Documente Academic
Documente Profesional
Documente Cultură
Sociology
CompSoc
Comparative Sociology 6 (2007) 114–135 www.brill.nl/coso
Abstract
This article proposes that elite theory is at the heart of understanding political
conflict in Africa. A case study of Ghana analyses the historical origins of elite
conflict in Ghana before and after independence. The article links high levels of
political elite circulation resulting from the transformation of traditional social
structures with high levels of political elite differentiation and instability in the
post-colonial era. Since 1992 Ghana’s new liberal democratic regime has flourished.
There are indications that there is a gradual increase in unity amongst competing
political elites. Diversity amongst political elites has resulted in greater representa-
tion at the leadership level. These factors may explain the sustained period of
political stability and the gradual deepening of liberal democracy in Ghana.
Keywords
political elites, elite circulation, elite transformation, democratization, Ghana
Introduction
This article is based on the premise that political processes in Africa are
driven by the same logic as politics elsewhere. Therefore general theories
which aim to explain the persistence of democratic regimes are equally
applicable to Africa. Here, I aim to highlight the importance of modern
elite theory in understanding the dynamics of political conflict and regime
stability in Africa. This will be done by using the case study of Ghana to
examine the processes of political elite formation, circulation, differentiation
and transformation in an historical context. The goal is to shed light on the
© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2007 DOI: 10.1163/156913307X187423
1)
It is beyond the scope of this article to evaluate the quality of democracy in Ghana.
Nevertheless, problems as to definition and quality of democracy are not limited to
Theoretical Background
One of the most compelling recent attempts to create a universally appli-
cable elite theory comes from John Higley and Michael Burton (2006).
They distinguish between united and disunited political elites and propose
a typology of elites which they suggest may apply in all cases. They define
political elites as ‘persons who are able, by virtue of their authoritative
positions in powerful organizations and movements of whatever kind, to
affect national political outcomes regularly and substantially’ (Burton and
Higley 2001:8). Burton and Higley have developed a systematic theory of
elites which aims to establish the connections between political elite unity
and regime stability.
‘Only after elites have entered into and sustained peaceful competitions
for mass support under agreed rules do constitutions and other political
institutions embodying representative principles and practices strengthen
and citizens become more self-confident and sophisticated in their politi-
cal participation. At varying speeds, relatively inclusive ‘democratic’ politi-
cal orders emerge. But the starting point is the taming of politics by
elites.’(Burton and Higley 2001:91)
The key role of political elites in sustaining political stability and liberal
democratic regimes is echoed by several other writers (Aron 1950; Ake
1967; Miller 1974; Fatton 1992; Samatar 1999). What emerges is that in
order to sustain a liberal democratic regime, there is the need for a balance
between both diversity and cohesiveness amongst political elites to main-
tain political stability and an enabling environment for political and eco-
nomic progress. Ake aptly describes this as:
This article draws from Burton and Higley’s (2001, 2006) elegant theory
linking consensually united elites to stable liberal democratic regimes.
African democracies. For a comprehensive and animated statement on the matter see
Claude Ake. 2002. The Feasibility of Democracy in Africa.
Direct links between political elite circulation and political elite unity are
rightly discounted by Burton and Higley (2001, 2006). However, links
between elite circulation, levels of differentiation and regime stability
though alluded to are not fully explored. The revision of their typology in
Elite Foundations of Liberal Democracy (Higley and Burton 2006) further
loses the nuances emanating from their concept of elite ‘differentiation’ in
“The Study of Political Elite Transformations”.
2)
See Higley and Burton (2006:18), Table 1.1.
Though many of the symbols of the state are Akan in origin, they are often
shared by other societies in Ghana who may have similar symbols and tradi-
tions. . . . During the colonial period, as the Gold Coast Chiefs List of 1936
stressed, the Akan paradigm of state-craft was, with some local modification,
adopted by nearly all other ethnic groups in the country. (1986:81)
In his book Nkrumah and the Chiefs, Richard Rathbone (2000:12) states
that some cultures in Ghana, “most notably that of the Akan, had a long
tradition of powerful monarchs supported by extensive aristocracies.” He
further explains that the colonial and anthropological convention of using
the word “chief ” rather than “king” diminished the status of the position
of such traditional rulers to avoid the absurdity of having “a British king
with imperial subjects who were also kings”. Within the social structure of
the Akan there was also the notion of commoners (asafo or nkwankwaa in
Twi) literally meaning ‘young men’. As Allman (1993:29) points out the
sense of the term was not that they were necessarily young but it distin-
guished them from elders (mpanyinfu) and political office holders (chiefs)
who were their superiors in traditional social hierarchy. Several writers
have recognised the role of organised commoner associations (e.g. asafo
companies) as a means of checks and balances on chiefly power, especially
in the context of the destoolment of chiefs (Rathbone 2000, Li 1995,
Owusu 1986, Austin 1970, Apter 1955). The traditional rights of protest
and rebellion by commoners have been linked to the protests of ‘young
men’ in the nationalist struggle for independence (Rathbone 2000) and
military coups in the post-colonial era (Owusu 1986).
Ivor Wilks wrote of the nineteenth century Nkwankwaa as men who
“belonged to old and well-established families but whose personal expecta-
tions of succeeding to office or even of acquiring wealth were low” (Wilks
1989). In his landmark study of Education and Social Change in Ghana,
Philip Foster (1965) highlights how a new kind of status system emerged
in the Gold Coast during the colonial period due to the critical impact
of Western-style education, and the implications that this had for the
configuration of political power in the independent state of Ghana. The
importance of education to social mobility is also emphasised by Dennis
Austin (1970). When talking about Nkrumah’s Convention People’s Party,
he observes that:
the demand made by the party for self-government was bound up with a
struggle for power which had many of the characteristics of a class struggle –
provided the words were widened in scope to connote a level determined as
much by education, and by social standing within a traditional political sys-
tem, as by economic criteria. (Austin 1970:13)
schools but since they were not eligible to inherit their fathers, the main
motive for educating them was thwarted (Foster 1965). Moreover such a
reforming role as the British hoped future chiefs would play would have
been in direct conflict to their conservative role as the guardians of cus-
toms and traditions within their own societies. Indeed for this very reason,
before independence, a Western-style education was generally not deemed
suitable for a potential traditional ruler.3
.... early recruitment into the schools was from groups who were not primar-
ily associated with traditional activities but were rather connected with
the exchange economy and European-type functions; it would also appear
that most of them were not eligible for traditionally prestigeful office.
In functional terms, the schools by operating increasingly as the gateway to
new occupational categories constituted an alternative avenue of mobility
operating independently of traditional modes of status acquisition. (Foster
1965:63)
This trend had a profound impact on the future balance of political power
within Ghanaian society and resulted in what Foster (1963) describes as
the “dysfunctional consequences of Western education”. Here I argue that
the social phenomenon created by the introduction of formal Western
education formed the basis of political elite circulation, differentiation
and subsequent fragmentation in the run up to independence and after.
As a more immediate consequence however, the failure of traditional
authorities to take up Western education for their future rulers meant that
instead of the hereditary authority and power of chiefs being mutually
reinforced through such education, a new breed of political elites whose
high status was inextricably linked to their close connections with Euro-
pean merchants and colonial officials on the coast as well as their high
levels of Western education, emerged to challenge the authority of the
chiefs. Foster writes:
The position of traditional elites in the Gold Coast was progressively weak-
ened by their inability to perceive the necessity for European education. For,
once European political control became effective, there was always the
3)
Ironically the exact opposite is now true in modern day Ghana where a higher education
is now seen as a prerequisite for potential traditional rulers.
possibility that the locus of power would shift from the chiefs in favour of
alternative groups which had earlier recognised the potential significance of
schooling. (Foster 1965:64)
Nevertheless, the fact that some chief ’s sons and lesser aristocrats were
educated meant that some royals of that period did receive education to
high levels helping to bridge the gap between neo-traditional elites and the
coastal elites who had begun to challenge their political role. A subsequent
political alliance diffused the potential conflict between these two groups.
This fusion of vocal coastal elites and educated royalty formed the core of
what came to be known as the “intelligentsia”. Austin asserts,
To be sure, the Colony chiefs and the intelligentsia had been close rivals for
power and position on the legislative council. . . . But there was little sense of
permanent hostility between any section of what constituted (by 1946) a
triple ruling elite – the officials, chiefs and intelligentsia. (Austin 1970:9)
4)
They shared the same father which meant that Danquah was not in the line of succession.
However [t]he passage of time had softened the earlier disputes of the 1920s
and Danquah had worked hard throughout the 1930s and the war years to
form a common front between the two sets of leaders. (Rathbone 2000:50)
political, economic and social elite status themselves. To achieve this they
would need to mobilise a mass following and the charismatic Kwame
Nkrumah was just the man for the job.
“Cape Coast Scholars” (Foster 1965). Foster contrasts them with the intel-
ligentsia of the coast:
At the other extreme were the ‘Cape Coast Scholars’ poorly educated and
regarded with disdain both by the Europeans and the more highly educated
Africans. There is a curious ambivalence in fact about the whole European
attitude towards the lesser products of the schools. Urged to emulate European
behaviour, they were, at the same time, an object of derision for attempting to
do so and Europeans were particularly critical of the results of a process which
they themselves were responsible for setting in motion. (Foster 1965:68)
in such a way as to qualify them for any other occupation than cocoa farm-
ing. . . . It is therefore appropriate to regard the extension of Western educa-
tion and the enlargement of the exchange sector of the economy as mutually
reinforcing factors leading to the progressive disintegration of traditional
structures and their successive replacement by new concepts of social status
and new modes of acquiring it. (Foster 1965:127)
Atta’s relationship with the British illustrated the policy operating at its
best with him skilfully combining elements of both the traditional and the
modern within his court. His authority and prestige were greatly enhanced
by his close relationship with the British and his “political and economic
shrewdness protected and enriched his immediate family in Akyem
Abuakwa” (Rathbone 1989:446). In 1927 at the age of 46, he was hon-
oured by the British Crown as a Knight Commander of the British Empire.
He was a member of the Gold Coast Legislative Council from 1916 to
1943 where he represented the interests of the chiefs and was one of the
first two Africans to sit on the Executive Council in 1942.
After Nana Ofori-Atta’s death in 1943, the Odikro or sub-chief of a
small town in Akyem Abuakwa was allegedly murdered at the royal palace
in Kyebi by 8 members of the royal family as part of the funeral rites asso-
ciated with the death of a paramount chief. The colonial government
arrested, prosecuted and convicted these members of the Akyem royal
family for murder. One of the counsels for the defence was Dr. J.B. Dan-
quah the half-brother of Nana Sir Ofori-Atta I. In the end 3 of the 8 men
were hung despite all efforts of Danquah to obtain a pardon from the Gov-
ernor and the colonial government. This event soured the relationship between
the colonial government and the royal house of Akyem Abuakwa.
Danquah went on to form the United Gold Coast Convention (UGCC)
in 1947 with seven others initially to agitate for increased representation of
the merchant class and intelligentsia on the Legislative Council. However
their overall goal was “self-government in the shortest possible time” and it
is likely that the outcome of the Kyebi murder trial created the impetus for
a new nationalism amongst this normally moderate group which included
the late king’s brother, son and son-in-law (Rathbone 1989). They recruited
Kwame Nkrumah a doctoral student at the London School of Economics
to be the Secretary-General of their newly formed political organisation.
Nkrumah had been active in student movements in the US and the UK
and had belonged to the anti-imperialist Pan-African movement which
called for independence and unity amongst African States.
It is arguable that Nkrumah’s interest in Pan-Africanism in the US and
the UK was bolstered by the fact that he was not a member of the established
elite within his own home country and did not therefore immediately see
a leading political role for himself at the national level. However his return
to the Gold Coast coincided with an increased politicisation of the country
Diversity in Leadership
The events described above account for the extreme disunity that existed
amongst Ghanaian political elites prior to and after independence, foster-
ing a politics of fierce conflict and instability. Although indigenous politi-
cal confrontation in Ghana prior to independence has been characterised
in the literature as one between chiefs and commoners the real battles since
independence have raged at the political elite level. Unlike other African
countries where civil wars have involved the masses as combatants or victims,
the casualties of political struggles in Ghana have predominantly been
amongst political elite groups themselves.
Elite circulation leads to diversity and differentiation amongst political
elites both in terms of social status and ethnicity. This can result in a sense
of increased representation even where political elites are not united.
Higher levels of representation prevent a situation where certain social or
ethnic groups feel completely excluded from the political process. As a
result, political conflict is largely contained at the elite level where different
groups struggle for pre-eminence. A situation where there is a low level of
elite circulation and a non-representative or non-diverse group of elites
monopolise political power for a long period, may lead to political stability
in the medium term but widespread and violent conflict in the long term.
Political elite disunity has characterised Ghanaian politics since indepen-
dence. This has been evidenced by assassination attempts, imprisonment of
dissidents, deaths of opposition politicians in prison, successive military
coups, political persecution and the execution of leaders. Further elite circula-
tion and differentiation occurred with the entry of the military into the polit-
ical fray. The intrigues, rivalries and turf wars of the various elite factions
which emerged after the military overthrow of Nkrumah are documented by
Austin and Luckham (1975) in Politicians and Soldiers in Ghana.
This period saw the crystallization of the two main political traditions
which represent the two main political cleavages in the country. They are
the Nkrumahist tradition which is perceived as ethnically and socially
inclusive, broad-based, populist and left-wing and the Busia/Danquah tra-
dition which is perceived as elitist, ethnically exclusive, liberal-democratic
and right-wing. At the leadership level both traditions have representatives
from all the main ethnic groupings although political parties in the
Nkrumahist tradition have tended to have more diversity at the top. How-
ever the political cleavages that divide Ghanaian politics go beyond ethnic-
ity and include historical, social and ideological ones.
Colonel I.K. Acheampong the military Head of State between 1972 and
1976 was derided by established elite groups for not being a university
graduate or even attending one of the more academic secondary schools.
Under his regime the role of education as a vehicle for upward social mobil-
ity was deeply undermined. Suddenly kalabule had become the main chan-
nel to secure the lifestyles which had formerly been guaranteed by a
university degree and a civil service job. Kalabule was a word coined to
The June 4th 1979 military mutiny coupled by the 31st December 1981
military coup led by Flight Lieutenant J.J, Rawlings acted as a catalyst in
the conflict amongst Ghana’s disunited political elites. In 1979, during its
brief 3 month rule, the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) led
by Lieutenant Jerry John Rawlings, executed several members of the
government and some former heads of state before handing over to an
elected civilian government. However economic conditions did not
improve significantly under the new government and by December 1981
Rawlings staged a military coup which returned him to power. Rawlings’
Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) regime attracted a new
generation of home-grown left wing intellectuals who had been politicised
by the economic chaos and corruption that had ensued in the seventies.
These were predominantly commoners who had benefited from the expan-
sionist and inclusive education policies of the Nkrumah era. These policies
involved the building of new secondary schools around the country as well
as the expansion of domestic, free, tertiary education. Therefore Ghanaians
no longer needed to bear the cost of going abroad to acquire university
degrees and this increased the number of commoners who could now
benefit from a university education.
However with the rapidly deteriorating economic conditions particu-
larly under the materialistic and profligate regime of Acheampong the life-
style and prestige which a good education was expected to deliver did not
materialise creating a new generation of disaffected educated commoners
ready to challenge the status quo. The return of Rawlings provided this
group with the opportunity to join the ranks of the political elites. How-
ever the width and depth of elite circulation was not as far-reaching as
might have been expected as links with some former politicians were not
completely broken. Some of Rawlings’ new ministers and advisors had
been connected with past governments in both the Nkrumahist and the
Busia/Danquah traditions. Indeed the current President, J.A. Kufour
served as Minister for Local Government for a brief period.
Rawlings declared a people’s “revolution” and lashed out at former poli-
ticians as well as the business and professional classes. The many human
rights abuses which occurred under an increasingly lawless climate included
the murder of three judges who by their rulings were deemed to be unsym-
pathetic to the regime. This marked a turning point for the Ghanaian
middle-classes in general and previous generations of political elites in par-
ticular who by then felt they were living under siege. Most of their patron-
client networks were broken and most who had not left the country already
scuttled into exile. Rawlings’ “revolution” swept away past structures of
political power and created new ones featuring a new set of political elites.
Nugent documents the desperate scramble of the PNDC hierarchy to define
the role and will of “the people” in the early days of the “revolution”:
“Whereas Rawlings insisted that it was the people who should govern, the
fact of the matter was that the real decisions were made in Accra by PNDC
functionaries who were not, strictly speaking, accountable to anyone.”
(Nugent 1995:48)
Rawlings’ NDC and he became President for a second term. By 2000 the
NPP had made the necessary reforms within their party and built up the
confidence to enter the elections in their own right once again. None of
the parties received the 50% plus one of the valid votes cast for an outright
victory in the first round. In the runoff between the NDC and the NPP
however, the opposition parties most of which were in the Nkrumahist
tradition put their weight behind the NPP by calling on their supporters
to vote for the NPP presidential candidate, J.A. Kufour helping the NPP
to sweep to victory with a convincing margin of 56.9 votes to the NDC’s
43.1. The victory of the NPP in the 2000 elections signified a joint effort
between two traditionally opposed political sides in their bid to oust the
newcomers and bears witness to an emerging integration of Ghana’s estab-
lished elites. Recognising the role the NPP’s erstwhile political opponents
had played in their victory, President Kufour promised an inclusive gov-
ernment and in the first term of office the NPP appointed a token number
of ministers from other parties to symbolise a new era of political unity.
One of these was Dr. Paa Kwesi Ndoum who survived as a minister into the
second term of President Kufour’s government. On his website it states:
It is indeed historic and significant that Dr. Nduom, a leading member of the
Convention People’s Party can serve as a Cabinet Minister in a New Patriotic
Party government. (www.ndoum.com).
Dr. Ndoum the current Minister of Public Sector Reform has also held the
portfolios of Minister of Economic Planning & Regional Cooperation and
Minister of Energy in President Kufour’s government.
Significantly however the NPP no longer see the CPP or other offshoots
of the original CPP as a major political threat but rather as potential
allies or coalition partners. This may be due to the fact that in the pro-
cess of becoming established elites themselves the educated commoners
of the Nkrumah era and their heirs have lost their common touch. In
achieving increased acceptance and integration with political elites of the
Busia/Danquah tradition they have lost the political edge required to
attract a mass following. The divisions within the Nkrumahist group led to
the emergence of several CPP off-shoot parties which have become increas-
ingly politically marginalised, allowing the NDC to take over the mantle as
the dominant party in the Nkrumahist tradition. The question therefore is
how much unity exists between the established political elites of the two
opposing traditions and the new elites of the NDC. This issue is the subject
of on-going research.
Conclusion
This article has chartered the history of social change, political elite forma-
tion, competition, conflict and disunity which existed in Ghana prior to
the current liberal democratic regime under the 4th Republic. It has argued
that the initial source of political conflict were the changes in traditional
social hierarchy created by increased wealth amongst commoners and the
introduction of Western-style education during the pre-colonial and colo-
nial eras. It has further striven to illustrate how political elite circulation
was fuelled by the emergence of successive generations of political elites
resulting in increased differentiation amongst political elites. The ensuing
disunity led to insecurity amongst political elites and a cycle of military
coups interspersed with brief periods of multi-party civilian government.
Nevertheless, elite differentiation also resulted in political elites becoming
more heterogeneous and representative of the different interest groups
within Ghanaian society compared to for example the Ivory Coast, Sierra
Leone or Liberia in the same period. After almost 50 years of indepen-
dence, competing Ghanaian political elites are finally beginning to show
signs of unity. The emerging political elite unity combined with the exist-
ing diversity amongst Ghanaian leadership may account for the persistence
and deepening of the liberal democratic regime under the 4th Republic
over more than a decade; a record in the history of Ghanaian politics.
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