Beleske o redukcionizmu:

People use representational devices.

In philosophy and mathematical logic, mereology (from the Greek , root: ()-, "part" and
the suffix -logy "study, discussion, science") is the study of parts and the wholes they form.

One solution to this problem would be to connect reductive explanation to

mechanistic explanation, even though mechanistic explanation is often
described by its proponents as non-reductivist in spirit (Kauffmann 1970;
Cummins 1975, 1983, 2000; Bechtel & Richardson 1993; Bechtel 1994;
Glennan 1996; Machamer et al. 2000; Craver 2005, 2007).

Others have held that not only is there a difference between explanatory
reduction, which is an epistemological matter, and ontological
reductionism, but that there might even be a difference between
explanatory reduction and derivation-based models of theory reduction.

On one interpretation, the non-reductive physicalist opposes the idea that

we can and should in fact reduce high-level sciences; we need them for
epistemic or pragmatic purposes (Fodor 1974, 1997; Putnam 1978; Van
Gulick 1992). We need a plurality of autonomous theories and
frameworks. However, the non-reductive physicalist accepts that what is
actually out there might very well be all of one kind, at least in some
ultimate sense such that ontological reductionism is true.

A much more modest position consists in the idea that, though

straightforward reductions might be rare, reductionism might play a role
as a regulative ideal (Schaffner 1993); the notion of reduction can, on this
view, be used to characterize one extreme of a spectrum of possible
relations between different stages of scientific developments. It comes
with a specific normative power: If a reduction can be effected,
it should be effected.

In addition, the notion of reduction obviously plays an important role in

the characterization of non-reductive physicalism; a careful investigation
of what reductionism consists in is required to adequately determine in
what respects, if any, a theory of mind could be coherently both non-
reductivist and materialist about the mental.
Secondly, an appropriate definition of reduction is called for when it
comes to evaluating anti-reductionist positions.

The hope that the actual progress of science can be successfully

described in terms of reduction has vanished. Concepts of reduction,
except for those re-adapted to actual scientific practice, are nowadays
studied primarily in the more theoretically oriented parts of the
metaphysics of science.

Mislim da je bilo kakav vid hijejarhije lazan (to se pominje bas kod autora
Sarkar -> apstraktna hijerarhija kao jedan od njegovih kriterijuma!!!), pa
tako I one koja se neminovno nalazi kao pretpostavka mozda svakog
oblika redukcionizma.

4 kriterijuma za reprezentaciju u redokc.objasnjenju -> 3 momenta koji

def organizam kao kompl.celinu-> naci primer koji pokazuje da polazimo
od redukc pristupa, ali se na njemu ne zavrsava nase istrazivanje.