PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS bar cannot escape the disciplining arm of the Court.
This
Professor: Atty. Arnold Abejaron
by Cid Benedict D. Pabalan (2016-2017)
A. PRELIMINARIES
1. Legal Ethics
It is a branch of moral science, which treats of the duties, which
an attorney owes to the courts, to his clients, to his colleagues
in the profession, and to the public. (Justice George Malcom)
2. Lawyers Oath
I, do solemnly swear that I will maintain allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines, I will support the Constitution and
obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted
authorities therein; I will do no falsehood, nor consent to the
doing of any in court; I will not wittingly or willingly promote
or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, or give aid nor
consent to the same; I will delay no man for money or malice,
and will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of
my knowledge and discretion, with all good fidelity as well to
the courts as to my clients; and I impose upon myself these
voluntary obligations without any mental reservation or
purpose of evasion. So help me God.
B. PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS
1. Imprescriptibility of Disbarment
Proceedings
EN BANC
A.C. No. 6656 May 4, 2006
BOBIE ROSE V. FRIAS vs. ATTY. CARMELITA S.
BAUTISTA-LOZADA
Rule VIII, Section 1 of the Rules of Procedure of the CBD-IBP
which provides for a prescriptive period for the filing of
administrative complaints against lawyers runs afoul of the
settled ruling of the Supreme Court. It is void and of no legal
effect for being ultra vires.
Prevailing:
An administrative complaint against a member of the bar does
not prescribe.
If the rule were otherwise, members of the bar would be
emboldened to disregard the very oath they took as lawyers,
prescinding from the fact that as long as no private complainant
would immediately come forward, they stand a chance of being
completely exonerated from whatever administrative liability
they ought to answer for. It is the duty of this Court to protect
the integrity of the practice of law as well as the administration
of justice. No matter how much time has elapsed from the time
of the commission of the act complained of and the time of the
institution of the complaint, erring members of the bench and
categorical pronouncement is aimed at unscrupulous members
of the bench and bar, to deter them from committing acts which
violate the Code of Professional Responsibility, the Code of
Judicial Conduct, or the Lawyers Oath. x x x
Thus, even the lapse of considerable time from the commission
of the offending act to the institution of the administrative
complaint will not erase the administrative culpability of a
lawyer.
2. Conflict of Interests
CANON 15 - A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE CANDOR,
FAIRNESS AND LOYALTY IN ALL HIS DEALINGS AND
TRANSACTIONS WITH HIS CLIENTS.
Rule 15.01. - A lawyer, in conferring with a prospective client,
shall ascertain as soon as practicable whether the matter would
involve a conflict with another client or his own interest, and
if so, shall forthwith inform the prospective client.
Rule 15.03. - A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests
except by written consent of all concerned given after a full
disclosure of the facts.
EN BANC
A.C. No. 6632. August 2, 2005
NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY, INC., and BEN A.
NICOLAS, vs. Atty. MACARIO D. ARQUILLO,
PANGANIBAN, J.
Northwestern University, Inc. and Mr. Ben A. Nicolas, accuses
Atty. Macario D. Arquillo, of engaging in conflicting interest
in a case before the National Labor Relations Commission,
Regional Arbitration Branch No. 1, San Fernando, La Union.
Allegedly Atty. Arquillo appeared and acted as counsels for
both complainants (eight out of the eighteen complainants
therein) and respondent (one out of the ten respondents
therein).
For instance, a motion to dismiss was filed by Jose de Castro,
whose counsel was Atty. Arquillo. As the counsel of the
complainants, he had the duty to oppose the very same motion
to dismiss filed also by his client, Jose de Castro. Atty. Arquillo
had the duty to prove the Complaint wrong but cannot do this
because he is also the counsel for the complainants.
Issue:
Was there a conflict of interest?
Ruling:
Yes. The circumstances involving the motion to dismiss show
the inconsistency. The inconsistency of interests is very clear.
The attorney in that situation will not be able to pursue, with
By Cid Benedict D. Pabalan 1
 vigor and zeal, the clients claim against the other and to
properly represent the latter in the unrelated action, or, if he
can do so, he cannot avoid being suspected by the defeated
client of disloyalty or partiality in favor of the successful client.
The foregoing considerations will strongly tend to deprive the
relation of attorney and client of those special elements which
make it one of trust and confidence.
Representing conflicting interests is prohibited by the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Unless all the affected clients
written consent is given after a full disclosure of all relevant
facts, attorneys guilty of representing conflicting interests shall
as a rule be sanctioned with suspension from the practice of
law.
TESTS for presence of CONFLICTS OF INTEREST:
When a lawyer represents two or more opposing parties,
there is a conflict of interests, the existence of which is
determined by three separate tests:
(1) when, in representation of one client, a lawyer is
required to fight for an issue or claim, but is also duty-
bound to oppose it for another client;
(2) when the acceptance of the new retainer will require an
attorney to perform an act that may injuriously affect the
first client or, when called upon in a new relation, to use
against the first one any knowledge acquired through their
professional connection; or
(3) when the acceptance of a new relation would prevent
the full discharge of an attorneys duty to give undivided
fidelity and loyalty to the client or would invite suspicion of
unfaithfulness or double dealing in the performance of that
duty. 1
EN BANC
A.M. No. MTJ-95-1053. January 2, 1997
SPOUSES MAKADAYA SADIK and USODAN SADIK
vs. JUDGE ABDALLAH CASAR
PER CURIAM
Judge Casar (respondent) represented Spouses Sadik as
beneficiaries of Lekiya Paito when he was still in private
practice. It was a case for specific performance in relation to
Spouses Sadiks insurance claim.
When the court rendered judgment on the case, Casar was
already a member of the judiciary, serving as the Presiding
Judge of the 5th Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Kolambugan-
Maigo (*Not the court handling the specific performance).
Nevertheless, Judge Casar continued to represent the Sadiks
when the case was brought to the Court of Appeals and Supreme
Court. Eventually the Insurance Company agreed to pay to the
Sadiks the judgment award. It was Judge Casar who received
1 Santos v. Beltran, 418 SCRA 17, December 11, 2003 as cited in the Northwestern case
the judgment award in the amount of 30,000 pesos. However,
Casar retained the award instead of handling it to the Sadiks. He
reasoned that he has the right to retain the same until he is paid
for his expenses pursuant to Sec. 37, Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court. Thus, the Spouses Sadik charged Judge Abdallah Casar,
with misconduct and misappropriation.
It has to be noted that in the abovementioned specific
performance case, Atty. Casar also deliberately, knowingly and
willfully agreed to procure a substitute witness, an impostor, to
pose as claimant Makadaya Sadik and testify in the case. He
even proposed that such witness be paid P5,000.00. And he
actually presented such witness as Makadaya Sadik in that case
and that impostor is the Makadaya Sadik who is the
complainant in this case.
Issue
Is the act of Judge Casar in serving as acounsel while already
an active municipal court judge a violation of the Code of
Judicial Conduct and of the Lawyers Oath?
Ruling:
Yes. Respondent judge proved himself repeatedly unworthy of
his post.
The records show that even after he became judge, respondent
acted as counsel for herein complainants and misappropriated
the judgment award of P30,000.00 which rightfully belongs to
complainants. Moreover, respondent's line of defense revealed
a significant and deplorable flaw in his character. In hoping to
redeem himself, he categorically admitted that he deliberately,
knowingly and willfully agreed to handle a case involving a
fraudulent insurance claim and in the process procured and
presented false witnesses in court. Under the circumstances, this
Court is amazed at how brazen respondent has comported
himself and without compunction at leaving a "paper trail"
behind him.
He violated Rule 5:07 of the Code of Judicial Conduct which
states that 'A judge shall not engage in the private practice of
law. He likewise violated the Attorney's Oath in agreeing to file
a civil case for the purpose of claiming the insurance proceeds
from Grepalife despite his having been informed that the
insurance policy of Lekiya Paito was fraudulently applied for.
Agreeing to handle the claim said to have arisen from a
fraudulent act against the insurer certainly speaks of a moral
flaw in his character.
It must be borne in mind that courts exist to dispense and to
promote justice. However, the reality of justice depends, above
all, on the intellectual, moral and personal quality of the men
and women who are called to serve as our judges.
Indeed, to be effective in his role, a judge must be a man of
exceptional integrity and honesty. The special urgency for
requiring these qualities in a judge is not hard to understand for
the judge acts directly upon the property, liberty, even life, of
By Cid Benedict D. Pabalan 2
his countrymen. Hence, being in a position of such grave
responsibility in the administration of justice, a judge must
conduct himself in a manner befitting the dignity of such
exalted office.
A.C. No.5804. July 1, 2003
BENEDICTO HORNILLA and ATTY. FEDERICO D.
RICAFORT vs. ATTY.ERNESTO S. SALUNAT
Benedicto Hornilla and Federico Ricafort were members of the
Philippine Public School Teachers Association (PPSTA). In
1997, they accused the Board of Directors of PPSTA of
unlawfully spending the funds of PPSTA. However, since the
PPSTA was not initiating a complaint against the Board of
Directors, the two then filed a suit on behalf of PPSTA against
the Board of PPSTA.
In the said suit, the Board of Directors were represented by Atty.
Ernesto Salunat. Hornilla et al were against the legal
representation being made by Salunat for and on behalf of the
Board of Directors because of the fact that Salunat is part of the
ASSA Law Office WHICH is also the retained law firm of the
PPSTA. In short, Hornilla et. al alleged that there is conflict of
interests.
As mentioned by Atty. Abejaron:
It has to be noted that this case involves a derivative suit. Where
corporate directors have committed a breach of trust either by
their frauds, ultra vires acts, or negligence, and the corporation
is unable or unwilling to institute suit to remedy the wrong, a
stockholder may sue on behalf of himself and other
stockholders and for the benefit of the corporation, to bring
about a redress of the wrong done directly to the corporation
and indirectly to the stockholders. This is what is known as a
derivative suit, and settled is the doctrine that in a derivative
suit, the corporation is the real party in interest while the
stockholder filing suit for the corporations behalf is only
nominal party. The corporation should be included as a party in
the suit.
Issue:
1. Can a lawyer engaged by a corporation defend members of
the board of the same corporation in a derivative suit?
Ruling:
1. No. The possibility for conflict of interest here is universally
recognized. Although early cases found joint representation
permissible where no conflict of interest was obvious, the
emerging rule is against dual representation in all derivative
actions. Outside counsel must thus be retained to represent one
of the defendants. The cases and ethics opinions differ on
whether there must be separate representation from the outset
or merely from the time the corporation seeks to take an active
role. Furthermore, this restriction on dual representation should
not be waivable by consent in the usual way; the corporation
should be presumptively incapable of giving valid consent.
There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents
inconsistent interests of two or more opposing parties.
The test is "whether or not in behalf of one client, it is the
lawyers duty to fight for an issue or claim, but it is his duty to
oppose it for the other client. In brief, if he argues for one client,
this argument will be opposed by him when he argues for the
other client."
This rule covers not only cases in which confidential
communications have been confided, but also those in which
no confidence has been bestowed or will be used.
Also, there is conflict of interests if the acceptance of the new
retainer will require the attorney to perform an act which will
injuriously affect his first client in any matter in which he
represents him and also whether he will be called upon in his
new relation to use against his first client any knowledge
acquired through their connection.
Another test of the inconsistency of interests is whether the
acceptance of a new relation will prevent an attorney from the
full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his
client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing in
the performance thereof.
A.C. No. 5098. April 11, 2012
JOSEFINA M. ANION vs. ATTY. CLEMENCIO
SABITSANA,JR
Aninon filed a disbarment case against Atty. Sabitsana.
Atty Sabitsanas legal services were initially engaged by
Josefina M. Anion (complainant) to protect her interest over a
certain property.
The records show that upon the legal advice of Atty. Sabitsana,
the Deed of Sale over the property was prepared and executed
in the complainants favor.
Atty. Sabitsana met with Zenaida Caete to discuss the latters
legal interest over the property subject of the Deed of Sale. At
that point, Atty. Sabitsana already had knowledge that Zenaida
Caetes interest clashed with the complainants interests.
Despite the knowledge of the clashing interests between his two
clients, Atty. Sabitsana accepted the engagement from Zenaida
Caete.
Atty. Sabitsanas actual knowledge of the conflicting interests
between his two clients was demonstrated by his own actions:
first, he filed a case against the complainant in behalf of Zenaida
Caete; second, he impleaded the complainant as the defendant
in the case; and third, the case he filed was for the annulment of
the Deed of Sale that he had previously prepared and executed
for the complainant.
By Cid Benedict D. Pabalan 3

In a resolution dated February 27, 2004, the IBP Board of
Governors resolved to adopt and approve the Report and
Recommendation of the IBP Commissioner after finding it to
be fully supported by the evidence on record and Respondent
was suspended from the practice of law for a period of one year.
Atty. Sabitsana moved to reconsider the above resolution, but
the IBP Board of Governors denied his motion.
Issue:
Whether Atty. Sabitsana is guilty of misconduct for
representing conflicting interests
Ruling:
Yes. By his acts, not only did Atty. Sabitsana agree to represent
one client against another client in the same action; he also
accepted a new engagement that entailed him to contend and
oppose the interest of his other client in a property in which his
legal services had been previously retained.
The relationship between a lawyer and his/her client should
ideally be imbued with the highest level of trust and confidence.
This is the standard of confidentiality that must prevail to
promote a full disclosure of the clients most confidential
information to his/her lawyer for an unhampered exchange of
information between them. Needless to state, a client can only
entrust confidential information to his/her lawyer based on an
expectation from the lawyer of utmost secrecy and discretion;
the lawyer, for his part, is duty-bound to observe candor,
fairness and loyalty in all dealings and transactions with the
client.6 Part of the lawyers duty in this regard is to avoid
representing conflicting interests, a matter covered by Rule
15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
quoted below:
Rule 15.03. A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests
except by written consent of all concerned given after a full
disclosure of the facts.
"The proscription against representation of conflicting interests
applies to a situation where the opposing parties are present
clients in the same action or in an unrelated action."
The prohibition also applies even if the "lawyer would not be
called upon to contend for one client that which the lawyer has
to oppose for the other client, or that there would be no occasion
to use the confidential information acquired from one to the
disadvantage of the other as the two actions are wholly
unrelated."
To be held accountable under this rule, it is "enough that the
opposing parties in one case, one of whom would lose the suit,
are present clients and the nature or conditions of the lawyers
respective retainers with each of them would affect the
performance of the duty of undivided fidelity to both clients."
RULE:
A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests
EXCEPTION:
By written consent of all concerned given after a full
disclosure of the facts.
*For the exception to apply, there must be a full disclosure
of the facts (that he will be representing a party which might
lead to a conflict of interest) to both of the clients.
A.C. No. 6664 July 16, 2013
FERDINAND A. SAMSON vs. ATTY. EDGARDO O.
ERA
The complainant and his relatives were among the investors
who fell prey to the pyramiding scam perpetrated by ICS
Corporation led by Emilia Sison and several others. They
engaged the services of Atty. Era to represent and assist him and
his relatives in the prosecution of criminal case against Sison
and her group.
Pursuant to the engagement, Atty. Era prepared the demand
letter demanding the return or refund of the money subject of
their complaints. He also prepared the complaint-affidavit that
Samson signed and swore to and subsequently presented to the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City (OCPQC). After
the preliminary investigation, the OCPQC formally charged
Sison and the others with several counts of estafa in the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 96 (RTC), in Quezon City.
In April 2003, Atty. Era called a meeting with Samson and his
relatives to discuss the possibility of an amicable settlement
with Sison and her cohorts. He told Samson and the others that
undergoing a trial of the cases would just be a waste of time,
money and effort for them, and that they could settle the cases
with Sison and her group, with him guaranteeing the turnover
to them of a certain property located in Antipolo City belonging
to ICS Corporation in exchange for their desistance. They
acceded and executed the affidavit of desistance he prepared,
and in turn they received a deed of assignment covering land
registered under Transfer Certificate of Title No. R-4475
executed by Sison in behalf of ICS Corporation.
After an amicable settlement and several negotiations with
Sison and her cohorts, Atty. Era expressed that he already
accomplished his professional responsibility towards Samson.
They also later found out that they could not liquidate the
property subject to the amicable settlement. During the hearings
in the RTC, Atty. Era did not anymore appear for Samson and
his group. They found out that Atty. Era had already been
entering his appearance as the counsel for Sison in her other
criminal cases involving the same pyramiding scam.
On January 20, 2005, Samson executed an affidavit alleging the
foregoing antecedents and prayed for Atty. Eras disbarment on
the ground of his violation of the trust, confidence and respect
reposed in him as their counsel.
By Cid Benedict D. Pabalan 4
Atty. Era was required to file his Comment. After several
extensions, Atty. Era finally filed his Comment on April 11,
2006 in the OBC. He alleged that the lawyer-client relationship
ended when Samson and his group entered into the compromise
settlement.
Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Era violated the Code of Professional
Responsibility on conflict of interests
Ruling:
Yes. The lawyer-client relationship did not terminate when the
parties entered into a compromise settlement, for the fact
remained that he still needed to oversee the implementation of
the settlement as well as to proceed with the criminal cases until
they were dismissed or otherwise concluded by the trial court.
It is also relevant to indicate that the execution of a compromise
settlement in the criminal cases did not ipso facto cause the
termination of the cases not only because the approval of the
compromise by the trial court was still required, but also
because the compromise would have applied only to the civil
aspect, and excluded the criminal aspect pursuant to Article
2034 of the Civil Code.
Contrary to Atty. Eras ill-conceived attempt to explain his
disloyalty to Samson and his group, the termination of the
attorney-client relationship does not justify a lawyer to
represent an interest adverse to or in conflict with that of the
former client. The spirit behind this rule is that the clients
confidence once given should not be stripped by the mere
expiration of the professional employment. Even after the
severance of the relation, a lawyer should not do anything that
will injuriously affect his former client in any matter in which
the lawyer previously represented the client. Nor should the
lawyer disclose or use any of the clients confidences acquired
in the previous relation. In this regard, Canon 17 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility expressly declares that: "A lawyer
owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful
of the trust and confidence reposed in him."
Prohibition against conflict of interest rests on 5 rationales,
rendered as follows:
1st: the law seeks to assure clients that their lawyers
will represent them with undivided loyalty
2nd: the prohibition against conflicts of interest seeks to
enhance the effectiveness of legal representation
3rd: a client has a legal right to have the lawyer
safeguard the clients confidential information
4th: conflicts rules help ensure that lawyers will not
exploit clients, such as by inducing a client to make a gift to
the lawyer
5th: some conflict-of-interest rules protect interests of
the legal system in obtaining adequate presentations to
tribunals.
Reason: the rule is grounded in the fiduciary obligation of
loyalty. The nature of their relationship is, therefore, one of
trust and confidence of the highest degree.
A.C. No. 1359 October 17, 1991
GENEROSA BUTED and BENITO BOLISAY vs. ATTY.
HAROLD M. HERNANDO
PER CURIAM
(First case handled by Atty. Hernando)
Atty. Harold M. Hernando represented Luciana Abadilla and
Angela Buted in a partition case. ultimately succeeded in
defending Luciana Abadilla's claim of exclusive ownership
over Lot 9439-B. When Luciana died, respondent withdrew his
appearance from that partition case.
(Second case handled)
It appears that Luciana Abadilla sold the lot to Benito Bolisay
and a new Transfer Certificate of Title over the lot was issued
in the name of Spouses Boiisay. When an action for specific
performance was lodged by a couple named Luis Sy and Elena
Sy against Benito Bolisay as one of the defendants, the latter
retained the services of respondent. Atty. Hernando however
claims that he rendered his services to Benito Bolisay free of
charge. Atty Hernando avers that the relationship between
himself and Benito Bolisay as regards this case was terminated
on 4 December 1969.
(Third Case handled)
In 1974, Carlos, Dionisia and Francisco Abadilla, relatives of
Luciana Abadilla filed an action for the cancellation of the
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) of Spouses Benito Bolisay
(cadastral proceeding), claiming that they were registered co-
owners of the subject property. This time however, Atty.
Hernando represented Carlos, Dionisia and Francisco,
questioning the validity of the very same title which he
defended before as counsel for Luciana Abadilla, and later, for
Spouses Bolisay.
Issue:
Whether or not there is a conflict of interest
Ruling:
Yes. Though as between the first and second cases handled by
respondent, no conflict of interest existed, the same cannot be
said with respect to the action for specific performance (second
case) and the cadastral proceeding (third case). By respondent's
own admission, he defended the right of ownership over Lot
9439-B of complainant Benito Bolisay in the action for specific
performance. He assailed this same right of ownership when he
subsequently filed a petition for cancellation of complainants'
Transfer Certificate of Title over that same lot. Respondent
Hernando was in a conflict of interest situation.
The contention of respondent is, in effect, that because
complainant has not clearly shown that respondent had obtained
any confidential information from Benito Bolisay while
By Cid Benedict D. Pabalan 5
representing the latter in the action for specific performance,
respondent cannot be penalized for representing conflicting
interests.
That is not the rule in this jurisdiction. The rule here is, rather,
that the mere fact that respondent had acted as counsel for
Benito Bolisay in the action for specific performance should
have precluded respondent from acting or appearing as counsel
for the other side in the subsequent petition for cancellation of
the Transfer Certificate of Title of the spouses Generosa and
Benito Bolisay.
There is no necessity for proving the actual transmission of
confidential information to an attorney in the course of his
employment by his first client in order that he may be precluded
from accepting employment by the second or subsequent client
where there are conflicting interests between the first and the
subsequent clients.
An attorney is not permitted, in serving a new client as against
a former one, to do anything which will injuriously affect the
former client in any manner in which the attorney formerly
represented him, though the relation of attorney and client has
terminated, and the new employment is in a different case; nor
can the attorney use against his former client any knowledge or
information gained through their former connection.
The absence of monetary consideration does not exempt the
lawyer from complying with the prohibition against pursuing
cases where a conflict of interest exists. The prohibition
attaches from the moment the attorney-client relationship is
established and extends beyond the duration of the professional
relationship.
3. Lawyer-Client Privilege/Rule on
Privileged Communication
Rule 15.02 A lawyer shall be bound by the rule on privilege
communication in respect of matters disclosed to him by a
prospective client.
A.C. No. 6711 July 3, 2007
MA. LUISA HADJULA vs. ATTY. ROCELES F.
MADIANDA
Hadjula alleged that she and Madianda used to be friends as
they both worked at the Bureau of Fire Protection (BFP)
whereat respondent was the Chief Legal Officer while she was
the Chief Nurse of the Medical, Dental and Nursing Services.
Complainant claimed that, sometime in 1998, she approached
respondent for some legal advice. Complainant further alleged
that, in the course of their conversationwhich was supposed to
be kept confidential, she disclosed personal secrets and
produced copies of a marriage contract, a birth certificate and
a baptismal certificate, only to be informed later by the
respondent that she (respondent) would refer the matter to a
lawyer friend. It was malicious, so complainant states, of
respondent to have refused handling her case only after she had
already heard her secrets.
Continuing, complainant averred that her friendship with
respondent soured after her filing, in the later part of 2000, of
criminal and disciplinary actions against the latter. What, per
complainant's account, precipitated the filing was when
respondent, then a member of the BFP promotion board,
demanded a cellular phone in exchange for the complainant's
promotion.
According to complainant, respondent, in retaliation to the
filing of the aforesaid actions, filed a COUNTER
COMPLAINT with the Ombudsman charging her
(complainant) with violation of Section 3(a) of Republic Act
No. 3019,4 falsification of public documents and immorality,
the last two charges being based on the disclosures
complainant earlier made to respondent. And also on the basis
of the same disclosures, complainant further stated, a
disciplinary case was also instituted against her before the
Professional Regulation Commission.
Issue:
Does the rule on privileged communication apply?
Ruling:
Yes. As it were, complainant went to respondent, a lawyer who
incidentally was also then a friend, to bare what she considered
personal secrets and sensitive documents for the purpose of
obtaining legal advice and assistance. The moment
complainant approached the then receptive respondent to seek
legal advice, a veritable lawyer-client relationship evolved
between the two. Such relationship imposes upon the lawyer
certain restrictions circumscribed by the ethics of the
profession. Among the burdens of the relationship is that which
enjoins the lawyer, respondent in this instance, to keep
inviolate confidential information acquired or revealed during
legal consultations. The fact that one is, at the end of the day,
not inclined to handle the client's case is hardly of
consequence. Of little moment, too, is the fact that no formal
professional engagement follows the consultation. Nor will it
make any difference that no contract whatsoever was executed
by the parties to memorialize the relationship.
The essential factors to establish the existence of the
attorney-client privilege communication: (DEAN
WIGMORE)
(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought
(2) from a professional legal adviser in his capacity as such,
(3) the communications relating to that purpose,
(4) made in confidence
(5) by the client,
(6) are at his instance permanently protected
(7) from disclosure by himself or by the legal advisor,
(8) except the protection be waived.
By Cid Benedict D. Pabalan 6
The purpose of the rule of confidentiality is to protect the
client from possible breach of confidence as a result of a
consultation with a lawyer.
A.C. No. 5108 May 26, 2005
ROSA F. MERCADO vs. ATTY. JULITO D. VITRIOLO
Mercado is a Senior Education Program Specialist of the
Standards Development Division, Office of Programs and
Standards while Vitriolo is a Deputy Executive Director IV of
the Commission on Higher Education (CHED).
Vitriolo was once a counsel for Mercado in her annulment
case.
Eventually, Vitriolo filed a criminal action against Mercado
before the Office of the City Prosecutor, Pasig City, entitled
"Atty. Julito Vitriolo, et al. v. Rose Dela Cruz F. Mercado,"
and docketed as I.S. No. PSG 99-9823, for violation of Articles
171 and 172 (falsification of public document) of the Revised
Penal Code.5 Respondent alleged that complainant made false
entries in the Certificates of Live Birth of her children,
Angelica and Katelyn Anne. More specifically, complainant
allegedly indicated in said Certificates of Live Birth that she is
married to a certain Ferdinand Fernandez, and that their
marriage was solemnized on April 11, 1979, when in truth, she
is legally married to Ruben G. Mercado and their marriage took
place on April 11, 1978.
Complainant Mercado alleged that said criminal complaint for
falsification of public document (I.S. No. PSG 99-9823)
disclosed confidential facts and information relating to the civil
case for annulment, then handled by respondent Vitriolo as her
counsel. This prompted complainant Mercado to bring this
action against respondent. She claims that, in filing the
criminal case for falsification, respondent is guilty of
breaching their privileged and confidential lawyer-client
relationship, and should be disbarred.
Vitriolo maintains that his filing of the criminal complaint for
falsification of public documents against complainant does not
violate the rule on privileged communication between attorney
and client because the bases of the falsification case are two
certificates of live birth which are public documents and in no
way connected with the confidence taken during the
engagement of respondent as counsel. According to
respondent, the complainant confided to him as then counsel
only matters of facts relating to the annulment case. Nothing
was said about the alleged falsification of the entries in the
birth certificates of her two daughters. The birth certificates are
filed in the Records Division of CHED and are accessible to
anyone.
Issue:
Is there a breach in the rule on privileged communication in the
case at bar?
Ruling:
There is none. The complainant failed to specifically allege the
confidential information she divulged to the respondent.
RULE:
(1) The complainant must specifically allege the specific
confidential information allegedly divulged by respondent
without her consent. It is difficult, if not impossible to
determine if there was any violation of the rule on
privileged communication. Such confidential information
is a crucial link in establishing a breach of the rule on
privileged communication between attorney and client. It
is not enough to merely assert the attorney-client privilege.
The burden of proving that the privilege applies is placed
upon the party asserting the privilege.
(2) The client made the communication in confidence.
The mere relation of attorney and client does not raise a
presumption of confidentiality. The client must intend the
communication to be confidential.
Points to remember from the case of Mercado vs. Vitriolo:
There exists an attorney-client relationship, or a prospective
attorney-client relationship, and it is by reason of this
relationship that the client made the communication.
Matters disclosed by a prospective client to a lawyer are
protected by the rule on privileged communication even if the
prospective client does not thereafter retain the lawyer or the
latter declines the employment.
A communication from a (prospective) client to a lawyer for
some purpose other than on account of the (prospective)
attorney-client relation is not privileged.
Instructive is the case of Pfleider v. Palanca (as cited in the
Vitriolo Case):
Where the client and his wife leased to their attorney a 1,328-
hectare agricultural land for a period of ten years. In their
contract, the parties agreed, among others, that a specified
portion of the lease rentals would be paid to the client-lessors,
and the remainder would be delivered by counsel-lessee to
client's listed creditors. The client alleged that the list of
creditors which he had "confidentially" supplied counsel for
the purpose of carrying out the terms of payment contained in
the lease contract was disclosed by counsel, in violation of
their lawyer-client relation, to parties whose interests are
adverse to those of the client. As the client himself, however,
states, in the execution of the terms of the aforesaid lease
contract between the parties, he furnished counsel with the
"confidential" list of his creditors. We ruled that this indicates
that client delivered the list of his creditors to counsel not
because of the professional relation then existing between
them, but on account of the lease agreement. We then held that
a violation of the confidence that accompanied the delivery of
By Cid Benedict D. Pabalan 7
that list would partake more of a private and civil wrong than
of a breach of the fidelity owing from a lawyer to his client.
CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION:
A confidential communication refers to information
transmitted by voluntary act of disclosure between
attorney and client in confidence and by means which, so
far as the client is aware, discloses the information to no
third person other than one reasonably necessary for the
transmission of the information or the accomplishment of
the purpose for which it was given.
EN BANC (Consolidated)
G.R. No. 105938 September 20, 1996
REGALA vs. THE SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. No. 108113 September 20, 1996
PARAJA G. HAYUDINI vs. THE SANDIGANBAYAN
Regala, Angara, Roco and others were then partners of the
ACCRA Law Firm. ACCRA performed legal services for its
clients (in this case, for EDUARDO DANDING
COJUANGCO, which included, among others, the
organization and acquisition of business associations and/or
organizations, with the correlative and incidental services
where its members acted as incorporators, or simply, as
stockholders. More specifically, in the performance of these
services, the members of the law firm delivered to its client
documents which substantiate the client's equity holdings, i.e.,
stock certificates endorsed in blank representing the shares
registered in the client's name, and a blank deed of trust or
assignment covering said shares. In the course of their dealings
with their clients, the members of the law firm acquire
information relative to the assets of clients as well as their
personal and business circumstances. In keeping with the
office practice, ACCRA lawyers acted as nominees-
stockholders of the said corporations involved in sequestration
proceedings against Cojuangco.
The PCGG wanted the ACCRA lawyers to reveal the
identity/NAME of the principal/s for whom they acted as
nominee/stockholder in the companies involved in PCGG Case
against Cojuangco.
It has to be noted that Roco was later excluded as respondent
on his undertaking that he will reveal the identity of the
principal/s for whom he acted as nominee/stockholder in the
companies involved in PCGG Case against Cojuanco.
The ACCRA Lawyers contend that they are prohibited from
revealing the identity of their principal under their sworn
mandate and fiduciary duty as lawyers to uphold at all times
the confidentiality of information obtained during such lawyer-
client relationship.
Respondent PCGG, through its counsel, refutes petitioners'
contention, alleging that the revelation of the identity of the
client is not within the ambit of the lawyer-client
confidentiality privilege, nor are the documents it required
(deeds of assignment) protected, because they are evidence of
nominee status.
Issue:
Whether or not the IDENTITY/NAMES of the clients of
ACCRA twhich PCGG seeks to be revealed is privileged
communication
Ruling:
Yes. The court upheld petitioners' right not to reveal the
identity of their clients under pain of the breach of fiduciary
duty owing to their clients, because the facts of the instant case
clearly fall within recognized exceptions to the rule that the
client's name is not privileged information.
PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION INVOLVING THE
IDENTITY/NAME OF A CLIENT
General Rule:
A client's identity should not be shrouded in mystery. A lawyer
may not invoke the privilege and refuse to divulge the name or
identity of this client.
The reasons advanced for the general rule:
First, the court has a right to know that the client whose
privileged information is sought to be protected is flesh and
blood.
Second, the privilege begins to exist only after the attorney-
client relationship has been established. The attorney-client
privilege does not attach until there is a client.
Third, the privilege generally pertains to the subject matter of
the relationship.
Finally, due process considerations require that the opposing
party should, as a general rule, know his adversary. "A party
suing or sued is entitled to know who his opponent is."
Exceptions:
1) Client identity is privileged where a strong probability
exists that revealing the client's name would implicate that
client in the very activity for which he sought the lawyer's
advice.
2) Where disclosure would open the client to civil liability;
his identity is privileged.
3) Where the government's lawyers have no case against an
attorney's client unless, by revealing the client's name, the
said name would furnish the only link that would form the
chain of testimony necessary to convict an individual of a
crime, the client's name is privileged.
4) The content of any client communication to a lawyer lies
within the privilege if it is relevant to the subject matter of
By Cid Benedict D. Pabalan 8
 the legal problem on which the client seeks legal
assistance.
5) Where the nature of the attorney-client relationship has
been previously disclosed and it is the identity which is
intended to be confidential, the identity of the client has
been held to be privileged, since such revelation would
otherwise result in disclosure of the entire transaction.
The circumstances involving the engagement of lawyers in the
case at bench, therefore, clearly reveal that the instant case falls
under at least two exceptions to the general rule. First,
disclosure of the alleged client's name would lead to establish
said client's connection with the very fact in issue of the case,
which is privileged information, because the privilege, as stated
earlier, protects the subject matter or the substance (without
which there would be not attorney-client relationship).
Furthermore, under the third main exception, revelation of the
client's name would obviously provide the necessary link for
the prosecution to build its case, where none otherwise exists.
It is the link, in the words of Baird, "that would inevitably form
the chain of testimony necessary to convict the (client) of a . . .
crime."
An important distinction must be made between a case where a
client takes on the services of an attorney for illicit purposes,
seeking advice about how to go around the law for the purpose
of committing illegal activities and a case where a client thinks
he might have previously committed something illegal and
consults his attorney about it. The first case clearly does not fall
within the privilege because the same cannot be invoked for
purposes illegal. The second case falls within the exception
because whether or not the act for which the client sought
advice turns out to be illegal, his name cannot be used or
disclosed if the disclosure leads to evidence, not yet in the hands
of the prosecution, which might lead to possible action against
him.
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-9231 January 6, 1915
UY CHICO vs. THE UNION LIFE ASSURANCE
SOCIETY, LIMITED, ET AL
In 1897, Uy Chicos father died. He continued the business still
in the name of his father after buying the share of his brother
in the said business. Uy Chico filed a case seeking the recovery
of the proceeds of 2 insurance policies on stock of dry goods
that was destroyed in a fire.
These policies were surrendered by the petitioners lawyer to
the administrator of his fathers estate, who had compromised
with the defendant for of the face value of the insurance that
was paid to the court.
Uy Chico alleged that said policies belong to him and that he
was not bound by the compromised agreement made by the
administrator. The company introduced evidence showing that
the petitioner had agreed to the settlement of the policies when
his lawyer surrendered the same to the estates administrator.
Uy Chico, on the witness stand had been asked if he had any
objection as to his lawyer testifying concerning the surrender
of the policies to which, he negatively replied. Whereupon, the
lawyer of the petitioner formally withdraw the waiver given by
the petitioner and objected to the testimony on the ground of
privileged communication.
Issue:
Was the testimony (of Uy Chicos lawyer) in question
privileged?
Ruling:
No. A similar provision is inserted in section 383, No. 4, of the
same Act. It will be noted that the evidence in question
concerned the dealings of the plaintiff's attorney with a third
person.
Of the very essence of the veil of secrecy which surrounds
communications made between attorney and client, is that such
communications are not intended for the information of third
persons or to be acted upon by them, put of the purpose of
advising the client as to his rights.
It is evident that a communication made by a client to his
attorney for the express purpose of its being communicated to
a third person is essentially inconsistent with the confidential
relation. When the attorney has faithfully carried out his
instructions be delivering the communication to the third
person for whom it was intended and the latter acts upon it, it
cannot, by any reasoning whatever, be classified in a legal
sense as a privileged communication between the attorney and
his client. It is plain that such a communication, after reaching
the party for whom it was intended at least, is a communication
between the client and a third person, and that the attorney
simply occupies the role of intermediary or agent.
A.C. No. 4078 July 14, 2003
WILLIAM ONG GENATO vs. ATTY. ESSEX L.
SILAPAN
Atty. Silapan obtained a loan from his client and mortgaged one
of his properties as security.
When Atty. Silapan failed to pay his obligation, Genato filed a
criminal case against respondent for violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 and a civil case for judicial foreclosure of
real estate mortgage.
In his response, Atty. Silapan alleged that Genato is a
businessman who is engaged in the real estate business, trading
and buy and sell of deficiency taxed imported cars, shark loans
and other shady deals and has many cases pending in court.
Atty. SIlapan also alleged that Genato had the intention to bribe
government officials in connection with a pending case.
Genato denied respondents charges and claimed that
respondents allegation is libelous as it was irrelevant to the
foreclosure case.
By Cid Benedict D. Pabalan 9

Genato gripes that the foregoing allegations are false,
immaterial to the foreclosure case and maliciously designed to
defame him. He charged that in making such allegations,
respondent is guilty of breaking their confidential lawyer-client
relationship and should be held administratively liable.
Silapan insisted that there was nothing libelous in his
imputations of dishonest business practices to complainant and
his revelation of complainants desire to bribe government
officials in relation to his pending criminal case. He claimed to
have made these statements in the course of judicial
proceedings to defend his case and discredit complainants
credibility by establishing his criminal propensity to commit
fraud, tell lies and violate laws. He argued that he is not guilty
of breaking his confidential lawyer-client relationship with
complainant as he made the disclosure in defense of his honor
and reputation.
Issue:
Whether respondent committed a breach of trust and confidence
by imputing to complainant illegal practices and disclosing
complainants alleged intention to bribe government officials in
connection with a pending case.
Ruling:
There is none. The attorney-client privilege does not attach,
there being no professional employment in the strict sense.
Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides
that a lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and shall be
mindful of the trust and confidence reposed on him. The long-
established rule is that an attorney is not permitted to disclose
communications made to him in his professional character by a
client, unless the latter consents. This obligation to preserve the
confidences and secrets of a client arises at the inception of their
relationship. The protection given to the client is perpetual and
does not cease with the termination of the litigation, nor is it
affected by the partys ceasing to employ the attorney and
retaining another, or by any other change of relation between
them. It even survives the death of the client.
HOWEVER, the privilege against disclosure of confidential
communications or information is limited only to
communications which are legitimately and properly within
the scope of a lawful employment of a lawyer. It does not extend
to those made in contemplation of a crime or perpetration of a
fraud. If the unlawful purpose is avowed, as in this case, the
complainants alleged intention to bribe government officials in
relation to his case, the communication is not covered by the
privilege as the client does not consult the lawyer
professionally. It is not within the profession of a lawyer to
advise a client as to how he may commit a crime as a lawyer is
not a gun for hire.
ADM. CASE No. 4426 February 17, 2000
RAMON SAURA, JR vs. ATTY. LALAINE LILIBETH
AGDEPPA
ADM. CASE No. 4429 February 17, 2000
HELEN BALDORIA and RAYMUNDO SAURA vs.
ATTY. LALAINE LILIBETH AGDEPPA
Negotiations for the settlement of the property (referring to the
intestate estate of Ramon E. Saura) dragged on far three (3)
years until on April 27, 1995, Saura and Baldoria learned that
the administrators of the property, Macrina, Romeo and
Amelita, had, with the assistance of Atty. Agdepa, who in fact
notarized the Deed of Sale, sold the property to Sandalwood
Real Estate and Development Corporation without the
knowledge and participation of petitioners. To compound
matters, petitioners alleged that despite repeated demands, the
vendors or their counsel, Atty. Agdeppa, have refused to
disclose the amount of the sale or account for the proceeds. The
petitioners have thus been constrained to institute criminal and
civil actions to enforce and protect their rights.
Atty. Agdeppa argued that the amount of the sale or account for
the proceeds is covered by privileged communication.
Issue:
Whether or not the amount of the sale or account for the
proceeds is covered by privileged communication.
Ruling:
The request for the information regarding the sale of the
property and to account for the proceeds is not a violation of the
attorney-client privilege. Rule 130, Section 24 (b) of the Rules
of Court provides:
Sec. 24. Disqualification by reason of privileged
communication. The following persons cannot testify as to
matters learned in confidence in the following cases:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) An attorney cannot, without the consent of his client,
be examined as to any communication made by the client to
him, or his advice given thereon in the course of, or with a view
to, professional employment, nor can an attorney's secretary,
stenographer, or clerk be examined, without the consent of the
client and his employer, concerning any fact the knowledge of
which has been acquired in such capacity.
The information requested by petitioners is not privileged. The
petitioners are only asking for the disclosure of the amount of
the sale or account for the proceeds. Petitioners certainly have
the right to ask for such information since they own the property
as co-heirs of the late Ramon E. Saura and as co-administrators
of the property. Hence, respondent cannot refuse to divulge
such information to them and hide behind the cloak of the
attorney-client relationship.
By Cid Benedict D. Pabalan 10
 EN BANC
[A.C. No. 2597. March 12, 1998]
GLORITO V. MATURAN vs. ATTY. CONRADO S.
GONZALES
Spouses Casquejo instituted their son-in-law, Glorito V.
Maturan (herein petitioner), as their attorney-in-fact, through a
Special Power of Attorney (SPA). Said SPA authorized
Maturan to file ejectment cases against squatters occupying Lot
1350-A, Psd-50375, located in General Santos City, as well as
criminal cases against the latter for violation of P.D. 772, again
in connection with said lot. Respondent, Atty. Conrado
Gonzales, prepared and notarized said Special Power of
Attorney.
Eventually, judgment was rendered in favor of Casquejo in the
ejectment cases. As the counsel of Casquejo, Atty. Gonzales
filed a motion for issuance of a writ of execution.
While the motion for issuance of a writ of execution was
pending, and without withdrawing as counsel for petitioner,
respondent filed, on behalf of Celestino Yokingco, et al., an
action to annul the judgment rendered in the ejectment cases
adjudged in favor of Casquejo, also a client of Atty. Gonzales.
The action was predicated on the lack of authority on the part
of petitioner to represent Antonio and Gloria Casquejo, has no
such authorization. As stated above, it was also Atty. Gonzales
who prepared the very same SPA that he is now questioning, as
counsel of his clients adversary.
Aggrieved by respondents acceptance of professional
employment from their adversary, and alleging that privileged
matters relating to the land in question had been transmitted by
petitioner to respondent in the ejectment cases. (THE PRIV.
COMM. ISSUE WAS NOT ADDRESSED IN THE RULING)
Petitioner filed an administrative complaint against the former
for immoral, unethical, and anomalous acts and asked for his
disbarment.
Respondent argued that he was of the belief that filing a motion
for issuance of a writ of execution was the last and final act in
the lawyer-client relationship between himself and petitioner,
and that his formal withdrawal as counsel for the Casquejos was
unnecessary in order to sever the lawyer-client relationship
between them. Furthermore, he alleged that his acceptance of
employment from Yokingco was for him, an opportunity to
honestly earn a little more for his childrens sustenance.
Issue:
1.Whether or not there was a conflict of interests
2.Whether or not the filing of a writ of execution terminated the
Lawyer-Client relationship of Maturan and Atty. Gonzales
Ruling:
1.Yes. Atty. Gonzales guilty of representing conflicting
interests. It is improper for a lawyer to appear as counsel for one
party against the adverse party who is his client in a related suit,
as a lawyer is prohibited from representing conflicting interests
or discharging inconsistent duties. He may not, without being
guilty of professional misconduct, act as counsel for a
person whose interest conflicts with that of his present or
former client.That the representation of conflicting interest is in
good faith and with honest intention on the part of the lawyer
does not make the prohibition inoperative.
The reason for the prohibition is found in the relation of attorney
and client, which is one of trust and confidence of the highest
degree. A lawyer becomes familiar with all the facts connected
with his clients case. He learns from his client the weak points
of the action as well as the strong ones. Such knowledge must
be considered sacred and guarded with care. No opportunity
must be given him to take advantage of the clients secrets. A
lawyer must have the fullest confidence of his client. For if the
confidence is abused, the profession will suffer by the loss
thereof.
This Court finds respondents actuations violative of Canon 6 of
the Canons of Professional Ethics which provide in part: It is
unprofessional to represent conflicting interests, except by
express consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of
the facts. Within the meaning of this canon, a lawyer represents
conflicting interests when, in behalf of one client, it is his duty
to contend for that which duty to another client requires him to
oppose.
justification for his actions reveal a patent ignorance of the
fiduciary obligations which a lawyer owes to his client.
2. No. A lawyer-client relationship is not terminated by the
filing of a motion for a writ of execution. His acceptance of a
case implies that he will prosecute the case to its conclusion. He
may not be permitted to unilaterally terminate the same to the
prejudice of his client.
EN BANC
[G.R. Nos. 115439-41. July 16, 1997]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HONORABLE
SANDIGANBAYAN, MANSUETO V. HONRADA,
CEFERINO S. PAREDES, JR. and GENEROSO S.
SANSAET
During the dates material to this case, respondent Honrada was
the Clerk of Court and Acting Stenographer of the First
Municipal Circuit Trial Court, San Francisco-Bunawan-
Rosario in Agusan del Sur.
Respondent Paredes was successively the Provincial Attorney
of Agusan del Sur, then Governor of the same province, and is
at present a Congressman.
Respondent Sansaet was a practicing attorney who served as
counsel for Paredes in several instances pertinent to the criminal
charges involved in the present recourse.
Eventually a case was filed by a certain A criminal case was
subsequently filed with the Sandiganbayan charging respondent
Paredes with a violation of Section 3(a) of Republic Act No.
3019, as amended. However, a motion to quash filed by the
defense was later granted in respondent courts resolution of
By Cid Benedict D. Pabalan 11
August 1, 1991[11] and the case was dismissed on the ground
of prescription.
On January 23, 1990, one Teofilo Gelacio, a taxpayer who had
initiated the perjury and graft charges against respondent
Paredes, sent a letter to the Ombudsman seeking the
investigation of the three respondents herein for falsification of
public documents. He claimed that respondent Honrada, in
conspiracy with his herein co-respondents, simulated and
certified as true copies certain documents purporting to be a
notice of arraignment, dated July 1, 1985, and transcripts of
stenographic notes supposedly taken during the arraignment of
Paredes on the perjury charge. These falsified documents were
annexed to respondent Paredes motion for reconsideration of
the Tanodbayan resolution for the filing of a graft charge
against him, in order to support his contention that the same
would constitute double jeopardy.
It was during this time that despite being Paredes counsel, Atty.
Sansaet suddenly changed tune after being impleaded along
with Paredes and Honrada in the perjury and graft cases.
Sansaet revealed that Paredes contrived to have the graft case
under preliminary investigation dismissed on the ground of
double jeopardy by making it that the perjury case had been
dismissed by the trial court after he had been arraigned therein.
For that purpose, the documents which were later filed by
respondent Sansaet in the preliminary investigation were
prepared and falsified by his co-respondents in this case in the
house of respondent Paredes. To evade responsibility for his
own participation in the scheme, he claimed that he did so upon
the instigation and inducement of respondent Paredes.
This was intended to pave the way for his discharge as a
government/state witness in the consolidated cases, as in fact a
motion therefor was filed by the prosecution pursuant to their
agreement.
Issues:
1.Whether or not the projected testimony of respondent Sansaet,
as proposed state witness, is barred by the attorney-client
privilege; and
2.Whether or not, as a consequence thereof, he is eligible for
discharge to testify as a particeps criminis.
Ruling:
1.No. The attorney-client privilege cannot apply in these cases,
as the facts thereof and the actuations of both respondents
therein constitute an exception to the rule.
1. It may correctly be assumed that there was a confidential
communication made by Paredes to Sansaet in connection with
Criminal Cases Nos. 17791-93 for falsification before
respondent court, and this may reasonably be expected since
Paredes was the accused and Sansaet his counsel therein.
Indeed, the fact that Sansaet was called to witness the
preparation of the falsified documents by Paredes and Honrada
was as eloquent a communication, if not more, than verbal
statements being made to him by Paredes as to the fact and
purpose of such falsification. It is significant that the
evidentiary rule on this point has always referred to any
communication, without distinction or qualification.
In the American jurisdiction from which our present evidential
rule was taken, there is no particular mode by which a
confidential communication shall be made by a client to his
attorney. The privilege is not confined to verbal or written
communications made by the client to his attorney but extends
as well to information communicated by the client to the
attorney by other means.
Nor can it be pretended that during the entire process,
considering their past and existing relations as counsel and
client and, further, in view of the purpose for which such
falsified documents were prepared, no word at all passed
between Paredes and Sansaet on the subject matter of that
criminal act. The clincher for this conclusion is the undisputed
fact that said documents were thereafter filed by Sansaet in
behalf of Paredes as annexes to the motion for reconsideration
in the preliminary investigation of the graft case before the
Tanodbayan. Also, the acts and words of the parties during the
period when the documents were being falsified were
necessarily confidential since Paredes would not have invited
Sansaet to his house and allowed him to witness the same except
under conditions of secrecy and confidence.
2. It is postulated that despite such complicity of Sansaet at the
instance of Paredes in the criminal act for which the latter stands
charged, a distinction must be made between confidential
communications relating to past crimes already committed, and
future crimes intended to be committed, by the client.
Corollarily, it is admitted that the announced intention of a
client to commit a crime is not included within the confidences
which his attorney is bound to respect. Respondent court
appears, however, to believe that in the instant case it is dealing
with a past crime, and that respondent Sansaet is set to testify
on alleged criminal acts of respondents Paredes and Honrada
that have already been committed and consummated.
The Court reprobates the last assumption which is flawed by a
somewhat inaccurate basis. It is true that by now, insofar as the
falsifications to be testified to in respondent court are
concerned, those crimes were necessarily committed in the past.
But for the application of the attorney-client privilege,
however, the period to be considered is the date when the
privileged communication was made by the client to the
attorney in relation to either a crime committed in the past
or with respect to a crime intended to be committed in the
future. In other words, if the client seeks his lawyers advice
with respect to a crime that the former has theretofore
committed, he is given the protection of a virtual confessional
seal which the attorney-client privilege declares cannot be
broken by the attorney without the clients consent. The same
privileged confidentiality, however, does not attach with regard
By Cid Benedict D. Pabalan 12
to a crime which a client intends to commit thereafter or in the
future and for purposes of which he seeks the lawyers advice.
Statements and communications regarding the commission of a
crime already committed, made by a party who committed it, to
an attorney, consulted as such, are privileged communications.
Contrarily, the unbroken stream of judicial dicta is to the effect
that communications between attorney and client having to do
with the clients contemplated criminal acts, or in aid or
furtherance thereof, are not covered by the cloak of privileges
ordinarily existing in reference to communications between
attorney and client.
3. In the present cases, the testimony sought to be elicited from
Sansaet as state witness are the communications made to him
by physical acts and/or accompanying words of Paredes at the
time he and Honrada, either with the active or passive
participation of Sansaet, were about to falsify, or in the process
of falsifying, the documents which were later filed in the
Tanodbayan by Sansaet and culminated in the criminal charges
now pending in respondent Sandiganbayan. Clearly, therefore,
the confidential communications thus made by Paredes to
Sansaet were for purposes of and in reference to the crime of
falsification which had not yet been committed in the past by
Paredes but which he, in confederacy with his present co-
respondents, later committed. Having been made for purposes
of a future offense, those communications are outside the pale
of the attorney-client privilege.
4. Furthermore, Sansaet was himself a conspirator in the
commission of that crime of falsification which he, Paredes and
Honrada concocted and foisted upon the authorities. It is well
settled that in order that a communication between a lawyer and
his client may be privileged, it must be for a lawful purpose or
in furtherance of a lawful end. The existence of an unlawful
purpose prevents the privilege from attaching. In fact, it has also
been pointed out to the Court that the prosecution of the
honorable relation of attorney and client will not be permitted
under the guise of privilege, and every communication made to
an attorney by a client for a criminal purpose is a conspiracy or
attempt at a conspiracy which is not only lawful to divulge, but
which the attorney under certain circumstances may be bound
to disclose at once in the interest of justice.
It is evident, therefore, that it was error for respondent
Sandiganbayan to insist that such unlawful communications
intended for an illegal purpose contrived by conspirators are
nonetheless covered by the so-called mantle of privilege. To
prevent a conniving counsel from revealing the genesis of a
crime which was later committed pursuant to a conspiracy,
because of the objection thereto of his conspiring client, would
be one of the worst travesties in the rules of evidence and
practice in the noble profession of law.
4. Rule on Multiplicity of Suits and Forum
Shopping
CANON 10 - A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS
AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT.
CANON 12 - A LAWYER SHALL EXERT EVERY EFFORT
AND CONSIDER IT HIS DUTY TO ASSIST IN THE
SPEEDY AND EFFICIENT ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE.
Rule 12.02 - A lawyer shall not file multiple actions arising
from the same cause.
Rule 12.04 - A lawyer shall not unduly delay a case, impede the
execution of a judgment or misuse Court processes.
A.C. No. 4058. March 12, 1998
BENGUET ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE,
INC. vs. ATTY. ERNESTO B. FLORES
After the Supreme Court rendered its decision in Benguet
Electric Cooperative, Inc. vs. National Labor Relations
Commission, et al. and upon motion of BENECO, Labor
Arbiter Irenarco R. Rimando issued a writ of execution ordering
the clerk of court and ex officio city sheriff of the Municipal
Trial Court of Baguio City to levy on and sell at public auction
personal and real property of the members of the Board of
Directors of BENECO.
On March 18, 1993, Respondent Flores, acting as counsel for
BENECO Board Members Victor Laoyan, Nicasio Aliping,
Lorenzo Pilando and Abundio Awal, filed with the RTC an
injunction suit praying for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order (TRO) to preserve the status quo as now
obtaining between the parties, as well as a writ of preliminary
preventive injunction ordering the clerk of court and the ex
officio city sheriff of the MTC of Baguio to cease and desist
from enforcing by execution and levy the writ of execution from
the NLRC-CAR, pending resolution of the main action raised
in court.
When this injunction case was dismissed, Respondent Flores
filed with another branch of the RTC two identical but separate
actions both entitled Judicial Declaration of Family Home
Constituted (Constitution of Family Home), ope lege, Exempt
from Levy and Execution; with Damages, etc. The said
complaints were supplemented by an Urgent Motion Ex Parte
which prayed for an order to temporarily restrain Sheriff
Wilfredo V. Mendez from proceeding with the auction sale of
plaintiffs property to avoid rendering ineffectual and functus
[officio] any judgment of the court later in these cases, until
further determined by the court.
Issue:
Whether or not there is forum-shopping
By Cid Benedict D. Pabalan 13
Ruling:
Yes. The suits for the constitution of a family home were not
only frivolous and unnecessary; they were clearly asking for
reliefs identical to the prayer previously dismissed by another
branch of the RTC, i.e., to forestall the execution of a final
judgment of the labor arbiter. That they were filed ostensibly
for the judicial declaration of a family home was a mere smoke
screen; in essence, their real objective was to restrain or delay
the enforcement of the writ of execution. In his deliberate
attempt to obtain the same relief in two different courts,
Respondent Flores was obviously shopping for a friendly forum
which would capitulate to his improvident plea for an injunction
and was thereby trifling with the judicial process.
Forum Shopping:
Forum shopping exists when, as a result of an adverse opinion
in one forum, a party seeks a favorable opinion (other than by
appeal or certiorari) in another, or when he institutes two or
more actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause, on
the gamble that one or the other court would make a favorable
disposition.
The most important factor in determining the existence of
forum shopping is the vexation caused the courts and parties-
litigants by a party who asks different courts to rule on the same
or related causes or grant the same or substantially the same
reliefs.
Revised Circular No. 28-91 and Administrative Circular No.
04-94 provides for the penalties when forum shopping is
committed:
Penalties:
(a) Any violation of this Circular shall be a cause for the
summary dismissal of the multiple petition or complaint.
(b) Any willful and deliberate forum shopping by any party
and his lawyer wit the filing of multiple petitions and
complaints to ensure favorable action shall constitute
direct contempt of court.
(c) The submission of false certification under Par. 2 of the
Circular shall likewise constitute contempt of Court, without
prejudice to the filing of criminal action against the guilty
party. The lawyer may also be subjected to disciplinary
proceedings.
G.R. No. 75349 October 13, 1986
BUAN and others, Quiapo Church Vendors, for
themselves and all others similarly situated as themselves
vs.
OFFICER-IN-CHARGE GEMILIANO C. LOPEZ, JR.,
OFFICE OF THE MAYOR OF MANILA
FIRST CASE FILED:
On July 7, 1986 there was filed in the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, docketed as Civil Case No. 86-36563, a special civil
action of "prohibition with preliminary injunction" against
Acting Manila City Mayor Gemiliano Lopez, Jr.
It was filed by Samahang Kapatiran Sa Hanapbuhay Ng
Bagong Lipunan, Inc." (hereafter, simply "Samahan")
composed, according to the petition, of "some 300 individual
owners and operators of separate business stalls ... mostly at
the periphery immediately beyond the fence of the Quiapo
Church." The president of the Samahan is Rosalina Buan and
its Press Relations Officer, Liza Ocampo.
SECOND CASE FILED:
On August 5, 1986 petitioners instituted in the Supreme Court
a special civil action for prohibition to the end that respondent
Gemiliano C. Lopez, Jr., acting as Mayor of the City of Manila,
be "perpetually prohibited from arbitrarily, whimsically and
capriciously revoking or cancelling ... their licenses or permits
(as hawkers or street vendors) and threatening the physical
demolition of their respective business stalls in the places
specified in such licenses or permits
It has to be noted that Rosalina Buan and Liza Ocampo are two
of the five petitioners in the RTC case and thise described in
the petition before the Supreme Court as suing "for themselves
and all others similarly situated as themselves": i.e., vendors
"around the Quiapo Church." The three other petitioners also
appear to be Samahan members.
Issue:
Is there forum shopping?
Ruling:
Yes. There thus exists between the action before the Supreme
Court and RTC Case No. 86-36563 Identity of parties, or at
least such parties as represent the same interests in both
actions, as well as Identity of rights asserted and relief prayed
for, the relief being founded on the same facts, and the Identity
on the two preceding particulars is such that any judgment
rendered in the other action, will regardless of which party is
successful, amount to res adjudicata in the action under
consideration: all the requisites, in fine, of auter action
pendant.
TERM:
Auter Action Pendant = Lis Pendens
By Cid Benedict D. Pabalan 14
 EN BANC
G.R. No. 130068October 1, 1998
FAR EASTERN SHIPPING COMPANY vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PHILIPPINE PORTS
AUTHORITY
G.R. No. 130150October, 1998
MANILA PILOTS ASSOCIATION (MPA) vs.
PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY and FAR EASTERN
SHIPPING COMPANY (FESC),
MPA's filed a petition in G.R. No. 130150 was posted by
registered mail on August 29, 1997.
FESC also filed a petition in G.R. 130068 on September 26,
1997. In this petition, FESC attached a CNFS*
However, despite FESCs knowledge if the petition filed by
MPA, FESC did not update the Court of such fact in
accordance with the rules where it is required that should a
party thereafter learn that a similar action or proceeding has
been filed or is pending before the Supreme Court, the Court
of Appeals or any other tribunal or agency, the party must
report the fact within five (5) days therefrom to the court
immediate court.
Issue:
Is there a violation on the rule against forum shopping?
Ruling:
Yes. Section 4(e), Rule 45 specifically requires that a petition
such as in the case at bar shall contain a sworn certification
against forum shopping as provided in the last paragraph of
Section 2, Rule 42. It is also required that should a party
thereafter learn that a similar action or proceeding has been
filed or is pending before the Supreme Court, the Court of
Appeals or any other tribunal or agency, the party must report
the fact within five (5) days therefrom to the court immediate
court.
Note:
A certification against forum shopping ordained under the
Rules is to be executed by the petitioner, and not by counsel.
Obviously it is the petitioner, and not always the counsel
whose professional services have been retained for a particular
case, who is in the best position to know whether he or it
actually filed or caused the filing of a petition in that case.
Hence, a certification against forum shopping by counsel is a
defective certification. It is clearly equivalent to non-
compliance with the requirement under Section 2, Rule 42 in
relation to Section 4, Rule 45, and constitutes a valid cause for
dismissal of the petition.
5. Sub-Judice Rule
Sub Judice Rule
The sub judice rule restricts comments and disclosures
pertaining to judicial proceedings to avoid prejudging the issue,
influencing the court, or obstructing the administration of
justice.
Anyone violating the sub judice rule can be cited for indirect
contempt of court under Section 3(d), Rule 71 of the Rules of
Court.
The restriction applies not only to participants in the pending
case, i.e., to members of the bar and bench, and to litigants and
witnesses, but also to the public in general, which necessarily
includes the media. Although the Rules of Court does not
contain a specific provision imposing the sub judice rule, it
supports the observance of the restriction by punishing its
violation as indirect contempt under Section 3(d) of Rule 71:
Section 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and
hearing. x x x a person guilty of any of the following acts may
be punished for indirect contempt:
xxxx
(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to
impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice[.]
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-30894 March 25, 1970
MARTELINO vs. ALEJANDRO
This case involves a court-martial proceeding.
This is a case against Major Eduardo Martelino, alias Abdul
Latif Martelino, of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and the
officers and men under him, for violation of the 94th and 97th
Articles of War, as a result of the alleged shooting on March 18,
1968 of some Muslim recruits then undergoing commando
training on the island of Corregidor.
At the hearing on August 12, 1969 the petitioner Martelino
sought the disqualification of the President of the general court-
martial, following the latter's admission that he read newspaper
stories of the Corregidor incident. The petitioner contended that
the case had received such an amount of publicity in the press
and other news media and in fact was being exploited for
political purposes in connection with the presidential election
on November 11, 1969 as to imperil his right to a fair trial. After
deliberating, the military court denied the challenge. However,
there was a suspension of the proceedings.
Issue;
Whether or not the court-martial failed to protect the accused
from prejudicial publicity
Ruling:
By Cid Benedict D. Pabalan 15
No. Absent here is a showing of failure of the court-martial to
protect the accused from massive publicity encouraged by those
connected with the conduct of the trial either by a failure to
control the release of information or to remove the trial to
another venue or to postpone it until the deluge of prejudicial
publicity shall have subsided. Indeed we cannot say that the trial
of the petitioners was being held under circumstances which did
not permit the observance of those imperative decencies of
procedure which have come to be identified with due process.
At all events, even granting the existence of "massive" and
"prejudicial" publicity, since the petitioners here do not contend
that the respondents have been unduly influenced but simply
that they might be by the "barrage" of publicity, we think that
the suspension of the court-martial proceedings has
accomplished the purpose sought by the petitioners' challenge
for cause, by postponing the trial of the petitioner until calmer
times have returned. The atmosphere has since been cleared and
the publicity surrounding the Corregidor incident has so far
abated that we believe the trial may now be resumed in
tranquility.
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-12871 July 25, 1959
TIMOTEO V. CRUZ vs. FRANCISCO G. H. SALVA
This case involved the killing of Manuel Monroy in 1953. A
number of persons were accused as involved and implicated in
said crime.
The respondent here, Fiscal Salva was tasked to conduct a
reinvestigation of the case. As part of such investigation, Fiscal
Salva called upon Timoteo Cruz to appear and testify before
him at the scheduled preliminary investigation.
The investigation was conducted not in respondent's office but
in the session hall of the Municipal Court of Pasay City
evidently, to accommodate the big crowd that wanted to witness
the proceeding, including members of the press. A number of
microphones were installed. Reporters were everywhere and
photographers were busy taking pictures. In other words,
apparently with the permission of, if not the encouragement by
the respondent, news photographers and newsmen had a filed
day. Not only this, but in the course of the investigation, as
shown by the transcript of the stenographic notes taken during
said investigation, on two occasions, the first, after Oscar
Caymo had concluded his testimony respondent Salva,
addressing the newspapermen said, "Gentlemen of the press, if
you want to ask questions I am willing to let you do so and the
question asked will be reproduced as my own"; and the second,
after Jose Maratella y de Guzman had finished testifying and
respondent Salva, addressing the newsmen, again said,
"Gentlemen of the press is free to ask questions as ours."
The newspapers certainly played up and gave wide publicity to
what took place during the investigation, and this involved
headlines and extensive recitals, narrations of and comments on
the testimonies given by the witnesses as well as vivid
descriptions of the incidents that took place during the
investigation. It seemed as though the criminal responsibility
for the killing of Manuel Monroy which had already been tried
and finally determined by the lower court and which was under
appeal and advisement by this Tribunal, was being retried and
redetermined in the press, and all with the apparent place and
complaisance of respondent.
Issue:
Whether or not there was undue publicity to the prejudice of the
alleged offenders?
Yes. It seemed as though the criminal responsibility for the
killing of Manuel Monroy which had already been tried and
finally determined by the lower court and which was under
appeal and advisement by this Tribunal, was being retried and
redetermined in the press, and all with the apparent place and
complaisance of respondent.
Salva committed what was regard a grievous error and poor
judgment for which we fail to find any excuse or satisfactory
explanation. His actuations in this regard went well beyond the
bounds of prudence, discretion and good taste. It is bad enough
to have such undue publicity when a criminal case is being
investigated by the authorities, even when it being tried in court;
but when said publicity and sensationalism is allowed, even
encouraged, when the case is on appeal and is pending
consideration by this Tribunal, the whole thing becomes
inexcusable, even abhorrent, and this Court, in the interest of
justice, is constrained and called upon to put an end to it and a
deterrent against its repetition by meting an appropriate
disciplinary measure, even a penalty to the one liable.
EN BANC
October 9, 2007
RE : SUSPENSION OF ATTY. ROGELIO Z.
BAGABUYO, FORMER SENIOR STATE
PROSECUTOR (ADM No. 7006)
This administrative case stemmed from the events of the
criminal case proceeding originally raffled to the sala of Judge
Floripinas C. Buyser.
Judge Buyser denied the Demurrer to the Evidence of the
accused, declaring that the evidence thus presented by the
prosecution was sufficient to prove the crime of homicide and
not the charge of murder.
The counsel of the defense filed a Motion to fix the amount of
Bail Bond. Respondent Atty. Bagabuyo, then Senior state
Prosecutor and the deputized prosecutor of the case, objected
thereto mainly on the ground that the original charge of murder,
punishable with reclusion perpetua, was not subject of bail
under the Rules of Court.
Judge Buser inhibited himself from further trying the case
because of the harsh insinuation of Senior Prosecutor Rogelio
Bagabuyo that he lacks the cold neutrality of an impartial
magistrate, by allegedly suggesting the filing of the motion to
fix the amount of bail bond by counsel for the accused.
Respondent appealed to the CA. Instead of availing himself
only of judicial remedies, respondent caused the publication of
an article regarding the Order granting to the accused in the
By Cid Benedict D. Pabalan 16
issue of the Mindanao Gold Star Daily. The article, entitled
Senior prosecutor lambast Surigao judge for allowing murder
suspect to bail out.
The RTC of Surigao City directed respondent and the writer of
the article to appear in court to explain why they should not be
cited for indirect contempt of court for the publication of the
article which degrade the court and its presiding judge with its
lies and misrepresentation.
Respondent admitted that he caused the holding of the press
conference, but refused to answer whether he made the
statement in the article until after he shall have filed a motion
to dismiss. For his refusal to answer, the trial court declared
him in contempt of court pursuant to the Rules of Court.
Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Bagabuyo violated the Canons and the
Lawyers Oath
Ruling:
Atty. Rogelio Z. Bagabuyo is found guilty of violating Rule
11.05, Canon 11 and Rule 13.02, Canon 13 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, and of violating the Lawyers Oath.
Lawyers are licensed officers of the courts who are empowered
to appear, prosecute and defend; and upon whom peculiar
duties, responsibilities and liabilities are devolved by law as a
consequence. Membership in the bar imposes upon them certain
obligations. Canon 11 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility mandates a lawyer to observe and maintain the
respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and [he] should
insist on similar conduct by others. Rule 11.05 of Canon 11
states that a lawyer shall submit grievances against a judge to
the proper authorities only.
Respondent violated Rule 11.05 of Canon 11 when he
admittedly caused the holding of a press conference where he
made statements against the Order dated November 12, 2002
allowing the accused in Crim. Case No. 5144 to be released on
bail.
Respondent also violated Canon 11 when he indirectly stated
that Judge Tan was displaying judicial arrogance in the article
entitled, Senior prosecutor lambasts Surigao judge for allowing
murder suspect to bail out, which appeared in the August 18,
2003 issue of the Mindanao Gold Star Daily. Respondents
statements in the article, which were made while Crim. Case
No. 5144 was still pending in court, also violated Rule 13.02 of
Canon 13, which states that a lawyer shall not make public
statements in the media regarding a pending case tending to
arouse public opinion for or against a party.
In regard to the radio interview given to Tony Consing,
respondent violated Rule 11.05 of Canon 11 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility for not resorting to the proper
authorities only for redress of his grievances against Judge Tan.
Respondent also violated Canon 11 for his disrespect of the
court and its officer when he stated that Judge Tan was ignorant
of the law, that as a mahjong aficionado, he was studying
mahjong instead of studying the law, and that he was a liar.
Respondent also violated the Lawyers Oath, as he has sworn to
conduct [himself] as a lawyer according to the best of [his]
knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the
courts as to [his] clients.
As a senior state prosecutor and officer of the court, respondent
should have set the example of observing and maintaining the
respect due to the courts and to judicial officers. Montecillo v.
Gica held:
It is the duty of the lawyer to maintain towards the
courts a respectful attitude. As an officer of the court,
it is his duty to uphold the dignity and authority of
the court to which he owes fidelity, according to the
oath he has taken. Respect for the courts guarantees
the stability of our democratic institutions which,
without such respect, would be resting on a very
shaky foundation.
5.Financial Accountability
Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral, or deceitful conduct.
Rule 16.01 A lawyer shall account for all money or
property collected or received for or from the client.
Rule 16.02 A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client
separate and apart from his own and those others kept by
him.
EN BANC
A.C. No. 6288 June 16, 2006
RONQUILLO et.al vs. ATTY. HOMOBONO T. CEZAR
Atty. Cezar entered into a contract with complainant Marili
Ronquillo, an OFW, representing to have the rights to transfer
title over a townhouse unit and lot.
For the price of P1.5M, respondent transferred, in favor of the
complainants, his rights and interests over a townhouse unit and
lot, located at 75 Granwood Villas Subd., BF Homes, Quezon
City. Respondent also obligated himself to deliver to
complainants a copy of the Contract to Sell he executed with
Crown Asia, the townhouse developer, dated April 19, 1996.
Upon full payment of the purchase price, respondent further
undertook to have Crown Asia execute a Deed of Absolute Sale
over the property in favor of the complainants.
In the main, Atty. Cezar failed in his obligation and refused to
return the payments made by Ronquillo.
Issue:
Whether ot not Atty. Cezar violated the Code of Professional
Respnsibility?
By Cid Benedict D. Pabalan 17
Ruling:
Yes. The respondent engaged in unlawful, dishonest, immoral
or deceitful conduct. He violated his oath under Rule 1.01,
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and he
ought to be disbarred or suspended from the practice of law.
Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
provides that "A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct." "Conduct," as used in this rule,
does not refer exclusively to the performance of a lawyers
professional duties. This Court has made clear in a long line of
cases7 that a lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for
misconduct, whether in his professional or private capacity,
which shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty,
probity and good demeanor, or unworthy to continue as an
officer of the court.
In the instant case, respondent may have acted in his private
capacity when he entered into a contract with complainant
Marili representing to have the rights to transfer title over the
townhouse unit and lot in question. When he failed in his
undertaking, respondent fell short of his duty under Rule 1.01,
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. It cannot
be gainsaid that it was unlawful for respondent to transfer
property over which one has no legal right of ownership.
Respondent was likewise guilty of dishonest and deceitful
conduct when he concealed this lack of right from
complainants. He did not inform the complainants that he has
not yet paid in full the price of the subject townhouse unit and
lot, and, therefore, he had no right to sell, transfer or assign said
property at the time of the execution of the Deed of Assignment.
His acceptance of the bulk of the purchase price amounting to
Nine Hundred Thirty-Seven Thousand Five Hundred Pesos
(P937,500.00), despite knowing he was not entitled to it, made
matters worse for him.
EN BANC (Per Curiam)
A.C. No. 7815 July 23, 2009
DOLORES C. BELLEZA vs. ATTY. ALAN S. MACASA
Dolores Belleza to avail of Atty. Macasas legal services in
connection with the case of her son, Francis John Belleza, who
was arrested by policemen of Bacolod City earlier that day for
alleged violation of Republic Act (RA) 9165.1 Respondent
agreed to handle the case for P30,000.
The following day, Belleza made a partial payment of P15,000
to Atty. Macasa thru their mutual friend Chua. On November
17, 2004, she gave him an additional P10,000. She paid the
P5,000 balance on November 18, 2004. Both payments were
also made thru Chua. On all three occasions, respondent did not
issue any receipt.
On November 21, 2004, respondent received P18,000 from
complainant for the purpose of posting a bond to secure the
provisional liberty of her (complainants) son. Again,
respondent did not issue any receipt. When complainant went
to the court the next day, she found out that respondent did not
remit the amount to the court.
Complainant demanded the return of the P18,000 from
respondent on several occasions but respondent ignored her.
Moreover, respondent failed to act on the case of complainants
son and complainant was forced to avail of the services of the
Public Attorneys Office for her sons defense.
Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Macasa violated the Code/Canons
Ruling:
Yes. Atty. Macasa is guilty of violation of Rule 1.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility which provides:
Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral, or deceitful conduct.
He is also guilty of violation of Rules 16.01 and 16.02 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility:
Rule 16.01 A lawyer shall account for all money or property
collected or received for or from the client.
Rule 16.02 A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client
separate and apart from his own and those others kept by him.
The fiduciary nature of the relationship between counsel and
client imposes on a lawyer the duty to account for the money or
property collected or received for or from the client.25
When a lawyer collects or receives money from his client for a
particular purpose (such as for filing fees, registration fees,
transportation and office expenses), he should promptly account
to the client how the money was spent. If he does not use the
money for its intended purpose, he must immediately return it
to the client.26 His failure either to render an accounting or to
return the money (if the intended purpose of the money does not
materialize) constitutes a blatant disregard of Rule 16.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility.27
Moreover, a lawyer has the duty to deliver his clients funds or
properties as they fall due or upon demand.28 His failure to
return the clients money upon demand gives rise to the
presumption that he has misappropriated it for his own use to
the prejudice of and in violation of the trust reposed in him by
the client.29 It is a gross violation of general morality as well
as of professional ethics; it impairs public confidence in the
legal profession and deserves punishment.30 Indeed, it may
border on the criminal as it may constitute a prima facie case of
swindling or estafa.
Respondent never denied receiving P18,000 from complainant
for the purpose of posting a bond to secure the provisional
liberty of her son. He never used the money for its intended
purpose yet also never returned it to the client. Worse, he
unjustifiably refused to turn over the amount to complainant
despite the latters repeated demands.
By Cid Benedict D. Pabalan 18
Moreover, respondent rendered no service that would have
entitled him to the P30,000 attorneys fees. As a rule, the right
of a lawyer to a reasonable compensation for his services is
subject to two requisites: (1) the existence of an attorney-client
relationship and (2) the rendition by the lawyer of services to
the client.31 Thus, a lawyer who does not render legal services
is not entitled to attorneys fees. Otherwise, not only would he
be unjustly enriched at the expense of the client, he would also
be rewarded for his negligence and irresponsibility.
RULE 139-B
Disbarment and Discipline of Attorneys
Section 1. How Instituted. - Proceedings for the disbarment,
suspension, or discipline of attorneys may be taken by the
Supreme Court motu propio, or upon the filing of a verified
complaint of any person before the Supreme Court or the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). The complaint shall
state clearly and concisely the facts complained of and shall be
supported by affidavits of persons having personal knowledge
of the facts therein alleged and/or by such documents as may
substantiate said facts.
The IBP shall forward to the Supreme Court for appropriate
disposition all complaints for disbarment, suspension and
discipline filed against incumbent Justices of the Court of
Appeals, Sandiganbayan, Court of Tax Appeals and judges of
lower courts, or against lawyers in the government service,
whether or not they are charged singly or jointly with other
respondents, and whether or not such complaint deals with acts
unrelated to the discharge of their official functions. If the
complaint is filed before the IBP, six ( 6) copies of the verified
complaint shall be filed with the Secretary of the IBP or the
Secretary of any of its chapter who shall forthwith transmit the
same to the IBP Board of Governors for assignment to an
investigator.
A. PROCEEDINGS IN THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE
PHILIPPINES
Section 2. National Grievance Investigators. The Board of
Governors shall appoint from among IBP members an
Investigator or, when special circumstances so warrant, a panel
of three (3) investigators to investigate the complaint. All
Investigators shall take an oath of office in the form prescribed
by the Board of Governors. A copy of the Investigator's
appointment and oath shall be transmitted to the Supreme
Court.
An Investigator may be disqualified by reason of relationship
within the fourth degree of consanguinity of affinity to any of
the parties of their counsel, pecuniary interest, personal bias, or
his having acted as counsel to his acting as such Investigator.
Where the Investigator does not disqualify himself, a party may
appeal to the IBP Board of Governors, which by majority vote
of the members present, there being a quorum, may order his
disqualification.
Any Investigator may also be removed for cause, after due
hearing, by the vote of at least six (6) members of the IBP Board
of Governors. The decision of the Board of Governors in all
cases of disqualification or removal shall be final.
Section 3. Duties of the National Grievance Investigator.
The National Grievance Investigators shall investigate all
complaints against members of the Integrated Bar referred to
them by the IBP Board of Governors.
Section 4. Chapter assistance to complainant. The proper
IBP Chapter may assist the complainant(s) in the preparation
and filing of his complaint(s).
By Cid Benedict D. Pabalan 19

Section 5. Service or dismissal. - If the complaint appears to be
meritorious, the Investigator shall direct that a copy thereof be
served upon the respondent, requiring him to answer the same
within fifteen (15) days from the date of service.
If the complaint does not merit action, or if the answer shows to
the satisfaction of the Investigator that the complaint is not
meritorious, the Investigator will recommend to the Board of
Governors the dismissal of the complaint.
Thereafter, the procedure in Section 12 of this Rule shall apply.
No investigation shall be interrupted or terminated by reason of
the desistance, settlement, compromise, restitution, withdrawal
of the charges, or failure of the complainant to prosecute the
same, unless the Supreme Court motu propio or upon
recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors, determines
that there is no compelling reason to continue with the
disbarment or suspension proceedings against the respondent.
Section 6. Verification and service of answer. The answer
shall be verified. The original and five (5) legible copies of the
answer shall be filed with the Investigator, with proof of service
of a copy thereof on the complainant or his counsel.
Section 7. Administrative counsel. The IBP Board of
Governors shall appoint a suitable member of the Integrated Bar
as counsel to assist the complainant of the respondent during
the investigation in case of need for such assistance.
Section 8. Investigation. Upon joinder of issues or upon
failure of the respondent to answer, the Investigator shall, with
deliberate speed, proceed with the investigation of the case. He
shall have the power to issue subpoenas and administer oaths.
The respondent shall be given full opportunity to defend
himself, to present witnesses on his behalf, and be heard by
himself and counsel. However, if upon reasonable notice, the
respondent fails to appear, the investigation shall proceed ex
parte.
The Investigator shall terminate the investigation within three
(3) months from the date of its commencement, unless extended
for good cause by the Board of Governors upon prior
application.
Willful failure or refusal to obey a subpoena or any other lawful
order issued by the Investigator shall be dealt with as for
indirect contempt of court. The corresponding charge shall be
filed by the Investigator before the IBP Board of Governors
which shall require the alleged contemnor to show cause within
ten (10) days from notice. The IBP Board of Governors may
thereafter conduct hearings, if necessary, in accordance with the
procedure set forth in this Rule for hearings before the
Investigator. Such hearing shall as far as practicable be
terminated within fifteen (15) days from its commencement.
Thereafter, the IBP Board of Governors shall within a like
period of fifteen (15) days issue a resolution setting forth its
findings and recommendations, which shall forthwith be
transmitted to the Supreme Court for final action and if
warranted, the imposition of penalty.
Section 9. Depositions. Depositions may be taken in
accordance with the Rules of Court with leave of the
investigator(s).
Within the Philippines, depositions may be taken before any
member of the Board of Governors, the President of any
Chapter, or any officer authorized by law to administer oaths.
Depositions may be taken outside the Philippines before
diplomatic or consular representative of the Philippine
Government or before any person agreed upon by the parties or
designated by the Board of Governors.
Any suitable member of the Integrated Bar in the place where a
deposition shall be taken may be designated by the Investigator
to assist the complainant or the respondent in taking a
deposition.
Section 10. Report of Investigator. Not later than thirty (30)
days from the termination of the investigation, the Investigator
shall submit a report containing his findings of fact and
recommendations to the IBP Board of Governors, together with
the stenographic notes and the transcript thereof, and all the
evidence presented during the investigation. The submission of
the report need not await the transcription of the stenographic
notes, it being sufficient that the report reproduce substantially
from the Investigator's personal notes any relevant and pertinent
testimonies.
Section 11. Defects. No defect in a complaint, notice,
answer, or in the proceeding or the Investigator's Report shall
be considered as substantial unless the Board of Governors,
upon considering the whole record, finds that such defect has
resulted or may result in a miscarriage of justice, in which event
the Board shall take such remedial action as the circumstances
may warrant, including invalidation of the entire proceedings.
Section 12. Review and recommendation by the Board of
Governors.
a) Every case heard by an investigator shall be reviewed by the
IBP Board of Governors upon the record and evidence
transmitted to it by the Investigator with his report.
b) After its review, the Board, by the vote of a majority of its
total membership, shall recommend to the Supreme Court the
dismissal of the complaint or the imposition of disciplinary
action against the respondent.
The Board shall issue a resolution setting forth its findings and
recommendations, clearly and distinctly stating the facts and the
reasons on which it is based.
The resolution shall be issued within a period not exceeding
thirty (30) days from the next meeting of the Board following
the submission of the Investigator's report.
c) The Board's resolution, together with the entire records and
all evidence presented and submitted, shall be transmitted to the
Supreme Court for final action within ten (10) days from
issuance of the resolution.
d) Notice of the resolution of the Board shall be given to all
parties through their counsel, if any.
By Cid Benedict D. Pabalan 20
B. PROCEEDINGS IN THE SUPREME COURT ATTORNEYS". All cases pending investigation by the Office
of the Solicitor General shall be transferred to the Integrated Bar
Section 13. Investigation of complaints. - In proceedings of the Philippines Board of Governors for investigation and
initiated by the Supreme Court, or in other proceedings when disposition as provided in this Rule except those cases where
the interest of justice so requires, the Supreme Court may refer the investigation has been substantially completed
the case for investigation to the Office of the Bar Confidant, or
to any officer of the Supreme Court or judge of a lower court,
in which case the investigation shall proceed in the same
manner provided in sections 6 to 11 hereof, save that the review
of the report of investigation shall be conducted directly by the
Supreme Court.

The complaint may also be referred to the IBP for investigation,

report, and recommendation.

Section 14. Report of the Solicitor General of other Court-

designated Investigator. Based upon the evidence adduced
at the investigation, the Solicitor General or other Investigator
designated by the Supreme Court shall submit to the Supreme
Court a report containing his findings of fact and
recommendations for the final action of the Supreme Court.

C. COMMON PROVISIONS

Section 15. Suspension of attorney by Supreme Court. - After

receipt of respondent's answer or lapse of the period therefor,
the Supreme Court, motu propio, or upon the recommendation
of the IBP Board of Governors, may suspend an attorney from
the practice of his profession for any of the causes specified in
Rule 138, section 27, during the pendency of the investigation
until such suspension is lifted by the Supreme Court.

Section 16. Suspension of attorney by the Court of Appeals or

a Regional Trial Court. 1 The Court of Appeals or Regional
Trial Court may suspend an attorney from practice for any of
the causes named in Rule 138, Section 27 2, until further action
of the Supreme Court in the case.

Section 17. Upon suspension by Court of Appeals or Regional

Trial Court, further proceedings in Supreme Court. Upon
such suspension, the Court of Appeals or a Regional Trial Court
shall forthwith transmit to the Supreme Court a certified copy
of the order of suspension and a full statement of the facts upon
which the same was based. Upon receipt of such certified copy
and statement, the Supreme Court shall make a full
investigation of the case and may revoke, shorten or extend the
suspension, or disbar the attorney as the facts may warrant.

Section 18. Confidentiality. Proceedings against attorneys

shall be private and confidential. However, the final order of the
Supreme Court shall be published like its decisions in other
cases.

Section 19. Expenses. All reasonable and necessary

expenses incurred in relation to disciplinary and disbarment
proceedings are lawfull charges for which the parties may be
taxed as costs.

Section 20. Effectivity and Transitory Provision. This Rule

shall take effect June 1, 1988 and shall supersede the present
Rule 139 entitled "DISBARMENT OR SUSPENSION OF
By Cid Benedict D. Pabalan 21