Republic of the Philippines Oposa Law Office for petitioners.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 101083 July 30, 1993
JUAN ANTONIO, ANNA ROSARIO and JOSE ALFONSO, all surnamed OPOSA,
minors, and represented by their parents ANTONIO and RIZALINA OPOSA,
ROBERTA NICOLE SADIUA, minor, represented by her parents CALVIN and
ROBERTA SADIUA, CARLO, AMANDA SALUD and PATRISHA, all surnamed
FLORES, minors and represented by their parents ENRICO and NIDA
FLORES, GIANINA DITA R. FORTUN, minor, represented by her parents
SIGRID and DOLORES FORTUN, GEORGE II and MA. CONCEPCION, all
surnamed MISA, minors and represented by their parents GEORGE and
MYRA MISA, BENJAMIN ALAN V. PESIGAN, minor, represented by his
parents ANTONIO and ALICE PESIGAN, JOVIE MARIE ALFARO, minor,
represented by her parents JOSE and MARIA VIOLETA ALFARO, MARIA
CONCEPCION T. CASTRO, minor, represented by her parents FREDENIL and
JANE CASTRO, JOHANNA DESAMPARADO,
minor, represented by her parents JOSE and ANGELA DESAMPRADO, CARLO
JOAQUIN T. NARVASA, minor, represented by his parents GREGORIO II and
CRISTINE CHARITY NARVASA, MA. MARGARITA, JESUS IGNACIO, MA.
ANGELA and MARIE GABRIELLE, all surnamed SAENZ, minors, represented
by their parents ROBERTO and AURORA SAENZ, KRISTINE, MARY ELLEN,
MAY, GOLDA MARTHE and DAVID IAN, all surnamed KING, minors,
represented by their parents MARIO and HAYDEE KING, DAVID, FRANCISCO
and THERESE VICTORIA, all surnamed ENDRIGA, minors, represented by
their parents BALTAZAR and TERESITA ENDRIGA, JOSE MA. and REGINA
MA., all surnamed ABAYA, minors, represented by their parents ANTONIO
and MARICA ABAYA, MARILIN, MARIO, JR. and MARIETTE, all surnamed
CARDAMA, minors, represented by their parents MARIO and LINA
CARDAMA, CLARISSA, ANN MARIE, NAGEL, and IMEE LYN, all surnamed
OPOSA, minors and represented by their parents RICARDO and MARISSA
OPOSA, PHILIP JOSEPH, STEPHEN JOHN and ISAIAH JAMES, all surnamed
QUIPIT, minors, represented by their parents JOSE MAX and VILMI QUIPIT,
BUGHAW CIELO, CRISANTO, ANNA, DANIEL and FRANCISCO, all surnamed
BIBAL, minors, represented by their parents FRANCISCO, JR. and
MILAGROS BIBAL, and THE PHILIPPINE ECOLOGICAL NETWORK,
INC., petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., in his capacity as the
Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, and
THE HONORABLE ERIBERTO U. ROSARIO, Presiding Judge of the RTC,
Makati, Branch 66, respondents.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
In a broader sense, this petition bears upon the right of Filipinos to a balanced and
healthful ecology which the petitioners dramatically associate with the twin
concepts of "inter-generational responsibility" and "inter-generational justice."
Specifically, it touches on the issue of whether the said petitioners have a cause of
action to "prevent the misappropriation or impairment" of Philippine rainforests and
"arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the country's vital life support systems and
continued rape of Mother Earth."
The controversy has its genesis in Civil Case No. 90-77 which was filed before
Branch 66 (Makati, Metro Manila) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), National Capital
Judicial Region. The principal plaintiffs therein, now the principal petitioners, are all
minors duly represented and joined by their respective parents. Impleaded as an
additional plaintiff is the Philippine Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI), a domestic, non-
stock and non-profit corporation organized for the purpose of, inter alia, engaging in
concerted action geared for the protection of our environment and natural
resources. The original defendant was the Honorable Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., then
Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). His
substitution in this petition by the new Secretary, the Honorable Angel C. Alcala, was
subsequently ordered upon proper motion by the petitioners. 1 The complaint 2 was
instituted as a taxpayers' class suit 3 and alleges that the plaintiffs "are all citizens of
the Republic of the Philippines, taxpayers, and entitled to the full benefit, use and
enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is the country's virgin tropical
forests." The same was filed for themselves and others who are equally concerned
about the preservation of said resource but are "so numerous that it is impracticable
to bring them all before the Court." The minors further asseverate that they
"represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn." 4 Consequently, it is
prayed for that judgment be rendered:
. . . ordering defendant, his agents, representatives and other
persons acting in his behalf to
(1) Cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country;
(2) Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing,
renewing or approving new timber license agreements.
and granting the plaintiffs ". . . such other reliefs just and equitable under the
premises." 5
1
The complaint starts off with the general averments that the Philippine archipelago
of 7,100 islands has a land area of thirty million (30,000,000) hectares and is
endowed with rich, lush and verdant rainforests in which varied, rare and unique
species of flora and fauna may be found; these rainforests contain a genetic,
biological and chemical pool which is irreplaceable; they are also the habitat of
indigenous Philippine cultures which have existed, endured and flourished since time
immemorial; scientific evidence reveals that in order to maintain a balanced and
healthful ecology, the country's land area should be utilized on the basis of a ratio of
fifty-four per cent (54%) for forest cover and forty-six per cent (46%) for agricultural,
residential, industrial, commercial and other uses; the distortion and disturbance of
this balance as a consequence of deforestation have resulted in a host of
environmental tragedies, such as (a) water shortages resulting from drying up of the
water table, otherwise known as the "aquifer," as well as of rivers, brooks and
streams, (b) salinization of the water table as a result of the intrusion therein of salt
water, incontrovertible examples of which may be found in the island of Cebu and
the Municipality of Bacoor, Cavite, (c) massive erosion and the consequential loss of
soil fertility and agricultural productivity, with the volume of soil eroded estimated at
one billion (1,000,000,000) cubic meters per annum approximately the size of the
entire island of Catanduanes, (d) the endangering and extinction of the country's
unique, rare and varied flora and fauna, (e) the disturbance and dislocation of
cultural communities, including the disappearance of the Filipino's indigenous
cultures, (f) the siltation of rivers and seabeds and consequential destruction of
corals and other aquatic life leading to a critical reduction in marine resource
productivity, (g) recurrent spells of drought as is presently experienced by the entire
country, (h) increasing velocity of typhoon winds which result from the absence of
windbreakers, (i) the floodings of lowlands and agricultural plains arising from the
absence of the absorbent mechanism of forests, (j) the siltation and shortening of
the lifespan of multi-billion peso dams constructed and operated for the purpose of
supplying water for domestic uses, irrigation and the generation of electric power,
and (k) the reduction of the earth's capacity to process carbon dioxide gases which
has led to perplexing and catastrophic climatic changes such as the phenomenon of
global warming, otherwise known as the "greenhouse effect."
Plaintiffs further assert that the adverse and detrimental consequences of continued
and deforestation are so capable of unquestionable demonstration that the same
may be submitted as a matter of judicial notice. This notwithstanding, they
expressed their intention to present expert witnesses as well as documentary,
photographic and film evidence in the course of the trial.
As their cause of action, they specifically allege that:
CAUSE OF ACTION
7. Plaintiffs replead by reference the foregoing allegations.
8. Twenty-five (25) years ago, the Philippines had some sixteen
(16) million hectares of rainforests constituting roughly 53% of the
country's land mass.
9. Satellite images taken in 1987 reveal that there remained no
more than 1.2 million hectares of said rainforests or four per cent
(4.0%) of the country's land area.
10. More recent surveys reveal that a mere 850,000 hectares of
virgin old-growth rainforests are left, barely 2.8% of the entire land
mass of the Philippine archipelago and about 3.0 million hectares
of immature and uneconomical secondary growth forests.
11. Public records reveal that the defendant's, predecessors have
granted timber license agreements ('TLA's') to various
corporations to cut the aggregate area of 3.89 million hectares for
commercial logging purposes.
A copy of the TLA holders and the corresponding areas covered is
hereto attached as Annex "A".
12. At the present rate of deforestation, i.e. about 200,000
hectares per annum or 25 hectares per hour nighttime,
Saturdays, Sundays and holidays included the Philippines will be
bereft of forest resources after the end of this ensuing decade, if
not earlier.
13. The adverse effects, disastrous consequences, serious injury
and irreparable damage of this continued trend of deforestation to
the plaintiff minor's generation and to generations yet unborn are
evident and incontrovertible. As a matter of fact, the
environmental damages enumerated in paragraph 6 hereof are
already being felt, experienced and suffered by the generation of
plaintiff adults.
14. The continued allowance by defendant of TLA holders to cut
and deforest the remaining forest stands will work great damage
and irreparable injury to plaintiffs especially plaintiff minors and
their successors who may never see, use, benefit from and
enjoy this rare and unique natural resource treasure.
This act of defendant constitutes a misappropriation and/or
impairment of the natural resource property he holds in trust for
the benefit of plaintiff minors and succeeding generations.
15. Plaintiffs have a clear and constitutional right to a balanced
and healthful ecology and are entitled to protection by the State in
its capacity as the parens patriae.
16. Plaintiff have exhausted all administrative remedies with the
defendant's office. On March 2, 1990, plaintiffs served upon
2
defendant a final demand to cancel all logging permits in the
country.
A copy of the plaintiffs' letter dated March 1, 1990 is hereto
attached as Annex "B".
17. Defendant, however, fails and refuses to cancel the existing
TLA's to the continuing serious damage and extreme prejudice of
plaintiffs.
18. The continued failure and refusal by defendant to cancel the
TLA's is an act violative of the rights of plaintiffs, especially
plaintiff minors who may be left with a country that is desertified
(sic), bare, barren and devoid of the wonderful flora, fauna and
indigenous cultures which the Philippines had been abundantly
blessed with.
19. Defendant's refusal to cancel the aforementioned TLA's is
manifestly contrary to the public policy enunciated in the
Philippine Environmental Policy which, in pertinent part, states
that it is the policy of the State
(a) to create, develop, maintain and improve conditions under
which man and nature can thrive in productive and enjoyable
harmony with each other;
(b) to fulfill the social, economic and other requirements of present
and future generations of Filipinos and;
(c) to ensure the attainment of an environmental quality that is
conductive to a life of dignity and well-being. (P.D. 1151, 6 June
1977)
20. Furthermore, defendant's continued refusal to cancel the
aforementioned TLA's is contradictory to the Constitutional policy
of the State to
a. effect "a more equitable distribution of opportunities, income
and wealth" and "make full and efficient use of natural resources
(sic)." (Section 1, Article XII of the Constitution);
b. "protect the nation's marine wealth." (Section 2, ibid);
c. "conserve and promote the nation's cultural heritage and
resources (sic)" (Section 14, Article XIV,id.);
d. "protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and
healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of
nature." (Section 16, Article II, id.)
21. Finally, defendant's act is contrary to the highest law of
humankind the natural law and violative of plaintiffs' right to
self-preservation and perpetuation.
22. There is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in law
other than the instant action to arrest the unabated hemorrhage of
the country's vital life support systems and continued rape of
Mother Earth. 6
On 22 June 1990, the original defendant, Secretary Factoran, Jr., filed a Motion to
Dismiss the complaint based on two (2) grounds, namely: (1) the plaintiffs have no
cause of action against him and (2) the issue raised by the plaintiffs is a political
question which properly pertains to the legislative or executive branches of
Government. In their 12 July 1990 Opposition to the Motion, the petitioners maintain
that (1) the complaint shows a clear and unmistakable cause of action, (2) the
motion is dilatory and (3) the action presents a justiciable question as it involves the
defendant's abuse of discretion.
On 18 July 1991, respondent Judge issued an order granting the aforementioned
motion to dismiss. 7 In the said order, not only was the defendant's claim that the
complaint states no cause of action against him and that it raises a political question
sustained, the respondent Judge further ruled that the granting of the relief
prayed for would result in the impairment of contracts which is prohibited by the
fundamental law of the land.
Plaintiffs thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Revised Rules of Court and ask this Court to rescind and set aside the dismissal
order on the ground that the respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion in
dismissing the action. Again, the parents of the plaintiffs-minors not only represent
their children, but have also joined the latter in this case. 8
On 14 May 1992, We resolved to give due course to the petition and required the
parties to submit their respective Memoranda after the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) filed a Comment in behalf of the respondents and the petitioners filed a reply
thereto.
Petitioners contend that the complaint clearly and unmistakably states a cause of
action as it contains sufficient allegations concerning their right to a sound
environment based on Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code (Human Relations),
Section 4 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 192 creating the DENR, Section 3 of
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental Policy), Section 16,
Article II of the 1987 Constitution recognizing the right of the people to a balanced
and healthful ecology, the concept of generational genocide in Criminal Law and the
concept of man's inalienable right to self-preservation and self-perpetuation
3
embodied in natural law. Petitioners likewise rely on the respondent's correlative
obligation per Section 4 of E.O. No. 192, to safeguard the people's right to a
healthful environment.
It is further claimed that the issue of the respondent Secretary's alleged grave abuse
of discretion in granting Timber License Agreements (TLAs) to cover more areas for
logging than what is available involves a judicial question.
Anent the invocation by the respondent Judge of the Constitution's non-impairment
clause, petitioners maintain that the same does not apply in this case because TLAs
are not contracts. They likewise submit that even if TLAs may be considered
protected by the said clause, it is well settled that they may still be revoked by the
State when the public interest so requires.
On the other hand, the respondents aver that the petitioners failed to allege in their
complaint a specific legal right violated by the respondent Secretary for which any
relief is provided by law. They see nothing in the complaint but vague and nebulous
allegations concerning an "environmental right" which supposedly entitles the
petitioners to the "protection by the state in its capacity as parens patriae." Such
allegations, according to them, do not reveal a valid cause of action. They then
reiterate the theory that the question of whether logging should be permitted in the
country is a political question which should be properly addressed to the executive
or legislative branches of Government. They therefore assert that the petitioners'
resources is not to file an action to court, but to lobby before Congress for the
passage of a bill that would ban logging totally.
As to the matter of the cancellation of the TLAs, respondents submit that the same
cannot be done by the State without due process of law. Once issued, a TLA remains
effective for a certain period of time usually for twenty-five (25) years. During its
effectivity, the same can neither be revised nor cancelled unless the holder has
been found, after due notice and hearing, to have violated the terms of the
agreement or other forestry laws and regulations. Petitioners' proposition to have all
the TLAs indiscriminately cancelled without the requisite hearing would be violative
of the requirements of due process.
Before going any further, We must first focus on some procedural matters.
Petitioners instituted Civil Case No. 90-777 as a class suit. The original defendant
and the present respondents did not take issue with this matter. Nevertheless, We
hereby rule that the said civil case is indeed a class suit. The subject matter of the
complaint is of common and general interest not just to several, but to all citizens of
the Philippines. Consequently, since the parties are so numerous, it, becomes
impracticable, if not totally impossible, to bring all of them before the court. We
likewise declare that the plaintiffs therein are numerous and representative enough
to ensure the full protection of all concerned interests. Hence, all the requisites for
the filing of a valid class suit under Section 12, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court
are present both in the said civil case and in the instant petition, the latter being but
an incident to the former.
This case, however, has a special and novel element. Petitioners minors assert that
they represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn. We find no
difficulty in ruling that they can, for themselves, for others of their generation and
for the succeeding generations, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of
the succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of intergenerational
responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned.
Such a right, as hereinafter expounded, considers
the "rhythm and harmony of nature." Nature means the created world in its
entirety. 9 Such rhythm and harmony indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious
disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the country's
forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural
resources to the end that their exploration, development and utilization be equitably
accessible to the present as well as future generations. 10 Needless to say, every
generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for
the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the
minors' assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes, at the same
time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for
the generations to come.
The locus standi of the petitioners having thus been addressed, We shall now
proceed to the merits of the petition.
After a careful perusal of the complaint in question and a meticulous consideration
and evaluation of the issues raised and arguments adduced by the parties, We do
not hesitate to find for the petitioners and rule against the respondent Judge's
challenged order for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction. The pertinent portions of the said order reads as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
After a careful and circumspect evaluation of the Complaint, the
Court cannot help but agree with the defendant. For although we
believe that plaintiffs have but the noblest of all intentions, it (sic)
fell short of alleging, with sufficient definiteness, a specific legal
right they are seeking to enforce and protect, or a specific legal
wrong they are seeking to prevent and redress (Sec. 1, Rule 2,
RRC). Furthermore, the Court notes that the Complaint is replete
with vague assumptions and vague conclusions based on
unverified data. In fine, plaintiffs fail to state a cause of action in
its Complaint against the herein defendant.
Furthermore, the Court firmly believes that the matter before it,
being impressed with political color and involving a matter of
public policy, may not be taken cognizance of by this Court
without doing violence to the sacred principle of "Separation of
Powers" of the three (3) co-equal branches of the Government.
4
 The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot, no matter the plenary sessions of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, the following exchange
how we stretch our jurisdiction, grant the reliefs prayed for by the transpired between Commissioner Wilfrido Villacorta and Commissioner Adolfo
plaintiffs, i.e., to cancel all existing timber license agreements in Azcuna who sponsored the section in question:
the country and to cease and desist from receiving, accepting,
processing, renewing or approving new timber license MR. VILLACORTA:
agreements. For to do otherwise would amount to "impairment of
contracts" abhored (sic) by the fundamental law. 11
Does this section mandate the State to provide
sanctions against all forms of pollution air,
We do not agree with the trial court's conclusions that the plaintiffs failed to allege water and noise pollution?
with sufficient definiteness a specific legal right involved or a specific legal wrong
committed, and that the complaint is replete with vague assumptions and
MR. AZCUNA:
conclusions based on unverified data. A reading of the complaint itself belies these
conclusions.
Yes, Madam President. The right to healthful (sic)
environment necessarily carries with it the
The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right the right to a
correlative duty of not impairing the same and,
balanced and healthful ecology which, for the first time in our nation's constitutional
therefore, sanctions may be provided for
history, is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law. Section 16, Article II of the
impairment of environmental balance. 12
1987 Constitution explicitly provides:

Sec. 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the
people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the
rhythm and harmony of nature.
This right unites with the right to health which is provided for in
the preceding section of the same article:
Sec. 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of
the people and instill health consciousness among them.
While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the
Declaration of Principles and State Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it does
not follow that it is less important than any of the civil and political rights
enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs to a different category of rights
altogether for it concerns nothing less than self-preservation and self-perpetuation
aptly and fittingly stressed by the petitioners the advancement of which may
even be said to predate all governments and constitutions. As a matter of fact, these
basic rights need not even be written in the Constitution for they are assumed to
exist from the inception of humankind. If they are now explicitly mentioned in the
fundamental charter, it is because of the well-founded fear of its framers that unless
the rights to a balanced and healthful ecology and to health are mandated as state
policies by the Constitution itself, thereby highlighting their continuing importance
and imposing upon the state a solemn obligation to preserve the first and protect
and advance the second, the day would not be too far when all else would be lost
not only for the present generation, but also for those to come generations which
stand to inherit nothing but parched earth incapable of sustaining life.
The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to
refrain from impairing the environment. During the debates on this right in one of
The said right implies, among many other things, the judicious management and
conservation of the country's forests.
Without such forests, the ecological or environmental balance would be
irreversiby disrupted.
Conformably with the enunciated right to a balanced and healthful ecology and the
right to health, as well as the other related provisions of the Constitution concerning
the conservation, development and utilization of the country's natural
resources, 13 then President Corazon C. Aquino promulgated on 10 June 1987 E.O.
No. 192, 14 Section 4 of which expressly mandates that the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources "shall be the primary government agency
responsible for the conservation, management, development and proper use of the
country's environment and natural resources, specifically forest and grazing lands,
mineral, resources, including those in reservation and watershed areas, and lands of
the public domain, as well as the licensing and regulation of all natural resources as
may be provided for by law in order to ensure equitable sharing of the benefits
derived therefrom for the welfare of the present and future generations of Filipinos."
Section 3 thereof makes the following statement of policy:
Sec. 3. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby declared the policy of
the State to ensure the sustainable use, development,
management, renewal, and conservation of the country's forest,
mineral, land, off-shore areas and other natural resources,
including the protection and enhancement of the quality of the
environment, and equitable access of the different segments of
the population to the development and the use of the country's
natural resources, not only for the present generation but for
future generations as well. It is also the policy of the state to

5
 recognize and apply a true value system including social and
environmental cost implications relative to their utilization,
development and conservation of our natural resources.
This policy declaration is substantially re-stated it Title XIV, Book IV of the
Administrative Code of 1987, 15specifically in Section 1 thereof which reads:
Sec. 1. Declaration of Policy. (1) The State shall ensure, for the
benefit of the Filipino people, the full exploration and development
as well as the judicious disposition, utilization, management,
renewal and conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land,
waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural
resources, consistent with the necessity of maintaining a sound
ecological balance and protecting and enhancing the quality of the
environment and the objective of making the exploration,
development and utilization of such natural resources equitably
accessible to the different segments of the present as well as
future generations.
(2) The State shall likewise recognize and apply a true value
system that takes into account social and environmental cost
implications relative to the utilization, development and
conservation of our natural resources.
The above provision stresses "the necessity of maintaining a sound ecological
balance and protecting and enhancing the quality of the environment." Section 2 of
the same Title, on the other hand, specifically speaks of the mandate of the DENR;
however, it makes particular reference to the fact of the agency's being subject to
law and higher authority. Said section provides:
Sec. 2. Mandate. (1) The Department of Environment and
Natural Resources shall be primarily responsible for the
implementation of the foregoing policy.
(2) It shall, subject to law and higher authority, be in charge of
carrying out the State's constitutional mandate to control and
supervise the exploration, development, utilization, and
conservation of the country's natural resources.
Both E.O. NO. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 have set the objectives
which will serve as the bases for policy formulation, and have defined the powers
and functions of the DENR.
It may, however, be recalled that even before the ratification of the 1987
Constitution, specific statutes already paid special attention to the "environmental
right" of the present and future generations. On 6 June 1977, P.D. No. 1151
(Philippine Environmental Policy) and P.D. No. 1152 (Philippine Environment Code)
were issued. The former "declared a continuing policy of the State (a) to create,
develop, maintain and improve conditions under which man and nature can thrive in
productive and enjoyable harmony with each other, (b) to fulfill the social, economic
and other requirements of present and future generations of Filipinos, and (c) to
insure the attainment of an environmental quality that is conducive to a life of
dignity and well-being." 16 As its goal, it speaks of the "responsibilities of each
generation as trustee and guardian of the environment for succeeding
generations." 17 The latter statute, on the other hand, gave flesh to the said policy.
Thus, the right of the petitioners (and all those they represent) to a balanced and
healthful ecology is as clear as the DENR's duty under its mandate and by virtue
of its powers and functions under E.O. No. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987
to protect and advance the said right.
A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the corelative duty or
obligation to respect or protect the same gives rise to a cause of action. Petitioners
maintain that the granting of the TLAs, which they claim was done with grave abuse
of discretion, violated their right to a balanced and healthful ecology; hence, the full
protection thereof requires that no further TLAs should be renewed or granted.
A cause of action is defined as:
. . . an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal right or
rights of the other; and its essential elements are legal right of the
plaintiff, correlative obligation of the defendant, and act or
omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right. 18
It is settled in this jurisdiction that in a motion to dismiss based on the ground that
the complaint fails to state a cause of action, 19 the question submitted to the court
for resolution involves the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint itself. No
other matter should be considered; furthermore, the truth of falsity of the said
allegations is beside the point for the truth thereof is deemed hypothetically
admitted. The only issue to be resolved in such a case is: admitting such alleged
facts to be true, may the court render a valid judgment in accordance with the
prayer in the complaint? 20 InMilitante vs. Edrosolano, 21 this Court laid down the rule
that the judiciary should "exercise the utmost care and circumspection in passing
upon a motion to dismiss on the ground of the absence thereof [cause of action]
lest, by its failure to manifest a correct appreciation of the facts alleged and deemed
hypothetically admitted, what the law grants or recognizes is effectively nullified. If
that happens, there is a blot on the legal order. The law itself stands in disrepute."
After careful examination of the petitioners' complaint, We find the statements
under the introductory affirmative allegations, as well as the specific averments
under the sub-heading CAUSE OF ACTION, to be adequate enough to show, prima
facie, the claimed violation of their rights. On the basis thereof, they may thus be
granted, wholly or partly, the reliefs prayed for. It bears stressing, however, that
insofar as the cancellation of the TLAs is concerned, there is the need to implead, as
party defendants, the grantees thereof for they are indispensable parties.
6
The foregoing considered, Civil Case No. 90-777 be said to raise a political question.
Policy formulation or determination by the executive or legislative branches of
Government is not squarely put in issue. What is principally involved is the
enforcement of a right vis-a-vis policies already formulated and expressed in
legislation. It must, nonetheless, be emphasized that the political question doctrine
is no longer, the insurmountable obstacle to the exercise of judicial power or the
impenetrable shield that protects executive and legislative actions from judicial
inquiry or review. The second paragraph of section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution
states that:
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable
and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been
a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.
22
Commenting on this provision in his book, Philippine Political Law, Mr. Justice
Isagani A. Cruz, a distinguished member of this Court, says:
The first part of the authority represents the traditional concept of
judicial power, involving the settlement of conflicting rights as
conferred as law. The second part of the authority represents a
broadening of judicial power to enable the courts of justice to
review what was before forbidden territory, to wit, the discretion of
the political departments of the government.
As worded, the new provision vests in the judiciary, and
particularly the Supreme Court, the power to rule upon even the
wisdom of the decisions of the executive and the legislature and to
declare their acts invalid for lack or excess of jurisdiction because
tainted with grave abuse of discretion. The catch, of course, is the
meaning of "grave abuse of discretion," which is a very elastic
phrase that can expand or contract according to the disposition of
the judiciary.
23
In Daza vs. Singson, Mr. Justice Cruz, now speaking for this Court, noted:
In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection becomes
even less tenable and decisive. The reason is that, even if we were
to assume that the issue presented before us was political in
nature, we would still not be precluded from revolving it under the
expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us that now covers, in proper
cases, even the political question. Article VII, Section 1, of the
Constitution clearly provides: . . .
The last ground invoked by the trial court in dismissing the complaint is the non-
impairment of contracts clause found in the Constitution. The court a quo declared
that:
The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot, no matter
how we stretch our jurisdiction, grant the reliefs prayed for by the
plaintiffs, i.e., to cancel all existing timber license agreements in
the country and to cease and desist from receiving, accepting,
processing, renewing or approving new timber license
agreements. For to do otherwise would amount to "impairment of
contracts" abhored (sic) by the fundamental law. 24
We are not persuaded at all; on the contrary, We are amazed, if not shocked, by
such a sweeping pronouncement. In the first place, the respondent Secretary did
not, for obvious reasons, even invoke in his motion to dismiss the non-impairment
clause. If he had done so, he would have acted with utmost infidelity to the
Government by providing undue and unwarranted benefits and advantages to the
timber license holders because he would have forever bound the Government to
strictly respect the said licenses according to their terms and conditions regardless
of changes in policy and the demands of public interest and welfare. He was aware
that as correctly pointed out by the petitioners, into every timber license must be
read Section 20 of the Forestry Reform Code (P.D. No. 705) which provides:
. . . Provided, That when the national interest so requires, the
President may amend, modify, replace or rescind any contract,
concession, permit, licenses or any other form of privilege granted
herein . . .
Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive
action. It is not a contract, property or a property right protested by the due
process clause of the Constitution. In Tan vs. Director of Forestry, 25 this
Court held:
. . . A timber license is an instrument by which the State regulates
the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that
public welfare is promoted. A timber license is not a contract
within the purview of the due process clause; it is only a license or
privilege, which can be validly withdrawn whenever dictated by
public interest or public welfare as in this case.
A license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise
would be unlawful, and is not a contract between the authority,
federal, state, or municipal, granting it and the person to whom it
is granted; neither is it property or a property right, nor does it
create a vested right; nor is it taxation (37 C.J. 168). Thus, this
Court held that the granting of license does not create irrevocable
rights, neither is it property or property rights (People vs. Ong Tin,
54 O.G. 7576).
7
We reiterated this pronouncement in Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Co., Inc. vs. Deputy
Executive Secretary: 26
. . . Timber licenses, permits and license agreements are the
principal instruments by which the State regulates the utilization
and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is
promoted. And it can hardly be gainsaid that they merely evidence
a privilege granted by the State to qualified entities, and do not
vest in the latter a permanent or irrevocable right to the particular
concession area and the forest products therein. They may be
validly amended, modified, replaced or rescinded by the Chief
Executive when national interests so require. Thus, they are not
deemed contracts within the purview of the due process of law
clause [See Sections 3(ee) and 20 of Pres. Decree No. 705, as
amended. Also, Tan v. Director of Forestry, G.R. No. L-24548,
October 27, 1983, 125 SCRA 302].
Since timber licenses are not contracts, the non-impairment clause, which reads:
Under our form of government the use of property and the making
of contracts are normally matters of private and not of public
concern. The general rule is that both shall be free of
governmental interference. But neither property rights nor
contract rights are absolute; for government cannot exist if the
citizen may at will use his property to the detriment of his fellows,
or exercise his freedom of contract to work them harm. Equally
fundamental with the private right is that of the public to regulate
it in the common interest.
31
In short, the non-impairment clause must yield to the police power of the state.
Finally, it is difficult to imagine, as the trial court did, how the non-impairment clause
could apply with respect to the prayer to enjoin the respondent Secretary from
receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber licenses for,
save in cases of renewal, no contract would have as of yet existed in the other
instances. Moreover, with respect to renewal, the holder is not entitled to it as a
matter of right.

Sec. 10. No law impairing, the obligation of contracts shall be WHEREFORE, being impressed with merit, the instant Petition is hereby GRANTED,
passed. 27 and the challenged Order of respondent Judge of 18 July 1991 dismissing Civil Case
No. 90-777 is hereby set aside. The petitioners may therefore amend their complaint
cannot be invoked. to implead as defendants the holders or grantees of the questioned timber license
agreements.

In the second place, even if it is to be assumed that the same are contracts, the
instant case does not involve a law or even an executive issuance declaring the No pronouncement as to costs.
cancellation or modification of existing timber licenses. Hence, the non-impairment
clause cannot as yet be invoked. Nevertheless, granting further that a law has SO ORDERED.
actually been passed mandating cancellations or modifications, the same cannot still
be stigmatized as a violation of the non-impairment clause. This is because by its
very nature and purpose, such as law could have only been passed in the exercise of
the police power of the state for the purpose of advancing the right of the people to
a balanced and healthful ecology, promoting their health and enhancing the general
welfare. In Abe vs. Foster Wheeler
Corp. 28 this Court stated:

The freedom of contract, under our system of government, is not

meant to be absolute. The same is understood to be subject to
reasonable legislative regulation aimed at the promotion of public
health, moral, safety and welfare. In other words, the
constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of obligations of
contract is limited by the exercise of the police power of the State,
in the interest of public health, safety, moral and general welfare.

29
The reason for this is emphatically set forth in Nebia vs. New York, quoted
in Philippine American Life Insurance Co. vs. Auditor General, 30 to wit:

8
 The clash between the responsibility of the City Government of Caloocan to dispose
off the 350 tons of garbage it collects daily and the growing concern and sensitivity
to a pollution-free environment of the residents of Barangay Camarin, Tala Estate,
Caloocan City where these tons of garbage are dumped everyday is the hub of this
controversy elevated by the protagonists to the Laguna Lake Development Authority
(LLDA) for adjudication.

The instant case stemmed from an earlier petition filed with this Court by Laguna
Lake Development Authority (LLDA for short) docketed as G.R.
No. 107542 against the City Government of Caloocan, et al. In the Resolution of
November 10, 1992, this Court referred G.R. No. 107542 to the Court of Appeals for
appropriate disposition. Docketed therein as CA-G.R. SP
No. 29449, the Court of Appeals, in a decision 1 promulgated on January 29, 1993
ruled that the LLDA has no power and authority to issue a cease and desist order
enjoining the dumping of garbage in Barangay Camarin, Tala Estate, Caloocan City.
The LLDA now seeks, in this petition, a review of the decision of the Court of
Appeals.

The facts, as disclosed in the records, are undisputed.

Republic of the Philippines On March 8, 1991, the Task Force Camarin Dumpsite of Our Lady of Lourdes Parish,
SUPREME COURT Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City, filed a letter-complaint 2 with the Laguna Lake
Manila Development Authority seeking to stop the operation of the 8.6-hectare open
garbage dumpsite in Tala Estate, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City due to its
THIRD DIVISION harmful effects on the health of the residents and the possibility of pollution of the
water content of the surrounding area.

On November 15, 1991, the LLDA conducted an on-site investigation, monitoring

and test sampling of the leachate 3 that seeps from said dumpsite to the nearby
G.R. No. 110120 March 16, 1994
creek which is a tributary of the Marilao River. The LLDA Legal and Technical
personnel found that the City Government of Caloocan was maintaining an open
LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner, dumpsite at the Camarin area without first securing an Environmental Compliance
vs. Certificate (ECC) from the Environmental Management Bureau (EMB) of the
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. MANUEL JN. SERAPIO, Presiding Judge RTC, Department of Environment and Natural Resources, as required under Presidential
Branch 127, Caloocan City, HON. MACARIO A. ASISTIO, JR., City Mayor of Decree No. 1586, 4 and clearance from LLDA as required under Republic Act No.
Caloocan and/or THE CITY GOVERNMENT OF CALOOCAN,respondents. 4850, 5 as amended by Presidential Decree No. 813 and Executive Order No. 927,
series of 1983. 6
Alberto N. Hidalgo and Ma. Teresa T. Oledan for petitioner.
After a public hearing conducted on December 4, 1991, the LLDA, acting on the
The City Legal Officer & Chief, Law Department for Mayor Macario A. Asistio, Jr. and complaint of Task Force Camarin Dumpsite, found that the water collected from the
the City Government of Caloocan. leachate and the receiving streams could considerably affect the quality, in turn, of
the receiving waters since it indicates the presence of bacteria, other than coliform,
which may have contaminated the sample during collection or handling. 7 On
December 5, 1991, the LLDA issued a Cease and Desist Order 8 ordering the City
Government of Caloocan, Metropolitan Manila Authority, their contractors, and other
ROMERO, J.: entities, to completely halt, stop and desist from dumping any form or kind of
garbage and other waste matter at the Camarin dumpsite.

9
The dumping operation was forthwith stopped by the City Government of Caloocan.
However, sometime in August 1992 the dumping operation was resumed after a
meeting held in July 1992 among the City Government of Caloocan, the
representatives of Task Force Camarin Dumpsite and LLDA at the Office of
Environmental Management Bureau Director Rodrigo U. Fuentes failed to settle the
problem.
After an investigation by its team of legal and technical personnel on August 14,
1992, the LLDA issued another order reiterating the December 5, 1991, order and
issued an Alias Cease and Desist Order enjoining the City Government of Caloocan
from continuing its dumping operations at the Camarin area.
On September 25, 1992, the LLDA, with the assistance of the Philippine National
Police, enforced its Alias Cease and Desist Order by prohibiting the entry of all
garbage dump trucks into the Tala Estate, Camarin area being utilized as a
dumpsite.
Pending resolution of its motion for reconsideration earlier filed on September 17,
1992 with the LLDA, the City Government of Caloocan filed with the Regional Trial
Court of Caloocan City an action for the declaration of nullity of the cease and desist
order with prayer for the issuance of writ of injunction, docketed as Civil Case No. C-
15598. In its complaint, the City Government of Caloocan sought to be declared as
the sole authority empowered to promote the health and safety and enhance the
right of the people in Caloocan City to a balanced ecology within its territorial
jurisdiction. 9
On September 25, 1992, the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan
City issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the LLDA from enforcing its
cease and desist order. Subsequently, the case was raffled to the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 126 of Caloocan which, at the time, was presided over by Judge
Manuel Jn. Serapio of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 127, the pairing judge of the
recently-retired presiding judge.
The LLDA, for its part, filed on October 2, 1992 a motion to dismiss on the ground,
among others, that under Republic Act No. 3931, as amended by Presidential Decree
No. 984, otherwise known as the Pollution Control Law, the cease and desist order
issued by it which is the subject matter of the complaint is reviewable both upon the
law and the facts of the case by the Court of Appeals and not by the Regional Trial
Court. 10
On October 12, 1992 Judge Manuel Jn. Serapio issued an order consolidating Civil
Case No. C-15598 with Civil Case No. C-15580, an earlier case filed by the Task Force
Camarin Dumpsite entitled "Fr. John Moran, et al. vs. Hon. Macario Asistio." The
LLDA, however, maintained during the trial that the foregoing cases, being
independent of each other, should have been treated separately.
On October 16, 1992, Judge Manuel Jn. Serapio, after hearing the motion to dismiss,
issued in the consolidated cases an order 11 denying LLDA's motion to dismiss and
granting the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the LLDA, its agent
and all persons acting for and on its behalf, from enforcing or implementing its
cease and desist order which prevents plaintiff City of Caloocan from dumping
garbage at the Camarin dumpsite during the pendency of this case and/or until
further orders of the court.
On November 5, 1992, the LLDA filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and
injunction with prayer for restraining order with the Supreme Court, docketed as G.R.
No. 107542, seeking to nullify the aforesaid order dated October 16, 1992 issued by
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 127 of Caloocan City denying its motion to dismiss.
The Court, acting on the petition, issued a Resolution 12 on November 10, 1992
referring the case to the Court of Appeals for proper disposition and at the same
time, without giving due course to the petition, required the respondents to
comment on the petition and file the same with the Court of Appeals within ten (10)
days from notice. In the meantime, the Court issued a temporary restraining order,
effective immediately and continuing until further orders from it, ordering the
respondents: (1) Judge Manuel Jn. Serapio, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court,
Branch 127, Caloocan City to cease and desist from exercising jurisdiction over the
case for declaration of nullity of the cease and desist order issued by the Laguna
Lake Development Authority (LLDA); and (2) City Mayor of Caloocan and/or the City
Government of Caloocan to cease and desist from dumping its garbage at the Tala
Estate, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City.
Respondents City Government of Caloocan and Mayor Macario A. Asistio, Jr. filed on
November 12, 1992 a motion for reconsideration and/or to quash/recall the
temporary restraining order and an urgent motion for reconsideration alleging that ".
. . in view of the calamitous situation that would arise if the respondent city
government fails to collect 350 tons of garbage daily for lack of dumpsite (i)t is
therefore, imperative that the issue be resolved with dispatch or with sufficient
leeway to allow the respondents to find alternative solutions to this garbage
problem."
On November 17, 1992, the Court issued a Resolution 13 directing the Court of
Appeals to immediately set the case for hearing for the purpose of determining
whether or not the temporary restraining order issued by the Court should be lifted
and what conditions, if any, may be required if it is to be so lifted or whether the
restraining order should be maintained or converted into a preliminary injunction.
The Court of Appeals set the case for hearing on November 27, 1992, at 10:00 in the
morning at the Hearing Room, 3rd Floor, New Building, Court of Appeals. 14 After the
oral argument, a conference was set on December 8, 1992 at 10:00 o'clock in the
morning where the Mayor of Caloocan City, the General Manager of LLDA, the
Secretary of DENR or his duly authorized representative and the Secretary of DILG or
his duly authorized representative were required to appear.
It was agreed at the conference that the LLDA had until December 15, 1992 to finish
its study and review of respondent's technical plan with respect to the dumping of
10
its garbage and in the event of a rejection of respondent's technical plan or a failure
of settlement, the parties will submit within 10 days from notice their respective
memoranda on the merits of the case, after which the petition shall be deemed
submitted for resolution. 15 Notwithstanding such efforts, the parties failed to settle
the dispute.
On April 30, 1993, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision holding that: (1)
the Regional Trial Court has no jurisdiction on appeal to try, hear and decide the
action for annulment of LLDA's cease and desist order, including the issuance of a
temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction in relation thereto, since
appeal therefrom is within the exclusive and appellate jurisdiction of the Court of
Appeals under Section 9, par. (3), of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129; and (2) the Laguna
Lake Development Authority has no power and authority to issue a cease and desist
order under its enabling law, Republic Act No. 4850, as amended by P.D. No. 813 and
Executive Order
No. 927, series of 1983.
The Court of Appeals thus dismissed Civil Case No. 15598 and the preliminary
injunction issued in the said case was set aside; the cease and desist order of LLDA
was likewise set aside and the temporary restraining order enjoining the City Mayor
of Caloocan and/or the City Government of Caloocan to cease and desist from
dumping its garbage at the Tala Estate, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City was lifted,
subject, however, to the condition that any future dumping of garbage in said area,
shall be in conformity with the procedure and protective works contained in the
proposal attached to the records of this case and found on pages 152-160 of
the Rollo, which was thereby adopted by reference and made an integral part of the
decision, until the corresponding restraining and/or injunctive relief is granted by the
proper Court upon LLDA's institution of the necessary legal proceedings.
Hence, the Laguna Lake Development Authority filed the instant petition for review
on certiorari, now docketed as G.R. No. 110120, with prayer that the temporary
restraining order lifted by the Court of Appeals be re-issued until after final
determination by this Court of the issue on the proper interpretation of the powers
and authority of the LLDA under its enabling law.
On July, 19, 1993, the Court issued a temporary restraining order 16 enjoining the
City Mayor of Caloocan and/or the City Government of Caloocan to cease and desist
from dumping its garbage at the Tala Estate, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City,
effective as of this date and containing until otherwise ordered by the Court.
It is significant to note that while both parties in this case agree on the need to
protect the environment and to maintain the ecological balance of the surrounding
areas of the Camarin open dumpsite, the question as to which agency can lawfully
exercise jurisdiction over the matter remains highly open to question.
The City Government of Caloocan claims that it is within its power, as a local
government unit, pursuant to the general welfare provision of the Local Government
Code, 17 to determine the effects of the operation of the dumpsite on the ecological
balance and to see that such balance is maintained. On the basis of said contention,
it questioned, from the inception of the dispute before the Regional Trial Court of
Caloocan City, the power and authority of the LLDA to issue a cease and desist order
enjoining the dumping of garbage in the Barangay Camarin over which the City
Government of Caloocan has territorial jurisdiction.
The Court of Appeals sustained the position of the City of Caloocan on the theory
that Section 7 of Presidential Decree No. 984, otherwise known as the Pollution
Control law, authorizing the defunct National Pollution Control Commission to issue
an ex-parte cease and desist order was not incorporated in Presidential Decree No.
813 nor in Executive Order No. 927, series of
1983. The Court of Appeals ruled that under Section 4, par. (d), of Republic Act No.
4850, as amended, the LLDA is instead required "to institute the necessary legal
proceeding against any person who shall commence to implement or continue
implementation of any project, plan or program within the Laguna de Bay region
without previous clearance from the Authority."
The LLDA now assails, in this partition for review, the abovementioned ruling of the
Court of Appeals, contending that, as an administrative agency which was granted
regulatory and adjudicatory powers and functions by Republic Act No. 4850 and its
amendatory laws, Presidential Decree No. 813 and Executive Order No. 927, series
of 1983, it is invested with the power and authority to issue a cease and desist order
pursuant to Section 4 par. (c), (d), (e), (f) and (g) of Executive Order No. 927 series
of 1983 which provides, thus:
Sec. 4. Additional Powers and Functions. The authority shall have
the following powers and functions:
xxx xxx xxx
(c) Issue orders or decisions to compel compliance with the
provisions of this Executive Order and its implementing rules and
regulations only after proper notice and hearing.
(d) Make, alter or modify orders requiring the discontinuance of
pollution specifying the conditions and the time within which such
discontinuance must be accomplished.
(e) Issue, renew, or deny permits, under such conditions as it may
determine to be reasonable, for the prevention and abatement of
pollution, for the discharge of sewage, industrial waste, or for the
installation or operation of sewage works and industrial disposal
system or parts thereof.
(f) After due notice and hearing, the Authority may also revoke,
suspend or modify any permit issued under this Order whenever
the same is necessary to prevent or abate pollution.
11
 (g) Deputize in writing or request assistance of appropriate
government agencies or instrumentalities for the purpose of
enforcing this Executive Order and its implementing rules and
regulations and the orders and decisions of the Authority.
The LLDA claims that the appellate court deliberately suppressed and totally
disregarded the above provisions of Executive Order No. 927, series of 1983, which
granted administrative quasi-judicial functions to LLDA on pollution abatement
cases.
In light of the relevant environmental protection laws cited which are applicable in
this case, and the corresponding overlapping jurisdiction of government agencies
implementing these laws, the resolution of the issue of whether or not the LLDA has
the authority and power to issue an order which, in its nature and effect was
injunctive, necessarily requires a determination of the threshold question: Does the
Laguna Lake Development Authority, under its Charter and its amendatory laws,
have the authority to entertain the complaint against the dumping of garbage in the
open dumpsite in Barangay Camarin authorized by the City Government of Caloocan
which is allegedly endangering the health, safety, and welfare of the residents
therein and the sanitation and quality of the water in the area brought about by
exposure to pollution caused by such open garbage dumpsite?
The matter of determining whether there is such pollution of the environment that
requires control, if not prohibition, of the operation of a business establishment is
essentially addressed to the Environmental Management Bureau (EMB) of the DENR
which, by virtue of Section 16 of Executive Order No. 192, series of 1987, 18 has
assumed the powers and functions of the defunct National Pollution Control
Commission created under Republic Act No. 3931. Under said Executive Order, a
Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB) under the Office of the DENR Secretary now
assumes the powers and functions of the National Pollution Control Commission with
respect to adjudication of pollution cases. 19
As a general rule, the adjudication of pollution cases generally pertains to the
Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB), except in cases where the special law provides
for another forum. It must be recognized in this regard that the LLDA, as a
specialized administrative agency, is specifically mandated under Republic Act No.
4850 and its amendatory laws to carry out and make effective the declared national
policy 20 of promoting and accelerating the development and balanced growth of the
Laguna Lake area and the surrounding provinces of Rizal and Laguna and the cities
of San Pablo, Manila, Pasay, Quezon and Caloocan 21 with due regard and adequate
provisions for environmental management and control, preservation of the quality of
human life and ecological systems, and the prevention of undue ecological
disturbances, deterioration and pollution. Under such a broad grant and power and
authority, the LLDA, by virtue of its special charter, obviously has the responsibility
to protect the inhabitants of the Laguna Lake region from the deleterious effects of
pollutants emanating from the discharge of wastes from the surrounding areas. In
carrying out the aforementioned declared policy, the LLDA is mandated, among
others, to pass upon and approve or disapprove all plans, programs, and projects
proposed by local government offices/agencies within the region, public
corporations, and private persons or enterprises where such plans, programs and/or
projects are related to those of the LLDA for the development of the region. 22
In the instant case, when the complainant Task Force Camarin Dumpsite of Our Lady
of Lourdes Parish, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City, filed its letter-complaint before
the LLDA, the latter's jurisdiction under its charter was validly invoked by
complainant on the basis of its allegation that the open dumpsite project of the City
Government of Caloocan in Barangay Camarin was undertaken without a clearance
from the LLDA, as required under Section 4, par. (d), of Republic Act. No. 4850, as
amended by P.D. No. 813 and Executive Order No. 927. While there is also an
allegation that the said project was without an Environmental Compliance Certificate
from the Environmental Management Bureau (EMB) of the DENR, the primary
jurisdiction of the LLDA over this case was recognized by the Environmental
Management Bureau of the DENR when the latter acted as intermediary at the
meeting among the representatives of the City Government of Caloocan, Task Force
Camarin Dumpsite and LLDA sometime in July 1992 to discuss the possibility of
re-opening the open dumpsite.
Having thus resolved the threshold question, the inquiry then narrows down to the
following issue: Does the LLDA have the power and authority to issue a "cease and
desist" order under Republic Act No. 4850 and its amendatory laws, on the basis of
the facts presented in this case, enjoining the dumping of garbage in Tala Estate,
Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City.
The irresistible answer is in the affirmative.
The cease and desist order issued by the LLDA requiring the City Government of
Caloocan to stop dumping its garbage in the Camarin open dumpsite found by the
LLDA to have been done in violation of Republic Act No. 4850, as amended, and
other relevant environment laws, 23 cannot be stamped as an unauthorized exercise
by the LLDA of injunctive powers. By its express terms, Republic Act No. 4850, as
amended by P.D. No. 813 and Executive Order No. 927, series of 1983, authorizes
the LLDA to "make, alter or modify order requiring the discontinuance or
pollution." 24(Emphasis supplied) Section 4, par. (d) explicitly authorizes the LLDA
to make whatever order may be necessary in the exercise of its jurisdiction.
To be sure, the LLDA was not expressly conferred the power "to issue and ex-
parte cease and desist order" in a language, as suggested by the City Government
of Caloocan, similar to the express grant to the defunct National Pollution Control
Commission under Section 7 of P.D. No. 984 which, admittedly was not reproduced in
P.D. No. 813 and E.O. No. 927, series of 1983. However, it would be a mistake to
draw therefrom the conclusion that there is a denial of the power to issue the order
in question when the power "to make, alter or modify orders requiring the
discontinuance of pollution" is expressly and clearly bestowed upon the LLDA by
Executive Order No. 927, series of 1983.
Assuming arguendo that the authority to issue a "cease and desist order" were not
expressly conferred by law, there is jurisprudence enough to the effect that the rule
12
granting such authority need not necessarily be express. 25 While it is a fundamental
rule that an administrative agency has only such powers as are expressly granted to
it by law, it is likewise a settled rule that an administrative agency has also such
powers as are necessarily implied in the exercise of its express powers. 26 In the
exercise, therefore, of its express powers under its charter as a regulatory and quasi-
judicial body with respect to pollution cases in the Laguna Lake region, the authority
of the LLDA to issue a "cease and desist order" is, perforce, implied. Otherwise, it
may well be reduced to a "toothless" paper agency.
In this connection, it must be noted that in Pollution Adjudication Board v. Court of
Appeals, et al., 27 the Court ruled that the Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB) has the
power to issue an ex-parte cease and desist order when there is prima
facie evidence of an establishment exceeding the allowable standards set by the
anti-pollution laws of the country. Theponente, Associate Justice Florentino P.
Feliciano, declared:
Ex parte cease and desist orders are permitted by law and
regulations in situations like that here presented precisely because
stopping the continuous discharge of pollutive and untreated
effluents into the rivers and other inland waters of the Philippines
cannot be made to wait until protracted litigation over the ultimate
correctness or propriety of such orders has run its full course,
including multiple and sequential appeals such as those which
Solar has taken, which of course may take several years. The
relevant pollution control statute and implementing regulations
were enacted and promulgated in the exercise of that pervasive,
sovereign power to protect the safety, health, and general welfare
and comfort of the public, as well as the protection of plant and
animal life, commonly designated as the police power. It is a
constitutional commonplace that the ordinary requirements of
procedural due process yield to the necessities of protecting vital
public interests like those here involved, through the exercise of
police power. . . .
The immediate response to the demands of "the necessities of protecting vital public
interests" gives vitality to the statement on ecology embodied in the Declaration of
Principles and State Policies or the 1987 Constitution. Article II, Section 16 which
provides:
The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a
balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and
harmony of nature.
As a constitutionally guaranteed right of every person, it carries the correlative duty
of non-impairment. This is but in consonance with the declared policy of the state
"to protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health
consciousness among them." 28 It is to be borne in mind that the Philippines is party
to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Alma Conference Declaration
of 1978 which recognize health as a fundamental human right. 29
The issuance, therefore, of the cease and desist order by the LLDA, as a practical
matter of procedure under the circumstances of the case, is a proper exercise of its
power and authority under its charter and its amendatory laws. Had the cease and
desist order issued by the LLDA been complied with by the City Government of
Caloocan as it did in the first instance, no further legal steps would have been
necessary.
The charter of LLDA, Republic Act No. 4850, as amended, instead of conferring upon
the LLDA the means of directly enforcing such orders, has provided under its Section
4 (d) the power to institute "necessary legal proceeding against any person who
shall commence to implement or continue implementation of any project, plan or
program within the Laguna de Bay region without previous clearance from the
LLDA."
Clearly, said provision was designed to invest the LLDA with sufficiently broad
powers in the regulation of all projects initiated in the Laguna Lake region, whether
by the government or the private sector, insofar as the implementation of these
projects is concerned. It was meant to deal with cases which might possibly arise
where decisions or orders issued pursuant to the exercise of such broad powers may
not be obeyed, resulting in the thwarting of its laudabe objective. To meet such
contingencies, then the writs of mandamus and injunction which are beyond the
power of the LLDA to issue, may be sought from the proper courts.
Insofar as the implementation of relevant anti-pollution laws in the Laguna Lake
region and its surrounding provinces, cities and towns are concerned, the Court will
not dwell further on the related issues raised which are more appropriately
addressed to an administrative agency with the special knowledge and expertise of
the LLDA.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The temporary restraining order issued by
the Court on July 19, 1993 enjoining the City Mayor of Caloocan and/or the City
Government of Caloocan from dumping their garbage at the Tala Estate, Barangay
Camarin, Caloocan City is hereby made permanent.
SO ORDERED.
13

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 111088. June 13, 1997]
C & M TIMBER CORPORATION (CMTC), petitioner, vs. HON. ANGEL C.
ALCALA, Secretary of the Department of Environment & Natural
Resources, HON. ANTONIO T. CARPIO, Chief Presidential Legal
Counsel, and HON. RENATO C. CORONA, Assistant Executive
Secretary for Legal Affairs,respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari by which C & M Timber Corporation seeks the
nullification of the order dated February 26, 1993 and the resolution dated June 7,
1993 of the Office of the President, declaring as of no force and effect Timber
License Agreement (TLA) No. 106 issued to petitioner on June 30, 1972. TLA No. 106,
with the expiry date June 30, 1997, covers 67,680 hectares of forest land in the
municipalities of Dipaculao and Dinalongan in the Province of Aurora and the
Municipality of Maddela in Quirino province.[1]
It appears that in a letter dated July 20, 1984 [2] to President Marcos, Filipinas
Loggers Development Corporation (FLDC), through its president and general
manager, requested a timber concession over the same area covered by petitioners
TLA No. 106, alleging that the same had been cancelled pursuant to a presidential
directive banning all forms of logging in the area.The request was granted in a note
dated August 14, 1984 by President Marcos who wrote, as was his wont, on the
margin of the letter of FLDC: Approved.[3]
Accordingly, on September 21, 1984, the Ministry of Natural Resources, as it
was then called, issued TLA No. 360, with the expiry date September 30, 1994, to
FLDC, covering the area subject of TLA No. 106. In 1985, FLDC began logging
operations.
On June 26, 1986, then Minister of Natural Resources Ernesto M. Maceda
suspended TLA No. 360 for FLDCs gross violation of the terms and conditions
thereof, especially the reforestation and selective logging activities and in
consonance with the national policy on forest conservation. [4] On July 26, 1986,
Minister Maceda issued another order cancelling the license of FLDC on the ground
that in spite of the suspension order dated June 26, 1986, said concessionaire has
continued logging operations in violation of forestry rules and regulations. [5]
Learning of the cancellation of FLDCs TLA, petitioner, through its officer-in-
charge, wrote Minister Maceda a letter dated October 10, 1986, requesting
revalidation of its TLA No. 106.[6]As FLDC sought a reconsideration of the order
cancelling its TLA, petitioner wrote another letter dated February 13, 1987,
[7]
alleging that because of the log ban imposed by the previous administration it had
to stop its logging operations, but that when the ban was lifted on September 21,
1984, its concession area was awarded to FLDC as a result of [FLDCs] covetous
maneuvers and unlawful machinations. (Petitioner was later to say that those behind
FLDC, among them being the former Presidents sister, Mrs. Fortuna Barba, were very
influential because of their very strong connections with the previous Marcos
regime.)[8] Petitioner prayed that it be allowed to resume logging operations.
In his order dated May 2, 1988, [9] Secretary Fulgencio Factoran, Jr., of the DENR,
declared petitioners TLA No. 106 as of no more force and effect and consequently
denied the petition for its restoration, even as he denied FLDCs motion for
reconsideration of the cancellation of TLA No. 360. Secretary Factoran, Jr. ruled that
petitioners petition was barred by reason of laches, because petitioner did not file its
opposition to the issuance of a TLA to FLDC until February 13, 1987, after FLDC had
been logging under its license for almost two years. On the other hand, FLDCs
motion for reconsideration was denied, since the findings on which the cancellation
order had been based, notably gross violation of the terms and conditions of its
license, such as reforestation and selective logging activities appear to be firmly
grounded.
Both petitioner CMTC and FLDC appealed to the Office of the President.
Petitioner denied that it was guilty of laches. It alleged that it had sent a letter to the
then Minister of Natural Resources Rodolfo del Rosario dated September 24, 1984
protesting the grant of a TLA to FLDC over the area covered by its (petitioners) TLA
and, for this reason, requesting nullification of FLDCs TLA.
In a decision dated March 21, 1991, [10] the Office of the President, through then
Executive Secretary Oscar Orbos, affirmed the DENRs order of May 2, 1988. Like the
DENR it found petitioner guilty of laches, the alleged filing by petitioner of a protest
on September 24, 1984 not having been duly proven. The decision of the Office of
the President stated:[11]
As disclosed by the records, this Office, in a letter of June 1, 1989, had
requested the DENR to issue a certification as to the authenticity/veracity of
CMTCs aforesaid Annex A to enable it to resolve this case judiciously and
expeditiously. Said letter-request pertinently reads:
x x x C & M Timber Corporation has attached to its Supplemental Petition For
Review, dated June 1, 1988, a xerox copy of (Annex A) of its letter to the Minister of
Natural Resources Rodolfo del Rosario, dated September 24, 1984, prepared by its
counsel, Atty. Norberto J. Quisumbing, protesting against the award of the contested
area to Filipinas Loggers Development Corporation and requesting that it be
annulled and voided.
Considering that the aforementioned Annex A constitutes a vital defense to C & M
Timber Corporation and could be a pivotal factor in the resolution by this Office of
the instant appeal, may we request your good office for a certification as to the
14
authenticity/veracity of said document (Annex A) to enable us to resolve the case
judiciously and expeditiously.
In reply thereto, the DENR, thru Assistant Secretary for Legal Affairs Romulo D. San
Juan, in a letter of July 7, 1989, informed this Office, thus:
xxx
Despite diligent efforts exerted to locate the alleged aforementioned Annex A, no
such document could be found or is on file in this Office.
This Office, therefore, regrets that it can not issue the desired certification as to the
authenticity/veracity of the document.
On September 10, 1990, this Office requested an updated comment of the DENR on
(a) the duplicate original copy of Annex A; (b) a xerox copy of Page 164, entry No.
2233, of the MNRs logbook tending to show that the original copy of Annex A was
received by the MNR; and (c) a xerox copy of Page 201 of the logbook of the BFD
indicating that the original copy of Annex A was received by BFD from the MNR.
On October 26, 1990, DENR Assistant Secretary San Juan endorsed to this Office the
updated comment of Director of Forest Management Bureau (FMB) in a 2nd
endorsement of October 25, 1990, which pertinently reads as follows:
Please be informed that this Office is not the addressee and repository of the letter
dated September 24, 1984 of Atty. Norberto Quisumbing. This Office was just
directed by then Minister Rodolfo del Rosario to act on the purported letter of Atty.
Quisumbing and as directed, we prepared a memorandum to the President which
was duly complied with as shown by the entries in the logbook. Annex A, which is
the main document of the letter-appeal of C & M Timber Corporation is presumed
appended to the records when it was acted upon by the BFD (now FMB) and
forwarded to the Secretary (then Minister).Therefore this Office is not in a position to
certify as to the authenticity of Annex A.
Clearly therefore, CMTCs reliance on its Annex A is misplaced, the authenticity
thereof not having been duly proven or established. Significantly, we note that in all
the pleadings filed by CMTC in the officea quo, and during the hearing conducted,
nothing is mentioned therein about its letter of September 24, 1984 (Annex
A). Jurisprudence teaches that issues neither averred in the pleadings nor raised
during the trial below cannot be raised for the first time on appeal (City of Manila vs.
Ebay, 1 SCRA 1086, 1089); that issues of fact not adequately brought to the
attention of the trial court need not be considered by a reviewing court, as they
cannot be raised for the first time on appeal (Santos v. Intermediate Appellate Court,
145 SCRA 592, 595); and that parties, may not, on appeal, adopt a position
inconsistent with what they sustained below (People v. Archilla, 1 SCRA 698, 700-
701)
The Office of the President also declined to set aside the DENRs order of July
31, 1986, cancelling FLDCs TLA No. 360, after finding the same to be fully
substantiated.
Petitioner and FLDC moved for reconsideration. In its order dated January 25,
1993,[12] the Office of the President, through Chief Presidential Legal Counsel Antonio
T. Carpio, denied petitioners motion for reconsideration. It held that even assuming
that CMTC did file regularly its letter-protest of September 24, 1984 with MNR on
September 25, 1984, CMTC failed to protect its rights for more than two (2) years
until it opposed reinstatement of FLDCs TLA on February 13, 1987. Within that two
(2) year period, FLDC logged the area without any opposition from CMTC. In the
same order, the Office of the President, however, directed the reinstatement of
FLDCs TLA No. 360, in view of the favorable report of the Bureau of Forest
Development dated March 23, 1987. Later, the Presidents office reconsidered its
action after the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources Angel C. Alcala, on
February 15, 1993, expressed concern that reinstatement of FLDCs TLA No. 360
might negate efforts to enhance the conservation and protection of our forest
resources. In a new order dated February 26, 1993,[13] the Office of the President
reinstated its March 21, 1991 decision.
Petitioner again moved for a reconsideration of the decision dated March 21,
1991 and for its license to be revived/restored. Petitioners motion was, however,
denied by the Office of the President on June 7, 1993 [14] in a resolution signed by
Assistant Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs Renato C. Corona. The Presidents
office ruled:
The above Order of February 26, 1993 was predicated, as stated therein, on a
new policy consideration on forest conservation and protection, unmistakably
implied from the Presidents handwritten instruction. Accordingly, this Order
shall be taken not only as an affirmation of the March 21, 1991 decision, but
also as a FINAL disposition of the case and ALL matters incident thereto, like
CMTCs motion for reconsideration, dated April 16, 1991.
Hence, this petition. Petitioner contends that laches cannot be imputed to it
because it did not incur delay in asserting its rights and even if there was delay, the
delay did not work to the prejudice of other parties, particularly FLDC, because the
cancellation of the FLDCs TLA was attributable only to its own actions. Petitioner also
denies that its license had been suspended by reason of mediocre performance in
reforestation by order of then Minister of Natural Resources Teodoro O. Pea. It says
that it did not receive any order to this effect. Finally, petitioner claims that the
denial of its petition, because of a new policy consideration on forest conservation
and protection, unmistakably implied from the Presidents handwritten instruction, as
stated in the resolution of June 7, 1993 of the Office of the President, would deny it
the due process of law. Petitioner points out that there is no total log ban in the
country; that Congress has yet to make a pronouncement on the issue; that any
notice to this effect must be stated in good form, not implied; and that in any case,
any new policy consideration should be prospective in application and cannot affect
petitioners vested rights in its TLA No. 106.
15
 We find the petition to be without merit.
First. As already stated, the DENR order of May 2, 1988, declaring petitioners
TLA No. 106 as no longer of any force and effect, was based on its finding that
although TLA No. 106s date of expiry was June 30, 1997 it had been suspended on
June 3, 1983 because of CMTCs mediocre performance in reforestation and
petitioners laches in failing to protest the subsequent award of the same area to
FLDC. There is considerable dispute whether there was really an order dated June 3,
1983 suspending petitioners TLA because of mediocre performance in reforestation,
just as there is a dispute whether there indeed was a letter written on September
24, 1984 on behalf of petitioner protesting the award of the concession covered by
its TLA No. 106 to FLDC, so as to show that petitioner did not sleep on its rights.
The alleged order of June 3, 1983 cannot be produced. The Office of the
Solicitor General was given until May 14, 1997 to secure a copy of the order but on
May 7, 1997 the OSG manifested that the order in question could not be found in the
records of this case in which the order might be.[15] Earlier, petitioner requested a
copy of the order but the DENR, through Regional Executive Director Antonio G.
Principe, said that based from our records there is no file copy of said alleged order.
[16]
On the other hand, the alleged letter of September 24, 1984 written by Atty.
Norberto J. Quisumbing, protesting the award of the concession in question to FLDC
cannot be found in the records of the DENR either. The Assistant Secretary for Legal
Affairs of the DENR certified that Despite diligent efforts exerted to locate the
alleged [letter], no such document could be found or is on file in this Office. [17] In a
later certification, however, Ofelia Castro Biron of the DENR, claimed that she was a
receiving clerk at the Records and Documents Section of the Ministry of Natural
Resources and that on September 25, 1984 she received the letter of Atty.
Quisumbing and placed on all copies thereof the stamp of the MNR. She stated that
the copy in the possession of petitioner was a faithful copy of the letter in question.
[18]
The difficulty of ascertaining the existence of the two documents is indeed a
reflection on the sorry state of record keeping in an important office of the executive
department. Yet these two documents are vital to the presentation of the evidence
of both parties in this case. Fortunately, there are extant certain records from which
it is possible to determine whether these documents even existed.
With respect to the alleged order of June 3, 1983 suspending petitioners TLA
No. 106 for mediocre performance in reforestation, the Court will presume that there
is such an order in accordance with the presumption of regularity in the performance
of official functions inasmuch as such order is cited both in the order dated May 2,
1988 of the DENR, declaring as of no force and effect TLA No. 106, and in the
decision dated March 21, 1991 of the Office of the President affirming the order of
the DENR. It is improbable that so responsible officials as the Secretary of the DENR
and the Executive Secretary would cite an order that did not exist.
On the other hand, with respect to the letter dated September 24, 1984, there
are circumstances indicating that it existed. In addition to the aforesaid certification
of Ofelia Castro Biron that she was the person who received the letter for the DENR,
the logbook of the Ministry of Natural Resources contains entries indicating that the
letter was received by the Bureau of Forest Development from the MNR. [19] DENR
Assistant Secretary Romulo San Juan likewise informed the Office of the President
that the Bureau of Forest Management prepared a memorandum on the aforesaid
letter of September 24, 1984,[20] thereby implying that there was such a letter.
On the premise that there was an order dated June 3, 1983, we find that after
suspending petitioners TLA for mediocre performance in reforestation under this
order, the DENR cancelled the TLA, this time because of a Presidential directive
imposing a log ban. The records of G.R. No. 76538, entitled Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Co. v.
Deputy Executive Secretary, the decision in which is reported in 190 SCRA 673
(1990), contain a copy of the memorandum of then Director Edmundo V. Cortes of
the Bureau of Forest Development to the Regional Director of Region 2, in
Tuguegarao, Cagayan, informing the latter that pursuant to the instruction of the
President and the memorandum dated August 18, 1983 of then Minister Teodoro Q.
Pea, the log ban previously declared included the concessions of the companies
enumerated in Cortes memorandum, in consequence of which the concessions in
question were deemed cancelled. The memorandum of Director Cortes stated:
MEMORANDUM ORDER
TO : The Regional Director
Region 2, Tuguegarao, Cagayan
FROM : The Director
DATE : 24 August 1983
SUBJECT : Stopping of all logging operations
in Nueva Vizcaya and Quirino
REMARKS :
Following Presidential Instructions and Memorandum Order of Minister Teodoro Q.
Pea dated 18 August 1983, and in connection with my previous radio message,
please be informed that the coverage of thelogging ban in Quirino and Nueva
Vizcaya provinces include the following concessions which are deemed cancelled as
of the date of the previous notice:
- Felipe Ysmael Co., Inc.
16
 - Industries Dev. Corp.
- Luzon Loggers, Inc.
- C & M Timber Corporation
- Buzon Industrial Dev. Corporation
- Dominion Forest Resources Corp.
- FCA Timber Development Corp.
- Kasibu Logging Corp.
- RCC Timber Company
- Benjamin Cuaresma
You are hereby reminded to insure full compliance with this order to stop logging
operations by all licensees above mentioned and submit a report on the pullout of
equipment and inventory of logs within five days upon receipt hereof.
ACTION
DESIRED : For your immediate implementation.
EDMUNDO V. CORTES
(Emphasis added)
It thus appears that petitioners license had been cancelled way back in 1983, a
year before its concession was awarded to FLDC. It is noteworthy that petitioner
admits that at the time of the award to FLDC in 1984 petitioner was no longer
operating its concession because of a log ban although it claims that the suspension
of operations was only temporary. As a result of the log ban, the TLA of petitioner,
along with those of other loggers in the region, were cancelled and petitioner and
others were ordered to stop operations. Petitioner also admits that it received a
telegram sent on August 24, 1983 by Director Cortes of the BFD, directing it to stop
all logging operations to conserve our remaining forests. [21] It is then not true, as
Atty. Quisumbing stated in protesting the award of the concession to FLDC, that the
logging ban did not cancel [petitioners] timber license agreement.
Now petitioner did not protest the cancellation of its TLA. Consequently, even if
consideration is given to the fact that a year later, on September 24, 1984, its
counsel protested the grant of the concession to another party (FLDC), this failure of
petitioner to contest first the suspension of its license on June 3, 1983 and later its
cancellation on August 24, 1983 must be deemed fatal to its present action.
Second. Except for the letter of its counsel to the Minister of Natural Resources,
which it reiterated in its letter to the President of the Philippines, petitioner took no
legal steps to protect its interest. After receiving no favorable response to its two
letters, petitioner could have brought the necessary action in court for the
restoration of its license. It did not. Instead it waited until FLDCs concession was
cancelled in 1986 by asking for the revalidation of its (petitioners) on TLA No. 106.
Petitioners excuse before the DENR is that it did not pursue its protest because
its president, Ricardo C. Silverio, had been told by President Marcos that the area in
question had been awarded to the Presidents sister, Mrs. Fortuna Barba, and
petitioner was afraid to go against the wishes of the former President. [22] This is a
poor excuse for petitioners inaction. In Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Co., Inc. v. Deputy
Executive Secretary,[23] a similar excuse was given that Ysmael & Cos license had
been cancelled and its concession awarded to entities controlled or owned by
relatives or cronies of then President Marcos. For this reason, after the EDSA
Revolution, Ysmael & Co. sought in 1986 the reinstatement of its timber license
agreement and the revocation of those issued to the alleged presidential cronies. As
its request was denied by the Office of the President, Ysmael & Co. filed a petition
for certiorari with this Court. On the basis of the facts stated, this Court denied the
petition: (1) because the August 25, 1983 order of the Bureau of Forest
Development, cancelling petitioners timber license agreement had become final and
executory. Although petitioner sent a letter dated September 19, 1983 to President
Marcos seeking reconsideration of the 1983 order of cancellation of the BFD, the
grounds stated there were different from those later relied upon by petitioner for
seeking its reinstatement; (2) because the fact that petitioner failed to seasonably
take judicial recourse to have the earlier administrative actions [cancelling its
license and granting another one covering the same concession to respondent]
reviewed by the court through a petition for certiorari is prejudicial to its cause. Such
special civil action of certiorari should have been filed within a reasonable time. And
since none was filed within such period, petitioners action was barred by laches; and
(3) because executive evaluation of timber licenses and their consequent
cancellation in the process of formulating policies with regard to the utilization of
timber lands is a prerogative of the executive department and in the absence of
evidence showing grave abuse of discretion courts will not interfere with the
exercise of that discretion.
This case is governed by the decision in Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Co., Inc. v. Deputy
Executive Secretary.
Third. It is finally contended that any policy consideration on forest
conservation and protection justifying the decision of the executive department not
to reinstate petitioners license must be formally enunciated and cannot merely be
17
implied from the Presidents instruction to his subordinates and that, at all events,
the new policy cannot be applied to existing licenses such as petitioners.
The Presidents order reconsidering the resolution of the Presidential Legal
Adviser (insofar as it reinstated the license of FLDC) was prompted by concerns
expressed by the then Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources that said
reinstatement [of FLDCs license] may negate our efforts to enhance conservation
and protection of our forest resources. There was really no new policy but, as noted
in Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Co., Inc., a mere reiteration of a policy of conservation and
protection. The policy is contained in Art. II, 16 of the Constitution which commands
the State to protect and promote the right of the people to a balanced and healthful
ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature. There is therefore no
merit in petitioners contention that no new policy can be applied to existing licenses.
As to petitioners contention that the cancellation of its license constitutes an
impairment of the obligation of its contract, suffice it for us to quote what we held
in Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Co. Inc. v. Deputy Executive Secretary:[24]
A cursory reading of the assailed orders issued by public respondent Minister
Maceda of the MNR, which were affirmed by the Office of the President, will disclose
public policy considerations which effectively forestall judicial interference in the
case at bar.
Public respondents herein, upon whose shoulders rests the task of implementing the
policy to develop and conserve the countrys natural resources, have indicated an
ongoing department evaluation of all timber license agreements entered into, and
permits or licenses issued, under the previous dispensation. . . .
The ongoing administrative reassessment is apparently in response to the renewed
and growing global concern over the despoliation of forest lands and the utter
disregard of their crucial role in sustaining a balanced ecological system. The
legitimacy of such concern can hardly be disputed, most especially in this country. . .
.
Thus, while the administration grapples with the complex and multifarious problems
caused by unbridled exploitation of these resources, the judiciary will stand
clear. . . . More so where, as in the present case, the interests of a private logging
company are pitted against that of the public at large on the pressing public policy
issue of forest conservation. . . . Timber licenses, permits and license agreements
are the principal instruments by which the State regulates the utilization and
disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. And it can
hardly be gainsaid that they merely evidence a privilege granted by the State to
qualified entities, and do not vest in the latter a permanent or irrevocable right to
the particular concession area and the forest products therein. They may be validly
amended, modified, replaced or rescinded by the Chief Executive when national
interests so require. Thus, they are not deemed contracts within the purview of the
due process of law clause [See Sections 3(33) and 20 of Pres. Decree No. 705, as
amended. Also, Tan v. Director of Forestry, G.R. No. L-24548, October 27, 1983, 125
SCRA 302].
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
18