
20-1373 in violation of the constitutional requirement of personal
determination by the issuing judge as to the existence of probable
cause. He is WARNED that any repetition of the procedure he had
heretofore observed in the issuance of warrants of arrest will merit a
more severe sanction.
SO ORDERED.
[G. R. Nos. 140900 & 140911. August 15, 2001]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs. RODERICK LICAYAN @ RUDY, ROBERTO LARA
@ TUNGKOY/UNYOK, PEDRO MABANSAG @
PUTOL (At large), ALEX PLACIO (At large), JOJO
 SAJORGO (At large), ALLAN PLACIO (At large), NOEL
DELOS REYES (At large), DODONG ADOLFO (At
large), and BENJIE MABANSAG (At large), accused,
RODERICK LICAYAN @ RUDY, ROBERTO LARA @
TUNGKOY/UNYOK, accused-appellants.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
This is an automatic review of the Consolidated Decision, [1] dated
September 9, 1999, of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 272, Marikina
City, finding accused-appellants Roderick Licayan and Roberto Lara
guilty of Kidnapping for Ransom under Art. 267 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended, and sentencing them to suffer the penalty of death
by lethal injection and to indemnify private complainants in the amount
of P100,000.00, as moral and exemplary damages, and the additional
amount of P20,000.00 for Private Complainant Joseph Co as actual
damages. Accused-appellants were acquitted of the crime of Robbery.
The Information[2] for Kidnapping for Ransom against accused-
appellants and their other co-accused charged -
That on or about August 10, 1998 at around 1:45 a.m., the above-named
accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another,
armed with a handgun and with evident premeditation, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with the use of force and
intimidation kidnap JOSEPH TOMAS CO and LINDA MANAYSAY
for the purpose of extorting ransom in the amount of P10 million at
Goodies Pares Mami House located at Loyola cor. Constancia St.,
Sampaloc, Manila, owned and managed by the aforementioned victim
Co and thereafter took them with the use of Toyota Tamaraw FX
likewise owned by Co as getaway vehicle to a house in Daang Bakal,
Parang, Marikina and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court
where they were kept under detention against their will until they were
able to escape the following day at around 4:30 in the afternoon on
August 11, 1998.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
The Information[3] for Robbery charged -
That on or about August 10 and 11, 1998 at Daang Bakal, Parang,
Marikina City and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, armed with a handgun and with intent to gain,
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping each other, by means of
force and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously take and divested JOSEPH TOMAS CO and LINDA
MANAYSAY of the following personal properties after forcible taking
them as hostages for ransom, to wit:
1. Wallet of Co containing his drivers license, original copy
of official receipt (OR), certificate of registration
(CR) of his two (2) L-300 vans;
2. Bank time deposit certificate at Metrobank, Valenzuela Branch;
3. Casio G-Shock watch;
4. Necklace and earrings of Manaysay; and
5. P10,000.00 cash
to the damage and prejudice of said victim as owners thereof
against their will.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
The facts are as follows:
Complainant Joseph Tomas Co owns a restaurant called Goodies
Pares Mami House with branches in Valenzuela, Cubao, and Sampaloc.
[4]
Cos regular routine was for him and the other complainant, Linda
Manaysay, the restaurants cashier and accounting officer, to make the
rounds of the three branches for inspection and collection of left-over
food and cash sales. The rounds would normally begin late in the
evening and last until early in the morning of the next day. [5] The
prosecution evidence shows that on August 9, 1998, complainant went
to the Goodies Valenzuela Branch where they stayed until midnight.
[6]
From there, they proceeded to the Cubao branch where they stayed
until about 12:45a.m., August 10, 1998. Their last stop was at the
Sampaloc branch which they visited at 1:30 a.m.[7]
While Co was at the Sampaloc branch, supervising the loading of
left-over food into the back of his Tamaraw FX service vehicle, three
men approached him from behind. When Co saw the men, he asked
what they wanted. The men were armed with two caliber .45 pistols and
a .38 revolver. None of the men wore any masks.[8]
Co told the men that if they wanted money, they could get it from
the store. The men refused to get money from the store. Without any
warning, one of the mens guns went off. When Manaysay heard the
shot, she came out and asked the men what they wanted. She told them
that they could get money from the store, but they refused to do so.
[9]
Instead, complainants were made to board the rear of the Tamaraw
FX.[10] Two of the mens companions were already seated in the front
seat. The man in the drivers seat asked Co for the key to the vehicle.
[11]
The three other men also boarded the vehicle with the
complainants. Co identified accused-appellant Roderick Licayan as one
of his five abductors.[12]
Co said their hands were tied and their eyes taped, and that they
were made to wear caps over their heads as the vehicle reached Quezon
Avenue in Quezon City.[13] After 45 minutes, Co said he felt the vehicle
stop. The rear door was opened and he heard the voices of people
approaching the vehicle.
Complainants were brought inside a room of a house made of
light materials and which had no ceiling. [14] They were made to sit on
the floor.[15] Then, they were transferred to another room where the
covers of their eyes were removed and their feet were tied. Manaysay
testified that she saw accused-appellants in the house after the masking
tape was removed from their eyes. [16] Cos wallet which contained
P5,000.00 in cash and his watch and Manaysays necklace and earrings
were taken from them.[17] A person was left to guard them inside the
room, whom both complainants identified as accused-appellant Roberto
Lara.[18]
After about two hours, Manaysay told Co that she wanted to
urinate. Hence, Co asked their guard if Manaysay could go outside to do
it.[19] The guard left and came back with a half-gallon container which
he gave Manaysay to urinate in.
Co tried talking to the guard and pleaded with him to let tem
go. But the guard replied that he was just following orders. Co offered
him some money which he had, but the guard did not accept the money
and instead threw it away.[20]
The guard later fell asleep and Co and Manaysay somehow
managed to escape without being noticed by the look-out outside their
room.[21] After running for several meters, complainants took refuge in a
house. An old woman living in the house allowed them to use the
telephone from which Co was able to call the Marikina Police
Headquarters.[22] The woman told them that they were in Kaolin St.,
Twinriver Subdivision, Parang, Marikina.[23] Two police officers from
the Marikina police arrived, followed by a police SWAT team.
[24]
Complainants case was later turned over to the Presidential Anti-
Organized Crime Task Force (PAOCTF) for investigation.[25]
On August 11, 1998, at around 6:30 p.m., members of the
PAOCTF raided the safehouse at Daang Bakal, Parang, Marikina where
Co and Manaysay had been held captive. [26] A man seen running away
was arrested by SPO3 Ismael Fajardo Jr.[27] Upon being questioned, the
man identified himself as accused-appellant Roberto Lara. [28] SPO3
Fajardo identified accused-appellant Lara from photographs shown to
him in court as the man he arrested. [29] Lara pointed to accused-
appellant Licayan as one of his companions and told the PAOCTF
members that Lara was hiding in his (Laras) uncles house at the back of
the San Mateo Rizal Municipal Hall. The PAOCTF members thereafter
proceeded to the house and were able to arrest accused-appellant
Licayan.[30]
Lara and Licayan were thereafter brought to the PAOCTF
headquarters in Camp Crame where they were identified by Co and
Manaysay in a line-up consisting of Lara, Licayan, and eight PAOCTF
members.[31]
Benjamin Co, complainant Joseph Thomas Cos brother, testified
that he was twice called in his office by unidentified persons who
demanded P10 million for the release of complainants. [32] The
kidnappers were of course frustrated as complainants were able to
escape.
Accused-appellants defense is alibi. Accused-appellant Licayan
claimed that on August 11, 1998, at around 7:00 p.m., he was at home in
Sta. Cecilia Village, San Mateo Rizal, having dinner with Nicolas
Salvivia, a dump truck driver; [33] that on the next day, August 12, 1998,
he was arrested by members of the PAOCTF while he was having
drinks with Salvivia and Salvivias father at the latters residence in Sta.
Cecilia Village;[34] and that when he was arrested, he was not informed
of the charges against him. He said he only learned that he was arrested
for the kidnapping of complainants after he had been brought to Camp
Crame.[35]
 In Camp Crame, he and his co-accused were handcuffed and
made to stand in a police-line up. They were not assisted by counsel.
[36]
The complainants pointed to him and Lara as part of the group who
kidnapped complainants.[37] Licayan claimed he only saw complainant
Co for the first time when he (Licayan) was brought to Camp Crame. [38]
On the other hand, accused-appellant Lara, a construction worker,
testified that from 7:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. of August 10, 1998, he was in
his place of work in Antipolo. [39] At 7:00 a.m. of August 11, 1999, he
went home to Novaliches, stopping by the house of his uncle, Pedro
Mabansag, in Parang, Marikina. Mabansag had driven Laras family out
of his house and Lara had gone there to get his childs belongings.
[40]
However, before he could do so, he was arrested by the Marikina
Police at Greenheights.[41]
Lara wanted to ask his cousin Nicolas Salvivia for help. [42] The
police beat him up and told him that they would go to Salvivias
house. He was made to board a van where his head was covered with a
plastic bag and he was again beaten up. [43] The police found Salvivia
and Licayan in Salvivias house and ordered the two to drop to the
ground.[44] The police poked a gun to Laras head and told him to
identify his companions, otherwise he would be killed. Thus, according
to Lara, he pointed to Licayan.[45]
Lara claimed that at Camp Crame, after he and Licayan were
identified by complainants in a police line-up, they were forced to sign
a statement.[46] They were not informed of their right to remain silent
and to be assisted by counsel.[47] Lara denied that Atty. Confesor B.
Sansano, who appeared to have assisted him in making his statement,
actually assisted him.[48]
After trial, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 272, Marikina City,
rendered its decision acquitting accused-appellants of robbery but
convicting them of kidnapping and sentencing them to death and to pay
damages to complainants. The dispositive portion of its decision states:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding RODERICK
LICAYAN and ROBERTO LARA GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
for the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom penalized under Article 267 of
the Revised Penal Code in relation to R.A. 7659, and imposing upon
both of them the penalty of death by lethal injection and the solidary
payment to each of the victims the amount of One Hundred Thousand
(P100,000.00) Pesos as moral and exemplary damages and an additional
amount of Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00) Pesos for Joseph Co as actual
damages for the valuables taken from him.However, both accused are
acquitted for the crime of robbery for the reasons previously discussed
in keeping with the constitutional presumption of innocence of any man
whose guilt is not within the standard of moral certainty. The cases
against the other accused Pedro Mabansag @ Tata Pandak, Jose
Sajorgo, Allan Placio, Noel Delos Reyes, Dodong Adolfo and Benjie
Mabansag who all remain at large are ordered archived and let alias
warrants for their arrest be issued.
Hence, this appeal. Accused-appellants contend that -
I. THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING
FULL CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONIES OF
PROSECUTION WITNESSES DESPITE THE
MANIFEST INCONSISTENCIES IN THEIR
TESTIMONIES.
II. THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT
RULING THAT THE ACCUSED APPELLANTS
WERE ILLEGALLY ARRESTED, AND THE
CIRCUMSTANCES UNDER WHICH THEY WERE
ARRESTED DO NOT FALL UNDER THE
WARRANTLESS ARREST.
III. ASSUMING IN ARGUENDO THAT THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANTS ARE GUILTY, THE COURT A
QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANTS ACTED IN
CONSPIRACY WITH THE OTHER CO-
ACCUSED AND IN NOT FINDING THAT THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANTS PARTICIPATION IN
THE COMMISSION OF THE CRIME AS MERE
ACCOMPLICES.
The Court finds the appeal to be without merit.
First. As in all criminal cases where conviction or acquittal
depends almost entirely on the victims positive identification of the
culprit, the basic issue presented in the case at bar deals with the
credibility of the complainants. For this purpose, the assessment of the
evidence by the trial court is given the highest degree of respect because
of the judges opportunity to observe directly the demeanor of the
witnesses on the stand.[49]
Accused-appellants make much of complainants failure to
remember the physical features and characteristics of their
abductors. The following testimony on cross-examination of
complainant Joseph Tomas Co is cited:
ATTY. LARACAS:
You were not able... Mr. Witness, the person who investigated you
did not require you to prepare any sketch of these three
persons who were in front of you at the FX?
WITNESS:
No maam.
ATTY. LARACAS:
Because you cannot very recall what their faces?
WITNESS:
No maam.
xx xx xx xx
ATTY. LARACAS:
Now, Mr. Witness, you were seated at the rar (rear[sic]) portion of
the FX, you cannot see the faces of the person driving the FX
and that man seated at the front portion.
WITNESS:
Yes maam.[50]
With respect to complainant Manaysay, the following portion of
her answer on cross-examination is cited:
ATTY. LARRACAS:
Of course, Madam Witness when you were seated at the place
where you said you were seated, you cannot see the faces of
the persons at the two section of the FX?
A: The person in front of us I was able to see, maam.
Q: The person who you saw which you said was seated in front of at
the back of FX is not of the two persons who are inside the
courtroom?
A: None, maam.
xx xx xx xx
Q: So Madam Witness, you said that there was a curtain which
separates the room and the curtain was always spread out
during that time that you were inside?
A: Yes, maam.
ATTY. LARRACAS:
Q: So you did not see the faces of the persons outside that curtain?
A: Just their feet maam. [51]
Whether or nor complainants saw the faces of any or all the
abductors while they were inside the vehicle is immaterial. What is
important is that complainants positively identified accused-appellants
as among those who abducted them on August 10, 1998. Complainant
Co said that accused-appellant Lara guarded them in the kidnappers
safehouse on August 10, 1998, while Licayan guarded them the next
day, August 11, 1998.[52] In the police line-up conducted on the same
day that complainants escaped, complainant Co was able to identify and
point to accused-appellants as part of the group of men who took part in
their kidnapping.[53] On the other hand, complainant Manaysay
positively identified accused-appellant Licayan as one of two persons
she saw when the tapes placed over their eyes were removed in the
safehouse.[54] Like Co, she identified accused-appellant Lara as the
person who guarded them in their room when they first arrived there
and as the person who brought her a half-gallon container in response to
her request to go out so she could urinate. [55] She said she and Co tried
to offer accused-appellant Lara money to help them escape, but he
refused the money and threw it away.[56] And like Co, Linda Manaysay
was also able to identify and point to accused-appellants during the
police line-up in Camp Crame as their abductors.[57]
Having heard the witnesses themselves and observed their
deportment and manner of testifying, [58] the trial court had reason to
declare:
[Complainants] assertions as to the identities of the accused were made
in a clear straightforward and frank manner and their testimonies are
compatible on material points and should be respected considering the
lengthy visible exposure of the accused to the victims from the time of
the kidnapping and up to the time of their escape x x x[59]
 In the light of complainants positive identification of accused-
appellants, the latters defense of alibi must fail. Alibi is an inherently
weak defense and must be rejected when the accused's identity is
satisfactorily and categorically established by the eyewitnesses to the
offense,[60] especially when there is no showing that such eyewitnesses
had any improper motive to testify falsely. [61] In the case at bar, the
defense failed to show that Co and Manaysay were motivated by ill will
in testifying against accused-appellants. It is noteworthy that accused-
appellants self-serving testimonies were not corroborated by other
witnesses.
Second. Accused-appellants contend that their arrest was illegal
because the arresting officers had no personal knowledge that accused-
appellants had committed a crime. Their arrest, according to accused-
appellants, was based only on the information given by complainants.
[62]
Accused-appellants argue that their warrantless arrest does not fall
under any of the cases enumerated in Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure under which warrantless arrests may
validly be made. In addition, accused-appellants claim that after their
arrest, they were already under custodial investigation and, therefore,
should have been informed of their constitutional rights, which the
arresting officers did not do.
We likewise find no merit in this contention.
Upon arraignment, accused-appellants pleaded not guilty without
moving to quash the information on the ground that their arrest was
invalid. Accused-appellants are, therefore, estopped from questioning
the legality of their arrest. Any irregularity attendant to accused-
appellants arrest was cured when they voluntarily submitted to the
jurisdiction of the trial court by entering a plea of not guilty and
participating in the trial.[63]
Anent the claim that they were not assisted by counsel during
their custodial investigation, suffice it to say that the trial court held:
Further, the admission of participation in the commission of the crime
by accused Roberto Lara was made voluntarily, as attested by counsel
de officio who legally assisted him in giving his sworn statement at the
office of the latter, has shown compliance with the constitutional
requirements on pre-interrogation advisories. Albeit an extra-judicial
confession is admissible only against the confessant, jurisprudence
makes it admissible as corroborative evidence of other facts that tend to
establish the guilt of the co-accused (People vs. Suarez, 267 SCRA
119).[64]
Third. Accused-appellants contend that even assuming that the
prosecutions version of the facts is true, they can only be found guilty as
accomplices to the crime [65] because the record does not clearly show
that they acted in conspiracy with the other accused. They maintain that
it was never shown that they directly conspired in abducting the
complainants nor that they were the ones who called and demanded
ransom from Benjamin Co. Accused-appellants assert that, if at all, their
participation was limited only to their act of guarding the victims in the
safehouse. They are mere accomplices since there is no showing that
they knew beforehand the criminal design of their co-accused.
This argument must be rejected.
Conspiracy can be inferred from and proven by acts of the
accused themselves when said acts point to a joint purpose and design,
concerted action, and community of interests. [66] Although the same
degree of proof required for establishing the crime is required to support
a finding of the presence of conspiracy, it need not be proven by direct
evidence. Conspiracy may be deduced from the mode and manner in
which the offense was perpetrated. [67] In the instant case, the trial court
correctly held that conspiracy can be deduced from the acts of accused-
appellant and their co-accused which show a concerted action and
community of interest. By guarding Co and Manaysay and preventing
their escape, accused-appellants exhibited not only their knowledge of
the criminal design of their co-conspirators but also their participation
in its execution.
Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. 7659,
imposes the penalty of death if the person kidnapped is a female or if
the crime was committed for the purpose of extorting ransom from the
victim or any other person. These circumstances being present in this
case, the crime proven to have been committed by accused-appellants is
kidnapping for ransom.
Four (4) Justices of the Court maintain their position that R.A.
7659 is unconstitutional insofar as it prescribes the death penalty;
nevertheless, they submit to the ruling of the majority that the law is
constitutional and the death penalty can be lawfully imposed in the case
at bar.
As already stated, the trial court ordered accused-appellants to pay
jointly and severally each of the complainants the amount of
P100,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages without specifying the
amount of each item of damages.
An award in the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages to each
of the complainants is proper, consistent with the current case law.
[68]
However, no award of exemplary damages can be made considering
the absence of aggravating circumstances. [69] Under Art. 2230 of the
Civil Code, exemplary damages in criminal offenses may be made only
when the crime is committed with one or more aggravating
circumstances. The award of actual damages in this case should
likewise be disallowed. Actual damages must be proved with certainty
and cannot be presumed. No evidence to sustain this award has been
presented in this case.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
272, Marikina City finding accused-appellant RODERICK LICAYAN
and ROBERTO LARA guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Kidnapping for Ransom and sentencing each of them to death is
AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that each of the accused-
appellants is ORDERED to pay P50,000.00 as moral damages to each
of the complainants. The award of P20,000.00 as actual damages made
in favor of complainant Joseph Co is deleted. Costs against accused-
appellants.
In accordance with Section 25 of R.A. 7659, amending Art. 83 of
the Revised Penal Code, upon the finality of this decision, let the
records of this case be forthwith forwarded to the President of the
Philippines for the possible exercise of the pardoning power.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 130805. April 27, 2004]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. TOKOHISA
KIMURA and AKIRA KIZAKI,[1] respondents.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Appellants Tomohisa Kimura and Akira Kizaki seek reversal
of the decision[2] dated June 27, 1997 in Criminal Case No. 94-
5606, rendered by the Regional Trial Court (Branch 66), Makati
City, finding them guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of
Section 4, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended by
R.A. No. 7659, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972, and sentencing each of them to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P500,000.00.
The Information dated August 8, 1994 against the accused
alleges:
The undersigned State Prosecutor of the Department of Justice accuses
TOMOHISA KIMURA and AKIRA KIZAKI of violation of Section 4,
Article II of Republic Act 6425, as amended by R.A. 7659, otherwise
known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, committed as follows:
That on or about June 27, 1994 in Makati, Metro Manila and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously transport and deliver
without lawful authority approximately 40,768 grams of Indian hemp
(marijuana), a prohibited drug, in violation of the aforecited law.
CONTRARY TO LAW. [3]
Upon arraignment on October 10, 1994, the two accused,
through counsel, entered their separate pleas of Not Guilty to the
crime charged;[4] whereupon, the trial of the case ensued.
The testimonies of the following prosecution witnesses, to
wit: SPO4 Juan Baldovino, Jr.,[5] SPO1 Rolando Cabato,[6] SPO1
Edmundo Badua, Chief Inspector Nilo Anso, PO3 Alfredo Cadoy,
SPO1 Manuel Delfin and Forensic Chemist, Police Inspector
Sonia Ludovico, sought to establish the following facts:
In the morning of June 27, 1994, Maj. Anso, head of Delta
Group, Narcotics Command (NARCOM) I, North Metro District
Command, Camp Karingal, Quezon City, received information
from a confidential informant that a certain Koichi Kishi and Rey
Plantilla were engaged in the selling of illegal drugs at the Cash
and Carry Supermarket, Makati City.[7] Acting on said information,
Maj. Anso organized a team composed of SPO4 Baldovino, Jr.,
SPO1 Cabato and PO3 Cadoy to conduct surveillance of the
area.[8] A buy-bust operation was launched and PO3 Cadoy was
designated to act as poseur-buyer and they prepared the buy-
bust money consisting of one P500.00 bill and five pieces
of P100.00 bill.[9]
At around 3:00 in the afternoon of the same day, the team
together with the informant arrived at the Cash and Carry
Supermarket and conducted surveillance of the area.[10] Later, the
informant was able to contact the targets who told him that they
will be arriving at 8:00 in the evening at the parking area of the
Cash and Carry Supermarket.[11] At around 8:00 in the evening,
Koichi and Rey arrived and were met by PO3 Cadoy and the
informant.[12] PO3 Cadoy gave the marked money
worth P1,000.00 to Rey and Koichi who then handed him the
shabu. PO3 Cadoy scratched his head as a pre-arranged signal
of the consummation of the sale. [13] The operatives were about
five meters from the suspects.[14] While the team was
approaching, PO3 Cadoy held Koichi by the hand while Rey
scampered away to the direction of the South Superhighway.
[15]
The team brought Koichi to a safe area within the Cash and
Carry Supermarket and interrogated him. They learned from
Koichi that his friends/suppliers will arrive the same evening to
fetch him.[16] Several minutes later, a white Nissan Sentra car
driven by appellant Kimura with his co-appellant Kizaki seating at
the passenger seat arrived at the parking area. Koichi pointed to
them as the ones who will fetch him. Appellants remained inside
the car for about ten to fifteen minutes.[17] Then, a certain Boy
driving a stainless jeep, without a plate number, arrived and
parked the jeep two to three parking spaces away from the
Sentra car.[18] Boy approached the Sentra car and after a few
minutes, appellants got out of their car. Appellant Kizaki went to
the stainless jeep and sat at the passenger seat. Boy and
appellant Kimura went to the rear of the Sentra car and opened
its trunk.[19] Appellant Kimura got a package wrapped in a
newspaper and gave it to Boy who walked back to his jeep.
[20]
While Maj. Anso and SPO4 Baldovino, Jr. were approaching to
check what was inside the wrapped newspaper, appellant Kimura
ran but was apprehended while Boy was able to board his jeep
and together with appellant Kizaki who was seated at the
passenger seat sped off towards South Superhighway.[21] The
police operatives then inspected the contents of the trunk and
found packages of marijuana.[22] They brought Koichi and
appellant Kimura to the headquarters and turned over the seized
marijuana to the investigator who made markings thereon.[23]Maj.
Anso reported the escape of appellant Kizaki to their
investigation section.[24]
The seized packages which were contained in 3 sacks were
brought to the PNP Crime Laboratory on June 29, 1994.
[25]
Forensic Chemist Sonia Sahagun-Ludovico testified that the
contents of the sacks weighed 40,768 grams and were positive to
the test of marijuana.[26]
On June 29, 1994, appellant Kizaki while having dinner with
his friends at the Nippon Ichi Restaurant located at Mabini,
Malate, Manila[27] was arrested by another NARCOM group led by
Maj. Jose F. Dayco.[28]
Appellants defense is denial and alibi. In support thereof,
both appellants were called to the witness stand.
Appellant Kimuras testimony is as follows: In the afternoon
of June 27, 1994, Kimura was in the house of his co-appellant
Kizaki at Dian Street, Makati City, together with Koichi Kishi, Luis
Carlos and a certain Sally and Boy.[29] In the evening of the said
date, Kimura borrowed the car of Kizaki in order to get his
(Kimuras) television from his house located in Evangelista Street,
near the Cash and Carry Supermarket, and bring the same to a
repair shop.[30] On their way to Kimuras house, Koichi requested
Kimura to pass by Cash and Carry Supermarket because Koichi
needed to meet a certain Rey who was borrowing money from
him. Upon reaching Cash and Carry, Kimura parked the car
about twenty meters from its entrance, then Koichi and Carlos
alighted from the car and Koichi handed something to Rey.
[31]
Shortly thereafter, Koichi and Carlos were grabbed by two
men from behind. Then four men approached the car and one
guy ordered him to sit at the back and together with Koichi and
Carlos, they were all brought to Camp Karingal allegedly for
violating Sec. 4 of Republic Act No. 6425. [32]Kimura was asked
questions about the address and business of Kizaki. Kimura
denied that there was marijuana in the car on the night of June
27, 1994 but claims that he saw marijuana placed at the car trunk
the following day at Camp Karingal. Kizaki was not with him at
Cash and Carry on the night of June 27, 1994. There was no
stainless jeep near the car on the same night. Carlos was
released and was not charged because Kimuras girlfriend, Sally,
served as Carlos guarantor.
On the other hand, appellant Kizaki testified that on the date
that the alleged crime was committed, he was in the company of
his friends, Mr. and Mrs. Takeyama, his co-appellant Kimura, and
his driver Boy and maid Joan at his house in Dian Street, Makati
City;[33] that appellant Kimura borrowed his car on the night of
June 27, 1994 to pick up Kimuras broken TV and bring it to the
repair shop.[34]
Appellant Kizakis alibi was corroborated by Rosario Quintia,
his former housemaid, and his friend, Akiyoshi Takeyama, who
both testified that they were at Kizakis house on the night of June
27, 1994 from 7:00 to 10:00 in the evening and never saw Kizaki
leave the house.[35]
Appellant Kizaki was arrested on June 29, 1994, two days
after the Cash and Carry incident, in the Nippon Ichi Restaurant
located at Mabini, Manila. He was having dinner with Lt. Col.
Rodolfo Tan, Masami Y. Nishino, Anita Takeyama and Akiyoshi
Takeyama. These witnesses executed a joint affidavit[36] and
testified that while they were about to leave the restaurant, a man
got near Kizaki and asked for his passport whom they thought
was from the Immigration. Later, they learned that Kizaki was
brought to Camp Karingal.[37]
On June 27, 1997, the trial court rendered the herein
assailed judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered finding
accused Akira Kizaki and Tomohisa Kimura GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt for violation of Section 4 of Republic Act 6425, as
amended by Republic Act 7659, and the Court hereby sentences them to
suffer, taking into consideration the absence of mitigating or
aggravating circumstances, the amount of marijuana seized from the
accused which weigh 40,768 grams, the penalty of RECLUSION
PERPETUA and to pay a fine of P500,000.00 each.
The Bureau of Immigration and Deportation is hereby ordered to deport
Akira Kizaki and Tomohisa Kimura without further proceedings after
the service of their sentence.
Let the marijuana, the subject matter of this case be immediately
forwarded to the Dangerous Drugs Board for proper disposition.
SO ORDERED.[38]
In convicting appellants, the trial court made the following
findings:
The settled jurisprudence is that alibi is inherently a weak defense. Like
the defense of alibi, denial by the accused of the offense charged against
him is also inherently a weak defense. It is also the settled jurisprudence
that the defense of alibi and denial cannot prosper over the positive
identification of the accused by the prosecution witnesses. For alibi to
prosper, the accused must show that it was impossible for him to have
been at the scene of the commission of the crime at the time of its
commission.
Akira testified that on the evening of June 27, 1994, he was in his house
located at Dian Street corner Ampil Street, Makati City, Metro Manila,
which is a walking distance to Cash and Carry Supermarket, the scene
of the offense. It was not therefore impossible for accused Akira Kizaki
to have been present at the scene of the crime at the time of its
commission.
Accused Kimura testified that on the evening of June 27, 1994, he was
with his co-accused Kizaki at the Cash and Carry Supermarket but for
another purpose, i.e., to meet Rey Plantilla who was borrowing money
from him. In fine accused Kimura merely denied the offense charged
against him, which is weak defense.
Both accused, Kizaki and Kimura, were positively identified by
prosecution witnesses SPO4 Baldomino, SPO1 Cabatu, Maj. Anso and
PO3 Cadoy as the persons whom they arrested for drug trafficking in a
buy-bust operation at the Cash and Carry Supermarket on June 27,
1994.
Finally, although the evidence show that there is a doubt in the illegality
of the arrest of accused Kimura by Major Dayco, the jurisprudence is
that the illegality of warrantless arrest cannot deprive the state of its
right to convict the guilty when all the facts on record point to their
culpability.[39]
Hence, this appeal before us. Appellants assert the
following:
I
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN DISREGARDING
ACCUSED-APPELLANTS DEFENSE.
II
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE
GUILT OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS HAD BEEN PROVEN
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
Appellants claim that although the defense of alibi and
denial are weak, it is still the duty of the prosecution to prove the
guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt to support a
judgment of conviction; that the trial court mainly relied on the
weakness of the defense rather than on the strength of the
evidence for the prosecution. They argue that appellant Kizakis
claim that he was not at the Cash and Carry Supermarket on the
night of June 27, 1994 was corroborated by three independent
witnesses including appellant Kimura who testified that he was
not with appellant Kizaki at Cash and Carry Supermarket on the
said night.
Appellants further question how the trial court could have
been certain that the marijuana presented in court are the same
articles confiscated from the appellants when the arresting
officers did not place identifying marks on the confiscated items.
Appellant Kizaki further contends that he was arrested two
days after the alleged buy-bust operation without a valid warrant
of arrest. He points out that although the trial court expressed
doubts as to the legality of his arrest, it nevertheless convicted
him of the crime charged, which is in violation of the
Constitution. Kizaki argues that he could not have been caught
in flagrante delicto to justify the warrantless arrest when he was
arrested two days after the alleged Cash and Carry incident while
he was only having dinner with his friends at a restaurant.
In the appellees brief, the Solicitor General prays that the
decision of the trial court finding appellants guilty as charged be
affirmed. He argues that appellants were positively identified by
four prosecution witnesses, all police officers, as among the three
persons engaged in the transportation and delivery of about
40,768 grams of marijuana on June 27, 1994 at the Cash and
Carry Supermarket; that the police operatives were able to seize
the marijuana from the Sentra car they were using to transport
the marijuana; that the marijuana introduced and offered at the
trial were positively identified by the arresting officers as those
seized from the car of the appellants; that the contention of
appellant Kizaki that his warrantless arrest two days after the
alleged incident, was unlawful, is legally inconsequential in this
case considering that his conviction was not based on his arrest
on June 29, 1994 but on his having participated in the transport
and delivery of marijuana on June 27, 1994; that appellant
Kizaki never questioned the validity of the warrantless arrest of
his co-appellant Kimura on June 27, 1994, either before the trial
court or before this Court; thus, any challenge against the search
and seizure of the marijuana based on constitutional ground is
deemed waived insofar as appellant Kizaki is concerned.
We will first resolve the issue on the alleged warrantless
arrest of appellant Kizaki.
Appellant Kizaki assails the legality of his warrantless
arrest. Indeed, SPO1 Delfin, one of those who arrested appellant
Kizaki at the Nippon Ichi restaurant, admitted that they did not
have a warrant of arrest when his group arrested Kizaki on the
night of June 29, 1994. Rule 113, Section 5 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure provides that a peace officer or a private
person may, without a warrant, arrest a person only under the
following circumstances:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting
to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has
probable cause to believe based on personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person
to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has
escaped from a penal establishment or place where
he is serving final judgment or is temporarily
confined while his case is pending, or has escaped
while being transferred from one confinement to
another.
The alleged crime happened on June 27, 1994 and
appellant Kizaki was arrested on June 29, 1994 or two days after
the subject incident. At the time appellant Kizaki was arrested, he
was at a restaurant having dinner with a group of friends, thus,
he was not committing or attempting to commit a crime. Neither
was he an escaped prisoner whose arrest could be effected even
without a warrant. It bears stressing that none of the arresting
officers of appellant Kizaki was present on the night of June 27
where appellant Kizaki allegedly sold and transported marijuana
and escaped, thus the arresting officers had no personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that appellant Kizaki
committed the crime. None of the exceptions enumerated above
was present to justify appellant Kizakis warrantless arrest.
However, notwithstanding the unjustified warrantless arrest
of appellant Kizaki, the records show that he did not raise such
question before he pleaded to the offense charged.[40]Neither did
he move to quash the information on that ground before the trial
court.[41] He thus waived objection to the illegality of his arrest.
[42]
Moreover, appellant Kizakis application for bail[43] which was
denied by the trial court likewise constitutes a waiver of his right
to question whatever irregularities and defects which attended his
arrest.[44]
Nevertheless, we find the other claims of appellants
meritorious.
In all prosecutions for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act,
the existence of all dangerous drugs is a sine qua non for
conviction. The dangerous drug is the very corpus delicti of the
crime of violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act.[45]
 In People vs. Casimiro,[46] we acquitted appellant for failure section that was the time when the investigator
of the prosecution to establish the identity of the prohibited drug mark them?
which constitutes the corpus delicti and held:
WITNESS:
In People vs. Mapa, the accused-appellant was granted an acquittal after
the prosecution failed to clarify whether the specimen submitted to the It is already their duty to mark them, your honor.
NBI for laboratory examination was the same one allegedly taken from
the accused. In People vs. Dismuke, this Court ruled that the failure to ...
prove that the specimen of marijuana examined by the forensic chemist
was that seized from the accused was fatal to the prosecutions case. In
ATTY. BALICUD:
People vs. Laxa, the policemen composing the buy-bust team failed to
mark the confiscated marijuana immediately after the alleged
apprehension of the accused-appellant. One policeman admitted that he And did you see if any of those men in the
marked the seized items only after seeing them for the first time in the investigation section did the corresponding
police headquarters. It was held: markings?

This deviation from the standard procedure in the anti-narcotics WITNESS:

operations produces doubts as to the origins of the marijuana. Were the
allegedly confiscated from the scene of the crime the same ones which I did not already see sir.[47]
the investigator marked in the police headquarters? This question gives
rise to surmises and speculations, and cannot prove beyond reasonable The testimony of Maj. Anso was confirmed by SPO4
doubt the guilt of accused-appellant. Baldovino, Jr. when the latter testified on cross-examination as
follows:
In this case, the prosecution failed to prove the crucial first link in the
chain of custody. The prosecution witnesses PO2 Supa, SPO2 Madlon ATTY. SENSON:
and PO3 Piggangay admitted they did not write their initials on the
brick of marijuana immediately after allegedly seizing from accused- Q. When the packages contained in Exhibits B, C and
appellant outside the grocery store but only did so in their headquarters. D were recovered at the car, did you not make
The narcotics field test, which initially identified the seized item as any markings on them, is that correct?
marijuana, was likewise not conducted at the scene of the crime, but
only at the narcotics office. There is thus reasonable doubt as to whether WITNESS:
the item allegedly seized from accused-appellant is the same brick of
marijuana marked by the policemen in their headquarters and given by
A. That is true, sir.[48]
them to the crime laboratory for examination.

SPO4 Baldovino, Jr. further clarified on his re-direct

After examining the evidence for the prosecution, and
examination why no markings were made, thus:
tested in the light of the Casimiro case, we find that the
prosecution failed to establish the identity of the marijuana
allegedly seized from appellants Kimura and Kizaki. Extant in the FISCAL MANABAT:
records were the admissions made by the police operatives of
their failure to place any markings on the seized marijuana Q. Why is it that no markings were made on these
immediately after they had allegedly apprehended appellants, marijuana packages?
thus failing to prove that the marijuana presented in court was the
very same marijuana seized from appellants. Maj. Anso, head of ...
the police operatives, testified on cross-examination as follows:
WITNESS:
ATTY. BALICUD:
We did not put markings there because after we
With respect to the packages which you identified confiscated those packages, there was a press
yesterday, before you showed that to your conference conducted and after that we
investigation section, did you make any markings submitted it to PCCL or Philippine Crime
thereat? Laboratory, sir.[49]

WITNESS: The failure to establish the chain of custody of the evidence

is further shown by the testimony of SPO1 Badua, the person
None, sir. assigned to bring the alleged seized marijuana to the PNP Crime
Laboratory. His testimony is as follows:
ATTY. BALICUD:
PROS. MANABAT:
Did any of your men place any markings at least to
identify that that is the drugs confiscated by you Do you recall your activities on that day, June 29,
at the Cash and Carry? 1994?

WITNESS: WITNESS:

What I know your honor, is that the investigation I was ordered to bring the marijuana to the Crime
section is the one who will mark the evidence. Laboratory.

... PROS. MANABAT:

COURT: Who ordered you to bring the marijuana to the Crime

Laboratory?
You mean to say when you have already
surrender(sic) the shabu(sic) to the investigation WITNESS:
Superintendent Eduardo Cario, sir. PROS. MANABAT:

PROS. MANABAT: ...

Where did this marijuana come from, if you know?
WITNESS:
In our office confiscated from Japanese nationals.
Now, you said that this marijuana was contained in
three sacks, three rice sacks, will you please
examine the sacks and tell us if these are the
same sacks which you brought to the PNP Crime
Laboratory?

PROS. MANABAT: WITNESS:

Do you know the name of the Japanese nationals you Yes, sir, these are the same sacks I brought.
are referring to?
COURT:
WITNESS;
What made you so sure that these are the same sacks
I do not know, sir. that you brought from your office to the Crime
Laboratory?

PROS. MANABAT:
WITNESS:

Can you describe this marijuana which you said you

were required to bring to the PNP Crime Because of the markings A, B, C.
Laboratory?
COURT:
WITNESS:
Who affixed those markings?
They are contained in sacks, sir.
WITNESS:
COURT:
The investigator, sir.
How many sacks?
COURT:
WITNESS:
Did you see the investigator affixed those markings?
Three (3), sir.
WITNESS:
PROS. MANABAT:
Yes, sir.
What kind of sacks were these, can you recall?
COURT:
WITNESS:
Who was the investigator?
Rice sacks.
WITNESSS:
...
SPO1 Delfin, sir.
PROS. MANABAT:
PROS. MANABAT:
Now, if you see this marijuana you said you were
required to bring to the PNP Crime Laboratory Now, what proof do you have that you actually brought
which you described as being contained in three these three sacks of marijuana which you
(3) sacks, will you be able to identify these three identified to the PNP Crime Laboratory?
(3) sacks of marijuana.
WITNESS:
WITNESS:
There is a request for laboratory examination.
Yes, sir.
PROS. MANABAT:
PROS. MANABAT:
Who prepared this request for laboratory examination
Now, I am showing to you SPO1 Badua, there are of the marijuana?
three (3) sacks (sic) here already deposited in
Court, please examine these three (3) sacks WITNESS:
carefully and tell us the relation of these three
sacks to that marijuana contained in sacks which SPO1 Delfin.[50]
you said you were required to bring to PNP
Crime Laboratory. And on cross-examination as follows:

WITNESS: ATTY. BALICUD:

These are the three sacks I brought.

Now, were you present when this request for WITNESS:
laboratory examination was prepared?
Yes, sir.
WITNESS:
ATTY. BALICUD:
Yes, sir.
Why did you open the sacks?
ATTY. BALICUD:
WITNESS:
Who specifically typed the request?
Yes, sir.
WITNESS:
ATTY. BALICUD:
SPO1 Delfin, sir.
Who opened the sacks?
ATTY. BALICUD:
WITNESS:
And this was made on June 28, 1994?
The investigator.
WITNESS:
ATTY. BALICUD:
Yes, sir.
So that they were placed in three sacks?
...
WITNESS:
ATTY. BALICUD:
Yes, sir.
And then about what time on June 28 was it
prepared? ATTY. BALICUD:

WITNESS: And you opened each and every sack?

Morning, sir. WITNESS:

ATTY. BALICUD: Yes, sir.

But then this request was received already by the ATTY. BALICUD:
Crime Laboratory on June 29, 1994, where were
the three sacks deposited from June 28 up to the You brought the same to the Crime Laboratory?
time you picked it up on June 29 to be brought to
the Crime Laboratory?
WITNESS:

WITNESS:
Yes, sir.

It was deposited inside our supply room.

ATTY. BALICUD:

ATTY. BALICUD:
Were there markings in the 3 sacks when the
same were brought to the PNP Crime
Why did you not deposit or deliver it immediately to Laboratory?
the Crime Laboratory?

WITNESS:
WITNESS:

Yes, sir. A, B, C.
We were still preparing the necessary papers.

ATTY. BALICUD:
ATTY. BALICUD:

So that one sack is marked A, the other sack is B

What papers were still being prepared? and the other is marked C.

WITNESS: WITNESS:

Request for laboratory, medical, drug dependency. Yes, sir.

... ATTY. BALICUD:

ATTY. BALICUD:
Now, when the request for laboratory
examination was made, did you already see the
contents inside the sack?
How about the contents of these three sacks, were
they also marked when you brought the same to
the PNP Crime Laboratory?
WITNESS:
 Yes, sir, but it was marked at the Crime Laboratory
already.
ATTY. BALICUD:
So, it is clear that when the alleged marijuana was
brought to the PNP Crime Laboratory, there was
no marking yet?
WITNESS:
Yes, sir. [51]
While SPO1 Baduas testimony showed that it was
investigator SPO1 Delfin who made the markings A, B, C on the
three sacks containing the marijuana which he brought to the
laboratory, nowhere in his testimony did he say that such
markings were made on the night the appellants were arrested,
i.e., on June 27, 1994. Investigator Delfin did not initial said
markings nor did he testify affirming his markings.
Moreover, although the three sacks of alleged marijuana
were marked as A, B, C, the contents of these three sacks
however had no markings when they were kept inside the supply
room on June 28 since as Badua intimated, the contents of these
three sacks were only marked when he brought the same to the
PNP Crime Laboratory on June 29, 1994.
The records of the case do not show that the police
operatives complied with the procedure in the custody of seized
prohibited and regulated drugs as embodied in the Dangerous
Drugs Board Regulation No. 3 Series of 1979 amending Board
Regulation No. 7 Series of 1974,[52] i.e., any apprehending team
having initial custody and control of said drugs and/or
paraphernalia, should immediately after seizure or confiscation,
have the same physically inventoried and photographed in the
presence of the accused, if there be any, and/or his
representative, who shall be required to sign the copies of the
inventory and be given a copy thereof. In this case, there was no
inventory made in the crime scene despite the fact that Maj. Anso
testified that he saw eighteen packages neatly wrapped in a
newspaper but the inventory was made already in the
headquarters. SPO1 Badua testified that the marijuana
confiscated from appellant Kimura was contained in three sacks.
Consequently, the failure of the NARCOM operatives to
place markings on the alleged seized marijuana coupled with
their failure to observe the procedure in the seizure and taking
custody of said drug seriously bring to question the existence of
the seized prohibited drug. It is not positively and convincingly
clear that what was submitted for laboratory examination and
presented in court was actually recovered from the appellants.
Evidently, the prosecution has not proven the indispensable
element of corpus delicti of the crime which failure produces a
grevious doubt as to the guilt of the appellants. In criminal cases,
proof beyond reasonable doubt is required to establish the guilt
of the accused. Similarly, in establishing the corpus
delicti, that unwavering exactitude is necessary. Every fact
necessary to constitute the crime must be established by proof
beyond reasonable doubt.[53]
Although the defense raised by appellants Kimura and
Kizaki were denial and alibi, respectively, which are inherently
weak, we have repeatedly declared that the conviction of the
accused must rest not on the weakness of the defense but on the
strength of the prosecution.[54] The denial of appellant Kimura that
he was caught in the Cash and Carry Supermarket delivering
marijuana on the night of June 27, 1994 may be weak but the
evidence for the prosecution is clearly even weaker. In People
vs. Laxa,[55] we acquitted the appellant for failure of the
prosecution to establish the identity of the prohibited drug which
constitutes the corpus delicti, an essential requirement in a drug
related case. In the present case, the prosecution also failed to
indubitably show the identity of the marijuana which mere
allegedly seized from appellants.
The alibi of appellant Kizaki that he was in his house on the
same night assumes weight and significance considering that the
scenario depicted by the prosecution on the alleged escape of
appellant Kizaki at the Cash and Carry left much to speculations
and surmises. The prosecution tried to show that appellant Kizaki
who was on board the stainless jeep was able to escape even if
the police operatives were only about five meters away from the
jeep[56] which was heading to the entrance of the Cash and Carry
along South Superhighway. It is quite difficult for us to accept its
veracity considering that despite the short distance of the
operatives from the jeep when it started to speed off, the
operatives who were all armed with service revolvers[57] chased
on foot the stainless jeep and did not even fire any warning shot
to stop the driver and appellant Kizaki nor did they fire a shot at
the tire of the jeep to immobilize it.The alibi of Kizaki found
corroboration from his friend Akiyoshi Takeyama and appellant
Kizakis former housemaid Rosaria Quintia that he was in his
house and never left it on the night of the alleged delivery or
transport of marijuana in Cash and Carry Supermarket. In fact,
co-appellant Kimura testified that appellant Kizaki was not one of
his companions in going to Cash and carry Supermarket on June
27, 1994.[58] Moreover, in the request for laboratory examination
dated June 28, 1994, signed by P/CI Jose F. Dayco, Chief,
Investigation Section, NMDU, NARCOM, the suspects named
therein were only Koichi Kishi and Tomohisa Kimura. [59] Hence,
the constitutional presumption of innocence has not been
overcome by the prosecution.
In fine, for failure of the prosecution to establish the guilt of
both appellants beyond reasonable doubt, they must perforce be
exonerated from criminal liability.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court in Criminal
Case No. 94-5606 is hereby REVERSED and appellants
Tomohisa Kimura and Akira Kizaki, are hereby ACQUITTED on
ground of reasonable doubt. They are ordered immediately
released from prison, unless they are being detained for some
other lawful cause. The Director of Prisons is DIRECTED to
inform this Court of the action taken hereon within five (5) days
from receipt hereof.
Let the PNP Director be furnished a copy of herein decision
for the proper information and guidance of his police operatives.
The marijuana is hereby ordered confiscated in favor of the
government for its proper disposition under the law.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
[A.M. No. MTJ-01-1384. April 11, 2002]
RASMIA U. TABAO, complainant, vs. ACTING PRESIDING
JUDGE ACMAD T. BARATAMAN, MTCC, BRANCH 1,
MARAWI CITY, respondent.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
The present administrative case stems from an affidavit-
complaint[1] filed by complainant Rasmia U. Tabao charging respondent
Judge Acmad Barataman, in his capacity as acting presiding judge of
MTCC, Branch 1, Marawi City, with gross ignorance of the law and
grave abuse of discretion.
Complainant Rasmia Tabao is the private complainant in Criminal
Case No. 9106 entitled "People vs. Samsodin M. Tabao" for
abandonment of minor. It appears that on July 16, 1998, respondent
judge issued an Order[2] granting the motion for bail on recognizance
filed by the father of the accused pursuant to R.A. No. 6036. The
motion of the prosecution to cancel bail on the ground that accused is a
certified public accountant and can afford to post cash bond was denied
by respondent judge in an Order dated June 30, 1999, [3] stating that the
law, in allowing bail on recognizance, does not distinguish whether an
accused is rich or poor.
Complainant avers that respondent committed grave abuse of
discretion in granting the motion for bail on recognizance because (1) it
was filed not by the accused but by his father, Hadji Yusoph Tabao; (2)
the prosecutor was not furnished a copy of the motion and there was no
hearing conducted; (3) it lacked the sworn statement of the accused
signed in the presence of two witnesses; and (4) the motion and its
supporting affidavit were signed by the father of the
accused. Complainant also contends that the accused is not poor but is a
certified public accountant and operates a transport business in Metro
Manila.Thus, it is urged that he should not have been released on
recognizance since he could put up a cash bond.
In his comment, respondent judge alleges that the crime of
abandonment of a minor is covered by the Rules on Summary
Procedure and hence bail on recognizance is not required as the court
can immediately arraign and try the accused, pursuant to Section 13 of
the Rules; that if he were the acting judge when the criminal case was
filed, he would not issue a warrant of arrest but order the immediate
arraignment and trial of the case and there would be no need to discuss
the matter of bail; and, that the court can appoint as custodian of the
accused his father, a former City Councilor of Marawi City, who
qualifies as a responsible person under Section 15, Rule 144 of the
Rules of Court.
On November 6, 2001, Court Administrator Presbitero J. Velasco,
Jr. submitted a Memorandum[4] finding respondent judge guilty of gross
ignorance of the law for releasing the accused on recognizance before it
could acquire jurisdiction over his person. The accused was still at large
when the motion for bail was filed. He likewise found the respondent
judge to have violated R.A. No. 6036. He ratiocinated:first, the law
requires that the accused sign in the presence of two witnesses of good
standing in the community a sworn statement binding himself, pending
final decision of his case, to report to the Clerk of Court hearing the
case periodically every two weeks. No such sworn statement was
executed by the accused and; second, in order to be released on
recognizance, the accused must be unable to post bail bond.The accused
is a CPA and can afford to post bond. The Court Administrator
recommends that respondent judge be ordered to pay a fine
of P20,000.00, considering that it is his first offense, with a warning that
a repetition of the same or similar offense shall be dealt with more
severely.
We agree with the finding of the Office of the Court
Administrator. The respondent judge is liable in granting the motion for
bail on recognizance in clear violation of R.A. No. 6036, for the
following reasons:
First. Section 1 of R.A. No. 6036 provides that "any provision of
law to the contrary notwithstanding, bail shall not be required of a
person charged with violation of a criminal offense the prescribed
penalty for which is not higher than six months imprisonment and/or a
fine of two thousand pesos, or both." Instead of bail, Section 2 states
that the person charged "shall be required to sign in the presence of two
witnesses of good standing in the community a sworn statement binding
himself, pending final decision of his case, to report to the Clerk of
Court hearing his case periodically every two weeks. The Court may, in
its discretion and with the consent of the person charged, require further
that he be placed under the custody and subject to the authority of a
responsible citizen in the community who may be willing to accept the
responsibility. In such a case the affidavit herein mentioned shall
include a statement of the person charged that he binds himself to
accept the authority of the citizen so appointed by the Court."
In the present case, it is not disputed that the sworn statement
supporting the motion for bail filed before respondent judge was signed,
not by the accused but by his father. The failure of the accused to sign
the sworn statement is in clear contravention of the express mandate of
the law that the person charged shall sign a sworn statement binding
himself to report to the Clerk of Court. This is a personal obligation
imposed by R.A. No. 6036 on the accused and cannot be assumed by
the custodian or responsible citizen who may be appointed by the
court. It is different from Section 15, Rule 114 of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure which allows the release of the accused on his own
recognizance or that of a responsible person. R.A. No. 6036 applies to
criminal cases where the prescribed penalty is not higher than six
months imprisonment and/or a fine of P2,000.00, or both. In the case at
bar, accused stands charged with abandonment of a minor which carries
with it the imposable penalty of arresto mayor and/or a fine
of P500.00. Hence, it was erroneous for respondent judge to have
granted the motion for bail on the basis of the affidavit of the father of
the accused.
Moreover, R.A. No. 6036 allows the release of the accused on his
own recognizance only where it has been established that he is unable to
post the required cash or bail bond. The accused in this case is a CPA
who is engaged in the transport business. We reject the contention of
respondent judge that the law does not distinguish whether the accused
is rich or poor. The distinction is all to clear for the law explicitly
provides that the accused can be released on his own recognizance only
if he is able to clearly establish that he is unable to post cash or bail
bond.
We reiterate the rule that although a judge may not be subjected to
disciplinary action for every erroneous order or decision he renders, that
relative immunity is not a license to be negligent or abusive and
arbitrary in performing his adjudicatory prerogatives. Judges who
wantonly misuse the powers vested in them by law cannot render fair
and impartial justice.
Second. Respondent judge does not deny that the accused in
Criminal Case No. 9106 was at large when the motion for bail on
recognizance was filed and subsequently granted. Bail is the security
given for the release of a person in custody of the law. [5] Section 15,
Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that the
court may release a person in custody on his own recognizance or that
of a responsible person. It is a basic principle that bail is intended to
obtain provisional liberty and cannot be granted before custody of an
accused has been acquired by the judicial authorities by his arrest or
voluntary surrender. It is self-evident that a court cannot grant
provisional liberty to one who is actually in the enjoyment of his liberty
for it would be incongruous to give freedom to one who is free. Thus,
we have held that it is premature to file a motion for bail for someone
whose liberty has yet to be curtailed.[6]
In the case at bar, respondent judge was fully cognizant that the
court had not yet acquired jurisdiction over the person of the accused
who was still at large and yet, he entertained and granted his motion for
bail. In doing so, respondent judge violated a tenet in criminal
procedure which is too basic as to constitute gross ignorance of the
law. When the law violated is elementary, a judge is subject to
disciplinary action.[7]
Indeed, the Code of Judicial Conduct enjoins judges to be faithful
to the law and maintain professional competence. A judge is called upon
to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with statutes and
procedural rules; it is imperative that he be conversant with basic legal
principles and be aware of well-settled authoritative doctrines. He
should strive for excellence exceeded only by his passion for truth, to
the end that he be the personification of justice and the Rule of Law.[8]
In the case of Comia vs. Antona,[9] we found respondent judge
liable for gross ignorance of the law for entertaining an application for
bail even though the court had not yet acquired jurisdiction over the
accused. He was fined P20,000.00 with a stern warning that a repetition
of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Judge Acmad T.
Barataman liable for gross ignorance of the law and imposes upon him a
fine of P20,000.00 with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or
similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.

[A.M. No. 00-1529-RTJ. April 9, 2002]
ATTY. FRED HENRY V. MARALLAG and NORMA F.
FERI, complainants, vs. JUDGE LORETO CLORIBEL-
PURUGGANAN, RTC, Branch 3, Tuguegarao,
Cagayan, respondent.
DECISION
KAPUNAN, J.:
This is an administrative complaint filed by Fred Henry V.
Marallag and his client Norma F. Feri against respondent Judge Loreto
Cloribel-Purugganan of the Regional Trial Court of Tuguegarao,
Cagayan, Branch 3 for gross incompetence, gross ignorance of the law,
oppression and grave abuse of discretion, relative to Criminal Case No.
7316.
The records show that on December 3, 1996, an information for
murder was filed against Segismundo Duarte charging him with the
murder of Ferdinand T. Feri. Subsequently, Duarte filed a petition for
bail.
On January 28, 1997, the date set for the hearing of the petition
for bail, complainant Marallag, the private prosecutor handling Criminal
Case No. 7316, manifested that Duarte first had to be arraigned in order
that the trial court may acquire jurisdiction over said accused. Upon
arraignment, Duarte pleaded Not Guilty to the offense charged. The
prosecution informed the court that during the preliminary investigation
before the Municipal Trial Court of Tuguegarao, Cagayan, Duarte
admitted to the killing of Ferdinand Feri but claimed that he did it in
self-defense. Thereafter, the prosecution orally moved that the reverse
order of trial be conducted (i.e., that the defense shall be the first to
present its evidence), in view of Duartes admission of the killing.
Respondent Judge ordered Duarte to clarify in writing whether he
admits to the killing of Ferdinand Feri or not. She likewise set for oral
argument the next day, January 29, 1997, the issue of whether the
reverse order of trial should be followed in the criminal case.
On January 29, 1997, after both parties were heard, respondent
Judge granted the motion to conduct the trial in reverse order. The
defense moved to reconsider the trial courts ruling. Subsequently, the
trial court required the parties to submit their respective position papers
on the issue of whether the trial should be in the reverse order. On
February 4, 1997, the prosecution submitted a Memorandum of
Authorities while the defense submitted its Position Paper.
In an Order dated February 26, 1997, respondent Judge ruled that
the prosecution shall first present evidence regarding the petition for
bail. The order stated in part:
xxx
Let this case be reset anew for hearing of the application for bail on
March 11 and 12, 1997, at 8:30 oclock in the morning, since the
accused refused to be presented during the last hearing, the prosecution
is directed to get ready with their witnesses to be presented if any to
prove their opposition. Otherwise the Court will consider this Motion
for Bail submitted for resolution.
The prosecution moved to reconsider the same, and its motion
was granted in part by respondent Judge in her Order of June 18, 1997,
which acknowledged that a hearing on the petition for bail must first be
conducted before the court may resolve the same.
On July 14, 1997, complainants filed with the Court of Appeals a
petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition questioning the
February 26, 1997 Order of the respondent Judge, but the same was
dismissed by the appellate court in a Resolution dated July 24, 1997, on
the ground that the prosecution failed to report the matter to the Office
of the Solicitor General for appropriate action.
Meanwhile, at the hearing of the petition for bail on August 12,
1997, the prosecution moved for postponement thereof in view of the
pendency of the petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition in the
Court of Appeals. Respondent Judge informed the parties of the
dismissal of said petition, but the prosecution reiterated their motion for
postponement, arguing that since they had not yet received a copy of the
appellate courts resolution denying their petition, said dismissal had not
yet attained finality and that they were going to file a motion for
reconsideration thereof. Respondent Judge ordered the prosecution to
proceed with the presentation of its witnesses but only complainant Feri
was present in court. When the respondent Judge called on Mrs. Feri to
testify, the prosecution refused, reasoning that the latter was not an
eyewitness to the crime charged and would be testifying only with
respect to the civil aspect of the case. However, respondent Judge
considered the petition for bail submitted for resolution.
On August 14, 1997, the trial court issued an Order granting bail
to Duarte. Respondent Judge concluded that the evidence against Duarte
was not strong and the latter was thus entitled to post bail due to the
prosecutions failure to present its witnesses during the scheduled
hearings for the petition for bail despite the issuance of subpoenas to
said witnesses. The Order stated:
xxx
Considering that the prosecution witnesses never appeared when their
turn to testify came and for four (4) settings, they never cropped up, this
Court developed its impression that prosecution is left without anybody
to oppose this motion for bail with no proof that the guilt of the accused
is strong.
So this Court has to follow the amended Rules on Criminal Procedure,
especially Rule 114, Sec. 3, quoted thus:
Sec. 3. Bail, a matter of right; exception. - All persons in custody, shall,
before final conviction, be entitled to bail as a matter of right; except
those charged with a capital offense, or an offense which, under the law
at the time of its commission and at the time of the application for bail,
is punishable by reclusion perpetua, when evidence of guilt is strong.
Finding no witnesses to prove the guilt of the accused or to show that
the evidence of guilt is strong;
AS PRAYED FOR, said Motion for Bail is hereby granted.[1]
Complainants thereafter filed the instant administrative case
against respondent Judge, claiming that her issuance of the August 14,
1997 Order reflects gross ignorance of the law, incompetence and grave
abuse of discretion on her part, since said Order granting bail did not
contain a summary of evidence presented by the prosecution which
summary is necessary to determine whether a judge has adequate basis
for granting bail.[2]
In her Answer, respondent Judge argued that the complaint is
premature since the assailed Order is still under reconsideration.
Moreover, she said that there was no gross incompetence on her part in
issuing the same because the prosecution failed to present its witnesses
to oppose the petition for bail, notwithstanding the setting of several
hearing dates for it to do so. [3] Respondent Judge also charged
complainant Marallag of violating Canons 10 [4] and 10.1[5] of the Code
of Professional Responsibility for including the following false
statements of fact in the administrative complaint against her:
(1) that respondent Judge denied his motion for
reconsideration of the February 26, 1997 Order (requiring
the prosecution to present evidence and to consider the
motion for bail submitted for resolution) in its Order of
June 18, 1997, when in fact respondent Judge partly
granted the same and acknowledged therein that in petitions
for bail, the prosecution must be accorded the opportunity
to present evidence to prove that the evidence of guilt of
 the accused is strong, and accordingly set the presentation
of evidence for August 12, 1997;
(2) that respondent Judge denied complainants due process
by considering the application for bail submitted for
resolution without conducting a hearing thereon, when it
was the prosecution which failed, despite several
opportunities granted thereto, to present its witnesses on the
scheduled hearing dates;
(3) that respondent Judge refused to postpone the hearing on
the application for bail on August 12, 1997 despite the
pendency in the Court of Appeals of the petition for
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus (assailing the order
directing the prosecution to present evidence ahead of the
defense), even though in truth, complainant had already
received a copy of the appellate courts resolution denying
said petition even before August 12, 1997. [6]
Respondent Judge further accused complainant Marallag of violating
Canons 11[7] and 11.03 [8] of the Code of Professional Responsibility for
exhibiting disrespect towards her during the hearing on August 12,
1997, specifically, by using menacing language against her and raising
his voice. [9]
On November 29, 1999, Office the Court Administrator submitted
its memorandum recommending that respondent Judge be held liable
for gross ignorance of the law and be fined in the amount of Five
Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00).
The complaint is meritorious.
The rule is that all persons in custody shall, before conviction, be
entitled to bail as a matter of right. However, when the accused is
charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion
perpetua, and the evidence of guilt is strong, the grant of bail becomes a
matter of discretion. [10]
Where the admission to bail of an accused is discretionary, it is
mandatory for the trial court to conduct a hearing to afford both the
prosecution and the defense a reasonable opportunity to present
evidence to establish, in the case of the prosecution, that evidence of the
guilt of the accused is strong, and in the case of the defense, that such
evidence of guilt is not strong. [11]
The criminal case before respondent Judge involved an accused
who was charged with murder, a capital offense. [12] Thus, the conduct of
a hearing on the accuseds application for bail was necessary before the
trial court could grant bail. The records of the case however reveal that
although the trial court set several dates for the hearing on the
application for bail, the parties were not able to adduce evidence which
would enable the trial court to determine whether the evidence of the
accuseds guilt was strong, for purposes of resolving the issue of whether
the latter is entitled to bail. It was the other issues raised by the
prosecution, such as the necessity of Duartes arraignment before the
application for bail may be resolved, and the propriety of conducting
trial in reverse order, which were taken up during the scheduled
hearings.[13] The prosecution was thus deprived of the opportunity to
prove that the evidence of Duartes guilt was strong, and the defense was
also denied the chance to prove otherwise. The records further indicate
that when the prosecution failed to present any evidence during the
hearing on the application for bail on August 12, 1997, respondent
Judge proceeded at once to pronounce that the motion was deemed
submitted for resolution.
The prosecutions failure to submit evidence on the accuseds
application for bail did not justify respondent Judges act of granting bail
to the accused without a hearing, because the established rule is that
even if the prosecution refuses to adduce evidence or fails to interpose
any objection to the motion for bail, it is still mandatory for the court to
conduct a hearing or ask searching and clarificatory questions from
which it may infer the strength of the States evidence of guilt of the
accused.[14] A judge is in fact required to include in his or her order
granting or refusing bail a summary of the evidence presented by the
prosecution; otherwise, such order would be uncontrolled and may be
deemed capricious or whimsical.[15]
Respondent Judges act of granting bail to the accused without
hearing the parties on the matter or asking searching and clarificatory
questions runs counter to the rule requiring the conduct of a hearing on
a petition for bail in cases where an accused is charged with a capital
offense. Such error merits a reprimand, for the Court has previously
held that-
xxx admission to bail as a matter of discretion presupposes the exercise
thereof in accordance with law and guided by the applicable legal
principles. The prosecution must first be accorded an opportunity to
present evidence because by the very nature of deciding applications for
bail, it is on the basis of such evidence that judicial discretion is
weighed in determining whether the guilt of the accused is strong. in
other words, discretion must be exercised regularly, legally and within
the confines of procedural due process, that is, after evaluation of the
evidence submitted by the prosecution. Any order issued in the absence
thereof is not a product of sound judicial discretion but of whim, caprice
and arbitrariness.[16]
However, the Court notes that the prosecutions failure to present
evidence in relation to the petition for bail was not entirely due to the
fault of respondent Judge. The prosecution is also partly to blame for
such failure. On the dates set by the trial court for hearing of the petition
for bail, the prosecution raised other issues-first, the alleged
inconsistency between the accuseds plea of Not Guilty during the
arraignment and his admission during the preliminary investigation that
he killed Ferdinand Feri in self-defense; and second, the necessity of
conducting the trial in the reverse order-which sidetracked the hearing
on the petition for bail. Moreover, it was the prosecution which refused
to heed respondent Judges order that it proceed with the presentation of
its evidence relative to the petition for bail during the hearing of August
12, 1997. Hence, the Court finds that an imposition on respondent Judge
of a fine would not be justified under the circumstances of this case.
The Court also deems it proper to refer to the integrated Bar of the
Philippines for investigation, recommendation and report the allegations
of respondent Judge that complainant Marallag knowingly made
untruthful statements of fact in his complaint filed with the Court, and
exhibited disrespect toward respondent Judge during several hearings of
Criminal Case No. 7316.
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Loreto Cloribel-Purugganan
of the Regional Trial Court of Tuguegarao, Cagayan, Branch 3, is
hereby REPRIMANDED and WARNED that a repetition of the same or
similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely. Let a copy of
this decision be attached to the personal record of respondent Judge.
The charges made by respondent Judge against complainant Atty.
Fred Henry V. Marallag are hereby REFERRED to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines for investigation, report and recommendation.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. Nos. 148712-15. January 21, 2004]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. DOMINADOR
CACHOLA y SALAZAR, ERNESTO AMAY y PASCUA,
NESTOR MARQUEZ y MANUEL, BENJAMIN
LAEGEN y CAMADO, RODOLFO SAGUN y JIMENEZ,
RODEMIR GUERZO y LATAOAN, MELLKE IGNACIO
y SALVADOR, and NELSON C. ECHABARIA,
appellants.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
 In just an instant, 12-year-old Jessie E. Barnachea lost his
mother, an elder brother, an uncle, and a cousin as a result of the
carnage that took place at around 6:00 p.m. of 28 December
1999 right inside their house in Barangay Calumbaya, Bauang,
La Union. Their horrible death was attributed to herein
appellants, who, however, pleaded not guilty to the four
separate informations for murder.
At the trial before the Regional Trial Court of Bauang, La
Union, Branch 67, the prosecution presented as witnesses Jessie
and his brother and neighbors, as well as several police officers.
Their testimonies disclose as follows:
Jessie was about to leave their house to watch cartoons in
his uncles house next door when two armed men suddenly
entered the front door of their house. The two ordered Jessie to
drop to the floor, and then hit him in the back with the butt of a
long gun. Without much ado, the intruders shot to death Jessies
uncle, Victorino V. Lolarga, who was then in the living room.
Jessie forthwith crawled and hid under a bed, from where he saw
the feet of a third man who had also entered the house. The men
entered the kitchen and continued shooting. When the rampage
was over and after the malefactors had already departed, Jessie
came out of his hiding place and proceeded to the kitchen. There
he saw his mother, Carmelita Barnachea; his brother
Felix Barnachea, Jr.; and his cousin Rubenson Abance - all
slaughtered.[1]
Meanwhile, Jessies eldest brother, Robert E. Barnachea,
was in his uncles house watching television with his aunt and
young cousins when he sensed a commotion outside. When
Robert went out to see what was transpiring, he saw armed men
running towards their house. One of them turned and pointed a
gun at him, prompting him to scamper away and hide at the back
of his uncles house. From where he was hiding, he noticed a
stainless jeep, with blue rim and marking fruits and vegetables
dealer, parked in front of the fence of their house. Standing
behind the jeep were three armed men wearing bonnets, with
only their nose and eyes exposed. In the next instant, he heard
gunshots and then saw men running from his house. The men
hurriedly boarded the jeep and left the place.[2]
The jeep did not go unnoticed by the
neighbors. Russel Tamba was with some friends in front
of Rodas Store, around 100 meters away from
the Barnachea residence, when the jeep passed by very slowly
going towards the Barnachea residence. According to him, the
jeep had a marking El Shaddai in front, aside from the marking
fruits and vegetables dealer on the sides.
[3]
Francisco Andrada was also talking with some people in front
of the Calumbaya Barangay Hall, only five meters away
from Rodas Store, when he noticed that jeep, with
the El Shaddai marking, pass by.[4] Not long after, both heard
gunshots and later saw the jeep pass by again, this time running
very fast.[5]
The incident was immediately reported to the police, and
the description of the El Shaddai jeep used by the malefactors
was relayed through radio to the police stations in
the provinceof La Union.[6] At around 7:45 p.m., the jeep was
intercepted at a checkpoint set up in the highway by the police
force in Aringay, La Union. On board were the eight appellants.
No firearms were found in the vehicle. The jeep and the eight
appellants were thereafter brought to the Aringay police station
and then turned over to the Bauang police.[7]
When the Chief of Police of Bauang Benjamin
M. Lusad was informed of the apprehension of the eight
appellants, he went to the Barnachea residence, where he came
to know that Jessie was an eyewitness. He invited Jessie to ride
with him to pick up the suspects. While Lusad was supervising
the boarding of the suspects into the vehicle, Jessie was in
another police vehicle with PO3 Juan Casern, Jr., to see whether
he could recognize any one of the eight men. Jessie pointed
to Dominador Cachola and Ernesto Amay as the two armed men
who entered his house and killed his relatives. During the police
line-up at the Bauang Police Station, Jessie again
identified Cachola and Amay as the assailants.[8] The next day,
when the police conducted the third confirmatory investigation,
which was to present Jessie with photographs of the suspects,
Jessie identified the two for the third time.
The eight appellants were thereafter subjected to paraffin
test. But only the right hands of Cachola and Amay yielded
positive results for gunpowder nitrates.[9]
The Death Certificates attest to the gruesome and
merciless killings. Carmelita sustained one gunshot wound on
her head and three on her body;[10] Felix, Jr., two gunshot wounds
on his head and on his body, and stab wounds on his chest and
arms;[11] Victorino, two gunshot wounds on his head, three on his
body, and with his penis excised; [12] Rubenson, one gunshot
wound on his head and a stab wound that lacerated his liver.[13]
The testimonies of the other prosecution witnesses were
dispensed with upon the stipulation by the public prosecutor and
the counsels for the appellants that the nature of their testimonies
would be that (1) PO3 Juan Casern, Jr., was inside the police car
with Jessie when the latter recognized
appellants Cachola and Amay; (2) Mark Garcia would
corroborate the testimony of Felix Andrada regarding the
description of the jeep; (3) Felix Barnachea, Sr., suffered actual
damages amounting to P177,000 as a result of the death of his
wife Carmelita and son Felix, Jr.; (4) a police officer of Aringay,
La Union, flagged down the jeep at the checkpoint and saw the
appellants on board; and (5) a police officer of Bauang, La Union,
would identify the pictures taken at the crime scene.
After the prosecution had rested its case, the defense
counsels orally asked for leave of court to file a demurrer to
evidence. The trial court denied the motion outright and set the
schedule for the presentation of the evidence for the defense.
[14]
Instead of presenting their evidence, however, the appellants,
through their respective counsels, filed a Demurrer to
Evidence[15] even without leave of court.
On 26 September 2000, the trial court rendered a
decision[16] (1) convicting (a) Cachola and Amay, as principals, of
four counts of murder and sentencing them to suffer four counts
of the supreme penalty of death; and (b)
Marquez, Laegen, Sagun, Guerzo, Ignacio, and Echabaria, as
accomplices, of four counts of murder and sentencing them to
suffer four counts of the indeterminate penalty of eight years
of prision mayor as minimum to twelve years and one day
of reclusion temporal as maximum; and (2) ordering all of them to
pay the heirs of the victims a total of P300,000 as death
indemnity; P200,000 as moral damages; and P177,000 as actual
or compensatory damages.
Before us on automatic review, appellants Cachola, Sagun,
Ignacio, and Marquez contend that the trial court erred (1) in
finding conspiracy among them and their co-appellants; (2) in
finding proof beyond reasonable doubt; and (3) in not dismissing
the informations outright despite a motion before arraignment,
there having been a clear illegal arrest and denial of due process.
As for appellants Amay, Guerzo, Laegen, and Echabaria,
they assert that the trial court erred (1) in finding
appellant Amay guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal in
the crime of murder; and (2) in not acquitting
appellants Guerzo, Laegen, and Echabaria for insufficiency of
evidence and on reasonable doubt.
In its Consolidated Reply Brief, the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) recommends the affirmance of the conviction for
murder of appellants Cachola and Amay, and the acquittal of the
other appellants for failure of the prosecution to establish their
identity and participation beyond reasonable doubt.
We agree with the recommendation of the OSG to acquit
appellants Sagun, Ignacio, Marquez, Guerzo, Laegen,
and Echabaria. Upon a thorough review of the records of the
case, we found nothing that would show their participation in the
commission of the crimes. Not one of the prosecution witnesses
identified them as among the malefactors who were at
the Barnachea residence on that fateful day. Surprisingly, even
as the trial court declared that the prosecution failed to establish
the actual participation of the other appellants in the commission
of the crime, it found that they cooperated in the execution of the
offense by previous or simultaneous acts.[17] It appears, however,
that the only reason why they were implicated was that they were
with Cachola and Amay on board the jeep that was intercepted
in Aringay, La Union, almost two hours after the killings. What
constitute previous or simultaneous acts that would make them
liable as accomplices are not found in the decision or in any
evidence on record.
To hold a person liable as an accomplice, two elements
must concur: (1) community of design, which means that the
accomplice knows of, and concurs with, the criminal design of the
principal by direct participation; and (2) the performance by the
accomplice of previous or simultaneous acts that are not
indispensable to the commission of the crime. [18] In the present
case, neither element was proved. The mere presence of the six
appellants in the company of appellants Cachola and Amay on
board a jeep is not evidence of their knowledge of, or assent to,
the criminal design to perpetuate the massacre.[19] That they were
found to be with appellants Cachola and Amay almost two
hours after the commission of the crime does not constitute
previous or simultaneous act. Absent a link between the crime
and their presence in the jeep two hours later, we cannot
consider their participation even as accessories to the crime.
It is a basic evidentiary rule in criminal law that the
prosecution has the burden of proving the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt.[20] If the prosecution fails to discharge
that burden, the accused need not present any evidence.[21] Thus,
for utter lack of evidence against the six appellants, their acquittal
is in order.
However, as regards appellants Cachola and Amay, we
concur with the trial court and the OSG that the prosecution had
presented sufficient evidence to prove their guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. The credible testimony of, and positive
identification by, Jessie Barnachea, which are corroborated by
forensic evidence, i.e., the positive results of the paraffin test on
the right hands of Cachola and Amay, constitute sufficient
evidence to sustain their conviction.
As to the credibility of Jessie Barnachea, the trial court
made the following observations:
The Court observed the demeanor of Jessie Barnachea on the witness
stand and ... did not observe any indication of falsehood in his narration.
He showed obvious readiness to answer questions propounded to him.
His reactions and answers to the questions displayed evident respect for
truth. He remained consistent on cross-examination. He positively
identified accused Amay and Cachola as the one who shot and killed his
family. The Court did not observe any hesitancy or indication of
uncertainty - and his recital of the events appeared spontaneous. [22]
There is nothing on record that gives this Court cause to
interfere with the trial courts determination of the credibility of
Jessie. Indeed, his testimony was unwavering despite attempts
of the defense counsels to confuse or trap him. The alleged
inconsistency between Jessies sworn statement and testimony
on the number of malefactors, if at all, does not detract from his
credibility. That Jessie saw two armed men enter his house is
clear. While the defense claims ambiguity as to the presence of a
third man, Jessies statement easily reveals that the third man
was not immediately mentioned because he (the third man) only
followed the two and Jessie did not see his face.
It is also pointed out that Jessies identification
of Cachola and Amay runs counter to Roberts testimony that the
armed men were wearing bonnets. Again, from their testimonies,
it is apparent that the brothers saw different men. Besides,
Robert also stated that one of the men did not have his head
covered. As to the alleged improbability of the lookouts wearing
bonnets while the principal shooters were unmasked, or of the
malefactors sparing Jessie, suffice it to say that such
circumstances are not so incredible as to cast reasonable doubt
on the truth of the narrated events.
In sum, none of the alleged inconsistencies, minor as they
are, could leave us with doubt that Jessie was present in his
house and saw armed men shoot his relatives. Barely two hours
had passed since he witnessed the gruesome murders when
Jessie identified appellants Cachola and Amay as the
malefactors. Reasonably, the memory of their faces was still
fresh on his mind. Moreover, Jessie identified the two appellants
two times more at the police station and once in open court, and
he never faltered in his identification.
Significantly, the appellants have not imputed any ill motive
to Jessie for testifying against Cachola and Amay. Where there is
no evidence to show a doubtful reason or improper motive why a
prosecution witness should testify against the accused or falsely
implicate him in a crime, the said testimony is trustworthy and
should be accorded full faith and credit.[23]
In all, there does not appear on record to be some fact or
circumstance of weight and influence which the trial court has
overlooked or the significance of which it has misapprehended or
misinterpreted. [24] We rely, therefore, on the competence of the
trial court to decide the question of credibility of the witnesses,
having heard them and observed their deportment and manner of
testifying during the trial.[25]
The reliance by appellant Cachola on People
v. Teehankee[26] is misplaced. In that case the negative result of
the paraffin test did not preclude a finding of guilt by the trial
court, the reason being that the accused was tested for the
presence of nitrates only after more than 72 hours had lapsed
from the time of the shooting. In the present case, the paraffin
test was conducted on the same night the shooting incident
occurred; hence, the lapse of only a few hours increases its
reliability. While the presence of nitrates on accuseds hand is not
conclusive of guilt, it bolsters the testimony of an eyewitness that
the accused fired a gun.
As to whether the trial court erred in not allowing the
appellants to present evidence after filing their demurrer to
evidence without leave of court, then Section 15, Rules 119 of
the Rules of Court[27] is clear on the matter, thus:
SEC. 15. - Demurrer to evidence. - After the prosecution has rested its
case, the court may dismiss the case on the ground of insufficiency of
evidence: (1) on its own initiative after giving the prosecution an
opportunity to be heard; or (2) on motion of the accused filed with prior
leave of court.
If the court denies the motion for dismissal, the accused may adduce
evidence in his defense. When the accused files such motion to
dismiss without express leave of court, he waives the right to present
evidence and submits the case for judgment on the basis of the evidence
for the prosecution. (Underscoring supplied).
The filing by the appellants of a demurrer to evidence in the
absence of prior leave of court was a clear waiver of their right to
present their own evidence. To sustain their claim that they had
been denied due process because the evidence they belatedly
sought to offer would have exculpated them would be to allow
them to wager on the outcome of judicial proceedings by
espousing inconsistent viewpoints whenever dictated by
convenience.[28] Furthermore, it cannot be said that the waiver
was not clear. The trial court postponed the hearings on the
motion for demurrer, even after leave of court had been denied,
and then granted extensions to Amay until he finally adopted the
position of his co-appellants. At no time other than in this
automatic review was there any attempt that is contrary to the
waiver of the presentation of evidence.
 Neither can the question of the legality of
the warrantless arrest of the appellants be raised for the first time
before this Court. As arrests fall into the question of the exercise
by the trial court of its jurisdiction over the person of the accused,
the question should have been raised prior to their arraignment.
That the appellants objected to the arrests prior to the
arraignment[29]is unsubstantiated. Their claim that they requested
an extension of time to file a motion to quash the information or
to dismiss the case,[30] which the trial court allegedly denied,
cannot save the day for them. The fact remains that before
arraignment, no such motion was filed. Even assuming that their
arrest was illegal, their act of entering a plea during their
arraignment constituted a waiver of their right to question their
arrest.[31]
We now discuss the circumstances that attended the
commission of the crimes.
The information alleges the qualifying circumstances of
treachery and evident premeditation. There is no doubt that the
killings were done with treachery, considering that the assailants
suddenly barged in and immediately went on a shooting
rampage. We have time and again ruled that when the attack is
sudden and unexpected, there is treachery.[32] The presence of
even this single qualifying circumstance is sufficient to qualify the
killing to murder.[33]
As to the qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation,
we find the same lacking, for there is no evidence of planning or
preparation to kill, much less of the time when the plot was
conceived.[34]
It may not be amiss to mention that the death certificate
of Victorino Lolarga reveals that his penis was excised. One may
wonder whether such circumstance amounted to ignominy that
can aggravate the offense.
For ignominy to be appreciated, it is required that the
offense be committed in a manner that tends to make its effect
more humiliating, thus adding to the victims moral suffering.
Where the victim was already dead when his body or a part
thereof was dismembered, ignominy cannot be taken against the
accused.[35] In this case, the information states
that Victorinos sexual organ was severed after he was shot and
there is no allegation that it was done to add ignominy to the
natural effects of the act. We cannot, therefore, consider
ignominy as an aggravating circumstance.
However, as regards Carmelita and Felix, Jr., we appreciate
the aggravating circumstance of dwelling, since it was alleged in
the information and proved during the trial that they were killed
inside their house. Appellants Cachola and Amay, therefore,
violated the sanctity of the said victims home.
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code provides that the
penalty for murder is reclusion perpetua to death. In conjunction,
Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code provides that when the law
prescribes two indivisible penalties, the greater penalty shall be
imposed when in the commission of the deed, there is present
one aggravating circumstance. In the cases of Carmelita and
Felix Jr., in Criminal Cases Nos. 2324 and 2325, there is one
aggravating circumstance and no mitigating circumstance to
offset it; hence, the higher penalty of death imposed by the trial
court stands.
Three members of the Court maintain their adherence to
the separate opinions expressed in People vs. Echegaray[36] that
Republic Act No. 7659, insofar as it prescribes the penalty of
death, is unconstitutional; nevertheless they submit to the ruling
of the majority that the law is constitutional and that the death
penalty should accordingly be imposed.
But in the cases of Victorino and Rubenson, in Criminal
Cases Nos. 2323 and 2326, there being no aggravating or
mitigating circumstance, the penalty should
be reclusion perpetua,which is the lower of the two indivisible
penalties prescribed by law.
As regards the civil liability of
appellants Cachola and Amay, we hold them jointly and severally
liable to pay the heirs of each of the victims death indemnity and
moral damages each in the amount of P50,000, or a total of
P400,000. They are further ordered to pay the respective heirs of
Carmelita and Felix Jr. exemplary damages in the amount of
P25,000, or a total of P50,000, in view of the presence of one
aggravating circumstance in the commission of the crime against
the said victims. As to the claim for damages by
Felix Barnachea Sr. in the amount of P177,000, we sustain the
same even if only a list of expenses, [37] not official receipts, was
submitted because such amount was admitted by the defense
during the trial.[38] Moreover, although there is no evidence as to
the amount spent as a result of the death
of Victorino and Rubenson, their respective heirs shall be
awarded temperate damages in the amount of P25,000, since
they clearly incurred funeral expenses.[39]
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision dated 26 September
2000 of the Regional Trial Court of Bauang, La Union, Branch 67,
is hereby AFFIRMED insofar as DOMINADOR CACHOLA y
SALAZAR and ERNESTO AMAY y PASCUA are found GUILTY
of four counts of murder in Criminal Cases Nos. 2323-26 and
sentenced to suffer the supreme penalty of death in Criminal
Cases Nos. 2324 and 2325. The said decision is, however,
MODIFIED in that they are (1) sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua, instead of death, in Criminal Cases Nos.
2323 and 2326; and (2) ordered to pay, jointly and severally, the
following damages:
a. P50,000 as death indemnity in favor of the heirs of each
victim, or a total of P200,000;
b. P50,000 as moral damages in favor of the heirs of each
victim, or a total of P200,000;
c. P25,000 as exemplary damages in favor of the respective
heirs of Carmelita Barnachea and Felix Barnachea Jr.,
or a total of P50,000;
d. P177,000 as actual damages in favor of the heirs of
Carmelita Barnachea and Felix Barnachea Jr.; and
e. P25,000 as temperate damages in favor of the respective
heirs of Rubenson Abance and Victorino Lolarga, or a
total of P50,000.
The assailed decision is REVERSED insofar as appellants
NESTOR MARQUEZ y MANUEL, BENJAMIN LAEGEN y
CAMADO, RODOLFO SAGUN y JIMENEZ, RODEMIR GUERZO
y LATAOAN, MELLKE IGNACIO y SALVADOR, and NELSON C.
ECHABARIA are concerned, and another one is hereby rendered
(1) acquitting them of the crimes charged for insufficiency of
evidence; (2) ordering their immediate release from confinement
unless their further detention is warranted by virtue of any lawful
cause; and (3) directing the Director of the Bureau of Corrections
to submit a report on their release within five days from notice
hereof.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 150735 March 15, 2004
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs.
STEPHEN CADLEY y CIANO, appellant.
 DECISION
CARPIO-MORALES, J.:
1
On appeal is the November 5, 2001 Decision of the Regional
Trial Court of Angeles City, Branch 59, in Criminal Case No. 597
finding Stephen Cadley y Ciano (appellant) guilty of violating
Section 4, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425 otherwise known as
the Dangerous Drugs Act.
2
The accusatory portion of the Information charging appellant for
violation of Republic Act No. 6425 reads:
That on or about 11th day of June, 2000, in the municipality of
Mabalacat, province of Pampanga, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
STEPHEN CADLEY y CIANO, without having been lawfully and
permitted and authorized, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously deliver and/or give away to a poseur buyer
SEVEN HUNDRED NINETY GRAMS and SEVEN THOUSAND
FOUR HUNDRED TWENTY ONE TENTH THOUSANDTHS OF
A GRAM (790.7421 g) of dried marijuana leaves, a prohibited
drug.
Contrary to law.
Appellant pleaded not guilty during his arraignment on June 27,
2000.3
As culled from the records of the case, the prosecution
established the following facts:
In May 2000, following information received from a female civilian
informant that a certain "Steve" was a supplier of marijuana,
team leader SPO4 Venusto Jamisolamin of the PNP Narcotics
Group at Camp Olivas, San Fernando, Pampanga instructed his
men to conduct surveillance and intelligence investigation at
Aguso, Dau, Mabalacat, Pampanga.4
On June 10, 2000, PO2 Luisito Ubias who was designated as
poseur-buyer and the civilian informant arranged with "Steve" by
telephone for the sale of 50 kilos of marijuana to be made on
June 11, 2000, at 4:00 a.m., at the Dau bus terminal station in
Dau, Mabalacat, Pampanga.
As scheduled, the buy-bust team composed of SPO4
Jamisolamin, PO2 Ubias, PO1 Avelino Lopez, Jr., four other
police officers, and the civilian informant proceeded to the Shell
gasoline station near the Dau bus terminal station. Except for
PO2 Ubias and the civilian informant who waited for the suspect
near the San Trans bus terminal,5 the other members of the team
positioned themselves in such a way that they would be able to
observe the transaction.
After waiting for more or less 25 minutes, the civilian informant
called PO2 Ubias attention to a man wearing a "blue or green t-
shirt" who directly approached them. The man, later identified as
Stephen Cadley, herein appellant, showed a rectangular object
wrapped in newspaper, with a hole through which the contents
could be seen,6 and informed the two that he had left 70 kilos of
marijuana with his companion.7 PO2 Ubias took a sample of the
contents of the rectangular object and once he was convinced
that it was marijuana,8 he wiped his face with a face-towel
several times, the pre-arranged signal for the rest of the team
members to approach them.
Appellant was at once arrested and the rectangular object was
brought to the PNP Regional Crime Laboratory where laboratory
tests conclusively proved that it contained marijuana weighing
790.7421 grams.9
Hence, the indictment of appellant.
In defense, appellant, who gave his occupation as a vegetable
vendor at La Trinidad, Benguet, claimed as follows:
A certain Binyang who hails from Angeles City goes to his stall at
least once a month to buy vegetables during which she would
ask him if he knows of any marijuana for sale to which he would
always respond in the negative. Sometimes, Binyang would also
offer to sell him shabu.
On June 9, 2000, appellant informed Binyang that he was going
down to Manila with his friends the following day, or on June 10,
2000, at 10:00 p.m., to buy spare parts for his vehicle, and they
would stop-over in Tarlac.
Appellant left for Manila as planned and while on a stop-over at
the Victory Bus Terminal in Tarlac, he saw Binyang and went to
talk to her while his companions went to the comfort room. While
he was talking to her, somebody approached him and poked a
gun at him, saying, "NARCOM ito, huwag gagalaw." More
persons, who later arrived, along with the persons who identified
himself as a "NARCOM," forcibly dragged him inside a vehicle.
Inside the vehicle, the persons mauled him, poked a gun at him,
and demanded that he show them where the marijuana was and
give the names of the persons in Benguet engaged in selling the
same. He, however, denied having brought any marijuana or
knowing any such persons.10
He was later brought to Camp Olivas, Pampanga where the
police confiscated his personal belongings without issuing him a
receipt therefor. PO2 Ubias then told him that he would be set
free if he could produce P60,000.00. Using PO2 Ubias'
cellphone, he thus called his brother McCoy11 and uncle Sgt.
Efren Aberin who repaired to Manila from Baguio City with the
said amount.
Despite giving money to the police, he was not released and his
brother and uncle were even charged with attempted bribery.12
With respect to the marijuana brick allegedly taken from him,
appellant denied any knowledge thereof, he claiming that the
purpose of his arrest was to extort money from him.
Testifying for appellant, his uncle Sgt. Aberin declared that he
and McCoy, bringing with them P60,000.00, left Baguio City and
arrived at Camp Olivas, Pampanga in the early morning of June
12, 2000. They refused to part off with the money, however, as
appellant was not being released. They were then told to return
on June 13, 2000, June 12, 2000 being a holiday. They thus
returned to the camp on June 13, 2000 and which McCoy turned
over the money to a certain SPO1 Gamit, upon which he (Sgt.
Aberin) and McCoy were handcuffed and charged with attempted
bribery.13 He further declared that despite their delivery
of P60,000 to the police, the police reported receiving
only P10,000.
Testifying for the defense, Larry Pantig who, together with
Benigno Guillermo, accompanied appellant to Manila, declared
that while they were on a stop-over at the Victory Bus Station in
Tarlac, they saw appellant talking to a lady after which five men
held appellant at gunpoint and forced him to board a red vehicle
with white stripes; and they (Pantig and Guillermo) thereupon
boarded their own vehicle and followed the red vehicle bearing
appellant and the five men until the gate of Clark, Pampanga, but
were forced to return to Baguio when the vehicle stopped and
one man got out cocking his firearm.14
The case was heard by different judges.15
As stated early on, the trial court convicted appellant by the
assailed decision,16 the dispositive portion17 of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused STEPHEN CADLEY y
CIANO guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of Violation
of Section 4, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, and
hereby sentences him to suffer a penalty of Reclusion Perpetua
and a fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) and
to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
Appellant assails the decision on the following grounds:
I.
THE APPEALED DECISION WAS RENDERED BY A NEWLY
APPOINTED JUDGE WHO HAS NOT PERSONALLY HEARD
ANY OF THE WITNESSES PRESENTED AND, THEREFORE,
HAD NO OPPORTUNITY TO OBSERVE THEIR
DEMEANOR VIS-A-VIS THE TRUTHFULNESS OF THEIR
VERSIONS.
II.
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN:
A. BEING PARTIAL, BY TOTALLY BELIEVING THE
INCREDIBLE VERSION OF THE PROSECUTION; BY
NOT APPRECIATING THE MAJOR
INCONSISTENCIES OF THE PROSECUTION
WITNESSES' TESTIMONIES AND THEIR LACK OF
PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE ABOUT THE DETAILS OF
THE ALLEGED BUY-BUST OPERARATION; BY
TOTALLY IGNORING THE EXCULPATORY FACTS IN
FAVOR OF THE ACCUSED; AND BY NOT
APPRECIATING THE CREDIBLE VERSION OF THE
DEFENSE.
B. RELYING ON SURMISES AND CONJECTURES.
C. NOT DISMISSING THE INFORMATION FOR LACK
OF JURISDICTION. GRANTING FOR THE SAKE OF
ARGUMENT THAT THE COURT A QUO HAD
JURISDICTION OVER THE INSTANT CASE, IT
GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING THE
ACCUSED.
D. NOT APPRECIATING THAT THE ACCUSED'S
DETENTION, INQUEST CONDUCTED, AND
INFORMATION FILED WERE LEGALLY
FLAWED/INFIRMED FROM THE VERY START
AMOUNTING TO BLATANT VIOLATION OF THE
CONSTITUTIONAL AND PROCEDURAL RIGHTS OF
THE ACCUSED WHICH SHOULD ENTITLE THE
LATTER FOR (sic) HIS IMMEDIATE RELEASE.
Appellant draws attention to the fact that the judge who wrote the
decision did not hear the case, hence, did not have the
opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses. That a
judge did not hear a case does not necessarily render him less
competent in assessing the credibility of witnesses. He can rely
on the transcripts of stenographic notes of their testimony and
calibrate them in accordance with their conformity to common
experience, knowledge and observation of ordinary men. Such
reliance does not violate substantive and procedural due process
of law.18
Appellant goes on to call the buy-bust operation a fabrication in
light of the lack of surveillance conducted on him, the admission
of the prosecution that no buy-bust money was involved or used
in the operation, and his immediate arrest after his alleged
production of only one brick of marijuana even if PO2 Ubias and
the civilian informant were allegedly offered 70 kilos. He posits
that no seller of marijuana would openly carry a brick thereof
under his arm and negotiate its sale in the open. And he
contends as denting the case for the prosecution its failure to
present the confidential informant as a witness, and the
inconsistency of statements of its witnesses.
In another vein, appellant argues that the trial court has no
jurisdiction over the offense as the incident actually occurred in
Tarlac City, and not in Dau, Pampanga. And he questions his
warrantless arrest and his detention as violative of Article 125 of
the Revised Penal Code, he not having waived its provision, and
of Department of Justice Circular No. 61, September 21, 1993 on
New Rules on Inquest.
Appellants appeal does not lie.
A prior surveillance is not a prerequisite for the validity of an
entrapment or buy-bust operation, the conduct of which has no
rigid or textbook method.19 Flexibility is a trait of good police work.
However the police carry out its entrapment operations, for as
long as the rights of the accused have not been violated in the
process,20 the courts will not pass on the wisdom thereof.
Neither is the fact that no money changed hands a critical factor
that affects the outcome of the case at bar. There is no rule of law
which requires that in buy-bust operations there must be a
simultaneous exchange of the marked money and the prohibited
drug between the poseur-buyer and the pusher.21
Moreover, Article II, Section 4 of Rep. Act No. 6425 punishes not
only the sale but also the mere act of delivery of prohibited drugs
after the offer to buy by the entrapping officer has been accepted
by the seller of prohibited drugs.22
As the information reflects, appellant was charged with the
unlawful delivery and/or giving away to a poseur buyer of
790.7421 grams of dried marijuana leaves. Since the prosecution
has discharged its onus of proving the accusation as in fact it
presented the prohibited drug and identified appellant as the
offender,23 it is immaterial that no payment was made to
appellant.
As for the alleged inconsistencies in the testimonies of PO2
Lopez and SPO4 Jamisolamin, the same are minor and do not
detract from the veracity and weight of the salient points thereof.
What is important is that the testimonies are supported by the
physical evidence consisting of the marijuana block presented
before the court in its original newspaper wrapper (bearing the
initials of the arresting officers), and Chemistry Report No. D-
0592-200024 "the genuineness, due execution and the truth of the
contents" of which were admitted by appellant during the pre-trial
on July 26, 2000 as shown by the Pre-Trial Order dated July 27,
2000.25
As to why the police arrested appellant after receiving only one
brick of marijuana instead of waiting for the receipt of the rest of
the 70 kilos offered for sale, PO2 Ubias explained that his
instructions were to effect the pre-arranged signal once he had
determined that what appellant was offering was indeed
marijuana, and there was no instruction for him to try to recover
the rest of the marijuana. Moreover, he proffered that when
appellant was asked where the remainder of the marijuana was,
appellant responded that "the other 70k were in the possession
of his companion."26
Neither is it improbable for appellant to deal in drugs openly in a
public place to persons he hardly knew, for drug dealers are
known to sell their goods even to strangers. They ply their wares
wherever prospective customers may be found. They have
indeed become increasingly daring and openly defiant of the
law.27
As for the non-presentation by the prosecution of the confidential
informant, it is well-settled that except when the appellant
vehemently denies selling prohibited drugs and there are material
inconsistencies in the testimonies of the arresting officers, or
there are reasons to believe that the arresting officers had
motives to testify falsely against appellant, or that only the
informant was the poseur-buyer who actually witnessed the
entire transaction, the testimony of the informant may be
dispensed with as it would merely be corroborative of the
apprehending officers' eyewitness testimonies.28
In the case at bar, the presentation of the confidential informant,
whose identity must be hidden to preserve his invaluable service
to the police,29 the sale having been adequately proven by
prosecution witnesses.30
Like alibi, frame-up as a defense has invariably been viewed with
disfavor as it is a common and standard line of defense in most
prosecutions arising from violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act.
Clear and convincing evidence is required to prove the defense
of "frame-up" which appellant has failed to proffer.
If the only reason appellant was brought to the police station was,
as he claims, to extort money, why did he fail to file charges
administrative or criminal against the policemen, especially in
light of the fact that his uncle who came to his rescue is a military
sergeant and, therefore, ought to have been aware and
knowledgeable of appellants rights in the premises.
Neither is there any basis for appellants contention that the
incident occurred in Tarlac City, Tarlac, and not in Dau,
Pampanga. The policemen were clear and straightforward in
furnishing details of their location, whereas the description made
by appellant and the witnesses for the defense as to the place of
the alleged arrest is bereft of details determinative of the exact
location of the arrest.
Parenthetically, albeit appellant had manifested that he had an
independent witness who would testify to the occurrence of the
incident in Tarlac City, no such witness was presented.
Finally, appellant's challenge on his warrantless arrest fails.
When an accused is apprehended in flagrante delicto, under
Section 5, Rule 113, paragraphs (a) and (b) of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure, as a result of a buy-bust operation, as in
appellants case, the police are not only authorized but duty-
bound to arrest him even without a warrant.31
As for appellants contention that his detention was unlawful
because there was no waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of
the Revised Penal Code, the same likewise fails.
While a public officer who thus detains a person beyond the legal
period may be held criminally liable, the proceeding taken against
him for the act he has committed remains unaffected, for the two
acts are distinct and separate.32 (Underscoring supplied)
It is gathered that after appellant was arrested on June 11, 2000,
and the Iinformation indicting him was prepared by the Provincial
Prosecutor on June 13, 2000 (the day before was a holiday), and
was filed before the trial court on June 14, 2000. Assuming
arguendo that the delay in the filing of the Information was
intentional, appellant should have taken steps to report or file
charges against the officers, failing which he cannot now rely on
administrative shortcomings of police officers to get a judgment
of acquittal.33
At all events, appellants entry of a valid plea34 and active
participation in the trial cured any defect in his arrest.35
In fine, the trial court did not err in rendering the appealed
decision.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
59, Angeles City finding appellant, STEPHEN CADLEY y CIANO,
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 4, Article II of
Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 144317. August 5, 2003]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. MICHAEL
MONTE y ABDUL, appellant.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision [1] of the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, Branch 18, in Criminal Case No. 99-171228,
finding appellant Michael Monte guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of violation of Article III, Section 15 of Republic Act 6425,
otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972,[2] as
amended, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, with all the accessory penalties provided by law, and to
pay the costs.
Appellant Michael Monte was charged with violation of
Article III, Section 15, of RA 6425, as amended, in an information
which reads:
That on or about March 1, 1999, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the
said accused, not having been authorized by law to sell, dispense,
deliver, transport or distribute any regulated drug, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully, and knowingly sell or offer for sale five (5) heat-
sealed transparent plastic bags each containing white crystalline
substance with a total weight [of] 262.272 grams known as shabu
containing methamphetamine hydrochloride, which is a regulated drug.
Contrary to law.[3]
When arraigned, appellant pleaded not guilty. Thereafter,
trial ensued.
The following facts are established:
On March 1, 1999, at about 6:00 in the morning, SPO2
Virgilio Martinez of the Metro Manila Drug Enforcement Group,
National Capital Region Police Office (MMDEG-NCRPO), Camp
Bagong Diwa, Taguig Metro Manila, received a call from a
confidential informant about the illegal drug activities of appellant
Michael Monte on P. Casal Street, San Miguel Manila.[4] A team of
eight operatives, SPO1 Isagani Jimenez included, was organized
to conduct surveilance and buy-bust operations.[5] They prepared
fake money which were arranged in a bundle placed in between
genuine P500.00 bills.[6] SPO1 Jimenez was designated as the
poseur buyer.[7] Upon arriving at P. Casal Street, the confidential
informant met SPO1 Jimenez and introduced him to appellant as
a prospective buyer of 250 grams of shabu. Appellant told them
that he can deliver the desired quantity of shabu at P50,000.00
per 50 gram. After SPO1 Jimenez agreed to the price, appellant
told him to come back at 10:00 in the evening of the same day.[8]
The team returned to the scene at the designated time and
positioned themselves strategically around the area. After a few
minutes, the informant and appellant arrived and, after a brief
conversation, SPO1 Jimenez handed the bundle of money to
appellant, who in turn gave Jimenez white crystalline substance
contained in five plastic sachets. Immediately, SPO1 Jimenez
introduced himself as a police officer and simultaneously raised
his right hand as a pre-arranged signal to his companions that
the sale had been consummated. Appellant tried to escape, but
he was arrested by SPO1 Jimenez, with the help of his
companions who had rushed to the scene after seeing the signal.
SPO1 Jimenez confiscated from appellant the bundle of money.
Appellant was then brought to the MMDEG-NCRPO station for
investigation. The five plastic sachets containing the white
crystalline substance, which weighed 262.272 grams were
forwarded to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination and
were found positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride or
shabu, a regulated drug.
Appellant denied the charge and claimed that he was
framed up by the police. He alleged that on March 1, 1999, at
3:30 in the afternoon, his friend, a certain Sherman, and the
latters female companion, dropped by his sisters house where he
was then staying. Sherman invited him to go with them to the
Luneta Park and later to have a snack at Jollibee.[9] They
boarded a black Mitsubishi Pajero. As soon as they passed Ayala
bridge, they were blocked by a Honda Civic. Eight armed men in
civilian clothes alighted therefrom and introduced themselves as
police officers. Appellant and his companions were ordered to
alight from the Pajero and were frisked. [10] Afterwards, appellant
was made to board the Honda Civic while Sherman and his
female companion boarded the Pajero.[11] Inside the Honda Civic,
appellant was mauled by the police officers.[12] He was brought to
the Drug Enforcement Unit in Bicutan, Taguig, where he was
tortured by putting a plastic bag over his head and tying it around
his neck.[13] He was told to put up a bailbond for his release.[14]
On July 10, 2002, the trial court rendered a decision
convicting appellant of the crime charged, the dispositive portion
of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the accused, Michael Monte y Abdul, is hereby
convicted of the crime of Violation of Section 15, Article III of R.A.
6425 as amended without any aggravating and/or mitigating
circumstances, and sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua with all the accessory penalties provided by law and to pay the
costs.
The 262.272 grams of shabu is forfeited in favor of the government and
is ordered turned over to the Dangerous Drugs Board, for proper
disposition.
SO ORDERED.[15]
Hence this appeal, raising the following errors:
I. THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING
WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE
UNBELIEVALE TESTIMONY OF PROSECUTION
WITNESS SPO1 ISAGANI JIMENEZ AND IN
GIVING IN HIS FAVOR THE PRESUMPTION OF
REGULARITY IN THE PERFORMANCE OF
DUTY DESPITE THE APPARENT
IRREGULARITIES IN THE MANNER THEY
CONDUCTED THE ALLEGED BUY-BUST
OPERATION.
II. THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING
SCANT CONSIDERATION TO THE EVIDENCE
PRESENTED BY THE ACCUSED APPELLANT.
III. THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN
FINDING THAT THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT FOR THE CRIME CHARGED HAS
BEEN PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT.[16]
The issue of whether or not the prosecution was able to
prove beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of appellant Michael
Monte is the core of the instant appeal.
Appellant argues that the trial court failed to consider the
irregularities in the conduct of the buy-bust operation which could
have exculpated him from criminal liability. He said that while the
prosecution claimed that two genuine 500 peso bills were put,
one on top and the other at the bottom of the fake money, it failed
to show the source of the said bills, which creates doubt as to
their existence and to the prosecutions claim that said genuine
500 peso bills were taken from appellant. Appellant maintains
that as a standard operating procedure in buy-bust operations,
the law enforcers put mark on the money bills and have them
photocopied. In the case at bar, the police officers who
participated in the buy bust neither marked nor photocopied the
two 500 peso bills. Also, SPO1 Jimenez, the lone prosecution
witness, testified that he confiscated from appellant 262.272
grams of shabu. However, he did not present the Booking Sheet
and Arrest Report which would show that shabu was indeed
taken from appellant.
The appeal is without merit.
In the prosecution for the sale of regulated drugs, like
shabu, what is material is the proof that the transaction or sale
transpired, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus
delicti.[17] Corpus delicti is the body or substance of the crime, and
establishes the fact that a crime has been actually committed.
[18]
It has two elements, namely: (1) proof of the occurrence of a
certain event; and (2) some persons criminal responsibility for the
act.[19]
SPO1 Jimenez, the poseur-buyer, clearly established the
above elements, viz: an illegal sale of the regulated drug actually
took place and appellant was the author thereof. He testified as
follows:
Prosecutor Panfilo Pabelonia, Jr. to witness
Q: When you arrived at that bridge [P. Casal], was the
accused already there?
A: He was not yet there, Sir.
Q: How long did you wait?
A: Around 10 minutes then the accused arrived.
Q: The accused arrived together with the confidential
informant?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: After the accused arrived together with the
confidential informant, what transpired?
A: He asked me the money and I also asked him
where is the shabu, and when I handed the
money to him I asked him to hand to me the
shabu and when the shabu was handed to me, I
introduced myself as police officer and at the
same time I held the accused and signaled for
my companions to approach us.[20]
The result of the laboratory examination conducted on the
white crystalline substance confiscated from appellant and
forwarded to the Western Police District bolsters the foregoing
testimony that, indeed, what was sold by appellant was shabu, a
regulated drug. The results of the examination states:
FINDINGS:
Qualitative examination conducted on the above-stated specimens gave
POSITIVE results to the tests for methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a
regulated drug. x x x
CONCLUSION:
Specimen A contains methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated
drug. x x x.[21]
Moreover, the prosecution witness was able to present and
identify in court the confiscated drugs, which are corroborating
pieces of evidence of the corpus delicti, thus:
Prosecutor Jaime Guray to witness:
Q: And you also testified that you were handed by the
accused 5 plastic sachets containing white
crystalline substance?
 A: Yes, sir.
Q: If shown to you these five plastic sachets
containing white crystalline substance which you
said was handed to you by the accused, will you
be able to identify the same?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: May I invite you in the table, Mr. witness, and
examine these five plastic sachets which have
been marked as Exhibit F, F-1 to F-5 for the
prosecution and tell us what relation is these five
plastic sachets to the plastic sachets which you
stated that was handed to you by the accused?
A: These were the shabu that were sold to me by the
accused, sir.[22]
We find no reason to deviate from the findings of the trial
court. It is very clear from the testimony of the prosecution
witness that his narration of events was positive, probable and in
accord with human experience. It bears the badges of truth, such
that it is extremely difficult for a rational mind not to find it
credible. SPO1 Jimenezs testimony was coherent,
straightforward and unperturbed even under the intense cross-
examination by the defense and searching questions by the trial
court.
Appellant claims that there were irregularities in his arrest.
He said that instead of bringing him to the Western Police District
on United Nations Avenue, Manila, the arresting officers brought
him to the Drug Enforcement Unit in Bicutan, Taguig, Metro
Manila, in clear violation of the mandate of Section 5, Rule 113 of
the Rules of Court.[23] Further, the arresting officers did not inform
him of his basic constitutional rights. He was not afforded the
assistance of a competent and independent counsel of his choice
during custodial investigation.
We find nothing irregular in the turn-over of appellant to the
Drug Enforcement Unit in Taguig, Metro Manila, although the
Rules provide that persons arrested without a warrant shall be
delivered to the nearest police station or jail. As correctly argued
by the Solicitor General, the place where appellant was brought
after the arrest for inquest is immaterial to the ultimate issue of
whether he peddled illicit drugs. Moreover, the records show that
appellant was brought to the Drug Enforcement Unit in Taguig,
Metro Manila because the arresting officers belonged to the
Metro Manila Drug Enforcement Group, National Capital Region
Police Office (MMDEG-NCRPO), Camp Bagong Diwa, Taguig,
Metro Manila, which office was more specialized in the area of
drug investigation.
In People v. Garcia,[24] it was held that there was nothing
irregular in the turn-over of appellant, who was arrested without a
warrant for illegal possession of marijuana, to the Criminal
Investigation Service (CIS) Office at the Baguio Water District
Compound instead of bringing him to the nearest police station,
since the CIS office was more specialized in the area of
investigation of drug offenses.
Nevertheless, considering that appellant had entered his
plea and actively participated in the trial of the case, he submitted
to the jurisdiction of the trial court, thereby curing any defect in
his arrest.[25]
Even assuming that appellant was not afforded the
assistance of a counsel of his own choice, the proceedings in the
trial court will not necessarily be struck down because no
incriminatory evidence in the nature of a compelled or involuntary
confession or admission was used as evidence against him.
Appellants guilt was clearly established by the evidence adduced
by the prosecution, which consisted of the testimony of SPO1
Jimenez, the arresting officer and poseur buyer, together with the
documentary and object evidence which were formally offered
and admitted in evidence in the trial court.
Anent the appellants defense that he was framed-up, we
are aware that in some instances, law enforcers resort to the
practice of planting evidence to extract information or even to
harass civilians.[26] However, like alibi, frame-up is viewed with
disfavor for it is self-serving, can easily be fabricated and is a
common standard defense ploy in most prosecutions for
violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act.[27] Clear and convincing
evidence is required to prove the defense.[28]
In the case at bar, apart from claiming that he was a victim
of frame-up and extortion by the narcotics agents of the MMDEG-
NCRPO, appellant failed to present any evidence to substantiate
his claim. He testified that he was accompanied by a friend, a
certain Sherman and the latters female companion, when the
vehicle they were boarding was blocked by the Honda Civic
being used by the narcotics operatives. However, he failed to
present in court these two persons to corroborate his claim.
Everything considered, we find that the prosecution has
established appellants guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Accordingly, he must suffer for his serious crime of being a
merchant of death, a killer without mercy who poisons the mind
and deadens the body of his victims.[29]
The penalty prescribed under Section 15 of Article III, in
relation to Section 20 of Article IV, of the Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972, as amended by RA 7659, for unauthorized sale of 200
grams or more of shabu or methylamphetamine hydrochloride
is reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five
hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos. In the case at bar,
as the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death consists of two (2)
indivisible penalties, appellant was correctly meted the lesser
penalty of reclusion perpetua, conformably with Article 63 (2) of
the Revised Penal Code that when there are neither mitigating
nor aggravating circumstances in the commission of the deed,
the lesser penalty shall be applied.
However, we note that the trial court did not impose a fine.
The imposition of fine is mandatory in cases of conviction of
unauthorized sale of regulated drugs. Courts may fix any amount
within the limits established by law and; in fixing the amount in
each case, attention shall be given, not only to the mitigating and
aggravating circumstances, but more particularly to the wealth or
means of the culprit. [30] As stated above, the law prescribes the
penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from
five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos if the shabu
involved weighs 200 grams or more. Considering that the amount
of shabu sold in this case weighed 262.272 grams, we deem the
amount of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00)
reasonable.[31]
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 18, in Criminal Case No.
99-171228, finding appellant Michael Monte y Abdul guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Article III, Section 15 of
Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, and sentencing him to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with all the accessory
penalties provided by law, is AFFIRMED, with the
MODIFICATION that appellant is further ordered to pay a fine in
the amount of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00).
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
[A.M. No. MTJ-03-1496. July 10, 2003]
JUDGE ELIEZER R. DE LOS SANTOS, complainant, vs.
JUDGE MARVIN B. MANGINO, respondent.
 RESOLUTION
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
This administrative matter refers to the Order dated 8 July
1998 of then Judge Eliezer R. de los Santos* of the Regional
[1]
Trial Court of Angeles City, Branch 59, relative to Criminal Cases
Nos. 93-100 and 101 entitled People of the Philippines v.
Jennifer Santos, which were pending in said court.
On 10 July 1998, Judge Eliezer R. de los Santos furnished
the Office of the Court Administrator with a copy of his 8 July
1998 Order for whatever action it may deem appropriate
concerning the actuation of Judge Mangino of the Municipal Trial
Court of Tarlac in approving the bail bond of an accused arrested
in Angeles City and residing in Angeles City and the cases being
pending also in Angeles City.
In his 8 July 1998 Order, Judge Eliezer R. de los Santos
narrated:
The records show that these cases pending before this Court were filed
since last February, 1993. Both the accused and the complainant are
residing in Angeles City. The accused was arrested in Angeles City and
the bail bond for the provisional liberty of the accused was issued by the
Angeles City office of the Imperial Insurance Company. According to
the accused, she paid P3,000 as premium to the Imperial Insurance
Company thru a certain Mr. Antonio Tolentino. However, instead of
having the said bail bond be approved by this Court, the said bail bond
was approved by Judge Marvin Mangino of Branch I of the Municipal
Trial Court of Tarlac. The order of release was also issued by the said
Judge Mangino. According to the accused, she never went to Tarlac and
appeared before said Judge Mangino. She also alleged that she never
went to Makati City and appeared before the Notary Public Melchor
Ancanan.
From the contents of the said bond No. 27367 issued by the Imperial
Insurance Company, it was made to appear that accused Jennifer Santos
appeared before Notary Public Melchor Ancanan in Makati City on
June 23, 1998.
In the same Order, Judge Eliezer R. de los Santos required
Julieta M. Bautista, Clerk of Court I, Branch 1, Municipal Trial
Court, Tarlac, to appear before his court on 24 July 1998 at 8:30
a.m. to explain and shed light on the circumstances behind the
issuance and approval of bail bond No. 27367 by Judge Marvin
B. Mangino of Branch 1 of the Municipal Trial Court of Tarlac,
Tarlac. He also ordered Mr. Roberto Cabuay, Executive Vice-
President and General Manager of the Imperial Insurance
Company and notary public Melchor Ancanan to explain in writing
or in person why they should not be held liable for making it
appear that accused Jennifer Santos appeared before notary
public Ancanan in Makati City on 23 June 1998.
In her written compliance[2] dated and filed on 23 July 1998,
Clerk of Court Julieta M. Bautista of the Municipal Trial Court of
Tarlac explained:
Regarding the bailbond posted by the accused JENNIFER SANTOS in
Crim. Cases Nos. 93-100 and 101 of that Court, at the time the
bondsman Imperial Insurance Co. who [sic] has a branch office at
Tarlac, Tarlac, presented the same for approval, he [sic] was with a
woman who appears [sic] to be the accused and believing the bond to be
legal with all its attached documents, the same was approved by Hon.
Marvin B. Mangino of this Court.
For its part, on 18 August 1998, the Office of the Court
Administrator referred to Judge Marvin B. Mangino for Comment
within ten (10) days from receipt thereof the 8 July 1998 Order of
Judge de los Santos.[3]
On 2 September 1998, Judge Marvin B. Mangino submitted
his Comment[4] wherein he stated that he initially adopts the
explanation of Clerk of Court Julieta M. Bautista on the incident,
and requested for a photocopy of the order and the bond subject
of the case so that he could intelligently make a comment
thereon. However, he did not file any supplemental comment or
press his request for a photocopy of the order and of the bond.
On 10 April 2002, this Court resolved to require the parties
to manifest within ten (10) days from notice whether they were
willing to submit the case for resolution on the basis of the
pleadings already filed.[5]
On 14 May 2002, Judge Marvin B. Mangino submitted his
manifestation expressing his willingness to submit for resolution
the above-entitled case based on the pleadings filed therein.
[6]
Since complainant Judge de los Santos did not submit any
manifestation, the Court, in its Resolution of 19 February 2003
directed that the Resolution of 10 April 2002 be served on him at
his office at the Court of Appeals. On 27 March 2003, the Court
received his Manifestation[7] dated 24 March 2002, expressing his
willingness to submit this matter for resolution on the basis of the
pleadings already filed.
In its Evaluation Report, the Office of the Court
Administrator stated:
Section 17 (a), Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that
Bail in the amount fixed may be filed with the Court where the case is
pending, or, in the absence or unavailability of the judge thereof, with
another branch of the same court within the province, city or
municipality other than where the case is pending, bail may be filed also
with any regional trial court of said place, or, if no judge there is
available, with any metropolitan judge, municipal trial judge or
municipal circuit trial judge therein.
Thus, bail may be filed with the same court where the case is
pending. In the absence or unavailability of the judge thereof, it may
[sic] filed with another branch of the same court within the province or
city.If the accused is arrested in a province, city or municipality other
than where the case is pending, bail may be filed also with any regional
trial court of said place, or, if no judge there is available, with any
metropolitan judge, municipal trial judge or municipal circuit trial judge
therein.
In the instant case, the accused Jennifer Santos was not arrested. That
being the case, she should have filed her bail bond with the court where
her case was pending, i.e., the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City. In
the absence of the judge thereof, it could be done at another branch of
the same court within the province of Pampanga or City of
Angeles. Instead, accused Jennifer Santos filed her bond in the
Municipal Trial Court of Tarlac, respondent Judge Marvin B. Mangino,
presiding, who approved the same and ordered his [sic] release from
custody. Res ipsa loquitor. Respondent Judges act is clearly irregular
and is in violation of the rules on the matter.
and recommended, as follows:
that respondent Judge Marvin B. Mangino of the Municipal Trial Court
of Tarlac, Branch I, be DECLARED guilty of misconduct for non-
observance of Section 17(a), Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Court, a
less serious offense under Section 4, Rule 140, supra, for which he
should be ordered to pay a FINE of P5,000.
As regards Section 17 (a), Rule 114 of the Rules of Court,
cited by the Court Administrator, this Court held in Cruz v.
Yaneza:[8]
The foregoing provision anticipates two (2) situations. First, the accused
is arrested in the same province, city or municipality where his case is
pending. Second, the accused is arrested in the province, city or
municipality other than where his case is pending. In the first situation,
the accused may file bail in the court where his case is pending or, in
the absence or unavailability of the judge thereof, with another branch
of the same court within the province or city. In the second situation, the
accused has two (2) options. First, he may file bail in the court where
his case is pending or, second, he may file bail with any regional trial
court in the province, city or municipality where he was arrested. When
no regional trial court judge is available, he may file bail with any
metropolitan trial judge, municipal trial judge or municipal circuit trial
judge therein.
The case at bar falls under the first situation mentioned
in Cruz v. Yaneza because the accused, Jennifer Santos, was
arrested in Angeles City and Criminal Cases Nos. 93-100 and
101, which were filed against her and under which she was
arrested, were pending with Branch 59 of the Regional Trial
Court of Angeles City. Thus, the bail bond for Jennifer Santos
provisional liberty should have been filed in said court, or, in the
absence or unavailability of the judge thereof, with another
branch of the same court within the province or city.
A mere cursory glance of the bail bond application would
readily inform Judge Marvin B. Mangino that the criminal cases in
question were pending with Branch 59 of the Regional Trial Court
of Angeles City. He also knew, or ought to know, that there are
many branches of the Regional Trial Court in Angeles City and in
the province of Pampanga. Thus, even if the Presiding Judge of
Branch 59 was absent or unavailable, any one of the judges of
the other branches of the Regional Trial Court in Angeles City
could have acted on the bail bond. Judge Marvin B. Mangino also
knew that his court is not of the same level as Branch 59 of the
Regional Trial Court of Angeles City. Therefore, he knew, or
ought to know, that he had absolutely no authority or jurisdiction
to approve the bail bond of accused Jennifer Santos. Clearly,
Judge Marvin B. Mangino blatantly disregarded Section 17(a),
Rule 114 of the Rules of Court.
Worse, it would further appear that Judge Marvin B.
Mangino did not even try to verify the authenticity of the bail
bond. It appears that the bail bond was notarized in Makati City,
although the bonding company has a branch office in Tarlac,
Tarlac. He should have inquired why it was notarized in Makati
City. It is obvious that he solely relied on the clerk of court and
approved the bail bond on the basis of the findings of the clerk of
court. He admitted this dereliction of duty to make an
independent assessment of the bail bond application when he
adopted as part of his Comment the compliance of his clerk of
court.
It is thus patent that Judge Marvin B. Mangino failed to
exert such conscientiousness, studiousness, and thoroughness
expected and demanded of a judge. He was, therefore, remiss in
observing the conduct expected of a member of the judiciary.[9]
A judges conduct should be above reproach, and in the
discharge of his judicial duties he should be conscientious,
studious, thorough, courteous, patient, punctual, just, impartial.
[10]
As an advocate of justice and a visible representation of the
law, he is expected to keep abreast with and be proficient in the
application and interpretation of the law. When the law is
sufficiently basic, a judge owes it to his office to simply apply it;
anything less than that would be gross ignorance of the law.
Further, a judge should exhibit more than a cursory
acquaintance with the basic legal norms and precepts as well as
with statutes and procedural rules. It is his pressing responsibility
to be diligently acquainted with the law and jurisprudence and the
changes therein not only because the study thereof is a never-
ending and ceaseless process but also for the reason that
ignorance of the law, which everyone is bound to know, excuses
no one, not even judges.[11] Having accepted his exalted position
as a member of the judiciary, Judge Marvin B. Mangino owes it to
the public and to the court over which he presides to maintain
professional competence at all times and to have the basic rules
at the palm of his hands.[12]
Judge Marvin B. Mangino failed to live up to these
standards. Not only did he approve the bail bond of the accused
without the requisite authority to do so, his manner of doing so
showed a flagrant disregard for the applicable procedural law he
had sworn to uphold and serve. Unfamiliarity with the Rules of
Court is a sign of incompetence which goes against Canon 3,
specifically Rule 3.01, of the Code of Judicial Conduct.[13] To
disregard the law when one has become familiar with it is worse
because bad faith comes in.
This palpable disregard of the procedural law on bail or
gross ignorance thereof, which also amounted to conduct grossly
prejudicial to the best interest of the service, renders Judge
Marvin B. Mangino administratively liable as recommended by
the Office of the Court Administrator. Under the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur, the Court may impose its authority upon erring
judges whose actuations, on their face, would show gross
incompetence, ignorance of the law or misconduct.[14]
A brief survey on the existing jurisprudence on the matter
reveals that for similar conduct, less severe penalties were
imposed. In Paz v. Tiong,[15] this Court imposed upon the
respondent judge of the Municipal Trial Court of Bolinao,
Pangasinan, a fine of P3,000 for signing the bail bond and the
order of release of an accused whose case was pending before
the Regional Trial Court of Alaminos, Pangasinan, absent any
showing that the judge presiding over the same was
unavailable. In Adapon v. Domagtoy,[16] this Court fined the
respondent judge of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Santa
Monica-Burgos, Surigao del Norte, in the amount of P10,000 for
ordering the release of an accused whose cases were pending
before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Dapa, Surigao del
Norte, notwithstanding the fact, that the accused was neither
arrested nor did he surrender to the authorities before the order
of release was issued and that the judge having jurisdiction over
the cases was not shown to be unavailable. In the more recent
case of Panganiban v. Cupin-Tesorero,[17] this Court imposed the
penalty of fine in the amount of P20,000 on respondent Municipal
Circuit Trial Court judge of Silang-Amadeo, Cavite who granted
bail and ordered the release of the accused whose case was
pending with the Regional Trial Court of Cavite by relying on the
representations made by the process server of the latter court
that the presiding judge therein was absent.
Under the factual milieu in this case, respondent Judge
Marvin B. Mangino deserves a penalty higher than a fine
of P5,000 recommended by the Office of the Court
Administrator. A fine of P15,000 is in order in light of the ruling of
this Court in Panganiban v. Cupin-Tesorero.
It is rather a sad commentary to make that this is not the
first time that a complaint involving irregular approval of bail bond
and issuance of order of release was brought before this Court.
[18]
Some judges refuse to learn from the lessons of previous
rulings of this Court. Indeed, some are difficult to reform. This
Court takes this opportunity to once again remind the judges of
lower courts of their role as the embodiment of competence,
integrity and independence.[19] They should always keep in mind
that in order to achieve justice, they should diligently ascertain
and conscientiously apply the law in relation to the facts of each
case they hear and then decide the same, unswayed by partisan
interests, public opinion or fear of criticism. The pursuit of
excellence must be their guiding principle. This is the least that
judges can do to sustain the trust and confidence which the
public reposed on them and the institution they represent.[20]
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Marvin B. Mangino of the
Municipal Trial Court of Tarlac, Tarlac, Branch 1, is hereby found
GUILTY of grave misconduct, gross ignorance of the law and
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and is
hereby FINED in the amount of Fifteen Thousand (P15,000)
Pesos, with a warning that a repetition of the same or
commission of similar acts in the future will be dealt with more
severely.
SO ORDERED.