LAW OF THE CASE
LITTON MILLS V. GALLEON TRADER
J. PADILLA
FACTS:
1) CONTEXT: appeal from the summary
judgment (action for recovery of sum of
money with damages and attorneys fees)
2) A contract of dealership was entered into
between Galleon Trader, Inc. (Galleon,
hereafter) and Litton Mills, Inc., (Litton,
hereafter) whereby the former was
authorized to distribute a particular product
manufactured by the latter. In connection
with said contract, Galleon incurred an
obligation with Litton amounting to
P84,368.24. As proof of said obligation,
Galleon executed an Acknowledgment of
Indebtedness and Promissory Note
3) In the same document, Supreme Investment
Corporation (Supreme, for short) bound.
itself solidarily with Galleon in the payment
of the obligation to Litton, while a surety
bond was issued by Overseas Insurance
Corporation (Overseas, for short) in favor of
Litton with a minimum maturity date of four
(4) months from 15 August 1968
4) ToA: the first P20,000 was to be paid after
the document was signed, and the balance
of the account was to be payable in three
(3) equal monthly installments, beginning 15
September 1968; should the debtor
(Galleon) fail to pay any one installment on
or before due date or violate any of the
terms agreed upon, the whole obligation
would become due and demandable, and
the debtor (Galleon), and the guarantor
(Supreme) would be jointly and severally
liable to the creditor (Litton
5) After Galleon failed to pay the first
installment, the whole obligation became
due and demandable. However, on 10, 12,
and 30 October 1968, the debtor made
partial payments, leaving a balance of
P42,912.16
6) Separate demands 4 were made upon
Galleon, Supreme and Overseas. Despite
said demands,. no payment was made to
Litton; hence, the latter filed a complaint for
recovery of sum of money against
defendants-appellants before the CFIM
7) After the Answers were filed, plaintiff Litton
moved for summary judgment, on the
ground that defendants' answers failed to
tender any valid defense or raise an issue of
fact that could give rise to a valid defense
(an affidavit of its collection manager was
attached to the motion) GRANTED
8) Pursuant to the decision, plaintiff Litton filed
a motion for execution pending appeal
OPPOSITIONS WERE FILED
Notwithstanding such, the court granted
such motion (to avoid delay)
9) Defendants then filed a motion for leave to
file a supersedeas bond but the same was
denied
10) CA (P for C, P, and PI): respondent Judge
acted with sound discretion in rendering the
summary judgment, in ordering its
execution pending appeal and in refusing to
accept petitioners' supersedeas bond to stay
the execution of said judgment
11) A petition for review of the aforesaid
Court of Appeals decision was filed by
defendants before this Court, docketed as
G.R. No. L-32758, but the same was denied
in a resolution dated 12 November 1970.
The motion to reconsider said resolution was
likewise denied
12) After the finality of the aforesaid Court of
Appeals decision (in CA G.R. No. 45428-R)
defendants pursued the appeal at bar
(having earlier filed a notice of a peal from
the summary judgment and a joint record on
appeal) again with the Court of Appeals
13) DEFENDANTS CONTENTION: PRIOR CA
DECISION REVOLVED ONLY ON THE ISSUE OF
JURISDICTION
SUPREME COURT
1) The main thrust of defendants-appellants
arguments presented in this appeal is
directed at the propriety of the summary
judgment, the execution pending appeal and
the denial of their motion to file a
supersedeas bond to stay execution pending
appeal. These issues have been fully
threshed out, discussed and disposed of by
the Court of Appeals in resolving the petition
for certiorari earlier filed by defendants-
appellants for alleged grave abuse of
discretion and excess of jurisdiction
committed by the respondent judge in
issuing the aforesaid judgment and orders. It
is significant to note that it was material
and, in fact, necessary for the Court of
Appeals to first ascertain whether the
questioned acts of the respondent judge
were in accordance with law and
jurisprudence, before it could resolve the
issue of alleged grave abuse of discretion
and excess of jurisdiction.
2) An act of a court or tribunal may only be
considered as committed in grave abuse of
discretion when the same was performed in
a capricious or whimsical exercise of
judgment which is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be
so patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of positive duty or to a virtual
refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or
to act at all in contemplation of law, as
where the power is exercised in an arbitrary
and despotic manner by reason of passion
or personal hostility
3) It was the finding of the Court of Appeals
that the questioned summary judgment, the
execution pending appeal and the rejection
of a supersedeas bond to stay such
execution, were in accordance with law,
thereby warranting the conclusion that the
respondent judge did not act in grave abuse
 of discretion or in excess of jurisdiction. This
finding is now "the law of the case" and it
cannot be raised anew in this appeal.
Whatever has been irrevocably established
as the controlling legal rule between the
parties in a case continues to be the law of
the case, whether correct on general
principles or not, so long as the facts on
which such decision was predicated
continue to be the facts of the case before
the Court.
4) Once a judgment has become final, the
issues therein should be laid to rest.
5) For this Court to grant defendants-
appellants' prayer to reverse the judgment
and orders appealed from and remand the
case to the trial court for a trial on the
merits, would amount to a reopening of the
case which could result in never ending
appeals. Their arguments raised in this
appeal do not attack at all the merits of the
judgment finding them liable under the
terms of the agreement, but persistently
impugn the procedural aspect of the act of
the court a quo in rendering a summary
judgment, allowing execution pending
appeal and denial of their supersedeas bond
to stay execution pending appeal.
AYALA CORPORATION V. ROSA-DIANA
REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT CORP.
J. DE LEON, JR.
FACTS:
1) P was the registered owner of a parcel of
land located in Alfaro Street, Salcedo Village,
Makati City
2) Ayala sold the lot to Manuel Sy married to
Vilma Po and Sy Ka Kieng married to Rosa
Chan
3) The DOS contained several special
conditions: the vendees shall build on the
lot and submit the building plans to the
vendor before September 30, 1976 for the
latters approval; the construction of the
building shall start on or before March 30,
1977 and completed before 1979. Before
such completion, neither the deed of sale
shall be registered nor the title released
even if the purchase price shall have been
fully paid; they CANNOT resell it
4) The Deed Restrictions, on the other hand,
contained the stipulation that the gross floor
area of the building to be constructed shall
not be more than five (5) times the lot area
and the total height shall not exceed forty
two (42) meters. The restrictions were to
expire in the year 2025.
5) Manuel Sy and Sy Ka Kieng failed to
construct the building in violation of the
Special Conditions of Sale. Notwithstanding
the violation, Manuel Sy and Sy Ka Kieng, in
April 1989, were able to sell the lot to
respondent Rosa-Diana Realty and
Development Corporation (hereinafter
referred to as Rosa-Diana) with Ayalas
approval (SUCH APPROVAL WAS SUBJECT
TO THE CONDITION THAT R WOULD COMPLY
WITH THE CONDITINS SET FORTH IN THE
FIRST DOS)
6) The title carried as encumbrances the
special conditions of sale and the deed
restrictions. Rosa-Dianas building plans as
approved by Ayala were subject to strict
compliance of cautionary notices appearing
on the building plans and to the restrictions
encumbering the Lot regarding the use and
occupancy of the same.
7) Thereafter, Rosa-Diana submitted to the
building official of Makati another set of
building plans for The Peak which were
substantially different from those that it
earlier submitted to Ayala for approval
(SECOND PLAN DID NOT FOLLOW
CONDITIONS)
8) During the construction of Rosa-Dianas
condominium project, Ayala filed an action
with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati,
Branch 139 for specific performance, with
application for a writ of preliminary
injunction/temporary restraining order
against Rosa-Diana Realty seeking to
compel the latter to comply with the
contractual obligations under the deed of
restrictions annotated on its title as well as
with the building plans it submitted to the
latter. In the alternative, Ayala prayed
for rescission of the sale of the subject
lot to Rosa- Diana Realty DENIED
9) Undeterred, Ayala tried to cause the
annotation of a notice of lis pendens on
Rosa-Dianas title NOT GRANTED BY THE
ROD (the case pending before the trial
court, being an action for specific
performance and/or rescission, is an action
in personam which does not involve the
title, use or possession of the)
10) Land Registration Authority (LRA)
reversed the ruling of the Register of Deeds
saying that an action for specific
performance or rescission may be classified
as a proceeding of any kind in court directly
affecting title to the land or the use or
occupation thereof for which a notice of lis
pendens may be held proper
OVERTURNED BY CA AFFIRMED BY SC
11) In the meantime, Ayala completed its
presentation of evidence before the trial
court.
12) Rosa-Diana filed a Demurrer to Evidence
averring that Ayala failed to establish its
right to the relief sought inasmuch as (a)
Ayala admittedly does not enforce the deed
restrictions uniformly and strictly (b) Ayala
has lost its right/power to enforce the
restrictions due to its own acts and
omissions; and (c) the deed restrictions are
no longer valid and effective against lot
buyers in Ayalas controlled subdivision
SUSTAINED
a) Ayala was guilty of abandonment and/or
estoppel due to its failure to enforce the
 terms of deed of restrictions and special
conditions of sale against Manuel Sy and
Sy Ka Kieng
b) AFFIRMED BY CA MR DENIED
13) Hence, this appeal
WON THE CA ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE
RTC?
YES
1) The doctrine of the law of the case has
certain affinities with, but is clearly
distinguishable from, the doctrines of res
judicata and stare decisis, principally on the
ground that the rule of the law of the case
operates only in the particular case and
only as a rule of policy and not as one
of law
2) At variance with the doctrine of stare
decisis, the ruling adhered to in the
particular case under the doctrine of the law
of the case need not be followed as a
precedent in subsequent litigation between
other parties, neither by the appellate court
which made the decision followed on a
subsequent appeal in the same case, nor by
any other court. The ruling covered by the
doctrine of the law of the case is adhered to
in the single case where it arises, but is not
carried into other cases as a precedent
3) On the other hand, under the doctrine of
stare decisis, once a point of law has been
established by the court, that point of law
will, generally, be followed by the same
court and by all courts of lower rank in
subsequent cases where the same legal
issue is raised
4) The Court of Appeals was aware that the
issue as to whether petitioner is estopped
from enforcing the deed of restrictions has
yet to be resolved by the trial court. Though
it did make a pronouncement that the
petitioner is estopped from enforcing the
deed of restrictions, it also mentioned at the
same time that this particular issue has yet
to be resolved by the trial court. Notably,
upon appeal to this Court, We have affirmed
the ruling of the Court of Appeals only as
regards the particular issue of the propriety
of the cancellation of the notice of lis
pendens.
5) There is no reason then, how the law of the
case or stare decisis can be held to be
applicable in the case at bench.
6) If at all, the pronouncement made by the
Court of Appeals that petitioner Ayala is
barred from enforcing the deed of
restrictions can only be considered as obiter
dicta. As earlier mentioned, the only issue
before the Court of Appeals at the time
was the propriety of the annotation of
the lis pendens.
7) The additional pronouncement of the Court
of Appeals that Ayala is estopped from
enforcing the deed of restrictions even as it
recognized that this said issue is being tried
before the trial court was not necessary to
dispose of the issue as to the propriety of
the annotation of the lis pendens. A dictum
is an opinion of a judge which does not
embody the resolution or determination of
the court, and made without argument, or
full consideration of the point, not the
proffered deliberate opinion of the judge
himself. It is not necessarily limited to issues
essential to the decision but may also
include expressions of opinion which are not
necessary to support the decision reached
by the court. Mere dicta are not binding
under the doctrine of stare decisis
8) WON P WAIVED ITS RIGHT TO ENFORCE THE
DEED OF RESTRICTIONS NO
a) It bears emphasis that as complainant,
Ayala had the prerogative to initiate an
action against violators of the deed
restrictions. That Rosa-Diana had acted
in bad faith is manifested by the fact
that it submitted two sets of building
plans, one which was in conformity with
the deed restrictions submitted to Ayala
and MACEA, and the other, which
exceeded the height requirement in the
deed restrictions to the Makati building
official for the purpose of procuring a
building permit from the latter.
Moreover, the violation of the deed
restrictions committed by respondent
can hardly be denominated as a minor
violationfaith by the respondent.
b) It may not be amiss to mention that the
deed restrictions were revised in a
general membership meeting of the
association of lot owners in Makati
Central Business District the Makati
Commercial Estate Association, Inc.
(MACEA) whereby direct height
restrictions were abolished in lieu of floor
area limits. Respondent, however, did
not vote for the approval of this revision
during the General Membership meeting
which was held on July 11, 1990 at the
Manila Polo Club Pavilion, Makati, Metro
Manila and again on July 12, 1990 at the
Hotel Mandarin Oriental, Makati, Metro
Manila.
c) Hence, respondent continues to be
bound by the original deed restrictions
d) Contractual obligations between parties
have the force of law between them and
absent any allegation that the same are
contrary to law, morals, good customs,
public order or public policy, they must
be complied with in good faith.
e) The Court agree with petitioner Ayalas
observation that respondent Rosa-Dianas
special and affirmative defenses before
the trial court never mentioned any
allegation that its president and
chairman were not authorized to execute
the Undertaking. It was inappropriate
therefore for the trial court to rule that in
the absence of any authority or
confirmation from the Board of Directors
 of respondent Rosa-Diana, its Chairman
and the President cannot validly enter
into an undertaking relative to the
construction of the building on the lot
within one year from July 27, 1989 and in
accordance with the deed restrictions.
f) The fact alone that respondent Rosa-
Diana conveniently prepared two sets of
building plans - with one set which fully
conformed to the Deed Restrictions and
another in gross violation of the same -
should have cautioned the trial court to
conclude that respondent Rosa-Diana
was under the erroneous impression that
the Deed Restrictions were no longer
enforceable and that it never intended to
be bound by the Undertaking signed by
its President and Chairman
g) In accordance with the peculiar
circumstances of the case at bar, the
development charges would certainly be
a fair measure of compensatory
damages to petitioner Ayala (2.5 M)
i) Specific performance and rescission
are no longer feasible
INSUFFICIENT ALLEGATIONS
MARCOPPER V. GARCIA
J. GUTIERREZ
FACTS:
1) P filed a complaint for quieting of
title/reconveyance and damages against
private respondent Miguel Garcia
2) COMPLAINT: P allegedly is the owner and
present possessor of the land in question,
having acquired it in good faith and for
value on October 2, 1972 from
Buenaventura Paez, that the latter, in turn,
who had been in open, continuous,
exclusive, adverse and notorious
possession, occupation, cultivation and
enjoyment thereof since about 1921 until its
sale to petitioner, inherited the land from his
father Arcadio Paez and had consistently
declared it for taxation purposes in his name
and religiously paid taxes to the
government; and that private respondent,
through fraud, deceit, and
misrepresentation, succeeded in misleading
the Director of Lands to believe that it is still
part of the public domain and thus obtained
the free patent and the corresponding OCT
in his name.
3) Rs ANSWER WITH COUNTERCLAIM: he is the
sole and exclusive owner of the land in
question as the holder of a free patent and
for which a corresponding certificate of title
was issued by the Registrar of Deeds of
Marinduque on October 23, 1973, in his
name; that Paez never possessed nor
occupied the land in question in the concept
of owner but was just residing in a small
portion of the land purely by mere tolerance
of the respondent and that therefore,
petitioner's alleged purchase of the same
from Paez is absolutely of no legal force and
effect. Respondent further alleged that Paez
had executed an affidavit of quitclaim before
the Inspector of the Bureau of Lands who
was processing the free pattent application,
stating categorically that he had absolutely
no claim nor interest in the land, thereby
unconditionally admitting that respondent is
the sole and exclusive owner thereof and
that since a free patent covering the said
land had been approved and issued in the
name of respondent and the corresponding
OCT issued on October 23, 1973, both had
long become final and indefeasible, hence,
no longer subject to any question nor
judicial scrutiny.
4) P ADMITTED THE FOLLOWING: 1) It was not
able to file any opposition against the
issuance of a Free Patent to the respondent
because it had no notice of any such
application for free patent filed by
respondent; 2) It did not file any action for
cancellation or annulment of the free patent
within one year following its approval
because it had no notice thereof but the
petitioner filed an action for the annulment
of the free patent upon its discovery in
1973; 3) Before the OCT was issued to the
respondent, it was not able to file any
opposition thereto because it had no notice
of such application by respondent; and 4) It
did not file any action for the cancellation or
annulment of the said certificate of title
within one year following its issuance
because it had no knowledge of such
issuance but it did file an action for the
cancellation of such certificate of title upon
its discovery in 1975
5) R FILED A MTD (AN ANSWER WAS ALREADY
FILED? WTF!): GROUNDS a) that the OCT
of the respondent had already become
indefeasible and incontrovertible as per
admission by the petitioner that said OCT
over the land in question was issued on
October 23, 1973; b) that petitioner's action
for reconveyance has prescribed since the
action should have been filed within four
years from the issuance of the OCT; c) that
even if the action had not yet prescribed,
the petitioner could not avail of the same
since the land in question before the
issuance of the OCT is public and therefore,
cannot be the subject of reconveyance; and
d) that the petitioner is guilty of laches and
inexcusable negligence in not protecting and
asserting its rights, if any, over the disputed
land.
6) Respondent Court issued the questioned
order dismissing the petitioner's complaint
as well as the respondent's counterclaim
a) plaintiff and its predecessor-in-interest
absolutely did not take any legal step to
assert and protect their rights over
subject land before the issuance of the
patent and the corresponding certificate
 in the name of defendant (ANONG
FINDING? P ADMITTED THIS, LOLS)
b) The issue as to the alleged
incompetency of the defendant, which
supposedly occurred after the filing of
this case and during its pendency, has
now become moot and academic.
7) Hence, this petition
WHETHER OR NOT THE COMPLAINT, ASSUMING
THAT THE ALLEGATIONS THEREIN ARE TRUE,
STATES A VALID CAUSE OF ACTION IN FAVOR OF
PLAINTIFF AGAINST THE DEFENDANT?
1) NO
2) Although the petitioner pleaded the
existence of an implied trust in its favor, all
of its allegations only attempted to show
fraud on the part of the respondent. Thus, it
is obvious that from the complaint itself, the
prescriptive period which is applicable in the
case is four years and not ten years as the
petitioner maintains.
3) Moreover, the rule on a motion to dismiss
cited by the petitioner, while correct as a
general rule is not without exceptions.
4) In the present case, before the trial court
issued the questioned order dismissing
petitioner's complaint, it had the opportunity
to examine the merits of the complaint, the
answer with counterclaim, the petitioner's
answer to the counterclaim and its answer
to the request for admission. It was but
logical for said court to consider all of these
pleadings in determining whether or not
there was a sufficient cause of action in the
petitioner's complaint. The order of
dismissal was in the nature of a
summary judgment
5) The trial court, therefore, did not err in
considering, in addition to the complaint,
other pleadings submitted by the parties in
deciding whether or not the complaint
should be dismissed for lack of a cause of
action.
OTHER ISSUES:
1) RE: PS CONTENTION THAT proven
possession for more than 30 years shall vest
title over the land on the possessor as to
segregate it from the mass of public land
such that it is no longer disposable under
the Public Land Act by free patent
WITHOUT MERIT the petitioner in its
complaint, impliedly admitted that the land
is public when it alleged that the free patent
should have been issued to it by virtue of
the allegedly more than 30 years possession
by its predecessor-in-interest. Furthermore,
the petitioner cannot argue that the Director
of Lands had no jurisdiction to issue the free
patent to private respondent on the ground
that the land was private. The mere
possession of the land for 30 years,
assuming that Paez really possessed the
land for this length of time, did not
automatically divest the land of its public
character
a) Moreover, nowhere in the complaint nor
in subsequent pleadings of the petitioner
did it state that it ever applied for a free
patent.
b) The lower court corrctly stated that as a
mining corporation the petitioner could
not legally obtain a free patent to the
land. The petitioner denies any
knowledge as to whether Paez, from
whom it bought the land, ever applied
for a free patent or obtained one,
notwithstanding its own admission that
before the alleged sale of the land to it
by Paez, it verified from the Bureau of
Lands office in Marinduque and Manila if
said land was subject to an application
for free patent. The petitioner cannot
maintain that Paez was the rightful
owner of the land, much less the person
qualified for the issuance of a free patent
for the latter did not
c) At the very least, the petitioner should
also have pursued its case in the
administrative proceedings it
commenced with the Bureau of Lands
2) RE: THE CONTENTION THAT that since the
title over the land was obtained by the
private respondent through fraud and by
means of which a title was issued in his
name, then the law creates what is called a
"constructive trust" in its favor as the
defrauded party and grants it the right to
vindicate the property (PRESCRIPTION THEN
IS 10 YRS.) AGAIN, BEREFT OF ANY
MERIT An implied or constructive trust
presupposes the existence of a defrauded
party who is the rightful owner of the
disputed property. In the case at bar, aside
from the fact that the petitioner and its
predecessor-in-interest never applied for a
free patent although the petitioner claims
that it was entitled to the same, it also did
not allege the existence of any relationship,
fiduciary or otherwise, with the respondent
which may justify the creation of an implied
trust. The respondent, therefore, could not
have committed fraud against the petitioner
or its predecessor-in-interest. Besides, the
petitioner's failure to file any opposition to
the registration of the land in the
respondent's favor and its filing of an action
for reconveyance only after almost six years
from the date of said registration cast doubt
on the petitioner's right over the property
3) In this case, the petitioner filed the
action only on August 16, 1979, after
the lapse of almost six years. Clearly,
the petitioner's action has prescribed
FLUOR DANIEL PHIL. V. EB VILLAROSA AND
PARTNERS CO.
J. QUISUMBING
FACTS:
1) P entered into an agreement with Fil-Estate
Properties, Inc. (Fil-Estate) for the
construction of the Fairways & Bluewater,
Newcoast Island Resort in Boracay Island.
2) R was one of the contractors engaged by
petitioner to provide services for the said
project
3) P and R executed a separate contract for
civil structure and architecture, for plumbing
and fire protection, and for millworks.
4) However, Fil-Estate failed to satisfy
petitioners monthly progress billing. Hence,
petitioner did not pay respondent.
5) Petitioner apprised Fil-Estate that the project
would have to be suspended. Petitioner
likewise issued a notice of suspension of
work to all its contractors, including
respondent.
6) In response, respondent informed petitioner
that it deemed the contracts between them
good as terminated. Thus, respondent
demanded payment for suspension cost and
for work so far performed.
7) Believing that petitioner was in bad faith,
respondent also filed with RTC Makati a
complaint for a sum of money and damages
8) P filed a MTD on the ground that the
complaint failed to state a cause of action
DENIED MR DENIED
9) Respondent subsequently filed a motion to
amend its complaint followed by its
amended complaint (GRANTED). Petitioner,
on the other hand, filed a motion to suspend
proceedings (DENIED)
10) Petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals
a special civil action for certiorari assailing
the November 19, 1998 and March 24, 1999
Orders of the court a quo and praying for a
temporary restraining order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction DENIED
WON RS COMPLAINT FAILED TO STATE A
CAUSE OF ACTION?
1) YES.
2) The essential elements of a cause of action
are as follows: 1) A right in favor of the
plaintiff by whatever means and under
whatever law it arises or is created; 2) An
obligation on the part of the defendant not
to violate such right; and 3) An act or
omission on the part of the defendant in
violation of the right of the plaintiff or
constituting a breach of the obligation of the
defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter
may maintain an action for recovery of
damages or other relief
3) It is, thus, only upon the occurrence of the
last element that a cause of action arises,
giving the plaintiff a right to file an action in
court for recovery of damages or other relief.
4) The test of sufficiency of facts alleged in the
complaint as constituting a cause of action
is whether or not admitting the facts
alleged, the court could render a valid
verdict in accordance with the prayer of the
complaint. That in determining sufficiency of
cause of action, the court takes into account
only the material allegations of the
complaint and no other, is not a hard and
fast rule. In some cases, the court
considers the documents attached to
the complaint to truly determine
sufficiency of cause of action
5) A complaint should not be dismissed for
insufficiency of cause of action if it appears
clearly from the complaint and its
attachments that the plaintiff is entitled to
relief
6) The converse is also true. The
complaint may be dismissed for lack of
cause of action if it is obvious from the
complaint and its annexes that the
plaintiff is not entitled to any relief
7) IN THE CASE AT BAR, annexed to the subject
complaint are the three contracts governing
the rights and obligations between
petitioner and respondent, namely the
contract for civil structure and architecture,
the contract for plumbing and fire
protection, and the contract for millworks.
Records show that recurring in each of the
said contracts is the provision that payment
by petitioner shall be subject to its timely
receipt of similar payments from Fil-Estate
8) On their face, the said attached contracts,
which define and delimit the rights and
obligations of the parties, clearly require a
specific condition before petitioner may be
held liable for payment. The complaint,
however, failed to state that the said
condition had been fulfilled. Without the said
condition having taken place, petitioner
cannot be said to have breached its
obligation to pay.
NON-COMPLIANCE WITH A CONDITION
PRECEDENT
MENDOZA V. CA
J. J.B.L. REYES
FACTS:
1) Luisa de la Rosa Mendoza instituted Case
No. 3436 against petitioner
2) COMPLAINT: she averred that she was
married to Cecilio Mendoza on 2 September
1953; that they lived together as husband
and wife until 14 July 1954, when the
husband departed for the United States to
further his studies and practice his
profession; that since then, defendant
Mendoza "without justifiable cause or reason
deliberately abandoned and neglected
plaintiff and despite repeated demands by
plaintiff, defendant has failed and refused,
and still fails and refuses, to provide for the
maintenance and support of plaintiff, who is
alleged to be pregnant, sickly and without
any source of revenue, while defendant
(now petitioner) is employed in a hospital in
the United States, earning an average of
$200.00 a month, besides being a part-
 owner of lands in Muoz, Nueva Ecija,
assessed at P32,330.00 in 1955.
3) Defendant Cecilio Mendoza moved for
dismissal of the complaint for lack of
jurisdiction and improper venue denied
4) The motion having been denied, he filed an
answer with counterclaim, putting in issue
the validity of his marriage to plaintiff (Brief,
p. 13), and plaintiff (now respondent) Luisa
de la Rosa duly replied.
5) Defendant filed a second motion to dismiss,
this time predicated on the complaint's
failure to state a cause of action, because it
contained no allegation that earnest efforts
toward a compromise have been made
before the filing of the suit, and invoking the
provisions of Article 222 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines1
6) The Court of First Instance, having refused
to entertain his second motion to dismiss,
the defendant petitioned the Court of
Appeals for writ of prohibition with
preliminary injunction to stop the Court of
First Instance from further proceeding with
the case. The Court of Appeals gave due
course to his petition and issued the
preliminary writ prayed for; but, after
hearing and consideration of the merits, it
denied the writ of prohibition and dissolved
the injunction MR DENIED
7) Hence, this petition
WON THE CA ERRED IN DISMISSING THE
PETITION?
1) NO.
2) While we agree that petitioner's position
represents a correct statement of the
general rule on the matter, we are
nevertheless constrained to hold that the
Court of Appeals and the Court of First
Instance committed no error in refusing to
dismiss the complaint, for on its face, the
same involved a claim for future support
that under Article 2035 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines can not be subject of a valid
compromise, and is, therefore, outside the
sphere of application of Article 222 of the
Code upon which petitioner relies. This
appears from the last proviso of said Article
222, already quoted. Even the answer
below, in attacking the validity of the
marriage of plaintiff-respondent Luisa de la
Rosa to defendant-petitioner Cecilio
Mendoza, poses a non-compromisable issue.
3) Since no valid compromise is possible on
these issues, a showing of previous efforts
to compromise them would be superfluous.
1 ART. 222. No suit shall be filed or maintained
between members of the same family unless it
should appear that earnest efforts toward a
compromise have been made, butthat the same
have failed, subject to the limitations in
article 2035.
4) It may be that the complaint asks for both
future support and support in arrears, as
petitioner contends. But, the possibility of
compromise on the latter does not negate
the existence of a valid cause of action for
future support, to which Article 222 cannot
apply.
PROCEDURE ON MTD
MALICDEM V. FLORES
J. CORONA
FACTS:
1) Dr. Apolinario G. Bautista, the former dean
of Pangasinan State University (PSU),
entered into a "contract of agreement with
respondent Romeo Flores and a certain
Francisco Lotivio.
2) In the contract, Dr. Bautista, as PSUs
representative, allowed them to lease the
canteen building and general merchandise
store for a monthly rental of P1,200.
3) The contract also obligated them to
"shoulder in advance the cost of the
required repair/renovation of the said
building The P1,200 rent was to be deducted
from the cost of the repair/renovation until
the amount they spent therefor was paid.
The term of the contract was six years
subject to extension by agreement of the
parties (1993-99)
4) 1995: subject to extension by agreement of
the parties
5) Before the expiration of the contract,
respondent was allegedly assured by PSU
that the contract would be renewed for
another six years to enable him to recover
the expenses he had incurred for the
repair/renovation and operations of the
canteen.
6) On September 12, 1999, respondent
formally informed the new dean, petitioner
Dr. Melanio Malicdem, of his intention to
renew the lease contract
7) On October 27, 1999, respondent received a
letter from Dr. Malicdem notifying him that
the contract was not going to be renewed
and that PSU President Dr. Rodolfo Asanion
had extended the term of the contract to
October 31, 1999 only (such decision was
declared to be final)
8) Because of these developments, respondent
instituted an action for specific performance
and damages, with prayer for a temporary
restraining order (TRO) and/or preliminary
injunction against PSU, represented by
university officials Dr. Rodolfo Asanion,
President; Dr. Melanio D. Malicdem, College
Dean and Roy C. Ferrer, Special Director for
Administrative Services
9) At the scheduled hearing, petitioners asked
to be represented by the Office of the
Solicitor General. The trial court
 consequently reset the hearing to December
27, 1999
10) On December 20, 1999, Dr. Rodolfo Asanion,
as PSUs representative, filed an answer
alleging that the lease in question "was an
unauthorized contract for it was never
approved by the President of the PSU."
Furthermore, petitioners never assured
respondent that the lease contract would be
renewed. In fact, as early as June 9, 1995,
the university had advised respondent that
the lease contract would be terminated
effective at the start of the school year 1995
to 1996
11) This move was meant to comply with the
Commission on Audits recommendation to
nullify the contract of lease for being
defective. Not only was there no public
bidding, the six-year term also violated the
two-year limit allowed by Sections 531 and
533 of the GAAM
12) Dr. Asanion also averred that the complaint
did not state a cause of action because "a
contract of lease (was) a consensual
contract and the court (had) no authority to
force the (petitioners) to enter into one."
13) Petitioners requested another postponement
of the hearing on the issuance of the TRO.
14) Respondent filed a "motion for issuance of
TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction,"
asserting that despite the advice of the trial
court to maintain the status quo, petitioners
started the construction of a new canteen
near the disputed premises
15) On the same date, petitioners filed a
"motion to dismiss (with opposition to the
prayer for issuance of a TRO and preliminary
injunction)."
a) Maintained that respondent had no
cause of action against them "as they
(were) not legally bound to renew the
contract of lease." Petitioners also stated
that they had no intention of renewing
the contract because respondent
allegedly violated several provisions of
the lease, namely: (a) failing to pay
rentals amounting to P3,510; (b) failing
to settle water and electric bills; (c)
using the canteen as dwelling place and
(d) making improvements without PSUs
prior approval
b) OPPOSED BY R: respondent maintained
that he repaired/renovated the premises
because of the assurances made to him
that the lease contract would be
renewed. He further asserted that the
civil case was not only for specific
performance but also for damages
16) THE MTD WAS DENIED (FILED AFTER FILING
OF ANSWER WHICH IS BAWAL MR
DENIED
17) HENCE, THIS PETITION
WON THE CA ERRED IN DENYING THE
PETITION?
1) NO.
2) The special civil action for certiorari filed by
petitioners with the Court of Appeals was
not the proper remedy to assail the denial
by the trial court of the motion to dismiss.
The order of the trial court denying the
motion to dismiss was merely interlocutory.
It neither terminated nor finally disposed of
the case as it still left something to be done
by the court before the case was finally
decided on the merits
3) This being so, the general rule applied: the
denial of a motion to dismiss cannot be
questioned in a certiorari proceeding under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court as it is a
remedy designed to correct errors of
jurisdiction and not errors of judgment
a) EXCEPTION: GAD
4) NO GAD IN THIS CASE
a) First, the motion to dismiss was clearly
dismissible because petitioners had
already filed an answer before they filed
the motion to dismiss. Section 1, Rule 16
of the Rules of Court provides that the
motion to dismiss must be filed "within
the time for but before filing the answer
to the complaint or pleading asserting a
claim." The records undeniably show that
petitioners, through Dr. Asanion, filed an
answer dated December 20, 1999, a
month before they filed the motion to
dismiss on January 21, 2000
i) The answer filed by Dr. Asanion as
PSUs representative was binding on
petitioners because they were not
sued in their personal capacities but
as PSU officials
b) Second, petitioners contention that the
trial court failed to state its reasons for
denying the motion is not correct. The
trial courts order denying the motion to
dismiss complied fully with Section 3,
Rule 16
i) It narrated the conflicting claims of
the parties and concluded that their
divergent positions were best
threshed out in a full-blown hearing.
ii) It also denied the motion to dismiss
on the basis of Section 1, Rule 16 for
having been filed after the filing of an
answer. This was sufficient to deny
the said motion. The trial court
followed the right procedure
because, after the issues were joined
by the filing of the answer, trial
should have ensued (SPECIFICITY OF
RULING LIBERALLY CONSTRUED AS
REGARDS INTERLOCUTORY ORDERS)
c) Lastly, contrary to petitioners
contention that respondent failed to
state a cause of action, suffice it to say
that the allegations in the complaint
constituted, at the very least, a cause of
action for damages.
i) SEC. 1, RULE 8
ii) It might have been true that PSU was
under no legal compulsion to renew
 the contract with respondent. It
might have also been true that there
was a violation of Sections 531 and
533 of the GAAM due to the absence
of public bidding and violation of the
two-year limit on a revenue-
generating contract. However,
nothing is more settled than the rule
that, in a motion to dismiss for failure
to state a cause of action, the focus
is on the sufficiency, not the veracity,
of the material allegations. Moreover,
the determination is confined to the
four corners of the complaint AND
NOWHERE ELSE
d) Furthermore, the issue of whether or not
respondent in fact secured PSUs prior
approval before he undertook the said
repair/renovation was, among other
things, a matter best threshed out in a
full-blown trial. In short, all this should be
resolved in a hearing on the merits
e) PARTIES SHOULD PROCEED WITH THE
TRIAL
MOTION TO SUSPEND PROCEEDINGS
BENGSON V. CHAN
J. AQUINO
FACTS:
1) Soledad F. Bengson and Mariano M. Chan
entered into a contract for the construction
of a six-story building on Bengsons lot
2) In that contract Soledad F. Bengson bound
herself to pay Chan, the contractor, the sum
of P352,000 for the materials, labor and
construction expenses.
3) It was stipulated inter alia that the
construction would start on July 5, 1965;
that the first and second stories, together
with the theater, should be completed and
available for use within five months from
July 5, 1965, and that the construction
should be finished within twelve calendar
months from that date in conformity with
the plans and specifications signed by the
parties
4) THE CONTRACT CONTAINED AN
ARBITRATION CLAUSE all questions, disputes
or differences arising between the parties
hereto relative to the construction of the
BUILDING shall be determined by arbitration
of two persons, each chosen by the parties
themselves; the determination of said
arbitration shall be final, conclusive and
binding upon both parties
5) Bengson filed an action for damages against
Mariano M. Chan and the sureties on his
performance bond
6) COMPLAINT: Chan violated the contract by
not constructing the first and second stories
within the stipulated five-month period; that
because the contractor admitted at a
conference on May 8, 1966 that he was
unable to continue or complete the
construction, Soledad F. Bengson terminated
the contract; that she suffered damages
amounting to P85,000 as a consequence of
Chans failure to construct the commercial
building, and that Chan did not comply with
clauses 7 and 8 of the contract in not
attending to his work and in not submitting
periodic reports of the work done as a basis
for the payment of the laborers wages. The
damages claimed totalled P183,800.
7) ANSWER (CHAN + HIS SURETIES): the
contractor stopped the construction because
Soledad F. Bengson refused to pay for ninety
percent of the work already accomplished;
that the construction actually started in
February, 1966 because of the changes
requested by Bengson; that the demolition
of the old building was effected from July to
December, 1965, and that the stipulation for
the construction of the first and second
stories within five months was novated by
the parties; further alleged that Soledad F.
Bengson had paid him P74,750 but refused
to pay on May 8, 1966 the additional sum of
P31,450 as the balance of ninety percent of
the work already accomplished worth
P118,000; that by reason of Bengsons
failure to pay the balance, Chan notified her
that he would stop the construction, and
that he actually stopped the construction on
May 30, 1966 when he was served with a
copy of the complaint
8) CHAN ALSO FILED A COUNTERCLAIM ALONG
WITH HIS ANSWER: balance due on the
contract; the value of the materials in the
construction yard; reimbursement of the
expenses for the demolition of the old
building; value of his construction
equipment under Bengsons control and
damages la
9) The defendants filed an amended answer
wherein they alleged as an additional
affirmative defense that the complaint
states no cause of action because Soledad F.
Bengson did not first submit the controversy
for arbitration as required in the aforequoted
paragraph 15 of the construction contract
10) Trial court in its order of November 24, 1966
sustained that new defense and dismissed
the complaint
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED (1) IN
ALLOWING THE DEFENDANTS TO PLEAD A NEW
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE IN THEIR AMENDED
ANSWER AND (2) IN HOLDING THAT THE CAUSE
OF ACTION IN PLAINTIFFS COMPLAINT ARE
EMBRACED IN THE REQUIREMENT FOR
ARBITRATION AS A CONDITION PRECEDENT TO
A COURT ACTION.
1) There is no merit in appellant Bengsons
contention that the defendants waived the
defense of lack of cause of action. It is true
that the defendants did not interpose as a
defense in their original answer Bengsons
failure to resort to arbitration before going
to court or the defense that her complaint
does not state a cause of action. The
 omission did not constitute a waiver of that
defense because section 2, Rule 9 of the
Rules of Court explicitly provides that
"defenses and objections not pleaded either
in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are
deemed waived; except the failure to state a
cause of action which may be alleged in a
later pleading, if one is permitted."
2) Appellant Bengsons other contention that
her causes of action do not involve disputes
relative to the construction of the building
and, consequently, should not be submitted
for arbitration, is not well-taken [She points
out that the contract for the construction of
the building and the construction of the
building are different concepts, just as the
Constitution and the formation of the
government under the Constitution are
different concepts; that a dispute relating to
the construction contract is not necessarily
a dispute relative to the construction of the
building; that the parties did not have any
dispute prior to the filing of the complaint,
and that it was only after the filing of the
case that a dispute arose between them.]
a) The trial court sensibly said that "all the
causes of action alleged in the plaintiffs
amended complaint are based upon the
supposed violations committed by the
defendants of the Contract for the
Construction of a Building" and that "the
provisions of paragraph 15 hereof leave
very little room for doubt that the said
causes of action are embraced within the
phrase any and all questions, disputes
or differences between the parties
hereto relative to the construction of the
building, which must be determined by
arbitration of two persons and such
determination by the arbitrators shall be
final, conclusive and binding upon both
parties unless they go to court, in which
case the determination by arbitration is
a condition precedent for taking any
court action."cralaw virtua1aw library
b) The terms of paragraph 15 clearly
express the intention of the parties that
all disputes between them should first be
arbitrated before court action can be
taken by the aggrieved party
c) Bengsons interpretation of paragraph 15
as being limited to controversies with
respect "to the joining together of
stones, steel, wood and other material to
put up a building" has a sophistical
flavor. Her superfine distinction between
the contract for the construction of the
building and the construction of the
building is specious but not convincing.
d) However, although the causes of
action in Bengsons complaint are
covered by paragraph 15, her
failure to resort to arbitration does
not warrant the dismissal of her
complaint
e) Within the meaning of section 6, the
failure of Soledad F. Bengson to resort to
arbitration may be regarded as a refusal
to comply with the stipulation for
arbitration. And defendants interposition
of the defense that arbitration is a
condition precedent to the institution of
a court action may be interpreted as a
petition for an order that arbitration
should proceed as contemplated in
section 15
f) Therefore, instead of dismissing the
case, the proceedings therein should be
suspended and the parties should be
directed to go through the motions of
arbitration at least within a sixty-day
period. With the consent of the parties,
the trial court may appoint a third
arbitrator to prevent a deadlock between
the two arbitrators. In the event that the
disputes between the parties could not
be settled definitively by arbitration,
then the hearing of the instant case
should be resumed.
MOTION FOR BILL OF PARTICULARS
BANTILLO V. IAC
Facts:
Case Background
1 Rosita Zafra Bantillo was alleged to be
the surviving heir of the deceased
spouses Candido Zafra and Maria
Pimentel Zafra. She has been in the
possession of Lot No. 63 since 1950 or
ever since the death of the spouses. She
also represents the Zafra spouses as a
surviving heir.
2 Elsa Maniquis-Sumcad, by virtue of an
Original Certificate issued in her name,
claims ownership. She sought to remove
Bantillo from possession.
Procedural Facts:
CFI:
Banti Sum
llo cad
(Plai (Def
ntiff) end
ant)
 rig
C M ht
O O or
M TI au
PL O th
AI N ori
N F ty
T O sh
F R e
O BI re
R LL pr
RE O es
C F en
O P ts
N A th
VE RT e
YA IC so
N U -
CE L ca
(p A lle
le R d
ad S h
in Dire eir
g) ct s
Ba of
All nti th
llo e
1 to: sp
un 1 sp ou
ec se
2 ify s;
as w th
ha e
3 t pa
ha ki pe
nd rs
of sh
su o
rvi wi
vi ng
ng thi
he s
ir au
sh th
e ori
is ty;
2 sp id
ec en
ify tif
w y
ha th
t es
 e tio
he ne
irs d
an in
d th
th e
e m
na oti
tu on
re we
of re
th no
eir t
he es
irs se
hi nti
p. al/
ne
ed
Q ed
ue to
sti en
on ab
ed le
th Su
e m
pr ca
op d
ri to
et fil
ar e
y an
of an
M sw
ot er
io No
n ta
fo pr
r op
Bil er
l su
of bj
Pa ec
rti t
cu for
la Bil
rs l
Ma of
tte Pa
rs rti
m cul
en ar
 s. pleadi
ng
BUT, Sumcad
in the must:
end, File
Bantil respo
lo nsive
agree pleadi
d to ng
specif within
y the 15
name days
s of from
the receip
heirs t of
she amen
repre ded
sents pleadi
and ng
submi
t the OPP MOT
Speci OSITI ION
al ON TO
Power to DIS
of the MIS
Attorn MOTI S
ey ON (Se
execu TO pte
ted DISM mbe
by ISS r 3,
the Ame 198
heirs nded 2)
in her com
favou plain B
r. t is
attac
MOTION hed N
GRANTED
(July 5, Th
1982)
N
Court Order:
Bantillo REJOI REJ
must: NDE OIN
Specif R to DER
y the the w/
names OPP MOT
Submi OSITI ION
t SPA ON TO
Furnis to STR
h an the IKE
amen MOTI OUT
ded ON /DIS
TO MIS thi
DISM S n
ISS PLAI 10
NTI da
It FFS ys
PLE (S
ADI ec
NGS .
Bant 1(
ill c),
o Ru
s le
de 12
la ,
ye R
d O
for C)
m MOTION
or GRANTED
e Dismiss
th complaint
an Strike out
1 amended
ye complaint
ar
CA:
w DISMISSED
he Guilty of unreasonable delay in
n complying with the July 5, 1982
R order. Rule 12, Section 1 (c)
requires 10 days. Bantillo
O submitted on June 22, 1983.
C Amended complaint should be
re filed within a seasonable time
qu and in a manner consistent with
the Order.
ire
The alleged vacancy (judge)
s lasted only for over 2 months
a (January-March)
re
Issues:
sp
on 1 WON Sumcads Motion for Bill of Particulars
se is proper.
for 2 WON the period on Section 1, Rule 12 should
be applied when the Court Order states the
Bil submission of an amended complaint and
l not a bill of particulars.
of 3 WON Rule 10 should be applied.
Pa
Held and Ratio:
rti
cu 1 YES, Bantillos basis for representation
lar of the heirs can help Sumcad formulate
s a responsive pleading which is the
purpose of Bill of Particulars.
to
be
wi
 Section 1. Motion for bill of particulars.
Before responding to a pleading or, if no
responsive pleading is permitted by these
rules, within ten (10) days after service of
the pleading upon him, a party may move
for a more definite statement or for a
bill of part of any matter which is not
averred with sufficient definiteness or
particularity to enable him properly to
prepare his responsive pleading or to
prepare for trial. Such motion shall point
out the defects complained of and the
details desired.
Under this Rule, the remedy available to a
party who seeks clarification of any issue
or matter vaguely or obscurely pleaded by
the other party, is to file a motion, either
for "a more definite statement" or for a bill
of particulars. An order directing the
submission of such statement or bill,
further, is proper where it enables the
party movant intelligently to prepare
a responsive pleading, or adequately
to prepare for trial.
The title of the (original) Complaint stated
that Bantillo had then brought suit "for
herself and in representation of the Heirs
of Spouses Candido Zafra and Maria
Pimentel Zafra." In paragraphs 2 and 3 of
the Complaint, Bantillo alleged her
capacity personally to maintain the judicial
action for reconveyance, manifesting that
she is the "surviving heir" of the Zafra
spouses, the alleged original owners of the
land under litigation. The Court notes,
however, the absolute lack of
allegations in the Complaint
regarding the petitioner's capacity or
authority to bring suit in behalf of her
alleged co-heirs and co-plaintiffs. On
this matter, Section 4 of Rule 8 of the
Revised Rules of Court specifically
provides:
Section 4. Capacity.Facts
showing the capacity of a party to
sue or be sued or the authority of a
party to sue or be sued in a
representative capacity or the legal
existence of an organized
association of persons that is made
a party, must be averred. A party
desiring to raise an issue as to the
legal existence of any party or the
capacity of any party to sue or be
sued in a representative capacity,
shall do so by specific denial, which
shall include such supporting
particulars as are peculiarly within
the pleader's knowledge.
Bantillo having failed to allege a
factual matter which, under the
Rules, must be alleged or pleaded,
respondent Sumcad was not unjustified
in moving for clarification of such
matter. Knowledge of the identity or
identities of petitioner's alleged co-
heirs and co-plaintiffs and, more
importantly, of the basis of petitioner's
claimed authority to represent the
latter, would obviously be useful to
respondent in the preparation of a
responsive pleading, respondent
Sumcad should be given sufficient
opportunity intelligently to contest
these matters and possibly to raise the
same as issues in her Answer.
2 YES, the 10 days period should be
applied.
The trial court did not in its Order of 5 July
1982 expressly direct Bantillo to submit a
bill of particulars. What was in fact
required of was an amended complaint,
which would incorporate the
"amendments" mentioned in the first
paragraph of the Order. This singular
circumstance, however, does not
preclude application in this case of Rule
12, Section l(c) of which provides:
xxx xxx xxx
(c) Refusal.If an order of the court
to make a pleading more definite
and certain or for a bill of particulars
is not obeyed within ten (10) days
after notice of the order or within
such other time as the court may fix,
the court may order the striking out
of the pleading to which the motion
was directed or make such other
 order as it deems just. It may, upon
motion, set aside the order, or
modify it in the interest of justice.
Under the above provision, the court may
upon motion in appropriate cases direct
the adverse party (a) to file a bill of
particulars, or (b) to make the pleading
referred to in the motion more definite
and certain, either by amending or
supplementing the same. The trial court's
disputed Order of 5 July 1982 falls squarely
within the second category. As the Order
itself did not specify the period for
compliance with its terms, Bantillo
was bound to comply therewith within
ten (10) days from notice. (deadline =
July 15).
3 NO
Section 2, Rule 10 of the Revised Rules of
Courtwhich allows amendment of
pleadings once as a matter of course at any
time before a responsive pleading is served.
That provision does not apply in situations
where it is the court itself that orders a
party litigant to amend his or her pleading.
Where, as in the case at bar, the trial court
orders the amendment after a motion for a
bill of particulars has been filed by the
adverse party and heard by the court, the
applicable provision is Section 1 of Rule 12
of the Rules of Court: the amended
pleading must be filed within the time
fixed by the court, or absent such a
specification of time, within ten (10) days
from notice of the order.
Ruling:
(useless discussion on Bill of Particulars
and delay in filing etc. kasi pinayagan din
naman ma-admit yung amended
complaint. Hmp.)
o Court concludes that an unreasonable time
had already elapsed (11months delay) so
the amended complaint is filed out of time.
BUT, in the interest of substantial and
expeditious justice, the Amended Complaint
should not have been dismissed and ordered
stricken from the record.
o The amendment of the original
complaint consisted simply of
deletion of any reference to "other
heirs" of the Zafra spouses as co-
plaintiffs in the action for
reconveyance; Bantillo, in other
words, clarified that she alone was
plaintiff and heir and therefore was
no longer suing also in a
representative capacity.
o In the second place, this amendment
imposed no substantial prejudice
upon Sumcad and was thus formal in
character. As a matter of fact,
Sumcad had not yet filed any
responsive pleading at all and had
not disclosed the nature and basis of
her own claim of ownership of Lot No.
63. The issues had not yet been
joined.
o Thirdly, the Amended Complaint was
already before the trial court and it
could have and should have
proceeded with the case.
o Alternatively, if it be assumed that the
Amended Complaint was properly dismissed,
such dismissal should not, for the same
reasons of substantial and expeditious
justice, be deemed as having the effect of
an adjudication upon the merits and hence
should be regarded as without prejudice to
Bantillos right to re-file her complaint in its
amended form. Under this alternative
hypothesis, to require petitioner to re-file
her complaint in a new action, would appear
little more than compelling her to go
through an idle ceremony. Public policy
favors the disposition of claims brought to
court on their merits, rather than on any
other basis.
LOWER COURT REVERSED. RTC is
DIRECTED to ADMIT the AMENDED
COMPLAINT.
Bantillo vs. IAC, Sumcad
Bill of particulars
FACTS
A complaint for reconveyance was filed by
petitioner Rosita Bantillo against Elsa Sumcad
with the CFI. Petitioner alleged that she is the
surviving heir of the deceased spouses Zafra;
that the spouses had occupied and leased the
property in dispute under a claim of ownership
since 1950.; that petitioner, as surviving heir
and in representation of the heirs of Zafra
spouses, had been in open and continuous
possession and occupation of the lot ever since
death of the spouses; that by virtue of a title
issued in the name of respondent, respondent
had ejected demands to reconvey the land to
petitioner.
Sumcad filed a Motion for Bill of Particulars.
Sumcad requested that Bantillo be directed by
court to:
a To specify what kind of surviving heir she
is;
b To specify by what right or authority she
represents the so-called heirs of
spouses;
c To show papers under which she is
authorized to represent them in court;
and
d To specify these other heirs by name and
nature of their heirship
Petitioner questioned the propriety of
respondents motion alleging that matters
mentioned were not essential to enable
respondent to file an answer to the complaint,
that such matters are not proper subjects of a
motion for bill of particulars.
Subsequently, petitioners counsel manifested
in open court that she was willing to specify the
names of the heirs allegedly being represented
by plaintiff as well as to submit the SPA
executed by said heirs. Hence, the court a quo
issues an Order requiring the submission of the
same and the defendant is given 15 days from
receipt of amended complaint within which to
file the defendants responsive pleading.
Respondent filed a motion to dismiss pointing
out that plaintiff had not yet submitted her
amended complaint as directed by the court.
Petitioner filed an Opposition to the Motion to
Dismiss attached to was the amended
complaint. It contended that the delay was due
to the fact that the court had for quite a time no
presiding judge, so that even said pleading be
filed, it still could not be acted upon.
Defendant interposed a Rejoinder with Motion to
Strike Out/Dismiss Plaintiffs Pleading, pointing
out that plaintiffs compliance with the Order
was made more than one year from the
issuance of Order. Invoking Sec. 1(c), Rule 12
which grants a party only 10 days within which
to respondent to a bill of particulars.
Plaintiff then filed a Rejoinder to the Opposition
to the Motion to Dismiss, arguing that the late
compliance to the Order was excusable under
Sec. 1, Rule 10 which allows amendment of
pleading without regard for mere technicalities.
CFI then dismissed the complaint and striked
out the amended complaint. Both trial and
appellate courts held that the dismissal was
warranted as she had been guilty of an
unreasonable delay in complying with the
Order citing Sec. 1(c), Rule 12 under which
petitioner had 10 days from notice of trial
courts Order to comply; that the amended
complaint should have been filed, at the very
least, within a seasonable time.; that the
alleged vacancy only lasted for 2 months.
Hence, this petition. Petitioner contests the
application of Sec. 1, Rule 12; that matters
mentioned in Sumcads disputed motion are
not within the scope and ambit of a bill of
particulars.; that there was really no bill of
particulars required of petitioner by the trial
court; that Rule 10 is the applicable rule.
ISSUE
Whether the amended complaint should be
admitted
HELD
Yes.
Under Rule 10, the remedy available to a party
who seeks clarification of any issue or matter
vaguely or obscurely pleaded by the other
party, is to file a motion, either for a more
definite statement or for a bill of particulars.
An order directing the submission of such
statement or bill, further, is proper where it
enables the party movant intelligently to
prepare a responsive pleading, or adequately to
prepare for trial.
The Court notes the absolute lack of allegations
in the complaint regarding the petitioners
capacity or authority to bring suit in behalf of
her alleged co-heirs and co-plaintiffs as required
by Sec. 4, Rule 18 (that capacity to sue or be
sued in a representative capacity must be
averred).
Hence, respondent is justified in moving for
clarification of such matter. Knowledge of the
identity of petitioners alleged co-heirs and co-
plaintiffs would obviously be useful to
respondent in the preparation of a responsive
pleading; respondent should be given sufficient
opportunity intelligently to contest the matters
and possibly raise the same as issues in her
Answer.
Order is to file an amended complaint, not
bill of particulars
The trial courts Order did not direct petitioner
to submit a bill of particulars. What was
required was an amended complaint, which
would incorporate the amendments.
However, this circumstance does not preclude
the application in Sec. 1(c), Rule 12. Under the
above provision, the court may upon motion in
appropriate cases direct the adverse party (a)
to file a bill of particulars, or (b) to make the
pleading referred to in the motion more definite
and certain, either by amending or
supplementing the same.
The trial courts Order falls squarely within the
second category. As the Order itself did not
specify the period for compliance with its terms,
petitioner Bantillo was bound to comply
therewith within ten (10) days from notice
thereof.
Petitioners reliance on Sec. 2, Rule 10 is
misplaced
The provision does not apply in situations where
it is the court itself that orders a party litigant to
amend his or her pleading. Where, as in the
case at bar, the trial court orders the
amendment after a motion for a bill of
particulars has been filed by the adverse party
and heard by the court, the applicable provision
is Section 1 of Rule 12.
The amended complaint should not have
been dismissed and ordered stricken
based on public policy
Petitioner filed its amended complaint eleven
(11) months after the required 10-day period
had expired. The amendment consisted simply
of deletion of any reference to other heirs and
that such amendment imposed no substantial
prejudice upon respondent and was thus formal
in character.
Alternatively, if it be assumed that the
Amended Complaint was properly dismissed,
such dismissal should not for the same reasons
of substantial and expeditious justice, be
deemed as having the effect of an adjudication
upon the merits and hence should be regarded
as without prejudice to petitioners right to refile
her complaint in its amended form.
Under this alternative hypothesis, to require
petitioner to refile her complaint in a new
action, would appear little more than compelling
her to go through an idle ceremony. Under
either view, therefore, the trial court should
have admitted the Amended Complaint instead
of striking it off the record. Public policy favors
the disposition of claims brought to court on
their merits, rather than on any other basis. The
trial courts discretion should have been
exercised conformably with that public policy.
CA decision is reversed. RTC is directed to admit
petitioners amended complaint and resume
proceedings.
VIRATA V. SANDIGANBAYAN
J. DAVIDE, JR.
FACTS:
1) P is among the forty-four (44) co-defendants
of Benjamin (Kokoy) Romualdez in a
complaint filed by the Republic of the
Philippines with the respondent
Sandiganbayan on 31 July 1987
2) The complaint was amended thrice, the last
amendment thereto is denominated as the
Second Amended Complaint, as expanded
per the Court-Approved
Manifestation/Motion dated 8 December
1987.
3) P moved to dismiss the case anchored on
several grounds, including the failure of the
expanded Second Amended Complaint to
state a cause of action denied
4) He then came to this Court via a special civil
action for certiorari imputing upon the
respondent Sandiganbayan the commission
of grave abuse of discretion in, inter alia,
finding that the complaint sufficiently states
a cause of action against him
5) SC SUSTAINED THE SB RULING
6) Petitioner was thus compelled to go back to
the Sandiganbayan. However, insisting that
he "could not prepare an intelligent and
adequate pleading in view of the general
and sweeping allegations against him in the
Second Amended Complaint as expanded,"
while at the same time remaining "steadfast
in his position maintaining his posture of
innocence," petitioner filed on 30 January
1992 a Motion For a Bill of Particulars. 9 He
alleges therein that on the basis of the
general and sweeping allegations in the
Second Amended Complaint
7) Petitioner claims, however, that insofar as
he is concerned, the allegations . . . and the
purported illegal acts imputed to them as
well as the alleged causes of actions are
vague and ambiguous. They are not averred
with sufficient definiteness or particularity
as would enable defendant Virata to
properly prepare his answer or responsive
pleading."
8) He therefore prays that "in accordance with
Rule 12 of the Rules of Court, plaintiff be
directed to submit a more definite
statement or a bill of particulars on the
matters mentioned above which are not
averred with sufficient definiteness or
particularity."
9) SB GRANTED THE MOTION FOR A BILL OF
PARTICULARS, HOWEVER, of the four (4)
actionable wrongs enumerated in the Motion
for a Bill of Particulars, the Sandiganbayan
favorably acted only with respect to the
fourth
10) Not satisfied with the partial grant of the
motion, petitioner filed the instant petition
under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court
contending that the Sandiganbayan acted
with grave abuse of its discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction in not totally
granting his Motion for a Bill of Particulars
PETITION GRANTED.
1) The Sandiganbayans favorable application
of Tantuico v. Republic of the Philippines 22
with respect to the fourth "actionable
 wrong," or more particularly to paragraphs
17 and 13 of the expanded Second
Amended Complaint in Civil Case No. 0035,
and its refusal to apply the same to the first
three (3) "actionable wrongs" simply
because it is "not prepared to rule that the
said case (Tantuico) applies squarely to the
case at bar to warrant an absolute ruling in
defendant-movants favor," is quite
contrived; the ratiocination: offered in
support of the rejection defeats the very
purpose of a bill of particulars.
2) IN THE CASE OF TANTUICO, This Court
eventually overruled the Sandiganbayan and
forthwith directed the respondents therein
to prepare and file a Bill of Particulars
embodying the facts prayed for by Tantuico;
this was based on Our finding that the
questioned allegations in the complaint
pertaining to Tantuico "are deficient because
the averments therein are mere conclusions
of law or presumptions, unsupported by
factual premises."
3) As in the earlier case of Virata v.
Sandiganbayan, We have carefully,
scrutinized the paragraphs of the expanded
Second Amended Complaint subject of the
petitioners motion for a bill of particulars
and find the same to be couched in general
terms and wanting in definiteness or
particularity. It is precisely for this reason
that We indirectly suggested in the said
decision that the petitioners remedy is to
file a motion for a bill of particulars and not
a motion to dismiss.
4) Thus, the basis of the distinction made by
the respondent Sandiganbayan between the
allegations in support of the first three (3)
"actionable wrongs" and those in support of
the fourth is as imperceptible as it is
insignificant in the light of its admission that
the ruling in Tantuico possesses "a
semblance of relevance to the factual
setting of the instant incident." As We see it,
there exists not only a semblance but a
striking similarity in the crafting of the
allegations between the causes of action
against Tantuico and those against the
petitioner. And, as already stated, such
allegations are general and suffer from a
lack of definiteness and particularity. As a
matter of fact, paragraphs 2, 7, 9 and 17
four of the five paragraphs of the complaint
in Civil Case No. 0035 which was resolved in
Tantuico are likewise involved in the
instant case. Tantuicos applicability to the
instant case is thus ineluctable and the
propriety of the motion for a bill of
particulars under Section 1, Rule 12 of the
Revised Rules of Court is beyond dispute
5) It is the office or function, as well as the
object or purpose, of a bill of particulars to
amplify or limit a pleading, specify more
minutely and particularly a claim or defense
set up and pleaded in general terms, give
information, not contained in the pleading,
to the opposite party and the court as to the
precise nature, character, scope, and extent
of the cause of action or defense relied on
by the pleader, and apprise the opposite
party of the case which he has to meet, to
the end that the proof at the trial may be
limited to the matters specified, and in order
that surprise at, and needless preparation
for, the trial may be avoided, and that the
opposite party may be aided in framing his
answering pleading and preparing for trial. It
has also been stated that it is the function or
purpose of a bill of particulars to define,
clarify, particularize, and limit or
circumscribe the issues in the case, to
expedite the trial, and assist the court. A
general function or purpose of a bill of
particulars is to prevent injustice or do
justice in the case when that cannot be
accomplished without the aid of such a bill.
6) It is not the office of a bill of particulars to
supply material allegations necessary to the
validity of a pleading, or to change a cause
of action or defense stated in the pleading,
or to state a cause of action or defense
other than the one stated. Also it is not the
office or function, or a proper object, of a bill
of particulars to set forth the pleaders
theory of his cause of action or a rule of
evidence on which he intends to rely, or to
furnish evidential information whether such
information consists of evidence which the
pleader proposes to introduce or of facts
which constitute a defense or offset for the
other party or which will enable the opposite
party to establish an affirmative defense not
yet pleaded."
7) The phrase "to enable him properly to
prepare his responsive pleading . . ." in
Section 1 of Rule 12 implies not just the
opportunity to properly prepare a responsive
pleading but also, and more importantly, to
prepare an intelligent answer
8) The latter task assumes added significance
because defenses not pleaded (save those
excepted in Section 2, Rule 9 of the Revised
Rules of Court and, whenever appropriate,
the defense of prescription) in a motion to
dismiss or in the answer are deemed
waived. It was, therefore, grave error for the
Sandiganbayan to state that" [a]lleging the
specific nature, character, time and extent
of the phrase active collaboration would be
a mere surplus age and would not serve any
useful purpose"for precisely, without any
amplification or particularization thereof, the
petitioner would be hard put in meeting the
charges squarely and in pleading
appropriate defences
9) Nor can We accept the public respondents
postulation that "any question as to the
validity or legality of the transactions
involved in the charges against defendant-
movant is irrelevant and immaterial in the
resolution of the instant incident, inasmuch
as the same is a matter of defense which
 shall have its proper place during the trial on
the merits, and on the determination of the
liability of defendant-movant after the trial
proper." ABSURD
10) MOREOVER, The above disquisitions
indubitably reveal that the matters sought
to be averred with particularity are not
evidentiary in nature. Since the issues have
not as yet been joined and no evidence has
so far been adduced by the parties the
Sandiganbayan was in no position to
conclude that the matters which the.
petitioner seeks are "within his intimate or
personal knowledge."
MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE
PLEADINGS
MONGAO V PRYCE PROPERTIES
Petition for certiorari under Rule 45 assailing CA
Decision reversing RTC Judgment and Resolution
denying petitioners MR
FACTS:
Complaint
- A complaint for rescission and damages
by Sps. Mongao (petitioner: Pesane
Mongao only) against Pryce Properties
(respondent) before RTC General Santos
alleging that both parties executed a
MOA wherein Sps. Mongao agreed to sell
to Pryce a parcel of land in S. Cotabato
for P5M (registered in the name of
petitioner).
- Pryce paid P550,000 as earnest money.
After considerable delay, it offered to
pay balance by check to Mongao and her
mother, which was rejected.
- The complaint further alleged that after
considerable delay, respondent
corporation offered to pay the balance of
the purchase price by issuing a check
payable to petitioner Mongao and her
mother, Nellie Animas, which the former
rejected
- Pryce refused to pay balance solely to
Mongao.
- Mongao did not execute a Deed of
Absolute Sale (DAS)
- Also asked for the award of moral and
exemplary damages
Answer
- R refuted Ps claims
- Pedro Animas IV approached Mole, a
Pryce officer, and negotiated the sale of
properties belonging to the Animas
family, which were to be foreclosed by a
bank
- Subject property was one of the two
parcels it purchased, allegedly belonging
to Mongaos parents but was registered
in Mongaos name as trustee
- Pryce did not pay earnest money directly
to Mongao but to Development Bank of
the Philippines, to redeem certain
properties of the Animas family
- Both Mongao and Pedro Animas,
registered owner of subject properties,
executed DOS and MOA after delivery of
checks to the bank
- However, Mongao demanded that
payment be made to her alone excluding
the Animas family
- Pryce issued P3.3M check to Mongao and
her mother but was refused by Mongao
- Pryce therefore was constrained to
deposit the payment with Clerk of Court
of RTC Davao City
- By way of a compulsory counterclaim,
Pryce prayed that petitioner be adjudged
liable for attorneys fees for their hasty
and unjustified institution of the case
Petitioner
- Moved for judgment on the pleadings on
the ground that the Answer admitted the
material allegations of the complaint-
Pryce admitting the existence of COS
and its refusal to satisfy the unpaid
balance of the purchase price despite
demand, and thus failed to tender an
issue
- Petitioners contended that respondent
corporation cannot avoid rescission by
raising the defense that it contracted
with the Animas family and not solely
with petitioner Mongao. Petitioners
belied respondent corporations claim for
consignation by attaching a letter from
the Office of the Clerk of Court of the RTC
of Davao City to the effect that the court
could not act on petitioners motion to
deny consignation because the deposit
was transmitted through a mere letter,
hence, the case was not raffled to a
particular branch of the court
Respondent
- Opposed Motion for judgment on the
pleadings arguing that material
allegations, that Mongao did not execute
DOS and that Mongao was owner of the
subject property, were disputed in the
answer
RTC Decision
- Granted Motion for judgment on the
pleadings
- Rescinded DAS
- Pryce directed to execute Deed of
reconveyance
CA Decision
- Reversed RTC
- Judgment on the pleadings not proper as
there were actual issues raised in the
answer requiring presentation and
assessment of evidence
 - The genuineness of DOS and nature of
Mongaos title to the subject of property
were also put in issue
ISSUE: WON judgment on the pleadings is
proper in this case
HELD: NO, IT IS NOT PROPER IN THIS CASE.
PETITION GRANTED.
- Judgment on the pleadings is governed
by Section 1, Rule 34 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure, essentially a
restatement of Section 1, Rule 19 of the
1964 Rules of Court then applicable to
the proceedings before the trial court
- Sec. 1, Rule 19: Where an answer fails to
tender an issue, or otherwise admits the
material allegations of the adverse
partys pleading, the court may, on
motion of that party, direct judgment on
such pleading.
- Answer fails to tender an issue when:
o It does not comply with the
requirements for a specific denial
o It would admit material
allegations of the adverse partys
pleadings not only where it
expressly confesses the
truthfulness thereof but also if it
omits to deal with them at all
- Now, if an answer does in fact
specifically deny the material averments
of the complaint in the manner indicated
by said Section 10 of Rule 8, and/or
asserts affirmative defenses (allegations
of new matter which, while admitting the
material allegations of the complaint
expressly or impliedly, would
nevertheless prevent or bar recovery by
the plaintiff) in accordance with Sections
4-6, a judgment on the pleadings would
naturally not be proper
- Thus, there is joinder of issues when the
answer makes a specific denial of the
material allegations in the complaint or
asserts affirmative defenses which would
bar recovery by the plaintiff. Where
there is proper joinder of issues, the trial
court is barred from rendering judgment
based only on the pleadings filed by the
parties and must conduct proceedings
for the reception of evidence. On the
other hand, an answer fails to tender an
issue where the allegations admit the
allegations in support of the plaintiffs
cause of action or fail to address them at
all. In either case, there is no genuine
issue and judgment on the pleadings is
proper
- Petitioners action for rescission is mainly
based on the alleged breach by
respondent corporation of its contractual
obligation under the Memorandum of
Agreement when respondent refused to
effect payment of the purchase price
solely to petitioner Mongao
- Nothing from the allegations in Pryce;s
answer makes out a proper joinder of
issues (where the answer makes a
specific denial of the material allegations
or asserts affirmative defenses which
would bar recovery from by the plaintiff)
o Allegations in answer do not
make out a specific denial that a
COS was perfected between the
parties
o Does not contest the due
execution and/or genuineness of
MOA
The answer was an implied admission by Pryce
that it effected payment contrary to the express
terms of the COS thereby admitting its breach
of contractual obligation and supports
petitioners cause of action for rescission
As earlier stated, an answer may allege
affirmative defenses which may strike down the
plaintiffs cause of action. An affirmative
defense is one which is not a denial of an
essential ingredient in the plaintiffs cause of
action, but one which, if established, will be a
good defensei.e. an "avoidance" of the claim
Affirmative defenses include fraud, statute of
limitations, release payment, illegality, statute
of frauds, estoppel, former recovery, discharge
in bankruptcy, and any other matter by way of
confession and avoidance. When the answer
asserts affirmative defenses, there is proper
joinder of issues which must be ventilated in a
full-blown trial on the merits and cannot be
resolved by a mere judgment on the pleadings.
Allegations presented in the answer as
affirmative defenses are not automatically
characterized as such. Before an allegation
qualifies as an affirmative defense, it must be of
such nature as to bar the plaintiff from claiming
on his cause of action
In essence, respondent corporation justifies its
refusal to tender payment of the purchase price
solely to petitioner Mongao by alleging that the
latter was a mere trustee and not the beneficial
owner of the property subject of the sale and
therefore not the proper party to receive
payment. Such defense cannot prevent
petitioners from seeking the rescission of the
contract of sale. The express terms of the
Memorandum of Agreement, the genuineness
and due execution of which are not denied,
clearly show that the contract of sale was
executed only between petitioner Mongao and
respondent corporation. Where there is an
apparent repudiation of the trust by petitioner
Mongao, such claim or defense may properly be
raised only by the parties for whose benefit the
trust was created. Respondent corporation
cannot assert said defense in order to resist
petitioners claim for rescission where it has
been sufficiently shown by the allegations of the
complaint and answer that respondent
corporation has breached its contractual
obligation to petitioners. There being no
material allegation in the answer to resist
petitioners claim, the trial court correctly
rendered judgment based on the pleadings
submitted by the parties.
The Court finds that the determination of these
factual questions is immaterial to the resolution
of the main issue of whether or not there is a
valid cause for rescission in light of
respondents implied admissions of certain
allegations and the weakness of the affirmative
defenses in the answer. At the risk of being
repetitious, respondent corporations answer
admitted that there was a perfected contract of
sale between respondent and petitioner Mongao
and that respondent corporation refused to
tender payment of the purchase price solely to
petitioner Mongao. These admissions clearly
make out a case for rescission of contract
PETITION FOR REVIEW GRANTED
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
ESTRADA V. CONDOLACION
Second Division, Antonio (J): 2 concur, 1 on
leave, 1 designated to sit in the second division
FACTS: On 1 January 1975, Gregorio Estradas
wife, Simeona Estrada, was a passenger of the
AC Jeep (ZE501), owned and operated by
Corazon Ramirez Uy and driven by Lucio
Galaura, while said jeep was cruising along
Claro M. Recto Avenue, heading towards the
direction of the Jones Circle, Davao City the
driver (Galaura) without regard for the safety
of Estradas wife who was among his
passengers and without taking the necessary
precaution in accordance with the situation,
bumped a Ford pick-up truck; as a consequence
of the incident Estradas wife sustained a
fractured left humerus (pulmonary) embolism
and shock due to respiratory failure; she was
brought to the San Pedro Hospital where she
died.
On 14 February 1975, Gregorio Estrada filed a
complaint for damages against Uy and Galaura
for breach of their obligations as a common
carrier, in view of the death of his wife while she
was a passenger of the vehicle.
Defendants, in their answer, while admitting
that Estradas wife was a passenger and that
she died as a result of the accident, alleged that
the proximate and only cause of the accident
was the negligence of third persons (the drivers,
Danilo Ang and Rodolfo D. Endino, of a Toyota
pick-up truck [TRU 221], and a Ford pick-up
truck [TRU 420]). Defendants likewise set up a
counterclaim for damages by reason of
Estradas institution of the clearly unfounded
suit against them.
On 16 April 1975, defendants filed a motion for
summary judgment against Estrada on the
ground that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact in the case except as to the
amount of damages defendants are seeking
from Estrada by way of counterclaim. On 20
May 1975, the CFI of Davao (Civil Case 8739)
decreed that defendants have judgment
summarily against the Estrada for such amount
as may be found due them for damages. A
motion for reconsideration of the order was
denied 9 June 1975 for lack of merit. Estrada
filed a petition for certiorari with prohibition
before the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for
certiorari with prohibition, without special
pronouncement as to costs.
SUPREME COURT
1) Annexes to answer in support of
motion for summary judgment. In
support of the defendants motion for
summary judgment, certain annexes to the
answer were incorporated therein, i.e. (a)
The sketch of the accident made by Traffic
Investigator J.S. Formeloza of the Davao City
Police Department, marked as Annex 3 of
the defendants answer. (b) Said
investigators affidavit detailing his findings
upon investigation stating that the pick-up
with plate No. T-RU-420 upon reaching the
intersection of Recto and Bonifacio Streets
collided with the pick-up with plate No. T-RU-
221, and that upon impact, the latter pick-
up collided with the jeep driven by Lucio
Galaura that was coming from the opposite
direction; (c) The respective sworn
statements of the drivers of the two pick-ups
(Danilo Ang and Rodolfo Endino) taken by
the Traffic Division of the Davao City Police
Department after the accident, marked as
Annexes 5 and of the defendants answer
wherein each driver respectively claimed
that he exercised due care but attributed to
the other negligence as the cause of the
collision; and (d) The sworn statement of
defendant driver (Lucio Galaura) of said A.
C. Jeep, likewise taken by the Traffic Division
of the Davao City Police Department
detailing what he did in order to prevent or
minimize damages to his vehicle and his
passengers, marked as Annex 7 of
defendants answer. By means of the
annexes, Uy and Galaura sought to prove
that they were relieved of any liability to
petitioner inasmuch as the accident which
caused the death of petitioners wife
resulted from the negligence of third
persons over whom defendants had no
supervision or control, namely, the drivers of
the two pick-up trucks which collided at the
intersection of C. M. Recto Ave. and
Bonifacio St., Davao City, as a result of
which collision, one of them was deviated
from course to the lane where defendants
 A.C.-Jeep was then travelling, where it also
collided with the latter.
2) Section 2, Rule 34 of the Revised Rules.
Pursuant to Section 2, Rule 34, of the
Revised Rules, A party against whom a
claim, counterclaim, or crossclaim is
asserted or a declaratory relief is sought
may, at any time, move with supporting
affidavits for a summary judgment in his
favor as to all or any part thereof. The
defendant who believes that he is untitled to
a judgment either on the pleadings or on the
basis of extrinsic facts established by
affidavits or depositions may move for
summary judgment in his favor. In other
words, when the moving party is a
defending party, his pleadings, depositions
or affidavits must show that his defenses or
denials arc sufficient to defeat the
claimants claim.
3) Summary judgment; Procedure. The
affidavit submitted by the party moving for
summary judgment shall be by persons
having personal knowledge of the facts; it
shall recite all material facts and show that
there is no defense to the cause of actions
or that the cause of action has no merits.
This motion shall be served on the adverse
party at least 10 days prior to the time
specified in the hearing. The adverse party
may also, prior to said date, serve opposing
affidavits The opposing papers, including
pleadings, depositions, and affidavits must
establish a genuine issue of fact in order to
defeat a motion for summary judgment.
After hearing, the motion for summary
judgment shall be granted if, on the basis of
all the papers and proofs submitted, the
cause of action or defense shall be
established sufficiently to warrant the court
as a matter of law in directing judgment in
favor of any party. The motion shall be
denied if any party shall show facts
sufficient to require a trial of any issue of
fact other than an issue as to the amount or
extent of the damages.
4) Summary judgment; Purpose. This
Summary Judgment or Accelerated
Judgment is a device for weeding out sham
claims or defenses at an early stage of the
litigation, thereby avoiding the expense and
loss of time involved in a trial. The very
object is to separate what is formal or
pretended in denial or averment from what
is genuine and substantial, so that only the
latter may subject a suitor to the burden of a
trial.
5) Motion for summary judgment deals on
whether there are triable issues of
facts; Test. In conducting the hearing, the
purpose of the judge is not to try the issue,
but merely to determine whether there is a
meritorious issue to be tried. Where a
motion is made for summary judgment, such
motion is not directed to the pleadings and
deals only with the question of whether
there are triable issues of facts and where
such issues exist summary judgment must
be denied. Summary judgment should not
be granted where is fairly appears that there
is a triable issue to be tried. The Court
should not pass, on questions of credibility
or weight of evidence, and that the
summary judgment procedure should not
be perverted to the trial of disputed
questions of fact upon affidavits. The test,
therefore, of a motion for summary
judgment is whether the pleadings,
affidavits and exhibits in support of the
motions are sufficient to overcome the
opposing papers and to justify a finding as a
matter of law that there is no defense to the
action or the claim is clearly meritorious.
6) Proceedings for summary judgment;
Burden of proof. In proceedings for
summary judgment, the burden of proof is
upon the plaintiff to prove the cause of
action and to show that the defense is
interposed solely for the purpose of delay.
After plaintiffs burden has been discharged,
defendant has the burden to show facts
sufficient to entitle him to defend.
7) Duty of carrier under the contract of
carriage; Presumption of negligence;
Diligence required. Under the contract of
carriage, Uy and Galaura assumed the
express obligation to transport Estradas
wife to her destination safely and to observe
extra ordinary diligence with due regard for
all the circumstances, and that any injury
suffered by her in the course thereof, is
immediately attributable to the negligence
of the carrier. To overcome such
presumption, it must be shown that the
carrier had observed the required
extraordinary diligence, which means that
the carrier must show the utmost diligence
of very cautious persons as far as human
care and foresight can provide, or that the
accident was caused by a fortuitous event.
8) What constitutes caso fortuito. In order
to constitute a case fortuito that would
exempt a person from responsibility, it is
necessary that (1) the event must be
independent of the human will; (2) the
occurrence must render it impossible for the
obligor to fulfill his obligation m a normal
manner; and (3) the obligor must be free of
a concurrent or contributory fault or
negligence.
9) Purpose of submission of the affidavit;
Affidavit prima facie proof, said proof
was unrebutted. It was precisely because
of the legal presumption that once a
passenger in the course of travel is injured
or does not reach his destination safely, the
carrier and the driver are presumed to be at
fault, that Uy and Galaura submitted
affidavits to prove that the accident which
resulted in the death of Estradas wife was
due to the fault or negligence of the drivers
of the two pickup trucks over whom the
 carrier had no supervision or control.
Having, therefore, shown prima facie that
the accident was due to a caso fortuito and
that the driver was free of concurrent or
contributory fault or negligence, it was
incumbent upon Estrada to rebut such proof.
Having failed to do so, the defense of the
carrier that the proximate cause of the
accident was a caso fortuito remains
unrebutted.
10) Questions of facts not yet resolved.
Whether a carrier used such reasonable
precautions to avoid the accident as would
ordinarily be used by careful, prudent
persons under like circumstances is a
question essentially one of fact and,
therefore, ordinarily such issue must be
decided at the trial. But where, as herein,
Estrada has not submitted opposing
affidavits to controvert Uys and Galauras
evidence that the driver of the passenger
jeepney was free of contributory fault as he
stopped the jeepney to avoid the accident,
but in spite of such precaution the accident
occurred, the Judge did not, therefore, act
arbitrarily in declaring in his Order that
there is no genuine issue to any material
fact and no controversial question of fact to
be submitted to the trial court.
11) Order merely an interlocutory order.
This was, however, a mere interlocutory
order directing that a hearing be conducted
for the purpose of ascertaining the amount
or the assessment of damages which may
be adjudged in favor of the prevailing party.
It is a determination of the court of a
preliminary point or directing some steps in
the proceedings, but not a disposition of the
merits. Upon the rendering of the
assessment, the Court shall direct the entry
forthwith of the appropriate summary
judgment.
12) Order of judge cannot be considered a
judgment, in the absence of any
findings of fact and conclusions of law.
In the absence of any findings of fact and
conclusions of law, the order of the Judge
cannot be considered a judgment. It has
been held that a trial court in granting
summary judgment should file findings of
fact and conclusion of law or a
memorandum opinion so as to disclose
grounds upon which the trial court reached
its determination. In this jurisdiction,
pursuant to Section 9 of Article X of the
Constitution and the procedural rules, all
judgments determining the merits of cases
should state clearly and distinctly the facts
and the law on which it is based.
13) Present petition premature.
14) There being no judgment, the present
petition is, therefore, premature. Certainly,
Estrada could move for the setting aside of
the Order of 20 May 1975 by the
presentation of opposing affidavits showing
that, other than the issue as to the amount
or extent of damages, there is a genuine
issue of fact on the carriers liability.
NOCOM V. CAMERINO
J. AZCUNA
FACTS:
1) PRIOR CASE: Respondent Oscar Camerino
and respondents-intervenors Efren
Camerino, Cornelio Mantile, the deceased
Nolasco Del Rosario, represented by Mildred
Del Rosario, and Domingo Enriquez were the
tenants who were tilling on the parcels of
land planted to rice and corn previously
owned by Victoria Homes, Inc.
2) On February 9, 1983, without notifying the
respondents, Victoria Homes, Inc. sold the
said lots to Springsun Management Systems
Corporation (SMSC).
3) Subsequently, SMSC mortgaged to Banco
Filipino (BF) the said lots as collaterals for its
loans amounting to P11,545,000. As SMSC
failed to pay the loans due, BF
extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgage and,
later, was adjudged the highest bidder.
4) SMSC redeemed the lots from BF. Earlier, on
March 7, 1995, respondents filed a
complaint against SMSC and BF for
"Prohibition/Certiorari,
Reconveyance/Redemption, Damages,
Injunction with Preliminary Injunction and
Temporary Restraining Order"
5) On January 25, 2002, the RTC of Muntinlupa
City, Branch 256, found respondents to be
tenants who have been tilling on the subject
land planted to rice and corn since 1967
and, thus, authorized them to redeem the
subject lots AFFIRMED BY CA, BUT AWARD
OF DAMAGES DELETED SUSTAINED BY SC
6) PRESENT CASE: (DEC. 2003) Mariano
Nocom gave the respondents several
Philtrust Bank Managers Checks amounting
to P500,000 each, which the latter
encashed, representing the price of their
"inchoate and contingent rights" over the
subject lots which they sold to him.
7) On December 18, 2003, respondents, with
the marital consent of their wives, executed
an "Irrevocable Power of Attorney" which
was notarized by their counsel Atty. Arturo S.
Santos
8) Meanwhile, on July 21, 2005, the
respondents, in Civil Case No. 95-020 of the
RTC of Muntinlupa City, Branch 256, filed a
Motion for Execution with Prayer to Order
the Register of Deeds of Muntinlupa City to
divest SMSC of title to the subject lots and
have the same vested on them. As SMSC
refused to accept the redemption amount of
P9,790,612 plus P147,059.18 as commission
given by the petitioner, the respondents
deposited, on August 4, 2005, the amounts
of P9,790,612, P73,529.59, and P73,529.59,
duly evidenced by official receipts, with the
RTC of Muntinlupa City, Branch 256. The RTC
of Muntinlupa City, Branch 256 granted
 respondents motion for execution and,
consequently, TCT Nos. 120542, 120541 and
123872 in the name of SMSC were cancelled
and TCT Nos. 15895, 15896 and 15897 were
issued in the names of the respondents. It
also ordered that the "Irrevocable Power of
Attorney," executed on December 18, 2003
by respondents in favor of petitioner, be
annotated in the memorandum of
encumbrances of the TCTs
9) On October 24, 2005, respondent Oscar
Camerino filed a complaint against
petitioner, captioned as "Petition to Revoke
Power of Attorney before RTC MUNTINLUPA
10) Respondent Oscar Camerinos complaint
alleged that he and co-respondents were
asked by their counsel, Atty. Arturo S.
Santos, to sign a document with the
representation that it was urgently needed
in the legal proceedings against SMSC; that
the contents of the said document were not
explained to him; that in the first week of
September 2005, he learned that TCT Nos.
15895, 15896 and 15897 were issued in
their favor by the Register of Deeds; that he
discovered that the annotation of the
"Irrevocable Power of Attorney" on the said
titles was pursuant to the Order of the RTC
of Muntinlupa City, Branch 256 dated August
31, 2005; that the "Irrevocable Power of
Attorney" turned out to be the same
document which Atty. Santos required him
and the other respondents to sign on
December 18, 2003; that despite repeated
demands, petitioner refused to surrender
the owners duplicate copies of the said
titles; that petitioner had retained ownership
over the subject lots; that he had no
intention of naming, appointing, or
constituting anyone, including petitioner, to
sell, assign, dispose, or encumber the
subject parcels of land; and that he
executed an Affidavit of Adverse Claim
which was annotated on the titles involving
the subject lots.
11) ANSWER +COUNTERCLAIM: countered
that on September 3, 2003, Atty. Santos
informed him of the desire of his clients,
herein respondents, to sell and assign to him
their "inchoate and contingent rights and
interests" over the subject lots because they
were in dire need of money and could no
longer wait until the termination of the
proceedings as SMSC would probably appeal
the CAs Decision to this Court; that they did
not have the amount of P9,790,612 needed
to redeem the subject lots; that on
December 18, 2003, he decided to buy the
contingent rights of the respondents and
paid each of them P500,000 or a total of
P2,500,000; that simultaneous with the
aforesaid payment, respondents and their
spouses voluntarily signed the "Irrevocable
Power of Attorney" dated December 18,
2003; that being coupled with interest, the
"Irrevocable Power of Attorney" cannot be
revoked or cancelled at will by any of the
parties; and that having received just and
reasonable compensation for their
contingent rights, respondents had no cause
of action or legal right over the subject lots.
Petitioner prayed for the dismissal of the
complaint and the payment of P1,000,000
moral damages, P500,000 exemplary
damages, and P500,000 attorneys fees plus
costs.
12) Petitioner filed a Motion for Preliminary
Hearing on his special and/or affirmative
defense that respondent Oscar Camerino
had no cause of action or legal right over
the subject lots because the latter and his
wife received the proceeds of the Philtrust
Bank Managers check in the sum of
P500,000 which they personally encashed
on December 19, 2003 and that being
coupled with interest, the "Irrevocable Power
of Attorney" cannot be revoked or cancelled
at will by any of the parties.
13) On January 30, 2006, respondent Oscar
Camerino filed a Motion for Summary
Judgment alleging that since the existence
of the "Irrevocable Power of Attorney" was
admitted by petitioner, the only issue to be
resolved was whether the said document
was coupled with interest and whether it
was revocable in contemplation of law and
jurisprudence; that Summary Judgment was
proper because petitioner did not raise any
issue relevant to the contents of the
"Irrevocable Power of Attorney"; and that in
an Affidavit dated January 23, 2005, he
admitted receipt of a check amounting to
P500,000.00 which was given to him by
petitioner as financial assistance.
14) petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss the
complaint on the ground that the petition for
the cancellation of the "Irrevocable Power of
Attorney" was actually an action to recover
the titles and ownership over the properties;
that since respondent Oscar Camerino
alleged in paragraph 29 of his Motion for
Summary Judgment that the assessed value
of the subject lots amounted to
P600,000,000, the case partook of the
nature of a real action and, thus, the docket
fees of P3,929 was insufficient; and that due
to insufficient docket fee, his complaint
should be dismissed as the RTC was not
vested with jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the complaint.
15) The RTC, Branch 203, granted the Motion
for Summary Judgment because "a
meticulous scrutiny of the material facts
admitted in the pleadings of the parties
reveals that there is really no genuine issue
of fact presented therein that needs to be
tried to enable the court to arrive at a
judicious resolution of a matter of law if the
issues presented by the pleadings are not
genuine issues as to any material fact but
are patently unsubstantial issues that do not
require a hearing on the merits
16) RTC rendered a Summary Judgment
annulling the "Irrevocable Power of
Attorney" for being contrary to law and
public policy
17) On July 3, 2006 petitioner filed an
Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration seeking
to set aside the trial courts Joint Order
dated June 9, 2005 and Summary Judgment
dated June 15, 2006 which was opposed by
the respondents.
18) On July 4, 2006, respondents filed a
Motion for Execution Pending Final
Decision/Appeal which was opposed by
petitioner
19) The trial court issued an order denying
petitioners Omnibus Motion for
Reconsideration
20) CA AFFIRMED RTC: The CA ruled that as
the RTC rendered the assailed Summary
Judgment based on the pleadings and
documents on record, without any trial or
reception of evidence, the same did not
involve factual matters. The CA found the
issues raised by the petitioner in his appeal
to be questions of law MR DENIED
WON THE CA ERRED IN DISMISSING PS
APPEAL?
1) YES.
2) In dismissing petitioners appeal, the CA
erroneously relied on the rationale that the
petitioners appeal raised questions of law
and, therefore, it had no recourse but to
dismiss the same for lack of jurisdiction. The
summary judgment rendered by the trial
court has the effect of an adjudication on
the merits and, thus, the petitioner, being
the aggrieved party, correctly appealed the
adverse decision of the RTC to the CA by
filing a notice of appeal coupled with the
appellants brief under Rule 41 of the Rules.
3) Contrary to the findings of the RTC and the
CA, the present case involves certain factual
issues which remove it from the coverage of
a summary judgment.
4) Under Section 1, Rule 35 of the Rules of
Court, a party seeking to recover upon a
claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim or to
obtain a declaratory relief may, at any time
after the pleading in answer thereto has
been served, move with supporting
affidavits, depositions or admissions for a
summary judgment in his favor upon all or
any part thereof.
5) Summary judgment is a procedural device
resorted to in order to avoid long drawn out
litigations and useless delays. When the
pleadings on file show that there are no
genuine issues of fact to be tried, the Rules
allow a party to obtain immediate relief by
way of summary judgment, that is, when the
facts are not in dispute, the court is allowed
to decide the case summarily by applying
the law to the material facts. Conversely,
where the pleadings tender a genuine issue,
summary judgment is not proper. A
genuine issue is such issue of fact which
requires the presentation of evidence as
distinguished from a sham, fictitious,
contrived or false claim. Section 3 of the
said rule provides two (2) requisites for
summary judgment to be proper: (1) there
must be no genuine issue as to any material
fact, except for the amount of damages; and
(2) the party presenting the motion for
summary judgment must be entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law
6) A summary judgment is permitted only if
there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and a moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law. A summary
judgment is proper if, while the pleadings on
their face appear to raise issues, the
affidavits, depositions, and admissions
presented by the moving party show that
such issues are not genuine
7) The present case should not be decided via
a summary judgment. Summary judgment is
not warranted when there are genuine
issues which call for a full blown trial. The
party who moves for summary judgment has
the burden of demonstrating clearly the
absence of any genuine issue of fact, or that
the issue posed in the complaint is patently
unsubstantial so as not to constitute a
genuine issue for trial. Trial courts have
limited authority to render summary
judgments and may do so only when there is
clearly no genuine issue as to any material
fact. When the facts as pleaded by the
parties are disputed or contested,
proceedings for summary judgment cannot
take the place of trial.
8) In this present case, while both parties
acknowledge or admit the existence of the
"Irrevocable Power of Attorney," the
variance in the allegations in the pleadings
of the petitioner vis--vis that of the
respondents require the presentation of
evidence on the issue of the validity of the
"Irrevocable Power of Attorney" to determine
whether its execution was attended by the
vices of consent and whether the
respondents and their spouses did not freely
and voluntarily execute the same.
9) CASE REMANDED TO THE RTC