SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 112761-65. February 3, 1997]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. PORFERIO M.

PEPITO, accused-appellant.

DECISION

PUNO, J.:

Accused-appellant PORFERIO PEPITO appeals from the Decision of the

trial court convicting him of Malversation of Public Funds through Falsification
of Official Documents on five (5) counts.

Appellant, as Acting Postmaster of Iligan City, was charged with

misappropriating government funds by manipulating his records and making it
appear that he paid a number of postal money orders although no such
payments were made. Appellant was found short in his cash accounts, as
follows: (a) P23,643.73 for October 1975; (b) P11.07 for December 1975;
[1]

(c)P7,283.59 for the month of January 1976; (d) P30,052.25 for April 1976,
[2] [3]

and; (e) P42,302.97 for May 1976.

[4] [5]

Except for the dates and amounts involved, appellant was similarly
charged in five (5) separate Informations as follows:
[6]

That sometime during the month of ________________, in the City of Iligan,

Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused
Porferio Pepito, Acting Postmaster of Iligan City, with official station thereat, and as
such accountable officer, responsible for funds collected and received by him by
reason of his position, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and fraudulently and
with grave abuse of confidence, misappropriate, embezzle and take away government
funds in his possession in the amount of ____________ accused employing deceit,
false manifestation and fraudulent misrepresentations, manipulated his records to
make it appear that on the month of ____________ , the Money Order Paid by him
was ___________ , although his payments amounted only to ____________, making
untruthful statements in a narration of facts and that by virtue of such falsification in
his record of payments, the said accused successfully appropriated and converted to
his own personal use and benefit the sum of ___________, to the damage and
prejudice of the Bureau of Post, Manila, Philippines, in the aforementioned amount of
___________.

Contrary to and in violation of Article 217 and Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code.

First, the facts. In a letter, dated August 5, 1976, CESAR L. JUAN,

[7]

Regional Director of the Bureau of Posts, Region X, Cagayan de Oro City,

requested the Office of the City Auditor, Iligan City, to audit the accounts of
appellant PORFERIO PEPITO, Acting Postmaster of Iligan City. Earlier, an
audit team from the Office of Regional Director Juan uncovered certain
anomalies regarding appellants postal money order transactions at the Iligan
City Post Office. However, due to lack of time, the team failed to determine the
exact figure involved in the anomaly. Hence, their request for assistance from
the City Auditors Office. [8]

Iligan City Auditor FRANCISCO APARECE immediately formed an audit

team composed of Assistant City Auditor HONORIO N. PABLICO and Auditor
ROMULO ORBE. They started their audit on August 19, 1976 and
[9]

concentrated on the postal money order transactions of appellant. They

examined the cash in appellants possession and verified the records of the
postal money orders (PMOs), the payment of these checks, and all depository
funds of said post office in government banks and in the Bureau of Posts,
Manila, covering the period from July 1, 1975 to August 9, 1976. [10]

Asst. Auditor Pablico outlined the procedure for payment of postal money
orders, thus: The postmaster pays the postal money order (PMO) upon
presentation to him. The PMO paid cards, evidencing payment of the PMOs,
are then kept by the postmaster as custodian. The postmaster then prepares
a list of the PMOs he paid for a period of fifteen (15) days. Hence, in a
month, the postmaster prepares two (2) lists or records of payment: one for
the first fifteen days of the month, and another list for the next fifteen
days. The PMO paid cards and the lists are then sent to the central office of
the Bureau of Posts in Manila for safekeeping. A copy of each list is sent to
the Regional Office of the Bureau of Posts, another copy is sent to the City
Auditors Office and the last copy is retained by the Postmaster himself. [11]
 The audit team verified the total amount of PMO payments appearing on
the lists or records prepared by appellant. They totalled the daily PMO
payments of appellant and cross-checked them with appellants entry on the
cash book. These reveal the total money order payments of appellant for the
month. After totalling the PMO payments of the postmaster per month, the
audit team requested the Central Office of the Bureau of Posts in Manila,
through its regional office, to furnish them the PMO paid cards, evidencing
payments of the PMOs during the period covered by their audit. [12]

Upon receipt of the PMO paid cards, the audit team cross-checked the
paid cards with the record of the PMOs allegedly paid by appellant. They
discovered that some PMOs were listed as paid but were not supported by
paid cards. The audit team uncovered these discrepancies for the months of
October and December, 1975 and for the months of January, April and May,
all of 1976. Based on the records, the total PMOs paid by appellant during the
period covered by the audit was P494,720.85, but only P250,090.60 was
supported by PMO paid cards. The balance of two hundred forty-four
thousand six hundred thirty pesos and twenty-five centavos (P244,630.25)
was disallowed in audit for lack of supporting documents. Hence, the cash
shortage in appellants account. Appellant asked the auditors to double-check
[13]

their findings but the audit team came out with the same result.

In a letter dated February 25, 1977, the audit team informed appellant of
[14]

the shortage in his cash accounts. They demanded from appellant the
immediate restitution of the missing funds and an explanation why no criminal
and administrative sanctions should be taken against him. No action was
[15]

taken by appellant to restore and explain his shortage of funds. Hence, five (5)
criminal Informations for malversation of public funds through falsification of
official documents were filed against him.

After the prosecution formally offered its evidence and rested its case on
December 18, 1978, the continuation of the hearing for the presentation of the
defense evidence was suspended due to the transfer of then Presiding Judge
Leonardo I. Cruz to Angeles City.

It was only after two (2) years, or on August 13, 1982, that continuation of
the trial resumed for the presentation of the defense evidence. However, on
the scheduled date of hearing, appellant, through counsel, filed a motion
to suspend the trial on the ground that he has applied for and was
[16]

conditionally granted an amnesty under P.D. 1082 by the 11th Amnesty

Commission of Marawi City, Lanao del Sur, for said cases. Appellant prayed
that pursuant to Section 6 of P.D. 1082, further proceedings in his cases be
held in abeyance pending final approval of his conditional amnesty by the
President of the Philippines.

The fiscal opposed the motion on the ground that the conditional
[17]

amnesty of appellant was spurious for it was issued by a person not duly
authorized for the purpose.

Resolution of this motion was deferred for six (6) years with the
subsequent reorganization of the judiciary and the re-raffling of appellants
cases. Finally, in an Order, dated September 9, 1988, appellants motion to
[18]

suspend the trial of the cases was set for hearing by the new presiding Judge
Tago M. Bantuas. However, on the date set, appellants counsel failed to
appear. Judge Bantuas continued with the hearing of appellants motion and
denied appellants motion to suspend the trial. The continuation of the hearing
of the cases was set on January 10, 1989. Upon receipt of the Order and
Notice of Hearing, appellants counsel, Atty. Dimnatang T. Saro, filed a motion
to postpone the hearing due to conflict of schedule. Hearing was thus reset
[19]

to February 7, 1989.[20]

Again, a series of motions to defer the hearing was filed at appellants

instance and granted by the trial court. It was only on January 24, 1992 that
the new presiding Judge Maximino Magno-Libre issued an Order admitting
the evidence offered by the prosecution. On July 14, 1992, the defense
[21]

commenced to adduce its evidence and presented appellant as its lone

witness.

On the stand, appellant denied there was shortage in his cash

accounts. After he was informed of the missing funds, he asked the audit
team to re-examine the records for his cash on hand has always tallied with
his cashbook. His office had been subjected to various regular audit
examinations by different offices, namely: the Bureau of Treasury, the District
Postal Inspector, the Postal Audit Examiners and the Iligan City Auditors
Office. None of these offices found any irregularity in his accountabilities. He
urged that there must have been some error or inaccuracy in the conduct of
the audit. He further charged that the malversation cases were filed against
him for political reasons for the late Governor Arsenio Quibranza had a grudge
against his son-in-law. [22]

Appellant admitted that when he was found short in his cash accounts, he
applied for amnesty under P.D. 1082. When he was informed by then
Presiding Judge Dalisay and Prosecutor Lagcao that he would have to admit
his guilt in his application for amnesty since amnesty presupposes the
commission of a crime, he still proceeded with his application for his friends in
Lanao del Sur assured him that his amnesty would be immediately processed
and approved. His conditional amnesty has been granted but it is still pending
final approval by the President for allegedly there is someone in Manila who is
blocking the grant of his amnesty. [23]

After trial, the court rendered judgment on September 8, 1993 finding

[24]

appellant guilty of the crime charged. The dispositive portion reads:

WHEREFORE, in accordance with the provisions of Article(s) 217, 171, in

relation to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, the Court finds accused guilty
on all the five (5) counts he is charged (with) and is hereby sentenced, to wit:

1. As to Criminal Case No. 277, since the amount misappropriated is P23,643.73,

accused should be penalized according to the penalty provided in Paragraph No. 4 of
Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code which is reclusion temporal maximum
to reclusion perpetua. Since according to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, the
penalty for the most serious crime shall be applied in its maximum period, accused is
meted out a penalty of reclusion perpetua.

2. As to Criminal Case No. 278, considering that the amount misappropriated

was P11.07, according to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for the
most serious crime shall be imposed in its maximum period, thus, accused should be
meted out the penalty prescribed in Article 171 and in applying the provisions of the
indeterminate sentence law, accused should be meted the indeterminate prison terms
of six (6) years prision correccional to twelve (12) years prision mayor.
3. As to Criminal Case No. 274, since the amount malversed was P7,283.79, accused
should be penalized according to Paragraph No. 3 of Article 217 of the Revised Penal
Code and should be meted out an indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years and one (1)
day of prision mayor to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months of reclusion
temporal.

4. As to Criminal Case No. 275, considering that the amount misappropriated

is P30,052.20, the penalty imposed should be akin to the penalty prescribed in
Criminal Case No. 277 mentioned in Paragraph 1 hereof, which is reclusion
perpetua;and

5. As to Criminal Case No. 276, considering that the amount subject of malversation
is P37,558.30, then the necessary penalty of reclusion perpetua should also be meted
out against accused.

Finally, accused is also hereby ordered to pay the government the total sum
of P98,549.99, which is the aggregate government funds actually misappropriated, for
restitution in accordance with Article 104 of the Revised Penal Code.

SO ORDERED.

Hence this appeal where appellant contends that:

I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS MOTION

TO SUSPEND THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE CASES PENDING FINAL ACTION
ON THE CONDITIONAL AMNESTY GRANTED TO THE APPELLANT;

II. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF

THE CRIMES OF MALVERSATION OF PUBLIC FUNDS THRU FALSIFICATION
OF OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS; AND

III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER VOLUNTARY

SURRENDER IN FAVOR OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

First. Appellant charges that the trial court erred in denying his motion to
suspend the proceedings in these cases pursuant to Section 6 of P.D. 1082.
Hence, the proceedings of the trial court are null and void and the judgment
[25]

of conviction against him should be vacated.

 We do not subscribe to appellants contention. On the date scheduled for
hearing of his motion, appellants counsel failed to appear and substantiate the
allegations in his motion. The trial court proceeded with the hearing of the
motion, found no merit thereto and denied the same. Appellants counsel
received a copy of the Order of denial and was notified of the continuation of
the hearing of said cases. Appellant did not challenge the correctness of this
ruling by way of a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of
Appeals. Instead, he proceeded to adduce evidence in his defense. After
[26]

more than fifteen (15) years of trial of his cases, appellant cannot now impugn
the Order of the court denying his motion to suspend his prosecution. [27]

Second. Appellant contends that there was no clear showing that he

misappropriated the missing funds. Allegedly, his office has been regularly
audited by different agencies and none has found him short in his
accountabilities. He insists on the inaccuracy of the audit report of the City
Auditors Office which examined his cash and accounts.

We find no merit in the contention. It is settled that in cases of

malversation of public funds, the mere failure of a public officer to have duly
forthcoming any public funds or property with which he is chargeable, upon
demand by any duly authorized officer, is prima facie evidence that he has put
such funds or property to personal use. An accountable officer may be
[28]

convicted of malversation even in the absence of direct proof of

misappropriation so long as there is evidence of shortage in his accounts
which he is unable to explain. Indeed, to justify conviction for malversation of
[29]

public funds, the prosecution has only to prove that the accused received
public funds or property and that he could not account for them or did not
have them in his possession and could not give a reasonable excuse for the
disappearance of the same. [30]

In the case at bar, all the elements of malversation of public funds are
present, viz: (a) the offender is a public officer, (b) he had custody or control of
the funds or property by reason of the duties of his office, (c) these funds or
property were public funds or property for which he was accountable, and (d)
that he appropriated, took, misappropriated or consented, or through
abandonment or negligence permitted another person to take them.
Appellant, as Acting Postmaster of Iligan City has custody of the funds of his
[31]
Office. A portion of these funds was used in the payment of postal money
orders (PMOs) presented to him. As evidence of these payments, the
Postmaster accomplishes the PMO paid cards and makes a list of the PMOs
he paid for a given period. These lists and paid cards are then sent to the
Central Office of the Bureau of Post for safekeeping.An audit of the PMO
transactions of appellant, however, disclosed that some of his PMO payments
were not supported by PMO paid cards.

Appellants assertion that the audit made by the Office of Iligan City Auditor
was inaccurate remains an unsubstantiated allegation. Although appellant
insisted on this alleged inaccuracy during the trial, he cannot point to the
specific procedure where the auditors erred in examining his accountabilities.
Noticeably, appellant did not present any document to show that the audit of
[32]

other government agencies covered also the PMO transactions of the post
office for the same period covered by the audit of the City Auditor.

Appellant also faults the trial court for considering as an admission of guilt
his application for amnesty under P.D. 1082. Regardless of this consideration,
however, the totality of the prosecution evidence has proved the guilt of
appellant beyond reasonable doubt. The testimonies of the auditors and the
documentary evidence adduced clearly proved appellants shortage of funds
and his corresponding liability therefor as an accountable officer. The
testimonial and documentary evidence of the prosecution were not
successfully rebutted by the defense.

Finally, appellant contends that the trial court failed to consider in his favor
the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. Allegedly, he voluntarily
surrendered to the court of justice and posted bail for his provisional liberty
before a warrant for his arrest could be issued.

The rule is clear that for the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender
to be appreciated, it must be proven that the accused freely placed himself at
the disposal of law enforcing authorities. The records confirm that appellant
was arrested and detained by the INP Station of Marawi City for the crimes
charged upon the issuance of the Order for his arrest on February 9,
[33]

1978. Appellant was only released from custody upon the approval of his
[34]
bailbond on March 27, 1978. Under the circumstances, appellant cannot be
credited with the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Decision of the trial court convicting appellant

PORFERIO M. PEPITO for five (5) counts of Malversation of Public Funds
Through Falsification of Official Documents is AFFIRMED. Costs against
appellant.

SO ORDERED.

Regalado, (Chairman), Romero, Mendoza and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 77429 January 29, 1990

LAURO SANTOS, petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

Puruganan, Chato, Chato & Tan for petitioner,

CRUZ, J.:

The factual findings of the lower courts are as a matter of policy not disturbed by this Court in the
absence of any of the recognized exceptions that will justify reversal. As none of these exceptions
appears in the case at bar, the petitioner's conviction, based on such findings, must be affirmed.

The evidence of the prosecution is, in the view of the Court, conclusive of the petitioner's guilt.

Sometime in November 1980, the complaining witness, Encarnacion Pealosa, entrusted her car, a
1976 Ford Escort, to herein petitioner Lauro Santos for repair of the carburetor. The work was to cost
P300.00. A week later, Santos persuaded her to have her car repainted by him for P6,500.00, within
a period of two months. 1

After two months, Pealosa went to the petitioner's repair shop at MacArthur Highway, Malabon, to
retrieve her car. Santos refused to deliver the vehicle unless she paid him P634.60 for the repairs.
As she did not have the money then, she left the shop to get the needed payment. Upon her return,
she could not find Santos although she waited five hours for him. She went back to the shop several
times thereafter but to no avail. 2

Pealosa was to learn later that Santos had abandoned his shop in Malabon. Unable to recover her
car, she filed a complaint for carnapping against Santos with the Constabulary Highway Patrol Group
in Camp Crame. The case was dismissed when the petitioner convinced the military authorities that
the complainant had sold the vehicle to him. He submitted for this purpose a Deed of Sale with Right
of Repurchase in his favor. 3

This notwithstanding, an information for estafa on Pealosa's complaint was filed against Santos in
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City on October 26,1982. After trial, the accused was found guilty
as charged and sentenced to "an indeterminate penalty of from four (4) months and one (1) day as
minimum to four (4) years and two (2) months as maximum, both of prision correccional, to
indemnify the offended party in the amount of P38,000.00 which is the value of the car without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and with costs." 4

On appeal, the conviction was affirmed but Santos was held guilty of qualified theft and not estafa.
The dispositive portion of the decision of the respondent court 5 read:

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is MODIFIED: the offense committed by

the appellant is qualified theft and he is hereby sentenced to an indeterminate
penalty ranging from TEN (10) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor, as
minimum, to FOURTEEN (14) YEARS and EIGHT (8) MONTHS of reclusion
temporal, as maximum; to indemnify Encarnacion Pealosa the sum of P20,000.00
without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency; and, to pay the costs.

In his defense, the petitioner now quibbles about the supposed inconsistences of the complaining
witness that he says make her testimony questionable. Our ruling is that such inconsistencies are
minor lapses and do not impair Pealosa's credibility as a whole. Santos also wonders why, if it is
true that she had asked him to repair and repaint her car, she had not even made an advance
payment. One reason could be that he himself did not ask for such advance, considering that they
were members of the same bowling team. There is even the suggestion that he was smitten with her
although she says she rejected his suit. 6

The petitioner's main reliance, though, is on the Deed of Sale with Right of Repurchase which he
submitted at the trial to prove that Pealosa had sold the car to him and now had no claim to it.

The lower courts were correct in rejecting this shoddy evidence. It is a wonder that it was even
considered at all when the case filed in Camp Crame was dismissed.

A cursory look at this alleged document will show that it is spurious. There are alterations and
deletions that are not even initialed to authenticate the changes. Two entire paragraphs are
cancelled. The name and address of the supposed original vendee are crossed out and those of the
petitioner are written in place of the deletions. Moreover, the so-called deed is not notarized.

It would have been so easy to re-type the one-page document to express clearly and indubitably the
intent of the parties and then have it properly acknowledged. But this was not done. The petitioner
insists that the document was originally intended to be concluded between Pealosa and Domingo
Corsiga but was hastily changed to make Santos the buyer and mortgagee. 7 Surely a vendee would
not be so rash as to depend for his title to the thing purchased on such a shabby and dubious deed of
sale.

The petitioner also makes much of the fact that Pealosa did not even sign a job order or get a
receipt when she delivered her car to him for repairs. In fact, she did not even check where his repair
shop was. He forgets that he was no less trusting either. He himself does not explain why the
amount of P6,000.00 he allegedly gave for the car was not acknowledged by Pealosa in the Deed
of Sale or in a separate instrument. There was no proof at all of such payment.
Given these circumstances, we find it easier to believe that Pealosa had signed the original
document with the intention of selling her car to Domingo Corsiga, the party first named therein, but
later changed her mind. She left the unused document in her car and Santos, chancing upon it when
the vehicle was delivered to him, decided to modify it to suit his purposes.

Besides, as the respondent court correctly observed, why would Santos still demand from Pealosa
the cost of the repairs on the car if he claims he had already bought it from her? And there is also the
glaring fact that Santos was unable to register the car in his name despite the lapse of all of two
years after his alleged purchase of the vehicle.

In his supplemental memorandum, the petitioner says he could not register the car because it had
merely been mortgaged to him and he had to wait until the expiration of the period of
repurchase. 8 Yet, during his cross-examination on March 5, 1984, Santos repeatedly declared that the
car belonged to him and that the right of repurchase expired after two months from November or
December 1980. He also said that rather than register it, he could cannibalize the car and sell the spare
parts separately at greater profit. 9

The Court also notes that, according to Santos, he accompanied Pealosa to redeem her car from
Corsiga and that he himself gave her the money for such redemption in Corsiga's
presence. 10 Having made that allegation, it was for the petitioner himself to present Corsiga as his
witness to corroborate that statement. Santos did not, and so failed to prove what was, to begin with, an
improbable defense. Ei incumbit probatio ui dicit.

Although the information charged the petitioner with estafa, the crime committed was theft. It is
settled that what controls is not the designation of the offense but the description thereof as alleged
in the information. 11 And as described therein, the offense imputed to Santos contains all the essential
elements of theft, to wit: (1) that there be a taking of personal property; (2) that said property belongs to
another; (3) that the taking be done with intent to gain; (4) that the taking be done without the consent of
the owner; and (5) that the taking be accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation against
persons or force upon things. 12

Theft should not be confused with estafa. According to Chief Justice Ramon C. Aquino in his book
on the Revised Penal Code, "The principal distinction between the two crimes is that in theft the
thing is taken while in estafa the accused receives the property and converts it to his own use or
benefit. However, there may be theft even if the accused has possession of the property. If he was
entrusted only with the material or physical (natural) or de facto possession of the thing, his
misappropriation of the same constitutes theft, but if he has the juridical possession of the thing, his
conversion of the same constitutes embezzlement or estafa." 13

The petitioner argues that there was no intent to gain at the time of the taking of the vehicle and so
no crime was committed. In U.S. v. De Vera, 14 we held that the subsequent appropriation by the
accused of the thing earlier delivered to him supplied the third element that made the crime theft instead
of estafa.

Illustrating, the Court declared:

 ... let us suppose that A, a farmer in the Province of Bulacan, agrees to sell B a
certain quantity of rice at a certain price per picul. A ships several sacks of the grain
which B receives in his warehouse. If, prior to the measuring required before the
payment of the agreed price, B takes a certain quantity of rice from the different
sacks, there can be no doubt that he is guilty of the crime of theft. Now, it may be
asked: Did not B receive the sacks of rice shipped to him by A?-Yes. And did A
voluntarily deliver the sacks of rice which he owned by shipping them to B?-Yes Was
the taking of the rice by B from the different sacks done with A's consent?- No.

This shows, to our mind, that the theory of the defense is untenable, according to
which, when the thing is received and then appropriated or converted to one's own
use without the consent of the owner, the crime committed is not that of theft.

It was erroneous for the respondent court to hold the petitioner guilty of qualified theft because the
fact that the object of the crime was a car was not alleged in the information as a qualifying
circumstance. 15 Santos would have had reason to argue that he had not been properly informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him, as qualified theft carries a higher penalty.

But although not pleaded and so not considered qualifying, the same circumstance may be
considered aggravating, having been proved at the trial. 16 Hence the imposable penalty for the theft,
there being no other modifying circumstances, should be in the maximum degree.

According to the Solicitor General:

The value of the car is P38,000.00. Under Article 309 of the Revised Penal Code, if
the value of the thing stolen exceeds P22,000.00, the penalty should be the
maximum period of the prescribed penalty plus one year for each additional
P10,000.00. Thus the imposable penalty is the maximum of prision mayor with a
range of TEN (10) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY to TWELVE (12) YEARS plus an
additional ONE (1) YEAR for every P10,000.00 in excess of P22,000.00, raising the
maximum penalty into Reclusion Temporal in the minimum period.

Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, there being one aggravating and no
mitigating circumstance the imposable penalty recommended is from SIX (6) YEARS
and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor to THIRTEEN (13) YEARS of reclusion temporal.

We approve the above observations and sentence the petitioner accordingly,

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED as herein modified. The petitioner is declared
guilty of theft and sentenced to from six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor to thirteen (13)
years of reclusion temporal. He is also ordered to restore the car in question to the private
respondent, or if this is no longer possible, to pay her the value thereof in the amount of P38,000.00,

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, Gancayco, Grio-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.