TESTATE ESTATE OF EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN vs.

HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA, G.R. No. L-16749

January 31, 1963
IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN, DECEASED.
ADOLFO C. AZNAR, Executor and LUCY CHRISTENSEN, Heir of the deceased, Executor and
Heir-appellees, VS. HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA, oppositor-appellant
January 31, 1963

FACTS:
Edward E. Christensen, though born in New York, migrated to California, where he resided and
consequently was considered a California citizen. In 1913, he came to the Philippines where he became a
domiciliary until his death. However, during the entire period of his residence in this country he had always
considered himself a citizen of California. In his will executed on March 5, 1951, he instituted an
acknowledged natural daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen as his only heir, but left a legacy of sum of money
in favor of Helen Christensen Garcia who was rendered to have been declared acknowledged natural
daughter. Counsel for appellant claims that California law should be applied; that under California law, the
matter is referred back to the law of the domicile; that therefore Philippine law is ultimately applicable; that
finally, the share of Helen must be increased in view of the success ional rights of illegitimate children under
Philippine law. On the other hand, counsel for the heir of Christensen contends that inasmuch as it is clear
that under Article 16 of our Civil Code, the national law of the deceased must apply, our courts must
immediately apply the internal law of California on the matter; that under California law there are no
compulsory heirs and consequently a testator could dispose of any property possessed by him in absolute
dominion and that finally, illegitimate children not being entitled to anything and his will remain undisturbed.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Philippine law should prevail in administering the estate of Christensen?

RULING:
The court in deciding to grant more successional rights to Helen said in effect that there are two rules in
California on the matter: the internal law which should apply to Californians domiciled in California; and the
conflict rule which should apply to Californians domiciled outside of California. The California conflict rule
says: If there is no law to the contrary in the place where personal property is situated, is deemed to follow
the person of its owner and is governed by the law of his domicile. Christensen being domiciled outside
California, the law of his domicile, the Philippines, ought to be followed. Where it is referred back to
California, it will form a circular pattern referring to both country back and forth.
Edward Christensen is a citizen of the State of California and domiciled in the Philippines. He executed
in his will acknowledging his natural daughter Maria Lucy Christensen as sole heir but left a legacy of
some money in favor of Helen Christensen Garcia who is declared by the Supreme Court in its
decision as acknowledged natural daughter of Edward C. Counsel of Helen asserts that her claim must
be increased in view of the successional rights of illegitimate children under Phil. law. Counsel of Maria
insists that Art. 16 (2) provides that the NATIONAL LAW OF THE PERSON applies in intestate and
testamentary successions and since Edward C. is a citizen of CA, its law should be applied. Lower
court ruled that CA law should be applied thus this petition for review.
Issue:

What law should be applicable Philippine or California Law?

Ruling:

The court refers to Art. 16 (2) providing that intestate and testamentary successions with respect to
order of succession and amt. of successional right is regulated by the NATIONAL LAW OF THE
PERSON.

California Probate Code provides that a testator may dispose of his property in the form and manner
he desires.
Art. 946 of the Civil Code of California provides that if no law on the contrary, the place where the
personal property is situated is deemed to follow the person of its owner and is governed by the LAW
OF HIS DOMICILE.

These provisions are cases when the Doctrine of Renvoi may be applied where the question of
validity of the testamentary provision in question is referred back to the decedents domicile
the Philippines.

S.C. noted the California law provides 2 sets of laws for its citizens: One for residents therein as
provided by the CA Probate Code and another for citizens domiciled in other countries as provided by
Art. 946 of the Civil Code of California.

The conflicts of law rule in CA (Art. 946) authorize the return of question of law to the testators
domicile. The court must apply its own rule in the Philippines as directed in the conflicts of law rule in
CA, otherwise the case/issue will not be resolved if the issue is referred back and forth between 2
states.

The SC reversed the lower courts decision and remanded the case back to it for
decision with an instruction that partition be made applying the Philippine law.

Factsofthecase
Groups of same-sex couples sued their relevant state agencies in Ohio, Michigan,
Kentucky, and Tennessee to challenge the constitutionality of those states' bans on
same-sex marriage or refusal to recognize legal same-sex marriages that occurred in
jurisdictions that provided for such marriages. The plaintiffs in each case argued that
the states' statutes violated the Equal Protection Clause and Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment, and one group of plaintiffs also brought claims under the
Civil Rights Act. In all the cases, the trial court found in favor of the plaintiffs. The U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed and held that the states' bans on
same-sex marriage and refusal to recognize marriages performed in other states did
not violate the couples' Fourteenth Amendment rights to equal protection and due
process.

Question
(1) Does the Fourteenth Amendment require a state to license a marriage between
two people of the same sex?
(2) Does the Fourteenth Amendment require a state to recognize a marriage between
two people of the same sex that was legally licensed and performed in another state?

Conclusion
Yes, yes. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy delivered the opinion for the 5-4 majority. The
Court held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees the
right to marry as one of the fundamental liberties it protects, and that analysis
applies to same-sex couples in the same manner as it does to opposite-sex couples.
Judicial precedent has held that the right to marry is a fundamental liberty because it
is inherent to the concept of individual autonomy, it protects the most intimate
association between two people, it safeguards children and families by according
legal recognition to building a home and raising children, and it has historically been
recognized as the keystone of social order. Because there are no differences between
a same-sex union and an opposite-sex union with respect to these principles, the
exclusion of same-sex couples from the right to marry violates the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment also guarantees the right of same-sex couples to marry as the denial of
that right would deny same-sex couples equal protection under the law. Marriage
rights have traditionally been addressed through both parts of the Fourteenth
Amendment, and the same interrelated principles of liberty and equality apply with
equal force to these cases; therefore, the Constitution protects the fundamental right
of same-sex couples to marry. The Court also held that the First Amendment protects
the rights of religious organizations to adhere to their principles, but it does not allow
states to deny same-sex couples the right to marry on the same terms as those for
opposite-sex couples.
Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. wrote a dissent in which he argued that, while same-
sex marriage might be good and fair policy, the Constitution does not address it, and
therefore it is beyond the purview of the Court to decide whether states have to
recognize or license such unions. Instead, this issue should be decided by individual
state legislatures based on the will of their electorates. The Constitution and judicial
precedent clearly protect a right to marry and require states to apply laws regarding
marriage equally, but the Court cannot overstep its bounds and engage in judicial
policymaking. The precedents regarding the right to marry only strike down
unconstitutional limitations on marriage as it has been traditionally defined and
government intrusions, and therefore there is no precedential support for making a
state alter its definition of marriage. Chief Justice Roberts also argued that the
majority opinion relied on an overly expansive reading of the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment without engaging with the judicial
analysis traditionally applied to such claims and while disregarding the proper role of
the courts in the democratic process. Justice Antonin Scalia and Justice Clarence
Thomas joined in the dissent. In his separate dissent, Justice Scalia wrote that the
majority opinion overstepped the bounds of the Courts authority both by exercising
the legislative, rather than judicial, power and by doing so in a realm that the
Constitution reserves for the states. Justice Scalia argued that the question of
whether same-sex marriage should be recognized is one for the state legislatures,
and that for the issue to be decided by unelected judges goes against one of the
most basic precepts of the Constitution: that political change should occur through
the votes of elected representatives. In taking on this policymaking role, the majority
opinion departed from established Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence to create a
right where none exists in the Constitution. Justice Thomas joined in the dissent.
Justice Thomas also wrote a separate dissent in which he argued that the majority
opinion stretched the doctrine of substantive due process rights found in the
Fourteenth Amendment too far and in doing so distorted the democratic process by
taking power from the legislature and putting it in the hands of the judiciary.
Additionally, the legislative history of the Due Process Clause in both the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments indicates that they were meant to protect people from
physical restraint and from government intervention, but they do not grant them
rights to government entitlements. Justice Thomas also argued that the majority
opinion impermissibly infringed on religious freedom by legislating from the bench
rather than allowing the state legislature to determine how best to address the
competing rights and interests at stake. Justice Scalia joined in the dissent. In his
separate dissent, Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. wrote that the Constitution does not
address the right of same-sex couples to marry, and therefore the issue is reserved to
the states to decide whether to depart from the traditional definition of marriage. By
allowing a majority of the Court to create a new right, the majority opinion
dangerously strayed from the democratic process and greatly expanded the power of
the judiciary beyond what the Constitution allows. Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas
joined in the dissent.
Renato Tayag vs Benguet
Consolidated, Inc.
26 SCRA 242 Business Organization Corporation Law Domicile of a Corporation
By Laws Must Yield To a Court Order Corporation is an Artificial Being
In March 1960, Idonah Perkins died in New York. She left behind properties here and
abroad. One property she left behind were two stock certificates covering 33,002
shares of stocks of the Benguet Consolidated, Inc (BCI). Said stock certificates were in
the possession of the Country Trust Company of New York (CTC-NY). CTC-NY was the
domiciliary administrator of the estate of Perkins (obviously in the USA). Meanwhile,
in 1963, Renato Tayag was appointed as the ancillary administrator (of the properties
of Perkins she left behind in the Philippines).
A dispute arose between CTC-NY and Tayag as to who between them is entitled to
possess the stock certificates. A case ensued and eventually, the trial court ordered
CTC-NY to turn over the stock certificates to Tayag. CTC-NY refused. Tayag then filed
with the court a petition to have said stock certificates be declared lost and to
compel BCI to issue new stock certificates in replacement thereof. The trial court
granted Tayags petition.
BCI assailed said order as it averred that it cannot possibly issue new stock
certificates because the two stock certificates declared lost are not actually lost; that
the trial court as well Tayag acknowledged that the stock certificates exists and that
they are with CTC-NY; that according to BCIs by laws, it can only issue new stock
certificates, in lieu of lost, stolen, or destroyed certificates of stocks, only after court
of law has issued a final and executory order as to who really owns a certificate of
stock.
ISSUE: Whether or not the arguments of Benguet Consolidated, Inc. are correct.
HELD: No. Benguet Consolidated is a corporation who owes its existence to
Philippine laws. It has been given rights and privileges under the law. Corollary, it also
has obligations under the law and one of those is to follow valid legal court orders. It
is not immune from judicial control because it is domiciled here in the Philippines. BCI
is a Philippine corporation owing full allegiance and subject to the unrestricted
jurisdiction of local courts. Its shares of stock cannot therefore be considered in any
wise as immune from lawful court orders. Further, to allow BCIs opposition is to
render the court order against CTC-NY a mere scrap of paper. It will leave Tayag
without any remedy simply because CTC-NY, a foreign entity refuses to comply with a
valid court order. The final recourse then is for our local courts to create a legal fiction
such that the stock certificates in issue be declared lost even though in reality they
exist in the hands of CTC-NY. This is valid. As held time and again, fictions which the
law may rely upon in the pursuit of legitimate ends have played an important part in
its development.
Further still, the argument invoked by BCI that it can only issue new stock certificates
in accordance with its bylaws is misplaced. It is worth noting that CTC-NY did not
appeal the order of the court it simply refused to turn over the stock certificates
hence ownership can be said to have been settled in favor of estate of Perkins here.
Also, assuming that there really is a conflict between BCIs bylaws and the court
order, what should prevail is the lawful court order. It would be highly irregular if
court orders would yield to the bylaws of a corporation. Again, a corporation is not
immune from judicial orders.

G.R. No. L-23145, Nov. 29, 1968

o PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW: Situs of Shares of Stock: domicile of the
corporation
o SUCCESSION: Ancillary Administration: The ancillary administration is
proper, whenever a person dies, leaving in a country other than that of his last
domicile, property to be administered in the nature of assets of the deceased
liable for his individual debts or to be distributed among his heirs.
o SUCCESSION: Probate: Probate court has authority to issue the order
enforcing the ancillary administrators right to the stock certificates when the
actual situs of the shares of stocks is in the Philippines.

FACTS:

Idonah Slade Perkins, an American citizen who died in New York City, left among
others, two stock certificates issued by Benguet Consolidated, a corporation
domiciled in the Philippines. As ancillary administrator of Perkins estate in the
Philippines, Tayag now wants to take possession of these stock certificates but
County Trust Company of New York, the domiciliary administrator, refused to part
with them. Thus, the probate court of the Philippines was forced to issue an order
declaring the stock certificates as lost and ordering Benguet Consolidated to
issue new stock certificates representing Perkins shares. Benguet Consolidated
appealed the order, arguing that the stock certificates are not lost as they are in
existence and currently in the possession of County Trust Company of New York.

ISSUE: Whether or not the order of the lower court is proper

HELD:

The appeal lacks merit.

Tayag, as ancillary administrator, has the power to gain control and possession of
all assets of the decedent within the jurisdiction of the Philippines

It is to be noted that the scope of the power of the ancillary administrator was, in
an earlier case, set forth by Justice Malcolm. Thus: "It is often necessary to have
more than one administration of an estate. When a person dies intestate owning
property in the country of his domicile as well as in a foreign country,
administration is had in both countries. That which is granted in the jurisdiction
of decedent's last domicile is termed the principal administration, while any other
administration is termed the ancillary administration. The reason for the latter is
because a grant of administration does not ex proprio vigore have any effect
beyond the limits of the country in which it is granted. Hence, an administrator
appointed in a foreign state has no authority in the [Philippines]. The ancillary
administration is proper, whenever a person dies, leaving in a country other than
that of his last domicile, property to be administered in the nature of assets of
the deceased liable for his individual debts or to be distributed among his heirs."
Probate court has authority to issue the order enforcing the ancillary
administrators right to the stock certificates when the actual situs of the shares
of stocks is in the Philippines.

It would follow then that the authority of the probate court to require that
ancillary administrator's right to "the stock certificates covering the 33,002
shares ... standing in her name in the books of [appellant] Benguet Consolidated,
Inc...." be respected is equally beyond question. For appellant is a Philippine
corporation owing full allegiance and subject to the unrestricted jurisdiction of
local courts. Its shares of stock cannot therefore be considered in any wise as
immune from lawful court orders.

Our holding in Wells Fargo Bank and Union v. Collector of Internal Revenue finds
application. "In the instant case, the actual situs of the shares of stock is in the
Philippines, the corporation being domiciled [here]." To the force of the above
undeniable proposition, not even appellant is insensible. It does not dispute it.
Nor could it successfully do so even if it were so minded.
Tayag v. Benguet Consolidated Inc.
Summary: mere excerpt to show the relevance of ancillary
administration
Facts:
-Decedent: Idonah Slade Perkins - left 2 stock certificates
covering 33,002 shares in BCMI
-BCMI Stock certificates: in possession of Country Trust Company of
NY (domiciliary administrator of Idonah's estate)
-ancillary administration proceedings instituted in Manila:
appointed finally Renato Tayag
-BCMI was compelled by the court to deliver to Tayag the
Certificates. BCMI did not comply
WON Tayag (and not Country Trust Company of NY) is
entitled to administration of the BCMI Certificate of Stocks?
TAYAG as ancillary administrator
1. No contest that ancillary administrator has control and
possession of all assets of the decedent w/n the jurisdiction of
the Philippines
2. An administrator appointed in one state or country has no
power over property in another state or country
3. Principal vs. Ancillary administration:
Principal administration: that which is granted in the jurisdiction of
the decedent's last domicile
Ancillary administration: any other administration
Why? A grant of administration does not ex proprio vigore (by its
own force) have any effect beyond the limits of the country in
which it is granted.
When proper? When a person dies leaving property in a country
other than that of his last domicile
4. BCMI, as a domestic corporation, owes full allegiance and
subject to the unrestricted jurisdiction of lower courts.
 5. The situs of the shares of stocks is here in RP [Wells Fargo
Bank and Union v. CIR]
G. Trusts
-right of property, real or personal, held by one party for the benefit of
another
-may be created by deed during the lifetime of the settler or by will
PRIL problem: When properties are located in places other than where
the trustor is domiciled and where the trust was made - does the effect of
that trust extend extraterritorially?
Validity
Essential propriety of the trust
Compliance with formalities
Choice-of-law provision: courts of the place where trust is being
administered will normally apply the chosen law (carry out intent of the
trustor)
>if none: follow the law that will sustain the validity of the trust
Testamentary trusts :: contained in a will :: follow the law of the place to
which extrinsic validity of the will depend (usu. Lex loci contractus)
But since it involves properties: lex situs

TAYAG VS BENGUET CONSOLIDATED INC. (26

SCRA 242)
Tayag vs Benguet Consolidated Inc
26 SCRA 242 [GR No. L-23145 November 27,1968]
Facts: County Trust Company of New York, United States of America is
the domiciliary administration of the decedent, Idonah Slade Perkins
who owned 33,002 shares of stocks in the appellant, domestic
corporation, Benguet Consolidated Inc. located in the Philippines. A
dispute arose between the appellee, Tayag who is the appointed
ancillary of Perkins in the Philippines and the domiciliary administration
as to who is entitled to the possession of the certificate of shares,
however, County Trust Company refuses to transfer the said certificate
to Tayag despite the order of the court. Hence, the appellee was
compelled to petition the court for the appellant to declare the subject
certificates as lost to which appellant allegeed that no new certificate
can be issued and the same cannot be rendered as lost in accordance
with their by-laws.
Issue: Whether or not the certificate of shares of stock can be
declared lost.
Held: Yes. Administration whether principal or ancillary certainly
extends to the assets of a decedent found within the state or country
where it was granted.
It is often necessary to have more than one administration of an
estate. When a person dies intestate owning property located in the
country of his domicile as well as in a foreign country, administration is
had in both countries. That which is granted in the jurisdiction of
decedents last domicile is termed the principal administration, while
any other administration is termed the ancillary administration. The
reason for the latter is because a grant of administration does not ex
proprio vigore have any effect beyond the limits of the country in
which it is granted.Hence, an administration appointed in a foreign
state has no authority in the Philippines. The ancillary administration is
proper, whenever a person dies, leaving in a country other than that of
his last domicile, property to be administered in the nature of the
deceaseds liable for his individual debts or to be distributed among his
heirs.
Since there is refusal, persistently adhered to by the domiciliary
administration in New York, to deliver the shares of stocks of appellant
corporation owned by the decedent to the ancillary administration in
the Philippines, there was nothing unreasonable or arbitrary in
considering them lost and requiring the appellant to issue new
certificates in lieu thereof. Thereby the task incumbent under the law
on the ancillary administration could be discharged and his
responsibility fulfilled.
Assuming that a contrariety exist between the provision of the laws
and the command of a court decree, the latter is to be followed.
A corporation as known to Philippine jurisprudence is a creature
without any existence until it has received the imprimatur of state
according to law. It is logically inconceivable therefore it will have
rights and privileges of a higher priority than that of its creator, more
than that, it cannot legitimately refuse to yield obedience to acts of its
state organs, certainly not excluding the judiciary, whenever called
upon to do so.