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1. G.R. No. 139875 December 4, 2000
GREGORIO PESTAO and METRO CEBU AUTOBUS
CORPORATION, petitioners,
vs.
Spouses TEOTIMO SUMAYANG and PAZ C. SUMAYANG, respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Factual findings of the Court of Appeals, affirming those of the trial judge, are
binding on this Court. In quasi-delicts, such findings are crucial because
negligence is largely a matter of evidence. In computing an award for lost
earning capacity, the life expectancy of the deceased, not that of the heir, is
used as basis.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, assailing the April 21, 1999 Decision and the August 6, 1999
Resolution of the Court of Appeals 1 (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 30289. The
questioned Decision disposed as follows:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is hereby DENIED. The
assailed Decision of the lower court is hereby AFFIRMED with the aforesaid
modification regarding the award of death penalty."
The Resolution of August 6, 1999 denied reconsideration. 2
The Facts
The events leading to this Petition were summarized by the Court of Appeals
as follows:
"It appears from the records that at around 2:00 o'clock [o]n the afternoon of
August 9, 1986, Ananias Sumayang was riding a motorcycle along the
national highway in Ilihan, Tabagon, Cebu. Riding with him was his friend
Manuel Romagos. As they came upon a junction where the highway
connected with the road leading to Tabagon, they were hit by a passenger
bus driven by [Petitioner] Gregorio Pestao and owned by [Petitioner] Metro
Cebu Autobus Corporation (Metro Cebu, for brevity), which had tried to
overtake them, sending the motorcycle and its passengers hurtling upon the
pavement. Both Ananias Sumayang and Manuel Romagos were rushed to the
hospital in Sogod, where Sumayang was pronounced dead on arrival.
Romagos was transferred to the Cebu Doctors' Hospital, but he succumbed to
his injuries the day after.
"Apart from the institution of criminal charges against Gregorio Pestao,
[Respondents] Teotimo and Paz Sumayang, as heirs of Ananias Sumayang,
filed this civil action for damages against Gregorio Pestao, as driver of the
passenger bus that rammed the deceased's motorcycle, Metro Cebu, as
owner and operator of the said bus, and Perla Compania de Seguros, as
insurer of Metro Cebu. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-6108.
"On November 9, 1987, upon motion of [Petitioner] Pestao, Judge Pedro C.
Son ordered the consolidation of the said case with Criminal Case No. 10624,
pending in Branch 16 of the same Court, involving the criminal prosecution of
Gregorio Pestao for [d]ouble [h]omicide thru [r]eckless [i]mprudence. Joint
trial of the two cases thereafter ensued, where the following assertions were
made:
'[Respondents] rely mainly on the testimonies of Ignacio Neis, Pat. Aquilino
Dinoy and Teotimo Sumayang, father of the deceased. Neis declared that he
saw the incident while he was sitting on a bench beside the highway; that
both vehicles c[a]me from the North; that as the motorcycle approached the
junction to Tab[a]gon, the driver Ananias Sumayang signalled with his left
arm to indicate that he was taking the Tab[a]gon Road; that the motorcycle
did turn left but as it did so, it was bumped by an overspeeding bus; that the
force of the impact threw Ananias Sumayang and his companion Manuel
Romagos about 14 meters away. The motorcycle, Neis continued, was badly
damaged as it was dragged by the bus.
'On the other hand, Pat. Dinoy testified that he was in the nearby house of
Ruben Tiu [when] he heard the sound or noise caused by the collision; that
he immediately went to the scene where he found Ananias Sumayang and
Manuel Romagos lying on the road bleeding and badly injured; that he
requested the driver of a PU vehicle to take them to a hospital; that he took
note of the various distances which he included in his sketch (Exh. J) that the
probable point of impact was at the left lane of the highway and right at the
junction to Tab[a]gon (Exh J-11); that he based his conclusion on the
'scratches' caused by the motorcycle's footrest on the asphalt pavement; that
he described the damage caused to the motorcycle in his sketch (Exh J); that
on the part of the bus, the right end of its front bumper was bent and the
right portion of the radiator grill was dented. Pat. Dinoy acknowledged that he
met at the scene Ignacio Neis who informed him that he saw the incident.

'On the contrary, Pestao blamed Sumayang for the accident. He testified that
when he first blew the horn the motorcycle which was about 15 or 20 meters
ahead went to the right side of the highway that he again blew the horn and
accelerated in order to overtake the motorcycle; that when he was just one
meter behind, the motorcycle suddenly turned left towards the Tab[a]gon
[R]oad and was bumped by his bus; that he was able to apply his break only
after the impact. Pestao's testimony was corroborated by Ireneo Casilia who
declared that he was one of the passengers of the bus; that the motorcycle
suddenly turned left towards Tab[a]gon [R]oad without giving any signal to
indicate its maneuver; that the bus was going at 40 kph when the accident
occurred.
'To substantiate its defense of bonos pater familias [petitioner] [c]orporation
recalled to the witness box Gregorio Pestao who explained how his driving
experience and ability were tested by the company before he was hired. He
further declared that the management gave regular lectures to drivers and
conductors touching on various topics like speeding, parking, loading and
treatment of passengers, and that before he took to the road at 2:30 AM of
that day he checked together with the mechanic the tires, brake, signal lights
as well as the tools to be brought along. He did the same thing before
commencing his return trip from Hagnaya, San Remegio later in the day.
'The corporation also presented its maintenance supervisor, Agustin Pugeda,
Jr., and its manager, Alfonso Corominas, Jr. who corroborated Pestao's
testimony that his driving ability was thoroughly tested, and that all drivers
underwent periodic lecture on various aspects of safety driving including
pertinent traffic regulations. They also confirmed the thorough checkup of
every vehicle before it would depart and that the performance of the drivers
was being monitored by several inspectors posted at random places along the
route.'
"In judgment, the lower court found [petitioners] liable to the [respondents],
in the amounts of P30,000.00 for death indemnity, P829,079 for loss of
earning capacity of the deceased Ananias Sumayang, and P36,000.00 for
necessary interment expenses. The liability of defendant Perla Compania de
Seguros, Inc., however, was limited only to the amount stipulated in the
insurance policy, which [was] P12,000 for death indemnity and P4,500.00 for
burial expenses.
"In so ruling, the lower court found [Petitioner] Pestao to have been
negligent in driving the passenger bus that hit the deceased. It was shown
that Pestao negligently attempted to overtake the motorcycle at a
TRANSPO | Assign No 8 | 2
dangerous speed as they were coming upon a junction in the road, and as the
motorcycle was about to turn left towards Tabagon. The court likewise found
Metro Cebu directly and primarily liable, along with Pestao, the latter's
employer under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, as [Petitioner] Metro Cebu
failed to present evidence to prove that it had observed . . . [the] diligence of
a good father of a family to prevent damage. Nor has Metro Cebu proven that
it had exercised due diligence in the supervision of its employees and in the
maintenance of vehicles."3
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The CA affirmed respondent's liability for the accident and for Sumayang's
death. Pestao was negligent when he tried to overtake the victim's
motorcycle at the Tabagon junction. As a professional driver operating a
public transport vehicle, he should have taken extra precaution to avoid
accidents, knowing that it was perilous to overtake at a junction, where
adjoining roads had brought about merging and diverging traffic.
The appellate court opined that Metro Cebu had shown laxity in the conduct
of its operations and in the supervision of its employees. By allowing the bus
to ply its route despite the defective speedometer, said petitioner showed its
indifference towards the proper maintenance of its vehicles. Having failed to
observe the extraordinary diligence required of public transportation
companies, it was held vicariously liable to the victims of the vehicular
accident.
In accordance with prevailing jurisprudence, the CA raised to P50,000 the
granted indemnity for the death of the victim. It also affirmed the award of
loss of earning capacity based on his life expectancy. Such liability was
assessed, not as a pension for the claiming heirs, but as a penalty and an
indemnity for the driver's negligent act.
Hence, this Petition.4
Issues
Petitioners submit the following issues5 for our consideration:
1) The Court of Appeals misapplied facts of weight and substance affecting
the result of the case.
2) The Court of Appeals misapplied R.A. 4136 as regards the behavior of the
deceased at the time of the accident.

3) The Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the award of damages
representing income that deceased could have earned be considered a
penalty.
4) The Court of Appeals, contrary to Article 2204, Civil Code, raised the award
of P30,000.00 damages representing indemnity for death to P50,000.00.
5) The Court of Appeals used as basis for the loss of earning capacity, the life
expectancy of the [d]eceased instead of that of the respondents which was
shorter."6
In short, they raise these questions: whether the CA erred (1) in applying
Section 45 of RA 4136 when it ruled that negligence in driving was the
proximate cause of the accident; (2) in increasing the civil indemnity from
P30,000 to P50,000; and (3) in using the life expectancy of the deceased
instead of the life expectancies of respondents.
The Court's Ruling
The Petition has no merit.
First Issue: Negligence
Petitioners contend that Pestao was not under any obligation to slow down
when he overtook the motorcycle, because the deceased had given way to
him upon hearing the bus horn. Seeing that the left side of the road was
clearly visible and free of oncoming traffic, Pestao accelerated his speed to
pass the motorcycle. Having given way to the bus, the motorcycle driver
should have slowed down until he had been overtaken.
They further contend that the motorcycle was not in the middle of the road
nearest to the junction as found by the trial and the appellate courts, but was
on the inner lane. This explains why the damage on the bus were all on the
right side - the right end of the bumper and the right portion of the radiator
grill were bent and dented. Hence, they insist that it was the victim who was
negligent.
We disagree. Petitioners are raising a question of fact based on Pestao's
testimony contradicting that of Eyewitness Ignacio Neis and on the location of
the dents on the bumper and the grill. Neis testified that as the two vehicles
approached the junction, the victim raised his left arm to signal that he was
turning left to Tabagon, but that the latter and his companion were thrown off
the motorcycle after it was bumped by the overspeeding bus.
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These contentions have already been passed upon by the trial and the
appellate courts. We find no cogent reason to reverse or modify their factual
findings. The CA agreed with the trial court that the vehicular collision was
caused by Pestao's negligence when he attempted to overtake the
motorcycle. As a professional driver operating a public transport bus, he
should have anticipated that overtaking at a junction was a perilous
maneuver and should thus have exercised extreme caution.
Factual findings of the CA affirming those of the trial court are conclusive and
binding on this Court. Petitioners failed to demonstrate that this case falls
under any of the recognized exceptions to this rule. 7 Indeed, the issue of
negligence is basically factual and, in quasi-delicts, crucial in the award of
damages.
Petitioners aver that the CA was wrong in attributing the accident to a faulty
speedometer and in implying that the accident could have been avoided had
this instrument been properly functioning.
This contention has no factual basis. Under Articles 2180 and 2176 of the
Civil Code, owners and managers are responsible for damages caused by
their employees. When an injury is caused by the negligence of a servant or
an employee, the master or employer is presumed to be negligent either in
the selection or in the supervision of that employee. This presumption may be
overcome only by satisfactorily showing that the employer exercised the care
and the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and the
supervision of its employee.8
The CA said that allowing Pestao to ply his route with a defective
speedometer showed laxity on the part of Metro Cebu in the operation of its
business and in the supervision of its employees. The negligence alluded to
here is in its supervision over its driver, not in that which directly caused the
accident. The fact that Pestao was able to use a bus with a faulty
speedometer shows that Metro Cebu was remiss in the supervision of its
employees and in the proper care of its vehicles. It had thus failed to conduct
its business with the diligence required by law.
Second Issue: Life Indemnity
Petitioners aver that the CA erred in increasing the award for life indemnity
from P30,000 to P50,000, without specifying any aggravating circumstance to
justify the increment as provided in the Civil Code. 9
 TRANSPO | Assign No 8 | 4

This contention is untenable. The indemnity for death caused by a quasi-delict

used to be pegged at P3,000, based on Article 2206 of the Civil Code.
However, the amount has been gradually increased through the years
because of the declining value of our currency. At present, prevailing
jurisprudence fixes the amount at P50,000.10

Third Issue: Loss of Earning Capacity

Petitioners cite Villa Rey Transit, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 11 which held:

"The determination of the indemnity to be awarded to the heirs of a deceased

person has therefore no fixed basis. . . . The life expectancy of the deceased
or of the beneficiary, whichever is shorter, is an important factor . . . "

They contend that the CA used the wrong basis for its computation of earning
capacity.

We disagree. The Court has consistently computed the loss of earning

capacity based on the life expectancy of the deceased, 12 and not on that of
the heir.13 Even Villa Rey Transit did likewise.

The award for loss of earning capacity is based on two factors: (1) the
number of years on which the computation of damages is based and (2) the
rate at which the loss sustained by the heirs is fixed. 14 The first factor refers
to the life expectancy, which takes into consideration the nature of the
victim's work, lifestyle, age and state of health prior to the accident. The
second refers to the victim's earning capacity minus the necessary living
expenses. Stated otherwise, the amount recoverable is that portion of the
earnings of the deceased which the beneficiary would have received the
net earnings of the deceased.15

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision and Resolution
AFFIRMED. Cost against petitioners.1wphi1.nt

SO ORDERED.
 TRANSPO | Assign No 8 | 5

2. G.R. No. 128607 January 31, 2000 P18,270.00 for burial expenses plus such amounts as may be fixed by the
trial court for exemplary damages and attorney's fees.
ALFREDO MALLARI, SR. and ALFREDO MALLARI, JR., petitioners,
vs. The trial court found that the proximate cause of the collision was the
COURT OF APPEALS and BULLETIN PUBLISHING negligence of Felix Angeles, driver of the Bulletin delivery van, considering
CORPORATION, respondents. the fact that the left front portion of the delivery truck driven by Felix Angeles
hit and bumped the left rear portion of the passenger jeepney driven by
BELLOSILLO, J.: Alfredo Mallari Jr. Hence, the trial court ordered BULLETIN and Felix Angeles
to pay jointly and severally Claudia G. Reyes, widow of the deceased victim,
ALFREDO MALLARI SR. and ALFREDO MALLARI JR. in this petition for review
the sums of P42,106.93 for medical expenses; P8,600.00 for funeral and
on certiorari seek to set aside the Decision of the Court of Appeals 1 which
burial expenses; P1,006,777.40 for loss of earning capacity; P5,000.00 for
reversed the court a quo and adjudged petitioners to be liable for damages
moral damages and P10,000.00 for attorney's fees. The trial court also
due to negligence as a common carrier resulting in the death of a passenger.
ordered N.V. Netherlands Insurance Company to indemnify Claudia G. Reyes
P12,000.00 as death indemnity and P2,500.00 for funeral expenses which
On 14 October 1987, at about 5:00 o'clock in the morning, the passenger
when paid should be deducted from the liabilities of respondent BULLETIN
jeepney driven by petitioner Alfredo Mallari Jr. and owned by his co-petitioner
and its driver Felix Angeles to the plaintiff. It also dismissed the complaint
Alfredo Mallari Sr. collided with the delivery van of respondent Bulletin
against the other defendants Alfredo Mallari Sr. and Alfredo Mallari Jr.
Publishing Corp. (BULLETIN, for brevity) along the National Highway in
Barangay San Pablo, Dinalupihan, Bataan. Petitioner Mallari Jr. testified that
On appeal the Court of Appeals modified the decision of the trial court and
he went to the left lane of the highway and overtook a Fiera which had
found no negligence on the part of Angeles and consequently of his employer,
stopped on the right lane. Before he passed by the Fiera, he saw the van of
respondent BULLETIN. Instead, the appellate court ruled that the collision
respondent BULLETIN coming from the opposite direction. It was driven by
was caused by the sole negligence of petitioner Alfredo Mallari Jr. who
one Felix Angeles. The sketch of the accident showed that the collision
admitted that immediately before the collision and after he rounded a curve
occurred after Mallari Jr. overtook the Fiera while negotiating a curve in the
on the highway, he overtook a Fiera which had stopped on his lane and that
highway. The points of collision were the and the left rear portion of the
he had seen the van driven by Angeles before overtaking the Fiera. The Court
passenger jeepney and the left front side of the delivery van of BULLETIN.
of Appeals ordered petitioners Mallari Jr. and Mallari Sr. to compensate
The two (2) right wheels of the delivery van were on the right shoulder of the
Claudia G. Reyes P1,006,777.50 for loss of earning capacity, P50,000.00 as
road and pieces of debris from the accident were found scattered along the
indemnity for death and P10,000.00 for attorney's fees. It absolved from any
shoulder of the road up to a certain portion of the lane travelled by the
liability respondent BULLETIN, Felix Angeles and N.V. Netherlands Insurance
passenger jeepney. The impact caused the jeepney to turn around and fall on
Company. Hence this petition.
its left side resulting in injuries to its passengers one of whom was Israel
Reyes who eventually died due to the gravity of his injuries.1wphi1.nt Petitioners contend that there is no evidence to show that petitioner Mallari Jr.
overtook a vehicle at a curve on the road at the time of the accident and that
On 16 December 1987 Claudia G. Reyes, the widow of Israel M. Reyes, filed a
the testimony of Angeles on the overtaking made by Mallari Jr. was not
complaint for damages with the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City against
credible and unreliable. Petitioner also submits that the trial court was in a
Alfredo Mallari Sr. and Alfredo Mallari Jr., and also against BULLETIN, its driver
better position than the Court of Appeals to assess the evidence and observe
Felix Angeles, and the N.V. Netherlands Insurance Company. The complaint
the witnesses as well as determine their credibility; hence, its finding that the
alleged that the collision which resulted in the death of Israel Reyes was
proximate cause of the collision was the negligence of respondent Angeles,
caused by the fault and negligence of both drivers of the passenger jeepney
driver of the delivery van owned by respondent BULLETIN, should be given
and the Bulletin Isuzu delivery van. The complaint also prayed that the
more weight and consideration.
defendants be ordered jointly and severally to pay plaintiff P1,006,777.40 in
compensatory damages, P40,000.00 for hospital and medical expenses,

We cannot sustain petitioners. Contrary to their allegation that there was no
evidence whatsoever that petitioner Mallari Jr. overtook a vehicle at a curve
on the road at the time of or before the accident, the same petitioner himself
testified that such fact indeed did occur
Q: And what was that accident all about?
A: Well, what happened, sir, is that at about that time 5:00 o'clock in that
morning of October 14 while I was negotiating on the highway at San Pablo,
Dinalupihan, Bataan, I was then following a blue Ford Fierra and my distance
behind was about twenty (20) feet and then I passed that blue Ford Fierra. I
overtook and when I was almost on the right lane of the highway towards
Olongapo City there was an oncoming delivery van of the Bulletin Publishing
Corporation which bumped the left rear portion of the jeepney which I was
driving and as a result of which the jeepney . . . turned around and fell on its
left side and as a result of which some of my passengers including me were
injured, sir . . . .
Q: Before you overtook the Ford Fierra jeepney did you look . . . whether
there was any vehicle coming towards you?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Did you see the Bulletin van or the Press van coming towards you?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: At the moment the Ford Fierra . . . stop(ped) and in overtaking the Fierra,
did you not have an option to stop and not to overtake the Ford Fierra?
A: Well, at the time when the Ford Fierra stopped in front of me I slowed
down with the intention of applying the brake, however, when I saw the
oncoming vehicle which is the Press van is very far. . . which is 100 feet
distance, . . . it is sufficient to overtake the Ford Fierra so I overt(ook) it . . . .
Q: You said that you took into consideration the speed of the oncoming Press
van but you also could not estimate the speed of the press van because it
was dark at that time, which of these statements are true?
A: What I wanted to say, I took into consideration the speed of the oncoming
vehicle, the Press van, although at the moment I could not estimate the
speed of the oncoming vehicle . . . .2
TRANSPO | Assign No 8 | 6
The Court of Appeals correctly found, based on the sketch and spot report of
the police authorities which were not disputed by petitioners, that the
collision occurred immediately after petitioner Mallari Jr. overtook a vehicle in
front of it while traversing a curve on the highway.3 This act of overtaking was
in clear violation of Sec. 41, pars. (a) and (b), of RA 4136 as amended,
otherwise known as The Land Transportation and Traffic Code which provides:
Sec. 41. Restrictions on overtaking and passing. (a) The driver of a vehicle
shall not drive to the left side of the center line of a highway in overtaking or
passing another vehicle proceeding in the same direction, unless such left
side is clearly visible and is free of oncoming traffic for a sufficient distance
ahead to permit such overtaking or passing to be made in safety.
(b) The driver of a vehicle shall not overtake or pass another vehicle
proceeding in the same direction when approaching the crest of a grade, nor
upon a curve in the highway, where the driver's view along the highway is
obstructed within a distance of five hundred feet ahead except on a highway
having two or more lanes for movement of traffic in one direction where the
driver of a vehicle may overtake or pass another vehicle: Provided That on a
highway, within a business or residential district, having two or more lanes for
movement of traffic in one direction, the driver of a vehicle may overtake or
pass another vehicle on the right.
The rule is settled that a driver abandoning his proper lane for the purpose of
overtaking another vehicle in an ordinary situation has the duty to see to it
that the road is clear and not to proceed if he cannot do so in safety.4When a
motor vehicle is approaching or rounding a curve, there is special necessity
for keeping to the right side of the road and the driver does not have the
right to drive on the left hand side relying upon having time to turn to the
right if a car approaching from the opposite direction comes into view. 5
In the instant case, by his own admission, petitioner Mallari Jr. already saw
that the BULLETIN delivery van was coming from the opposite direction and
failing to consider the speed thereof since it was still dark at 5:00 o'clock in
the morning mindlessly occupied the left lane and overtook two (2) vehicles
in front of it at a curve in the highway. Clearly, the proximate cause of the
collision resulting in the death of Israel Reyes, a passenger of the jeepney,
was the sole negligence of the driver of the passenger jeepney, petitioner
Alfredo Mallari Jr., who recklessly operated and drove his jeepney in a lane
where overtaking was not allowed by traffic rules. Under Art. 2185 of the Civil
Code, unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person
driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap he was
 TRANSPO | Assign No 8 | 7

violating a traffic regulation. As found by the appellate court, petitioners

failed to present satisfactory evidence to overcome this legal presumption.

The negligence and recklessness of the driver of the passenger jeepney is

binding against petitioner Mallari Sr., who admittedly was the owner of the
passenger jeepney engaged as a common carrier, considering the fact that in
an action based on contract of carriage, the court need not make an express
finding of fault or negligence on the part of the carrier in order to hold it
responsible for the payment of damages sought by the passenger. Under Art.
1755 of the Civil Code, a common carrier is bound to carry the passengers
safely as far as human care and foresight can provide using the utmost
diligence of very cautious persons with due regard for all the circumstances.
Moreover, under Art. 1756 of the Civil Code, in case of death or injuries to
passengers, a common carrier is presumed to have been at fault or to have
acted negligently, unless it proves that it observed extraordinary diligence.
Further, pursuant to Art. 1759 of the same Code, it is liable for the death of
or injuries to passengers through the negligence or willful acts of the former's
employees. This liability of the common carrier does not cease upon proof
that it exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection
of its employees. Clearly, by the contract of carriage, the carrier jeepney
owned by Mallari Sr. assumed the express obligation to transport the
passengers to their destination safely and to observe extraordinary diligence
with due regard for all the circumstances, and any injury or death that might
be suffered by its passengers is right away attributable to the fault or
negligence of the carrier.

The monetary award ordered by the appellate court to be paid by petitioners

to the widow of the deceased passenger Israel M. Reyes of P1,006,777.50 for
loss of earning capacity, P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for death, and
P10,000.00 for attorney's fees, all of which were not disputed by petitioners,
is a factual matter binding and conclusive upon this Court.1wphi1.nt

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the Decision of the Court of Appeals
dated 20 September 1995 reversing the decision of the trial court being in
accord with law and evidence is AFFIRMED. Consequently, petitioners are
ordered jointly and severally to pay Claudia G. Reyes P1,006,777.50 for loss
of earning capacity, P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for death, and P10,000.00
for attorney's fees. Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

3. G.R. No. 120027 April 21, 1999
EDNA A. RAYNERA, for herself and on behalf of the minors RIANNA
and REIANNE RAYNERA, petitioners,
vs.
FREDDIE HICETA and JIMMY ORPILLA, respondents.
PARDO, J.:
The case is a petition for review certiorari of the decision of the Court of
Appeals, 1 reversing that of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 45, Manila. 2
The rule is well-settled that factual findings of the Court of Appeals are
generally considered final and may not be reviewed on appeal. However, this
principle admits of certain exceptions, among which is when the findings of
the appellate court are contrary to those of the trial court, a re-examination
of the facts and evidence may be undertaken. 3 This case falls under the cited
exception.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Petitioner Edna A. Raynera was the widow of Reynaldo Raynera and the
mother and legal guardian of the minors Rianna and Reianne, both surnamed
Raynera. Respondents Freddie Hiceta and Jimmy Orpilla were the owner and
driver, respectively, of an Isuzu truck-trailer with plate No. NXC 848, involved
in the accident.1wphi1.nt
On March 23, 1989, at about 2:00 in the morning, Reynaldo Raynera was on
his way home. He was riding a motorcycle traveling on the southbound lane
of East Service Road, Cupang, Muntinlupa. The Isuzu truck was travelling
ahead of him at 20 to 30 kilometers per hour. 4 The truck was loaded with two
(2) metal sheets extended on both sides, two (2) feet on the left and three
(3) feet on the right. There were two (2) pairs of red lights, about 35 watts
each, on both sides of the metal plates. 5 The asphalt road was not well
lighted.
At some point on the road, Reynaldo Raynera crashed his motorcycle into
left rear portion of the truck trailer, which was without tail lights. Due to
collision, Reynaldo sustained head injuries and truck helper Geraldino
Lutelo 6 rushed him to the Paraaque Medical Center. Upon arrival at
TRANSPO | Assign No 8 | 8
hospital, the attending physician, Dr. Marivic Aguirre, 7
pronounced Reynaldo
Raynera dead on arrival.
At the time of his death, Reynaldo was manager of the Engineering
Department, Kawasaki Motors (Phils.) Corporation. He was 32 years old, had
a life expectancy of sixty five (65) years, and an annual net earnings of not
less than seventy three thousand five hundred (P73,500.00) pesos, 8 with a
potential increase in annual net earnings of not less than ten percent (10%)
of his salary. 9
On May 12, 1989, the heirs of the deceased demanded 10 from respondents
payment of damages arising from the death of Reynaldo
Raynera as a result of the vehicular accident. The respondents refused to pay
the claims.
On September 13, 1989, petitioners filed with the Regional Trial Court,
Manila 11 a complaint 12 for damages against respondents owner and driver of
the Isuzu truck.
In their complaint against respondents, petitioners sought recovery of
damages for the death of Reynaldo Raynera caused by the negligent
operation of the truck-trailer at nighttime on the highway, without tail lights.
In their answer filed on April 4, 1990, respondents alleged that the truck was
travelling slowly on the service road, not parked improperly at a dark portion
of the road, with no tail lights, license plate and early warning device.
At the trial, petitioners presented Virgilio Santos. He testified that at about
1.00 and 2:00 in the morning of March 23, 1989, he and his wife went to
Alabang, market, on board a tricycle. They passed by the service road going
south, and saw a parked truck trailer, with its hood open and without tail
lights. They would have bumped the truck but the tricycle driver was quick in
avoiding a collision. The place was dark, and the truck had no early warning
device to alert passing motorists. 13
On the other hand, respondents presented truck helper Geraldino
Lucelo. 14 He testified that at the time the incident happened, the truck was
slowly traveling at approximately 20 to 30 kilometers per hour. Another
the
employee of respondents, auto-mechanic Rogoberto Reyes, 15 testified that at
the
about 3:00 in the afternoon of March 22, 1989, with the help of Lucelo, he
D.
installed two (2) pairs of red lights, about 30 to 40 watts each, on both sides
the
of the steel plates. 16 On his part, traffic investigation officer Cpl. Virgilio del
Monte 17 admitted that these lights were visible at a distance of 100 meters.

On December 19, 1991, the trial court rendered decision in favor of
petitioners. It found respondents Freddie Hiceta and Jimmy Orpilla negligent
in view of these circumstances: (1) the truck trailer had no license plate and
tail lights; (2) there were only two pairs of red lights, 50 watts 18 each, on
both sides of the steel plates; and (3) the truck trailer was improperly parked
in a dark area.
The trial court held that respondents' negligence was the immediate and
proximate cause of Reynaldo Raynera's death, for which they are jointly and
severally liable to pay damages to petitioners. The trial court also held that
the victim was himself negligent, although this was insufficient to overcome
respondents' negligence. The trial court applied the doctrine of contributory
negligence 19 and reduced the responsibility of respondents by 20% on
account of the victim's own negligence.
The dispositive portion of the lower court's decision reads as follows:
All things considered, the Court is of the opinion that it is fair and reasonable
to fix the living and other expenses of the deceased the sum of P54,000.00 a
year or about P4,500.00 a month (P150.00 p/d) and that, consequently, the
loss or damage sustained by the plaintiffs may be estimated at
P1,674,000.00 for the 31 years of Reynaldo Raynera's life expectancy.
Taking into account the cooperative negligence of the deceased Reynaldo
Raynera, the Court believes that the demand of substantial justice are
satisfied by allocating the damages on 80-20 ratio. Thus, P1,337,200.00 shall
be paid by the defendants with interest thereon, at the legal rate, from date
of decision, as damages for the loss of earnings. To this sum, the following
shall be added:
(a) P33,412.00, actually spent for funeral services, interment and memorial
lot;
(b) P20,000.00 as attorney's fees;
(c) cost of suit.
SO ORDERED. 20
On January 10, 1992, respondents Hiceta and Orpilla appealed to the Court of
Appeals. 21
TRANSPO | Assign No 8 | 9
After due proceedings, on April 28, 1995, the Court of Appeals rendered
decision setting aside the appealed decision. The appellate court held that
Reynaldo Raynera's bumping into the left rear portion of the truck was the
proximate cause or his death, 22 and consequently, absolved respondents
from liability.
Hence, this petitition for review on certiorari.
In this petition, the heirs of Reynaldo Raynera contend that the appellate
court erred in: (1) overturning the trial court's finding that respondents'
negligent operation of the Isuzu truck was the proximate cause of the victim's
death; (2) applying the doctrine of last clear chance; (3) setting aside the
trial court's award of actual and compensatory damages.
The issues presented are (a) whether respondents were negligent, and if so,
(b) whether such negligence was the proximate cause of the death of
Reynaldo Raynera.
Petitioners maintain that the proximate cause of Reynaldo Raynera's death
was respondents' negligence in operating the truck trailer on the highway
without tail lights and license plate.
The Court finds no reason to disturb the factual findings of the Court of
Appeals.
"Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided
by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human
affairs, would do, or the doing of something, which a prudent and reasonable
man would not do." 23
Proximate cause is "that cause, which, in natural and continous sequence,
unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without
which the result would not have occured." 24
During the trial, it was established that the truck had no tail lights. The
photographs taken of the scene of the accident showed that there were no
tail lights of license plates installed on the Isuzu truck. Instead, what were
installed were two (2) pairs of lights on top of the steel plates, and one (1)
pair of lights in front of the truck. With regard to the rear of the truck, the
photos taken and the sketch in the spot report proved that there were no tail
lights.
 TRANSPO | Assign No 8 | 10

Despite the absence of tail lights and license plate, respondents truck was WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition for review on certiorari and AFFIRM the
visible in the highway. It was traveling at a moderate speed, approximately decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 35895, dismissing the
20 to 30 kilometers per hour. It used the service road, instead of the highway, amended complaint in Civil Case No. 89-50355, Regional Trial Court, Branch
because the cargo they were hauling posed a danger to passing motorists. In 45, Manila.1wphi1.nt
compliance with the Land Transportation Traffic Code (Republic Act No.
4136)" 25 respondents installed 2 pairs of lights on top of the steel plates, as No costs.
the vehicle's cargo load extended beyond the bed or body thereof.
SO ORDERED.
We find that the direct cause of the accident was the negligence of the victim.
Traveling behind the truck, he had the responsibility of avoiding bumping the
vehicle in front of him. He was in control of the situation. His motorcycle was
equipped with headlights to enable him to see what was in front of him. He
was traversing the service road where the prescribed speed limit was less
than that in the highway.

Traffic investigator Cpl. Virgilio del Monte testified that two pairs of 50-watts
bulbs were on top of the steel plates, 26which were visible from a distance of
100 meters . 27 Virgilio Santos admitted that from the tricycle where he was on
board, he saw the truck and its cargo of iron plates from a distance of ten
(10) meters. 28 In light of these circumstances, an accident could have been
easily avoided, unless the victim had been driving too fast and did not
exercise dues care and prudence demanded of him under the circumstances.

Virgilio Santos' testimony strengthened respondents' defense that it was the

victim who was reckless and negligent in driving his motorcycle at high
speed. The tricycle where Santos was on board was not much different from
the victim's motorcycle that figured in the accident. Although Santos claimed
the tricycle almost bumped into the improperly parked truck, the tricycle
driver was able to void hitting the truck.

It has been said that drivers of vehicles "who bump the rear of another
vehicle" are presumed to be "the cause of the accident, unless contradicted
by other evidence". 29 The rationale behind the presumption is that the driver
of the rear vehicle has full control of the situation as he is in a position to
observe the vehicle in front of him.

We agree with the Court of Appeals that the responsibility to avoid the
collision with the front vehicle lies with the driver of the rear vehicle.

Consequently, no other person was to blame but the victim himself since he
was the one who bumped his motorcycle into the rear of the Isuzu truck. He
had the last clear chance of avoiding the accident.
 TRANSPO | Assign No 8 | 11

4. G.R. No. 113003 October 17, 1997 fast," she cautioned the driver to slow down but he merely stared at her
through the mirror. At around 3:30 p.m., in Trento, she heard something
ALBERTA YOBIDO and CRESENCIO YOBIDO, petitioners, vs. explode and immediately, the bus fell into a ravine.
COURT OF APPEALS, LENY TUMBOY, ARDEE TUMBOY and JASMIN
TUMBOY, respondents. For their part, the defendants tried to establish that the accident was due to a
fortuitous event. Abundio Salce, who was the bus conductor when the
ROMERO, J.: incident happened, testified that the 42-seater bus was not full as there were
only 32 passengers, such that he himself managed to get a seat. He added
In this petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals,
that the bus was running at a speed of "60 to 50" and that it was going slow
the issue is whether or not the explosion of a newly installed tire of a
because of the zigzag road. He affirmed that the left front tire that exploded
passenger vehicle is a fortuitous event that exempts the carrier from liability
was a "brand new tire" that he mounted on the bus on April 21, 1988 or only
for the death of a passenger.
five (5) days before the incident. The Yobido Liner secretary, Minerva
Fernando, bought the new Goodyear tire from Davao Toyo Parts on April 20,
On April 26, 1988, spouses Tito and Leny Tumboy and their minor children
1988 and she was present when it was mounted on the bus by Salce. She
named Ardee and Jasmin, bearded at Mangagoy, Surigao del Sur, a Yobido
stated that all driver applicants in Yobido Liner underwent actual driving tests
Liner bus bound for Davao City. Along Picop Road in Km. 17, Sta. Maria,
before they were employed. Defendant Cresencio Yobido underwent such test
Agusan del Sur, the left front tire of the bus exploded. The bus fell into a
and submitted his professional driver's license and clearances from the
ravine around three (3) feet from the road and struck a tree. The incident
barangay, the fiscal and the police.
resulted in the death of 28-year-old Tito Tumboy and physical injuries to
other passengers.
On August 29, 1991, the lower court rendered a decision 2 dismissing the
action for lack of merit. On the issue of whether or not the tire blowout was
On November 21, 1988, a complaint for breach of contract of carriage,
a caso fortuito, it found that "the falling of the bus to the cliff was a result of
damages and attorney's fees was filed by Leny and her children against
no other outside factor than the tire blow-out." It held that the ruling in
Alberta Yobido, the owner of the bus, and Cresencio Yobido, its driver, before
the La Mallorca and Pampanga Bus Co. v. De Jesus 3 that a tire blowout is "a
the Regional Trial Court of Davao City. When the defendants therein filed their
mechanical defect of the conveyance or a fault in its equipment which was
answer to the complaint, they raised the affirmative defense of caso fortuito.
easily discoverable if the bus had been subjected to a more thorough or rigid
They also filed a third-party complaint against Philippine Phoenix Surety and
check-up before it took to the road that morning" is inapplicable to this case.
Insurance, Inc. This third-party defendant filed an answer with compulsory
It reasoned out that in said case, it was found that the blowout was caused
counterclaim. At the pre-trial conference, the parties agreed to a stipulation
by the established fact that the inner tube of the left front tire "was pressed
of facts. 1
between the inner circle of the left wheel and the rim which had slipped out of
Upon a finding that the third party defendant was not liable under the the wheel." In this case, however, "the cause of the explosion remains a
insurance contract, the lower court dismissed the third party complaint. No mystery until at present." As such, the court added, the tire blowout was
amicable settlement having been arrived at by the parties, trial on the merits "a caso fortuito which is completely an extraordinary circumstance
ensued. independent of the will" of the defendants who should be relieved of
"whatever liability the plaintiffs may have suffered by reason of the explosion
The plaintiffs asserted that violation of the contract of carriage between them pursuant to Article 1174 4 of the Civil Code."
and the defendants was brought about by the driver's failure to exercise the
diligence required of the carrier in transporting passengers safely to their Dissatisfied, the plaintiffs appealed to the Court of Appeals. They ascribed to
place of destination. According to Leny Tumboy, the bus left Mangagoy at the lower court the following errors: (a) finding that the tire blowout was
3:00 o'clock in the afternoon. The winding road it traversed was not a caso fortuito; (b) failing to hold that the defendants did not exercise utmost
cemented and was wet due to the rain; it was rough with crushed rocks. The and/or extraordinary diligence required of carriers under Article 1755 of the
bus which was full of passengers had cargoes on top. Since it was "running

Civil Code, and (c) deciding the case contrary to the ruling in Juntilla
v. Fontanar, 5 and Necesito v. Paras. 6
On August 23, 1993, the Court of Appeals rendered the Decision 7 reversing
that of the lower court. It held that:
To Our mind, the explosion of the tire is not in itself a fortuitous event. The
cause of the blow-out, if due to a factory defect, improper mounting,
excessive tire pressure, is not an unavoidable event. On the other hand, there
may have been adverse conditions on the road that were unforeseeable
and/or inevitable, which could make the blow-out a caso fortuito. The fact
that the cause of the blow-out was not known does not relieve the carrier of
liability. Owing to the statutory presumption of negligence against the carrier
and its obligation to exercise the utmost diligence of very cautious persons to
carry the passenger safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, it
is the burden of the defendants to prove that the cause of the blow-out was a
fortuitous event. It is not incumbent upon the plaintiff to prove that the cause
of the blow-out is not caso-fortuito.
Proving that the tire that exploded is a new Goodyear tire is not sufficient to
discharge defendants' burden. As enunciated in Necesito vs. Paras, the
passenger has neither choice nor control over the carrier in the selection and
use of its equipment, and the good repute of the manufacturer will not
necessarily relieve the carrier from liability.
Moreover, there is evidence that the bus was moving fast, and the road was
wet and rough. The driver could have explained that the blow-out that
precipitated the accident that caused the death of Toto Tumboy could not
have been prevented even if he had exercised due care to avoid the same,
but he was not presented as witness.
The Court of Appeals thus disposed of the appeal as follows:
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the court a quo is set aside and another one
entered ordering defendants to pay plaintiffs the sum of P50,000.00 for the
death of Tito Tumboy, P30,000.00 in moral damages, and P7,000.00 for
funeral and burial expenses. SO ORDERED.
The defendants filed a motion for reconsideration of said decision which was
denied on November 4, 1993 by the Court of Appeals. Hence, the instant
petition asserting the position that the tire blowout that caused the death of
Tito Tumboy was a caso fortuito. Petitioners claim further that the Court of
Appeals, in ruling contrary to that of the lower court, misapprehended facts
TRANSPO | Assign No 8 | 12
and, therefore, its findings of fact cannot be considered final which shall bind
this Court. Hence, they pray that this Court review the facts of the case.
The Court did re-examine the facts and evidence in this case because of the
inapplicability of the established principle that the factual findings of the Court
of Appeals are final and may not be reviewed on appeal by this Court. This
general principle is subject to exceptions such as the one present in this case,
namely, that the lower court and the Court of Appeals arrived at diverse
factual findings. 8 However, upon such re-examination, we found no reason to
overturn the findings and conclusions of the Court of Appeals.
As a rule, when a passenger boards a common carrier, he takes the risks
incidental to the mode of travel he has taken. After all, a carrier is not an
insurer of the safety of its passengers and is not bound absolutely and at all
events to carry them safely and without injury. 9 However, when a passenger
is injured or dies while travelling, the law presumes that the common carrier
is negligent. Thus, the Civil Code provides:
Art. 1756. In case of death or injuries to passengers, common carriers are
presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they
prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed in articles
1733 and 1755.
Article 1755 provides that "(a) common carrier is bound to carry the
passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the
utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with a due regard for all the
circumstances." Accordingly, in culpa contractual, once a passenger dies or is
injured, the carrier is presumed to have been at fault or to have acted
negligently. This disputable presumption may only be overcome by evidence
that the carrier had observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed by Articles
1733, 10 1755 and 1756 of the Civil Code or that the death or injury of the
passenger was due to a fortuitous event. 11 Consequently, the court need not
make an express finding of fault or negligence on the part of the carrier to
hold it responsible for damages sought by the passenger.12
In view of the foregoing, petitioners' contention that they should be exempt
from liability because the tire blowout was no more than a fortuitous event
that could not have been foreseen, must fail. A fortuitous event is possessed
of the following characteristics: (a) the cause of the unforeseen and
unexpected occurrence, or the failure of the debtor to comply with his
obligations, must be independent of human will; (b) it must be impossible to
foresee the event which constitutes the caso fortuito, or if it can be foreseen,

it must be impossible to avoid; (c) the occurrence must be such as to render
it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner; and
(d) the obliger must be free from any participation in the aggravation of the
injury resulting to the creditor. 13 As Article 1174 provides, no person shall be
responsible for a fortuitous event which could not be foreseen, or which,
though foreseen, was inevitable. In other words, there must be an entire
exclusion of human agency from the cause of injury or loss. 14
Under the circumstances of this case, the explosion of the new tire may not
be considered a fortuitous event. There are human factors involved in the
situation. The fact that the tire was new did not imply that it was entirely free
from manufacturing defects or that it was properly mounted on the vehicle.
Neither may the fact that the tire bought and used in the vehicle is of a brand
name noted for quality, resulting in the conclusion that it could not explode
within five days' use. Be that as it may, it is settled that an accident caused
either by defects in the automobile or through the negligence of its driver is
not a caso fortuito that would exempt the carrier from liability for damages. 15
Moreover, a common carrier may not be absolved from liability in case
of force majeure or fortuitous event alone. The common carrier must still
prove that it was not negligent in causing the death or injury resulting from
an accident. 16 This Court has had occasion to state:
While it may be true that the tire that blew-up was still good because the
grooves of the tire were still visible, this fact alone does not make the
explosion of the tire a fortuitous event. No evidence was presented to show
that the accident was due to adverse road conditions or that precautions were
taken by the jeepney driver to compensate for any conditions liable to cause
accidents. The sudden blowing-up, therefore, could have been caused by too
much air pressure injected into the tire coupled by the fact that the jeepney
was overloaded and speeding at the time of the accident. 17
It is interesting to note that petitioners proved through the bus conductor,
Salce, that the bus was running at "60-50" kilometers per hour only or within
the prescribed lawful speed limit. However, they failed to rebut the testimony
of Leny Tumboy that the bus was running so fast that she cautioned the
driver to slow down. These contradictory facts must, therefore, be resolved in
favor of liability in view of the presumption of negligence of the carrier in the
law. Coupled with this is the established condition of the road rough,
winding and wet due to the rain. It was incumbent upon the defense to
establish that it took precautionary measures considering partially dangerous
condition of the road. As stated above, proof that the tire was new and of
TRANSPO | Assign No 8 | 13
good quality is not sufficient proof that it was not negligent. Petitioners should
have shown that it undertook extraordinary diligence in the care of its carrier,
such as conducting daily routinary check-ups of the vehicle's parts. As the
late Justice J.B.L. Reyes said:
It may be impracticable, as appellee argues, to require of carriers to test the
strength of each and every part of its vehicles before each trip; but we are of
the opinion that a due regard for the carrier's obligations toward the traveling
public demands adequate periodical tests to determine the condition and
strength of those vehicle portions the failure of which may endanger the
safety of the passengers. 18
Having failed to discharge its duty to overthrow the presumption of
negligence with clear and convincing evidence, petitioners are hereby held
liable for damages. Article 1764 19 in relation to Article 2206 20 of the Civil
Code prescribes the amount of at least three thousand pesos as damages for
the death of a passenger. Under prevailing jurisprudence, the award of
damages under Article 2206 has been increased to fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000.00). 21
Moral damages are generally not recoverable in culpa contractual except
when bad faith had been proven. However, the same damages may be
recovered when breach of contract of carriage results in the death of a
passenger, 22 as in this case. Exemplary damages, awarded by way of
example or correction for the public good when moral damages are
awarded, 23 may likewise be recovered in contractual obligations if the
defendant acted in wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent
manner. 24 Because petitioners failed to exercise the extraordinary diligence
required of a common carrier, which resulted in the death of Tito Tumboy, it is
deemed to have acted recklessly. 25 As such, private respondents shall be
entitled to exemplary damages.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED
subject to the modification that petitioners shall, in addition to the monetary
awards therein, be liable for the award of exemplary damages in the amount
of P20,000.00. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

5. G.R. No. 116110 May 15, 1996
BALIWAG TRANSIT, INC., petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES ANTONIO GARCIA & LETICIA GARCIA,
A & J TRADING, AND JULIO RECONTIQUE, respondents.
PUNO, J.:p
This is a petition for certiorari to review the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV-31246 awarding damages in favor of the spouses Antonio and
Leticia Garcia for breach of contract of carriage. 2
The records show that on July 31, 1980, Leticia Garcia, and her five-year old
son, Allan Garcia, boarded Baliwag Transit Bus No. 2036 bound for
Cabanatuan City driven by Jaime Santiago. They took the seat behind the
driver.
At about 7:30 in the evening, in Malimba, Gapan, Nueva Ecija, the bus
passengers saw a cargo truck parked at the shoulder of the national highway.
Its left rear portion jutted to the outer lane, as the shoulder of the road was
too narrow to accommodate the whole truck. A kerosene lamp appeared at
the edge of the road obviously to serve as a warning device. The truck driver,
Julio Recontique, and his helper, Arturo Escala, were then replacing a flat tire.
The truck is owned by respondent A & J Trading.
Bus driver Santiago was driving at an in ordinately fast speed and failed to
notice the truck and the kerosene lamp at the edge of the road. Santiago's
passengers urged him to slow down but he paid them no heed. Santiago even
carried animated conversations with his co-employees while driving. When
the danger of collision became imminent, the bus passengers shouted
"Babangga tayo!". Santiago stepped on the brake, but it was too late. His bus
rammed into the stalled cargo truck. It caused the instant death of Santiago
and Escala, and injury to several others. Leticia and Allan Garcia were among
the injured passengers.
Leticia suffered a fracture in her pelvis and right leg. They rushed her to the
provincial hospital in Cabanatuan City where she treatment. After three days,
she was transferred to the National Orthopedic Hospital where she was
confined for more than a month. 3 She underwent an operation for partial hip
prosthesis. 4
TRANSPO | Assign No 8 | 14
Allan, on the other hand, broke a leg. He was also given emergency
treatment at the provincial hospital.
Spouses Antonio and Leticia Garcia sued Baliwag Transit, Inc., A & J Trading
and Julio Recontique for damages in the Regional Trial Court of
Bulacan. 5 Leticia sued as an injured passenger of Baliwag and as mother of
Allan. At the time of the complaint, Allan was a minor, hence, the suit initiated
by his parents in his favor.
Baliwag, A & J Trading and Recontique disclaimed responsibility for the
mishap. Baliwag alleged that the accident was caused solely by the fault and
negligence of A & J Trading and its driver, Recontique. Baliwag charged that
Recontique failed to place an early warning device at the corner of the
disabled cargo truck to warn on coming vehicles. 6 On the other hand, A & J
Trading and Recontique alleged that the accident was the result of the
negligence and reckless driving of Santiago, bus driver of Baliwag. 7
After hearing, the trial court found all the defendants liable, thus:
xxx xxx xxx
In view thereof, the Court holds that both defendants should be held liable;
the defendant Baliwag Transit, Inc. for having failed to deliver the plaintiff and
her son to their point of destination safely in violation of plaintiff's and
defendant Baliwag Transit's contractual relation.
The defendant A & J and Julio Recontique for failure to provide its cargo truck
with an early warning device in violation of the Motor Vehicle Law. 8
The trial court ordered Baliwag, A & J Trading and Recontique to pay jointly
and severally the Garcia spouses the following: (1) P25,000,00 hospitalization
and medication fee, (2) P450,000.00 loss of earnings in eight (8) years, (3)
P2,000.00 for the hospitalization of their son Allan Garcia, (4) P50,000.00
moral damages, and (5) P30,000.00 attorney's fee. 9
On appeal, the Court of Appeals modified the trial court's Decision by
absolving A & J Trading from liability and by reducing the award of attorney's
fees to P10,000.00 and loss of earnings to P300,000.00, respectively. 10
Baliwag filed the present petition for review raising the following issues:
 TRANSPO | Assign No 8 | 15

1. Did the Court of Appeals err in absolving A & J Trading from liability and Baliwag cannot evade its liability by insisting that the accident was caused
holding Baliwag solely liable for the injuries suffered by Leticia and Allan solely by the negligence of A & J Trading and Julio Recontique. It harps on
Garcia in the accident? their alleged non use of an early warning device as testified to by Col.
Demetrio dela Cruz, the station commander of Gapan, Nueva Ecija who
2. Is the amount of damages awarded by the Court of Appeals to the Garcia investigated the incident, and Francisco Romano, the bus conductor.
spouses correct?
The records do not bear out Baliwag's contention. Col. dela Cruz and Romano
We affirm the factual findings of the Court of Appeals. testified that they did not see any early warning device at the scene of the
accident. 16 They were referring to the triangular reflectorized plates in red
I
and yellow issued by the Land Transportation Office. However, the evidence
shows that Recontique and Ecala placed a kerosene lamp or torch at the edge
As a common carrier, Baliwag breached its contract of carriage when it failed
of the road, near the rear portion of the truck to serve as an early warning
to deliver its passengers, Leticia and Allan Garcia to their destination safe and
device. 17 This substantially complies with Section 34 (g) of the Land
sound. A common carrier is bound to carry its passengers safely as far as
Transportation and Traffic Code, to wit:
human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of a very
cautious person, with due regard for all the circumstances. 11 In a contract of
(g) Lights and reflector when parked or disabled. Appropriate parking
carriage, it is presumed that the common carrier was at fault or was negligent
lights or flares visible one hundred meters away shall be displayed at the
when a passenger dies or is injured. Unless the presumption is rebutted, the
corner of the vehicle whenever such vehicle is parked on highways or in
court need not even make an express finding of fault or negligence on the
places that are not well-lighted or, is placed in such manner as to endanger
part of the common carrier. This statutory presumption may only be
passing traffic. Furthermore, every motor vehicle shall be provided at all
overcome by evidence that the carrier exercised extraordinary diligence as
times with built-in reflectors or other similar warning devices either pasted,
prescribed in Articles 1733 and 1755 of the Civil Code. 12
painted or attached at its front and back which shall likewise be visible at
night at least one hundred meters away. No vehicle not provided with any of
The records are bereft of any proof to show that Baliwag exercised extra
the requirements mentioned in this subsection shall be registered. (emphasis
ordinary diligence. On the contrary, the evidence demonstrates its driver's
supplied)
recklessness. Leticia Garcia testified that the bus was running at a very high
speed despite the drizzle and the darkness of the highway. The passengers
Baliwag's argument that the kerosene lamp or torch does not substantially
pleaded for its driver to slow down, but their plea was ignored. 13 Leticia also
comply with the law is untenable. The aforequoted law clearly allows the use
revealed that the driver was smelling of liquor. 14 She could smell him as she
not only of an early warning device of the triangular reflectorized plates
was seated right behind the driver. Another passenger, Felix Cruz testified
variety but also parking lights or flares visible one hundred meters away.
that immediately before the collision, the bus driver was conversing with a
Indeed, Col. dela Cruz himself admitted that a kerosene lamp is an
co-employee. 15 All these prove the bus driver's wanton disregard for the
acceptable substitute for the reflectorized plates. 18 No negligence, therefore,
physical safety of his passengers, which makes Baliwag as a common carrier
may be imputed to A & J Trading and its driver, Recontique.
liable for damages under Article 1759 of the Civil Code:
Anent this factual issue, the analysis of evidence made by the Court of
Art. 1759. Common carriers are liable for the death of or injuries to
Appeals deserves our concurrence, viz:
passengers through the negligence or willfull acts of the former's employees,
although such employees may have acted beyond the scope of their authority xxx xxx xxx
or in violation of the orders of the common carriers.
In the case at bar, both the injured passengers of the Baliwag involved in the
This liability of the common carriers do not cease upon proof that they accident testified that they saw some sort of kerosene or a torch on the rear
exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection or portion of the truck before the accident. Baliwag Transit's conductor
supervision of their employees.

attempted to defeat such testimony by declaring that he noticed no early
warning device in front of the truck.
Among the testimonies offered by the witnesses who were present at the
scene of the accident, we rule to uphold the affirmative testimonies given by
the two injured passengers and give less credence to the testimony of the
bus conductor who solely testified that no such early warning device exists.
The testimonies of injured passengers who may well be considered as
disinterested witness appear to be natural and more probable than the
testimony given by; Francisco Romano who is undoubtedly interested in the
outcome of the case, being the conductor of the defendant-appellant Baliwag
Transit Inc.
It must be borne in mind that the situation then prevailing at the time of the
accident was admittedly drizzly and all dark. This being so, it would be
improbable and perhaps impossible on the part of the truck helper without
the torch nor the kerosene to remove the flat tires of the truck . Moreover,
witness including the bus conductor himself admitted that the passengers
shouted, that they are going to bump before the collision which consequently
caused the bus driver to apply the brake 3 to 4 meters away from the truck.
Again, without the kerosene nor the torch in front of the truck, it would be
improbable for the driver, more so the passengers to notice the truck to be
bumped by the bus considering the darkness of the place at the time of the
accident.
xxx xxx xxx
While it is true that the investigating officer testified that he found no early
warning device at the time of his investigation, We rule to give less credence
to such testimony insofar as he himself admitted on cross examination that
he did not notice the presence of any kerosene lamp at the back of the truck
because when he arrived at the scene of the accident, there were already
many people surrounding the place (TSN, Aug. 22, 1989, p. 13). He further
admitted that there exists a probability that the lights of the truck may have
been smashed by the bus at the time of the accident considering the location
of the truck where its rear portion was connected with the front portion of the
bus (TSN, March 29, 1985, pp. Investigator's testimony therefore did not
confirm nor deny the existence of such warning device, making his testimony
of little probative value. 19
We now review the amount of damages awarded to the Garcia spouses.
TRANSPO | Assign No 8 | 16
First, the propriety of the amount awarded as hospitalization and medical
fees. The award of P25,000.00 is not supported by the evidence on record.
The Garcias presented receipts marked as Exhibits "B-1" to "B-42" but their
total amounted only to P5,017.74. To be sure, Leticia testified as to the extra
amount spent for her medical needs but without more reliable evidence, her
lone testimony cannot justify the award of P25,000.00. To prove actual
damages, the best evidence available to the injured party must be presented.
The court cannot rely on uncorroborated testimony whose truth is suspect,
but must depend upon competent proof that damages have been actually
suffered. 20 Thus, we reduce the actual damages for medical and
hospitalization expenses to P5,017.74.
Second, we find as reasonable the award of P300,000.00 representing
Leticia's lost earnings. Before the accident, Leticia was engaged in
embroidery, earning P5,000.00 per month. 21 Her injuries forced her to stop
working. Considering the nature and extent of her injuries and the length of
time it would take her to recover, 22 we find it proper that Baliwag should
compensate her lost income for five (5) years. 23
Third, the award of moral damages is in accord with law. In a breach of
contract of carriage, moral damages are recoverable if the carrier, through its
agent, acted fraudulently or in bad faith. 24 The evidence show the gross
negligence of the driver of Baliwag bus which amounted to bad faith. Without
doubt, Leticia and Allan experienced physical suffering, mental anguish and
serious anxiety by reason of the accident. Leticia underwent an operation to
replace her broken hip bone with a metal plate. She was confined at the
National Orthopedic Hospital for 45 days. The young Allan was also confined
in the hospital for his foot injury. Contrary to the contention of Baliwag, the
decision of the trial court as affirmed by, the Court of Appeals awarded moral
damages to Antonio and Leticia Garcia not in their capacity as parents of
Allan. Leticia was given moral damages as an injured party. Allan was also
granted moral damages as an injured party but because of his minority, the
award in his favor has to be given to his father who represented him in the
suit.
Finally, we find the award of attorney's fees justified. The complaint for
damages was instituted by the Garcia spouses on December 15, 1982,
following the unjustified refusal of Baliwag to settle their claim. The Decision
was promulgated by the trial court only on January 29, 1991 or about nine
years later. Numerous pleadings were filed before the trial court, the appellate
court and to this Court. Given the complexity of the case and the amount of
 TRANSPO | Assign No 8 | 17

damages involved, 25
the award of attorney's fee for P10,000.00 is just and
reasonable.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Decision of the respondent Court of Appeals in CA-

G.R. CV-31246 is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION reducing the actual
damages for hospitalization and medical fees to P5,017.74. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

6. G.R. No. 85691 July 31, 1990
BACHELOR EXPRESS, INCORPORATED, and CRESENCIO
RIVERA, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (Sixth Division), RICARDO
BETER, SERGIA BETER, TEOFILO RAUTRAUT and ZOETERA
RAUTRAUT, respondents.
Aquino W. Gambe for petitioners.
Tranquilino O. Calo, Jr. for private respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals which
reversed and set aside the order of the Regional Trial Court, Branch I, Butuan
City dismissing the private respondents' complaint for collection of "a sum of
money" and finding the petitioners solidarily liable for damages in the total
amount of One Hundred Twenty Thousand Pesos (P120,000.00). The
petitioners also question the appellate court's resolution denying a motion for
reconsideration.
On August 1, 1980, Bus No. 800 owned by Bachelor Express, Inc. and driven
by Cresencio Rivera was the situs of a stampede which resulted in the death
of passengers Ornominio Beter and Narcisa Rautraut.
The evidence shows that the bus came from Davao City on its way to
Cagayan de Oro City passing Butuan City; that while at Tabon-Tabon, Butuan
City, the bus picked up a passenger; that about fifteen (15) minutes later, a
passenger at the rear portion suddenly stabbed a PC soldier which caused
commotion and panic among the passengers; that when the bus stopped,
passengers Ornominio Beter and Narcisa Rautraut were found lying down the
road, the former already dead as a result of head injuries and the latter also
suffering from severe injuries which caused her death later. The passenger
assailant alighted from the bus and ran toward the bushes but was killed by
the police. Thereafter, the heirs of Ornominio Beter and Narcisa Rautraut,
private respondents herein (Ricardo Beter and Sergia Beter are the parents of
Ornominio while Teofilo Rautraut and Zoetera [should be Zotera] Rautraut are
the parents of Narcisa) filed a complaint for "sum of money" against Bachelor
Express, Inc. its alleged owner Samson Yasay and the driver Rivera.
TRANSPO | Assign No 8 | 18
In their answer, the petitioners denied liability for the death of Ornominio
Beter and Narcisa Rautraut. They alleged that ... the driver was able to
transport his passengers safely to their respective places of destination
except Ornominio Beter and Narcisa Rautraut who jumped off the bus without
the knowledge and consent, much less, the fault of the driver and conductor
and the defendants in this case; the defendant corporation had exercised due
diligence in the choice of its employees to avoid as much as possible
accidents; the incident on August 1, 1980 was not a traffic accident or
vehicular accident; it was an incident or event very much beyond the control
of the defendants; defendants were not parties to the incident complained of
as it was an act of a third party who is not in any way connected with the
defendants and of which the latter have no control and supervision; ..."
(Rollo, pp. 112-113).itc-asl
After due trial, the trial court issued an order dated August 8, 1985
dismissing the complaint.
Upon appeal however, the trial court's decision was reversed and set aside.
The dispositive portion of the decision of the Court of Appeals states:
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a
new one entered finding the appellees jointly and solidarily liable to pay the
plaintiffs-appellants the following amounts:
1) To the heirs of Ornominio Beter, the amount of Seventy Five Thousand
Pesos (P75,000.00) in loss of earnings and support, moral damages, straight
death indemnity and attorney's fees; and,
2) To the heirs of Narcisa Rautraut, the amount of Forty Five Thousand Pesos
(P45,000.00) for straight death indemnity, moral damages and attorney's
fees. Costs against appellees. (Rollo, pp. 71-72)
The petitioners now pose the following questions
What was the proximate cause of the whole incident? Why were the
passengers on board the bus panicked (sic) and why were they shoving one
another? Why did Narcisa Rautraut and Ornominio Beter jump off from the
running bus?
The petitioners opine that answers to these questions are material to arrive at
"a fair, just and equitable judgment." (Rollo, p. 5) They claim that the
assailed decision is based on a misapprehension of facts and its conclusion is
grounded on speculation, surmises or conjectures.

As regards the proximate cause of the death of Ornominio Beter and Narcisa
Rautraut, the petitioners maintain that it was the act of the passenger who
ran amuck and stabbed another passenger of the bus. They contend that the
stabbing incident triggered off the commotion and panic among the
passengers who pushed one another and that presumably out of fear and
moved by that human instinct of self-preservation Beter and Rautraut jumped
off the bus while the bus was still running resulting in their untimely death."
(Rollo, p. 6) Under these circumstances, the petitioners asseverate that they
were not negligent in the performance of their duties and that the incident
was completely and absolutely attributable to a third person, the passenger
who ran amuck, for without his criminal act, Beter and Rautraut could not
have been subjected to fear and shock which compelled them to jump off the
running bus. They argue that they should not be made liable for damages
arising from acts of third persons over whom they have no control or
supervision.
Furthermore, the petitioners maintain that the driver of the bus, before,
during and after the incident was driving cautiously giving due regard to
traffic rules, laws and regulations. The petitioners also argue that they are not
insurers of their passengers as ruled by the trial court.
The liability, if any, of the petitioners is anchored on culpa contractual or states that the vehicular incident resulting in the death of passengers Beter
breach of contract of carriage. The applicable provisions of law under the New and Rautraut was caused by force majeure or caso fortuito over which the
Civil Code are as follows:
ART. 1732. Common carriers are persons, corporations, firms or associations
engaged in the business of carrying or transporting passengers or goods or
both by land, water, or air, for compensation, offering their services to the
public.
ART. 1733. Common carriers, from the nature of their business and for
reasons of public policy, are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the
vigilance over the goods and for the safety of the passengers transported by
them, according to all the circumstances of each case.
xxx xxx xxx
ART. 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far
as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very
cautious persons, with a due regard for all the circumstances.
ART. 1756. In case of death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers are
presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they
TRANSPO | Assign No 8 | 19
prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed in Articles
1733 and 1755.
There is no question that Bachelor Express, Inc. is a common carrier. Hence,
from the nature of its business and for reasons of public policy Bachelor
Express, Inc. is bound to carry its passengers safely as far as human care and
foresight can provide using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons,
with a due regard for all the circumstances.
In the case at bar, Ornominio Beter and Narcisa Rautraut were passengers of
a bus belonging to petitioner Bachelor Express, Inc. and, while passengers of
the bus, suffered injuries which caused their death. Consequently, pursuant
to Article 1756 of the Civil Code, petitioner Bachelor Express, Inc. is
presumed to have acted negligently unless it can prove that it had observed
extraordinary diligence in accordance with Articles 1733 and 1755 of the New
Civil Code.
Bachelor Express, Inc. denies liability for the death of Beter and Rautraut on
its posture that the death of the said passengers was caused by a third
person who was beyond its control and supervision. In effect, the petitioner,
in order to overcome the presumption of fault or negligence under the law,
common carrier did not have any control.
Article 1174 of the present Civil Code states:
Except in cases expressly specified by law, or when it is otherwise declared by
stipulations, or when the nature of the obligation requires the assumption of
risk, no person shall be responsible for those events which could not be
foreseen, or which though foreseen, were inevitable.
The above-mentioned provision was substantially copied from Article 1105 of
the old Civil Code which states"
No one shall be liable for events which could not be foreseen or which, even if
foreseen, were inevitable, with the exception of the cases in which the law
expressly provides otherwise and those in which the obligation itself imposes
liability.
In the case of Lasam v. Smith (45 Phil. 657 [1924]), we defined "events"
which cannot be foreseen and which, having been foreseen, are inevitable in
the following manner:

... The Spanish authorities regard the language employed as an effort to
define the term 'caso fortuito' and hold that the two expressions are
synonymous. (Manresa Comentarios al Codigo Civil Espaol, vol. 8, pp. 88 et
seq.; Scaevola, Codigo Civil, vol. 19, pp. 526 et seq.)
The antecedent to Article 1105 is found in Law II, Title 33, Partida 7, which
defines caso fortuito as 'occasion que acaese por aventura de que non se
puede ante ver. E son estos, derrivamientos de casas e fuego que enciende a
so ora, e quebrantamiento de navio, fuerca de ladrones' (An event that takes
place by incident and could not have been foreseen. Examples of this are
destruction of houses, unexpected fire, shipwreck, violence of robbers ...)
Escriche defines caso fortuito as an unexpected event or act of God which
could neither be foreseen nor resisted, such as floods, torrents, shipwrecks,
conflagrations, lightning, compulsion, insurrections, destruction of buildings
by unforeseen accidents and other occurrences of a similar nature.
In discussing and analyzing the term caso fortuito the Enciclopedia Juridica
Espaola says: 'In a legal sense and, consequently, also in relation to
contracts, a caso fortuito presents the following essential characteristics: (1)
The cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence, or of the failure of
the debtor to comply with his obligation, must be independent of the human
will. (2) It must be impossible to foresee the event which constitutes the caso
fortuito, or if it can be foreseen, it must be impossible to avoid. (3) The
occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his
obligation in a normal manner. And (4) the obligor (debtor) must be free from
any participation in the aggravation of the injury resulting to the creditor. (5)
Enciclopedia Juridica Espaola, 309)
As will be seen, these authorities agree that some extraordinary circumstance
independent of the will of the obligor or of his employees, is an essential
element of a caso fortuito. ...
The running amuck of the passenger was the proximate cause of the incident
as it triggered off a commotion and panic among the passengers such that
the passengers started running to the sole exit shoving each other resulting
in the falling off the bus by passengers Beter and Rautraut causing them fatal
injuries. The sudden act of the passenger who stabbed another passenger in
the bus is within the context of force majeure.
However, in order that a common carrier may be absolved from liability in
case of force majeure, it is not enough that the accident was caused by force
TRANSPO | Assign No 8 | 20
majeure. The common carrier must still prove that it was not negligent in
causing the injuries resulting from such accident. Thus, as early as 1912, we
ruled:
From all the foregoing, it is concluded that the defendant is not liable for the
loss and damage of the goods shipped on the lorcha Pilar by the Chinaman,
Ong Bien Sip, inasmuch as such loss and damage were the result of a
fortuitous event or force majeure, and there was no negligence or lack of
care and diligence on the part of the defendant company or its agents. (Tan
Chiong Sian v. Inchausti & Co., 22 Phil. 152 [1912]; Emphasis supplied).
This principle was reiterated in a more recent case, Batangas Laguna Tayabas
Co. v. Intermediate Appellate Court (167 SCRA 379 [1988]), wherein we
ruled:
... [F]or their defense of force majeure or act of God to prosper the accident
must be due to natural causes and exclusively without human intervention.
(Emphasis supplied)
Therefore, the next question to be determined is whether or not the
petitioner's common carrier observed extraordinary diligence to safeguard the
lives of its passengers.
In this regard the trial court and the appellate court arrived at conflicting
factual findings.
The trial court found the following facts:
The parties presented conflicting evidence as to how the two deceased
Narcisa Rautruat and Ornominio Beter met their deaths.
However, from the evidence adduced by the plaintiffs, the Court could not see
why the two deceased could have fallen off the bus when their own witnesses
testified that when the commotion ensued inside the bus, the passengers
pushed and shoved each other towards the door apparently in order to get off
from the bus through the door. But the passengers also could not pass
through the door because according to the evidence the door was locked.
On the other hand, the Court is inclined to give credence to the evidence
adduced by the defendants that when the commotion ensued inside the bus,
the two deceased panicked and, in state of shock and fear, they jumped off
from the bus by passing through the window.

It is the prevailing rule and settled jurisprudence that transportation
companies are not insurers of their passengers. The evidence on record does
not show that defendants' personnel were negligent in their duties. The
defendants' personnel have every right to accept passengers absent any
manifestation of violence or drunkenness. If and when such passengers harm
other passengers without the knowledge of the transportation company's
personnel, the latter should not be faulted. (Rollo, pp. 46-47)
A thorough examination of the records, however, show that there are material
facts ignored by the trial court which were discussed by the appellate court to
arrive at a different conclusion. These circumstances show that the petitioner
common carrier was negligent in the provision of safety precautions so that
its passengers may be transported safely to their destinations. The appellate
court states:
A critical eye must be accorded the lower court's conclusions of fact in its
tersely written ratio decidendi. The lower court concluded that the door of the
bus was closed; secondly, the passengers, specifically the two deceased,
jumped out of the window. The lower court therefore concluded that the
defendant common carrier is not liable for the death of the said passengers
which it implicitly attributed to the unforeseen acts of the unidentified
passenger who went amuck.
There is nothing in the record to support the conclusion that the solitary door
of the bus was locked as to prevent the passengers from passing through.
Leonila Cullano, testifying for the defense, clearly stated that the conductor
opened the door when the passengers were shouting that the bus stop while
they were in a state of panic. Sergia Beter categorically stated that she
actually saw her son fall from the bus as the door was forced open by the
force of the onrushing passengers.
Pedro Collango, on the other hand, testified that he shut the door after the
last passenger had boarded the bus. But he had quite conveniently neglected
to say that when the passengers had panicked, he himself panicked and had
gone to open the door. Portions of the testimony of Leonila Cullano, quoted
below, are illuminating:
xxx xxx xxx
Q When you said the conductor opened the door, the door at the front or rear
portion of the bus?
A Front door.
TRANSPO | Assign No 8 | 21
Q And these two persons whom you said alighted, where did they pass, the
fron(t) door or rear door?
A Front door.
xxx xxx xxx
(Tsn., p. 4, Aug. 8, 1984)
xxx xxx xxx
Q What happened after there was a commotion at the rear portion of the
bus?
A When the commotion occurred, I stood up and I noticed that there was a
passenger who was sounded (sic). The conductor panicked because the
passengers were shouting 'stop, stop'. The conductor opened the bus.'
(Tsn. p. 3, August 8, 1984).
Accordingly, there is no reason to believe that the deceased passengers
jumped from the window when it was entirely possible for them to have
alighted through the door. The lower court's reliance on the testimony of
Pedro Collango, as the conductor and employee of the common carrier, is
unjustified, in the light of the clear testimony of Leonila Cullano as the sole
uninterested eyewitness of the entire episode. Instead we find Pedro
Collango's testimony to be infused by bias and fraught with inconsistencies, if
not notably unreliable for lack of veracity. On direct examination, he testified:
xxx xxx xxx
Q So what happened to the passengers inside your bus?
A Some of the passengers jumped out of the window.
COURT:
Q While the bus was in motion?
A Yes, your Honor, but the speed was slow because we have just picked up a
passenger.
Atty. Gambe:

Q You said that at the time of the incident the bus was running slow because
you have just picked up a passenger. Can you estimate what was your speed
at that time?
Atty. Calo:
No basis, your Honor, he is neither a driver nor a conductor.
COURT:
Let the witness answer. Estimate only, the conductor experienced.
Witness:
Not less than 30 to 40 miles.
COURT:
Kilometers or miles?
A Miles.
Atty. Gambe:
Q That is only your estimate by your experience?
A Yes, sir, estimate.
(Tsn., pp. 4-5, Oct. 17, 1983).
At such speed of not less than 30 to 40 miles ..., or about 48 to 65 kilometers
per hour, the speed of the bus could scarcely be considered slow considering
that according to Collango himself, the bus had just come from a full stop
after picking a passenger (Tsn, p. 4, Id.) and that the bus was still on its
second or third gear (Tsn., p. 12, Id.).
In the light of the foregoing, the negligence of the common carrier, through
its employees, consisted of the lack of extraordinary diligence required of
common carriers, in exercising vigilance and utmost care of the safety of its
passengers, exemplified by the driver's belated stop and the reckless opening
of the doors of the bus while the same was travelling at an appreciably fast
speed. At the same time, the common carrier itself acknowledged, through its
administrative officer, Benjamin Granada, that the bus was commissioned to
travel and take on passengers and the public at large, while equipped with
TRANSPO | Assign No 8 | 22
only a solitary door for a bus its size and loading capacity, in contravention of
rules and regulations provided for under the Land Transportation and Traffic
Code (RA 4136 as amended.) (Rollo, pp. 23-26)
Considering the factual findings of the Court of Appeals-the bus driver did not
immediately stop the bus at the height of the commotion; the bus was
speeding from a full stop; the victims fell from the bus door when it was
opened or gave way while the bus was still running; the conductor panicked
and blew his whistle after people had already fallen off the bus; and the bus
was not properly equipped with doors in accordance with law-it is clear that
the petitioners have failed to overcome the presumption of fault and
negligence found in the law governing common carriers.
The petitioners' argument that the petitioners "are not insurers of their
passengers" deserves no merit in view of the failure of the petitioners to
prove that the deaths of the two passengers were exclusively due to force
majeure and not to the failure of the petitioners to observe extraordinary
diligence in transporting safely the passengers to their destinations as
warranted by law. (See Batangas Laguna Tayabas Co. v. Intermediate
Appellate Court, supra).
The petitioners also contend that the private respondents failed to show to
the court that they are the parents of Ornominio Beter and Narcisa Rautraut
respectively and therefore have no legal personality to sue the petitioners.
This argument deserves scant consideration. We find this argument a belated
attempt on the part of the petitioners to avoid liability for the deaths of Beter
and Rautraut. The private respondents were Identified as the parents of the
victims by witnesses during the trial and the trial court recognized them as
such. The trial court dismissed the complaint solely on the ground that the
petitioners were not negligent.
Finally, the amount of damages awarded to the heirs of Beter and Rautraut by
the appellate court is supported by the evidence. The appellate court stated:
Ornominio Beter was 32 years of age at the time of his death, single, in good
health and rendering support and service to his mother. As far as Narcisa
Rautraut is concerned, the only evidence adduced is to the effect that at her
death, she was 23 years of age, in good health and without visible means of
support.
In accordance with Art. 1764 in conjunction with Art. 2206 of the Civil Code,
and established jurisprudence, several factors may be considered in
 TRANSPO | Assign No 8 | 23

determining the award of damages, namely: 1) life expectancy (considering
the state of health of the deceased and the mortality tables are deemed
conclusive) and loss of earning capacity; (2) pecuniary loss, loss of support
and service; and (3) moral and mental suffering (Alcantara, et al. v. Surro, et
al., 93 Phil. 470).
In the case of People v. Daniel (No. L-66551, April 25, 1985, 136 SCRA 92, at
page 104), the High Tribunal, reiterating the rule in Villa Rey Transit, Inc. v.
Court of Appeals (31 SCRA 511), stated that the amount of loss of earring
capacity is based mainly on two factors, namely, (1) the number of years on
the basis of which the damages shall be computed; and (2) the rate at which
the losses sustained by the heirs should be fixed.
In the case of Narcisa Rautraut, her heirs are entitled to a straight death
indemnity of Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00), to moral damages in the
amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) and Five Thousand Pesos
(P5,000.00) as attorney's fees, or a total of Forty Five Thousand Pesos
(P45,000.00) as total indemnity for her death in the absence of any evidence
that she had visible means of support. (Rollo, pp. 30-31)
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED. The questioned decision
dated May 19, 1988 and the resolution dated August 1, 1988 of the Court of
Appeals are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

As the formula adopted in the case of Davila v. Philippine Air Lines, 49 SCRA
497, at the age of 30 one's normal life expectancy is 33-1/3 years based on
the American Expectancy Table of Mortality (2/3 x 80-32).itc-asl By taking
into account the pace and nature of the life of a carpenter, it is reasonable to
make allowances for these circumstances and reduce the life expectancy of
the deceased Ornominio Beter to 25 years (People v. Daniel, supra). To fix the
rate of losses it must be noted that Art. 2206 refers to gross earnings less
necessary living expenses of the deceased, in other words, only net earnings
are to be considered (People v. Daniel, supra; Villa Rey Transit, Inc. v. Court
of Appeals, supra).

Applying the foregoing rules with respect to Ornominio Beter, it is both just
and reasonable, considering his social standing and position, to fix the
deductible, living and incidental expenses at the sum of Four Hundred Pesos
(P400.00) a month, or Four Thousand Eight Hundred Pesos (P4,800.00)
annually. As to his income, considering the irregular nature of the work of a
daily wage carpenter which is seasonal, it is safe to assume that he shall have
work for twenty (20) days a month at Twenty Five Pesos (P150,000.00) for
twenty five years. Deducting therefrom his necessary expenses, his heirs
would be entitled to Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) representing loss of
support and service (P150,000.00 less P120,000.00). In addition, his heirs
are entitled to Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) as straight death
indemnity pursuant to Article 2206 (People v. Daniel, supra). For damages for
their moral and mental anguish, his heirs are entitled to the reasonable sum
of P10,000.00 as an exception to the general rule against moral damages in
case of breach of contract rule Art. 2200 (Necesito v. Paras, 104 Phil. 75). As
attorney's fees, Beter's heirs are entitled to P5,000.00. All in all, the plaintiff-
appellants Ricardo and Sergia Beter as heirs of their son Ornominio are
entitled to an indemnity of Seventy Five Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00).

7. G.R. No. L-55300 March 15, 1990
FRANKLIN G. GACAL and CORAZON M. GACAL, the latter assisted by
her husband, FRANKLIN G. GACAL, petitioners,
vs.
PHILIPPINE AIR LINES, INC., and THE HONORABLE PEDRO SAMSON
C. ANIMAS, in his capacity as PRESIDING JUDGE of the COURT OF
FIRST INSTANCE OF SOUTH COTABATO, BRANCH I, respondents.
Vicente A. Mirabueno for petitioners.
Siguion Reyna, Montecillo & Ongsiako for private respondent.
PARAS, J.:
This is a, petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of First
Instance of South Cotabato, Branch 1, * promulgated on August 26, 1980
dismissing three (3) consolidated cases for damages: Civil Case No. 1701,
Civil Case No. 1773 and Civil Case No. 1797 (Rollo, p. 35).
The facts, as found by respondent court, are as follows:
Plaintiffs Franklin G. Gacal and his wife, Corazon M. Gacal, Bonifacio S.
Anislag and his wife, Mansueta L. Anislag, and the late Elma de Guzman,
were then passengers boarding defendant's BAC 1-11 at Davao Airport for a
flight to Manila, not knowing that on the same flight, Macalinog, Taurac
Pendatum known as Commander Zapata, Nasser Omar, Liling Pusuan Radia,
Dimantong Dimarosing and Mike Randa, all of Marawi City and members of
the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), were their co-passengers, three
(3) armed with grenades, two (2) with .45 caliber pistols, and one with a .22
caliber pistol. Ten (10) minutes after take off at about 2:30 in the afternoon,
the hijackers brandishing their respective firearms announced the hijacking of
the aircraft and directed its pilot to fly to Libya. With the pilot explaining to
them especially to its leader, Commander Zapata, of the inherent fuel
limitations of the plane and that they are not rated for international flights,
the hijackers directed the pilot to fly to Sabah. With the same explanation,
they relented and directed the aircraft to land at Zamboanga Airport,
Zamboanga City for refueling. The aircraft landed at 3:00 o'clock in the
afternoon of May 21, 1976 at Zamboanga Airport. When the plane began to
taxi at the runway, it was met by two armored cars of the military with
machine guns pointed at the plane, and it stopped there. The rebels thru its
TRANSPO | Assign No 8 | 24
commander demanded that a DC-aircraft take them to Libya with the
President of the defendant company as hostage and that they be given
$375,000 and six (6) armalites, otherwise they will blow up the plane if their
demands will not be met by the government and Philippine Air Lines.
Meanwhile, the passengers were not served any food nor water and it was
only on May 23, a Sunday, at about 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon that they
were served 1/4 slice of a sandwich and 1/10 cup of PAL water. After that,
relatives of the hijackers were allowed to board the plane but immediately
after they alighted therefrom, an armored car bumped the stairs. That
commenced the battle between the military and the hijackers which led
ultimately to the liberation of the surviving crew and the passengers, with the
final score of ten (10) passengers and three (3) hijackers dead on the spot
and three (3) hijackers captured.
City Fiscal Franklin G. Gacal was unhurt. Mrs. Corazon M. Gacal suffered
injuries in the course of her jumping out of the plane when it was peppered
with bullets by the army and after two (2) hand grenades exploded inside the
plane. She was hospitalized at General Santos Doctors Hospital, General
Santos City, for two (2) days, spending P245.60 for hospital and medical
expenses, Assistant City Fiscal Bonifacio S. Anislag also escaped unhurt but
Mrs. Anislag suffered a fracture at the radial bone of her left elbow for which
she was hospitalized and operated on at the San Pedro Hospital, Davao City,
and therefore, at Davao Regional Hospital, Davao City, spending P4,500.00.
Elma de Guzman died because of that battle. Hence, the action of damages
instituted by the plaintiffs demanding the following damages, to wit:
Civil Case No. 1701
City Fiscal Franklin G. Gacal and Mrs. Corazon M. Gacal actual damages:
P245.60 for hospital and medical expenses of Mrs Gacal; P8,995.00 for their
personal belongings which were lost and not recovered; P50,000.00 each for
moral damages; and P5,000.00 for attorney's fees, apart from the prayer for
an award of exemplary damages (Record, pp. 4-6, Civil Case No. 1701).
Civil Case No. 1773
xxx xxx xxx
Civil Case No. 1797
xxx xxx xxx

The trial court, on August 26, 1980, dismissed the complaints finding that all
the damages sustained in the premises were attributed to force majeure.
On September 12, 1980 the spouses Franklin G. Gacal and Corazon M. Gacal,
plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 1701, filed a notice of appeal with the lower court
on pure questions of law (Rollo, p. 55) and the petition for review
on certiorari was filed with this Court on October 20, 1980 (Rollo, p. 30).
The Court gave due course to the petition (Rollo, p. 147) and both parties
filed their respective briefs but petitioner failed to file reply brief which was
noted by the Court in the resolution dated May 3, 1982 (Rollo, p. 183).
Petitioners alleged that the main cause of the unfortunate incident is the
gross, wanton and inexcusable negligence of respondent Airline personnel in
their failure to frisk the passengers adequately in order to discover hidden
weapons in the bodies of the six (6) hijackers. They claimed that despite the
prevalence of skyjacking, PAL did not use a metal detector which is the most
effective means of discovering potential skyjackers among the passengers
(Rollo, pp. 6-7).
Respondent Airline averred that in the performance of its obligation to safely
transport passengers as far as human care and foresight can provide, it has
exercised the utmost diligence of a very cautious person with due regard to
all circumstances, but the security checks and measures and surveillance
precautions in all flights, including the inspection of baggages and cargo and
frisking of passengers at the Davao Airport were performed and rendered
solely by military personnel who under appropriate authority had assumed
exclusive jurisdiction over the same in all airports in the Philippines.
Similarly, the negotiations with the hijackers were a purely government
matter and a military operation, handled by and subject to the absolute and
exclusive jurisdiction of the military authorities. Hence, it concluded that the
accident that befell RP-C1161 was caused by fortuitous event, force
majeure and other causes beyond the control of the respondent Airline.
The determinative issue in this case is whether or not hijacking or air piracy
during martial law and under the circumstances obtaining herein, is
a caso fortuito or force majeure which would exempt an aircraft from
payment of damages to its passengers whose lives were put in jeopardy and
whose personal belongings were lost during the incident.
Under the Civil Code, common carriers are required to exercise extraordinary
diligence in their vigilance over the goods and for the safety of passengers
TRANSPO | Assign No 8 | 25
transported by them, according to all the circumstances of each case (Article
1733). They are presumed at fault or to have acted negligently whenever a
passenger dies or is injured (Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. National Labor
Relations Commission, 124 SCRA 583 [1983]) or for the loss, destruction or
deterioration of goods in cases other than those enumerated in Article 1734
of the Civil Code (Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate
Court, 150 SCRA 463 [1987]).
The source of a common carrier's legal liability is the contract of carriage, and
by entering into said contract, it binds itself to carry the passengers safely as
far as human care and foresight can provide. There is breach of this
obligation if it fails to exert extraordinary diligence according to all the
circumstances of the case in exercise of the utmost diligence of a very
cautious person (Isaac v. Ammen Transportation Co., 101 Phil. 1046 [1957];
Juntilla v. Fontanar, 136 SCRA 624 [1985]).
It is the duty of a common carrier to overcome the presumption of negligence
(Philippine National Railways v. Court of Appeals, 139 SCRA 87 [1985]) and it
must be shown that the carrier had observed the required extraordinary
diligence of a very cautious person as far as human care and foresight can
provide or that the accident was caused by a fortuitous event (Estrada v.
Consolacion, 71 SCRA 523 [1976]). Thus, as ruled by this Court, no person
shall be responsible for those "events which could not be foreseen or which
though foreseen were inevitable. (Article 1174, Civil Code). The term is
synonymous with caso fortuito (Lasam v. Smith, 45 Phil. 657 [1924]) which is
of the same sense as "force majeure" (Words and Phrases Permanent Edition,
Vol. 17, p. 362).
In order to constitute a caso fortuito or force majeure that would exempt a
person from liability under Article 1174 of the Civil Code, it is necessary that
the following elements must concur: (a) the cause of the breach of the
obligation must be independent of the human will (the will of the debtor or
the obligor); (b) the event must be either unforeseeable or unavoidable; (c)
the event must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his
obligation in a normal manner; and (d) the debtor must be free from any
participation in, or aggravation of the injury to the creditor (Lasam v. Smith,
45 Phil. 657 [1924]; Austria v. Court of Appeals, 39 SCRA 527 [1971];
Estrada v. Consolacion, supra; Vasquez v. Court of Appeals, 138 SCRA 553
[1985]; Juan F. Nakpil & Sons v. Court of Appeals, 144 SCRA 596
[1986]). Caso fortuito or force majeure, by definition, are extraordinary
events not foreseeable or avoidable, events that could not be foreseen, or
which, though foreseen, are inevitable. It is, therefore, not enough that the
 TRANSPO | Assign No 8 | 26

event should not have been foreseen or anticipated, as is commonly believed,

but it must be one impossible to foresee or to avoid. The mere difficulty to
foresee the happening is not impossibility to foresee the same (Republic v.
Luzon Stevedoring Corporation, 21 SCRA 279 [1967]).

Applying the above guidelines to the case at bar, the failure to transport
petitioners safely from Davao to Manila was due to the skyjacking incident
staged by six (6) passengers of the same plane, all members of the Moro
National Liberation Front (MNLF), without any connection with private
respondent, hence, independent of the will of either the PAL or of its
passengers.

Under normal circumstances, PAL might have foreseen the skyjacking incident
which could have been avoided had there been a more thorough frisking of
passengers and inspection of baggages as authorized by R.A. No. 6235. But
the incident in question occurred during Martial Law where there was a
military take-over of airport security including the frisking of passengers and
the inspection of their luggage preparatory to boarding domestic and
international flights. In fact military take-over was specifically announced on
October 20, 1973 by General Jose L. Rancudo, Commanding General of the
Philippine Air Force in a letter to Brig. Gen. Jesus Singson, then Director of
the Civil Aeronautics Administration (Rollo, pp. 71-72) later confirmed shortly
before the hijacking incident of May 21, 1976 by Letter of Instruction No. 399
issued on April 28, 1976 (Rollo, p. 72).

Otherwise stated, these events rendered it impossible for PAL to perform its
obligations in a nominal manner and obviously it cannot be faulted with
negligence in the performance of duty taken over by the Armed Forces of the
Philippines to the exclusion of the former.

Finally, there is no dispute that the fourth element has also been satisfied.
Consequently the existence of force majeure has been established exempting
respondent PAL from the payment of damages to its passengers who suffered
death or injuries in their persons and for loss of their baggages.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit

and the decision of the Court of First Instance of South Cotabato, Branch I is
hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

8. G.R. No. L-22272 June 26, 1967
ANTONIA MARANAN, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
PASCUAL PEREZ, ET AL., defendants.
PASCUAL PEREZ, defendant appellant.
Pedro Panganiban for plaintiff-appellant.
Magno T. Bueser for defendant-appellant.
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
Rogelio Corachea, on October 18, 1960, was a passenger in a taxicab owned
and operated by Pascual Perez when he was stabbed and killed by the driver,
Simeon Valenzuela.
Valenzuela was prosecuted for homicide in the Court of First Instance of
Batangas. Found guilty, he was sentenced to suffer imprisonment and to
indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P6,000. Appeal from said
conviction was taken to the Court of Appeals.1wph1.t
On December 6 1961, while appeal was pending in the Court of Appeals,
Antonia Maranan, Rogelio's mother, filed an action in the Court of First
Instance of Batangas to recover damages from Perez and Valenzuela for the
death of her son. Defendants asserted that the deceased was killed in self-
defense, since he first assaulted the driver by stabbing him from behind.
Defendant Perez further claimed that the death was a caso fortuito for which
the carrier was not liable.
The court a quo, after trial, found for the plaintiff and awarded her P3,000 as
damages against defendant Perez. The claim against defendant Valenzuela
was dismissed. From this ruling, both plaintiff and defendant Perez appealed
to this Court, the former asking for more damages and the latter insisting on
non-liability. Subsequently, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of
conviction earlier mentioned, during the pendency of the herein appeal, and
on May 19, 1964, final judgment was entered therein. (Rollo, p. 33).
Defendant-appellant relies solely on the ruling enunciated in Gillaco v. Manila
Railroad Co., 97 Phil. 884, that the carrier is under no absolute liability for
assaults of its employees upon the passengers. The attendant facts and
controlling law of that case and the one at bar are very different however. In
the Gillaco case, the passenger was killed outside the scope and the course of
duty of the guilty employee. As this Court there found:
TRANSPO | Assign No 8 | 27
x x x when the crime took place, the guard Devesa had no duties to
discharge in connection with the transportation of the deceased from
Calamba to Manila. The stipulation of facts is clear that when Devesa shot
and killed Gillaco, Devesa was assigned to guard the Manila-San Fernando (La
Union) trains, and he was at Paco Station awaiting transportation to Tutuban,
the starting point of the train that he was engaged to guard. In fact, his tour
of duty was to start at 9:00 two hours after the commission of the
crime. Devesa was therefore under no obligation to safeguard the passengers
of the Calamba-Manila train, where the deceased was riding; and the killing
of Gillaco was not done in line of duty. The position of Devesa at the time was
that of another would be passenger, a stranger also awaiting transportation,
and not that of an employee assigned to discharge any of the duties that the
Railroad had assumed by its contract with the deceased. As a result, Devesa's
assault can not be deemed in law a breach of Gillaco's contract of
transportation by a servant or employee of the carrier. . . . (Emphasis
supplied)
Now here, the killing was perpetrated by the driver of the very cab
transporting the passenger, in whose hands the carrier had entrusted the
duty of executing the contract of carriage. In other words, unlike
the Gillaco case, the killing of the passenger here took place in the course of
duty of the guilty employee and when the employee was acting within the
scope of his duties.
Moreover, the Gillaco case was decided under the provisions of the Civil Code
of 1889 which, unlike the present Civil Code, did not impose upon common
carriers absolute liability for the safety of passengers against wilful assaults
or negligent acts committed by their employees. The death of the passenger
in the Gillaco case was truly a fortuitous event which exempted the carrier
from liability. It is true that Art. 1105 of the old Civil Code on fortuitous
events has been substantially reproduced in Art. 1174 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines but both articles clearly remove from their exempting effect the
case where the law expressly provides for liability in spite of the occurrence of
force majeure. And herein significantly lies the statutory difference between
the old and present Civil Codes, in the backdrop of the factual situation before
Us, which further accounts for a different result in the Gillaco case. Unlike the
old Civil Code, the new Civil Code of the Philippines expressly makes the
common carrier liable for intentional assaults committed by its employees
upon its passengers, by the wording of Art. 1759 which categorically states
that

Common carriers are liable for the death of or injuries to passengers through
the negligence or willful acts of the former's employees, although such
employees may have acted beyond the scope of their authority or in violation
of the orders of the common carriers.
The Civil Code provisions on the subject of Common Carriers 1 are new and
were taken from Anglo-American Law.2 There, the basis of the carrier's
liability for assaults on passengers committed by its drivers rests either on
(1) the doctrine of respondeat superior or (2) the principle that it is the
carrier's implied duty to transport the passenger safely.3
Under the first, which is the minority view, the carrier is liable only when the
act of the employee is within the scope of his authority and duty. It is not
sufficient that the act be within the course of employment only.4
Under the second view, upheld by the majority and also by the later cases, it
is enough that the assault happens within the course of the employee's duty.
It is no defense for the carrier that the act was done in excess of authority or
in disobedience of the carrier's orders. 5 The carrier's liability here is absolute
in the sense that it practically secures the passengers from assaults
committed by its own employees.6
As can be gleaned from Art. 1759, the Civil Code of the Philippines evidently
follows the rule based on the second view. At least three very cogent reasons
underlie this rule. As explained in Texas Midland R.R. v. Monroe, 110 Tex. 97,
216 S.W. 388, 389-390, and Haver v. Central Railroad Co., 43 LRA 84, 85:
(1) the special undertaking of the carrier requires that it furnish its passenger
that full measure of protection afforded by the exercise of the high degree of
care prescribed by the law, inter alia from violence and insults at the hands of
strangers and other passengers, but above all, from the acts of the carrier's
own servants charged with the passenger's safety; (2) said liability of the
carrier for the servant's violation of duty to passengers, is the result of the
formers confiding in the servant's hands the performance of his contract to
safely transport the passenger, delegating therewith the duty of protecting
the passenger with the utmost care prescribed by law; and (3) as between
the carrier and the passenger, the former must bear the risk of wrongful acts
or negligence of the carrier's employees against passengers, since it, and not
the passengers, has power to select and remove them.
Accordingly, it is the carrier's strict obligation to select its drivers and similar
employees with due regard not only to their technical competence and
TRANSPO | Assign No 8 | 28
physical ability, but also, no less important, to their total personality,
including their patterns of behavior, moral fibers, and social attitude.
Applying this stringent norm to the facts in this case, therefore, the lower
court rightly adjudged the defendant carrier liable pursuant to Art. 1759 of
the Civil Code. The dismissal of the claim against the defendant driver was
also correct. Plaintiff's action was predicated on breach of contract of
carriage7 and the cab driver was not a party thereto. His civil liability is
covered in the criminal case wherein he was convicted by final judgment.
In connection with the award of damages, the court a quo granted only
P3,000 to plaintiff-appellant. This is the minimum compensatory damages
amount recoverable under Art. 1764 in connection with Art. 2206 of the Civil
Code when a breach of contract results in the passenger's death. As has been
the policy followed by this Court, this minimal award should be increased to
P6,000. As to other alleged actual damages, the lower court's finding that
plaintiff's evidence thereon was not convincing, 8 should not be disturbed. Still,
Arts. 2206 and 1764 award moral damages in addition to compensatory
damages, to the parents of the passenger killed to compensate for the mental
anguish they suffered. A claim therefor, having been properly made, it
becomes the court's duty to award moral damages. 9 Plaintiff demands P5,000
as moral damages; however, in the circumstances, We consider P3,000 moral
damages, in addition to the P6,000 damages afore-stated, as sufficient.
Interest upon such damages are also due to plaintiff-appellant. 10
Wherefore, with the modification increasing the award of actual damages in
plaintiff's favor to P6,000, plus P3,000.00 moral damages, with legal interest
on both from the filing of the complaint on December 6, 1961 until the whole
amount is paid, the judgment appealed from is affirmed in all other respects.
No costs. So ordered.
 TRANSPO | Assign No 8 | 29

9. G.R. No. 144723 February 27, 2006 Fiera; that only one tire mark from the front right wheel of the cargo truck
was seen on the road. A sketch of the accident was drawn by investigator
LARRY ESTACION, Petitioner, Mateo Rubia showing the relative positions of the two vehicles, their distances
vs. from the shoulder of the road and the skid marks of the right front wheel of
NOE BERNARDO, thru and his guardian ad litem ARLIE BERNARDO, the truck measuring about 48 feet.
CECILIA BANDOQUILLO and GEMINIANO
QUINQUILLERA, Respondents. On February 18, 1993, respondent Noe, through his guardian ad litem Arlie
Bernardo, filed with the RTC of Dumaguete City a complaint 3 for damages
DECISION arising from quasi delict against petitioner as the registered owner of the
cargo truck and his driver Gerosano. He alleged that the proximate cause of
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
his injuries and suffering was the reckless imprudence of Gerosano and
petitioners negligence in the selection of a reckless driver and for operating a
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari filed by Larry Estacion
vehicle that was not roadworthy. He prayed for actual damages, loss of
(petitioner) seeking to annul the Decision dated April 17, 2000 1 of the Court
income, moral and exemplary damages, attorneys fees, litigation expenses
of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 41447 which affirmed in toto the decision of
and costs of suit.
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dumaguete City, Branch 41, Negros Oriental,
holding petitioner and his driver Bienvenido Gerosano (Gerosano) liable for
Petitioner and his driver Gerosano filed their Answer 4 denying the material
damages for the injury sustained by Noe Bernardo (respondent Noe). Also
allegations in the complaint. They, in turn, filed a third party
assailed is the appellate courts Resolution dated August 16, 2000 2 denying
complaint5 against respondents Bandoquillo and Quinquillera, as owner and
petitioners motion for reconsideration.
driver respectively of the Fiera. They alleged that it was the reckless
imprudence of respondent driver Quinquillera and his clear violation of the
In the afternoon of October 16, 1982, respondent Noe was going home to
traffic rules and regulations which was the proximate cause of the accident
Dumaguete from Cebu, via Bato and Tampi. At Tampi, he boarded a Ford
and asked for indemnification for whatever damages they would be sentenced
Fiera passenger jeepney with plate no. NLD 720 driven by respondent
to pay. Respondents Bandoquillo and Quinquillera filed their Answer to the
Geminiano Quinquillera (Quinquillera), owned by respondent Cecilia
third party complaint asking for the dismissal of the third party complaint and
Bandoquillo (Bandoquillo), and was seated on the extension seat placed at
for payment of attorneys fees.
the center of the Fiera. From San Jose, an old woman wanted to ride, so
respondent Noe offered his seat. Since the Fiera was already full, respondent
Driver Gerosano was charged criminally for reckless imprudence resulting to
Noe hung or stood on the left rear carrier of the vehicle. Somewhere along
multiple physical injuries with damage to property before the Municipal Circuit
Barangay Sto. Nio, San Jose, Negros Oriental, between kilometers 13 and
Trial Court (MCTC) of Pamplona-Amlan and San Jose, Negros Oriental. On
14, the Fiera began to slow down and then stopped by the right shoulder of
November 16, 1987, the MCTC rendered its decision 6 finding him guilty of the
the road to pick up passengers. Suddenly, an Isuzu cargo truck, owned by
crime charged and was sentenced to four months and one day to two years
petitioner and driven by Gerosano, which was traveling in the same direction,
and four months and to pay the costs.
hit the rear end portion of the Fiera where respondent Noe was standing. Due
to the tremendous force, the cargo truck smashed respondent Noe against On February 18, 1993, the RTC rendered its judgment in the civil case, 7 the
the Fiera crushing his legs and feet which made him fall to the ground. A dispositive portion of which reads:
passing vehicle brought him to the Silliman University Medical Center where
his lower left leg was amputated. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered, ordering
defendants Gerosano and Estacion, to pay plaintiff, jointly or solidarily, the
Police investigation reports showed that respondent Noe was one of the 11 following:
passengers of the Fiera who suffered injuries; that when the Fiera stopped to
pick up a passenger, the cargo truck bumped the rear left portion of the

1. P129,584.20 for actual damages in the form of medical and hospitalization
expenses;
2. P50,000.00 for moral damages, consisting of mental anguish, moral shock,
serious anxiety and wounded feelings;
3. P10,000.00 for attorneys fees; and
4. P5,000.00 for litigation expenses.
SO ORDERED.8
The trial court ruled that the negligence of Gerosano, petitioners driver, is the
direct and proximate cause of the incident and of the injuries suffered by
respondent Noe; that Gerosanos gross negligence and reckless imprudence
had been confirmed by the Judgment in Criminal Case No. 463; that based on
the findings of the police investigator, the faulty brakes caused the cargo
truck to bump the Fiera; that the Traffic Accident Report showed that the tire
mark of the cargo truck measuring 48 feet is visibly imprinted on the road
where the incident took place indicating that the said vehicle was speeding
fast; that the existence of one tire mark of the cargo truck proved that the
said vehicle had a faulty brake, otherwise, it would have produced two tire
marks on the road; and that the photographs taken right after the incident
also showed who the guilty party was.
The trial court did not give credence to the argument of petitioner and his
driver that the truck was properly checked by a mechanic before it was
dispatched for a trip. It found that petitioner is negligent in maintaining his
vehicle in good condition to prevent any accident to happen; that petitioner is
liable under Article 2180 of the Civil Code as employer of driver Gerosano for
being negligent in the selection and supervision of his driver as well as for
maintaining and operating a vehicle that was not roadworthy; and that
petitioner and his driver are solidarily liable for all the natural and probable
consequences of their negligent acts or omissions. The trial court dismissed
the third party complaint filed by petitioner and his driver against
respondents Bandoquillo and Quinquillera.
Dissatisfied, only petitioner appealed to the CA. On April 17, 2000, the CA
rendered the assailed decision which affirmed in toto the decision of the trial
court. Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied in a Resolution dated
August 16, 2000.
Hence, the herein petition for review.
TRANSPO | Assign No 8 | 30
Petitioner submits the following issues for resolution: 9
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT
PETITIONER LARRY ESTACION EXERCISED THE DUE DILIGENCE OF A GOOD
FATHER OF A FAMILY TO PREVENT DAMAGE DESPITE ABUNDANCE OF
EVIDENCE TO THAT EFFECT;
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT
PETITIONER LARRY ESTACION EXERCISED DUE DILIGENCE IN THE
SELECTION AND SUPERVISION OF HIS EMPLOYEE AND IN MAINTAINING HIS
CARGO TRUCK ROADWORTHY AND IN GOOD OPERATING CONDITION;
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN EXONERATING RESPONDENTS
CECILIA BANDOQUILLO AND GEMINIANO QUINQUILLERA.
In his Memorandum, petitioner contends that he was able to establish that he
observed the diligence of a good father of a family not only in the selection of
his employees but also in maintaining his truck roadworthy and in good
operating condition; that the CA erred in exonerating respondents Bandoquillo
and Quinquillera, owner and driver, respectively of the Fiera from liability
when their negligence was the proximate cause of respondent Noes injuries;
that respondent Noes act of standing in the rear carrier of the Fiera is in itself
negligence on his part which was aggravated by the fact that respondent
Quinquillera overtook the cargo truck driven by Gerosano on the curve and
suddenly cut into the latters lane; that due to the overloading of passengers,
Gerosano was not able to see the brake lights of the Fiera when it suddenly
stopped to pick up passengers; that overloading is in violation of the
applicable traffic rules and regulations and Article 2185 is explicit when it
provides that "unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a
person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the
mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation"; that since the Fiera driver
was negligent, there arises a presumption that respondent Bandoquillo, as
owner of the Fiera, is negligent in the selection and supervision of her
employee; that assuming petitioner Estacion and his driver are not entirely
blameless, the negligence of Quinquillera is sufficient basis why the respective
liabilities should be delineated vis--vis their degree of negligence consistent
with Article 217910 of the Civil Code.
Respondent Noe filed his Memorandum alleging that the first and second
issues raised are factual in nature which are beyond the ambit of a petition
for review; that petitioner failed to overcome the presumption of negligence

thus he is liable for the negligence of his driver Gerosano; and that the third
issue is best addressed to respondents Bandoquillo and Quinquillera.
Respondents Bandoquillo and Quinquillera failed to file their memorandum
despite receipt of our Resolution requiring them to submit the same.
We find it apropos to resolve first the third issue considering that the extent
of the liability of petitioner and his driver is dependent on whether
respondents Bandoquillo and Quinquillera are the ones negligent in the
vehicular mishap that happened in the afternoon of October 16, 1982 where
respondent Noe was injured, resulting in the amputation of his left leg.
At the outset, the issue raised is factual in nature. Whether a person is
negligent or not is a question of fact which we cannot pass upon in a petition
for review on certiorari, as our jurisdiction is limited to reviewing errors of
law.11As a rule, factual findings of the trial court, affirmed by the CA, are final
and conclusive and may not be reviewed on appeal. The established
exceptions are: (1) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd
or impossible; (2) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (3) when the
findings are grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures; (4)
when the judgment of the CA is based on misapprehension of facts; (5) when
the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when the CA, in making its findings,
went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the
admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) when the findings of fact are
conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (8)
when the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the
parties and which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion;
and (9) when the findings of fact of the CA are premised on the absence of
evidence and are contradicted by the evidence on record. 12
On the basis of the records of this case, we find that there is cogent reason
for us to review the factual findings of the lower courts to conform to the
evidence on record and consider this case as an exception to the general rule.
The trial court and the appellate court had made a finding of fact that the
proximate cause of the injury sustained by respondent Noe was the negligent
and careless driving of petitioners driver, Gerosano, who was driving at a fast
speed with a faulty brake when the accident happened. We see no cogent
reason to disturb the trial courts finding in giving more credence to the
testimony of respondent Noe than the testimony of Gerosano, petitioners
truck driver.
TRANSPO | Assign No 8 | 31
The correctness of such finding is borne by the records. In his testimony,
Gerosano said that he was driving the truck at a speed of about 40 kilometers
per hour;13 that the Fiera was behind him but upon reaching the curve,
i.e., after passing San Jose going to Dumaguete, the Fiera overtook him and
blocked his way;14 that he was 10 meters from the Fiera prior to the
impact15 when he applied the brakes16 and tried to evade the Fiera but he still
hit it.17
We agree with the trial court and the appellate court when they found that
the truck was running at a fast speed because if Gerosano was really driving
at a speed of 40 kilometers per hour and considering that the distance
between the truck and the Fiera in front was about 10 meters, he had more
than enough time to slacken his speed and apply his break to avoid hitting
the Fiera. However, from the way the truck reacted to the application of the
brakes, it showed that Gerosano was driving at a fast speed because the
brakes skidded a lengthy 48 feet as shown in the sketch of police investigator
Rubia of the tire marks visibly printed on the road.
Moreover, the photographs taken after the incident and the testimony of
Gerosano as to the extent of damage to the truck, i.e. the trucks windshield
was broken and its hood was damaged after the impact, 18 further support the
finding of both courts that Gerosano was driving at a fast pace.
The accident was further caused by the faulty brakes of the truck. Based on
the sketch report, there was only one tire mark of the right tire of the cargo
truck during the incident which, as testified to by police investigator Rubia,
meant that the brakes of the truck were not aligned otherwise there would be
two tire marks impressions on the road. 19 Although petitioner contends that
there are other factors to explain why only one skid mark was found at the
place of the incident, such as the angle and edges of the road as well as the
balance of the weight of the cargo laden in the truck, he failed to show that
indeed those factors were present to prove his defense. Such claim cannot be
given credence considering that investigator Rubia testified that the body of
the truck was very much on the road, i.e., not over the shoulder of the
road,20 and the road was straight. 21 Indeed, it is the negligent act of
petitioners driver of driving the cargo truck at a fast speed coupled with
faulty brakes which was the proximate cause of respondent Noes injury.
Petitioners claim that right after overtaking the cargo truck, the Fiera driver
suddenly stopped to pick up three passengers from the side of the road; that
the overloading of passengers prevented his truck driver from determining
that the Fiera had pulled over to pick up passengers as the latters brakelights

were obstructed by the passengers standing on the rear portion of the Fiera
were not substantiated at all. Respondent Quinquillera, the driver of the Fiera,
testified that the distance from the curve of the road when he stopped and
picked up passengers was estimated to be about 80 to 90 feet. 22 In fact, from
the sketch drawn by investigator Rubia, it showed a distance of 145 feet from
the curve of the road to the speed tire mark (which measured about 48 feet)
visibly printed on the road to the Fiera. This means that the Fiera driver did
not stop immediately after the curve as what petitioner claims. Moreover,
Gerosano admitted that his truck was at a distance of 10 meters prior to the
impact. The distance between the two vehicles was such that it would be
impossible for Gerosano not to have seen that the Fiera had pulled over to
pick up passengers.
However, we agree with petitioner that respondent Noes act of standing on
the rear carrier of the Fiera exposing himself to bodily injury is in itself
negligence on his part. We find that the trial court and the CA erred when
they failed to consider that respondent Noe was also guilty of contributory
negligence. Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the injured
party, contributing as a legal cause to the harm he has suffered, which falls
below the standard to which he is required to conform for his own
protection. 23
It has been established by the testimony of respondent Noe that he was with
four or five other persons standing on the rear carrier of the Fiera since it was
already full. Respondent Noes act of standing on the left rear carrier portion
of the Fiera showed his lack of ordinary care and foresight that such act could
cause him harm or put his life in danger. It has been held that "to hold a
person as having contributed to his injuries, it must be shown that he
performed an act that brought about his injuries in disregard of warning or
signs of an impending danger to health and body.24 Respondent Noes act of
hanging on the Fiera is definitely dangerous to his life and limb.
We likewise find merit in petitioners contention that respondent Quinquillera,
the Fiera driver, was also negligent. There is merit to petitioners claim that
there was overloading which is in violation of traffic rules and regulations.
Respondent Noe himself had testified that he was standing at the rear portion
of the Fiera because the Fiera was already full. Respondent Quinquillera
should not have taken more passengers than what the Fiera can
accommodate. If the Fiera was not overloaded, respondent Noe would not
have been standing on the rear carrier and sustained such extent of injury.
TRANSPO | Assign No 8 | 32
Furthermore, we find that respondent Quinquillera was negligent in allowing
respondent Noe to stand on the Fieras rear portion. Section 32(c) of Article
III of Republic Act No. 4136, otherwise known as "The Land Transportation
and Traffic Code" provides:
(c) Riding on running boards No driver shall allow any person to ride on
running board, step board or mudguard of his motor vehicle for any purpose
while the vehicle is in motion.
Respondent Quinquilleras act of permitting respondent Noe to hang on the
rear portion of the Fiera in such a dangerous position creates undue risk of
harm to respondent Noe. Quinquillera failed to observe that degree of care,
precaution and vigilance that the circumstances justly demand. Thus,
respondent Noe suffered injury.25Since respondent Quinquillera is negligent,
there arises a presumption of negligence on the part of his employer,
respondent Bandoquillo, in supervising her employees properly. Such
presumption was not rebutted at all by Bandoquillo. Thus, the CA erred in
affirming the dismissal of the third party complaint filed by petitioner against
respondents Quinquillera and Bandoquillo.
Petitioner contends that he was able to establish that he exercised the due
diligence of a good father of a family in the selection of his employees as well
as in the maintenance of his cargo truck in good operating condition. He
claims that in addition to looking at Gerosanos drivers license, he
accompanied the latter in his first two trips, during which he ascertained
Gerosanos competence as a driver, petitioner being a driver himself; that the
truck driven by Gerosano has never figured in any accident prior to the
incident involved; that upon his acquisition of the cargo truck on March 16,
1982, only 7 months prior to the incident, the same was thoroughly checked
up and reconditioned; and that he had in his employ a mechanic who
conducted periodic check-ups of the engine and brake system of the cargo
truck.
We are not persuaded.
Article 2180 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for
ones own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is
responsible.
xxx
 TRANSPO | Assign No 8 | 33

Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and fails the test of due diligence in the selection of her bus driver. Case law
household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even teaches that for an employer to have exercised the diligence of a
though the former are not engaged in any business or industry. good father of a family, he should not be satisfied with the applicants
mere possession of a professional drivers license; he must also
xxx carefully examine the applicant for employment as to his
qualifications, his experience and record of service. Petitioner failed to
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons
present convincing proof that she went to this extent of verifying Venturinas
herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father
qualifications, safety record, and driving history. The presumption juris
of a family to prevent damage.
tantum that there was negligence in the selection of her bus driver, thus,
remains unrebutted.
As the employer of Gerosano, petitioner is primarily and solidarily liable for
the quasi-delict committed by the former. Petitioner is presumed to be
Nor did petitioner show that she exercised due supervision over Venturina
negligent in the selection and supervision of his employee by operation of law
after his selection. For as pointed out by the Court of Appeals, petitioner did
and may be relieved of responsibility for the negligent acts of his driver, who
not present any proof that she drafted and implemented training
at the time was acting within the scope of his assigned task, only if he can
programs and guidelines on road safety for her employees. In fact,
show that he observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent
the record is bare of any showing that petitioner required Venturina
damage.26
to attend periodic seminars on road safety and traffic
efficiency. Hence, petitioner cannot claim exemption from any liability
In Yambao v. Zuniga,27 we have clarified the meaning of the diligence of a
arising from the recklessness or negligence of Venturina.
good father of a family, thus:
In sum, petitioners liability to private respondents for the negligent and
The "diligence of a good father" referred to in the last paragraph of the
imprudent acts of her driver, Venturina, under Article 2180 of the Civil Code is
aforecited statute means diligence in the selection and supervision of
both manifest and clear. Petitioner, having failed to rebut the legal
employees. Thus, when an employee, while performing his duties, causes
presumption of negligence in the selection and supervision of her driver, is
damage to persons or property due to his own negligence, there arises
responsible for damages, the basis of the liability being the relationship
the juris tantum presumption that the employer is negligent, either in the
of pater familias or on the employers own negligence. x x x 28 (Emphasis
selection of the employee or in the supervision over him after the
supplied)
selection. For the employer to avoid the solidary liability for a tort
committed by his employee, an employer must rebut the presumption
Petitioner failed to show that he examined driver Gerosano as to his
by presenting adequate and convincing proof that in the selection and
qualifications, experience and service records. In fact, the testimony of driver
supervision of his employee, he or she exercises the care and
Gerosano in his cross-examination showed the non-observance of these
diligence of a good father of a family. x x x
requirements. Gerosano testified that petitioner was his first employer in
Dumaguete and that he was accepted by petitioner on the very day he
Petitioners claim that she exercised due diligence in the selection and
applied for the job;29 that his drivers license was issued in Mindanao where
supervision of her driver, Venturina, deserves but scant consideration. Her
he came from30 and that while petitioner asked him about his driving record in
allegation that before she hired Venturina she required him to submit
Mindanao, he did not present any document of his driving record. 31 Such
his drivers license and clearances is worthless, in view of her failure
admission clearly established that petitioner did not exercise due diligence in
to offer in evidence certified true copies of said license and
the selection of his driver Gerosano.
clearances. Bare allegations, unsubstantiated by evidence, are not
equivalent to proof under the rules of evidence. x x x
Moreover, the fact that petitioners driver Gerosano was driving in an efficient
manner when petitioner was with him in his first two trips would not
In any case, assuming arguendo that Venturina did submit his license and
conclusively establish that Gerosano was not at all reckless. It could not be
clearances when he applied with petitioner in January 1992, the latter still
 TRANSPO | Assign No 8 | 34

considered as due diligence in the supervision of his driver to exempt
petitioner from liability. In the supervision of his driver, petitioner must show
that he had formulated training programs and guidelines on road safety for
his driver which the records failed to show. We find that petitioner failed to
rebut the presumption of negligence in the selection and supervision of his
employees.
deducted from the actual and moral damages awarded by the trial court in
favor of respondent Noe, that is: 20% of P129,584.20 for actual damages
is P25,916.84 and 20% of P50,000.00 for moral damages is P10,000.00.
Thus, after deducting the same, the award for actual damages should
be P103,667.36 and P40,000.00 for moral damages or 80% of the damages
so awarded.

Moreover, there was also no proof that he exercised diligence in maintaining Petitioner and respondents Bandoquillo and Quinquillera are jointly and
his cargo truck roadworthy and in good operating condition. While petitioners severally liable for the 80% of the damages as well as attorneys fees and
mechanic driver testified that he made a routine check up on October 15, litigation expenses conformably with our pronouncement in Tiu v.
1982, one day before the mishap happened, and found the truck operational, Arriesgado35 where we held:
there was no record of such inspection.
The petitioners, as well as the respondents Benjamin Condor and Sergio
Turning now to the award of damages, since there was contributory Pedrano are jointly and severally liable for said amount, conformably with the
negligence on the part of respondent Noe, petitioners liability should be following pronouncement of the Court in Fabre, Jr. v. Court of Appeals:
mitigated in accordance with Article 2179 of the Civil Code which provides:
The same rule of liability was applied in situations where the negligence of the
When the plaintiffs own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause driver of the bus on which plaintiff was riding concurred with the negligence
of his injury, he cannot recover damages. But if his negligence was only of a third party who was the driver of another vehicle, thus causing an
contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the accident. In Anuran v. Buo, Batangas Laguna Tayabas Bus Co. v.
defendants lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the Intermediate Appellate Court, and Metro Manila Transit Corporation v. Court
courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded. of Appeals, the bus company, its driver, the operator of the other vehicle and
the driver of the vehicle were jointly and severally held liable to the injured
The underlying precept of the above article on contributory negligence is that passenger or the latters heirs. The basis of this allocation of liability was
a plaintiff who is partly responsible for his own injury should not be entitled to explained in Viluan v. Court of Appeals, thus:
recover damages in full but must bear the consequences of his own
negligence. The defendant must thus be held liable only for the damages "Nor should it make difference that the liability of petitioner [bus owner]
actually caused by his negligence.32 springs from contract while that of respondents [owner and driver of other
vehicle] arises from quasi delict. As early as 1913, we already ruled
In Phoenix Construction, Inc., v. Intermediate Appellate Court,33 where we in Gutierrez v. Gutierrez, 56 Phil. 177, that in case of injury to a passenger
held that the legal and proximate cause of the accident and of Dionisios due to the negligence of the driver of the bus on which he was riding and of
injuries was the wrongful and negligent manner in which the dump truck was the driver of another vehicle, the drivers as well as the owners of the two
parked but found Dionisio guilty of contributory negligence on the night of the vehicles are jointly and severally liable for damages. Some members of the
accident, we allocated most of the damages on a 20-80 ratio. In said case, Court, though, are of the view that under the circumstances they are liable
we required Dionisio to bear 20% of the damages awarded by the appellate on quasi delict."36
court, except as to the award of exemplary damages, attorneys fees and
costs. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The assailed
Decision of the Court of Appeals dated April 17, 2000 as well as its Resolution
In the present case, taking into account the contributing negligence of dated August 16, 2000 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION to the effect
respondent Noe, we likewise rule that the demands of substantial justice are that the dispositive portion of the Decision dated February 18, 1993 of the
satisfied by distributing the damages also on a 20-80 ratio excluding Regional Trial Court of Dumaguete City in Civil Case No. 8122, should read as
attorneys fees and litigation expenses.34 Consequently, 20% should be follows:
 TRANSPO | Assign No 8 | 35

"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered,

ordering defendants Gerosano and Estacion, as well as third party defendants
Bandoquillo and Quinquillera, to pay plaintiff, jointly and solidarily, the
following:

1. P103,667.36 for actual damages in the form of medical and hospitalization

expenses;

2. P40,000.00 for moral damages, consisting of mental anguish, moral shock,

serious anxiety and wounded feelings;

3. P10,000.00 for attorneys fees; and

4. P5,000.00 for litigation expenses.1avvphil.net

SO ORDERED."

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
 TRANSPO | Assign No 8 | 36

10. G.R. No. 122039 May 31, 2000 other hand, filed a third-party complaint against Francisco Salva, the owner of
the Isuzu truck.
VICENTE CALALAS, petitioner,
vs. The lower court rendered judgment against Salva as third-party defendant
COURT OF APPEALS, ELIZA JUJEURCHE SUNGA and FRANCISCO and absolved Calalas of liability, holding that it was the driver of the Isuzu
SALVA, respondents. truck who was responsible for the accident. It took cognizance of another
case (Civil Case No. 3490), filed by Calalas against Salva and Verena, for
quasi-delict, in which Branch 37 of the same court held Salva and his driver
Verena jointly liable to Calalas for the damage to his jeepney.

MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision1 of the Court of
Appeals, dated March 31, 1991, reversing the contrary decision of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 36, Dumaguete City, and awarding damages
instead to private respondent Eliza Jujeurche Sunga as plaintiff in an action
for breach of contract of carriage.
The facts, as found by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:
At 10 o'clock in the morning of August 23, 1989, private respondent Eliza
Jujeurche G. Sunga, then a college freshman majoring in Physical Education
at the Siliman University, took a passenger jeepney owned and operated by
petitioner Vicente Calalas. As the jeepney was filled to capacity of about 24
passengers, Sunga was given by the conductor an "extension seat," a wooden
stool at the back of the door at the rear end of the vehicle.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the ruling of the lower court was reversed
on the ground that Sunga's cause of action was based on a contract of
carriage, not quasi-delict, and that the common carrier failed to exercise the
diligence required under the Civil Code. The appellate court dismissed the
third-party complaint against Salva and adjudged Calalas liable for damages
to Sunga. The dispositive portion of its decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE, and another one is entered ordering defendant-appellee Vicente
Calalas to pay plaintiff-appellant:
(1) P50,000.00 as actual and compensatory damages;
(2) P50,000.00 as moral damages;
(3) P10,000.00 as attorney's fees; and

On the way to Poblacion Sibulan, Negros Occidental, the jeepney stopped to
let a passenger off. As she was seated at the rear of the vehicle, Sunga gave
way to the outgoing passenger. Just as she was doing so, an Isuzu truck
driven by Iglecerio Verena and owned by Francisco Salva bumped the left rear
portion of the jeepney. As a result, Sunga was injured. She sustained a
fracture of the "distal third of the left tibia-fibula with severe necrosis of the
underlying skin." Closed reduction of the fracture, long leg circular casting,
and case wedging were done under sedation. Her confinement in the hospital
lasted from August 23 to September 7, 1989. Her attending physician, Dr.
Danilo V. Oligario, an orthopedic surgeon, certified she would remain on a
cast for a period of three months and would have to ambulate in crutches
during said period.
(4) P1,000.00 as expenses of litigation; and
(5) to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
Hence, this petition. Petitioner contends that the ruling in Civil Case No. 3490
that the negligence of Verena was the proximate cause of the accident
negates his liability and that to rule otherwise would be to make the common
carrier an insurer of the safety of its passengers. He contends that the
bumping of the jeepney by the truck owned by Salva was a caso fortuito.
Petitioner further assails the award of moral damages to Sunga on the ground
that it is not supported by evidence.

On October 9, 1989, Sunga filed a complaint for damages against Calalas, The petition has no merit.
alleging violation of the contract of carriage by the former in failing to
exercise the diligence required of him as a common carrier. Calalas, on the

The argument that Sunga is bound by the ruling in Civil Case No. 3490
finding the driver and the owner of the truck liable for quasi-delict ignores the
fact that she was never a party to that case and, therefore, the principle
of res judicata does not apply.
Nor are the issues in Civil Case No. 3490 and in the present case the same.
The issue in Civil Case No. 3490 was whether Salva and his driver Verena
were liable for quasi-delict for the damage caused to petitioner's jeepney. On
the other hand, the issue in this case is whether petitioner is liable on his
contract of carriage. The first, quasi-delict, also known as culpa aquiliana or
culpa extra contractual, has as its source the negligence of the tortfeasor.
The second, breach of contract or culpa contractual, is premised upon the
negligence in the performance of a contractual obligation.
Consequently, in quasi-delict, the negligence or fault should be clearly
established because it is the basis of the action, whereas in breach of
contract, the action can be prosecuted merely by proving the existence of the
contract and the fact that the obligor, in this case the common carrier, failed
to transport his passenger safely to his destination. 2 In case of death or
injuries to passengers, Art. 1756 of the Civil Code provides that common
carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently
unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as defined in
Arts. 1733 and 1755 of the Code. This provision necessarily shifts to the
common carrier the burden of proof.
There is, thus, no basis for the contention that the ruling in Civil Case No.
3490, finding Salva and his driver Verena liable for the damage to petitioner's
jeepney, should be binding on Sunga. It is immaterial that the proximate
cause of the collision between the jeepney and the truck was the negligence
of the truck driver. The doctrine of proximate cause is applicable only in
actions for quasi-delict, not in actions involving breach of contract. The
doctrine is a device for imputing liability to a person where there is no
relation between him and another party. In such a case, the obligation is
created by law itself. But, where there is a pre-existing contractual relation
between the parties, it is the parties themselves who create the obligation,
and the function of the law is merely to regulate the relation thus created.
Insofar as contracts of carriage are concerned, some aspects regulated by the
Civil Code are those respecting the diligence required of common carriers with
regard to the safety of passengers as well as the presumption of negligence
in cases of death or injury to passengers. It provides:
TRANSPO | Assign No 8 | 37
Art. 1733. Common carriers, from the nature of their business and for
reasons of public policy, are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the
vigilance over the goods and for the safety of the passengers transported by
them, according to all the circumstances of each case.
Such extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods is further
expressed in articles 1734, 1735, and 1746, Nos. 5, 6, and 7, while the
extraordinary diligence for the safety of the passengers is further set forth in
articles 1755 and 1756.
Art. 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as
human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very
cautious persons, with due regard for all the circumstances.
Art. 1756. In case of death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers are
presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they
prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed by articles
1733 and 1755.
In the case at bar, upon the happening of the accident, the presumption of
negligence at once arose, and it became the duty of petitioner to prove that
he had to observe extraordinary diligence in the care of his passengers.
Now, did the driver of jeepney carry Sunga "safely as far as human care and
foresight could provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons,
with due regard for all the circumstances" as required by Art. 1755? We do
not think so. Several factors militate against petitioner's contention.
First, as found by the Court of Appeals, the jeepney was not properly parked,
its rear portion being exposed about two meters from the broad shoulders of
the highway, and facing the middle of the highway in a diagonal angle. This is
a violation of the R.A. No. 4136, as amended, or the Land Transportation and
Traffic Code, which provides:
Sec. 54. Obstruction of Traffic. No person shall drive his motor vehicle in
such a manner as to obstruct or impede the passage of any vehicle, nor, while
discharging or taking on passengers or loading or unloading freight, obstruct
the free passage of other vehicles on the highway.
Second, it is undisputed that petitioner's driver took in more passengers than
the allowed seating capacity of the jeepney, a violation of 32(a) of the same
law. It provides:

Exceeding registered capacity. No person operating any motor vehicle shall
allow more passengers or more freight or cargo in his vehicle than its
registered capacity.
The fact that Sunga was seated in an "extension seat" placed her in a peril
greater than that to which the other passengers were exposed. Therefore, not
only was petitioner unable to overcome the presumption of negligence
imposed on him for the injury sustained by Sunga, but also, the evidence
shows he was actually negligent in transporting passengers.
We find it hard to give serious thought to petitioner's contention that Sunga's
taking an "extension seat" amounted to an implied assumption of risk. It is
akin to arguing that the injuries to the many victims of the tragedies in our
seas should not be compensated merely because those passengers assumed
a greater risk of drowning by boarding an overloaded ferry. This is also true of
petitioner's contention that the jeepney being bumped while it was improperly
parked constitutes caso fortuito. A caso fortuito is an event which could not
be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, was inevitable. 3 This requires that
the following requirements be present: (a) the cause of the breach is
independent of the debtor's will; (b) the event is unforeseeable or
unavoidable; (c) the event is such as to render it impossible for the debtor to
fulfill his obligation in a normal manner, and (d) the debtor did not take part
in causing the injury to the
creditor. Petitioner should have foreseen the danger of parking his jeepney
4 the hospital does not imply that petitioner was utterly indifferent to the plight
with its body protruding two meters into the highway.
Finally, petitioner challenges the award of moral damages alleging that it is
excessive and without basis in law. We find this contention well taken.
In awarding moral damages, the Court of Appeals stated:
Plaintiff-appellant at the time of the accident was a first-year college student
in that school year 1989-1990 at the Silliman University, majoring in Physical
Education. Because of the injury, she was not able to enroll in the second
semester of that school year. She testified that she had no more intention of
continuing with her schooling, because she could not walk and decided not to
pursue her degree, major in Physical Education "because of my leg which has
a defect already."
Plaintiff-appellant likewise testified that even while she was under
confinement, she cried in pain because of her injured left foot. As a result of
her injury, the Orthopedic Surgeon also certified that she has "residual
TRANSPO | Assign No 8 | 38
bowing of the fracture side." She likewise decided not to further pursue
Physical Education as her major subject, because "my left leg . . . has a
defect already."
Those are her physical pains and moral sufferings, the inevitable bedfellows
of the injuries that she suffered. Under Article 2219 of the Civil Code, she is
entitled to recover moral damages in the sum of P50,000.00, which is fair,
just and reasonable.
As a general rule, moral damages are not recoverable in actions for damages
predicated on a breach of contract for it is not one of the items enumerated
under Art. 2219 of the Civil Code. 5 As an exception, such damages are
recoverable: (1) in cases in which the mishap results in the death of a
passenger, as provided in Art. 1764, in relation to Art. 2206(3) of the Civil
Code; and (2) in the cases in which the carrier is guilty of fraud or bad faith,
as provided in Art. 2220.6
In this case, there is no legal basis for awarding moral damages since there
was no factual finding by the appellate court that petitioner acted in bad faith
in the performance of the contract of carriage. Sunga's contention that
petitioner's admission in open court that the driver of the jeepney failed to
assist her in going to a nearby hospital cannot be construed as an admission
of bad faith. The fact that it was the driver of the Isuzu truck who took her to
of his injured passenger. If at all, it is merely implied recognition by Verena
that he was the one at fault for the accident.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals, dated March 31, 1995, and
its resolution, dated September 11, 1995, are AFFIRMED, with the
MODIFICATION that the award of moral damages is DELETED.
SO ORDERED.

11. G.R. No. 141910 August 6, 2002
FGU INSURANCE CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
G.P. SARMIENTO TRUCKING CORPORATION and LAMBERT
EROLES, respondents.
VITUG, J.:
G.P. Sarmiento Trucking Corporation (GPS) undertook to deliver on 18 June
1994 thirty (30) units of Condura S.D. white refrigerators aboard one of its
Isuzu truck, driven by Lambert Eroles, from the plant site of Concepcion
Industries, Inc., along South Superhighway in Alabang, Metro Manila, to the
Central Luzon Appliances in Dagupan City. While the truck was traversing the
north diversion road along McArthur highway in Barangay Anupol, Bamban,
Tarlac, it collided with an unidentified truck, causing it to fall into a deep
canal, resulting in damage to the cargoes.
FGU Insurance Corporation (FGU), an insurer of the shipment, paid to
Concepcion Industries, Inc., the value of the covered cargoes in the sum of
P204,450.00. FGU, in turn, being the subrogee of the rights and interests of
Concepcion Industries, Inc., sought reimbursement of the amount it had paid
to the latter from GPS. Since the trucking company failed to heed the claim,
FGU filed a complaint for damages and breach of contract of carriage against
GPS and its driver Lambert Eroles with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 66, of
Makati City. In its answer, respondents asserted that GPS was the exclusive
hauler only of Concepcion Industries, Inc., since 1988, and it was not so
engaged in business as a common carrier. Respondents further claimed that
the cause of damage was purely accidental.1wphi1.nt
The issues having thus been joined, FGU presented its evidence, establishing
the extent of damage to the cargoes and the amount it had paid to the
assured. GPS, instead of submitting its evidence, filed with leave of court a
motion to dismiss the complaint by way of demurrer to evidence on the
ground that petitioner had failed to prove that it was a common carrier.
The trial court, in its order of 30 April 1996, 1 granted the motion to dismiss,
explaining thusly:
"Under Section 1 of Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, it is provided that Each
party must prove his own affirmative allegation, xxx.
TRANSPO | Assign No 8 | 39
"In the instant case, plaintiff did not present any single evidence that would
prove that defendant is a common carrier.
"x x x xxx xxx
M.
"Accordingly, the application of the law on common carriers is not warranted
and the presumption of fault or negligence on the part of a common carrier in
case of loss, damage or deterioration of goods during transport under 1735 of
the Civil Code is not availing.
"Thus, the laws governing the contract between the owner of the cargo to
whom the plaintiff was subrogated and the owner of the vehicle which
transports the cargo are the laws on obligation and contract of the Civil Code
as well as the law on quasi delicts.
"Under the law on obligation and contract, negligence or fault is not
presumed. The law on quasi delict provides for some presumption of
negligence but only upon the attendance of some circumstances. Thus, Article
2185 provides:
Art. 2185. Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person
driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap, he
was violating any traffic regulation.
"Evidence for the plaintiff shows no proof that defendant was violating any
traffic regulation. Hence, the presumption of negligence is not obtaining.
"Considering that plaintiff failed to adduce evidence that defendant is a
common carrier and defendants driver was the one negligent, defendant
cannot be made liable for the damages of the subject cargoes." 2
The subsequent motion for reconsideration having been denied, 3 plaintiff
interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals, contending that the trial court
had erred (a) in holding that the appellee corporation was not a common
carrier defined under the law and existing jurisprudence; and (b) in
dismissing the complaint on a demurrer to evidence.
The Court of Appeals rejected the appeal of petitioner and ruled in favor of
GPS. The appellate court, in its decision of 10 June 1999, 4 discoursed, among
other things, that -
"x x x in order for the presumption of negligence provided for under the law
governing common carrier (Article 1735, Civil Code) to arise, the appellant

must first prove that the appellee is a common carrier. Should the appellant
fail to prove that the appellee is a common carrier, the presumption would not
arise; consequently, the appellant would have to prove that the carrier was
negligent.
"x x x xxx xxx
"Because it is the appellant who insists that the appellees can still be
considered as a common carrier, despite its `limited clientele, (assuming it
was really a common carrier), it follows that it (appellant) has the burden of
proving the same. It (plaintiff-appellant) `must establish his case by a
preponderance of evidence, which means that the evidence as a whole
adduced by one side is superior to that of the other. (Summa Insurance
Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 243 SCRA 175). This, unfortunately, the
appellant failed to do -- hence, the dismissal of the plaintiffs complaint by the
trial court is justified.
"x x x xxx xxx
"Based on the foregoing disquisitions and considering the circumstances that
the appellee trucking corporation has been `its exclusive contractor, hauler
since 1970, defendant has no choice but to comply with the directive of its
principal, the inevitable conclusion is that the appellee is a private carrier.
"x x x xxx xxx
"x x x the lower court correctly ruled that 'the application of the law on
common carriers is not warranted and the presumption of fault or negligence
on the part of a common carrier in case of loss, damage or deterioration of
good[s] during transport under [article] 1735 of the Civil Code is not availing.'
x x x.
"Finally, We advert to the long established rule that conclusions and findings
of fact of a trial court are entitled to great weight on appeal and should not
be disturbed unless for strong and valid reasons."5
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was likewise denied; 6 hence, the
instant petition,7 raising the following issues:
I
WHETHER RESPONDENT GPS MAY BE CONSIDERED AS A COMMON CARRIER
AS DEFINED UNDER THE LAW AND EXISTING JURISPRUDENCE.
TRANSPO | Assign No 8 | 40
II
WHETHER RESPONDENT GPS, EITHER AS A COMMON CARRIER OR A PRIVATE
CARRIER, MAY BE PRESUMED TO HAVE BEEN NEGLIGENT WHEN THE GOODS
IT UNDERTOOK TO TRANSPORT SAFELY WERE SUBSEQUENTLY DAMAGED
WHILE IN ITS PROTECTIVE CUSTODY AND POSSESSION.
III
WHETHER THE DOCTRINE OF RES IPSA LOQUITUR IS APPLICABLE IN THE
INSTANT CASE.
On the first issue, the Court finds the conclusion of the trial court and the
Court of Appeals to be amply justified. GPS, being an exclusive contractor and
hauler of Concepcion Industries, Inc., rendering or offering its services to no
other individual or entity, cannot be considered a common carrier. Common
carriers are persons, corporations, firms or associations engaged in the
business of carrying or transporting passengers or goods or both, by land,
water, or air, for hire or compensation, offering their services to
the public,8 whether to the public in general or to a limited clientele in
particular, but never on an exclusive basis.9 The true test of a common carrier
is the carriage of passengers or goods, providing space for those who opt to
avail themselves of its transportation service for a fee. 10 Given accepted
standards, GPS scarcely falls within the term "common carrier."
The above conclusion nothwithstanding, GPS cannot escape from liability.
In culpa contractual, upon which the action of petitioner rests as being the
subrogee of Concepcion Industries, Inc., the mere proof of the existence of
the contract and the failure of its compliance justify, prima facie, a
corresponding right of relief.11 The law, recognizing the obligatory force of
contracts,12 will not permit a party to be set free from liability for any kind of
misperformance of the contractual undertaking or a contravention of the
tenor thereof.13 A breach upon the contract confers upon the injured party a
valid cause for recovering that which may have been lost or suffered. The
remedy serves to preserve the interests of the promisee that may include his
"expectation interest," which is his interest in having the benefit of his
bargain by being put in as good a position as he would have been in had the
contract been performed, or his "reliance interest," which is his interest in
being reimbursed for loss caused by reliance on the contract by being put in
as good a position as he would have been in had the contract not been made;
or his "restitution interest," which is his interest in having restored to him any

benefit that he has conferred on the other party.14 Indeed, agreements can
accomplish little, either for their makers or for society, unless they are made
the basis for action.15 The effect of every infraction is to create a new duty,
that is, to make recompense to the one who has been injured by the failure of
another to observe his contractual obligation 16 unless he can show
extenuating circumstances, like proof of his exercise of due diligence
(normally that of the diligence of a good father of a family or, exceptionally by
stipulation or by law such as in the case of common carriers, that of
extraordinary diligence) or of the attendance of fortuitous event, to excuse
him from his ensuing liability.
Respondent trucking corporation recognizes the existence of a contract of
carriage between it and petitioners assured, and admits that the cargoes it
has assumed to deliver have been lost or damaged while in its custody. In
such a situation, a default on, or failure of compliance with, the obligation
in this case, the delivery of the goods in its custody to the place of destination
- gives rise to a presumption of lack of care and corresponding liability on the
part of the contractual obligor the burden being on him to establish
otherwise. GPS has failed to do so.
Respondent driver, on the other hand, without concrete proof of his
negligence or fault, may not himself be ordered to pay petitioner. The driver,
not being a party to the contract of carriage between petitioners principal
and defendant, may not be held liable under the agreement. A contract can
only bind the parties who have entered into it or their successors who have
assumed their personality or their juridical position. 17 Consonantly with the
axiom res inter alios acta aliis neque nocet prodest, such contract can neither
favor nor prejudice a third person. Petitioners civil action against the driver
can only be based on culpa aquiliana, which, unlike culpa contractual, would
require the claimant for damages to prove negligence or fault on the part of
the defendant.18
A word in passing. Res ipsa loquitur, a doctrine being invoked by petitioner,
holds a defendant liable where the thing which caused the injury complained
of is shown to be under the latters management and the accident is such
that, in the ordinary course of things, cannot be expected to happen if those
who have its management or control use proper care. It affords reasonable
evidence, in the absence of explanation by the defendant, that the accident
arose from want of care.19 It is not a rule of substantive law and, as such, it
does not create an independent ground of liability. Instead, it is regarded as a
mode of proof, or a mere procedural convenience since it furnishes a
substitute for, and relieves the plaintiff of, the burden of producing specific
TRANSPO | Assign No 8 | 41
proof of negligence. The maxim simply places on the defendant the burden of
going forward with the proof.20 Resort to the doctrine, however, may be
allowed only when (a) the event is of a kind which does not ordinarily occur in
the absence of negligence; (b) other responsible causes, including the
conduct of the plaintiff and third persons, are sufficiently eliminated by the
evidence; and (c) the indicated negligence is within the scope of the
defendant's duty to the plaintiff.21 Thus, it is not applicable when an
unexplained accident may be attributable to one of several causes, for some
of which the defendant could not be responsible. 22
Res ipsa loquitur generally finds relevance whether or not a contractual
relationship exists between the plaintiff and the defendant, for the inference
of negligence arises from the circumstances and nature of the occurrence and
not from the nature of the relation of the parties. 23 Nevertheless, the
requirement that responsible causes other than those due to defendants
conduct must first be eliminated, for the doctrine to apply, should be
understood as being confined only to cases of pure (non-contractual) tort
since obviously the presumption of negligence in culpa contractual, as
previously so pointed out, immediately attaches by a failure of the covenant
or its tenor. In the case of the truck driver, whose liability in a civil action is
predicated on culpa acquiliana, while he admittedly can be said to have been
in control and management of the vehicle which figured in the accident, it is
not equally shown, however, that the accident could have been exclusively
due to his negligence, a matter that can allow, forthwith, res ipsa loquitur to
work against him.
If a demurrer to evidence is granted but on appeal the order of dismissal is
reversed, the movant shall be deemed to have waived the right to present
evidence.24 Thus, respondent corporation may no longer offer proof to
establish that it has exercised due care in transporting the cargoes of the
assured so as to still warrant a remand of the case to the trial
court.1wphi1.nt
WHEREFORE, the order, dated 30 April 1996, of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 66, of Makati City, and the decision, dated 10 June 1999, of the Court
of Appeals, are AFFIRMED only insofar as respondent Lambert M. Eroles is
concerned, but said assailed order of the trial court and decision of the
appellate court are REVERSED as regards G.P. Sarmiento Trucking
Corporation which, instead, is hereby ordered to pay FGU Insurance
Corporation the value of the damaged and lost cargoes in the amount of
P204,450.00. No costs.SO ORDERED.

12. G.R. Nos. L-21353 and L-21354 May 20, 1966
GREGORIO ANURAN, MARIA MALIGAYA, LAPAZ LARO, ET
AL., petitioners,
vs.
PEPITO BUO, PEDRO GAHOL, LUISA ALCANTARA, GUILLERMO
RAZON, ANSELMO MALIGAYA and CEFERINA ARO, respondents.
Victoriano A. Endaya for petitioners.
Trinidad and Borromeo for respondents Buo, et al.
Contreras and Adapon for respondents Razon, et al.
BENGZON, C.J.:
At noon of January 12, 1958, a passenger jeepney was parked on the road to
Taal, Batangas. A motor truck speeding along, negligently bumped it from
behind, with such violence that three of its passengers died, even as two
others (passengers too) suffered injuries that required their confinement at
the Provincial Hospital for many days.
So, in February 1958 these suits were instituted by the representatives of the
dead and of the injured, to recover consequently damages against the driver
and the owners of the truck and also against the driver and the owners of the
jeepney.
The Batangas Court of First Instance, after trial, rendered judgment absolving
the driver of the jeepney and its owners, but it required the truck driver and
the owners thereof to make compensation.
The plaintiffs appealed to the Court of Appeals insisting that the driver and
the owners of the jeepney should also be made liable for damages.
The last mentioned court, upon reviewing the record, declared that:
It is admitted that at about noontime on January 13, 1958, the passenger
jeepney owned by defendants spouses Pedro Gahol and Luisa Alcantara,
bearing plate No. TPU-13548, then being driven by their regular driver,
defendant Pepito Buo was on its regular route travelling from Mahabang
Ludlud, Taal, Batangas, towards the poblacion of the said municipality. When
said passenger jeepney crossed the bridge separating Barrios Mahabang
Ludlud and Balisong, Taal, Batangas, it had fourteen passengers, excluding
the driver, according to the testimony of defendant Buo (pp. 12 and 18,
t.s.n. July 17, 1958), or sixteen passengers according to the testimony of
TRANSPO | Assign No 8 | 42
plaintiff Edita de Sagun, (pp. 9, 12 and 13, t.s.n. June 26, 1958). However,
the fact remains that the vehicle was overloaded with passengers at the time,
because according to the partial stipulation of facts "the maximum capacity of
the jeepney bearing plate No. TPU-13548 of said defendants was eleven (11)
passengers including the driver. (Printed Record on Appeal, pp. 35, 37.)
After crossing the bridge, defendant Buo stopped his vehicle in order to
allow one of his passengers to alight. But he so parked his jeepney in such a
way that one-half of its width (the left wheels) was on the asphalted
pavement of the road and the other half, on the right shoulder of said road
(pp. 21-22, t.s.n. May 26, 1958; p. 12 t.s.n. July 17, 1958). Approximately
five minutes later and before Buo could start his vehicle, a speeding water
truck, which bore plate No. T-17526 and owned by defendants-spouses
Anselmo Maligaya and Ceferina Aro, then being driven by Guillermo Razon
from the direction of Mahabang Ludlud, Taal, Batangas, towards the poblacion
of that municipality, violently smashed against the parked jeepney from
behind, causing it to turn turtle into a nearby ditch.
Then said Appellate Court went on to affirm the exoneration of the jeepney
driver and of its owners. It explained that although "the driver of the ill-
starred vehicle was not free from fault, for he was guilty of an antecedent
negligence in parking his vehicle with a portion thereof occupying the
asphalted road", it considered the truck driver guilty of greater negligence
which was the efficient cause of the collision; and applying the doctrine of the
"last clear chance"1 said Court ordered the owners of the truck to pay,
solidarily with its driver, damages as follows:
x x x the sum of P6,000.00 for the death of their daughter Emelita, another
sum of P5,000.00 as moral damages and the sum of P500.00 as actual
damages, and to plaintiffs Simplicio, Alberto, Avelina and Alfredo, all
surnamed Arriola, and represented by their guardian ad litem Agustin Arriola,
the sum of P6,000.00 for the death of their natural mother, Leonor
Masongsong, another sum of P5,000.00 as moral damages the sum of
P3,600.00 for loss of earning capacity of said deceased and the sum of
P850.00 as actual damages.
The plaintiffs brought the matter to this Supreme Court insisting that the
driver and the owners of the jeepney should also be made liable.
We gave due course to the petition for review, because we thought the
decision meant exoneration of the carrier from liability to its
passengers, notwithstanding the negligence of its driver.
 TRANSPO | Assign No 8 | 43

Upon further and more extended consideration of the matter, we have

become convinced that error of law was committed in releasing the jeepney
from liability. It must be remembered that the obligation of the carrier to
transport its passengers safely is such that the New Civil Code requires
"utmost diligence" from the carriers (Art. 1755) who are "presumed to have
been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they have
observed extraordinary diligence" (Art. 1756). In this instance, this legal
presumption of negligence is confirmed by the Court of Appeals' finding that
the driver of the jeepney in question was at fault in parking the vehicle
improperly. It must follow that the driver and the owners of the jeepney
must answer for injuries to its passengers.

The principle about the "last clear chance" would call for application in a
suit between the owners and drivers of the two colliding vehicles. It does not
arise where a passenger demands responsibility from the carrier to enforce its
contractual obligations. For it would be inequitable to exempt the negligent
driver of the jeepney and its owners on the ground that the other driver was
likewise guilty of negligence.

Now as to damages. The driver and the owners of the truck have not
appealed from the Court of Appeals' assessment. The plaintiffs (petitioners)
have not asked here for a greater amount of indemnity. They merely pray for
a declaration that Pepito Buo, Pedro Gahol and Luisa Alcantara (the driver
and the owners of the jeepney, respectively) be declared jointly and severally
liable with the other defendants.1wph1.t

Wherefore, affirming the decision under review, we hereby modify it in the

sense prayed for by plaintiffs-petitioners. The three defendants last
mentioned are required to pay solidarily with the other defendants-
respondents the amounts fixed by the appealed decision. Costs of both
appeals against said three defendants. So ordered.

13. G.R. No. L-40452 October 12, 1989
GREGORIO GENOBIAGON, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Mario D. Ortiz for petitioner.
GRIO-AQUINO, J.:
This is a petition for review of the Court of Appeals' decision in CA-G.R. No.
09949-CR, dated October 10, 1974, affirming the conviction of the petitioner
of the crime of homicide thru reckless imprudence.
As found by the Court of Appeals, the facts of this case are:
On December 31,1959, at about 7:30 o'clock in the evening, a rig driven by
appellant bumped an old woman who was crossing T. Padilla St., Cebu City, at
the right side of T. Padilla Market. The appellant's rig was following another at
a distance of two meters. The old woman started to cross when the first rig
was approaching her, but as appellant's vehicle was going so fast not only
because of the steep down-grade of the road, but also because he was trying
to overtake the rig ahead of him, the appellant's rig bumped the old woman,
who as a consequence, fell at the middle of the road. The appellant continued
to drive on, but a by-stander, one Vicente Mangyao, who just closed his store
in market in order to celebrate the coming of the New Year, and who saw the
incident right before him, shouted at the appellant to stop. He ran after
appellant when the latter refused to stop. Overtaking the appellant, Mangyao
asked him why he bumped the old woman and his answer was, 'it was the old
woman that bumped him.' The appellant went back to the place where the old
woman was struck by his rig. The old woman was unconscious, and the food
and viands she was carrying were scattered on her body. The victim was then
loaded in a jeep and brought to the hospital where she died three hours later
(Exh. C). The findings after an autopsy are as follows:
Contusion with Hematoma Left, Frontal and Occipito-Parietal Regionas
Fracture Occipito-Parietal Bone Cerebral Hemorrhage.
The deceased was an eighty-one-year old woman named Rita B. Cabrera. (pp.
31-32, Rollo.)
TRANSPO | Assign No 8 | 44
Petitioner was charged with homicide thru reckless imprudence in the Court of
First Instance of Cebu (Crim. Case No. V7855). The trial court found
petitioner guilty of the felony charged and sentenced him to "suffer an
indeterminate penalty of three (3) months of arresto mayor as minimum to
one (1) year, one (1) month and eleven (11) days of prision correccional as
maximum, to indemnify the heirs of Rita Banzon Cabrera the sum of P6,000
with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, not to exceed 1/3 of the
principal penalty and to pay the costs" (p. 3, Appellant's Brief, p. 56, Rollo).
The petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. 09949-CR)which,on
October 10,1974,conviction of the accused but increased his civil liability to
P12,000. The dispositive portion of its decision reads:
WHEREFORE, finding no error in the judgment appealed from except in the
amount of indemnity to be paid to the heirs of the deceased, Rita B. Cabrera,
which is the sum of P6,000.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency which should be raised to P12,000.00 (People vs. Pantoja, G.R.
No. L-18793, October 11, 1968, 25 SCRA 468) but without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, the same should be, as it is hereby
affirmed in all other respects with costs. (P. 37, Rollo.)
After his motion for reconsideration of the Court of Appeals' decision was
denied, he filed a petition for review in this Court, alleging that the Court of
Appeals erred:
1. in not finding that the reckless negligence of the victim was the proximate
cause of the accident which led to her death;
2. in not acquitting the petitioner on the ground of reasonable doubt; and
3. in unjustly increasing the civil liability of the petitioner from P6,000.00 to
P12,000.00, although the circumstances of the victim and the accused
(petitioner) do not warrant such increase.
It is quite evident that all the issues raised in the petition for review are
factual. Well-entrenched in our jurisprudence is the rule that findings of fact
of the trial court and the Court of Appeals are binding upon us (Bernardo vs.
Bernardo, 101 SCRA 351; Vda. De Roxas vs. IAC, 143 SCRA 77; Republic vs.
IAC, 144 SCRA 705).
The alleged contributory negligence of the victim, if any, does not exonerate
the accused. "The defense of contributory negligence does not apply in
criminal cases committed through reckless imprudence, since one cannot
 TRANSPO | Assign No 8 | 45

allege the negligence of another to evade the effects of his own negligence
(People vs. Orbeta, CA-G.R. No. 321, March 29,1947)." (People vs. Quinones,
44 O.G. 1520).

The petitioner's contention that the Court of Appeals unjustly increased his
civil liability to P12,000, is devoid of merit. The prevailing jurisprudence in
fact provides that indemnity for death in homicide or murder is P30,000
(People vs. De la Fuente, [1983]126 SCRA 518; People vs. Centeno, 130
SCRA 198). Accordingly, the civil liability of the petitioner is increased to
P30,000.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is affirmed with modification as to the

civil liability of the petitioner which is hereby increased to P30,000. Costs
against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
 TRANSPO | Assign No 8 | 46

14. G.R. Nos. 153760-61 October 12, 2006 TEODORICO MANZANARES, and EDUARDO YANG, petitioners,
vs.
TEODORICO MANZANARES, petitioner, CITA VICENTE, respondent.
vs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

x-------------------------x
DECISION
EDUARDO YANG, doing business under the name and style of
MANHATTAN ENTERPRISES, INC., and TEODORICO
MANZANARES, petitioners,
vs.
Spouses EDILBERTO EXALTACION and ADELAIDA CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
EXALTACION, respondents,
This is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
x-------------------------x Procedure which seeks to reverse and set aside the Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated 30 April 20021 in CA-G.R. CR No. 19600 and CA-G.R. CV No.
MANHATTAN ENTERPRISES, CO., and TEODORICO
53834 affirming the joint decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos,
MANZANARES, petitioners,
Bulacan, in Criminal Case No. 5782-M and Civil Cases No. 6734-M, 6769-M,
vs.
6935-M, 6894-M, and 8478-M.
LYDIA, CONSEJO, MIGUEL, JR., WILFREDO, BELINDA, JOHNA,
DANIEL, DESPOSORIO, VICTOR, - ANTONIETTE [all surnamed ANAS] The pertinent facts are as follows:
and MA. MILLIE ANAS-SACLOTE, respondents,
At about 2:30 oclock in the afternoon of 13 January 1983, a vehicular
x-------------------------x collision took place along MacArthur Highway, Barangay Tikay, Malolos,
Bulacan, involving an Isuzu six-wheeler truck bearing plate no. CBG 283
TEODORICO MANZANARES, and EDUARDO YANG, petitioners,
Pilipinas 82 and a passenger jeepney with plate no. DDC 430 UV Pilipinas 82.
vs.
The Isuzu truck was owned by petitioner Manhattan Enterprises, Inc. and was
FELICIDAD TOMAQUIN, respondent,
then driven by petitioner Teodorico Manzanares. The passenger jeepney, on
the other hand, was registered in the name of Teodoro Basallo. It was
x-------------------------x
established during the trial that the passenger jeepney was heading
MANHATTAN ENTERPRISES CO., and TEODORICO southwards in the direction of Manila while the Isuzu truck was heading the
MANZANARES, petitioners, opposite way.
vs.
The incident resulted in the deaths of the driver of the passenger jeepney
EDUARDA DAPLINAN VDA. DE PASCO, ROSA PASCO ALONZO, JESUSA
Jesus Basallo, Miguel Anas, Ferdinand Exaltacion, and Antonio Pasco. It also
PASCO BUSLON, FRANCISCO PASCO, MIRAVER PASCO & MA. TERESA
inflicted serious physical injuries to some of the passengers of the jeepney,
PASCO, respondents,
namely: Angela Enriquez, Romeo Espelimbergo, Teresita dela Cruz, Cita
x-------------------------x Vicente, Jesus Bartolome, Rolando Peralta, and Felicidad Raymundo.

As expected, the incident spawned the filing of civil suits by those harmed by
the collision.

The families of the deceased Ferdinand Exaltacion 2 and Miguel
Anas instituted separate civil cases for damages against petitioners
3
Manzanares, Manhattan Enterprises, Inc., the latters managing partner,
Eduardo Yang, and the operator of the passenger jeepney, Teodoro Basallo.
The heirs of Antonio Pasco opted to file a complaint against petitioners
Manhattan Enterprises Co. and Teodorico Manzanares. 4
The heirs of Jesus Basallo also filed a complaint for his death but their
complaint was dismissed for failure to prosecute. 5
Two of those who sustained injuries also filed their respective complaints
against petitioners and Teodoro Basallo. In her complaint, 6 Felicidad Tomaquin
claimed that because of the incident, she would not be able to report to her
work in a factory for more than twelve months while Cita Vicente demanded
that she be paid her salary for the two-month period that she was unable to
perform her job as a secretary in a law firm in Bulacan. 7
Except for the personal circumstances of the parties and the amount of
damages claimed, the civil cases filed against petitioner Manzanares alleged
that he drove the Isuzu truck in a grossly negligent, reckless, careless, and
imprudent manner without due regard to traffic rules and ordinances.
As for petitioners Manhattan Enterprises, Inc. and Eduardo Yang, the
complainants alleged that they failed to exercise the diligence of a good
father of a family in the selection and supervision of petitioner Manzanares
who was their employee when the mishap occurred.
Teodoro Basallo was sued on the basis of breach of contract of carriage as he
was the registered owner of the passenger jeepney.
In their joint answers, petitioners denied the material allegations of the
8
complaints and claimed, by way of special and affirmative defense, that
petitioner Manzanares was faultless in the accident in question; that
petitioner Manhattan Enterprises, Inc. had always exercised the diligence
required in the selection and supervision of all its employees; and that it had
always acted in good faith in dealing with others.
In his answers,9 Teodoro Basallo alleged that while he owned the passenger
jeepney involved in the collision, the same was on lease to his brother and
the jeepneys driver, Jesus Basallo for P100.00 a day thus, he did not have a
contract of carriage with anyone.
TRANSPO | Assign No 8 | 47
Aside from the civil cases, an Information was also filed against petitioner
Manzanares before the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan. The accusatory portion of the
information reads:
That on or about the 13 th day of January, 1983, in the municipality of Malolos,
province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the said accused Teodorico Manzanares y Domingo, being then the
chauffeur and person in charge of a truck bearing plate no. CBG 283 Pilipinas
82, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously drive and operate
the same while passing along the Mac-Arthur Highway in the said municipality
in a negligent, careless and imprudent manner, without due regard to the
traffic laws, rules and regulations and without taking the necessary
precautions to prevent accident to persons and damage to property, causing
by such negligence, carelessness and imprudence, the said truck bearing
plate no. CBG 283 T. Pilipinas 82, to bump a passenger jeep bearing plate no.
DDC 430 UV Pilipinas 82 owned by Teodoro Basallo and driven by Jesus
Basallo, thereby causing serious physical injuries which directly caused the
death of the said Jesus Basallo, Atty. Miguel Anas y Alli, Ferdinand Exaltacion
y de Guzman and Antonio Pasco y Geronimo; serious physical injuries to the
passenger(s) thereof; namely: Angela Enriquez y Nicolas, Romeo
Espelimbergo and Teresita dela Cruz, Cita Vicente, Jesus Bartolome, Rolando
Peralta and Felicidad Raymundo y Tomaquin which required medical
attendance for a period of two (2) to three (3) months barring complications
and which incapacitated them from performing their customary labor for the
same period of time; and damage to the said jeep in the amount
of P65,000.00, to the damage and prejudice of the said owner in the
aforesaid amount of P65,000.00.10
These cases were later on consolidated and a joint trial ensued.
During the hearing of the cases, Dr. Eufemia B. Arellano, rural physician of
Malolos, Bulacan, testified that she issued the death certificates of Jesus
Basallo, Atty. Anas, and Antonio Pasco11 and she was the one who signed their
autopsy reports. For Jesus Basallo, she identified the cause of death to be
cerebral hemorrhage due to fracture of the base of the skull and hemorrhage
of the lung due to multiple fractures of the ribs 12 while Atty. Anas died
because of cerebral hemorrhage due to fracture of the skull and hemorrhage
of the lungs due to multiple fractures of the ribs. 13 As for Pasco, his death was
brought about by cerebral hemorrhage due to multiple fractures of cranium
and hemorrhage of the lungs brought about by multiple fractures of his ribs. 14
 TRANSPO | Assign No 8 | 48

The prosecution likewise introduced in evidence the radiological report on Romeo Espelimbergo
Exaltacion stating that he suffered from complete fracture of the distal end of
the left clavicle and complete fracture of the scapula. 15 1. Punctured wound, left arm, measuring 0.5 cm in circumference, 1 cm. in
depth.
The following temporary medico-legal certificates with respect to the injuries
to the passengers of the jeepney were also admitted during the trial: 2. Lacerated wound superficial face left side 1 cm. in length.

Angela Enriquez: 3. Skin Abrasion, multiple, both lower extremities, and left hand.

1. Lacerated wound on the left eyeball 4-5 cm. in size. 4. Skin burns 2nd degree multiple left eye inner cantus and around the
left leg.
2. Hematoma, periorbital area left.
5. Contusion with abrasion, left superior iliac spine measuring 7 cms. x 7
3. Abrasion, 3-4 cm. left lateral neck. cms.

4. Complete, over-riding fracture middle third of the clavicle, right. 16 6. X-ray of the hip shows an incomplete fracture of the left acetabulum. 20

Cita Vicente Teresita Dela Cruz

1. Lacerated wound, 6 cm. right parietal area. 1. Wound lacerated, 4-5 cm. temporo-perietal left.

2. Lacerated wound, 3 cm. left occipital area. 2. Wound lacerated, mouth, left angle, 5 cm.

3. Contusion hematoma, right and left side of nasal bone. 3. Complete fracture distal end of the clavicle, left.

4. Abrasion, right arm. 4. Complete over-riding fracture 3rd rib anteriorly, left and 2nd rib, right.

5. Abrasion, right and left knee.17 5. Complete, [over]-riding fracture middle third of the tibia and fibula. 21

Jesus Bartolome Felicidad Tomaquin

1. 4-5 cms. Lacerated wound, deep right frontal. 1. Abrasion, left side of the mouth.

2. 3-4 cms. Lacerated wound, on the right eyebrow. 2. 4 cm. lacerated wound, at the right occipital area.

3. 5x1 cm. lacerated wound, right face. 3. Hematoma, chest left side at the level of the angle of lower.

4. Lacerated wound, 4-5 cm. medial aspect right hand. 4. Tenderness at the epigastric area.

5. Multiple abrasions, right hand.18 5. Tenderness at the left lateral side of abdomen and inguinal area. 22

Rolando Peralta Subsequently, Patrolman Liberato Macapagal was presented as a witness and
he testified that at about 2:35 oclock in the afternoon of 13 January 1983, he
1. Swelling of the right arm.19 received a report about an accident which happened at Barangay Tikay,
Malolos, Bulacan.23 When he arrived at the said place, he saw that the

reported mishap involved a passenger jeepney with plate number DDC 430
and an Isuzu delivery truck bearing plate number CBG 283. 24 The two
vehicles were resting on the right side of the MacArthur Highway going
towards Guiguinto, Bulacan. The Isuzu truck was still on the asphalted
highway while the passenger jeepney rested on the ramp. 25 In the course of
his investigation, he prepared a sketch showing the relative conditions of the
Isuzu truck and of the passenger jeepney as well as the other physical
evidence around these vehicles. 26 In addition, he also caused the taking of
pictures of the incident before the body of Jesus Basallo was extracted from
the passenger jeepney.27
Patrolman Macapagal also stated that he noticed skid marks along the
highway which were allegedly caused by the Isuzu truck when its driver
stepped on its brake pedal.28 When asked as to the length of the skid marks,
he replied that they measured about fifteen to twenty meters. 29 While he was
not certain as to the point of impact, Patrolman Macapagal stated that there
were more pieces of broken glass on the shoulder of the highway than there
were on the asphalted portion thereof.30
After Patrolman Macapagal, Angela Enriquez, a passenger of the jeepney
which figured in the collision testified that the vehicle she was riding in was
on the inclined pavement of the cemented portion 31 of the highway when it
was bumped by the Isuzu truck which was then in the process of overtaking
another vehicle.32 Substantially, this was also how Tomaquin and Vicente
recalled the incident. Tomaquin stated during her turn at the witness stand
that "the jeep (they) were riding was already ascending in the cemented
portion of the highway" 33 while Vicente alleged that the passenger jeepney
was "umaakyat pa lang sa kalsada"34 when the incident took place.
Another witness presented by the prosecution was Paterno Dimapilis who
claimed that he was resting near the entrance of the vulcanizing shop he was
working located along Barangay Tikay, Malolos, Bulacan. 35 He declared that
the smash up occurred in the following manner:
Q - Immediately before the collision, where was the passenger jeepney?
A - It was at the shoulder of the road, sir.
Q - What shoulder if coming from Malolos (going) towards the direction of
Manila?
A - At the right shoulder of the road, sir.
TRANSPO | Assign No 8 | 49
Q - How about the 6 wheeler truck, where was it before the collision took
place?
A - The 6-wheeler truck came from the direction of Manila, sir.
Q - Where was it facing before the collision?
A - It was facing Malolos, sir.
Q - If the truck was coming from Manila while according to you the jeep
was facing towards Manila coming from Malolos, please tell the Honorable
Court how the collision took place?
A - That truck was following a Philippine Rabbit Bus, sir.
Q - Yes, please continue.
A - This Philippine Rabbit Bus wanted to overtake while the 6 wheeler truck
also wanted to overtake but was in a dilemma because there was an on-
coming tamaraw jeep, sir.
Q - You said that the truck was placed in a dilemma or "naalangan," what
do you want to tell the court by "naalangan"?
A - Because of the dilemma of the driver of the 6 wheeler truck due to the
oncoming tamaraw jeep, the 6-wheeler truck (swerved) to the left, sir.
Q - Left of what?
A - At the left side of the road coming from Manila going to Malolos, sir.
Q - At that precise moment, when you saw the 6-wheeler truck swerved to
the left, did you notice where the passenger jeepney was?
A - The passenger jeepney was at the right shoulder of the road facing
Manila, sir.
Q - Alright, what happened when the truck swerved to the left?
A - When the 6-wheeler truck was swerving to the left to avoid the
tamaraw, the passenger jeepney was about to stop on the cemented portion
of the road, sir, and that was the time when it was bumped by the 6-wheeler
truck, sir.36

For his part, petitioner Manzanares testified that he, together with a truck
helper, was on his way back to petitioner Manhattan Enterprises, Inc.
premises after delivering cement in Tabang, Guiguinto, Bulacan when he got
involved in an accident with a passenger jeepney. According to him, he was
following a passenger bus which overtook another passenger jeepney
unloading its passengers. After the passenger bus successfully went back to
its proper lane he tried to see if there was any oncoming vehicle so that he
too can overtake the passenger jeepney which was then still occupying a
portion of his side of the road. Seeing no oncoming vehicle except for another
passenger jeepney on the shoulder at the opposite side of the MacArthur
Highway, he proceeded to overtake. However, the passenger jeepney he was
trying to pass "immediately took its motion" 37 forcing him to apply the brakes
of the Isuzu truck which skidded as a result. It was then that the Isuzu truck
bumped the passenger jeepney on the other side of the highway then driven
by Jesus Basallo.
When asked by the prosecutor on cross-examination, petitioner Manzanares
admitted that the two passenger jeepneys were obliquely situated from one
another and were about five to ten meters apart. 38 He also claimed that while
he was overtaking, Jesus Basallo suddenly "climbed" 39 onto the asphalted
portion of the highway forcing him to step on his brakes but despite his effort,
the Isuzu truck still skidded to the left without him even turning the steering
wheel to that side.40
After the trial, petitioner Manzanares was found guilty of reckless imprudence
resulting in multiple homicide and serious physical injuries and damage to
property. The dispositive portion of the trial courts decision states:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
I. Criminal Case No. 5782-M entitled People of the Philippines vs. Teodorico
Manzanares. This Court finds the said accused guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Multiple Homicide and
Serious Physical Injuries and Damage to Property. Accordingly, the said
accused is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison term of a
minimum of three (3) years, six (6) months and twenty (20) days of prison
correccional, medium to a maximum of seven (7) years and four (4) months
of prision mayor, medium and to pay the costs.
The accused is likewise ordered to pay: 1) ANGELA ENRIQUEZ a) actual
damages in the amount of Two Hundred Fifty (P250.00) PESOS; b) moral
damages in the amount of FIVE HUNDRED (P500.00) PESOS; c) exemplary
TRANSPO | Assign No 8 | 50
damages in the amount of ONE HUNDRED (P100.00) PESOS; and d)
attorneys fees and litigation expenses in the amount of ONE THOUSAND
(P1,000.00) PESOS; and 2) TERESITA DELA CRUZ a) actual damages in the
amount of ONE THOUSAND (P1,000.00) PESOS; b) moral damages in the
amount of ONE THOUSAND (P1,000.00) PESOS; c) exemplary damages in the
amount of TWO HUNDRED (P200.00) PESOS; and d) attorneys fees and
litigation expenses in the amount of ONE THOUSAND (P1,000.00) PESOS.
II. In the Civil Cases
1) In Civil Case No. 6734-M, entitled Sps. Edilberto Exaltacion, et al. vs.
Eduardo Yang, et al., judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs
and against the defendants, ordering the latter to pay the former as follows:
a. actual damages in the amount of TWENTY SIX THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED
THIRTY (P26,630.00) PESOS;
b. moral damages in the amount of ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND
(P150,000.00) PESOS;
c. exemplary damages in the amount of TEN THOUSAND (P10,000.00)
PESOS;
d. attorneys fees in the amount of TWENTY THOUSAND (P20,000.00) PESOS
plus five (5%) per cent of the total amount recoverable;
e. litigation expenses in the amount of FIFTEEN THOUSAND (P15,000.00)
PESOS.
2) In Civil Case No. 6769-M entitled Lydia Anas, et al. vs. Manhattan
Enterprises Co., et al., judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs
and against the defendants, ordering the latter to pay the former as follows:
a. actual damages in the amount of THIRTY THOUSAND (P30,000.00) PESOS;
b) compensatory damages in the amount of NINETY FOUR THOUSAND NINE
HUNDRED (P94,900.00) PESOS;
c) moral damages in the amount of SIXTY THOUSAND (P60,000.00) PESOS;
d) exemplary damages in the amount of TEN THOUSAND (P10,000.00)
PESOS; and

e) attorneys fees and litigation expenses in the amount of TWENTY
THOUSAND (P20,000.00) PESOS.
3) In Civil Case No. 6935-M entitled Eduarda Daplinan Vda. De Pasco, et al.
vs. Manhattan Enterprises Co., et al., judgment is hereby rendered in favor of
the plaintiffs and against the defendants, ordering the latter to pay the
former as follows:
a. actual damages in the amount of TWENTY FIVE THOUSAND (P25,000.00)
PESOS;
b. compensatory damages in the amount of THIRTY THOUSAND (P30,000.00)
PESOS;
c. moral damages in the amount of TWENTY THOUSAND (P20,000.00)
PESOS;
d. exemplary damages in the amount of FIVE THOUSAND (P5,000.00)
PESOS; and
e. attorneys fees and litigation expenses in the amount of TWENTY
THOUSAND (P20,000.00) PESOS.
4) In Civil Case No. 6894-M entitled Felicidad Tomaquin vs. Teodorico
Manzanares, et al., judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and
against the defendants, ordering the latter to pay the former as follows:
a. actual damages in the amount of ONE THOUSAND (P1,000.00) PESOS:
b. moral damages in the amount of FIVE HUNDRED (P500.00) PESOS;
c. exemplary damages in the amount of TWO HUNDRED (P200.00) PESOS;
and
d. attorneys fees and litigation expenses in the amount of ONE THOUSAND
(P1,000.00) PESOS.
5) In Civil Case No. 8478-M entitled Cita Vicente vs. Teodorico Manzanares, et
al., judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the
defendants, ordering the latter to pay the former as follows:
a. actual damages in the amount of FIVE HUNDRED (P500.00) PESOS;
b. moral damages in the amount of ONE THOUSAND (P1,000.00) PESOS;
TRANSPO | Assign No 8 | 51
c. exemplary damages in the amount of FIVE HUNDRED (P500.00) PESOS;
and
d. attorneys fees and litigation expenses in the amount of TWO THOUSAND
FIVE HUNDRED (P2,500.00) PESOS.
COSTS against the defendants in all of the instant 5 civil cases. 41
In its assailed Decision of 30 April 2002, the Court of Appeals affirmed, with
modification, the Decision of the trial court. The decretal portion of the Court
of Appeals Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, except for these MODIFICATIONS:
In Crim. Case No. 5782-M, the awards for exemplary damages, attorneys
fees and litigation expenses, are DELETED;
In Civil Case No. 6734-M, the awards for exemplary damages, attorneys fees
and litigation expenses, are deleted; indemnity for death of P50,000.00 is
additionally awarded; and the award for moral damages is reduced
to P50,000.00;
In Civil Case No. 6769-M, the awards for exemplary damages, attorneys fees
and litigation expenses, are deleted; indemnity for death of P50,000.00 is
additionally awarded; and the award for moral damages is reduced
to P50,000.00;
In Civil Case No. 6935-M, the awards for exemplary damages, attorneys fees
and litigation expenses, are deleted; indemnity for death of P50,000.00 is
additionally awarded; and the award for moral damages is increased
to P50,000.00;
In Civil Case No. 6894-M, the awards for exemplary damages, attorneys fees
and litigation expenses, are deleted; and
In Civil Case No. 8478-M, the awards for exemplary damages, attorneys fees
and litigation expenses, are deleted.
but in all other respects the appealed Decision is otherwise AFFIRMED. 42
Aggrieved, petitioners are now before this Court impugning the judgment of
the appellate court for the following reason:

THE COURT A QUO ERRED AND ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN AFFIRMING WITH
MODIFICATION ONLY AS TO DAMAGES THE APRIL 30, 2002 DECISION OF
THE TRIAL COURT BY OVERLOOKING CERTAIN FACTS WHICH MAY
SUBSTANTIALLY AFFECT THE RESOLUTION OF THE CASE.43
Petitioners insist that the prosecution failed to discharge its duty of
establishing petitioner Manzanares guilt beyond reasonable doubt and that
the decisions both of the trial court and of the Court of Appeals were based
only on mere assumptions. They pointed out that if it were true that
petitioner Manzanares swerved farther to the left of the highway while he was
overtaking, as found by the trial court, then, there was no reason why it still
ended up on the asphalted portion of the highway. Moreover, they claim that
petitioner Manzanares exercised caution before he proceeded to overtake the
passenger jeepney on his side of the road by making sure that there was no
oncoming vehicle on the opposite side of the highway. It was only after
petitioner Manzanares was certain that he could successfully overtake that he
did so but Jesus Basallo suddenly and unexpectedly maneuvered his
passenger jeepney into the highway forcing petitioner Manzanares to apply
the brakes of his truck. Unfortunately, the Isuzu truck skidded and rammed
into the passenger jeepney driven by Jesus Basallo. Petitioners also impugn
the reliance by the trial court and the Court of Appeals on the testimony of
Dimapilis by claiming that the latter was a biased witness supplied by the
parents of Ferdinand Exaltacion, one of the passengers who died because of
the incident.
Petitioners also maintain that at the time of the incident, the passenger
jeepney owned by Teodoro Basallo was not covered by any franchise to
operate and that Jesus Basallo was driving with an expired license. Thus,
under Article 2185 of the Civil Code,44 Jesus Basallo is presumed negligent.
The Office of the Solicitor General filed its Comment 45 and essentially
maintained that this petition does not present any special and important
reason that may justify the exercised of this Courts power of review under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
The petition is unmeritorious.
It is quite evident that the question as to who between petitioner Manzanares
and Jesus Basallo was negligent in the operation of his vehicle is factual in
nature justifying the outright rejection of this petition. As this court has
repeatedly stressed in the majority of appeals in criminal cases, an appellate
TRANSPO | Assign No 8 | 52
court gives great weight to the factual findings of trial courts and accords
them respect if not finality unless the accused-appellant is able to show that
the trial court overlooked or disregarded matters of substance which if
considered would very likely change the results. 46
Petitioners plead with us to absolve them of any liability arising from the
incident which occurred in the afternoon of 13 January 1983 by shifting the
blame to the Jesus Basallo, the driver of the passenger jeepney involved in
the incident. We have carefully reviewed the entire records of this case and
failed to find any reason to rule in their favor.
We particularly take note of the inconsistency in petitioner Manzanares
stance as to what really caused him to abruptly step on his brakes while he
was trying to pass the passenger jeepney then unloading its passengers in his
side of the road. While he insists that he was compelled to apply his brakes
when he saw Jesus Basallos passenger jeepney move into the MacArthur
Highway away from the shoulder to allow its passengers to disembark, he
stated a different recollection of the incident in his direct testimony on 5
March 1986, thus:
Q - Will you tell this Honorable Court how that accident where you were
involved happened?
A - I was following a truck, sir, and that truck I was following overtook a
jeep which was unloading a passenger, sir.
Q - What happened next after that truck you have mentioned overtook a
passenger jeep which was unloading a passenger?
A - I was also coming, sir.
Q - Coming from where?
A - From Tabang going to Malolos, sir.
Q - How about that truck which according to you overtook a jeep which
was unloading a passenger, where did it come from?
A - From Tabang, sir.
Q - What happened when that truck you were following overtook that jeep
which was unloading passenger?
A - He was able to overtook (sic), sir.
 TRANSPO | Assign No 8 | 53

Q - And after by the way, what kind of truck was it which you said Q - And what did you do when you saw that the jeep on the
overtook that passenger jeepney which you said was unloading a passenger, shoulder immediately entering the pavement?
if you still recall?
A - I applied my brakes, sir.
A - It was a passenger bus, sir, colored red.
Q - How many times did you apply your brakes?
xxxx
A - Only once, sir.
Q - After that passenger bus according to you had overtaken the jeep
which was unloading a passenger, what happened next to you, if anything Q - Did the truck you were driving stopped as a result of the application of
had happened? that brake?

A - I was also going to overtake because the jeep was still there but I tried A - It still continued to move (umusad), sir.
to see whether there was an oncoming vehicle so that I would be able to
xxxx
overtake, also, sir.
Q - You said your truck skidded, what happened after it skidded?
Q - Was that the only thing you did before overtaking the said passenger
jeep?
A - It bumped the jeep, sir.
A - I did not see any oncoming vehicle, sir.
Q - What kind of jeep?
Q - When you said you did not see oncoming vehicle, you mean you did
A - A passenger jeep, sir.47 (Emphases supplied.)
not see vehicle coming from the direction of Malolos going towards Guiguinto?
On cross-examination, he reiterated that the passenger jeepney he was
A - No one, sir, was coming except a jeep which was on the shoulder of the
supposed to pass commenced moving while he was in the process of
road, sir.
overtaking
Q - What did you do upon seeing that there was no oncoming vehicle from
ATTY. ARCEO:
the direction of Malolos?
Q - And when you were abreast to the jeep you testified, did you not, that
A - I overtook, sir.
the jeep started its motion?
Q - Were you able to successfully overtook that passenger jeepney which
ATTY. PASAMBA:
was unloading passenger?
Which jeep now?
A - No, sir.
ATTY. ARCEO:
Q - Why, please tell the Court?
The jeep at the right side.
A - When I was already aligned with the jeep, I was to overtake the
jeep which was on a stop on the shoulder, it immediately took its A - Still little by little, sir.48
motion, sir.
By his own admission, it is crystal clear that petitioner Manzanares was
caught by surprise when the passenger jeepney he intended to overtake

started moving alongside him causing him to hesitate and to step on his
brakepedal. But as he was running at such a fast pace, the momentum of the
Isuzu truck overpowered his brakes such that the truck still continued with its
motion until it bumped the passenger jeepney driven by Jesus Basallo right at
the edge of the asphalted portion of the highway. The location of the debris,
as illustrated by the sketch prepared by Patrolman Macapagal, and his
testimony confirm that there were more pieces of broken glass on the
shoulder of the road than there were on the highway itself. Evidence tending
to illustrate the relative positions of the vehicles immediately after the
accident tends to throw light on the issue of speed and direction of the
vehicles movements prior to, and at the same time of, the accident. 49 This
confirms that only a small portion of the passenger jeepney was positioned on
the asphalted portion of the highway itself while the remainder of its body
was still on the shoulder of the road. Given petitioners testimony that the two
passenger jeepneys were far from one another, there was more than ample
road space within which petitioner Manzanares could have maneuvered the
Isuzu truck instead of bumping into the passenger jeepney and pinning Jesus
Basallo to his death. The fact that he was unable to do so and in the end lost
control of the Isuzu truck indicate that petitioner Manzanares was
unreasonably fast in traversing that portion of the road despite his insistence
that he was driving slowly because his speedometer was not functioning. 50
Equally damning for petitioner Manzanares are the photographs of the two
vehicles which were presented before the court for they easily contradict his
claim with respect to the speed of the Isuzu truck. 51 In the case of Macalinao
v. Ong,52 we had the occasion to discuss the evidentiary value of photographs
According to American courts, photographs are admissible in evidence in
motor vehicle accident cases when they appear to have been accurately taken
and are proved to be a faithful and clear representation of the subject, which
cannot itself be produced, and are of such nature as to throw light upon a
disputed point.53
TRANSPO | Assign No 8 | 54
The severe damage to the front left portion of the passenger jeepney as
shown by said pictures gives rise to the inevitable conclusion that the Isuzu
truck was running fast before it smashed into the jeepney. Such destruction
could not have resulted had petitioner Manzanares been driving his truck
slowly for then the impact would not have been as severe. As we have
previously declared, "the very fact of speeding is indicative of imprudent
behavior, as a motorist must exercise ordinary care and drive at a reasonable
rate of speed commensurate with the conditions encountered, which will
enable him or her to keep the vehicle under control and avoid injury to others
using the highway."54
Nor are we convinced that the Isuzu truck "voluntarily" swerved to the left of
the highway. Such bare claim on the part of petitioner Manzanares part
amounts to nothing but an unsubstantiated and self-serving allegation.
Finally, as to petitioners argument that Jesus Basallo should be presumed
negligent because he was driving with an expired license and the passenger
jeepney owned by his brother Teodorico did not have a franchise to operate,
we hold that the same fails to convince. "The defense of contributory
negligence does not apply in criminal cases committed through reckless
imprudence, since one cannot allege the negligence of another to evade the
effects of his own negligence."55
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present Petition is DENIED. The
Court of Appeals Decision dated 30 April 2002 affirming, with modification,
the Decision dated 16 December 1994 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 7,
Malolos, Bulacan is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.