*SLANDER

G.R. Nos. L-21528 and L-21529, March 28, 1969

ROSAURO REYES, petitioner,
vs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
MAKALINTAL, J.:
This case is before us on appeal by certiorari, from the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming that a the municipal court of Cavite City,
convicting Rosauro Reyes of the crimes of grave threats and grave oral defamation, and sentencing him, in the first case (Criminal Case No.
2594), to four (4) months and ten (10) days of arresto mayor and to pay a fine of P300, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency;
and in the second case (Criminal Case No. 2595), to an indeterminate penalty of from four (4) months of arresto mayor to one (1) year and
eight (8) months of prison correccional and to pay Agustin Hallare the sum of P800 as moral damages, with costs in both cases.
The petitioner herein, Rosauro Reyes, was a former civilian employee of the Navy Exchange, Sangley Point, Cavite City, whose services
were terminated on May 6, 1961. In the afternoon of June 6, 1961, he led a group of about 20 to 30 persons in a demonstration staged in front
of the main gate of the United States Naval Station at Sangley Point. They carried placards bearing statements such as, "Agustin, mamatay
ka;" "To, alla boss con Nolan;" "Frank do not be a common funk;" "Agustin, mamamatay ka rin"; "Agustin, Nolan for you;" "Agustin alla bos
con Nolan;" "Agustin, dillega, el dia di quida rin bo chiquiting;" and others. The base commander, Capt. McAllister, called up Col. Patricia
Monzon, who as Philippine Military Liaison Officer at Sangley Point was in charge of preserving harmonious relations between personnel of
the naval station and the civilian population of Cavite City. Capt. McAllister requested Col. Monzon to join him at the main gate of the base to
meet the demonstrators. Col. Monzon went to the place and talked to Rosauro Reyes and one Luis Buenaventura upon learning that the
demonstration was not directed against the naval station but against Agustin Hallare and a certain Frank Nolan for their having allegedly
caused the dismissal of Rosauro Reyes from the Navy Exchange, Col. Monzon suggested to them to demonstrate in front of Hallare's
residence, but they told him that they would like the people in the station to know how they felt about Hallare and Nolan. They assured him,
however, that they did not intend to use violence, as "they just wanted to blow off steam."
At that time Agustin Hallare was in his office inside the naval station. When he learned about the demonstration he became apprehensive
about his safety, so he sought Col. Monzon's protection. The colonel thereupon escorted Hallare, his brother, and another person in going out
of the station, using his (Monzon's) car for the purpose. Once outside, Col. Monzon purpose slowed down to accommodate the request of
Reyes. He told Hallare to take a good look at the demonstrators and at the placards they were carrying. When the demonstrators saw Hallare
they shouted, "Mabuhay si Agustin." Then they boarded their jeeps and followed the car. One jeep overtook passed the car while the other to
led behind. After Hallare and his companions had alighted in front of his residence at 967 Burgos St., Cavite City, Col. Monzon sped away.
The three jeeps carrying the demonstrators parked in front of Hallare's residence after having gone by it twice Rosauro Reyes got off his jeep
and posted himself at the gate, and with his right hand inside his pocket and his left holding the gate-door, he shouted repeatedly, "Agustin,
putang ina mo. Agustin, mawawala ka. Agustin lumabas ka, papatayin kita." Thereafter, he boarded his jeep and the motorcade left the
premises. Meanwhile, Hallare, frightened by the demeanor of Reyes and the other demonstrators, stayed inside the house.lwphi1.et
On the basis of the foregoing events Rosauro Reyes was charged on July 24 and 25, 1961 with grave threats and grave oral defamation,
respectively (Criminal Cases Nos. 2594 and 2595, Municipal Court of Cavite City), as follows;
The undersigned City Fiscal of the City of Cavite accuses Rosauro Reyes of the crime of Grave Threats, as defined by
Article 282 of the Revised Penal Code and penalized by paragraph 2 of the same Article, committed as follows:

That on or about June 6, 1961, in the City of Cavite, Republic of the Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above named accused, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, orally threaten to
kill, one Agustin Hallare.

Contrary to law.

Cavite City, July 24, 1961.

DEOGRACIAS S. SOLIS
City Fiscal

BY: (SGD.) BUEN N. GUTIERREZ

Special Counsel

The undersigned complainant, after being duly sworn to an oath in accordance with law, accuses Rosauro Reyes of the
crime of Grave Oral Defamation, as defined and penalized by Article 358 of the Revised Penal Code, committed as
follows:

That on or about June 6, 1961, in the City of Cavite, Republic of the Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above named accused, without any justifiable motive but with the intention to cause dishonor,
 discredit and contempt to the undersigned complainant, in the presence of and within hearing of several persons, did
then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously utter to the undersigned complainant the following insulting and
serious defamatory remarks, to wit: "AGUSIN, PUTANG INA MO". which if translated into English are as follows:
"Agustin, Your mother is a whore."

Contrary to law.

Cavite City, July 25, 1961.

(SGD.) AGUSTIN HALLARE

Complainant

Subscribed and sworn to before me this. 25th day of July, 1961, in the City of Cavite, Philippines.

(SGD.) BUEN N. GUTIERREZ

Special Counsel

Upon arraignment, the accused pleaded not guilty to both charges and the cases were set for joint trial. On the day of the hearing the
prosecution moved to amend the information in Criminal Case No. 2594 for grave threats by deleting therefrom the word "orally". The
defense counsel objected to the motion on the ground that the accused had already been arraigned on the original information and that the
amendment "would affect materially the interest of the accused." Nevertheless, the amendment was allowed and the joint trial proceeded.
From the judgment of conviction the accused appeal to the Court of Appeals, which returned a verdict of affirmance. A motion for
reconsideration having been denied, the accused brought this appeal by certiorari.
Petitioner avers that the Court of Appeals erred: (1) in affirming the proceedings in the lower court allowing the substantial amendment of
the information for grave threats after petitioner had been arraigned on the original information; (2) in proceeding with the trial of the case of
grave threats without first requiring petitioner to enter his plea on the amended information; (3) in convicting petitioner of both offenses when
he could legally be convicted of only one offense, thereby putting him in jeopardy of being penalized twice for the same offense; (4) in
convicting petitioner of grave threats when the evidence adduced and considered by the court tend to establish the offense of light threats only;
and (5) in convicting petitioner of grave oral defamation when the evidence tend to establish that of simple slander only.
On the first error assigned, the rule is that after the accused has pleaded the information may be amended as to all matters of form by leave
and at the discretion of the court when the same can be done without prejudice to the rights of the defendant (Section 13, Rule 110, New Rules
of Court). Amendments that touch upon matters of substance cannot be permitted after the plea is entered.
After a careful consideration of the original information, we find that all the elements of the crime of grave threats as defined in Article 282 1
of the Revised Penal Code and penalized by its paragraph 2 were alleged therein namely: (1) that the offender threatened another person with
the infliction upon his person of a wrong; (2) that such wrong amounted to a crime; and (3) that the threat was not subject to a condition.
Hence, petitioner could have been convicted thereunder. It is to be noted that under the aforementioned provision the particular manner in
which the threat is made not a qualifying ingredient of the offense, such that the deletion of the word "orally" did not affect the nature and
essence of the crime as charged originally. Neither did it change the basic theory of the prosecution that the accused threatened to kill Rosauro
Reyes so as to require the petitioner to undergo any material change or modification in his defense. Contrary to his claim, made with the
concurrence of the Solicitor General, petitioner was not exposed after the amendment to the danger of conviction under paragraph 1 of Article
282, which provides for a different penalty, since there was no allegation in the amended information that the threat was made subject to a
condition. In our view the deletion of the word "orally" was effected in order to make the information conformable to the evidence to be
presented during the trial. It was merely a formal amendment which in no way prejudiced petitioner's rights.
Petitioner next contends that even assuming that the amendment was properly allowed, the trial court committed a reversible error in
proceeding with the trial on the merits without first requiring him to enter his plea to the amended information. Considering, however, that the
amendment was not substantial, no second plea was necessary at all.
The third and fourth issues are related and will be discussed together. Petitioner avers that the appellate court erred in affirming the decision
of the trial court erred in affirming him of grave threats and of grave oral defamation when he could legally be convicted of only one offense,
and in convicting him of grave threats at all when the evidence adduced and considered by the court indicates the commission of light threats
only.
The demonstration led by petitioner Agustin Hallare in front of the main gate of the naval station; the fact that placards with threatening
statements were carried by the demonstrators; their persistence in trailing Hallare in a motorcade up to his residence; and the demonstration
conducted in front thereof, culminating in repeated threats flung by petitioner in a loud voice, give rise to only one conclusion: that the threats
were made "with the deliberate purpose of creating in the mind of the person threatened the belief that the threat would be carried into
effect." 2Indeed, Hallare became so apprehensive of his safety that he sought the protection of Col. Monzon, who had to escort him home,
wherein he stayed while the demonstration was going on. It cannot be denied that the threats were made deliberately and not merely in a
temporary fit of anger, motivated as they were by the dismissal of petitioner one month before the incident. We, therefore, hold that the
appellate court was correct in upholding petitioner's conviction for the offense of grave threats.
 The charge of oral defamation stemmed from the utterance of the words, "Agustin, putang ina mo". This is a common enough expression in
the dialect that is often employed, not really to slander but rather to express anger or displeasure. It is seldom, if ever, taken in its literal sense
by the hearer, that is, as a reflection on the virtues of a mother. In the instant case, it should be viewed as part of the threats voiced by appellant
against Agustin Hallare, evidently to make the same more emphatic. In the case of Yebra, G.R. No. L-14348, Sept. 30, 1960, this Court said:
The letter containing the allegedly libelous remarks is more threatening than libelous and the intent to threaten is the principal aim
and object to the letter. The libelous remarks contained in the letter, if so they be considered, are merely preparatory remarks
culminating in the final threat. In other words, the libelous remarks express the beat of passion which engulfs the writer of the letter,
which heat of passion in the latter part of the letter culminates into a threat. This is the more important and serious offense committed
by the accused. Under the circumstances the Court believes, after the study of the whole letter, that the offense committed therein is
clearly and principally that of threats and that the statements therein derogatory to the person named do not constitute an independent
crime of libel, for which the writer maybe prosecuted separately from the threats and which should be considered as part of the more
important offense of threats.
The foregoing ruling applies with equal force to the facts of the present case.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and petitioner is acquitted, with costs de oficio, insofar as Criminal Case No.
2595 of the Court a quo (for oral defamation) is concerned; and affirmed with respect to Criminal Case No. 2594, for grave threats, with costs
against petitioner.

G.R. Nos. L-32836-37 May 3, 1989

DANIEL VICTORIO and EXEQUIEL VICTORIO, petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

BIDIN, J.:
This is a petition for review by certiorari of the decision** of the Court of Appeals dated July 27, 1970 in Criminal Cases Nos.
09243 and 09244 entitled "People of the Philippines v. Exequiel Victorio and Daniel Victoria", affirming the lower court's judgment
of conviction of the petitioners for grave oral defamation with modification of sentence and the appellate court's resolution dated
October 28, 1970 denying herein petitioners' motion for rehearing and/or new trial as well as their urgent motion for
reconsideration filed on October 19, 1970. The dispositive portion of the appealed decision reads as follows:
IN VIEW HEREOF, with the modification that appellants are sentenced to the indeterminate penalty of one (1)
month and one (1) day of arresto mayor to one (1) year and one (1) day of prision correccional, the judgment
appealed from is affirmed in all respects with costs." (as amended by the resolution dated August 7, 1970, Rollo,
p. 19).
The facts of the case taken from the decision of the Court of Appeals are as follows:
Atty. Vivencio Ruiz, a practising lawyer since 1926, one time Justice of the Peace and member of the Provincial Board of Nueva
Ecija, a professor of law and for sometime president of the Nueva Ecija Bar Association, has been the attorney of petitioner
Exequiel Victorio in certain civil cases from 1953 until 1963 when petitioner decided to hire the services of another lawyer, Atty. L.
Castillo in place of Atty. Ruiz and his collaborator Judge Alfredo Guiang, then Municipal Judge of Guimba, Nueva Ecija. Exequiel
Victorio and his wife afterwards filed an administrative charge against Judge Guiang which was assigned to Judge Ramon
Avancena, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, for investigation and disbarment proceedings against
Atty. Ruiz, then pending in the Office of the Solicitor General. Petitioner Daniel Victorio is the son of Exequiel Victoria.
During the hearing of the administrative case on that particular afternoon of January 9, 1964 in the sala of Judge Avancea, Atty.
Castillo, counsel of the Victorios, presented an urgent motion to disqualify Judge Avancea to hear the administrative case, who
apparently taken aback, called down Atty. Castillo and gave him a lecture, while Atty. Ruiz, as counsel for respondent Judge
Guiang in the administrative case, moved that Atty. Castillo be cited for contempt of court.
After the said hearing and while the two accused were later walking down the corridor leading to the stairs from the sala of Judge
Avancea, the incident that gave rise to the criminal prosecution for oral defamation took place. Petitioners were overheard by
Emiliano Manuzon, a policeman of Cabanatuan City and one of the witnesses for the prosecution, to have uttered the following
defamatory words:
Daniel: "Kayabang ng putang-inang abogadong Ruiz na iyan, tunaw naman ang utak, suwapang
at estapador."
Exequiel: "Lastog ta ukinnanata abogado Ruiz, suwapang, estapador, paltogak ta ukinana ta
abogado Ruiz, suwapang ken estapador." (Translated in Tagalog as, Mayabang yang putang-
inang abogado Ruiz na iyan, babarilin ko ang putang inang iyan, suwapang at estapador.")
On February 8, 1964, Daniel Victorio and Exequiel Victorio were separately charged with the crime of Serious Oral Defamation in
the City Court of Cabanatuan City, in Identical informations (Original Record, p. 1) indicting the accused as follows:
 That on or about the 9th day of January, 1964, in the City of Cabanatuan, Republic of the Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused moved by resentment and hatred which he
entertained against the person of one Vivencio Ruiz, and in order to put him into public ridicule, discredit, and
contempt, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously, and in the the presence of many persons,
uttered the following defamatory words, to wit:
LASTOG TA UKINANATA ABOGADO RUIZ, SWAPANG, ESTAPADOR, PALTOGAK TA UKINNANATA. 1
and other words of similar import to the great embarrassment of said Vivencio Ruiz.
Contrary to law.
Both accused pleaded not guilty upon arraignment (Original Record, p. 10; p. 4) and the cases were tried jointly.
After trial, both accused were convicted in a decision of the the City Court dated April 10, 1968,*** the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, the prosecution having proved the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, the accused,
Exequiel Victoria is hereby found guilty of Grave Oral Defamation and is hereby sentenced to suffer an
imprisonment of SIX (6) MONTHS & ONE (1) DAY, and the accused Daniel Victorio is hereby sentenced to suffer
an imprisonment of (6) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY and to pay the costs proportionately.
SO ORDERED. (Original Record, p. 179).
Their motion for reconsideration and/or modification of judgment (Original Record, p. 181) filed on the same date was denied in
an order of the trial court dated September 25, 1968 (Original Record, p. 189). On appeal, the Court of Appeals, on October 9,
1968 (Original Record, p. 201) affirmed the decision of the trial court but modified the penalty to the indeterminate sentence of
one (1) month and one (1) day of arresto mayor as minimum to one (1) year and one (1) day of prisIon correccional as maximum
(Resolution of August 7, 1970; Rollo, p. 19). The motion for hearing and/or reconsideration filed on October 15, 1970 as well as
their urgent motion for reconsideration filed on October 19, 1970 were denied by the Court of Appeals in its resolution dated
October 28, 1970. Thus, this petition for review by certiorari filed with the Court on December 18, 1970 (Rollo, P. 9).
On February 11, 1971, the Court resolved to deny the petition for insufficient showing that findings of facts are unsupported by
substantial evidence and for lack of merit (Rollo, p. 43). However, in its Resolution of April 15, 1971, the Court, considering the
grounds of the motion of petitioners for reconsideration of the resolution of February 11, 1971, resolved to: (a) reconsider said
resolution; and (b) to give due course to the petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals (Rollo, p. 56).
On October 15, 1974, counsel for petitioners-appellants filed a motion to dismiss G.R. No. L-32836 (Criminal Case No. 9469 of
the City Court of Cabanatuan City and CA-G.R. No. 09243-44-CR), manifesting that the petitioner-appellant Exequiel Victorio
died on April 14, 1974 at Guimba, Nueva Ecija where he was then residing (Rollo, p. 131). There being no objection interposed
by the Solicitor General in his comment filed with the Court on December 11, 1974, the death of petitioner-appellant having
occurred prior to the rendition of final judgment (Rollo,p. 154), the Court resolved on December 18, 1974 to dismiss L-32836-37
only insofar as appellant Exequiel Victorio is concerned (Rollo, p. 157).
The lone assignment of error (Brief for the Petitioners, p. 91), is as follows:
THAT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE WORDS UTTERED BY THE
PETITIONERS IN CONVERSATION WITH EACH OTHER AND WHILE IN THE HEAT OF ANGER CONSTITUTE
GRAVE ORAL DEFAMATION INSTEAD OF MERELY LIGHT ORAL DEFAMATION.
In effect, counsel for petitioners abandoned all the assignments of error in the Court of Appeals, confined himself to only one, and
practically admitted that the accused committed the crime charged although of a lesser degree that of slight oral defamation only,
instead of grave oral defamation.
There is no dispute regarding the main facts that had given rise to the present case. Appellant-petitioner in this instant appeal,
does not deny that the accused, on the occasion in question, uttered the defamatory words alleged in the information. Thus, the
sole issue that the Court has to resolve is whether or not the defamatory words constitute serious oral defamation or simply slight
oral defamation.
The term oral defamation or slander as now understood, has been defined as the speaking of base and defamatory words which
tend to prejudice another in his reputation, office, trade, business or means of livelihood (33 Am. Jur. 39). Article 358, Revised
Penal Code, spells out the demarcation line, between serious and slight oral defamations, as follows: "Oral defamation shall be
punished by arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period, if it is of a serious and insulting
nature, otherwise, the penalty shall be arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos." (Balite v. People, 18 SCRA 280 [1966]).
To determine whether the offense committed is serious or slight oral defamation, the Court adopted the following guidelines:
. . . We are to be guided by a doctrine of ancient respectability that defamatory words will fall under one or the
other, depending upon, as Viada puts it, '...upon their sense and grammatical meaning judging them separately,
but also upon the special circumstances of the case, antecedents or relationship between the offended party and
the offender, which might tend to prove the intention of the offender at the time: ... Balite v. People, Ibid., quoting
Viada, Codigo Penal, Quinta edicion, page 494).
Thus, in the same case cited where scurrilous words imputed to the offended party the crime of estafa, the Court ruled:
The scurrilous words imputed to the offended party the crime estafa. The language of the indictment strikes deep
into the character of the victim; He 'has sold the union; he 'has swindled the money of the vendees; he 'received
bribe money in the amount of P10,000.00 ... and another P6,000.00'; He 'is engaged in racketeering and
enriching himself with the capitalists'; He 'has spent the funds of the union for his personal use.'
No amount of sophistry will take these statements out of the compass of grave oral defamation. They are serious
and insulting. No circumstances need to be shown to upgrade the slander. . . .
In another case where a woman of violent temper hurled offensive and scurrilous epithets including words imputing unchastity
against a respectable married lady and tending to injure the character of her young daughters, the Court ruled that the crime
committed was grave slander:
The language used by the defendant was deliberately applied by her to the complainant. The words were uttered
with evident intent to injure complainant, to ruin her reputation, and to hold her in public contempt, for the sake of
revenge. One who will thus seek to impute vice or immorality to another, the consequences of which might
gravely prejudice the reputation of the person insulted, in this instance apparently an honorable and respectable
lady and her young daughters, all prominent in social circles, deserves little judicial sympathy. Certainly, it is time
for the courts to put the stamp of their disapproval on this practice of vile and loud slander. (U.S. v. Tolosa, 37
Phil. 166 [1917]).
In a case where the accused, a priest, called the offended party a gangster, in the middle of a sermon, the court affirmed the
conviction of the accused for slight slander (People v. Arcand 68 Phil. 601 [1939]). There was no imputation of a crime nor a vice
or immorality in said case.
In the instant case, appellant-petitioner admitted having uttered the defamatory words against Atty. Vivencio Ruiz. Among others
he called Atty. Ruiz, "estapador", which attributes to the latter the crime of estafa, a serious and insulting imputation. As stated by
the Court in Balite v. People, supra, "no amount of sophistry will take these statements out of the compass of grave oral
defamation . . . No circumstances need to be shown to upgrade the slander."
Defamatory words uttered specifically against a lawyer when touching on his profession are libelous per se. Thus, in Kleeberg v.
Sipser (191 NY 845 [1934]), it was held that "where statements concerning plaintiff in his professional capacity as attorney are
susceptible, in their ordinary meaning, of such construction as would tend to injure him in that capacity, they are libelous per
se and (the) complaint, even in the absence of allegation of special damage, states cause of action." Oral statements that a
certain lawyer is 'unethical,' or a false charge, dealing with office, trade, occupation, business or profession of a person charged,
are slanderous per se (Kraushaar v. LaVin, 42 N.Y.S. 2d 857 [1943]; Mains v. Whiting 49 NW 559 [1891]; Greenburg v. De Salvo,
216 So. 2d 638 [1968]).
In Pollard v. Lyon (91 US 225 [1876]), the court there had occasion to divide oral slander, as a cause of action, into several
classes, as follows:
(1) Words falsely spoken of a person which impute to the party the commission of some criminal offense
involving moral turpitude for which the party, if the charge is true, may be indicted and punished;
(2) Words falsely spoken of a person which impute that the party is infected with some contagious disease,
where, if the charge is true, it would exclude the party from society;
(3) Defamatory words falsely spoken of a person which impute to the party unfitness to perform the duties of an
office or employment, or the want of integrity in the discharge of the duties of such office or employment;
(4) Defamatory words falsely spoken of a party which prejudice such party in his or her profession or trade; and
(5) Defamatory words falsely spoken of a person, which, though not in themselves actionable, occasion the party
special damage."
In the instant case, appellant-petitioner imputed the crime of estafa against a prominent lawyer one-time Justice of the Peace and
member of the Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija, a professor of law and for sometime a president of the Nueva Ecija Bar
Association. As the scurrilous imputation strikes deep into the character of the victim, no special circumstance need be shown for
the defamatory words uttered to be considered grave oral defamation Balite v. People, supra. In addition, the fact that the
offended party is a lawyer, the totality of such words as "kayabang", "tunaw ang utak", "swapang at estapador", imputed against
him has the import of charging him with dishonesty or improper practice in the performance of his duties, hence, actionable per
se.
Petitioner argues that this Court in People v. Doronila (40 O.G. No. 15, Supp. 11, p. 231 [1941]) and People v. Modesto (40 O.G.
No. 15, Supp. 11, p. 128 [1941]) ruled that defamatory words uttered in the heat of anger could only give rise to slight oral
defamation (Rono, p. 13).
We disagree.
An examination of the rulings relied upon by petitioner showed that said cases were decided not by this Court but by the
respondent court. Suffice it to say that said decisions do not bind this Court.
Nevertheless, the cases adverted to by petitioner would not in any manner help his cause. As pointed out by the Solicitor
General, there was no reason for the petitioner to be angry at the offended party who was merely performing his duties as a
lawyer in defense of his client. Petitioner's anger was not lawfully caused. (Brief for the Appellee, p. 7). The fact that the
defamatory words were uttered by the petitioner without provocation by private respondent and taken seriously by the latter,
renders inapplicable the cases relied upon by petitioner.
As a matter of fact, the scurrilous remarks were found by the respondent court to have been uttered in a loud voice, in the
presence of at least ten (10) persons, taken seriously by the offended party and without provocation on his part.
WHEREFORE, the petition is Denied for lack of merit and the appealed decision Affirmed in toto.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-57103 January 30, 1982

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff,
vs.
HON. ANTONIO A. ORCULLO, as Acting City Judge of Cagayan de Oro City, and VENIDA PERALTA alias EDAT
PERALTA, respondents.

FERNANDEZ, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari filed by the City Fiscal and Assistant City Fiscal of Cagayan de Oro City praying that the order of
the respondent Judge, Hon. Antonio A. Orcullo, dismissing Criminal Case No. 40117 be set aside and that said case be ordered
reinstated and tried on the merits.
The petition alleges that on September 4, 1978, a special counsel in the Office of the City Fiscal of Cagayan de Oro City filed an
information with the City Court of Cagayan de Oro, Branch I, charging the respondent Venida Peralta alias Edat Peralta with oral
defamation committed as follows:
That on or about August 17, 1978, at 7:00 o'clock in the evening, at Gumamela Extension Street, Carmen,
Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
with deliberate intent to cast undue shame, public ridicule, discredit, disrepute and contempt against one Lydia
Flores, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously speak and shouted the following words towards the
latter: "Hostess ug nangabit, bisan unsa lang oten and nakapaslak "; which approximately means in English.- "A
hostess and has a paramour, any kind of penis had penetrated your vagina", or words of similar import, directed
to the said Lydia Flores, in the presence and with the hearing of many people, well-knowing that what she uttered
were not only defamatory but downright false, causing the offended party by said utterance to suffer undue
shame, public ridicule, disrepute, discredit and contempt, to the great damage and prejudice of the said Lydia
Flores.
Contrary to Article 358 of the Revised Penal Code.
Cagayan de Oro City, September 1, 1978.
(SGD) EFREN L. LAMPIOS Special Counsel 1
which information was docketed as Criminal Case No. 40117; that on November 3, 1978, Criminal Case No. 40117 was set for
arraignment and the accused- respondent pleaded not guilty; that on February 2, 1981, the accused-respondent filed a motion to
quash on the ground that the crime alleged constituted an imputation of a crime which cannot be prosecuted de oficio; that on
February 10, 1981, the respondent judge, Hon. Antonio A. Orcullo, issued an order dismissing Criminal Case No. 40117 on the
ground that the offense alleged in the information is a private crime which can be instituted or filed only by the offended party;
that on February 27, 1981, the City Fiscal filed a motion for reconsideration of the order dismissing Criminal Case No. 40117; and
that on March 11, 1981, the respondent judge denied the motion for reconsideration. 2
In his comment filed on November 3, 1981, the private respondent contended that the wordings "Hostess and has a paramour,
any kind of penis had penetrated your vagina" are in unequivocal terms and can be readily understood as imputing to the
offended party the commission of the act of adultery, she being a married woman, hence the crime charged consists in the
imputation of an offense which cannot be prosecuted de oficio and can be brought only upon complaint filed by the offended
party as provided in paragraph 5, Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code. 3
The Solicitor General was required to comment on the petition and on the opposition of the accused. 4
The pertinent portion of the comment of the Solicitor General filed on December 18, 1981, reads:
The main issue to be resolved is whether the derogatory remarks "A hostess and has a paramour, any kind of
penis had penetrated your vagina" imputes adultery or prostitution. Petitioner submits that the remarks impute
prostitution rather than adultery. The word "hostess" has acquired a notorious connotation. It has a peculiar
reference to one who works in nightclubs and "misters to the pleasures of men for fee". The expression "any kind
 of penis had penetrated your vagina" definitely describes and only refers to the work of a prostitute, and not that
of a mere adulteress.
It is alleged by accused-respondent that the remarks imputed adultery, because the word "paramour" was
mentioned, thereby implying complainant to be a married woman who was carrying on an affair with a man not
her husband. It must be pointed out that since the information does not allege the civil status of complainant as
married, she should be presumed to be single, and therefore the remarks must be understood as imputing
prostitution, and not adultery. Assuming arguendo that complainant is married and that the remarks, while
imputing acts of prostitution to her and in effect charged her with adultery, the information can still be filed without
her complaint. The case of People vs. Hong Din Chu, 33 SCRA 199, 202 is in point.
As thus alleged it is clear that, while the utterance in effect also imputed on her the commission
of adultery, the offended party being a married woman, the disreputable conduct she was
particularly charged with was the crime of prostitution, not adultery. And it may be pointed out that
prostitution and adultery are not one and the same thing, the first is a crime against public
morals, committed by a woman, whether married or not, who, for money or profit, habitually
indulges in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, whereas adultery is in the nature of a private
offense committed by a married woman who shall have sexual intercourse with a man not her
husband. In short, the essential element in prostitution is not simply a woman's entering into
marital relations with a man other than her husband, if she happens to be married, but the
existence of pecuniary or financial gain as inducement to, or consideration for, that woman's
engaging in sexual activities. Thus, to call a married woman a prostitute is not merely to proclaim
her an adulteress a violator of her marital vows: it is to charge her of having committed an
offense against public morals, of moral degeneracy far exceeding that involved in the
maintenance of adulterous relations.
It appearing from the recital of the information that the alleged defamatory remark by the accused
specifically imputed upon the offended party the commission of prostitution, which is a public
crime that can be prosecuted de oficio, the information filed under the signature of the Assistant
City Fiscal duly conferred jurisdiction upon the lower court to try the case. (Emphasis supplied)
This ruling is a mere reiteration of previous pronouncements made by this Honorable Court in People v. Santos,
98 Phil. 11 and Mangila v. Lantik, 30 SCRA 82. Still for another reason, assuming arguendo that adultery which is
a private crime, and prostitution which is a public crime, are both imputed to complainant, criminal action may still
be instituted without her complaint because public interest, which is always paramount to private interest, so
requires (People v. Yu, 1 SCRA 199).
It must be noted that it is only when derogatory remarks clearly and categorically reflect the elements constituting
adultery would the complaint for libel by the offended party be necessary to commence prosecution (People v.
Padilla, 105 Phil. 45). In this case, however, the derogatory remarks of accused-respondent, not only do not
clearly show the elements of adultery, but on the contrary, such remarks indubitably impute the crime of
prostitution. Therefore, the information for libel can be filed without the complaint of the offended party. 5
The submission of the Solicitor General is well taken. Indeed, the words quoted in the information are indubitably an imputation of
the crime of prostitution which can be prosecuted de oficio.
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted, the order dismissing Criminal Case No. 40117 of the City Court of Cagayan de Oro City is
set aside, and the respondent judge, Hon. Antonio A. Orcullo, is ordered to reinstate said criminal case and to try the same on the
merits.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 160351 April 10, 2006

 NOEL VILLANUEVA, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and YOLANDA CASTRO, Respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is no ordinary word war story. Here, the Councilor and Vice-Mayor of a town, both holders of exalted government positions,
became slaves to their human limitations and engaged in a verbal scuffle at the municipal hall as if they were ordinary men in the
streets. A moment of unguarded emotional outburst lead to the long-drawn out twists and turns of this case, which should have
been avoided if only they have imbedded in their complex emotions, habits and convictions that consciousness to regulate these
deflecting forces and not to let them loose, either to their own detriment or to that of the public they serve. This is the high price
they have to pay as occupants of their exalted positions.1
At bar is a petition for review assailing the decision2 dated 28 March 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 22932
which affirmed with modification the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tarlac, likewise affirming with modification the
joint decision of the 2nd Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Capas-Bamban-Concepcion, convicting petitioner of the crime
of Grave Oral Defamation in Criminal Case No. 139-94 and Slander by Deed in Criminal Case No.140-94. Also assailed is the
resolution3 dated 9 October 2003 of the Court of Appeals denying the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner.
Petitioner Noel Villanueva was then a member of the Municipal Council while private complainant Yolanda C. Castro was then
Municipal Vice Mayor, both of Concepcion, Tarlac. Upon complaint of private complainant, two separate Criminal Complaints
were filed on 9 October 1994 against the petitioner in the 2nd MCTC of Capas-Bamban-Concepcion, to wit:
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 139-94
For: Grave Oral Defamation
On September 12, 1994 on or about 10:00 in the morning at the SB Office in the Municipal Building of Concepcion, Tarlac, in the
presence of several persons and again in the afternoon on or about four thirty (4:30 PM) at the Old Session Hall of the Municipal
Building in my presence and in the presence of several persons, defendant NOEL L. VILLANUEVA, in a loud voice and within
hearing distance of everyone present, unlawfully, maliciously and feloniously uttered in a serious and insulting manner at the
undersigned complainant the following words: ["]Nagmamalinis ca, ena ca man malinis, garapal ca["] and "Balamu mansanas
cang malutu, pero queng quilib ularan ca, tictac carinat" (You are pretending to be clean and honest yet you are not clean and
honest, you are corrupt; you are like a red apple, but inside you are worm infested and extremely dirty), which utterances are
serious and insulting in nature, tending to cause dishonor, discredit and contempt of undersigned complainant and causing her
extreme mental anguish, wound (sic) feelings, besmirched reputation and serious anxiety for which she is entitled to recover
moral and exemplary damages in an amount to be determined by the honorable court. Contrary to law.
CRIM.CASE NO. 140-94
For: Slander by Deed
On September 12, 1994 around four thirty (4:30 P.M.) in the afternoon, more or less, at the Municipal Building of Concepcion,
Tarlac, where public authorities are engaged in the discharge of their duties, and in the presence of several persons, the accused
Noel L. Villanueva while in the process of hurling verbal insults at the complainant, then and there unlawfully, feloniously and
contemptuously gave the complainant what is commonly known as "dirty finger" by poking his hand at complainants face with
the middle finger extended and the rest of his fingers half-closed, an act tending to cause dishonor, discredit and contempt on the
complainant and causing her mental anguish, wounded feelings and moral suffering for which she is entitled to moral and
exemplary damages in an amount to be determined by the honorable court. Contrary to law.4
Petitioner entered a plea of "not guilty" on both counts and trial ensued. The prosecution witnesses presented were the
complainant and her two witnesses.
The MCTC restated the facts as presented by the prosecution evidence as follows:
On 12 September 1994, at 10:00 oclock in the morning, two utility men came to complainants office, bringing with them
the application for monetized leave of Sangguniang Bayan member Noel Villanueva, petitioner in this case. The
application for monetized leave was not immediately attended to by complainant as she was then busy dictating some
important matters to her secretary.5
The accused at that time was standing in front of the Vice Mayors Office and he allegedly said: "E ano kung wala sa mood, e
ano kung galit sya."6 These utterances of accused were disregarded by complainant but accused then entered the complainants
office bringing with him his Application for Monetized Leave. The accused addressed the complainants secretary: "Malou, pag
atiu ne keng mood, papirma mu ne." The alleged request of accused to the Secretary was made in a very sarcastic manner.7
Complainant got the monetized leave and filed it in her "in and out" files and while doing this, the paper accidentally fell on the
floor. When she was about to pick it up, the accused allegedly got a yellow pad and swung it at complainants face, but she was
able to evade it. Accused then said: "Ibuat daka ken, inabu daka keng awang, e baling masukul naku." (I will lift you from there
and I will throw you out of the window and I dont care if I will go to jail). Then the accused went out of the office and before
leaving, he pointed a "dirty finger" at complainant, prompting the latter to stand and get an empty bottle of coke to shield her face.
Accused proceeded towards the office of the municipal mayor. Because accused was still frothing invectives, complainant
purportedly "rolled" the empty bottle of coke towards him. The incident was witnessed by so many people numbering about 20 to
30 who were then at the municipal hall.8
Prosecution evidence further showed that accused allegedly mouthed the following disparaging remarks, "Magmalinis ka, ena ka
man malinis, garapal ka." "Balamu mansanas kang malutu, pero king kilub ularan ka, tiktak karinat" (You are pretending to be
clean and honest yet you are not clean and honest, you are corrupt. You are like red apple, you are worm infested inside and
extremely dirty). While this was going on, the Municipal Attorney, Atty. Pepito Torres, intervened to pacify the accused, but he was
unable to do so.9
Based on the account of the prosecution witnesses, from the municipal session hall, the complainant was persuaded to enter the
office of the Sangguniang Bayan Secretary. Accused followed her and inside said office, the accused again said, "Ibuat daka,
inabu daka keng awang, e baling masukul ku (I will lift you from there and I will throw you out of the window and I dont care if I
will go to jail). I Tata mu tinagal yang kapitan pero masambut ya, pero ing kaputul ku sinambut ne man" (Your father ran for
barangay captain and lost but my brother won)10and again, the accused pointed a "dirty finger" at complainant.11
The defense, on the other hand, presented six witnesses. From their testimonies, the MCTC gathered that on 12 September
1994, accused requested Flora Calayag to prepare the application for monetized leave and asked her to have it approved by the
complainant. Because the application remained unsigned by the latter, it was Joel Cecilio who in the afternoon went to her office
for the approval of the monetized leave, but again, to no avail.12
Accused then personally carried his application to complainants office. At that time, complainant was dictating something to the
Secretary and as he was about to give the copy to the Secretary, complainant got up and grabbed the paper from him and placed
it on the right side of her table.13
This angered the accused and he said to complainant, "[i]s this the actuation of the high government official?" The complainant
replied, "Bolang (Insane)." A verbal squabble ensued and the complainant allegedly said, "nung munta kayo keng municipiyong
ayni balamu ninu kayong hari, ala nakong depatan nung-e gawang pera, sira nako kareng tau." (When you go to the municipal
building as if you are a king, you did nothing except to make money, the people no longer believe in you.)14
Complainant, at that instant, hurled a bottle of coke at petitioner and hit one of the Barangay Captains then present.15
After trial, the MCTC found petitioner guilty of Grave Oral Defamation and Serious Slander by Deed in a joint decision dated 26
February 1998. The MCTC held that the statements uttered by petitioner and the act of making a dirty finger constitute an affront
on complainant who, as Vice Mayor and a lady, deserves greater respect.1avvphil.net The MCTC posited that the defense
interposed by the petitioner that complainant brought the havoc upon herself when she refused to approve his application for
accrued leave credits monetization cannot be considered as valid to obviate or obliterate the crime or damage done unto the
complainant. The MCTC then held:
With these, this Court finds overwhelming evidence against the accused and as such this Court finds the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of a charged (sic) of Grave Oral Defamation punishable under Art. 358 of the Revised Penal Code and Slander
by Deed punishable under Art. 359 of the Revised Penal Code. x x x The complainant although she can estimate the value of the
moral damages is entitled to the sum of P50,000.00 and attorneys fees of P30,000.00 and P1,000.00 as appearance fee plus
litigation expenses.
WHEREFORE, finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the offenses or charges mentioned above, he is hereby
sentenced to an imprisonment of FOUR (4) MONTHS and one (1) day to one (1) year in each case which the accused shall
served (at the same time), and to pay by way of moral damages the sum of P50,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case
of insolvency and litigation expenses and attorneys fees of P30,000.00 plus P1,000.00 per appearance fee.16
Both parties appealed to the RTC of Tarlac, which affirmed petitioners conviction, but modified the penalty and the manner of
serving accuseds sentence, and with a substantial increase in the award of damages. The fallo reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, insofar as it finds the accused guilty of
grave oral defamation in Criminal Case No. 139 and slander by deed in Criminal Case No. 140 is hereby AFFIRMED with the
modification that the accused is to be sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from three (3) months as
minimum to TWO (2) years and TWO (2) months as maximum in each of the cases, the same to be served SUCCESSIVELY.
Likewise, the decision of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court is further modified and the accused is ordered to pay the amount
of P100,000.00 as moral damages and another amount of P50,000.00 as exemplary damages, including the amount
of P30,000.00 as attorneys fees and P1,000.00 per hearing as appearance fee.17
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the trial court with the modification that the award of exemplary damages
was deleted because according to the Court of Appeals it was shown from the records that the petitioner himself was a
victim of complainants indiscretion for refusing, for no reason at all, to approve petitioners application for
monetization of his accrued leave credits. The Court of Appeals disposed as follows:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the assailed decision is hereby affirmed with the modification that the award of exemplary
damages is hereby deleted.18
As petitioners motion for reconsideration was likewise met with failure, petitioner, in a last stab at absolution, lodged the present
petition for reviewhttp://elibrary.supremecourt.gov.ph/dtSearch/ - _ftn36 on the following arguments:
I.

The honorable court of appeals gravely erred in ruling on only ONE (1) issue raised by petitioner in his petition for
review and in not ruling squarely on the other FIVE (5) issues, thus, denying petitioner of his right to be heard and to
due process.

II.

III.

IV.

19

The issues are: (1) whether the Court of Appeals erred in sustaining the conviction of petitioner for grave oral defamation in
Criminal Case No. 139-94, and (2) whether the Court of Appeals erred in sustaining the conviction of petitioner for serious
slander by deed in Criminal Case No. 140-94.
Anent the first issue, Article 358 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
Art. 358. Slander. Oral defamation shall be punished by arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its
minimum period if it is of a serious and insulting nature; otherwise, the penalty shall be arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200
pesos.
Slander is libel committed by oral (spoken) means, instead of in writing. The term oral defamation or slander as now understood,
has been defined as the speaking of base and defamatory words which tend to prejudice another in his reputation, office, trade,
business or means of livelihood.20
There is grave slander when it is of a serious and insulting nature. The gravity of the oral defamation depends not only (1) upon
the expressions used, but also (2) on the personal relations of the accused and the offended party, and (3) the circumstances
surrounding the case.21 Indeed, it is a doctrine of ancient respectability that defamatory words will fall under one or the other,
depending not only upon their sense, grammatical significance, and accepted ordinary meaning judging them separately, but also
upon the special circumstances of the case, antecedents or relationship between the offended party and the offender, which
might tend to prove the intention of the offender at the time.22
In our previous rulings, we held that the social standing and position of the offended party are also taken into account and thus, it
was held that the slander was grave, because the offended party had held previously the Office of Congressman, Governor, and
Senator and was then a candidate for Vice-President,23 for which no amount of sophistry would take the statement out of the
compass of grave oral defamation.24 However, we have, likewise, ruled in the past that uttering defamatory words in the heat of
anger, with some provocation on the part of the offended party constitutes only a light felony.25
In the case at bar, as a public official, petitioner, who was holding the position of Councilor at that time, is hidebound to be an
exemplar to society against the use of intemperate language particularly because the offended party was a Vice-Mayor. However,
we cannot keep a blind eye to the fact that such scathing words were uttered by him in the heat of anger triggered by the fact,
as found by the Court of Appeals, that complainant refused, without valid justification to approve the monetization of
accrued leave credits of petitioner. In a manner of speaking, she sowed the wind that reaped the storm.
In the words of the Court of Appeals:
The already existing animosity between them does not vest in the complainant the prerogative to deny petitioner a right
to which he was legally entitled. Exemplary damages cannot be recovered as a matter of right. They are designed to permit
the court to mould behavior that has socially deleterious consequences. Its imposition is required by public policy to suppress the
wanton acts of the offender. It cannot be invoked as a matter of right. x x x 26
The above findings of fact of the Court of Appeals supported by substantial evidence are conclusive and binding on the parties
and are not reviewable by this Court.27 Considering this finding, the Court of Appeals not only should have struck out the award
of exemplary damages but should have modified as well the offense committed to be of simple nature punishable by arresto
mayor or a fine not exceeding P200.00 under the above-quoted Art. 358 of the Revised Penal Code.
In Pader v. People,28 complainant was conversing with his political leaders at the terrace of his house at Morong, Bataan, when
petitioner appeared at the gate and shouted "putang ina mo Atty. Escolango. Napakawalanghiya mo!" The latter was
dumbfounded and embarrassed. At that time, Atty. Escolango was a candidate for Vice Mayor of Morong, Bataan in the elections
of 8 May 1995. We held that the offense committed was only slight slander. We explained why in this wise:
The issue is whether petitioner is guilty of slight or serious oral defamation. In resolving the issue, we are guided by a doctrine of
ancient respectability that defamatory words will fall under one or the other, depending not only upon their sense, grammatical
significance, and accepted ordinary meaning judging them separately, but also upon the special circumstances of the case,
antecedents or relationship between the offended party and the offender, which might tend to prove the intention of the offender
at the time.
Unquestionably, the words uttered were defamatory. Considering, however, the factual backdrop of the case, the oral defamation
was only slight. The trial court, in arriving at its decision, considered that the defamation was deliberately done to destroy Atty.
Escolangos reputation since the parties were political opponents.
We do not agree. Somehow, the trial court failed to appreciate the fact that the parties were also neighbors; that petitioner was
drunk at the time he uttered the defamatory words; and the fact that petitioners anger was instigated by what Atty.
Escolango did when petitioners father died. In which case, the oral defamation was not of serious or insulting nature.
In Reyes v. People [137 Phil. 112, 120 (1969)], we ruled that the expression "putang ina mo" is a common enough utterance in
the dialect that is often employed, not really to slander but rather to express anger or displeasure. In fact, more often, it is just an
expletive that punctuates ones expression of profanity. We do not find it seriously insulting that after a previous incident involving
his father, a drunk Rogelio Pader on seeing Atty. Escolango would utter words expressing anger. Obviously, the intention was to
show his feelings of resentment and not necessarily to insult the latter. Being a candidate running for vice mayor, occasional
gestures and words of disapproval or dislike of his person are not uncommon.
In similar fashion, the trial court erred in awarding moral damages without proof of suffering. Accordingly, petitioner may be
convicted only of slight oral defamation defined and penalized under Article 358, Revised Penal Code, prescribing the penalty
of arresto mayor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos.29 (Emphasis supplied.)
Similarly, in Cruz v. Court of Appeals,30 petitioner and complainant, a Municipal Judge, were next door neighbors. Animosity
grew between their two families because of some disputes. Petitioner resented the practice of complainant of throwing garbage
and animal excrement into her premises. There was also a boundary dispute between petitioner's mother and complainant, which
was the subject of a civil suit for "Recovery of Possession, Ownership, Enforcement of Legal Easement and Abatement of
Nuisance" filed by the mother before the Court of First Instance of Iloilo against complainant. Additionally, petitioner's mother had
previously instituted an administrative complaint against the complainant before the Supreme Court, but the same was
dismissed. There was a pent-up feeling of being aggrieved, resentment, anger, and vexation on petitioner's part, culminating in
her outburst against complainants. For having called the complainant judge "land grabber," "shameless" and "hypocrite,"
petitioner was charged and subsequently convicted by the Court of First Instance of three separate offenses of Grave Oral
Defamation committed on 5, 6 and 8 August 1976. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the verdicts of conviction. On review,
however, we held that although the abusive remarks may ordinarily be considered as serious defamation, under the
environmental circumstances of the case, there having been provocation on complainant's part, and the utterances complained
of having been made in the heat of unrestrained anger and obfuscation, petitioner is liable only for the crime of Slight Oral
Defamation. Petitioner was sentenced to pay a fine of P200.00 in each of the criminal cases, with subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.
Guided by the foregoing precedents, we find petitioner guilty only of slight oral defamation because of the attendant
circumstances in the case at bar.
Lest we be misconstrued, the Court does not condone the vilification or use of scurrilous language on the part of petitioner, but
following the rule that all possible circumstances favorable to the accused must be taken in his favor, it is our considered view
that the slander committed by petitioner can be characterized as slight slander following the doctrine that uttering defamatory
words in the heat of anger, with some provocation on the part of the offended party, constitutes only a light felony.31
In fact, to be denied approval of monetization of leave without valid justification, but as an offshoot of a political dissension may
have been vexing for petitioner and may have been perceived by him as provocation that triggered him to blow his top and utter
those disparaging words. In hindsight, to be denied monetization of leave credits must have stirred upon the petitioner a feeling
akin to begging for money that he was legally entitled to. This oppressive conduct on the part of complainant must have scarred
petitioners self-esteem, too, to appear as begging for money. But again, this is not an excuse to resort to intemperate language
no matter how such embarrassment must have wreaked havoc on his ego.
The next issue that faces this Court is whether or not petitioners act of poking a dirty finger at complainant constitutes grave
slander by deed.
Following the same principle as enunciated in our foregoing discussion of the first issue, we find petitioner guilty only of slight
slander by deed in Criminal Case No. 140-94 inasmuch as we find complainants unjust refusal to sign petitioners application for
monetization and her act of throwing a coke bottle at him constituted a perceived provocation that triggered the "poking of finger"
incident.
Article 359 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
Art. 359. Slander by deed. The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period or
a fine ranging from 200 to 1,000 pesos shall be imposed upon any person who shall perform any act not included and punished
in this title, which shall cast dishonor, discredit, or contempt upon another person. If said act is not of a serious nature, the
penalty shall be arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos.
Slander by deed is a crime against honor, which is committed by performing any act, which casts dishonor, discredit, or contempt
upon another person. The elements are (1) that the offender performs any act not included in any other crime against honor, (2)
that such act is performed in the presence of other person or persons, and (3) that such act casts dishonor, discredit or contempt
upon the offended party. Whether a certain slanderous act constitutes slander by deed of a serious nature or not, depends on the
social standing of the offended party, the circumstances under which the act was committed, the occasion, etc. 32 It is libel
committed by actions rather than words. The most common examples are slapping someone or spitting on his/her face in front of
the public market, in full view of a crowd, thus casting dishonor, discredit, and contempt upon the person of another.
In Mari v. Court of Appeals,33 complainant and petitioner were co-employees in the Department of Agriculture, with office at
Digos, Davao del Sur, although complainant occupied a higher position. On 6 December 1991, petitioner borrowed from
complainant the records of his 201 file. However, when he returned the same three days later, complainant noticed that several
papers were missing which included official communications from the Civil Service Commission and Regional Office, Department
of Agriculture, and a copy of the complaint by the Rural Bank of Digos against petitioner. Upon instruction of her superior officer,
complainant sent a memorandum to petitioner asking him to explain why his 201 file was returned with missing documents.
Instead of acknowledging receipt of the memorandum, petitioner confronted complainant and angrily shouted at her: " Putang ina,
bullshit, bugo." He banged a chair in front of complainant and choked her. With the intervention of the security guard, petitioner
was prevailed upon to desist from further injuring complainant. We held:
Prescinding from the foregoing, it would serve the ends of justice better if the petitioner were sentenced to pay a fine instead of
imprisonment. The offense while considered serious slander by deed was done in the heat of anger and was in reaction to a
perceived provocation. The penalty for serious slander by deed may be either imprisonment or a fine. We opt to impose a fine.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court hereby SETS ASIDE the decision of the Court of Appeals and in lieu thereof renders judgment finding
petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of serious slander by deed defined and penalized under Article 359 of the Revised
Penal Code, and sentencing him to pay a fine of P1,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.34 (Emphasis
supplied.)
In Mari, the Court found petitioner guilty of serious slander by deed defined and penalized under Article 359 of the Revised Penal
Code, and sentenced him to pay a fine of P1,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. The deed involved was
the banging of a chair in front of complainant and choking her.
In another case, Teodoro v. Court of Appeals,35 the incident, which gave rise to this case, is narrated as follows:
Petitioner Amado B. Teodoro was vice-president and corporate secretary of the DBT-Marbay Construction, Inc., while
complainant, Carolina Tanco-Young, was treasurer of the same corporation. Petitioner is the brother of the president of the
corporation, Donato Teodoro, while complainant is the daughter of the chairman of the board of the corporation, Agustin Tanco. x
xx
Records show that the incident complained of took place at the Board Room of the D.B.T. Mar Bay Construction Incorporated in
the afternoon of August 17, 1984. Present at the meeting were Agustin Tanco, Chairman of the Board; the President, Donato
Teodoro; the accused, Amado Teodoro, as Corporate Secretary; the complainant, Carolina Tanco-Young who is the Treasurer;
and one Oscar Benares.
xxxx
It appears that there was a controversial document being insisted upon by the accused, as secretary, to be signed by the
chairman. The Board Treasurer, Carolina Tanco-Young questioned the propriety of having the document signed as there was,
according to her, no such meeting that ever took place as to show a supposed resolution to have been deliberated upon. A
verbal exchange of words and tirades took place between the accused Secretary and the Treasurer. One word led to another up
to the point where Carolina Tanco-Young, the treasurer, either by implication or expressed domineering words, alluded to the
accused as a "falsifier" which blinded the accused-appellant to extreme anger and rage, thus leading him to slap Tanco-Young
the alleged name caller.[36] (Emphasis supplied.)
This Court in Teodoro held that there was grave slander by deed.
In another case, the acts of pushing and slapping a woman in order to ridicule and shame her before other people constitute the
felony of slander by deed defined and penalized under Article 359 of the Revised Penal Code by arresto mayor in its maximum
period to prision correccional in its minimum period.37
In the cases as above-cited, there was no provocation on the part of the complainants unlike the present case. Moreover, the
"poking of the finger" in the case at bar was, palpably, of less serious magnitude compared to the banging of chair, the choking in
Mari and the slapping of a face in Teodoro. Thus, we find that the poking of dirty finger in the case at bar, while it smacks of
slander by deed, is of a lesser magnitude than the acts committed in the foregoing cases.
Moreover, pointing a dirty finger ordinarily connotes the phrase "Fuck You," which is similar to the expression "Puta" or "Putang
Ina mo," in local parlance. Such expression was not held to be libelous in Reyes v. People,38where the Court said that: "This is a
common enough expression in the dialect that is often employed, not really to slander but rather to express anger or displeasure.
It is seldom, if ever, taken in its literal sense by the hearer, that is, as a reflection on the virtues of a mother." Following Reyes,
and in light of the fact that there was a perceived provocation coming from complainant, petitioners act of pointing a dirty finger
at complainant constitutes simple slander by deed, it appearing from the factual milieu of the case that the act complained of was
employed by petitioner "to express anger or displeasure" at complainant for procrastinating the approval of his leave
monetization. While it may have cast dishonor, discredit or contempt upon complainant, said act is not of a serious nature, thus,
the penalty shall be arresto menor meaning, imprisonment from one day to 30 days or a fine not exceeding P200.00. We opt to
impose a fine following Mari.39
Yes, complainant was then a Vice-Mayor and a lady at that, which circumstances ordinarily demanded respect from petitioner.
But, it was, likewise, her moral obligation springing from such position to act in a manner that is worthy of respect. In the case at
bar, complainants demeanor of refusing to sign the leave monetization of petitioner, an otherwise valid claim, because of a
political discord smacks of a conduct unbecoming of a lady and a Vice-Mayor at that. Moreover, it appears that she had, indeed,
thrown a bottle of coke at petitioner, which actuation reveals that she, too, had gone down to petitioners level.
Holding an esteemed position is never a license to act capriciously with impunity. The fact that there was a squabble between
petitioner and complainant, both high-ranking local public officials, that a verbal brawl ostensibly took place, speaks very poorly of
their self-control and public relations. For this, they both deserve to be censured and directed to conduct themselves in a more
composed manner and keep their pose as befits ranking officials who officially deal with the public.40
To be worthy of respect, one must act respectably, remembering always that courtesy begets courtesy.
Anent the award of damages, the Court of Appeals erred in increasing the award of moral damages to P100,000.00 in light of its
own finding that petitioner himself was "a victim of complainants indiscretion for her refusal, for no reason at all, to approve
petitioners application for monetization of his accrued leave credits."
In similar fashion, considering that petitioner and complainant belong to warring political camps, occasional gestures and words
of disapproval or dislike are among the hazards of the job.41 Considering this political reality and the fact that the Court of
Appeals concluded, based on evidence on records, that petitioner himself was a victim of complainants indiscretion, her claim for
damages and attorneys fees must, likewise, fail. Akin to the principle that "he who comes to court must have clean hands," each
of the parties, in the case at bar, must bear his own loss.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 22932 is hereby MODIFIED as
follows:
1) In Crim. Case No. 139-94, petitioner Noel Villanueva is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of slight oral
defamation only for which we impose on him a fine of P200.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency;
2) In Crim. Case No. 140-94, petitioner Noel Villanueva is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of simple slander by deed for
which we impose a fine of P200.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency;
3) The awards for moral damages and attorneys fees are DELETED.
Finally, the decision of the Court of Appeals insofar as it deleted the award for exemplary damages is AFFIRMED. No costs.
so ORDERED.
*INCRIMINATING AN INNOCENT PERSON
G.R. No. L-20721 April 30, 1966
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
MARTIN ALAGAO, et al., defendants-appellees.
ZALDIVAR, J.:
This is an appeal by the City Fiscal of Manila from an order of the Court of First Instance of Manila sustaining the motion to quash
the information in its Criminal Case No. 66655.
On October 20, 1962 the City Fiscal of Manila filed an information against the defendants-appellees charging them of having
committed the complex crime of incriminatory machinations through unlawful arrest, as follows:
That on or about the 28th day of February, 1961, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, being then
members of the Manila Police Department, conspiring and confederating together and helping one another, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously incriminate or impute to one Marcial Apolonio y Santos the commission of the
crime of bribery through unlawful arrest, in the following manner, to wit: the said accused, on the aforesaid date, without
reasonable ground therefor and for the purpose of delivering said Marcial Apolonio y Santos to the proper authorities, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously arrest said Marcial Apolonio y Santos; that after the said Marcial
Apolonio y Santos had been arrested in the manner aforestated, and while the latter was supposedly being investigated
by the said accused, the said accused did then and there place or commingle a marked P1.00 bill together with the
money taken from said Marcial Apolonio y Santos, supposedly given to the latter by one Emerita Calupas de Aresa, so
that he (Marcial Apolonio y Santos), then an employee of the Local Civil Registrar's Office of Manila, would appear to
have agreed to perform an act not constituting a crime, in connection with the performance of his (Marcial Apolonio y
Santos') duties, which was to expedite the issuance of a birth certificate, thereby directly incriminating or imputing to said
Marcial Apolonio y Santos the commission of the crime bribery.
On October 25, 1962 the defendants, through counsel, moved to quash the information against them on the grounds that (1) the
facts charged in the information do not constitute an offense; and (2) the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense
charged. Later on, the defendants filed a supplemental motion to quash, alleging that the information charges more than one
offense.
The contention of the defense in the motion to quash is that "... the information would seem to indicate that the accused are
charged with a complex crime, that is, the accused without reasonable ground arrested Marcial Apolonio y Santos for the
purpose of incriminating him by planting on his person a marked P1.00 bill. We have searched the penal laws in vain for a crime
such as set out in the information at bar." Then the motion to quash further states: "... there would either be only the singular
crimes of incriminatory machinations or unlawful arrest, or perhaps two crimes, incriminatory machinations and unlawful arrest. If
such would be the case then this Honorable Court would not have any jurisdiction over any crime or crimes charged. For
certainly, incriminatory machinations and unlawful arrest would come within the jurisdiction of the inferior court.
The City Fiscal opposed the motion to quash, contending that "A perusal of the information will readily conclude that it is a
complex crime in the sense that unlawful arrest was used as a means for incriminatory machination." The City Fiscal further
contended that the motion to quash raises a question of fact which should be raised during the trial and not during the stage of
the proceedings when the allegations in the information should be controlling. The City Fiscal also contended that the crime of
unlawful arrest, being punishable by arresto mayor and a fine of not exceeding P500.00, the same falls within the jurisdiction of
the Court of First Instance.
On November 9, 1962, the Court of First Instance of Manila issued an order sustaining the motion to quash, the pertinent portion
of which order reads as follows:
A careful perusal of the information quoted above shows clearly that it is defective. Assuming the truth of the allegations
of the information, the Court is of the opinion that there is no complex crime involved. The alleged unlawful arrest
committed by the defendants cannot be said to have been used as a necessary means to commit the crime of
incriminatory machination. The latter crime could be committed without the unlawful arrest. The acts constituting the two
offenses unlawful arrest and incriminatory machination are two separate and independent acts that preclude the
concept of a complex crime. The alleged planting of evidence took place while the victim was already under investigation,
long after the consummation of the alleged unlawful arrest.
It is true that under an information charging a complex crime the Court may convict the defendant of two component
crimes, if the evidence of record does not establish the complexity of the crime. This cannot be done, however, in the
case at bar for the simple reason that one of the component offenses of the alleged complex crime, that is,
incriminatory machination, does not fall within the concurrent, much less original exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of
First Instance.
Consequently, the motion to quash is granted and the case is hereby dismissed, without prejudice for the prosecution to
file the proper informations against the defendants in the proper court.;
The City Fiscal of Manila, on November 28, 1962, filed a motion for reconsideration of the foregoing order, but on December 19,
1962 the Court of First Instance of Manila denied the motion for reconsideration. Hence this appeal of the City Fiscal of Manila to
this Court.
In the present appeal, the main question to be resolved is whether the information filed in the court below alleges the complex
crime of "incriminatory machinations through unlawful arrest." It is the view of the court a quo that the information alleges the
commission of two distinct crimes, one, for unlawful arrest, and, the other, for incriminatory machinations. The lower court
discarded the theory of the prosecution that the offense of unlawful arrest was a necessary means to commit the crime of
incriminatory machinations, because of the allegation in the information that the accused had first unlawfully arrested the
offended party Marcial Apolonio y Santos and after the arrest he was investigated and it was during the investigation that the
accused had commingled the marked P1.00 bill among the paper bills that were taken from the possession of the said offended
party. The trial court is of the opinion that "the alleged planting of evidence took place while the victim was already under
investigation, long after the consummation of the alleged unlawful arrest."1
We cannot sustain the view of the trial court. It is the general rule that in resolving the motion to quash a criminal complaint or
information the facts alleged in the complaint or information should be taken as they are. The exceptions to this general rule are
those cases where the Rules of Court expressly permit the investigation of facts alleged in the motion to quash. 2 The grounds, or
facts, relied upon in the motion, to quash in the present case, are not included in the exceptions we have adverted to. We find
that the information in the present case specifically alleges that the accused did "willfully, unlawfully and feloniously incriminate
and impute to one Marcial Apolonio y Santos the commission of the crime of bribery through unlawful arrest ... ."3 The
information further alleges that "... the said accused ... without reasonable ground therefor and for the purpose of delivering said
Marcial Apolonio y Santos to the proper authorities did there and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously arrest said Marcial
Apolonio y Santos; that after the said Marcial Apolonio y Santos had been arrested in the manner aforestated, and while the latter
was supposedly being investigated by the said accused, the said accused did then and there placed or commingled a marked
P1.00 bill together with the money taken from the said Marcial Apolonio y Santos ...". It is very apparent that by the use of the
phrase "through unlawful arrest" in the information an idea is conveyed that the unlawful arrest was resorted to as a necessary
means to plant evidence in the person of the offended party, thereby incriminating him. From a reading of the information we find
a close connection between the act of the accused in first unlawfully arresting the offended party and then investigating him; and
it was during that investigation that they planted incriminatory evidence against him. We agree with the Solicitor General in his
contention that the accused first had to resort to unlawful arrest in order to be able to plant the P1.00 bill among the money taken
from the offended party. We find merit in the following argument, as stated in the brief of the Solicitor General:
Under the circumstances of the case, the accused had to arrest Marcial because it was the only way that they could with
facility detain him and, more importantly, search his person or effects and, in the process, commingle therewith the
marked peso bill. It should be observed that without detaining, investigating and searching Marcial it would have been
impossible, if not difficult, for the accused to plant the marked one peso bill, because then they could not have simply
held Marcial and placed the marked one peso bill in his pocket, without the latter vigoriously protesting the act. Besides, if
the accused simply held Marcial and planted in his pockets the marked one peso bill without arresting him, they could not
have possibly accomplished their purpose, because Marcial would have surely and easily discovered what they were up
to. Indeed, the accused had to arrest Marcial, even in the absence of a valid reason, so that under the semblance of a
police investigation, they could get whatever money was inside his pockets and include in it the marked one peso bill. In
short, the accused had to arrest Marcial so that he could be detained and pretending to investigate him, search his
person and thereby have the opportunity of planting the marked one peso bill among his belongings.1wph1.t
In declaring that the information did not allege a complex crime the trial court expressed the view that the alleged planting of
evidence took place while the victim was already under investigation, "long after the consummation of the alleged unlawful
arrest." This observation of the trial court does not find support in the allegations contained in the information in question. The
statement in the information that the offended party was investigated "after" the unlawful arrest does not necessarily convey the
idea that the investigation took place "long after" the arrest had been effected. It should be a matter of evidence first, before any
conclusion is arrived at: that the investigation, during which the incriminating evidence was planted, had taken place immediately
after the arrest or long after the arrest. The allegation in the information that the accused committed the complex crime of
incriminatory machinations thru unlawful arrest, and also the allegation that the act of planting the incriminatory evidence took
place during the supposed investigation after the unlawful arrest, are basis for the logical assumption, in the absence of
evidence, that the two acts imputed to the accused that of unlawfully arresting and that of planting incriminatory evidence
had closely followed each other, and that the former was a necessary means to commit the latter.
For a criminal complaint or information to charge the commission of a complex crime, the allegations contained therein do not
necessarily have to charge a complex crime as defined by law. It is sufficient that the information contains allegations which show
that one offense was a necessary means to commit the other.4 On this particular point this Court has ruled, as follows:
In order to determine whether two offenses constitute a complex crime, we should not find out whether, in accordance
with their definition by law, one of them is an essential element of the other, such as physical injuries which cause the
death of the victim, or stealing of personal property without the consent of the owner through force or violence, for in such
cases there would be only one single offense of homicide in the first and robbery in the second case. But we should take
into consideration the facts alleged in a complaint or information and determine whether one of the two separate and
different offenses charged therein was committed as a necessary means to commit the other offense; if it were, the two
 offenses constitute one complex crime; otherwise the complaint or information charges two crimes or offenses
independent from one another. (Parulan vs. Rodas and Reyes, 78 Phil. 855, 856)
We, therefore, held that the information in question in the present case contains allegations properly charging the commission of
the complex crime of incriminatory machinations thru unlawful arrest, and the court a quo committed error when it ordered its
dismissal.
We likewise hold that the court a quo has jurisdiction to try the accused of the offense charged in the information. The crime of
unlawful arrest is punishable with arresto mayor or imprisonment of from one month and one day to six months, and a fine not
exceeding P500.00; 5 and the crime of incriminatory machinations is punishable with arresto mayor, or imprisonment of from one
month and one day to six months. 6 Under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, in complex crimes, the penalty for the most
serious offense shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period. And so, in the present case, in the event of
conviction, the penalty for the crime of unlawful arrest should be imposed in its maximum period.7
In view of the foregoing, the order appealed from is reversed and set aside, and this case is remanded to the court of origin for
further proceedings. No costs. So ordered.
*QUASI-OFFENSES
G.R. No. 172716 November 17, 2010
JASON IVLER y AGUILAR, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. MARIA ROWENA MODESTO-SAN PEDRO, Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 71, Pasig City, and
EVANGELINE PONCE, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
The petition seeks the review1 of the Orders2 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City affirming sub-silencio a lower courts ruling
finding inapplicable the Double Jeopardy Clause to bar a second prosecution for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide
and Damage to Property. This, despite the accuseds previous conviction for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical
Injuries arising from the same incident grounding the second prosecution.
The Facts
Following a vehicular collision in August 2004, petitioner Jason Ivler (petitioner) was charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court
of Pasig City, Branch 71 (MeTC), with two separate offenses: (1) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries
(Criminal Case No. 82367) for injuries sustained by respondent Evangeline L. Ponce (respondent Ponce); and (2) Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property (Criminal Case No. 82366) for the death of respondent Ponces
husband Nestor C. Ponce and damage to the spouses Ponces vehicle. Petitioner posted bail for his temporary release in both
cases.
On 7 September 2004, petitioner pleaded guilty to the charge in Criminal Case No. 82367 and was meted out the penalty of
public censure. Invoking this conviction, petitioner moved to quash the Information in Criminal Case No. 82366 for placing him in
jeopardy of second punishment for the same offense of reckless imprudence.
The MeTC refused quashal, finding no identity of offenses in the two cases.3
After unsuccessfully seeking reconsideration, petitioner elevated the matter to the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 157
(RTC), in a petition for certiorari (S.C.A. No. 2803). Meanwhile, petitioner sought from the MeTC the suspension of proceedings
in Criminal Case No. 82366, including the arraignment on 17 May 2005, invoking S.C.A. No. 2803 as a prejudicial question.
Without acting on petitioners motion, the MeTC proceeded with the arraignment and, because of petitioners absence, cancelled
his bail and ordered his arrest.4 Seven days later, the MeTC issued a resolution denying petitioners motion to suspend
proceedings and postponing his arraignment until after his arrest.5 Petitioner sought reconsideration but as of the filing of this
petition, the motion remained unresolved.
Relying on the arrest order against petitioner, respondent Ponce sought in the RTC the dismissal of S.C.A. No. 2803 for
petitioners loss of standing to maintain the suit. Petitioner contested the motion.
The Ruling of the Trial Court
In an Order dated 2 February 2006, the RTC dismissed S.C.A. No. 2803, narrowly grounding its ruling on petitioners forfeiture of
standing to maintain S.C.A. No. 2803 arising from the MeTCs order to arrest petitioner for his non-appearance at the
arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366. Thus, without reaching the merits of S.C.A. No. 2803, the RTC effectively affirmed the
MeTC. Petitioner sought reconsideration but this proved unavailing.6
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner denies absconding. He explains that his petition in S.C.A. No. 2803 constrained him to forego participation in the
proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366. Petitioner distinguishes his case from the line of jurisprudence sanctioning dismissal of
appeals for absconding appellants because his appeal before the RTC was a special civil action seeking a pre-trial relief, not a
post-trial appeal of a judgment of conviction.7
Petitioner laments the RTCs failure to reach the merits of his petition in S.C.A. 2803. Invoking jurisprudence, petitioner argues
that his constitutional right not to be placed twice in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense bars his prosecution in Criminal
Case No. 82366, having been previously convicted in Criminal Case No. 82367 for the same offense of reckless imprudence
charged in Criminal Case No. 82366. Petitioner submits that the multiple consequences of such crime are material only to
determine his penalty.
Respondent Ponce finds no reason for the Court to disturb the RTCs decision forfeiting petitioners standing to maintain his
petition in S.C.A. 2803. On the merits, respondent Ponce calls the Courts attention to jurisprudence holding that light offenses
(e.g. slight physical injuries) cannot be complexed under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code with grave or less grave felonies
(e.g. homicide). Hence, the prosecution was obliged to separate the charge in Criminal Case No. 82366 for the slight physical
injuries from Criminal Case No. 82367 for the homicide and damage to property.
In the Resolution of 6 June 2007, we granted the Office of the Solicitor Generals motion not to file a comment to the petition as
the public respondent judge is merely a nominal party and private respondent is represented by counsel.
 The Issues
Two questions are presented for resolution: (1) whether petitioner forfeited his standing to seek relief in S.C.A. 2803 when the
MeTC ordered his arrest following his non-appearance at the arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366; and (2) if in the negative,
whether petitioners constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause bars further proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366.
The Ruling of the Court
We hold that (1) petitioners non-appearance at the arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366 did not divest him of personality to
maintain the petition in S.C.A. 2803; and (2) the protection afforded by the Constitution shielding petitioner from prosecutions
placing him in jeopardy of second punishment for the same offense bars further proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366.
Petitioners Non-appearance at the Arraignment in
Criminal Case No. 82366 did not Divest him of Standing
to Maintain the Petition in S.C.A. 2803
Dismissals of appeals grounded on the appellants escape from custody or violation of the terms of his bail bond are governed by
the second paragraph of Section 8, Rule 124,8 in relation to Section 1, Rule 125, of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure
authorizing this Court or the Court of Appeals to "also, upon motion of the appellee or motu proprio, dismiss the appeal if the
appellant escapes from prison or confinement, jumps bail or flees to a foreign country during the pendency of the appeal." The
"appeal" contemplated in Section 8 of Rule 124 is a suit to review judgments of convictions.
The RTCs dismissal of petitioners special civil action for certiorari to review a pre-arraignment ancillary question on the
applicability of the Due Process Clause to bar proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366 finds no basis under procedural rules and
jurisprudence. The RTCs reliance on People v. Esparas9 undercuts the cogency of its ruling because Esparas stands for a
proposition contrary to the RTCs ruling. There, the Court granted review to an appeal by an accused who was sentenced to
death for importing prohibited drugs even though she jumped bail pending trial and was thus tried and convicted in absentia. The
Court in Esparas treated the mandatory review of death sentences under Republic Act No. 7659 as an exception to Section 8 of
Rule 124.10
The mischief in the RTCs treatment of petitioners non-appearance at his arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366 as proof of his
loss of standing becomes more evident when one considers the Rules of Courts treatment of a defendant who absents himself
from post-arraignment hearings. Under Section 21, Rule 11411 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the defendants
absence merely renders his bondsman potentially liable on its bond (subject to cancellation should the bondsman fail to produce
the accused within 30 days); the defendant retains his standing and, should he fail to surrender, will be tried in absentia and
could be convicted or acquitted. Indeed, the 30-day period granted to the bondsman to produce the accused underscores the fact
that mere non-appearance does not ipso facto convert the accuseds status to that of a fugitive without standing.
Further, the RTCs observation that petitioner provided "no explanation why he failed to attend the scheduled proceeding" 12 at
the MeTC is belied by the records. Days before the arraignment, petitioner sought the suspension of the MeTCs proceedings in
Criminal Case No. 82366 in light of his petition with the RTC in S.C.A. No. 2803. Following the MeTCs refusal to defer
arraignment (the order for which was released days after the MeTC ordered petitioners arrest), petitioner sought reconsideration.
His motion remained unresolved as of the filing of this petition.
Petitioners Conviction in Criminal Case No. 82367
Bars his Prosecution in Criminal Case No. 82366
The accuseds negative constitutional right not to be "twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense" 13protects him
from, among others, post-conviction prosecution for the same offense, with the prior verdict rendered by a court of competent
jurisdiction upon a valid information.14 It is not disputed that petitioners conviction in Criminal Case No. 82367 was rendered by
a court of competent jurisdiction upon a valid charge. Thus, the case turns on the question whether Criminal Case No. 82366 and
Criminal Case No. 82367 involve the "same offense." Petitioner adopts the affirmative view, submitting that the two cases
concern the same offense of reckless imprudence. The MeTC ruled otherwise, finding that Reckless Imprudence Resulting in
Slight Physical Injuries is an entirely separate offense from Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property
"as the [latter] requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not."15
We find for petitioner.
Reckless Imprudence is a Single Crime,
its Consequences on Persons and
Property are Material Only to Determine
the Penalty
The two charges against petitioner, arising from the same facts, were prosecuted under the same provision of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended, namely, Article 365 defining and penalizing quasi-offenses. The text of the provision reads:
Imprudence and negligence. Any person who, by reckless imprudence, shall commit any act which, had it been intentional,
would constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its
medium period; if it would have constituted a less grave felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods
shall be imposed; if it would have constituted a light felony, the penalty of arresto menor in its maximum period shall be imposed.
Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall commit an act which would otherwise constitute a grave felony, shall
suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods; if it would have constituted a less serious felony, the
penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum period shall be imposed.
When the execution of the act covered by this article shall have only resulted in damage to the property of another, the offender
shall be punished by a fine ranging from an amount equal to the value of said damages to three times such value, but which shall
in no case be less than twenty-five pesos.
A fine not exceeding two hundred pesos and censure shall be imposed upon any person who, by simple imprudence or
negligence, shall cause some wrong which, if done maliciously, would have constituted a light felony.
In the imposition of these penalties, the court shall exercise their sound discretion, without regard to the rules prescribed in Article
sixty-four.
The provisions contained in this article shall not be applicable:
1. When the penalty provided for the offense is equal to or lower than those provided in the first two paragraphs of this
article, in which case the court shall impose the penalty next lower in degree than that which should be imposed in the
period which they may deem proper to apply.
2. When, by imprudence or negligence and with violation of the Automobile Law, to death of a person shall be caused, in
which case the defendant shall be punished by prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods.
Reckless imprudence consists in voluntary, but without malice, doing or failing to do an act from which material damage results
by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing or failing to perform such act, taking into
consideration his employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition and other circumstances regarding
persons, time and place.
Simple imprudence consists in the lack of precaution displayed in those cases in which the damage impending to be caused is
not immediate nor the danger clearly manifest.
The penalty next higher in degree to those provided for in this article shall be imposed upon the offender who fails to lend on the
spot to the injured parties such help as may be in this hand to give.
Structurally, these nine paragraphs are collapsible into four sub-groupings relating to (1) the penalties attached to the quasi-
offenses of "imprudence" and "negligence" (paragraphs 1-2); (2) a modified penalty scheme for either or both quasi-offenses
(paragraphs 3-4, 6 and 9); (3) a generic rule for trial courts in imposing penalties (paragraph 5); and (4) the definition of "reckless
imprudence" and "simple imprudence" (paragraphs 7-8). Conceptually, quasi-offenses penalize "the mental attitude or condition
behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight, the imprudencia punible,"16 unlike willful offenses which
punish the intentional criminal act. These structural and conceptual features of quasi-offenses set them apart from the mass of
intentional crimes under the first 13 Titles of Book II of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
Indeed, the notion that quasi-offenses, whether reckless or simple, are distinct species of crime, separately defined and
penalized under the framework of our penal laws, is nothing new. As early as the middle of the last century, we already sought to
bring clarity to this field by rejecting in Quizon v. Justice of the Peace of Pampanga the proposition that "reckless imprudence is
not a crime in itself but simply a way of committing it x x x"17 on three points of analysis: (1) the object of punishment in quasi-
crimes (as opposed to intentional crimes); (2) the legislative intent to treat quasi-crimes as distinct offenses (as opposed to
subsuming them under the mitigating circumstance of minimal intent) and; (3) the different penalty structures for quasi-crimes
and intentional crimes:
The proposition (inferred from Art. 3 of the Revised Penal Code) that "reckless imprudence" is not a crime in itself but simply a
way of committing it and merely determines a lower degree of criminal liability is too broad to deserve unqualified assent. There
are crimes that by their structure cannot be committed through imprudence: murder, treason, robbery, malicious mischief, etc. In
truth, criminal negligence in our Revised Penal Code is treated as a mere quasi offense, and dealt with separately from willful
offenses. It is not a mere question of classification or terminology. In intentional crimes, the act itself is punished; in negligence or
imprudence, what is principally penalized is the mental attitude or condition behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of
care or foresight, the imprudencia punible. x x x x
Were criminal negligence but a modality in the commission of felonies, operating only to reduce the penalty therefor, then it would
be absorbed in the mitigating circumstances of Art. 13, specially the lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong as the one actually
committed. Furthermore, the theory would require that the corresponding penalty should be fixed in proportion to the penalty
prescribed for each crime when committed willfully. For each penalty for the willful offense, there would then be a corresponding
penalty for the negligent variety. But instead, our Revised Penal Code (Art. 365) fixes the penalty for reckless imprudence at
arresto mayor maximum, to prision correccional [medium], if the willful act would constitute a grave felony, notwithstanding that
the penalty for the latter could range all the way from prision mayor to death, according to the case. It can be seen that the actual
penalty for criminal negligence bears no relation to the individual willful crime, but is set in relation to a whole class, or series, of
crimes.18 (Emphasis supplied)
This explains why the technically correct way to allege quasi-crimes is to state that their commission results in damage, either to
person or property.19
Accordingly, we found the Justice of the Peace in Quizon without jurisdiction to hear a case for "Damage to Property through
Reckless Imprudence," its jurisdiction being limited to trying charges for Malicious Mischief, an intentional crime conceptually
incompatible with the element of imprudence obtaining in quasi-crimes.
Quizon, rooted in Spanish law20 (the normative ancestry of our present day penal code) and since repeatedly
reiterated,21 stands on solid conceptual foundation. The contrary doctrinal pronouncement in People v. Faller 22that "[r]eckless
impudence is not a crime in itself x x x [but] simply a way of committing it x x x," 23 has long been abandoned when the Court en
banc promulgated Quizon in 1955 nearly two decades after the Court decided Faller in 1939. Quizon rejected Fallers
conceptualization of quasi-crimes by holding that quasi-crimes under Article 365 are distinct species of crimes and not merely
methods of committing crimes. Faller found expression in post-Quizon jurisprudence24 only by dint of lingering doctrinal
confusion arising from an indiscriminate fusion of criminal law rules defining Article 365 crimes and the complexing of intentional
crimes under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code which, as will be shown shortly, rests on erroneous conception of quasi-
crimes. Indeed, the Quizonian conception of quasi-crimes undergirded a related branch of jurisprudence applying the Double
Jeopardy Clause to quasi-offenses, barring second prosecutions for a quasi-offense alleging one resulting act after a prior
conviction or acquittal of a quasi-offense alleging another resulting act but arising from the same reckless act or omission upon
which the second prosecution was based.
Prior Conviction or Acquittal of
Reckless Imprudence Bars
Subsequent Prosecution for the Same
Quasi-Offense
The doctrine that reckless imprudence under Article 365 is a single quasi-offense by itself and not merely a means to commit
other crimes such that conviction or acquittal of such quasi-offense bars subsequent prosecution for the same quasi-offense,
regardless of its various resulting acts, undergirded this Courts unbroken chain of jurisprudence on double jeopardy as applied to
Article 365 starting with People v. Diaz,25 decided in 1954. There, a full Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Montemayor,
ordered the dismissal of a case for "damage to property thru reckless imprudence" because a prior case against the same
accused for "reckless driving," arising from the same act upon which the first prosecution was based, had been dismissed earlier.
Since then, whenever the same legal question was brought before the Court, that is, whether prior conviction or acquittal of
reckless imprudence bars subsequent prosecution for the same quasi-offense, regardless of the consequences alleged for both
charges, the Court unfailingly and consistently answered in the affirmative in People v. Belga26(promulgated in 1957 by the Court
en banc, per Reyes, J.), Yap v. Lutero27 (promulgated in 1959, unreported, per Concepcion, J.), People v.
Narvas28 (promulgated in 1960 by the Court en banc, per Bengzon J.), People v. Silva29 (promulgated in 1962 by the Court en
banc, per Paredes, J.), People v. Macabuhay30 (promulgated in 1966 by the Court en banc, per Makalintal, J.), People v.
Buan31 (promulgated in 1968 by the Court en banc, per Reyes, J.B.L., acting C. J.), Buerano v. Court of Appeals 32 (promulgated
in 1982 by the Court en banc, per Relova, J.), and People v. City Court of Manila 33 (promulgated in 1983 by the First Division,
per Relova, J.). These cases uniformly barred the second prosecutions as constitutionally impermissible under the Double
Jeopardy Clause.
The reason for this consistent stance of extending the constitutional protection under the Double Jeopardy Clause to quasi-
offenses was best articulated by Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Buan, where, in barring a subsequent prosecution for "serious
physical injuries and damage to property thru reckless imprudence" because of the accuseds prior acquittal of "slight physical
injuries thru reckless imprudence," with both charges grounded on the same act, the Court explained:34
Reason and precedent both coincide in that once convicted or acquitted of a specific act of reckless imprudence, the accused
may not be prosecuted again for that same act. For the essence of the quasi offense of criminal negligence under article 365 of
the Revised Penal Code lies in the execution of an imprudent or negligent act that, if intentionally done, would be punishable as a
felony. The law penalizes thus the negligent or careless act, not the result thereof. The gravity of the consequence is only taken
into account to determine the penalty, it does not qualify the substance of the offense. And, as the careless act is single, whether
the injurious result should affect one person or several persons, the offense (criminal negligence) remains one and the same,
and can not be split into different crimes and prosecutions.35 x x x (Emphasis supplied)
Evidently, the Diaz line of jurisprudence on double jeopardy merely extended to its logical conclusion the reasoning of Quizon.
There is in our jurisprudence only one ruling going against this unbroken line of authority. Preceding Diaz by more than a decade,
El Pueblo de Filipinas v. Estipona,36 decided by the pre-war colonial Court in November 1940, allowed the subsequent
prosecution of an accused for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property despite his previous conviction for multiple
physical injuries arising from the same reckless operation of a motor vehicle upon which the second prosecution was based.
Estiponas inconsistency with the post-war Diaz chain of jurisprudence suffices to impliedly overrule it. At any rate, all doubts on
this matter were laid to rest in 1982 in Buerano.37 There, we reviewed the Court of Appeals conviction of an accused for
"damage to property for reckless imprudence" despite his prior conviction for "slight and less serious physical injuries thru
reckless imprudence," arising from the same act upon which the second charge was based. The Court of Appeals had relied on
Estipona. We reversed on the strength of Buan:38
Th[e] view of the Court of Appeals was inspired by the ruling of this Court in the pre-war case of People vs. Estipona decided on
November 14, 1940. However, in the case of People vs. Buan, 22 SCRA 1383 (March 29, 1968), this Court, speaking thru Justice
J. B. L. Reyes, held that
Reason and precedent both coincide in that once convicted or acquitted of a specific act of reckless imprudence, the accused
may not be prosecuted again for that same act. For the essence of the quasi offense of criminal negligence under Article 365 of
the Revised Penal Code lies in the execution of an imprudent or negligent act that, if intentionally done, would be punishable as a
felony. The law penalizes thus the negligent or careless act, not the result thereof. The gravity of the consequence is only taken
into account to determine the penalty, it does not qualify the substance of the offense. And, as the careless act is single, whether
the injurious result should affect one person or several persons, the offense (criminal negligence) remains one and the same, and
can not be split into different crimes and prosecutions.
xxxx
. . . the exoneration of this appellant, Jose Buan, by the Justice of the Peace (now Municipal) Court of Guiguinto, Bulacan, of the
charge of slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence, prevents his being prosecuted for serious physical injuries through
reckless imprudence in the Court of First Instance of the province, where both charges are derived from the consequences of
one and the same vehicular accident, because the second accusation places the appellant in second jeopardy for the same
offense.39 (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, for all intents and purposes, Buerano had effectively overruled Estipona.
It is noteworthy that the Solicitor General in Buerano, in a reversal of his earlier stance in Silva, joined causes with the accused, a
fact which did not escape the Courts attention:
Then Solicitor General, now Justice Felix V. Makasiar, in his MANIFESTATION dated December 12, 1969 (page 82 of the Rollo)
admits that the Court of Appeals erred in not sustaining petitioners plea of double jeopardy and submits that "its affirmatory
decision dated January 28, 1969, in Criminal Case No. 05123-CR finding petitioner guilty of damage to property through reckless
imprudence should be set aside, without costs." He stressed that "if double jeopardy exists where the reckless act resulted into
homicide and physical injuries. then the same consequence must perforce follow where the same reckless act caused merely
damage to property-not death-and physical injuries. Verily, the value of a human life lost as a result of a vehicular collision cannot
be equated with any amount of damages caused to a motors vehicle arising from the same mishap."40 (Emphasis supplied)
Hence, we find merit in petitioners submission that the lower courts erred in refusing to extend in his favor the mantle of
protection afforded by the Double Jeopardy Clause. A more fitting jurisprudence could not be tailored to petitioners case than
People v. Silva, 41 a Diaz progeny. There, the accused, who was also involved in a vehicular collision, was charged in two
separate Informations with "Slight Physical Injuries thru Reckless Imprudence" and "Homicide with Serious Physical Injuries thru
Reckless Imprudence." Following his acquittal of the former, the accused sought the quashal of the latter, invoking the Double
Jeopardy Clause. The trial court initially denied relief, but, on reconsideration, found merit in the accuseds claim and dismissed
the second case. In affirming the trial court, we quoted with approval its analysis of the issue following Diaz and its progeny
People v. Belga:42
On June 26, 1959, the lower court reconsidered its Order of May 2, 1959 and dismissed the case, holding:
[T]he Court believes that the case falls squarely within the doctrine of double jeopardy enunciated in People v. Belga, x x x In the
case cited, Ciriaco Belga and Jose Belga were charged in the Justice of the Peace Court of Malilipot, Albay, with the crime of
physical injuries through reckless imprudence arising from a collision between the two automobiles driven by them (Crim. Case
No. 88). Without the aforesaid complaint having been dismissed or otherwise disposed of, two other criminal complaints were
filed in the same justice of the peace court, in connection with the same collision one for damage to property through reckless
imprudence (Crim. Case No. 95) signed by the owner of one of the vehicles involved in the collision, and another for multiple
physical injuries through reckless imprudence (Crim. Case No. 96) signed by the passengers injured in the accident. Both of
these two complaints were filed against Jose Belga only. After trial, both defendants were acquitted of the charge against them in
Crim. Case No. 88. Following his acquittal, Jose Belga moved to quash the complaint for multiple physical injuries through
reckless imprudence filed against him by the injured passengers, contending that the case was just a duplication of the one filed
by the Chief of Police wherein he had just been acquitted. The motion to quash was denied and after trial Jose Belga was
convicted, whereupon he appealed to the Court of First Instance of Albay. In the meantime, the case for damage to property
through reckless imprudence filed by one of the owners of the vehicles involved in the collision had been remanded to the Court
of First Instance of Albay after Jose Belga had waived the second stage of the preliminary investigation. After such remand, the
Provincial Fiscal filed in the Court of First Instance two informations against Jose Belga, one for physical injuries through reckless
imprudence, and another for damage to property through reckless imprudence. Both cases were dismissed by the Court of First
Instance, upon motion of the defendant Jose Belga who alleged double jeopardy in a motion to quash. On appeal by the Prov.
Fiscal, the order of dismissal was affirmed by the Supreme Court in the following language: .
The question for determination is whether the acquittal of Jose Belga in the case filed by the chief of police constitutes a bar to
his subsequent prosecution for multiple physical injuries and damage to property through reckless imprudence.
In the case of Peo[ple] v. F. Diaz, G. R. No. L-6518, prom. March 30, 1954, the accused was charged in the municipal court of
Pasay City with reckless driving under sec. 52 of the Revised Motor Vehicle Law, for having driven an automobile in a fast and
reckless manner ... thereby causing an accident. After the accused had pleaded not guilty the case was dismissed in that court
for failure of the Government to prosecute. But some time thereafter the city attorney filed an information in the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, charging the same accused with damage to property thru reckless imprudence. The amount of the damage
was alleged to be P249.50. Pleading double jeopardy, the accused filed a motion, and on appeal by the Government we affirmed
the ruling. Among other things we there said through Mr. Justice Montemayor
The next question to determine is the relation between the first offense of violation of the Motor Vehicle Law prosecuted before
the Pasay City Municipal Court and the offense of damage to property thru reckless imprudence charged in the Rizal Court of
First Instance. One of the tests of double jeopardy is whether or not the second offense charged necessarily includes or is
necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information (Rule 113, Sec. 9). Another test is whether the
evidence which proves one would prove the other that is to say whether the facts alleged in the first charge if proven, would have
been sufficient to support the second charge and vice versa; or whether one crime is an ingredient of the other. x x x
xxxx
The foregoing language of the Supreme Court also disposes of the contention of the prosecuting attorney that the charge for
slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence could not have been joined with the charge for homicide with serious
physical injuries through reckless imprudence in this case, in view of the provisions of Art. 48 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended. The prosecutions contention might be true. But neither was the prosecution obliged to first prosecute the accused for
slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence before pressing the more serious charge of homicide with serious physical
injuries through reckless imprudence. Having first prosecuted the defendant for the lesser offense in the Justice of the Peace
Court of Meycauayan, Bulacan, which acquitted the defendant, the prosecuting attorney is not now in a position to press in this
case the more serious charge of homicide with serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence which arose out of the
same alleged reckless imprudence of which the defendant have been previously cleared by the inferior court.43
Significantly, the Solicitor General had urged us in Silva to reexamine Belga (and hence, Diaz) "for the purpose of delimiting or
clarifying its application."44 We declined the invitation, thus:
The State in its appeal claims that the lower court erred in dismissing the case, on the ground of double jeopardy, upon the basis
of the acquittal of the accused in the JP court for Slight Physical Injuries, thru Reckless Imprudence. In the same breath said
State, thru the Solicitor General, admits that the facts of the case at bar, fall squarely on the ruling of the Belga case x x x, upon
which the order of dismissal of the lower court was anchored. The Solicitor General, however, urges a re-examination of said
ruling, upon certain considerations for the purpose of delimiting or clarifying its application. We find, nevertheless, that further
elucidation or disquisition on the ruling in the Belga case, the facts of which are analogous or similar to those in the present case,
will yield no practical advantage to the government. On one hand, there is nothing which would warrant a delimitation or
clarification of the applicability of the Belga case. It was clear. On the other, this Court has reiterated the views expressed in the
Belga case, in the identical case of Yap v. Hon. Lutero, etc., L-12669, April 30, 1959.45 (Emphasis supplied)
Article 48 Does not Apply to Acts Penalized .
Under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code
The confusion bedeviling the question posed in this petition, to which the MeTC succumbed, stems from persistent but awkward
attempts to harmonize conceptually incompatible substantive and procedural rules in criminal law, namely, Article 365 defining
and penalizing quasi-offenses and Article 48 on complexing of crimes, both under the Revised Penal Code. Article 48 is a
procedural device allowing single prosecution of multiple felonies falling under either of two categories: (1) when a single act
constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies (thus excluding from its operation light felonies46); and (2) when an offense
is a necessary means for committing the other. The legislature crafted this procedural tool to benefit the accused who, in lieu of
serving multiple penalties, will only serve the maximum of the penalty for the most serious crime.
In contrast, Article 365 is a substantive rule penalizing not an act defined as a felony but "the mental attitude x x x behind the act,
the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight x x x,"47 a single mental attitude regardless of the resulting consequences.
Thus, Article 365 was crafted as one quasi-crime resulting in one or more consequences.
Ordinarily, these two provisions will operate smoothly. Article 48 works to combine in a single prosecution multiple intentional
crimes falling under Titles 1-13, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, when proper; Article 365 governs the prosecution of
imprudent acts and their consequences. However, the complexities of human interaction can produce a hybrid quasi-offense not
falling under either models that of a single criminal negligence resulting in multiple non-crime damages to persons and property
with varying penalties corresponding to light, less grave or grave offenses. The ensuing prosecutorial dilemma is obvious: how
should such a quasi-crime be prosecuted? Should Article 48s framework apply to "complex" the single quasi-offense with its
multiple (non-criminal) consequences (excluding those amounting to light offenses which will be tried separately)? Or should the
prosecution proceed under a single charge, collectively alleging all the consequences of the single quasi-crime, to be penalized
separately following the scheme of penalties under Article 365?
Jurisprudence adopts both approaches. Thus, one line of rulings (none of which involved the issue of double jeopardy) applied
Article 48 by "complexing" one quasi-crime with its multiple consequences48 unless one consequence amounts to a light felony,
in which case charges were split by grouping, on the one hand, resulting acts amounting to grave or less grave felonies and filing
the charge with the second level courts and, on the other hand, resulting acts amounting to light felonies and filing the charge
with the first level courts.49 Expectedly, this is the approach the MeTC impliedly sanctioned (and respondent Ponce invokes),
even though under Republic Act No. 7691,50 the MeTC has now exclusive original jurisdiction to impose the most serious
penalty under Article 365 which is prision correccional in its medium period.
Under this approach, the issue of double jeopardy will not arise if the "complexing" of acts penalized under Article 365 involves
only resulting acts penalized as grave or less grave felonies because there will be a single prosecution of all the resulting acts.
The issue of double jeopardy arises if one of the resulting acts is penalized as a light offense and the other acts are penalized as
grave or less grave offenses, in which case Article 48 is not deemed to apply and the act penalized as a light offense is tried
separately from the resulting acts penalized as grave or less grave offenses.
The second jurisprudential path nixes Article 48 and sanctions a single prosecution of all the effects of the quasi-crime collectively
alleged in one charge, regardless of their number or severity,51 penalizing each consequence separately. Thus, in Angeles v.
Jose,52 we interpreted paragraph three of Article 365, in relation to a charge alleging "reckless imprudence resulting in damage
to property and less serious physical injuries," as follows:
[T]he third paragraph of said article, x x x reads as follows:
When the execution of the act covered by this article shall have only resulted in damage to the property of another, the offender
shall be punished by a fine ranging from an amount equal to the value of said damage to three times such value, but which shall
in no case be less than 25 pesos.
The above-quoted provision simply means that if there is only damage to property the amount fixed therein shall be imposed, but
if there are also physical injuries there should be an additional penalty for the latter. The information cannot be split into two; one
for the physical injuries, and another for the damage to property, x x x.53(Emphasis supplied)
By "additional penalty," the Court meant, logically, the penalty scheme under Article 365.
Evidently, these approaches, while parallel, are irreconcilable. Coherence in this field demands choosing one framework over the
other. Either (1) we allow the "complexing" of a single quasi-crime by breaking its resulting acts into separate offenses (except for
light felonies), thus re-conceptualize a quasi-crime, abandon its present framing under Article 365, discard its conception under
the Quizon and Diaz lines of cases, and treat the multiple consequences of a quasi-crime as separate intentional felonies defined
under Titles 1-13, Book II under the penal code; or (2) we forbid the application of Article 48 in the prosecution and sentencing of
quasi-crimes, require single prosecution of all the resulting acts regardless of their number and severity, separately penalize each
as provided in Article 365, and thus maintain the distinct concept of quasi-crimes as crafted under Article 365, articulated in
Quizon and applied to double jeopardy adjudication in the Diaz line of cases.1avvphi1
A becoming regard of this Courts place in our scheme of government denying it the power to make laws constrains us to keep
inviolate the conceptual distinction between quasi-crimes and intentional felonies under our penal code. Article 48 is incongruent
to the notion of quasi-crimes under Article 365. It is conceptually impossible for a quasi-offense to stand for (1) a
single act constituting two or more grave or less grave felonies; or (2) an offense which is a necessary means for committing
another. This is why, way back in 1968 in Buan, we rejected the Solicitor Generals argument that double jeopardy does not bar a
second prosecution for slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence allegedly because the charge for that offense could
not be joined with the other charge for serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence following Article 48 of the Revised
Penal Code:
The Solicitor General stresses in his brief that the charge for slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence could not be
joined with the accusation for serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence, because Article 48 of the Revised Penal
Code allows only the complexing of grave or less grave felonies. This same argument was considered and rejected by this Court
in the case of People vs. [Silva] x x x:
[T]he prosecutions contention might be true. But neither was the prosecution obliged to first prosecute the accused for slight
physical injuries through reckless imprudence before pressing the more serious charge of homicide with serious physical injuries
through reckless imprudence. Having first prosecuted the defendant for the lesser offense in the Justice of the Peace Court of
Meycauayan, Bulacan, which acquitted the defendant, the prosecuting attorney is not now in a position to press in this case the
more serious charge of homicide with serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence which arose out of the same alleged
reckless imprudence of which the defendant has been previously cleared by the inferior court.
[W]e must perforce rule that the exoneration of this appellant x x x by the Justice of the Peace x x x of the charge of slight
physical injuries through reckless imprudence, prevents his being prosecuted for serious physical injuries through reckless
imprudence in the Court of First Instance of the province, where both charges are derived from the consequences of one and the
same vehicular accident, because the second accusation places the appellant in second jeopardy for the same
offense.54 (Emphasis supplied)
Indeed, this is a constitutionally compelled choice. By prohibiting the splitting of charges under Article 365, irrespective of the
number and severity of the resulting acts, rampant occasions of constitutionally impermissible second prosecutions are avoided,
not to mention that scarce state resources are conserved and diverted to proper use.
Hence, we hold that prosecutions under Article 365 should proceed from a single charge regardless of the number or severity of
the consequences. In imposing penalties, the judge will do no more than apply the penalties under Article 365 for each
consequence alleged and proven. In short, there shall be no splitting of charges under Article 365, and only one information shall
be filed in the same first level court.55
Our ruling today secures for the accused facing an Article 365 charge a stronger and simpler protection of their constitutional
right under the Double Jeopardy Clause. True, they are thereby denied the beneficent effect of the favorable sentencing formula
under Article 48, but any disadvantage thus caused is more than compensated by the certainty of non-prosecution for quasi-
crime effects qualifying as "light offenses" (or, as here, for the more serious consequence prosecuted belatedly). If it is so
minded, Congress can re-craft Article 365 by extending to quasi-crimes the sentencing formula of Article 48 so that only the most
severe penalty shall be imposed under a single prosecution of all resulting acts, whether penalized as grave, less grave or light
offenses. This will still keep intact the distinct concept of quasi-offenses. Meanwhile, the lenient schedule of penalties under
Article 365, befitting crimes occupying a lower rung of culpability, should cushion the effect of this ruling.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We REVERSE the Orders dated 2 February 2006 and 2 May 2006 of the Regional Trial
Court of Pasig City, Branch 157. We DISMISS the Information in Criminal Case No. 82366 against petitioner Jason Ivler y Aguilar
pending with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 71 on the ground of double jeopardy.
Let a copy of this ruling be served on the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 163879 July 30, 2014

DR. ANTONIO P. CABUGAO, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and SPOUSES RODOLFO M. PALMA and ROSARIO F. PALMA, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 165805
DR. CLENIO YNZON, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and SPOUSES RODOLFO M. PALMA AND ROSARIO F. PALMA, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before this Court are appeals via Rule 45 from the Decision1 dated June 4, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No.
27293, affirming the Decision2 dated February 28,2003 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), convicting appellant Dr. Antonio P.
Cabugao (Dr. Cabugao) and Dr. Clenio Ynzon (Dr. Ynzon) of the crime of Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Homicide.
The Information3 alleged
That on or about June 17, 2000in the City of Dagupan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
abovenamed accused, DR. ANTONIO P.CABUGAO and DR. CLENIO YNZON, being then the attending physicians of one
RODOLFO PALMA, JR., a minor 10 years old, confederating and acting jointly with one another, did, then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously fail through negligence, carelessness and imprudence to perform immediate operation upon their
patient, RODOLFO PALMA, JR. of acute appendicitis, when they, the said physicians, should have been done so considering
that examinations conducted upon their patient Rodolfo Palma, Jr. seriously manifest todo so, causing by such negligence,
carelessness, and imprudence the victim, RODOLFO PALMA JR., to die due to:
"CARDIORESPIRATORY ARREST, METABOLIC ENCEPHALOPATHY, SEPTICEMIA (ACUTE APPENDICITIS), CEREBRAL
ANEURYSM RUPTURED (?)"
As per Certificate of Death issued by accused Dr. Antonio P. Cabugao, to the damage and prejudice of the legal heirs of said
deceased RODOLFO PALMA, JR. and other consequential damages relative thereto.
CONTRARY to Article 365, 1st par. of the Revised Penal Code.
Dagupan City, Philippines, January 29, 2001.
Arising from the same events, the Court resolved to consolidate these cases.4 The facts, as culled from the records, are as
follows:
On June 14, 2000, at around 4 o'clock in the afternoon, ten (10)-year old Rodolfo F. Palma, Jr. (JR) complained of abdominal
pain to his mother, Rosario Palma. At 5 oclock that sameafternoon, Palma's mother and father, Atty. Rodolfo Palma Sr., brought
JR to the clinic of accused Dr. Cabugao. Dr. Cabugao, a general practitioner, specializing in familymedicine gave medicines for
the pain and told Palma's parents to call him up if his stomach pains continue. Due to persistent abdominal pains, at 4:30 in the
early morning of June 15, 2000, they returnedto Dr. Cabugao, who advised them to bring JR to the Nazareth General Hospital in
Dagupan City, for confinement. JR was admitted at the said hospital at 5:30 in the morning.5
Blood samples were taken from JR for laboratory testing. The complete blood count conveyed the following result: wbc 27.80 x
10 9/L; lymphocytes 0.10 and neutrophils 0.90. Diagnostic ultrasound was likewise conducted on the patient's lower abdomen
by radiologist, Dr. Ricky V. Querubin, with the following findings:
Normal liver, bile ducts, gallbladder, pancreas, spleen, kidneys and urinary bladder.
There is no free peritoneal fluid.
There is localized tenderness in the paraumbilical region, more so in the supra and right paraumbilical areas.
There is a vague elongated hypoechoic focus in the right periumbilical region roughly about 47 x 18 mm surrounded by
undistended gas-filled bowels. This is suggestive of an inflammatory process wherein appendiceal or periappendiceal pathology
cannot be excluded. Clinical correlation is essential."6
Dr. Cabugao did a rectal examination noting the following: "rectal: good sphincter, negative tenderness, negative mass." The
initial impression was Acute Appendicitis,7 and hence, he referred the case to his co-accused, Dr. Ynzon, a surgeon.8 In the later
part of the morning of June 15, 2000, Dr. Ynzon went to the hospital and readthe CBC and ultrasound results. The administration
of massive antibiotics and pain reliever to JRwere ordered. Thereafter, JR was placed on observation for twenty-four (24) hours.
In the morning of June 16, 2000, JR complained again of abdominal pain and his parents noticeda swelling in his scrotum. In the
afternoon of the same day, JR vomitted out greenish stuff three (3) times and had watery bowels also three (3) times. The nurses
on-duty relayed JR's condition to Dr. Ynzon who merely gaveorders via telephone.9 Accused continued medications to alleviate
JR's abdominal spasms and diarrhea. By midnight, JR again vomitted twice, had loose bowel movements and was unable to
sleep. The following morning, June 17,2000, JR's condition worsened, he had a running fever of 38C. JR's fever remained
uncontrolled and he became unconscious, he was given Aeknil (1 ampule) and Valium (1 ampule). JR's condition continued to
deteriorate that by 2 o'clock in the afternoon, JR's temperature soared to 42C, had convulsions and finally died.
The Death Certificate10 dated June 19, 2000 prepared by Dr. Cabugao indicated the following causes of death:
Immediate cause: CARDIORESPIRATORY ARREST
Antecedent cause: METABOLIC ENCEPHALOPATHY
Underlying cause: SEPTICEMIA (ACUTE APPENDICITIS)
Other significant conditionscontributing to death:
CEREBRAL ANEURYSM RUPTURED (?)
No post-mortem examination was conducted on JR. On February 1, 2001, an Information was filed against accused for reckless
imprudence resulting to homicide. At their arraignment, both accused, duly assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty to the charge.
On February 28, 2003, in convicting both the accused, the trial court found the following circumstances as sufficient basis to
conclude that accused were indeed negligent in the performance of their duties:
It is unquestionable that JR was under the medical care of the accused from the time of his admission for confinement at the
Nazareth General Hospital until his death. Upon his admission, the initial working diagnosis was to consider acute appendicitis.
To assist the accused in the consideration of acute appendicitis, Dr. Cabugao requested for a complete blood count (CBC) and a
diagnostic ultrasound on JR. The findings of the CBC and ultrasound showed that an inflammatory process or infection was going
on inside the body of JR. Said inflammatory process was happening in the periumbilical region where the appendix could be
located. The initial diagnosis of acute appendicitis appears to be a distinct possibility. x x x.
Dr. Ynzon ordered medications to treat the symptoms being manifested by JR. Thereafter, he ordered that JR be observed for 24
hours. However, the accused, as the attending physicians, did not personally monitor JR in order to check on subtle changes that
may occur. Rather, they left the monitoring and actual observation to resident physicians who are just on residency training and in
doing so, they substituted their own expertise, skill and competence with those of physicians who are merely new doctors still on
training. Not having personally observed JR during this 24-hour critical period of observation, the accused relinquished their duty
and thereby were unable to give the proper and correct evaluation as to the real condition of JR. In situations where massive
infection is going on as shown by the aggressive medication of antibiotics, the condition of the patient is serious which
necessitated personal, not delegated, attention of attending physicians, namely JR and the accused in this case.
xxxx
Throughout the course of the hospitalization and treatment of JR, the accused failed to address the acute appendicitis which was
the initial diagnosis. They did not take steps to find out if indeed acute appendicitis was what was causing the massive infection
that was ongoing inside the body of JR even when the inflammatory process was located at the paraumbilical region where the
appendix can be located. x x x
There may have been other diseases but the records do not show that the accused took steps to find outwhat disease exactly
was plaguing JR. It was their duty to find out the disease causing the health problem of JR, but they did not perform any process
of elimination. Appendicitis, according to expert testimonies, could be eliminated only by surgery but no surgery was done by the
accused. But the accused could not have found out the real disease of JR because they were treating merely and exclusively the
symptoms by means of the different medications to arrest the manifested symptoms. In fact, by treating the symptoms alone, the
accused were recklessly and wantonly ignoring the same as signs of the graver health problem of JR. This gross negligence on
the part of the accused allowed the infection to spread inside the body of JR unabated. The infection obviously spread so fastand
was so massive that within a period of only two and a half (2 ) days from the day of admission to the hospital on June 15, 2000,
JR who was otherwise healthy died [of] Septicemia (Acute Appendicitis) on June 17, 2000.11
On June 4, 2004, in affirming the accused' conviction, the Court of Appeals gave similar observations, to wit:
The foregoing expert testimony clearly revealed such want of reasonable skill and care on the part of JR's attending physicians,
appellants Dr. Cabugao and Dr. Ynzon in neglecting to monitor effectively and sufficiently the developments/changes during the
observation period and act upon the situation after said 24-hour period when his abdominal pain subsisted, his condition even
worsened with the appearance of more serious symptoms of nausea, vomiting and diarrhea. Considering the brief visit only made
on regular rounds, the records clearly show such gross negligence in failing to take appropriate steps to determine the real cause
of JR's abdominal pain so that the crucial decision to perform surgery (appendectomy) had even been ruled out precisely
because of the inexcusable neglect to undertake suchefficient diagnosis by process of elimination, as correctly pointed out by the
trial court. As has been succinctly emphasized by Dr. Mateo, acute appendicitis was the working diagnosis, and with the
emergence of symptoms after the 24-hour observation (high fever, vomiting, diarrhea) still, appellants ruled out surgery, not even
considering exploratory laparoscopy. Dr. Mateo also expressed the opinion that the decision to operate could have been made
after the result of the ultrasound test, considering that acute appendicitis was the initial diagnosis by Dr. Cabugao after he had
conducted a rectal examination.
Medical records buttress the trial court's finding that in treating JR, appellants have demonstrated indifference and neglect of the
patient's condition as a serious case. Indeed, appendicitis remains a clinical emergencyand a surgical disease, as correctly
underscored by Dr. Mateo, a practicing surgeon who has already performed over a thousand appendectomy. In fact,
appendectomy is the only rational therapy for acute appendicitis; it avoids clinical deterioration and may avoid chronic or
recurrent appendicitis. Although difficult, prompt recognition and immediate treatment of the disease prevent complications.
Under the factual circumstances, the inaction, neglect and indifference of appellants who, after the day of admission and after
being apprised of the ongoing infection from the CBC and initial diagnosis as acute appendicitis from rectal examination and
ultrasound testand only briefly visited JR once during regular rounds and gave medication orders by telephone constitutes
gross negligenceleading to the continued deterioration of the patient, his infection having spread in sofast a pace that he died
within just two and a half (2 ) days stay inthe hospital. Authorities state that if the clinical picture is unclear a short period of 4 to
6 hours of watchful waiting and a CT scan may improve diagnostic accuracy and help to hasten diagnosis.Even assuming that
JR's case had an atypical presentation in view of the location of his appendix, laboratory tests could have helped to confirm
diagnosis, as Dr. Mateo opined thatthe possibility of JR having a retrocecal appendicitis should have been a strong consideration.
Lamentably, however, as found by the trial court, appellants had not taken steps towards correct diagnosis and demonstrated
laxity even when JR was already running a high fever in the morning of June 17, 2000 and continued vomiting with diarrhea, his
abdominal pain becoming more intense. This is the reason why private complainants were not even apprised of the progress of
appellants' diagnosis appellants have nothing to report because they did nothing towards the end and merely gave medications
to address the symptoms.12
Thus, these appeals brought beforethis Court raising the following arguments:
I

WHETHER THE CAUSE OF ACCUSATION AS CONTAINED IN THE INFORMATION IS "FAILURE TO PERFORM

IMMEDIATE OPERATION UPON THE PATIENT ROFOLFO PALMA JR. OF ACUTE APPENDICITIS;

II

WHETHER THE SUBJECT INFORMATION APPEARS TO HAVE ACCUSED BOTH ACCUSED DOCTORS OF
CONSPIRACY AND THE APPEALED DECISION SEEMS TO HAVE TREATED BOTH ACCUSED DOCTORS TO
BE IN CONSPIRACY;

III

WHETHER PETITIONER DR. CABUGAO IS A GENERAL PRACTITIONER (NOT A SURGEON) AND HAVE
EXCLUDED SURGERY FROM THE LIMITS OFHIS PRACTICE, AND IT WAS NOT AND NEVER HIS DUTY TO
OPERATE THE PATIENT RODOLFO PALMA JR., THAT WAS WHY HE REFERRED SUBJECT PATIENT TO A
SURGEON, DR. CLENIO YNZON;

IV
 WHETHER THE DEFENSE NEVER STATED THAT THERE IS GUARANTEE THAT DOING SURGERY WOULD
HAVE SAVED THE PATIENT;

WHETHER THE WITNESSES FOR THE PROSECUTION INCLUDING PROSECUTION'S EXPERT WITNESSES
EVER DECLARED/TESTIFIED THAT PETITIONER DR. CABUGAO HAD THE DUTY TO PERFORM IMMEDIATE
OPERATION ON RODOLFO PALMA, JR., AND THEY FAILED TO STATE/SHOW THAT THE PROXIMATE CAUSE
OF DEATH OF JR WAS ACUTE APPENDICITIS;

VI

WHETHER THE EXPERT WITNESSES PRESENTED BY THE PROSECUTION EVER QUESTIONED THE
MANAGEMENT AND CARE APPLIED BY PETITIONER DR. CABUGAO;

VII

WHETHER THE EXPERT WITNESSES PRESENTED BY THE DEFENSE ARE UNANIMOUS IN APPROVING THE
METHOD OF TREATMENT APPLIED BY BOTH ACCUSED DOCTORS ON SUBJECT PATIENT, AND THEY
DECLARED/AFFIRMED THAT THEY WOULD FIRST PLACE SUBJECT THE PATIENT UNDER OBSERVATION,
AND WOULD NOT PERFORM IMMEDIATE OPERATION;

VIII

WHETHER THE CONVICTION OF PETITIONER DR. YNZON WAS ESTABLISHED WITH THE REQUIRED
QUANTUM OF PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT THAT THE PATIENT WAS SPECIFICALLY SUFFERING
FROM AND DIED OF ACUTE APPENDICITIS; and

IX

WHETHER THE FAILURE TO CONDUCT THE SPECIFIC SURGICAL OPERATION KNOWN AS APPENDECTOMY
CONSTITUTED CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE.

In a nutshell, the petition brought before this Court raises the issue of whether or not petitioners' conviction of the crime of
reckless imprudence resulting in homicide, arising from analleged medical malpractice, is supported by the evidence on record.
Worth noting is that the assigned errors are actually factual in nature, which as a general rule, findings of factof the trial court and
the Court of Appeals are binding and conclusiveupon this Court, and we will not normally disturb such factual findings unless the
findings of the court are palpably unsupported by the evidence on record or unless the judgment itself is based on
misapprehension of facts. Inthe instant case, we find the need to make certain exception.
AS TO DR. YNZON'S LIABILITY:
Reckless imprudence consists of voluntarily doing or failing to do, without malice, an act from which material damage results by
reason of an inexcusable lack of precautionon the part of the person performing or failing to perform such act. 13 The elements of
reckless imprudence are: (1) that the offender does or fails to do an act; (2) that the doing or the failure to do that act is voluntary;
(3) that it bewithout malice; (4) that material damage results from the reckless imprudence; and (5) that there is inexcusable lack
of precaution on the part of the offender, taking into consideration his employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical
condition, and other circumstances regarding persons, time and place.14
With respect to Dr. Ynzon, all the requisites of the offense have been clearly established by the evidence on record. The court a
quoand the appellate court were one in concluding that Dr. Ynzon failed to observe the required standard of care expected from
doctors.
In the instant case, it was sufficiently established that to prevent certain death, it was necessary to perform surgery on JR
immediately. Even the prosecutions own expert witness, Dr. Antonio Mateo,15 testified during cross-examination that he would
perform surgery on JR:
ATTY. CASTRO:
Q. Given these data soft non-tender abdomen, ambulatory, watery diarrhea, Exhibit C which is the ultrasound result, with that
laboratory would you operate the patient?
A Yes, I would do surgery.
Q And you should have done surgery with this particular case?"
A Yes, sir.16
xxxx
COURT:
Q You stated a while ago doctor thatyou are going to [do] surgery to the patient, why doctor, if you are notgoing to do surgery,
what will happen?
A If this would be appendicitis, the usual progress would be that it would be ruptured and generalized peritonitis and eventually
septicemia, sir.
Q What do you mean by that doctor?
A That means that infection would spread throughout the body, sir.
Q If unchecked doctor, what will happen?
A It will result to death.17
xxxx
Q And what would have you doneif you entertain other considerations from the time the patient was admitted?
A From the time the patient was admitted until the report of the sonologist, I would have made a decision by then.
Q And when to decide the surgery would it be a particular exact time, would it be the same for all surgeons?
A If you are asking acute appendicitis, it would be about 24 hours because acute appendicitis is a 24-hour disease, sir.
Q. And would it be correct to say that it depends on the changes on the condition of the patient?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. So, are you saying more than 24 hours when there are changes?
A. If there are changes in the patient pointing towards appendicitis then you have to decide right there and then, sir.
Q. So if there are changes in the patient pointing to appendicitis?
A. It depends now on what you are trying to wait for in the observation period, sir.
Q. So precisely if the change is a condition which bring you in doubt that there is something else other than appendicitis, would
you extend over a period of 24 hours?
A. It depends on the emergent development, sir.
Q. That is the point, if you are the attending physician and there is a change not pointing to appendicitis, would you extend over a
period of 24 hours?
A. In 24 hours you have to decide, sir.
xxxx
Q. And that is based on the assessment of the attending physician?
A. Yes, sir.18
Dr. Mateo further testified on cross-examination:
ATTY. CASTRO:
Q: So you will know yourself, as far as the record is concerned, because if you will agree with me, you did not even touch the
patient?
A. Yes, I based my opinion on what is put on record, sir. The records show that after the observation period, the abdominal pain is
still there plus there are already other signs and symptoms which are not seen or noted.
Q. But insofar as you yourself not having touched the abdomen of the patient, would you give a comment on that?
A. Yes, based on the record, after 24 hours of observation, the pain apparently was still there and there was more vomiting and
there was diarrhea. In my personal opinion, I think the condition of the patient was deteriorating.
Q. Even though you have not touched the patient?
A. I based on what was on the record, sir.19
From the foregoing, it is clear that if JRs condition remained unchecked it would ultimately result in his death, as what actually
happened in the present case. Another expert witness for the defense, Dr. Vivencio Villaflor, Jr. testified on direct examination
that he would perform a personal and thorough physical examination of the patient as frequent as every 4 to 6 hours, to wit:
ATTY. CASTRO:
Q. As an expert doctor, if you were faced with a history of abdominal pain with nausea, vomiting, fever, anurecia (sic), elevated
white blood cell count, physical examination of a positive psoas sign, observation of the sonologist of abdominal tenderness and
the ultrasound findings of the probability of appendiceal (sic) pathology, what will you do if you have faced these problems,
Doctor?
A. I will examine the patient thoroughly and it will depend on my physical examination and that isprobably every 4 to 6 hours,
sir.20
On cross-examination, Dr. Villaflor affirmed:
Cross Exam. By Atty. Marteja:
Q. x x x However, there are corrections and admissions made at that time, your Honor, do I understand thatT/C does not mean
ruled out but rather to consider the matter?
A. Yes, now that I have seen the records of the patient, it says here, impression and T/C means to consider the appendicitis.
Q. Isn't it that it is worth then to say that the initial working diagnosis on Rodolfo Palma, Jr., otherwise known as JR, to whom I
shall now refer to as JR, the primary consideration then is acute appendicitis, is that correct to say Doctor?
A. I think so, that is the impression.
Q. x x x Now if it is to be considered as the primary consideration in the initial working diagnosis, isn't it a fact that it has tobe
ruled out in order to consider it as not the disease of JR?
A. Yes. Sir.
Q. Isn't it a fact thatto rule out acute appendicitis as not the disease of JR, surgery or operation must be done, isn't it Doctor?
A. You have to correlate all the findings.
Q. Is it yes or no, Doctor?
A. Yes.
Q. So, you are saying then that in order to rule out acute appendicitis there must be an operation, that is right Doctor?
A. No, sir. If your diagnosis is toreally determine if it is an acute appendicitis, you have to operate.21
xxxx
Q. Now Doctor, considering the infection, considering that there was a [symptom] that causes pain, considering that JR likewise
was feverish and that he was vomiting, does that not show a disease of acute appendicitis Doctor?
A. Its possible.
Q. So that if that is possible, are we getting the impression then Doctor what you have earlier mentioned that the only way to rule
out the suspect which is acute appendicitis is by surgery, you have said that earlier Doctor, I just want any confirmation of it?
A. Yes, sir.22
Verily, whether a physician or surgeon has exercised the requisite degree of skill and care in the treatment of his patient is, in the
generality of cases, a matter of expert opinion. The deference of courts to the expert opinions of qualified physicians stems from
its realization that the latter possess unusual technical skills which laymen in most instances are incapable of intelligently
evaluating.23 From the testimonies of the expert witnesses presented, it was irrefutably proven that Dr. Ynzon failed to practice
that degree of skill and care required in the treatment of his patient.
As correctly observed by the appellate court, Dr. Ynzon revealed want of reasonable skill and care in attending to the needs of JR
by neglecting to monitor effectively the developmentsand changes on JR's condition during the observation period, and to act
upon the situation after the 24-hour period when his abdominal pain persisted and his condition worsened. Lamentable, Dr.
Ynzon appeared to have visited JRbriefly only during regular rounds in the mornings. He was not there during the crucial times
on June 16, 2000 when JR's condition started to deteriorate until JR's death. As the attending surgeon, he should be primarily
responsible in monitoring the condition of JR, as he is in the best position considering his skills and experience to know if the
patient's condition had deteriorated. While the resident-doctors-onduty could likewise monitor the patientscondition, he is the one
directly responsible for the patient as the attending surgeon. Indeed, it is reckless and gross negligence of duty to relegate his
personal responsibility to observe the condition of the patient. Again, acute appendicitis was the working diagnosis, and with the
emergence of graver symptoms after the 24-hour observation, Dr. Ynzon ruled out surgery for no apparent reason. We, likewise,
note that the records are devoid of showing of any reasonable cause which would lead Dr. Ynzon tooverrule appendectomy
despite the initial diagnosis of appendicitis. Neitherwas there any showing that he was entertaining another diagnosis nor he took
appropriate steps towards another diagnosis.
Among the elements constitutive of reckless imprudence, what perhaps is most central to a finding of guilt is the conclusive
determination that the accused has exhibited, by his voluntary act without malice, an inexcusable lack of precaution. It is that
which supplies the criminal intent so indispensable as tobring an act of mere negligence and imprudence under the operation of
the penal law. This is because a conscious indifference to the consequences of the conduct is all that is required from the
standpoint of the frame of mind of the accused.24Quasioffenses penalize the mental attitudeor condition behind the act, the
dangerous recklessness, the lack of care or foresight, the "imprudencia punible," unlike willful offenses which punish the
intentional criminal act.25 This is precisely where this Court found Dr. Ynzon to be guilty of - his seemingly indifference to the
deteriorating condition of JR that he as a consequence, failed to exercise lack of precaution which eventually led to JR's death.
To be sure, whether or not a physician has committed an "inexcusable lack of precaution" in the treatment of his patient is to be
determined according to the standard of care observed by other members of the profession in good standing under similar
circumstances bearing in mind the advanced state of the profession at the time of treatment or the present state of medical
science. In accepting a case, a doctor in effect represents that, having the needed training and skill possessed by physicians and
surgeons practicing in the same field, he will employ such training, care and skill in the treatment of his patients. He, therefore,
has a duty to use at least the same level of care that any other reasonably competent doctor would use to treat a condition under
the same circumstances.26 Sadly, Dr. Ynzon did not display that degree of care and precaution demanded by the circumstances.
AS TO DR. CABUGAO'S LIABILITY:
Every criminal conviction requires of the prosecution to prove two things the fact of the crime, i.e., the presence of all the
elements of the crime for which the accused stands charged, and the fact that the accused is the perpetrator of the crime. Based
on the above disquisitions, however, the prosecution failed to prove these two things. The Court is not convinced with moral
certainty that Dr. Cabugao isguilty of reckless imprudence as the elements thereof were not proven by the prosecution beyond a
reasonable doubt.
Both the trial court and the appellate court bewail the failure to perform appendectomy on JR, or the failure to determine the
source of infection which caused the deterioration of JR's condition. However, a review of the records fail to show that Dr.
Cabugao is in any position to perform the required appendectomy.
Immediately apparent from a review of the records of this case is the fact that Dr. Cabugao is not a surgeon,but a general
practitioner specializing in family medicine;27 thus, even if he wanted to, he cannot do an operation, much less an appendectomy
on JR. It is precisely for this reason why he referred JR to Dr. Ynzon after he suspected appendicitis. Dr. Mateo, the prosecutions
expert witness, emphasized the role of the surgeon during direct examination, to wit:
ATTY. MARTEJA:
Q. You had mentioned that under this circumstances and condition, you have mentioned that surgery is the solution, would you
have allowed then a 24 hour observation?
A. If there is a lingering doubt, inshort period of observation of 18-24 hours can be allowed provided that there would be close
monitoring of the patient, sir.
Q. Would you please tell us who would be doing the monitoring doctor?
A. The best person should be the first examiner, the best surgeon, sir.
Q. So that would you say that it is incumbent on the surgeon attending to the case to have been the one to observe within the
period of observation?
A. Yes, because he will be in the best position to observe the sudden changes in the condition of the patient, sir.
Q. And how often would in your experience doctor, how often would the surgeon re-assist (sic) the condition of the patient during
the period of observation?
A. Most foreign authors would recommend every four (4) hours, some centers will recommend hourly or every two hours but here
in the Philippines, would recommend for 4 to 6 hours, sir.28
Dr. Cabugaos supervision does not cease upon his endorsement of his patient to the surgeon. Here, Dr. Cabugao has shown to
have exerted all efforts to monitor his patient and under these circumstances he did not have any cause to doubt Dr. Ynzons
competence and diligence. Expert testimonies have been offered to prove the circumstances surrounding the case of JR and the
need to perform an operation. Defense witness, Dr. Villaflor, on cross examination testified, to wit:
Q. Isn't it a fact that torule out acute appendicitis as notthe disease of JR, surgery or operation mustbe done, isn't it Doctor?
A. You have to [correlate] all the findings.
Q. Is it yes or no, Doctor?
A. Yes.
Q. So, you are saying then that in order to rule out acute appendicitis there must be an operation, that is right Doctor?
A. No, sir. If your diagnosis is to really determine if it is an acute appendicitis, you have to operate.29
xxxx
Q. Now Doctor, considering the infection, considering that there was a [symptom] that causes pain, considering that JR likewise
was feverish and that he was vomitting, does that not show a disease of acute appendicitis Doctor?
A. Its possible.
Q. So that if that is possible, are we getting the impression then Doctor what you have earlier mentioned that the only way to rule
out the suspect which is acute appendicitis is by surgery, you have said that earlier Doctor, I just want any confirmation of it?
A. Yes, sir.30
Neither do we find evidence that Dr. Cabugao has been negligent or lacked the necessary precaution in his performance of his
duty as a family doctor. On the contrary, a perusal ofthe medical records would show that during the 24-hour monitoring on JR, it
was Dr. Cabugao who frequently made orders on the administration of antibiotics and pain relievers. There was also repetitive
instructions from Dr. Cabugao to refer JR to Dr. Ynzon as it appeared that he is suspecting appendicitis. The referral of JR to Dr.
Ynzon, a surgeon, is actually an exercise of precaution as he knew that appendicitis is not within his scope of expertise. This
clearly showed that he employed the best of his knowledge and skill in attending to JR's condition, even after the referral of JR to
Dr. Ynzon. To be sure, the calculated assessment of Dr. Cabugao to refer JRto a surgeon who has sufficient training and
experience to handle JRs case belies the finding that he displayed inexcusable lack of precaution in handling his patient.31
We likewise note that Dr. Cabugao was out of town when JR's condition began to deteriorate. Even so, before he left, he made
endorsement and notified the resident-doctor and nurses-on-duty that he will be on leave.
Moreover, while both appeared to be the attending physicians of JR during his hospital confinement, it cannot be said that the
finding of guilt on Dr. Ynzon necessitates the same finding on the co-accused Dr. Cabugao. Conspiracy is inconsistent with the
idea of a felony committed by means of culpa.32 Thus, the accused-doctors to be found guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide, it must be shown that both accused-doctors demonstratedan act executed without malice or criminal intent but with
lack of foresight, carelessness, or negligence. Noteworthy, the evidence on record clearly points to the reckless imprudence of
Dr. Ynzon; however, the same cannot be said in Dr. Cabugao's case.
AS TO CIVIL LIABILITY
While this case is pending appeal, counsel for petitioner Dr. Ynzon informed the Court that the latter died on December 23, 2011
due to "multiorgan failure" as evidenced by a copy of death certificate.33 Thus, the effect of death, pending appeal of his
conviction of petitioner Dr. Ynzon with regard to his criminal and pecuniary liabilities should be in accordance to People v.
Bayotas,34 wherein the Court laid down the rules in case the accused dies prior to final judgment:
1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability
based solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the death of the accused prior to final judgment
terminates his criminal liability and only the civil liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense committed,
i.e.,civil liability ex delictoin senso strictiore."
2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of accused, if the same may also be predicated
on a source of obligation other than delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these other sources of obligation
fromwhich the civil liability may arise as a result of the same act or omission:
a) Law
b) Contracts
c) Quasi-contracts
d) x x x x x x x x x
e) Quasi-delicts
3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for recovery therefor may be pursued but
only by way of filing a separate civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as
amended. This separate civil action may be enforced either againstthe executor/administrator or the estate of the
accused, depending on the source of obligation upon which the same is based as explained above.
4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil action by prescription, in
cases where during the prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its extinction, the private-offended party instituted
together therewith the civil action. In such case, the statute of limitationson the civil liability is deemed interrupted during
the pendency of the criminal case, conformably with provisions of Article 1155 of the Civil Code, that should thereby avoid
any apprehension on a possible privation of right by prescription.35
In view of the foregoing, it is clear that the death of the accused Dr. Ynzon pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his
criminal liability. However, the recovery of civil liability subsists as the same is not based on delictbut by contract and the reckless
imprudence he was guilty of under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code.1wphi1 For this reason, a separate civil action may be
enforced either against the executor/administrator or the estate of the accused, depending on the source of obligation upon
which the same is based,36 and in accordance with Section 4, Rule 111 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, we quote:
Sec. 4. Effect of death on civil actions. The death of the accused after arraignment and during the pendency of the criminal
action shall extinguish the civil liability arising from the delict. However, the independent civil action instituted under section 3 of
this Rule or which thereafter is instituted to enforce liability arising from other sources of obligation may be continued against the
estate or legal representative of the accused after proper substitution or against said estate, as the case may be. The heirs of the
accused may besubstituted for the deceased without requiring the appointment of an executor or administrator and the court may
appoint a guardian ad litem for the minor heirs.
The court shall forthwith order said legal representative or representatives to appear and be substituted within a period of thirty
(30) days from notice.
A final judgment entered in favor of the offended party shall be enforced in the manner especially provided in these rules for
prosecuting claims against the estate of the deceased.
If the accused dies before arraignment, the case shall be dismissed without prejudice to any civil action the offended party may
file against the estate of the deceased. (Emphases ours)
In sum, upon the extinction of the criminal liability and the offended party desires to recover damages from the same act or
omission complained of, the party may file a separate civil action based on the other sources of obligation in accordance with
Section 4, Rule 111.37 If the same act or omission complained of arises from quasi-delict,as in this case, a separate civil action
must be filed against the executor or administrator of the estate of the accused, pursuant to Section 1, Rule 87 of the Rules of
Court:38
Section 1. Actions which may and which may not be brought against executor or administrator. No action upon a claim for the
recovery of money or debtor interest thereon shall be commenced against the executor or administrator; but to recover real or
personal property, or an interest therein, from the estate, or to enforce a lien thereon, and actions to recover damages for an
injury to person or property, real or personal, may be commenced against him. (Emphases ours)
Conversely, if the offended party desires to recover damages from the same act or omission complained of arising from contract,
the filing of a separate civil action must be filed against the estate, pursuant to Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
Section 5. Claims which must be filed under the notice. If not filed, barred; exceptions. All claims for money against the decent,
arising from contract, express or implied, whether the same be due, not due, or contingent, all claims for funeral expenses and
expense for the last sickness of the decedent, and judgment for money against the decent, must be filed within the time limited in
the notice; otherwise they are barred forever, except that they may be set forth as counterclaims in any action that the executor
or administrator may bring against the claimants. Where an executor or administrator commencesan action, or prosecutes an
action already commenced by the deceased in his lifetime, the debtor may set forth by answer the claims he has against the
decedent, instead of presenting them independently to the court as herein provided, and mutual claims may be set off against
each other in such action; and if final judgment is rendered in favor of the defendant, the amount so determined shall be
considered the true balance against the estate, as though the claim had been presented directly beforethe court in the
administration proceedings. Claims not yet due, or contingent, may be approved at their present value.
As a final note, we reiterate thatthe policy against double recovery requires that only one action be maintained for the same act
or omission whether the action is brought against the executor or administrator, or the estate.39 The heirs of JR must choose
which of the available causes of action for damages they will bring.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, petitioner DR. ANTONIO P. CABUGAO is hereby ACQUITTEDof the crime of reckless
imprudence resulting to homicide.
Due to the death of accused Dr. Clenio Ynzon prior to the disposition of this case, his criminal liability is extinguished; however,
his civil liability subsists. A separate civil action may be filed either against the executor/administrator, or the estateof Dr. Ynzon,
depending on the source of obligation upon which the same are based.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 129029. April 3, 2000]
RAFAEL REYES TRUCKING CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and ROSARIO P. DY (for herself
and on behalf of the minors Maria Luisa, Francis Edward, Francis Mark and Francis Rafael, all surnamed Dy), respondents.
DECISION
PARDO, J.:
The case is an appeal via certiorari from the amended decision[1] of the Court of Appeals[2] affirming the decision and supplemental decision
of the trial court,[3] as follows:
"IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the appeals interposed by both accused and
Reyes Trucking Corporation and affirming the Decision and Supplemental Decision dated June 6, 1992 and October 26,
1992 respectively.
"SO ORDERED."[4]
The facts are as follows:
On October 10, 1989, Provincial Prosecutor Patricio T. Durian of Isabela filed with the Regional Trial Court, Isabela, Branch 19, Cauayan an
amended information charging Romeo Dunca y de Tumol with reckless imprudence resulting in double homicide and damage to property,
reading as follows:
"That on or about the 20th day of June, 1989, in the Municipality of Cauayan, Province of Isabela, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused being the driver and person-in-charge of a Trailer Truck Tractor
bearing Plate No. N2A-867 registered in the name of Rafael Reyes Trucking Corporation, with a load of 2,000 cases of
empty bottles of beer grande, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously drove and operated the same while along the National
Highway of Barangay Tagaran, in said Municipality, in a negligent, careless and imprudent manner, without due regard to
traffic laws, rules and ordinances and without taking the necessary precautions to prevent injuries to persons and damage to
property, causing by such negligence, carelessness and imprudence the said trailer truck to hit and bump a Nissan Pick-up
bearing Plate No. BBG-957 driven by Feliciano Balcita and Francisco Dy, Jr., @ Pacquing, due to irreversible shock,
internal and external hemorrhage and multiple injuries, open wounds, abrasions, and further causing damages to the heirs of
Feliciano Balcita in the amount of P100,000.00 and to the death of Francisco Dy, Jr.; @ Pacquing and damages to his Nissan
Pick-Up bearing Plate No. BBG-957 in the total amount of P2,000,000.00.
"CONTRARY TO LAW.
"Cauayan, Isabela, October 10, 1989.
"(Sgd.) FAUSTO C. CABANTAC
"Third Assistant Provincial Prosecutor"
Upon arraignment on October 23, 1989, the accused entered a plea of not guilty. On the same occasion, the offended parties (Rosario P. Dy
and minor children and Angelina M. Balcita and minor son Paolo) made a reservation to file a separate civil action against the accused arising
from the offense charged.[5] On November 29, 1989, the offended parties actually filed with the Regional Trial Court, Isabela, Branch 19,
Cauayan a complaint against petitioner Rafael Reyes Trucking Corporation, as employer of driver Romeo Dunca y de Tumol, based on quasi
delict. The petitioner settled the claim of the heirs of Feliciano Balcita (the driver of the other vehicle involved in the accident). The private
respondents opted to pursue the criminal action but did not withdraw the civil case quasi ex delicto they filed against petitioner. On December
15, 1989, private respondents withdrew the reservation to file a separate civil action against the accused and manifested that they would
prosecute the civil aspect ex delicto in the criminal action.[6] However, they did not withdraw the separate civil action based on quasi
delictagainst petitioner as employer arising from the same act or omission of the accused driver.[7]
Upon agreement of the parties, the trial court consolidated both criminal and civil cases and conducted a joint trial of the same.
The facts, as found by the trial court, which appear to be undisputed, are as follows:
"The defendant Rafael Reyes Trucking Corporation is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of transporting beer
products for the San Miguel Corporation (SMC for short) from the latters San Fernando, Pampanga plant to its various sales
outlets in Luzon. Among its fleets of vehicles for hire is the white truck trailer described above driven by Romeo Dunca y
Tumol, a duly licensed driver. Aside from the Corporations memorandum to all its drivers and helpers to physically inspect
their vehicles before each trip (Exh. 15, pars. 4 & 5), the SMCs Traffic Investigator-Inspector certified the roadworthiness of
this White Truck trailer prior to June 20, 1989 (Exh. 17). In addition to a professional drivers license, it also conducts a rigid
examination of all driver applicants before they are hired.
"In the early morning of June 20, 1989, the White Truck driven by Dunca left Tuguegarao, Cagayan bound to San Fernando,
Pampanga loaded with 2,000 cases of empty beer "Grande" bottles. Seated at the front right seat beside him was Ferdinand
Domingo, his truck helper ("pahinante" in Pilipino). At around 4:00 oclock that same morning while the truck was
descending at a slight downgrade along the national road at Tagaran, Cauayan, Isabela, it approached a damaged portion of
the road covering the full width of the trucks right lane going south and about six meters in length. These made the surface
of the road uneven because the potholes were about five to six inches deep. The left lane parallel to this damaged portion is
smooth. As narrated by Ferdinand Domingo, before approaching the potholes, he and Dunca saw the Nissan with its
headlights on coming from the opposite direction. They used to evade this damaged road by taking the left lance but at that
particular moment, because of the incoming vehicle, they had to run over it. This caused the truck to bounce wildly. Dunca
lost control of the wheels and the truck swerved to the left invading the lane of the Nissan. As a result, Duncas vehicle
rammed the incoming Nissan dragging it to the left shoulder of the road and climbed a ridge above said shoulder where it
finally stopped. (see Exh. A-5, p. 8, record). The Nissan was severely damaged (Exhs. A-7, A-8, A-9 and A-14, pp. 9-11,
record), and its two passengers, namely: Feliciano Balcita and Francisco Dy, Jr. died instantly (Exh. A-19) from external and
internal hemorrhage and multiple fractures (pp. 15 and 16, record).
"For the funeral expenses of Francisco Dy, Jr. her widow spent P651,360.00 (Exh. I-3). At the time of his death he was 45
years old. He was the President and Chairman of the Board of the Dynamic Wood Products and Development Corporation
(DWPC), a wood processing establishment, from which he was receiving an income of P10,000.00 a month (Exh. D). In the
Articles of Incorporation of the DWPC, the spouses Francisco Dy, Jr. and Rosario Perez Dy appear to be stockholders of
10,000 shares each with par value of P100.00 per share out of its outstanding and subscribed capital stock of 60,000 shares
valued at P6,000,000.00 (Exhs. K-1 & 10-B). Under its 1988 Income Tax Returns (Exh. J) the DWPC had a taxable net
income of P78,499.30 (Exh. J). Francisco Dy, Jr. was a La Salle University graduate in Business Administration, past
president of the Pasay Jaycees, National Treasurer and President of the Philippine Jaycees in 1971 and 1976, respectively,
and World Vice-President of Jaycees International in 1979. He was also the recipient of numerous awards as a civic leader
 (Exh. C). His children were all studying in prestigious schools and spent about P180,000.00 for their education in 1988
alone (Exh. H-4).
"As stated earlier, the plaintiffs procurement of a writ of attachment of the properties of the Corporation was declared illegal
by the Court of Appeals. It was shown that on December 26, 1989, Deputy Sheriff Edgardo Zabat of the RTC at San
Fernando, Pampanga, attached six units of Truck Tractors and trailers of the Corporation at its garage at San Fernando,
Pampanga. These vehicles were kept under PC guard by the plaintiffs in said garage thus preventing the Corporation to
operate them. However, on December 28, 1989, the Court of Appeals dissolved the writ (p. 30, record) and on December 29,
1989, said Sheriff reported to this Court that the attached vehicles were taken by the defendants representative, Melita
Manapil (Exh. O, p. 31, record). The defendants general Manager declared that it lost P21,000.00 per day for the non-
operation of the six units during their attachment (p. 31, t.s.n., Natividad C. Babaran, proceedings on December 10,
1990)."[8]
On June 6, 1992, the trial court rendered a joint decision, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations judgment is hereby rendered:
"1. Finding the accused Romeo Dunca y de Tumol guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Double Homicide through
Reckless Imprudence with violation of the Motor Vehicle Law (Rep. Act No. 4136), and appreciating in his favor the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender without any aggravating circumstance to offset the same, the Court hereby
sentences him to suffer two (2) indeterminate penalties of four months and one day of arresto mayor as minimum to three
years, six months and twenty days as maximum; to indemnify the Heirs of Francisco Dy. Jr. in the amount of P3,000,000.00
as compensatory damages, P1,000,000.00 as moral damages, and P1,030,000.00 as funeral expenses;
"2. Ordering the plaintiff in Civil Case No. Br. 19-424 to pay the defendant therein actual damages in the amount of
P84,000.00; and
"3. Ordering the dismissal of the complaint in Civil Case No. Br. 19-424.
"No pronouncement as to costs.
"SO ORDERED.
"Cauayan, Isabela, June 6, 1992.
"(Sgd.) ARTEMIO R. ALIVIA
"Regional Trial Judge"[9]
On September 3, 1992, petitioner and the accused filed a notice of appeal from the joint decision.[10]
On the other hand, private respondents moved for amendment of the dispositive portion of the joint decision so as to hold petitioner
subsidiarily liable for the damages awarded to the private respondents in the event of insolvency of the accused.[11]
On October 26, 1992, the trial court rendered a supplemental decision amending the dispositive portion by inserting an additional paragraph
reading as follows:
"2:A Ordering the defendant Reyes Trucking Corporation subsidiarily liable for all the damages awarded to the heirs of
Francisco Dy, Jr., in the event of insolvency of the accused but deducting therefrom the damages of P84,000.00 awarded to
said defendant in the next preceding paragraph; and x x x"[12]
On November 12, 1992, petitioner filed with the trial court a supplemental notice of appeal from the supplemental decision.[13]
During the pendency of the appeal, the accused jumped bail and fled to a foreign country. By resolution dated December 29, 1994, the Court
of Appeals dismissed the appeal of the accused in the criminal case.[14]
On January 6, 1997, the Court of Appeals rendered an amended decision affirming that of the trial court, as set out in the opening paragraph of
this decision.[15]
On January 31, 1997, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the amended decision.[16]
On April 21, 1997, the Court of Appeals denied petitioners motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.[17]
Hence, this petition for review.[18]
On July 21, 1997, the Court required respondents to comment on the petition within ten (10) days from notice.[19]
On January 27, 1998, the Solicitor General filed his comment.[20] On April 13, 1998, the Court granted leave to petitioner to file a reply and
noted the reply it filed on March 11, 1998.[21]
We now resolve to give due course to the petition and decide the case.
Petitioner raises three (3) grounds for allowance of the petition, which, however, boil down to two (2) basic issues, namely:
 1.....May petitioner as owner of the truck involved in the accident be held subsidiarily liable for the damages awarded to the
offended parties in the criminal action against the truck driver despite the filing of a separate civil action by the offended
parties against the employer of the truck driver?
2.....May the Court award damages to the offended parties in the criminal case despite the filing of a civil action against the
employer of the truck driver; and in amounts exceeding that alleged in the information for reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide and damage to property?[22]
We grant the petition, resolving under the circumstances pro hac vice to remand the cases to the trial court for determination of the civil
liability of petitioner as employer of the accused driver in the civil action quasi ex delicto re-opened for the purpose.
In negligence cases, the aggrieved party has the choice between (1) an action to enforce civil liability arising from crime under Article 100 of
the Revised Penal Code; and (2) a separate action for quasi delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Once the choice is
made, the injured party can not avail himself of any other remedy because he may not recover damages twice for the same negligent act or
omission of the accused.[23] This is the rule against double recovery.
In other words, "the same act or omission can create two kinds of liability on the part of the offender, that is, civil liability ex delicto, and civil
liability quasi delicto" either of which "may be enforced against the culprit, subject to the caveat under Article 2177 of the Civil Code that the
offended party can not recover damages under both types of liability."[24]
In the instant case, the offended parties elected to file a separate civil action for damages against petitioner as employer of the accused, based
on quasi delict, under Article 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Private respondents sued petitioner Rafael Reyes Trucking
Corporation, as the employer of the accused, to be vicariously liable for the fault or negligence of the latter. Under the law, this vicarious
liability of the employer is founded on at least two specific provisions of law.
The first is expressed in Article 2176 in relation to Article 2180 of the Civil Code, which would allow an action predicated on quasi-delict to
be instituted by the injured party against the employer for an act or omission of the employee and would necessitate only a preponderance of
evidence to prevail. Here, the liability of the employer for the negligent conduct of the subordinate is direct and primary, subject to the defense
of due diligence in the selection and supervision of the employee. The enforcement of the judgment against the employer in an action based on
Article 2176 does not require the employee to be insolvent since the nature of the liability of the employer with that of the employee, the two
being statutorily considered joint tortfeasors, is solidary.[25] The second, predicated on Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, provides that
an employer may be held subsidiarily civilly liable for a felony committed by his employee in the discharge of his duty. This liability attaches
when the employee is convicted of a crime done in the performance of his work and is found to be insolvent that renders him unable to
properly respond to the civil liability adjudged.[26]
As regards the first issue, the answer is in the negative. Rafael Reyes Trucking Corporation, as employer of the accused who has been
adjudged guilty in the criminal case for reckless imprudence, can not be held subsidiarily liable because of the filing of the separate civil
action based on quasi delict against it. In view of the reservation to file, and the subsequent filing of the civil action for recovery of civil
liability, the same was not instituted with the criminal action. Such separate civil action was for recovery of damages under Article 2176 of the
Civil Code, arising from the same act or omission of the accused.[27]
Pursuant to the provision of Rule 111, Section 1, paragraph 3 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, when private respondents, as
complainants in the criminal action, reserved the right to file the separate civil action, they waived other available civil actions predicated on
the same act or omission of the accused-driver. Such civil action includes the recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code, and
damages under Articles 32, 33, and 34 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same act or omission of the accused.[28]
The intention of private respondents to proceed primarily and directly against petitioner as employer of accused truck driver became clearer
when they did not ask for the dismissal of the civil action against the latter based on quasi delict.
Consequently, the Court of Appeals and the trial court erred in holding the accused civilly liable, and petitioner-employer of the accused
subsidiarily liable for damages arising from crime (ex delicto) in the criminal action as the offended parties in fact filed a separate civil action
against the employer based on quasi delict resulting in the waiver of the civil action ex delicto.
It might be argued that private respondents as complainants in the criminal case withdrew the reservation to file a civil action against the
driver (accused) and manifested that they would pursue the civil liability of the driver in the criminal action. However, the withdrawal is
ineffective to reverse the effect of the reservation earlier made because private respondents did not withdraw the civil action against petitioner
based on quasi delict. In such a case, the provision of Rule 111, Section 1, paragraph 3 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure is clear that
the reservation to file or the filing of a separate civil action results in a waiver of other available civil actions arising from the same act or
omission of the accused. Rule 111, Section 1, paragraph 2 enumerated what are the civil actions deemed waived upon such reservation or
filing, and one of which is the civil indemnity under the Revised Penal Code. Rule 111, Section 1, paragraph 3 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure specifically provides:
"A waiver of any of the civil actions extinguishes the others. The institution of, or the reservation of the right to file, any of
said civil actions separately waives the others."
The rationale behind this rule is the avoidance of multiple suits between the same litigants arising out of the same act or omission of the
offender. The restrictive phraseology of the section under consideration is meant to cover all kinds of civil actions, regardless of their source in
law, provided that the action has for its basis the same act or omission of the offender.[29]
However, petitioner as defendant in the separate civil action for damages filed against it, based on quasi delict, may be held liable thereon.
Thus, the trial court grievously erred in dismissing plaintiffs civil complaint. And the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial courts
decision. Unfortunately private respondents did not appeal from such dismissal and could not be granted affirmative relief.[30]
The Court, however, in exceptional cases has relaxed the rules "in order to promote their objectives and assist the parties in obtaining just,
speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action or proceeding"[31] or exempted "a particular case from the operation of the rules."[32]
Invoking this principle, we rule that the trial court erred in awarding civil damages in the criminal case and in dismissing the civil action.
Apparently satisfied with such award, private respondent did not appeal from the dismissal of the civil case. However, petitioner did appeal.
Hence, this case should be remanded to the trial court so that it may render decision in the civil case awarding damages as may be warranted
by the evidence.[33]
With regard to the second issue, the award of damages in the criminal case was improper because the civil action for the recovery of civil
liability was waived in the criminal action by the filing of a separate civil action against the employer. As enunciated in Ramos vs. Gonong,
[34] "civil indemnity is not part of the penalty for the crime committed." The only issue brought before the trial court in the criminal action is
whether accused Romeo Dunca y de Tumol is guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide and damage to property. The action for
recovery of civil liability is not included therein, but is covered by the separate civil action filed against the petitioner as employer of the
accused truck-driver.
In this case, accused-driver jumped bail pending his appeal from his conviction. Thus, the judgment convicting the accused became final and
executory, but only insofar as the penalty in the criminal action is concerned. The damages awarded in the criminal action was invalid because
of its effective waiver. The pronouncement was void because the action for recovery of the civil liability arising from the crime has been
waived in said criminal action.
With respect to the issue that the award of damages in the criminal action exceeded the amount of damages alleged in the amended
information, the issue is de minimis. At any rate, the trial court erred in awarding damages in the criminal case because by virtue of the
reservation of the right to bring a separate civil action or the filing thereof, "there would be no possibility that the employer would be held
liable because in such a case there would be no pronouncement as to the civil liability of the accused.[35]
As a final note, we reiterate that "the policy against double recovery requires that only one action be maintained for the same act or omission
whether the action is brought against the employee or against his employer.[36] The injured party must choose which of the available causes
of action for damages he will bring.[37]
Parenthetically, the trial court found the accused "guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Double Homicide Through Reckless
Imprudence with violation of the Motor Vehicle Law (Rep. Act No. 4136)." There is no such nomenclature of an offense under the Revised
Penal Code. Thus, the trial court was misled to sentence the accused "to suffer two (2) indeterminate penalties of four (4) months and one (1)
day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to three (3) years, six (6) months and twenty (20) days of prision correccional, as maximum." This is
erroneous because in reckless imprudence cases, the actual penalty for criminal negligence bears no relation to the individual willful crime or
crimes committed, but is set in relation to a whole class, or series of crimes.[38]
Unfortunately, we can no longer correct this judgment even if erroneous, as it is, because it has become final and executory.
Under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, criminal negligence "is treated as a mere quasi offense, and dealt with separately from willful
offenses. It is not a question of classification or terminology. In intentional crimes, the act itself is punished; in negligence or imprudence,
what is principally penalized is the mental attitude or condition behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight,
the imprudencia punible. Much of the confusion has arisen from the common use of such descriptive phrase as homicide through reckless
imprudence, and the like; when the strict technical sense is, more accurately, reckless imprudence resulting in homicide; or simple imprudence
causing damages to property."[39]
There is need, therefore, to rectify the designation of the offense without disturbing the imposed penalty for the guidance of bench and bar in
strict adherence to precedent.
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition and SETS ASIDE the amended decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R.
CR No. 14448, promulgated on January 6, 1997, and the joint decision of the Regional Trial Court, Isabela, Branch 19, Cauayan, in Criminal
Case No. Br. 19-311 and Civil Case No. Br. 19-424, dated June 6, 1992.
IN LIEU THEREOF, the Court renders judgment as follows:
(1) In Criminal Case No. Br. 19-311, the Court declares the accused Romeo Dunca y de Tumol guilty beyond reasonable doubt of reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide and damage to property, defined and penalized under Article 365, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code,
with violation of the automobile law (R. A. No. 4136, as amended), and sentences him to suffer two (2) indeterminate penalties of four (4)
months and one (1) day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to three (3) years, six (6) months and twenty (20) days of prision correccional, as
maximum,[40] without indemnity, and to pay the costs, and
(2) In Civil Case No. Br. 19-424, the Court orders the case re-opened to determine the liability of the defendant Rafael Reyes Trucking
Corporation to plaintiffs and that of plaintiffs on defendants counterclaim.
No costs in this instance.
SO ORDERED.
 [G.R. No. 122445. November 18, 1997]

DR. NINEVETCH CRUZ, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and LYDIA UMALI, respondents.

DECISION

FRANCISCO, J.:

"Doctors are protected by a special law. They are not guarantors of care. They do not even warrant a good result. They are not insurers against
mishap or unusual consequences. Furthermore they are not liable for honest mistake of judgment"[1]

The present case against petitioner is in the nature of a medical malpractice suit, which in simplest term is the type of claim which a
victim has available to him or her to redress a wrong committed by a medical professional which has cause bodily harm.[2] In this
jurisdiction, however, such claims are most often brought as a civil action for damages under Article 2176 of the Civil Code,[3] and in some
instances, as a criminal case under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code[4] with which the civil action for damages is impliedly instituted. It
is via the latter type of action that the heirs of the deceased sought redress for the petitioner's alleged imprudence and negligence in treating
the deceased thereby causing her death. The petitioner and one Dr. Lina Ercillo who was the attending anaesthesiologist during the operation
of the deceased were charged with "reckless imprudence and negligence resulting to (sic) homicide" in an information which reads:
"That on or about March 23, 1991, in the City of San Pablo, Republic of the Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the accused abovenamed, being then the attending anaesthesiologist and surgeon, respectively, did then and there, in a negligence (sic),
careless, imprudent, and incompetent manner, and failing to supply or store sufficient provisions and facilities necessary to meet any and all
exigencies apt to arise before, during and/or after a surgical operation causing by such negligence, carelessness, imprudence, and
incompetence, and causing by such failure, including the lack of preparation and foresight needed to avert a tragedy, the untimely death of
said Lydia Umali on the day following said surgical operation."[5]

Trial ensued after both the petitioner and Dr. Lina Ercillo pleaded not guilty to the above-mentioned charge. On March 4, 1994, the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of San Pablo City rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which is hereunder quoted as
follows:
"WHEREFORE, the court finds the accused Dr. Lina Ercillo not guilty of the offense charged for insufficiency of evidence while her co-
accused Dra. Ninevetch Cruz is hereby held responsible for the death of Lydia Umali on March 24, 1991, and therefore guilty under Art. 365
of the Revised Penal Code, and she is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of 2 months and 1 day imprisonment of arresto mayor with
costs."[6]

The petitioner appealed her conviction to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) which affirmed in toto the decision of the MTCC[7] prompting the
petitioner to file a petition for review with the Court of Appeals but to no avail. Hence this petition for review on certiorari assailing the
decision promulgated by the Court of Appeals on October 24, 1995 affirming petitioner's conviction with modification that she is further
directed to pay the heirs of Lydia Umali P50,000.00 as indemnity for her death.[8]

In substance, the petition brought before this Court raises the issue of whether or not petitioner's conviction of the crime of reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide, arising from an alleged medical malpractice, is supported by the evidence on record.

First the antecedent facts.

On March 22, 1991, prosecution witness, Rowena Umali De Ocampo, accompanied her mother to the Perpetual Help Clinic and General
Hospital situated in Balagtas Street, San Pablo City, Laguna. They arrived at the said hospital at around 4:30 in the afternoon of the same day.
[9] Prior to March 22, 1991, Lydia was examined by the petitioner who found a "myoma"[10] in her uterus, and scheduled her for a
hysterectomy operation on March 23, 1991.[11] Rowena and her mother slept in the clinic on the evening of March 22, 1991 as the latter was
to be operated on the next day at 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon.[12] According to Rowena, she noticed that the clinic was untidy and the
window and the floor were very dusty prompting her to ask the attendant for a rag to wipe the window and the floor with.[13] Because of the
untidy state of the clinic, Rowena tried to persuade her mother not to proceed with the operation. [14] The following day, before her mother
was wheeled into the operating room, Rowena asked the petitioner if the operation could be postponed. The petitioner called Lydia into her
office and the two had a conversation. Lydia then informed Rowena that the petitioner told her that she must be operated on as scheduled.[15]

Rowena and her other relatives, namely her husband, her sister and two aunts waited outside the operating room while Lydia underwent
operation. While they were waiting, Dr. Ercillo went out of the operating room and instructed them to buy tagamet ampules which Rowena's
sister immediately bought. About one hour had passed when Dr. Ercillo came out again this time to ask them to buy blood for Lydia. They
bought type "A" blood from the St. Gerald Blood Bank and the same was brought by the attendant into the operating room. After the lapse of a
few hours, the petitioner informed them that the operation was finished. The operating staff then went inside the petitioner's clinic to take their
snacks. Some thirty minutes after, Lydia was brought out of the operating room in a stretcher and the petitioner asked Rowena and the other
relatives to buy additional blood for Lydia. Unfortunately, they were not able to comply with petitioner's order as there was no more type "A"
blood available in the blood bank. Thereafter, a person arrived to donate blood which was later transfused to Lydia. Rowena then noticed her
mother, who was attached to an oxygen tank, gasping for breath. Apparently the oxygen supply had run out and Rowena's husband together
with the driver of the accused had to go to the San Pablo District Hospital to get oxygen. Lydia was given the fresh supply of oxygen as soon
as it arrived.[16] But at around 10:00 o'clock P.M. she went into shock and her blood pressure dropped to 60/50. Lydia's unstable condition
necessitated her transfer to the San Pablo District Hospital so she could be connected to a respirator and further examined. [17] The transfer to
the San Pablo City District Hospital was without the prior consent of Rowena nor of the other relatives present who found out about the
intended transfer only when an ambulance arrived to take Lydia to the San Pablo District Hospital. Rowena and her other relatives then
boarded a tricycle and followed the ambulance.[18]

Upon Lydia's arrival at the San Pablo District Hospital, she was wheeled into the operating room and the petitioner and Dr. Ercillo re-
operated on her because there was blood oozing from the abdominal incision.[19] The attending physicians summoned Dr. Bartolome
Angeles, head of the Obstetrics and Gynecology Department of the San Pablo District Hospital. However, when Dr. Angeles arrived, Lydia
was already in shock and possibly dead as her blood pressure was already 0/0. Dr. Angeles then informed petitioner and Dr. Ercillo that there
was nothing he could do to help save the patient.[20] While petitioner was closing the abdominal wall, the patient died.[21] Thus, on March
24, 1991, at 3:00 o'clock in the morning, Lydia Umali was pronounced dead. Her death certificate states "shock" as the immediate cause of
death and "Disseminated Intravascular Coagulation (DIC)" as the antecedent cause.[22]

In convicting the petitioner, the MTCC found the following circumstances as sufficient basis to conclude that she was indeed negligent
in the performance of the operation:
"x x x, the clinic was untidy, there was lack of provision like blood and oxygen to prepare for any contingency that might happen during the
operation. The manner and the fact that the patient was brought to the San Pablo District Hospital for reoperation indicates that there was
something wrong in the manner in which Dra. Cruz conducted the operation. There was no showing that before the operation, accused Dr.
Cruz had conducted a cardio pulmonary clearance or any typing of the blood of the patient. It was (sic) said in medical parlance that the
"abdomen of the person is a temple of surprises" because you do not know the whole thing the moment it was open (sic) and surgeon must be
prepared for any eventuality thereof. The patient (sic) chart which is a public document was not presented because it is only there that we
could determine the condition of the patient before the surgery. The court also noticed in Exh. "F-1" that the sister of the deceased wished to
postpone the operation but the patient was prevailed upon by Dra. Cruz to proceed with the surgery. The court finds that Lydia Umali died
because of the negligence and carelessness of the surgeon Dra. Ninevetch Cruz because of loss of blood during the operation of the deceased
for evident unpreparedness and for lack of skill, the reason why the patient was brought for operation at the San Pablo City District Hospital.
As such, the surgeon should answer for such negligence. With respect to Dra. Lina Ercillo, the anaesthesiologist, there is no evidence to
indicate that she should be held jointly liable with Dra. Cruz who actually did the operation."[23]

The RTC reiterated the abovementioned findings of the MTCC and upheld the latter's declaration of "incompetency, negligence and lack
of foresight and skill of appellant (herein petitioner) in handling the subject patient before and after the operation."[24] And likewise affirming
the petitioner's conviction, the Court of Appeals echoed similar observations, thus:
"x x x. While we may grant that the untidiness and filthiness of the clinic may not by itself indicate negligence, it nevertheless shows the
absence of due care and supervision over her subordinate employees. Did this unsanitary condition permeate the operating room? Were the
surgical instruments properly sterilized? Could the conditions in the OR have contributed to the infection of the patient? Only the petitioner
could answer these, but she opted not to testify. This could only give rise to the presumption that she has nothing good to testify on her
defense. Anyway, the alleged "unverified statement of the prosecution witness" remains unchallenged and unrebutted.
Likewise undisputed is the prosecution's version indicating the following facts: that the accused asked the patient's relatives to buy Tagamet
capsules while the operation was already in progress; that after an hour, they were also asked to buy type "A" blood for the patient; that after
the surgery, they were again asked to procure more type "A" blood, but such was not anymore available from the source; that the oxygen
given to the patient was empty; and that the son-in-law of the patient, together with a driver of the petitioner, had to rush to the San Pablo City
District Hospital to get the much-needed oxygen. All these conclusively show that the petitioner had not prepared for any unforeseen
circumstances before going into the first surgery, which was not emergency in nature, but was elective or pre-scheduled; she had no ready
antibiotics, no prepared blood, properly typed and cross-matched, and no sufficient oxygen supply.
Moreover, there are a lot of questions that keep nagging Us. Was the patient given any cardio-pulmonary clearance, or at least a clearance by
an internist, which are standard requirements before a patient is subjected to surgery. Did the petitioner determine as part of the pre-operative
evaluation, the bleeding parameters of the patient, such as bleeding time and clotting time? There is no showing that these were done. The
petitioner just appears to have been in a hurry to perform the operation, even as the family wanted the postponement to April 6, 1991.
Obviously, she did not prepare the patient; neither did she get the family's consent to the operation. Moreover, she did not prepare a medical
chart with instructions for the patient's care. If she did all these, proof thereof should have been offered. But there is none. Indeed, these are
overwhelming evidence of recklessness and imprudence."[25]

This court, however, holds differently and finds the foregoing circumstances insufficient to sustain a judgment of conviction against the
petitioner for the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. The elements of reckless imprudence are: (1) that the offender does or
fails to do an act; (2) that the doing or the failure to do that act is voluntary; (3) that it be without malice; (4) that material damage results from
the reckless imprudence; and (5) that there is inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the offender, taking into consideration his
employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition, and other circumstances regarding persons, time and place.
 Whether or not a physician has committed an "inexcusable lack of precaution" in the treatment of his patient is to be determined
according to the standard of care observed by other members of the profession in good standing under similar circumstances bearing in mind
the advanced state of the profession at the time of treatment or the present state of medical science.[26] In the recent case of Leonila Garcia-
Rueda v. Wilfred L. Pacasio, et. al.,[27] this Court stated that in accepting a case, a doctor in effect represents that, having the needed training
and skill possessed by physicians and surgeons practicing in the same field, he will employ such training, care and skill in the treatment of his
patients. He therefore has a duty to use at least the same level of care that any other reasonably competent doctor would use to treat a
condition under the same circumstances. It is in this aspect of medical malpractice that expert testimony is essential to establish not only the
standard of care of the profession but also that the physician's conduct in the treatment and care falls below such standard. [28] Further,
inasmuch as the causes of the injuries involved in malpractice actions are determinable only in the light of scientific knowledge, it has been
recognized that expert testimony is usually necessary to support the conclusion as to causation.[29]

Immediately apparent from a review of the records of this case is the absence of any expert testimony on the matter of the standard of
care employed by other physicians of good standing in the conduct of similar operations. The prosecution's expert witnesses in the persons of
Dr. Floresto Arizala and Dr. Nieto Salvador, Jr. of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) only testified as to the possible cause of death
but did not venture to illuminate the court on the matter of the standard of care that petitioner should have exercised.

All three courts below bewail the inadequacy of the facilities of the clinic and its untidiness; the lack of provisions such as blood,
oxygen, and certain medicines; the failure to subject the patient to a cardio-pulmonary test prior to the operation; the omission of any form of
blood typing before transfusion; and even the subsequent transfer of Lydia to the San Pablo Hospital and the reoperation performed on her by
the petitioner. But while it may be true that the circumstances pointed out by the courts below seemed beyond cavil to constitute reckless
imprudence on the part of the surgeon, this conclusion is still best arrived at not through the educated surmises nor conjectures of laymen,
including judges, but by the unquestionable knowledge of expert witnesses. For whether a physician or surgeon has exercised the requisite
degree of skill and care in the treatment of his patient is, in the generality of cases, a matter of expert opinion. [30] The deference of courts to
the expert opinion of qualified physicians stems from its realization that the latter possess unusual technical skills which laymen in most
instances are incapable of intelligently evaluating.[31] Expert testimony should have been offered to prove that the circumstances cited by the
courts below are constitutive of conduct falling below the standard of care employed by other physicians in good standing when performing
the same operation. It must be remembered that when the qualifications of a physician are admitted, as in the instant case, there is an
inevitable presumption that in proper cases he takes the necessary precaution and employs the best of his knowledge and skill in attending to
his clients, unless the contrary is sufficiently established.[32] This presumption is rebuttable by expert opinion which is so sadly lacking in the
case at bench.

Even granting arguendo that the inadequacy of the facilities and untidiness of the clinic; the lack of provisions; the failure to conduct
pre-operation tests on the patient; and the subsequent transfer of Lydia to the San Pablo Hospital and the reoperation performed on her by the
petitioner do indicate, even without expert testimony, that petitioner was recklessly imprudent in the exercise of her duties as a surgeon, no
cogent proof exists that any of these circumstances caused petitioner's death. Thus, the absence of the fourth element of reckless imprudence:
that the injury to the person or property was a consequence of the reckless imprudence.

In litigations involving medical negligence, the plaintiff has the burden of establishing appellant's negligence and for a reasonable
conclusion of negligence, there must be proof of breach of duty on the part of the surgeon as well as a casual connection of such breach and
the resulting death of his patient.[33] In Chan Lugay v. St Luke's Hospital, Inc.,[34] where the attending physician was absolved of liability for
the death of the complainant's wife and newborn baby, this court held that:
"In order that there may be a recovery for an injury, however, it must be shown that the 'injury for which recovery is sought must be the
legitimate consequence of the wrong done; the connection between the negligence and the injury must be a direct and natural sequence of
events, unbroken by intervening efficient causes.' In other words, the negligence must be the proximate cause of the injury. For, 'negligence,
no matter in what it consists, cannot create a right of action unless it is the proximate cause of the injury complained of. ' And 'the proximate
cause of an injury is that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury,
and without which the result would not have occurred.'''[35] (Underscoring supplied.)
Dr. Arizala who conducted an autopsy on the body of the deceased summarized his findings as follows:
"Atty. Cachero:
Q. You mentioned about your Autopsy Report which has been marked as Exh. "A-1-b". There appears here a signature above the
typewritten name Floresto Arizala, Jr., whose signature is that?
A. That is my signature, sir.
Q. Do you affirm the truth of all the contents of Exh. "A-1-b"?
A. Only as to the autopsy report no. 91-09, the time and place and everything after the post mortem findings, sir.
Q. You mentioned on your "Post Mortem Findings" about surgical incision, 14:0 cm., infraumbilical area, anterior abdominal area,
midline, will you please explain that in your own language?
A. There was incision wound (sic) the area just below the navel, sir.
Q. And the last paragraph of the postmortem findings which I read: Uterus, pear-shaped and pale measuring 7.5 x 5.5 x 5.0 cm,
with some surface nodulation of the fundic area posteriorly. Cut-section shows diffusely pale myometrium with areas of streak
 induration. The ovaries and adnexal structures are missing with the raw surfaces patched with clotted blood. Surgical sutures
were noted on the operative site.
Intestines and mesenteries are pale with blood clots noted between the mesentric folds.
Hemoperitonium: 300 s.s.,
right paracolic gutter,
50 c.c., left paracolic gutter
200 c.c., mesentric area,
100 c.c., right pelvic gutter
stomach empty.
Other visceral organs, pale.',
will you please explain that on (sic) your own language or in ordinary
A. There was a uterus which was not attached to the adnexal structures namely ovaries which were not present and also sign of
previous surgical operation and there were (sic) clotted blood, sir.
Q. How about the ovaries and adnexal structures?
A. They are missing, sir.
Q. You mean to say there are no ovaries?
A. During that time there are no ovaries, sir.
Q. And there were likewise sign of surgical sutures?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. How about the intestines and mesenteries are place (sic) with blood clots noted between the mesenteric folds, will you please
explain on (sic) this?
A. In the peritoneal cavity, they are mostly perritonial blood.
Q. And what could have caused this blood?
A. Well, ordinarily blood is found inside the blood vessel. Blood were (sic) outside as a result of the injuries which destroyed the
integrity of the vessel allowing blood to sip (sic) out, sir.
Q. By the nature of the postmortem findings indicated in Exh. A-1-B, can you tell the court the cause of death?
A. Yes, sir. The cause of death is: Gross findings are compatible with hemorrhagic shock.
Q. Can you tell the us what could have caused this hemorrhagic shock?
A. Well hemorrhagic shock is the result of blood loss.
Q. What could have the effect of that loss of blood?
A. Unattended hemorrhage, sir.[36] (Underscoring supplied.)
The foregoing was corroborated by Dr. Nieto Salvador:
"Q. And were you able to determine the cause of death by virtue of the examination of the specimen submitted by Dr. Arizala?
A. Without knowledge of the autopsy findings it would be difficult for me to determine the cause of death, sir.
Q. Have you examined the post mortem of Dr. Arizala?
A. Yes, sir, and by virtue of the autopsy report in connection with your pathology report.
Q. What could have caused the death of the victim?
A. This pathologic examination are (sic) compatible with the person who died, sir.
Q. Will you explain to us the meaning of hemorrhagic compatible?
A. It means that a person died of blood loss. Meaning a person died of non-replacement of blood and so the victim before she died
there was shock of diminish of blood of the circulation. She died most probably before the actual complete blood loss, sir.
Court: Is it possible doctor that the loss of the blood was due on (sic) operation?
A. Based on my pathology findings, sir.
Q. What could have caused this loss of blood?
A. Many, sir. A patient who have undergone surgery. Another may be a blood vessel may be cut while on operation and this cause
(sic) bleeding, or may be set in the course of the operation, or may be (sic) he died after the operation. Of course there are
other cause (sic).
Atty. Cachero:
Q. Especially so doctor when there was no blood replacement?
A. Yes, sir."[37] (Underscoring supplied.)

The testimonies of both doctors establish hemorrhage or hemorrhagic shock as the cause of death. However, as likewise testified to by
the expert witnesses in open court, hemorrhage or hemorrhagic shock during surgery may be caused by several different factors. Thus, Dr.
Salvador's elaboration on the matter:
 "Atty. Pascual:
Q. Doctor, among the causes of hemorrhage that you mentioned you said that it could be at the moment of operation when one
losses (sic) control of the presence, is that correct? During the operation there is lost (sic) of control of the cut vessel?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Or there is a failure to ligate a vessel of considerable size?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Or even if the vessel were ligated the knot may have slipped later on?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And you also mentioned that it may be possible also to some clotting defect, is that correct?
A. May be (sic)."[38] (Underscoring supplied).
Defense witness, Dr. Bu C. Castro also gave the following expert opinion:
"Q. Doctor even a patient after an operations (sic) would suffer hemorrage what would be the possible causes of such hemorrage
(sic)?
A. Among those would be what we call Intravascular Coagulation and this is the reason for the bleeding, sir, which cannot be
prevented by anyone, it will happen to anyone, anytime and to any persons (sic), sir.
COURT:
What do you think of the cause of the bleeding, the cutting or the operations done in the body?
A. Not related to this one, the bleeding here is not related to any cutting or operation that I (sic) have done.
Q. Aside from the DIC what could another causes (sic) that could be the cause for the hemorrhage or bleeding in a patient by an
operations (sic)?
A. In general sir, if there was an operations (sic) and it is possible that the ligature in the suture was (sic) become (sic) loose, it is
(sic) becomes loose if proven.
xxxxxxxxx
Q. If the person who performed an autopsy does not find any untight (sic) clot (sic) blood vessel or any suture that become (sic)
loose the cause of the bleeding could not be attributed to the fault of the subject?
A. Definitely, sir."[39] (Underscoring supplied.)
According to both doctors, the possible causes of hemorrhage during an operation are: (1) the failure of the surgeon to tie or suture a cut
blood vessel; (2) allowing a cut blood vessel to get out of control; (3) the subsequent loosening of the tie or suture applied to a cut blood
vessel; and (4) and a clotting defect known as DIC. It is significant to state at this juncture that the autopsy conducted by Dr. Arizala on the
body of Lydia did not reveal any untied or unsutured cut blood vessel nor was there any indication that the tie or suture of a cut blood vessel
had become loose thereby causing the hemorrhage.[40] Hence the following pertinent portion of Dr. Arizala's testimony:
"Q: Doctor, in examining these structures did you know whether these were sutured ligature or plain ligature
A: Ligature, sir.
Q: We will explain that later on. Did you recall if the cut structures were tied by first suturing it and then tying a knot or the tie was
merely placed around the cut structure and tied?
A: I cannot recall, sir.
Q: As a matter of fact, you cannot recall because you did not even bothered (sic) to examine, is that correct?
A: Well, I bothered enough to know that they were sutured, sir.
Q: So, therefore, Doctor, you would not know whether any of the cut structures were not sutured or tied neither were you able to
determine whether any loose suture was found in the peritoneal cavity?
A: I could not recall any loose sutured (sic), sir."[41]
On the other hand, the findings of all three doctors do not preclude the probability that DIC caused the hemorrhage and consequently,
Lydia's death. DIC which is a clotting defect creates a serious bleeding tendency and when massive DIC occurs as a complication of surgery
leaving raw surface, major hemorrhage occurs.[42] And as testified to by defense witness, Dr. Bu C. Castro, hemorrhage due to DIC "cannot
be prevented, it will happen to anyone, anytime."[43] He testified further:
"Q. Now, under the circumstance one of the possibility as you mentioned in (sic) DIC?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And you mentioned that it cannot be prevented?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Can you even predict if it really happen (sic)?
A. Possible, sir.
Q. Are there any specific findings of autopsy that will tell you whether this patient suffered among such things as DIC?
A. Well, I did reserve because of the condition of the patient.
 Q. Now, Doctor you said that you went through the record of the deceased Lydia Umali looking for the chart, the operated (sic)
records, the post mortem findings on the histophanic (sic) examination based on your examination of record, doctor, can you
more or less says (sic) what part are (sic) concerned could have been the caused (sic) of death of this Lydia Umali?
A. As far as the medical record is concern (sic) the caused (sic) of death is dessimulated (sic) Intra Vascular Coagulation or the DIC
which resulted to hemorrhage or bleedings, sir.
Q. Doctor based on your findings then there is knowing (sic) the doctor would say whether the doctor her (sic) has been (sic) fault?
ATTY. MALVEDA:
We will moved (sic) to strike out the (sic) based on finding they just read the chart as well as the other record.
ATTY. PASCUAL:
Precisely based on this examination.
ATTY. MALVEDA:
Not finding, there was no finding made.
COURT:
He is only reading the record.
ATTY. PASCUAL:
Yes, sir.
A. No, sir, there is no fault on the part of the surgeon, sir." [44]
This court has no recourse but to rely on the expert testimonies rendered by both prosecution and defense witnesses that substantiate
rather than contradict petitioner's allegation that the cause of Lydia's death was DIC which, as attested to by an expert witness, cannot be
attributed to the petitioner's fault or negligence. The probability that Lydia's death was caused by DIC was unrebutted during trial and has
engendered in the mind of this Court a reasonable doubt as to the petitioner's guilt. Thus, her acquittal of the crime of reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide. While we condole with the family of Lydia Umali, our hands are bound by the dictates of justice and fair dealing which
hold inviolable the right of an accused to be presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Nevertheless, this Court finds
the petitioner civilly liable for the death of Lydia Umali, for while a conviction of a crime requires proof beyond reasonable doubt, only a
preponderance of evidence is required to establish civil liability.[45]

The petitioner is a doctor in whose hands a patient puts his life and limb. For insufficiency of evidence this Court was not able to
render a sentence of conviction but it is not blind to the reckless and imprudent manner in which the petitioner carried out her duties. A
precious life has been lost and the circumstances leading thereto exacerbated the grief of those left behind. The heirs of the deceased continue
to feel the loss of their mother up to the present time[46] and this Court is aware that no amount of compassion and commiseration nor words
of bereavement can suffice to assuage the sorrow felt for the loss of a loved one. Certainly, the award of moral and exemplary damages in
favor of the heirs of Lydia Umali are proper in the instant case.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, petitioner DR. NINEVETCH CRUZ is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime of reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide but is ordered to pay the heirs of the deceased Lydia Umali the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS ( P50,000.00) as
civil liability, ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P100,000.00) as moral damages, and FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) as
exemplary damages.

Let the copy of this decision be furnished to the Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) for appropriate action.

SO ORDERED.
 [G.R. No. 124670. June 21, 2000]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. PATROLMAN DOMINGO BELBES, accused-appellant.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
Before the Regional Trial Court of Tabaco, Albay, Branch 18, Patrolman Domingo Belbes stood charged of Murder. The information against
him reads:
"That on or about the 16th of February, 1990 at 9:00 oclock in the evening, more or less, inside the campus of Pili National
High School, at Barangay Pili, Municipality of Bacacay, Province of Albay, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with treachery, taking advantage of nighttime, employing means to insure or
afford impunity, with the use of high powered firearm, and with intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully,
feloniously, suddenly, unexpectedly and without any warning, attack, fire and shoot successively with an armalite rifle (M-
16) FERNANDO B. BATALLER while the latter was intoxicated, thereby hitting and inflicting upon him multiple serious
and mortal wounds on his head, at the right lower face, the chest (front) at the left antero lateral approximately 5 cm. below
but lateral to the left nipple, at the left lateral waistline, thereby lacerating the liver, hitting the stomach portions of the large
and small intestines and lower vertebrae, and the chest (back) at the middle back and another at the left back, lateral level of
the lower rib, which caused Fernando B. Batallers direct and instantaneous death, to the damage and prejudice of his legal
heirs.
ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW."[1]
When arraigned, he pleaded not guilty.
The facts established during trial by the prosecution is summarized by the appellee in its brief, thus:
"In the evening of February 16, 1990, appellant Pat. Domingo Belbes and Pat. Jose Pabon were assigned by the Bacacay
Station Commander to maintain peace and order at the Junior and Senior Prom of Pili Barangay High School, Pili, Bacacay,
Albay.
Around 9:00 p.m. while Teacher-In-Charge Mila Ulanca, appellant, Pat. Pabon and Elmo Bes were watching the dance, two
students, Riselle Banares and Juliana Basaysay, approached Mrs. Ulanca and said "Mam, it seems that there is somebody
making trouble." Appellant and Pat. Pabon, armed with an armalite rifle and a .38 caliber revolver, respectively, responded
forthwith. Moments after the two police officers left, bursts of gunfire-- "Rat-tat-tat-tat-tat" filled the air. Fernando Bataller,
a graduating student of Pili Barangay High School, was hit on different parts of his body and died.
Moments before the gruesome incident, Fernando Bataller, then drunk, was in the company of Carlito Bataller and Rosalio
Belista. While Fernando was vomiting and holding on to the bamboo wall of the schools temporary building, the bamboo
splits broke. At this instance, appellant and Pat. Pabon appeared. Without warning, appellant fired his gun. Fernando
slumped on the ground, bathed with his own blood. Appellant and Pat. Pabon fled from the crime scene.
Fernando was pronounced dead on arrival at the hospital. As shown in the autopsy report, Fernando suffered the following
gunshot wounds: (1) head, located at the right lower face, skin, muscles, blood vessels, nerves, bone torn away; (2) chest
(front, located at left, antero lateral approximately 5 cm. below but lateral to the left nipple, another gunshot wound on the
same location with tattooing located at left lateral waistline; (3) chest (back) located at the middle back at the level of the
lowest rib, skin and superficial muscles torn away, another gunshot wound located at the left back, lateral level of the lowest
rib, with tattooing. (Citations omitted)"[2]
In his defense, the accused-appellant presented his version of the fatal incident, summed up by the trial court as follows:
"The accused, Domingo Belbes in his defense testified that he was at Pili Barangay High School with P/Cpl. Jose Pabon
because they were detailed by their Station Commander. x x x At 9:00 p.m. two female students reported to them and Mrs.
Ulanca that somebody was making trouble at the back of the temporary building. They were requested by Mrs. Ulanca to
see what happened and they went to the place. There they came upon somebody who was making trouble and destroying the
wall of the temporary building. He came to know that it was Fernando Bataller. Fernando Bataller had some companions,
Carlito Bataller and certain Belista. Fernando Bataller was more than 20 years old at that time and Carlito was about
Fernandos age. He saw Fernando destroying the wall of the temporary building which was made of bamboo splits. Pabon
was in front of him. The two companions were prevailing upon Fernando. Fernando was drunk or a little bit tipsy. He was
not vomiting but he smelled of wine. They approached Fernando and identified themselves as policemen. Fernando did not
mind them. Fernando stabbed Pabon with a knife. Belbes knew because he saw the glint of the blade when the thrust was
made on Pabon. Pabon and Bataller were about one (1) meter away from each other. Pabon was not hit, for he was able to
move backward. Fernando made two thrusts on Pabon. After Pabon retreated because of the knife thrusts, he (Belbes) was
also stabbed by Fernando. He was hit on his lower left shoulder. He was able to hold Fernandos hand because he wanted to
get the knife from him. His firearm was slung on his shoulder. Fernando was able to free himself. Fernando made another
thrust and Belbes moved to his left. Then he made a warning shot. After the warning shot, Fernando suddenly grabbed his
firearm. Belista was quite aggressive at that moment, while Carlito wanted to kick him. Fernando was able to hold the barrel
of the armalite. They struggled with each other and the gun went off considering that his armalite was semi-automatic, with
one squeeze of the trigger one shot came out. During the process of grappling for the armalite he could not recall how many
 shots came out. When his service armalite went off he saw Fernando fall to the ground. When Fernando fell, he took the
knife from his hand. The people gathered around them. They asked that Fernando be brought to the hospital. After one hour,
the police mobile car arrived. They proceeded to the Police Station. There they turned over the knife to the Desk Officer.
The knife is now with the Provincial Command."[3]
Defense witness Jose Pabon, also a policeman, who was present when the incident happened, corroborated the testimony of the appellant.
However, on cross-examination, Pabon belied the fact that the appellant fired a warning shot. Pabon likewise failed to mention anything about
aggression on the part of the companions of the deceased, namely Carlito Bataller and Rosalio Belista. He only recalled that said companions
ganged up on Belbes after he shot the deceased.
Finding the defense weak, while the evidence for the prosecution sufficiently strong, the trial court convicted the appellant of murder and
sentenced him to reclusion perpetua.
In this appeal, counsel de oficio raised one issue:
WAS THE TRIAL [Court] CORRECT IN HOLDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY OF MURDER?[4]
We shall now consider this matter as well as the more basic issues of self-defense claimed by appellant and the credibility of the witness for
the prosecution. Appellant policeman admits firing the fatal gunshots that hit the deceased student. But he claims that he did so in self-defense.
He contends that he was only performing his official functions when he responded in the course of police duties to the information that
somebody was making trouble and disturbing the peace. Being in charge of maintaining peace and order within the vicinity, he ascertained the
veracity of the information given by the students concerned. He asserts that in the absence of intent and voluntariness, he cannot be faulted for
the death of the deceased.
At the outset, we note that appellant questions the credibility of the sole eye-witness for the prosecution, Carlito Bataller. He states that Carlito
is the cousin and friend of the deceased. In his view, Carlito had strong motive to falsely testify against him. Moreover, appellant says that
Carlito kindled some moral guilt because he contributed to the sudden death of his cousin. Appellant alleges that if only Carlito had prevailed
over Fernando (instead of tolerating the hostility of the deceased), he could have prevented the shooting incident.
Regrettably, appellant offers no material evidence to sufficiently support his claim of self-defense on the face of mortal danger while on police
duty. The cross-examination of Carlito Bataller did not bear out his averments of fraternal bias and psychological guilt or moral taint in
Carlitos testimony. The testimony of the single witness, if positive and clear, is sufficient to sustain a judgment of conviction, even in a charge
for murder.[5] Moreover, when the issue boils down to the credibility of witnesses, the findings of the trial court deserve great respect since it
is in a better position to observe the demeanor of the witnesses while testifying in court, and to discern its dimensions, both verbal and non-
verbal.[6] The relationship of a witness to the victim does not necessarily diminish the formers credibility.[7]
It is a settled rule that the findings and conclusions of the trial court on the credibility of a witness deserve respect because it is in a better
position to determine whether the witness was telling the truth or not, having observed the demeanor of the witness while testifying on the
witness stand.[8] In the case at bar, there appears to be no cogent reason why we should not adhere to this rule.
Where the accused owns up to killing the victim in self-defense, the burden of evidence shifts to him. He must show by clear and convincing
evidence that he indeed acted in self-defense, or in defense of a relative or a stranger.[9] To prove self-defense, the accused must show with
clear and convincing evidence, that: (1) he is not the unlawful aggressor; (2) there was lack of sufficient provocation on his part; and (3) he
employed reasonable means to prevent or repel the aggression. Self-defense, like alibi, is a defense which can easily be concocted. It is well
settled in this jurisdiction that once an accused had admitted that he inflicted the fatal injuries on the deceased, it was incumbent upon him, in
order to avoid criminal liability, to prove the justifying circumstance claimed by him with clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence. He
cannot rely on the weakness of the prosecution but on the strength of his own evidence, "for even if the evidence of the prosecution were weak
it could not be disbelieved after the accused himself had admitted the killing."[10]
Appellant testified that upon responding to the report of two students, he and Patrolman Pabon, saw Fernando Bataller destroying the bamboo
wall of the schools temporary building. Fernando appeared to be drunk and a little bit tipsy. They approached Fernando and identified
themselves as policemen but the former ignored them. Instead, Fernando lunged with a knife at Patrolman Pabon but the latter avoided the
thrust. Afterwards, Fernando also stabbed the appellant and hit his left shoulder. As another thrust was coming, appellant claims he fired a
warning shot. Fernando grabbed the armalite and they struggled until the gun went off hitting Fernando, according to appellant.
We have serious questions on accused-appellants claim of self-defense, on his part, against the alleged aggressiveness of the deceased student.
First, why was the knife allegedly used by the deceased mis-handled? It was not even subjected to fingerprinting. Second, why was the wound
on appellants shoulder medically examined only after the lapse of more than twenty-one hours? Was it possibly self-inflicted? According to
the doctor who examined him, Dr. Evelyn Amador, it was a possibility.[11] Lastly, as observed by the trial court, if it was true that they
grappled face to face with each other, why was the victim hit sideways, as testified to by Amador?
The time factor here appears significant. Mrs. Mila Ulanca testified that it only took about six seconds from the time Patrolman Belbes left his
seat until she heard the burst of gunshots.[12]This testimony is not contradicted or rebutted.
Thus, appellants claim of self-defense could not prosper. The evidence on record, however, reveals an incomplete justifying circumstance
defined in Article 11, paragraph number 5 of the Revised Penal Code.[13] A person incurs no criminal liability when he acts in the fulfillment
of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office. But we must stress there are two requisites for this justifying circumstance: (a) that the
offender acted in the performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right: and (b) that the injury or
offense committed be the necessary consequence of the due performance of such right or office.[14] In the instant case, only the first requisite
is present; admittedly appellant acted in the performance of his duty. However, the second requisite is lacking, for the killing need not be a
necessary consequence of the performance of his duty. His duty is to maintain peace and order during the Junior and Senior Prom. But he
exceeded such duty, in our view, when he fired his armalite without warning. No doubt, the concept of mitigating circumstances is founded on
leniency in favor of an accused who has shown less perversity in the commission of an offense.[15] Though his protestation of innocence is
unavailing, his offense could only be characterized as homicide, not murder, as hereafter shown.
On one hand, treachery did not attend the commission of the crime as to rule out murder. Treachery cannot be presumed but must be proved
by clear and convincing evidence as conclusively as the killing itself. For the same to be considered as a qualifying circumstance, two
conditions must concur: (a) the employment of means, method or manner of execution which would ensure the safety of the malefactor from
defensive or retaliatory acts on the part of the victim, no opportunity being given the latter to defend himself or to retaliate; and (b) the means,
method or manner of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted by the offender.[16] There is no showing that the shooting was
premeditated or that appellant, in shooting the victim, employed means, methods or forms to ensure its execution, without risk to himself
arising from the defense which the offended victim might make. Likewise, mere suddenness of the attack does not necessarily imply treachery.
[17]
On the other hand, the offense is definitely not reckless imprudence resulting in homicide because the shooting was intentional.
[18] Illustrations of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide are: (1) exhibiting a loaded revolver to a friend, who was killed by the
accidental discharge brought about by negligent handling;[19] or (2) discharging a firearm from the window of ones house and killing a
neighbor who just at the moment leaned over the balcony front;[20] or (3) where the defendant, to stop a fist fight, fired his .45 caliber pistol
twice in the air, and, as the bout continued, he fired another shot at the ground, but the bullet ricocheted and hit a bystander who died soon
thereafter.[21] In this case, appellant intended to fire AT the victim, and in fact hit ONLY the victim.
We conclude that appellant is guilty only of homicide, mitigated by the incomplete justifying circumstance of fulfillment of duty. The penalty
for homicide is reclusion temporal. There being one mitigating circumstance, the maximum of the penalty should be reclusion temporal in its
minimum period, which is 12 years and 1 day to 14 years and 8 months. Applying the indeterminate sentence law, the minimum of said
penalty should be taken from prision mayor.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court convicting appellant Domingo Belbes of the crime of murder is hereby MODIFIED. Appellant
is found guilty of the crime of homicide and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of eight (8) years of prision mayor minimum, as minimum,
to fourteen (14) years of reclusion temporal minimum, as maximum. He is also ordered to pay the heirs of the victim the amount of
P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and P20,000.00 as moral damages, and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.